clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

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permanent damage to the information technology (IT) structure and
financial losses were minimal, but the significance was frightening. (Collier,
2007)
One of the long term implications is the continued strain on Estonia
relationship with Russia. Members of the Estonian government and
outside observers believe that the attacks originated in Russia, but that fact
remains unproven. The finger pointing between Estonia and Russia began
immediately after the attacks and continues today. Dmitry Peskov, Deputy
Press Secretary for the Russian President said,
Russia can no way be
involved in cyber terrorism and all claims to the contrary are an absolute
(The Baltic Times, 2007a). Andrus Ansip, the Estonian Prime Minister,
and others have accused the Russian government because of the
identification of Russian internet protocol (IP) addresses used in the attack.
To date, Russian involvement has never been proven, but the implications
and belief that they were involved continues to influence and affect the
relationship between Russia and Estonia. (The Baltic Times, 2007b)
Baltic Security & Defence Review
Volume 11, 2009
After the attacks and recovery, Estonia has been heralded as a leader in
technological security. According to Alexander Ntok, head of Corporate
Strategy at the International Telecommunication Union,
it was
imaginative responses that allowed Estonia to emerge from the spring
cyber attack relatively unscathed
(Collier, 2007). As a result Estonia has
capitalized on the internet security market. They are called upon to assist
during attacks and to speak to different business and IT groups on internet
security issues. Estonian government leaders have spoken to allies, regional
organizations and international organizations to improve IT security and
cooperation. (Ibid.)
When Georgia
s IT infrastructure was attacked in August 2008 specialists
from Estonia
s Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) travelled to
Georgia and assisted response efforts to counter the attacks (DPA, 2008).
This example demonstrates how Estonia has established itself as a major
player in an emerging field, as they are too small to make a large impact on
the international scene through the use of economic or military power.
Estonia has been able to establish itself as a major player in Europe and
among NATO members as an expert in cyber security and cyber war.
Their expertise has allowed them to lobby for increased IT awareness and
for increased cooperation to defeat or deter future cyber attacks.
(Nikiforov, 2008)
In 2003 Estonia proposed a cyber excellence centre in Tallinn even before
it became a member of NATO. In light of Estonia
s expertise in IT the
NATO Cyber Defence Centre was approved. In May 2008 the centre
opened in Tallinn with Estonia providing the leadership and personnel to
man the centre. Estonia emerged as a leader within NATO and leads the
effort to protect the IT structure of NATO. (Socor, 2008)
The continuous threat of cyber attacks against its IT structure, and the
dedication of public officials to improve IT security resulted in a
comprehensive national cyber security strategy. This strategy, developed by
the Ministry of Defence, was adopted by the Estonian government in May
of 2008, just over a year after the attack on its IT systems. The main
measures of its strategy included IT security measures that strengthened
their defensive posture, as well as developed their expertise and awareness
in the IT field. Estonia now looks to strengthen the international legal
framework to ensure that the IT system is protected by laws, and that
Volume 11, 2009
Baltic Security & Defence Review
violators of the law will be prosecuted. Estonia has also taken the charge
of increasing international co-operation not just to protect their systems
but to protect the global cyber system. (Estonian Ministry of Defence,
2008)
4. Cyber concerns for former Soviet satellites
What do the countries of Estonia, Georgia, Lithuania and Kyrgyzstan have
in common? They are all former Soviet satellites and have all been allegedly
cyber attacked by Russia.
4.1. Georgian cyber attack
On July 20th, 2008 the website of the Georgian president came under a
denial of service cyber attack. The attack shut the website down for 24
hours and was a precursor to a larger cyber attack that would come less
than a month later (Melikishvili, 2008/2009). On August 8th, 2008 a
coordinated distributed denial of service attack was made against the
Georgian government websites at the same time that Russian forces were
engaged in combat with Georgian forces. As the ground attacks increased
so did the cyber attacks. This was the first time that a cyber attack was
done in conjunction with armed conflict. (Ibid)
The cyber war between Georgia and Russia focused on shaping public
opinion on the internet. Georgian and Russian supporters used a variety of
cyber techniques including distributed denial of service attacks and the
creation of fake web sites to control how their version of the
truth
was
delivered to the public. (Thomas, 2009:55-59)
Georgia
s IT infrastructure was not very advanced so the disruption of
service was not as complicated as it was in Estonia. Banking, media and
government websites were blocked disrupting the flow of information
throughout Georgia and to the outside world. The websites of the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs and the National Bank were vandalized by adding
pictures of the Georgian President and Adolf Hitler (Melikishvili,
2008/2009). The cyber attacks against Georgia were different from the
cyber attacks on Estonia, as these attacks included distributed denial of
services using botnets, but they also included SQL injection attacks that are
harder to identify than a botnet attack because they require less computers
than a botnet attack. The SQL injection attack shows a greater expertise in
Baltic Security & Defence Review

permanent damage to the information technology (IT) structure and

financial losses were minimal, but the significance was frightening. (Collier,

2007)

One of the long term implications is the continued strain on Estonia

relationship with Russia. Members of the Estonian government and

outside observers believe that the attacks originated in Russia, but that fact

remains unproven. The finger pointing between Estonia and Russia began

immediately after the attacks and continues today. Dmitry Peskov, Deputy

Press Secretary for the Russian President said,

Russia can no way be

involved in cyber terrorism and all claims to the contrary are an absolute

(The Baltic Times, 2007a). Andrus Ansip, the Estonian Prime Minister,

and others have accused the Russian government because of the

identification of Russian internet protocol (IP) addresses used in the attack.

To date, Russian involvement has never been proven, but the implications

and belief that they were involved continues to influence and affect the

relationship between Russia and Estonia. (The Baltic Times, 2007b)

Baltic Security & Defence Review

Volume 11, 2009

After the attacks and recovery, Estonia has been heralded as a leader in

technological security. According to Alexander Ntok, head of Corporate

Strategy at the International Telecommunication Union,

it was

imaginative responses that allowed Estonia to emerge from the spring

cyber attack relatively unscathed

(Collier, 2007). As a result Estonia has

capitalized on the internet security market. They are called upon to assist

during attacks and to speak to different business and IT groups on internet

security issues. Estonian government leaders have spoken to allies, regional

organizations and international organizations to improve IT security and

cooperation. (Ibid.)

When Georgia

s IT infrastructure was attacked in August 2008 specialists

from Estonia

s Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) travelled to

Georgia and assisted response efforts to counter the attacks (DPA, 2008).

This example demonstrates how Estonia has established itself as a major

player in an emerging field, as they are too small to make a large impact on

the international scene through the use of economic or military power.

Estonia has been able to establish itself as a major player in Europe and

among NATO members as an expert in cyber security and cyber war.

Their expertise has allowed them to lobby for increased IT awareness and

for increased cooperation to defeat or deter future cyber attacks.

(Nikiforov, 2008)

In 2003 Estonia proposed a cyber excellence centre in Tallinn even before

it became a member of NATO. In light of Estonia

s expertise in IT the

NATO Cyber Defence Centre was approved. In May 2008 the centre

opened in Tallinn with Estonia providing the leadership and personnel to

man the centre. Estonia emerged as a leader within NATO and leads the

effort to protect the IT structure of NATO. (Socor, 2008)

The continuous threat of cyber attacks against its IT structure, and the

dedication of public officials to improve IT security resulted in a

comprehensive national cyber security strategy. This strategy, developed by

the Ministry of Defence, was adopted by the Estonian government in May

of 2008, just over a year after the attack on its IT systems. The main

measures of its strategy included IT security measures that strengthened

their defensive posture, as well as developed their expertise and awareness

in the IT field. Estonia now looks to strengthen the international legal

framework to ensure that the IT system is protected by laws, and that

Volume 11, 2009

Baltic Security & Defence Review

violators of the law will be prosecuted. Estonia has also taken the charge

of increasing international co-operation not just to protect their systems

but to protect the global cyber system. (Estonian Ministry of Defence,

2008)

4. Cyber concerns for former Soviet satellites

What do the countries of Estonia, Georgia, Lithuania and Kyrgyzstan have

in common? They are all former Soviet satellites and have all been allegedly

cyber attacked by Russia.

4.1. Georgian cyber attack

On July 20th, 2008 the website of the Georgian president came under a

denial of service cyber attack. The attack shut the website down for 24

hours and was a precursor to a larger cyber attack that would come less

than a month later (Melikishvili, 2008/2009). On August 8th, 2008 a

coordinated distributed denial of service attack was made against the

Georgian government websites at the same time that Russian forces were

engaged in combat with Georgian forces. As the ground attacks increased

so did the cyber attacks. This was the first time that a cyber attack was

done in conjunction with armed conflict. (Ibid)

The cyber war between Georgia and Russia focused on shaping public

opinion on the internet. Georgian and Russian supporters used a variety of

cyber techniques including distributed denial of service attacks and the

creation of fake web sites to control how their version of the

truth

was

delivered to the public. (Thomas, 2009:55-59)

Georgia

s IT infrastructure was not very advanced so the disruption of

service was not as complicated as it was in Estonia. Banking, media and

government websites were blocked disrupting the flow of information

throughout Georgia and to the outside world. The websites of the Ministry

of Foreign Affairs and the National Bank were vandalized by adding

pictures of the Georgian President and Adolf Hitler (Melikishvili,

2008/2009). The cyber attacks against Georgia were different from the

cyber attacks on Estonia, as these attacks included distributed denial of

services using botnets, but they also included SQL injection attacks that are

harder to identify than a botnet attack because they require less computers

than a botnet attack. The SQL injection attack shows a greater expertise in

Baltic Security & Defence Review