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In order to understand the reasons behind the Estonian cyber attack this
article will explore the social tensions and the cyber attack itself. The
impact that the attack had on the different actors will also be noted. The
reality of the attacks indicates some important implications for Estonia and
other former Soviet satellites to work with NATO to develop a coherent
cyber strategy. Russia
s cyber strategy also has considerable significance for
the United States. This article will conclude with a summary of possible
countermeasures to a cyber attack.
2. Cyber attack on Estonia
The social tensions between Estonians and Estonia
s Russian minority are
key to understanding why there was a cyber attack. Estonia is made up of
1.3 million people where 25.6 percent of the population is Russian (Central
Intelligence Agency, 2008). In 1918, the Estonians gained their
independence from Russia, and in 1940 they were forced into the Soviet
Union. From 1940 until they regained their independence in 1991 Estonia
viewed Russia
s presence as an illegal occupation. Mass deportations were
made, people were summarily executed, and the population was resettled
by ethnic Russians. Russians on the other hand view the Estonians as
ungrateful because they were saved by Russians from the Nazi German
fascists. Today there exists significant animosity between the Russians and
the Estonians that permeate personal relationships and political
interactions within the country and between the two nations. (Vesilind,
2008) 3
The actual events that occurred in Estonia centred on the Soviet Bronze
Soldier monument. The Bronze Soldier monument is a World War II
Soviet War memorial which memorialized the graves of Soviet Soldiers
who died during World War II. However, over time ethnic Russians had
used the memorial as a rallying site for demonstrations and other forms of
protest against the Estonian government. This led to a decision by the
Estonian government to move the monument to an area that was less
public. (Davis, 2009)
The decision to move the statue led to actual riots in the capital city of
Tallinn on April 27th, 2007. The demonstrations degraded into criminal
activities involving looting and the destruction of private and public
property. Hundreds of demonstrators were arrested, most of whom were
Baltic Security & Defence Review
Volume 11, 2009
ethnic Russians. The civil unrest was contained, order was restored to the
streets by the Estonian government, and most of the physical damage was
repaired by the next morning. (Davis, 2009)
During this period of civil unrest computers in the Estonian government
and the Estonian national media were hacked into with significant affect.
Some of the attacks on the system were vandalism of sites and some were
distributed denial of service attacks (a cyber attack that disrupts internet
service so that a user cannot access a given computer service). The attacks
started small with a major attack culminating on the Estonian internet
system on May 9th, 2007. This date coincidentally corresponded to the day
the Russians celebrate their victory over the Germans in World War II.
During this time a Russian youth-group conducted protests against the
Estonian ambassador to Russia and against the Estonian Embassy in
Moscow. The protests against the ambassador and the embassy did not
end until the ambassador left the country as part of a deal that was
negotiated by Germany. The Russian government even suspended
passenger rail services between Tallinn and St. Petersburg. The riots, the
protests, the stopping of rail service, and the cyber attacks led to an
increasingly tense relationship between Estonia and Russia. (Davis, 2009;
Kampmark, 2003: 288-293)
The Estonians were able to respond to the cyber attacks in a very
proficient manner, as they were able to coordinate responses that only
caused relatively short term outages instead of any permanent damage to
their IT infrastructure. The Estonian government was able to employ its
Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) which coordinated IT
responses among government and civilian specialists. However, due to the
ambiguous nature of the internet and the use of fake internet protocol (IP)
addresses the Estonian
s were unable to conclusively prove who initiated
the cyber attacks. (Collier, 2007)
The cyber attacks themselves were not very sophisticated as the attackers
used techniques that had been in existence for several years. The focus of
the cyber attack was to completely shut down the IT structure of Estonia.
The cyber attackers used botnet attacks to perform a distributed denial of
service rendering systems that use the internet useless. Botnets are hijacked
computers that send out mass amounts of information which overwhelm
an internet server. The increase in internet traffic will cause a server to
exceed its bandwidth capabilities and cause it to shut down. The botnets
Volume 11, 2009
Baltic Security & Defence Review
can be installed well in advance of a planned cyber attack, and they can be
placed in any computer anywhere in the world. If the computer user has
not installed appropriate protective software on their computer they will
not even know that they have been hijacked and that they are participating
in a cyber attack. The botnet attacks on the Estonian IT structure ended as
abruptly as they began leading Estonian officials to conclude that the
attack was a planned and coordinated. (Davis, 2009)
The cyber attacks on Estonia illustrates the vulnerability of IT structures
that rely on the internet. The use of technology can improve personal,
business, and government interactions but it is still vulnerable to attacks
and interruptions. The next section of this article will concentrate on the
implications for Estonia in the aftermath of the cyber attacks.
3. Implications for Estonia
After the cyber attacks in 2007, there were several implications for Estonia
as the country recovered from the cyber wake-up call. Some implications
had an immediate impact on the people and the government of Estonia,
while others were more long term and required a deliberate strategy. The
immediate implication for Estonia was the loss of services for government,
communication, and banking. What emerged from the attack was Estonia
ability to counter and minimize the effects of the attack. There was no

In order to understand the reasons behind the Estonian cyber attack this

article will explore the social tensions and the cyber attack itself. The

impact that the attack had on the different actors will also be noted. The

reality of the attacks indicates some important implications for Estonia and

other former Soviet satellites to work with NATO to develop a coherent

cyber strategy. Russia

s cyber strategy also has considerable significance for

the United States. This article will conclude with a summary of possible

countermeasures to a cyber attack.

2. Cyber attack on Estonia

The social tensions between Estonians and Estonia

s Russian minority are

key to understanding why there was a cyber attack. Estonia is made up of

1.3 million people where 25.6 percent of the population is Russian (Central

Intelligence Agency, 2008). In 1918, the Estonians gained their

independence from Russia, and in 1940 they were forced into the Soviet

Union. From 1940 until they regained their independence in 1991 Estonia

viewed Russia

s presence as an illegal occupation. Mass deportations were

made, people were summarily executed, and the population was resettled

by ethnic Russians. Russians on the other hand view the Estonians as

ungrateful because they were saved by Russians from the Nazi German

fascists. Today there exists significant animosity between the Russians and

the Estonians that permeate personal relationships and political

interactions within the country and between the two nations. (Vesilind,

2008) 3

The actual events that occurred in Estonia centred on the Soviet Bronze

Soldier monument. The Bronze Soldier monument is a World War II

Soviet War memorial which memorialized the graves of Soviet Soldiers

who died during World War II. However, over time ethnic Russians had

used the memorial as a rallying site for demonstrations and other forms of

protest against the Estonian government. This led to a decision by the

Estonian government to move the monument to an area that was less

public. (Davis, 2009)

The decision to move the statue led to actual riots in the capital city of

Tallinn on April 27th, 2007. The demonstrations degraded into criminal

activities involving looting and the destruction of private and public

property. Hundreds of demonstrators were arrested, most of whom were

Baltic Security & Defence Review

Volume 11, 2009

ethnic Russians. The civil unrest was contained, order was restored to the

streets by the Estonian government, and most of the physical damage was

repaired by the next morning. (Davis, 2009)

During this period of civil unrest computers in the Estonian government

and the Estonian national media were hacked into with significant affect.

Some of the attacks on the system were vandalism of sites and some were

distributed denial of service attacks (a cyber attack that disrupts internet

service so that a user cannot access a given computer service). The attacks

started small with a major attack culminating on the Estonian internet

system on May 9th, 2007. This date coincidentally corresponded to the day

the Russians celebrate their victory over the Germans in World War II.

During this time a Russian youth-group conducted protests against the

Estonian ambassador to Russia and against the Estonian Embassy in

Moscow. The protests against the ambassador and the embassy did not

end until the ambassador left the country as part of a deal that was

negotiated by Germany. The Russian government even suspended

passenger rail services between Tallinn and St. Petersburg. The riots, the

protests, the stopping of rail service, and the cyber attacks led to an

increasingly tense relationship between Estonia and Russia. (Davis, 2009;

Kampmark, 2003: 288-293)

The Estonians were able to respond to the cyber attacks in a very

proficient manner, as they were able to coordinate responses that only

caused relatively short term outages instead of any permanent damage to

their IT infrastructure. The Estonian government was able to employ its

Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) which coordinated IT

responses among government and civilian specialists. However, due to the

ambiguous nature of the internet and the use of fake internet protocol (IP)

addresses the Estonian

s were unable to conclusively prove who initiated

the cyber attacks. (Collier, 2007)

The cyber attacks themselves were not very sophisticated as the attackers

used techniques that had been in existence for several years. The focus of

the cyber attack was to completely shut down the IT structure of Estonia.

The cyber attackers used botnet attacks to perform a distributed denial of

service rendering systems that use the internet useless. Botnets are hijacked

computers that send out mass amounts of information which overwhelm

an internet server. The increase in internet traffic will cause a server to

exceed its bandwidth capabilities and cause it to shut down. The botnets

Volume 11, 2009

Baltic Security & Defence Review

can be installed well in advance of a planned cyber attack, and they can be

placed in any computer anywhere in the world. If the computer user has

not installed appropriate protective software on their computer they will

not even know that they have been hijacked and that they are participating

in a cyber attack. The botnet attacks on the Estonian IT structure ended as

abruptly as they began leading Estonian officials to conclude that the

attack was a planned and coordinated. (Davis, 2009)

The cyber attacks on Estonia illustrates the vulnerability of IT structures

that rely on the internet. The use of technology can improve personal,

business, and government interactions but it is still vulnerable to attacks

and interruptions. The next section of this article will concentrate on the

implications for Estonia in the aftermath of the cyber attacks.

3. Implications for Estonia

After the cyber attacks in 2007, there were several implications for Estonia

as the country recovered from the cyber wake-up call. Some implications

had an immediate impact on the people and the government of Estonia,

while others were more long term and required a deliberate strategy. The

immediate implication for Estonia was the loss of services for government,

communication, and banking. What emerged from the attack was Estonia

ability to counter and minimize the effects of the attack. There was no