clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

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financial gain, theft of state secrets, and theft of intellectual property. True threat intelligence requires reaching beyond
malware infections to identify the individuals, country of origin, and intent of the attacker.
HB GARY THREAT REPORT: OPERATION AURORA
THREAT SUMMARY
The Aurora malware operation was identified recently and made public by Google and McAfee. This malware operation has been
associated with intellectual property theft including source code and technical diagrams (CAD, oil exploration bid-data, etc).
Companies hit have been publically speculated, including Google, Adobe, Yahoo, Symantec, Juniper Networks, Rackspace,
Northrop Grumman, and Dow Chemical. The malware package used with Aurora is mature and been in development since at
least 2006.
The Aurora operation is characterized by a remotely operated backdoor program that persists on a Windows computer. This
backdoor program has several capabilities that are outlined below.
KEY FINDINGS
Evidence collected around the malware operation suggest
that Operation Aurora is simply an example of highly effective
malware penetration. There is not significant evidence to
attribute the operation directly to the Chinese Government.
However, key actors have been identified in association
with malware operations that utilize Chinese systems and
native language malware. This has lead to a great deal of
speculation about Chinese-State involvement. It must be
noted that a large and thriving underground economy exists
to both build and disseminate malware worldwide, and that
most of this malware is capable of intellectual property
theft. The malicious hacking underculture is strong in China,
as in Eastern Europe and elsewhere, and clearly enmeshed
into a global criminal economy of data theft. While difficult
to conclude that these activities receive any form of state
sponsorship or direction, the malware operation remains a
funded and significant risk to intellectual property in the
enterprise.
ASPECT
DESCRIPTION
Target
The operation is targeting intellectual property with
no specific industry focus. This is an example of
knowing what they are looking for until they find it
Origin
It is highly probable that the malware was developed
in native Chinese language, and the operation control
system is designed for Chinese users, indicating the
entire operation is Chinese. This does not, however,
mean the Chinese Government is using the system.
Developers
Forensic tool-marks in the CRC algorithm can be
traced to Chinese origin. That, combined with domain
registration information, leads to at least one potential
actor, Peng Yong ii. The malware has been in development
since at least 2006. It has been updated several times.
ASPECT
DESCRIPTION
Operators
Operators of the malware appear to use certain domains
for C&C control. Dynamic DNS is a key feature of the
operation, with many known C&C servers operating
from domains registered through Peng Yong
s 3322.org
service.
Intent
The primary intent is the theft of intellectual property.
Coms
Communication is encrypted over HTTP, port 443,
obfuscated with a weak encryption scheme. The C&C
servers tend to operate from domains hosted on
dynamic DNS.
ATTRIBUTION
At this time, there is very little available in terms of
attribution. A CRC algorithm tends to indicate the malware
package is of Chinese origin, and many attacks are sourced
out of a service called 3322.org
a small company operating
out of Changzhou. The owner is Peng Yong, a Mandarin speaker
who may have some programming background with such
algorithms. His dynamic DNS service hosts over 1 million
domain names. Over the last year, HBGary has analyzed
thousands of distinct malware samples that communicate with
3322.org. While Peng Yong is clearly tolerant of cyber crime
operating through his domain services, this does not indicate
he has any direct involvement with Aurora.
TOOLMARK
DESCRIPTION
Embedded Resource Language Code
United States
CRC Algorithm Table of Constants
Embedded systems/
Chinese publicationiii
DNS registration services
Peng Yong, others
February 10, 2010 3
DETECT
This section of the report details how you can detect
Operation Aurora in your Enterprise. The exploit and payload
vehicle consists of the following components:
JavaScript based exploit vector, known to exploit IE 6
Shellcode component, embedded in the JavaScript
Secondary payload server that delivers a dropper
The dropper itself, which only used once and then deleted
The backdoor program which is decompressed from
the dropper
JAVASCRIPT AND SHELLCODE
The JavaScript based attack vector associated with

financial gain, theft of state secrets, and theft of intellectual property. True threat intelligence requires reaching beyond

malware infections to identify the individuals, country of origin, and intent of the attacker.

HB GARY THREAT REPORT: OPERATION AURORA

THREAT SUMMARY

The Aurora malware operation was identified recently and made public by Google and McAfee. This malware operation has been

associated with intellectual property theft including source code and technical diagrams (CAD, oil exploration bid-data, etc).

Companies hit have been publically speculated, including Google, Adobe, Yahoo, Symantec, Juniper Networks, Rackspace,

Northrop Grumman, and Dow Chemical. The malware package used with Aurora is mature and been in development since at

least 2006.

The Aurora operation is characterized by a remotely operated backdoor program that persists on a Windows computer. This

backdoor program has several capabilities that are outlined below.

KEY FINDINGS

Evidence collected around the malware operation suggest

that Operation Aurora is simply an example of highly effective

malware penetration. There is not significant evidence to

attribute the operation directly to the Chinese Government.

However, key actors have been identified in association

with malware operations that utilize Chinese systems and

native language malware. This has lead to a great deal of

speculation about Chinese-State involvement. It must be

noted that a large and thriving underground economy exists

to both build and disseminate malware worldwide, and that

most of this malware is capable of intellectual property

theft. The malicious hacking underculture is strong in China,

as in Eastern Europe and elsewhere, and clearly enmeshed

into a global criminal economy of data theft. While difficult

to conclude that these activities receive any form of state

sponsorship or direction, the malware operation remains a

funded and significant risk to intellectual property in the

enterprise.

ASPECT

DESCRIPTION

Target

The operation is targeting intellectual property with

no specific industry focus. This is an example of

knowing what they are looking for until they find it

Origin

It is highly probable that the malware was developed

in native Chinese language, and the operation control

system is designed for Chinese users, indicating the

entire operation is Chinese. This does not, however,

mean the Chinese Government is using the system.

Developers

Forensic tool-marks in the CRC algorithm can be

traced to Chinese origin. That, combined with domain

registration information, leads to at least one potential

actor, Peng Yong ii. The malware has been in development

since at least 2006. It has been updated several times.

ASPECT

DESCRIPTION

Operators

Operators of the malware appear to use certain domains

for C&C control. Dynamic DNS is a key feature of the

operation, with many known C&C servers operating

from domains registered through Peng Yong

s 3322.org

service.

Intent

The primary intent is the theft of intellectual property.

Coms

Communication is encrypted over HTTP, port 443,

obfuscated with a weak encryption scheme. The C&C

servers tend to operate from domains hosted on

dynamic DNS.

ATTRIBUTION

At this time, there is very little available in terms of

attribution. A CRC algorithm tends to indicate the malware

package is of Chinese origin, and many attacks are sourced

out of a service called 3322.org

a small company operating

out of Changzhou. The owner is Peng Yong, a Mandarin speaker

who may have some programming background with such

algorithms. His dynamic DNS service hosts over 1 million

domain names. Over the last year, HBGary has analyzed

thousands of distinct malware samples that communicate with

3322.org. While Peng Yong is clearly tolerant of cyber crime

operating through his domain services, this does not indicate

he has any direct involvement with Aurora.

TOOLMARK

DESCRIPTION

Embedded Resource Language Code

United States

CRC Algorithm Table of Constants

Embedded systems/

Chinese publicationiii

DNS registration services

Peng Yong, others

February 10, 2010 3

DETECT

This section of the report details how you can detect

Operation Aurora in your Enterprise. The exploit and payload

vehicle consists of the following components:

JavaScript based exploit vector, known to exploit IE 6

Shellcode component, embedded in the JavaScript

Secondary payload server that delivers a dropper

The dropper itself, which only used once and then deleted

The backdoor program which is decompressed from

the dropper

JAVASCRIPT AND SHELLCODE

The JavaScript based attack vector associated with