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Volume 11, 2009 |
the ability to conduct a cyber attack than the cyber attacks on Estonia |
s IT |
infrastructure. (Secure Works Press Release, 2008) |
Georgia received considerable assistance in countering the cyber attacks |
and in communicating internally and internationally. Google provided |
domain space to protect the websites of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
and Civil.ge, a Georgian Daily online news service. A private American |
internet service provider (the head of the company is an ethnic Georgian) |
assisted the Georgian government by hosting the Georgian President |
website. The President of Poland also assisted the Georgian government |
by placing official press releases on his website. Estonia even sent two |
information security specialists from its Computer Emergency Response |
Team to assist Georgia in countering the cyber attacks. According to |
outside investigators there is no direct proof of any Russian government |
involvement in the cyber attacks. But what is undeniable is that even |
without proven Russian government involvement it remains clear that the |
Russian government benefited from the cyber attacks. (Melikishvili, |
2008/2009) |
4.2. Lithuanian cyber attack |
Lithuania faced its own attacks in June 2008 three days after it passed a law |
outlawing the use of Soviet and communist symbols; over 300 websites |
were attacked. Some were denial of service attacks while other sites were |
vandalized with the Soviet hammer and sickle. Prior to the attacks and the |
passage of the law, Russian and Lithuanian ties had deteriorated because of |
Russia |
s refusal to compensate Lithuanian victims of Soviet labour camps, |
and Russia |
s leveraging of energy resources for political gain. Lithuania also |
blocked talks on an EU-Russia partnership. The animosities between the |
two countries have provided observers with a clear motive that the attacks |
were by the Russians. The reason for the cyber attacks against Lithuania |
was similar to the cyber attacks against Estonia, both attacks were in |
response to a government action that was unpopular to the Russian |
people. (McLaughlin, 2008) |
4.3. Kyrgyzstan cyber attack |
The latest country that has come under a cyber attack from computers in |
Russia is Kyrgyzstan. On January 18th, 2009 Kyrgyzstan |
s two main |
internet servers came under a denial of service attacks shutting down |
Volume 11, 2009 |
Baltic Security & Defence Review |
websites and email within the country. The originators of the attacks were |
traced back to Russia (Rhoads, 2009). The attacks occurred on the same |
day that the Russian government was pressuring Kyrgyzstan to stop U.S. |
access to the airbase at Bishkek at Manas. The airbase is a key logistics |
centre that supports the U.S. war efforts in Afghanistan. According to Don |
Jackson, a senior security researcher at SecureWorks 4, the distributed denial |
of service attacks are believed to be directed towards any opposition that is |
not in favour of the closure of the airbase. While it is unproven whether |
the government was behind the attacks the implication is that cyber attacks |
will be used against any opposition to the Russian government (Bradbury, |
2009). |
The cyber attacks on Georgia, Lithuania and Kyrgyzstan have two |
characteristics in common. The first characteristic is that the cyber attacks |
were initiated because of opposition to the Russian government and |
secondly that there is no proof that the Russian government was involved |
in the cyber attacks. Regardless of who is initiating the attack it is clear that |
opposition to the Russian government could result in a cyber attack which |
could disrupt critical government infrastructure. |
5. Compelling realities for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization |
Cyber defence is a critical issue for NATO. U.S. General James Mattis, |
NATO |
s Supreme Allied Commander for Transformation, articulates the |
importance of cyber defence for NATO by stating, |
We cannot say that |
we are not going to defend the Web that everybody needs |
(Tanner & |
Peach, 2008). Nations that are party to the North Atlantic Treaty agree on |
Article 5 |
that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or |
North America shall be considered an attack against them all |
(The |
North Atlantic Treaty, 1949). Does a cyber attack fit the requirement of an |
armed attack? A senior NATO official asked, |
If a member state |
communications centre is attacked with a missile, you call it an act of war. |
So what do you call it if the same installation is disabled with a cyberattack? |
(The Economist, 2007). However, the current political reality is |
that they are not the same. Prior to the cyber attacks on Estonia, NATO |
cyber strategy was focused on NATO |
s ability to protect its own IT |
infrastructure. Now, the current reality is, is that the NATO |
s strategy |
must focus on assisting allies as they protect their own IT infrastructure |
during an attack (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, undated a). |
Baltic Security & Defence Review |
Volume 11, 2009 |
Members of NATO have taken several steps in defining a cyber strategy |
and implementing a cyber defence. As early as 2002, at the Prague Summit, |
cyber defence appeared on NATO |
s agenda. At the Prague Summit |
NATO leaders agreed to the implementation of a NATO Cyber Defence |
Program. The program consisted of a NATO Computer Incident |
Response Capability and for NATO to use the latest cyber defence |
measures (North Atlantic Treaty Organization, undated a). In the spring of |
2006 cyber defence was made a priority for NATO during the Riga |
Summit. The issue of cyber security gained even more attention when |
Estonia, a NATO member, was cyber attacked in 2007 (EU News, Policy |
Positions & EU Actors online, 2008). |
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