clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

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In the interest of full disclosure, Triumfant had no direct interaction with the attack either directly on Triumfant
s own
endpoints or indirectly through a Triumfant customer. The analysis is based on detailed information collected through a
variety of publically available research performed by reliable sources that performed hands-on analysis of the attack.
Based on this research, Triumfant is fully confident that our software would have detected the attack and built a
remediation that would have restored the machine to its pre-attack condition.
The Operation Aurora attack falls squarely into one of the classes of attacks that Triumfant excels at detecting: targeted
attacks engineered to evade traditional network and endpoint protections. While the actual attack vector used was not
exceptionally sophisticated, the attack was created to have a digital signature that would not be detected by antivirus
tools. The attack also took steps to protect and obscure itself from detection once it infected a machine. The case study
steps through the process in four parts: initial detection, diagnosis, the assimilation of data about the attack into the
Triumfant knowledge base, and remediation of the affected machine.
Detection
The malicious code used by Operation Aurora created several service keys during three specific steps: execution of the
dropper, the first stage of installation, and the second stage of installation. Some of these keys are subsequently deleted
but at least one was persistent. The appearance of one or more of these keys would be interpreted as a marker of
potential malicious activity by the Triumfant real-time malware scan and would therefore trigger the detection process.
The first step in the detection process would be a request by the agent to the server requesting permission for the agent
to execute a full scan of the machine. The purpose of this scan is to capture all of the changes to that machine since the
previous scan results were processed as part of the normal agent/server interaction that occurs every 24 hours. The
Triumfant server would respond within seconds, authorizing the scan and throttling up the agent to complete the scan as
rapidly as possible, collecting all 200,000 plus attributes in under a minute. The resulting scan would captures the state
of the machine immediately after infection, providing the raw material for diagnosis so the analytics could verify the
machine is under attack and identify all of the primary and secondary artifacts of the attack.
Diagnosis
The Triumfant server would receive the full scan, recognize that it was executed as a result of suspicious behavior, and
immediately compare it to the adaptive reference model (the unique context built by our patented analytics). The result
of this comparison would be a set of anomalous files and registry keys. The fact that the files and keys associated with
Operation Aurora have random names would guarantee that they would be perceived as anomalous despite the fact that
humans might tend to confuse them with legitimate Windows services. Further analysis would then be applied to the
anomaly set to identify important characteristics and functional impacts. In this case the salient characteristics are an
anomalous service and a number of anomalous system32 files.
The discovery of an anomalous service would cause the Triumfant server to build a probe to be sent to the agent for
execution to gather more data to complete the analysis. In this case, the probe would contain a list of all of the
anomalous attributes found by the server during its analysis. Such probes leverage a series of correlation functions
designed to partition the anomalous attributes associated with an attack into related groups. For Operation Aurora
these correlation functions would group all of the anomalous attributes and then perform a risk assessment on this
group. In this specific case, this analysis would find that the malicious attack is communicating over the internet.
The cumulative results of the correlation and risk assessment would then be sent back to the Triumfant server. This new
information is then processed and classified as an
Anomalous Application
with a complete analysis of the changes that
composed the attack. This data would show the full set of changes associated with the attack such as files, registry keys,
2010
Triumfant, Incorporated
CASE STUDY: OPERATION AURORA
processes, ports, services, and event logs that were added, changed, or deleted as part of the attack. The data about the
attacks would be posted at the console and the Triumfant server would alert the appropriate personnel based on the
established reporting and alert protocols. Personnel could then access the correlated attack information and the
corresponding risk assessment who could then take appropriate actions including the ability to save the analysis to
readily share the data with CIRT and forensics teams.
Knowledge Base
Triumfant has the ability to save the analysis from any anomalous activity and leverage that data to create what
Triumfant calls a Recognition Filter that becomes a permanent part of the knowledge base contained in the adaptive
reference model. These Recognition Filters have a number of benefits. First, they provide a very precise mechanism for
storing and sharing knowledge about an incident. Second, they allow the system to search for any other instances of
that particular condition on other machines. Third, they enable the operator to pre-authorize automatic responses such as automatic remediation - should that incident be detected in the future.
In the case of Operation Aurora, an analyst could save the analysis and build a filter specifically about this attack. Once
built, the filter could be used to check other endpoint machines (the entire population or specified groups) for
infection. This mechanism uses acquired knowledge to address broad attacks before they have the chance to spread
beyond their initial penetration. These filters are also more resilient than digital signatures because they use wildcarding
to continue to detect the attack even as it morphs its basic signature over time to avoid traditional signature based tools.
Remediation
The ability to identify and correlate all of the changes associated with any attack provides a depth of information that
enables Triumfant to build a contextual and situational remediation that surgically and reliably removes the components
of that attack without reimaging the machine. This remediation is built to exactly match the attributes of the anomalous
application, in this case Operation Aurora, on an attribute by attribute basis.
For Operation Aurora, Triumfant would construct a remediation to address all of the changes associated with the attack,
restoring the altered attributes to their pre-attack condition. This includes the changes Aurora makes to affected
machine
s configuration settings to either execute or hide itself. The files added to the machine would be deleted, and
any files deleted or corrupted would be remediated using Triumfant
s patent pending donor technology.
Summary
Operation Aurora is illustrative of the targeted and well engineered attacks that characterize the evolving threats
businesses and government agencies face daily. Based on the available data regarding Operation Aurora, Triumfant can
say with confidence that Resolution Manager would have detected the attack, identified changes associated with the
primary and collateral damage done to the affected machines, and used that data to build a remediation to address the
specific elements of the attack. Within five minutes of the infection Triumfant would have analyzed the attack and
created a remediation to return the machine to its pre-attack condition pending confirmation by the administrator. This
ability to detect and remediate the attacks that evade traditional endpoint protections demonstrates the unique
capabilities of Triumfant
s technology.
Triumfant uses two continuous scan cycles. One is a scan for markers of malicious activity that runs approximately
every thirty seconds. The second is a continuous scan of every attribute on the machine that identifies and collects
changes to those attributes and communicates them to the server on a 24 hour reporting cycle.
Triumfant leverages the knowledge contained in the adaptive reference model to find another machine that has the
proper version of corrupted or missing files
validated to the specific release number and MD5 hash - and uses that
machine as a donor to repair the affected machine. This technology is patent pending.
2010
Triumfant, Incorporated
OPERATION
AURORA
February 10, 2010
Cyber Espionage is a critical issue. Over 80% of intellectual property is stored online digitally. The computing
infrastructure in a typical Enterprise is more vulnerable to attack than ever before. Current security solutions are
proving ineffective at stopping cyber espionage. Malware is the single greatest problem in computer security today.
Yet, malware represents only the tip of the spear. The true threat is the human being who is operating the malware.
This human and the organization represented is the true threat that is targeting information for the purposes of

In the interest of full disclosure, Triumfant had no direct interaction with the attack either directly on Triumfant

s own

endpoints or indirectly through a Triumfant customer. The analysis is based on detailed information collected through a

variety of publically available research performed by reliable sources that performed hands-on analysis of the attack.

Based on this research, Triumfant is fully confident that our software would have detected the attack and built a

remediation that would have restored the machine to its pre-attack condition.

The Operation Aurora attack falls squarely into one of the classes of attacks that Triumfant excels at detecting: targeted

attacks engineered to evade traditional network and endpoint protections. While the actual attack vector used was not

exceptionally sophisticated, the attack was created to have a digital signature that would not be detected by antivirus

tools. The attack also took steps to protect and obscure itself from detection once it infected a machine. The case study

steps through the process in four parts: initial detection, diagnosis, the assimilation of data about the attack into the

Triumfant knowledge base, and remediation of the affected machine.

Detection

The malicious code used by Operation Aurora created several service keys during three specific steps: execution of the

dropper, the first stage of installation, and the second stage of installation. Some of these keys are subsequently deleted

but at least one was persistent. The appearance of one or more of these keys would be interpreted as a marker of

potential malicious activity by the Triumfant real-time malware scan and would therefore trigger the detection process.

The first step in the detection process would be a request by the agent to the server requesting permission for the agent

to execute a full scan of the machine. The purpose of this scan is to capture all of the changes to that machine since the

previous scan results were processed as part of the normal agent/server interaction that occurs every 24 hours. The

Triumfant server would respond within seconds, authorizing the scan and throttling up the agent to complete the scan as

rapidly as possible, collecting all 200,000 plus attributes in under a minute. The resulting scan would captures the state

of the machine immediately after infection, providing the raw material for diagnosis so the analytics could verify the

machine is under attack and identify all of the primary and secondary artifacts of the attack.

Diagnosis

The Triumfant server would receive the full scan, recognize that it was executed as a result of suspicious behavior, and

immediately compare it to the adaptive reference model (the unique context built by our patented analytics). The result

of this comparison would be a set of anomalous files and registry keys. The fact that the files and keys associated with

Operation Aurora have random names would guarantee that they would be perceived as anomalous despite the fact that

humans might tend to confuse them with legitimate Windows services. Further analysis would then be applied to the

anomaly set to identify important characteristics and functional impacts. In this case the salient characteristics are an

anomalous service and a number of anomalous system32 files.

The discovery of an anomalous service would cause the Triumfant server to build a probe to be sent to the agent for

execution to gather more data to complete the analysis. In this case, the probe would contain a list of all of the

anomalous attributes found by the server during its analysis. Such probes leverage a series of correlation functions

designed to partition the anomalous attributes associated with an attack into related groups. For Operation Aurora

these correlation functions would group all of the anomalous attributes and then perform a risk assessment on this

group. In this specific case, this analysis would find that the malicious attack is communicating over the internet.

The cumulative results of the correlation and risk assessment would then be sent back to the Triumfant server. This new

information is then processed and classified as an

Anomalous Application

with a complete analysis of the changes that

composed the attack. This data would show the full set of changes associated with the attack such as files, registry keys,

2010

Triumfant, Incorporated

CASE STUDY: OPERATION AURORA

processes, ports, services, and event logs that were added, changed, or deleted as part of the attack. The data about the

attacks would be posted at the console and the Triumfant server would alert the appropriate personnel based on the

established reporting and alert protocols. Personnel could then access the correlated attack information and the

corresponding risk assessment who could then take appropriate actions including the ability to save the analysis to

readily share the data with CIRT and forensics teams.

Knowledge Base

Triumfant has the ability to save the analysis from any anomalous activity and leverage that data to create what

Triumfant calls a Recognition Filter that becomes a permanent part of the knowledge base contained in the adaptive

reference model. These Recognition Filters have a number of benefits. First, they provide a very precise mechanism for

storing and sharing knowledge about an incident. Second, they allow the system to search for any other instances of

that particular condition on other machines. Third, they enable the operator to pre-authorize automatic responses such as automatic remediation - should that incident be detected in the future.

In the case of Operation Aurora, an analyst could save the analysis and build a filter specifically about this attack. Once

built, the filter could be used to check other endpoint machines (the entire population or specified groups) for

infection. This mechanism uses acquired knowledge to address broad attacks before they have the chance to spread

beyond their initial penetration. These filters are also more resilient than digital signatures because they use wildcarding

to continue to detect the attack even as it morphs its basic signature over time to avoid traditional signature based tools.

Remediation

The ability to identify and correlate all of the changes associated with any attack provides a depth of information that

enables Triumfant to build a contextual and situational remediation that surgically and reliably removes the components

of that attack without reimaging the machine. This remediation is built to exactly match the attributes of the anomalous

application, in this case Operation Aurora, on an attribute by attribute basis.

For Operation Aurora, Triumfant would construct a remediation to address all of the changes associated with the attack,

restoring the altered attributes to their pre-attack condition. This includes the changes Aurora makes to affected

machine

s configuration settings to either execute or hide itself. The files added to the machine would be deleted, and

any files deleted or corrupted would be remediated using Triumfant

s patent pending donor technology.

Summary

Operation Aurora is illustrative of the targeted and well engineered attacks that characterize the evolving threats

businesses and government agencies face daily. Based on the available data regarding Operation Aurora, Triumfant can

say with confidence that Resolution Manager would have detected the attack, identified changes associated with the

primary and collateral damage done to the affected machines, and used that data to build a remediation to address the

specific elements of the attack. Within five minutes of the infection Triumfant would have analyzed the attack and

created a remediation to return the machine to its pre-attack condition pending confirmation by the administrator. This

ability to detect and remediate the attacks that evade traditional endpoint protections demonstrates the unique

capabilities of Triumfant

s technology.

Triumfant uses two continuous scan cycles. One is a scan for markers of malicious activity that runs approximately

every thirty seconds. The second is a continuous scan of every attribute on the machine that identifies and collects

changes to those attributes and communicates them to the server on a 24 hour reporting cycle.

Triumfant leverages the knowledge contained in the adaptive reference model to find another machine that has the

proper version of corrupted or missing files

validated to the specific release number and MD5 hash - and uses that

machine as a donor to repair the affected machine. This technology is patent pending.

2010

Triumfant, Incorporated

OPERATION

AURORA

February 10, 2010

Cyber Espionage is a critical issue. Over 80% of intellectual property is stored online digitally. The computing

infrastructure in a typical Enterprise is more vulnerable to attack than ever before. Current security solutions are

proving ineffective at stopping cyber espionage. Malware is the single greatest problem in computer security today.

Yet, malware represents only the tip of the spear. The true threat is the human being who is operating the malware.

This human and the organization represented is the true threat that is targeting information for the purposes of