clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

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PAP internal security units can act as light infantry supporting the PLA in local defence
missions. Similarly, the PLA can fill in for the PAP and has done so during the Cultural
Revolution, the Tiananmen Square incident, and flooding of the Yellow River (People's
Armed Police Force Organisation 2007; China's National Defense in 2006; People
s Armed
Police 2005).
Military Intelligence
The General Staff Department carries out staff and operational functions for the PLA and is
responsible for implementing military modernization plans. It serves as the headquarters for
the PLAGF and contains directorates for the PLAN, PLAAF, and SAC, as well as a
department for electronic warfare. The General Staff Department also includes subdepartments for artillery, armoured units, communications, engineering, mobilization,
operations, politics, training, and surveying. Direct control over the four military branches is
sub-divided among the General Staff Department and regional commanders; however the
General Staff Department can assume direct operation control at any time. The General Staff
Department is under the control of the Central Military Commission (General Staff
Department 1997).
The Second Department of the General Staff Headquarters is responsible for collecting
military intelligence. This includes military attach
s at Chinese embassies abroad,
clandestine agents to conduct espionage, and the analysis of publicly available data published
by foreign countries. The Second Department oversees military human intelligence
(HUMINT), open source intelligence (OSINT), and satellite and aerial imagery intelligence
(IMINT) which it disseminates to the Central Military Commission and various branches.
The Second Department has increased its focus on scientific and technological military
intelligence gathering. The Third Department of the General Staff Headquarters is
responsible for monitoring the telecommunications of foreign militaries and producing
reports based on the military information gathered. China operates the most extensive signals
intelligence (SIGINT) network of all the countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Since the
1950s, the Second and Third Departments have maintained a number of secondary and higher
learning institutions for producing recruits, particularly in foreign languages. The Third
Department not only intercepts communication of foreign militaries, but also those of the
PLA, thereby maintaining control and supervision over the different branches and
commanders within all of the military regions (Second Intelligence Department 2005,
General Staff Department 1997).
Other branches of the General Staff Department include the Fourth Department and the
General Political Department (GPD). The Fourth Department (ECM and Radar) is
responsible for electronic intelligence (ELINT) including electronic countermeasures and
maintaining databases on electronic signals. The GPD is responsible for overseeing the
political education required for advancement within the PLA and controls the PLA
s internal
prison system. The International Liaison Department, a branch within the GPD, conducts
propaganda, psychological operations (PSYOPS), and counter-espionage against foreign
intelligence. As with the PAP, many of the departments within the General Staff Department
appear to have significant overlap. The structural details are beyond the scope of this study;
however, they are worth noting, as they pertain to the discussion below of cyber warfare.
Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80
Copyright
2008 Jason Fritz
Technology Transfer
China continues to pursue the acquisition of foreign military technology. Beijing is in
ongoing negotiations with Moscow to obtain multiple weapons systems, and in 2007 signed
arms agreements worth $150 million. Israel has previously supplied advanced military
technology to China. However, under pressure from the US, Israel began to implement strict
military export regulations. China is attempting to remove an embargo placed on lethal
military export from the EU. This embargo was a response to the Tiananmen Square
incident. Opinion on removing the embargo remains divided among EU member states.
According to the 2008 Annual Report to Congress on China
s Military:
China continues a systematic effort to obtain dual-use and military technologies from abroad
through legal and illegal commercial transactions. Many dual-use technologies, such as
software, integrated circuits, computers, electronics, semiconductors, telecommunications,
and information security systems, are vital for the PLA
s transformation into an informationbased, network-enabled force.
Between 1995 and 2008, several high profile cases of Chinese espionage against the US
surfaced. These attempts targeted aerospace programs, space shuttle design, F-16 design,
submarine propulsion, C4ISR data, high-performance computers, nuclear weapons design,
cruise missile data, semiconductors, integrated circuit design, and details of US arms sales to
Taiwan.
Targeted organisations include Northrop Grumman, NASA, Los Alamos
Laboratories, Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Sun Microsystems, and various defence installations.
The Chinese do not limit themselves to high value targets or an elite group of agents. They
obtain any data which may be of value, including legally obtained documents or OSINT,
which may help them piece together the larger picture. China utilizes a decentralized
network of students, business people, scientists, diplomats, and engineers from within the
Chinese Diaspora. The majority of these individuals have legitimate purposes within the host
state; however they are recruited at a later date, or asked for small pieces of information or
favours which can seem harmless in scope to the individual. Attempts are also made to
purchase interests within high technology companies, as well as win political favour with
government officials. For example, there have been repeated allegations that President Bill
Clinton
s decision to sell sophisticated computer and satellite technology to China was
influenced by campaign contributions (Appel 2004; Cooper 2006; Grier 2005; Jordan 2008;
Warrick and Johnson 2008; Lynch 2007; Cox Report 1999; McLaughlin 1999; PRC
Acquisitions of US Technology 1998).
China
s use of espionage to obtain foreign military technology is not restricted to the US. In
2007, the head of a Russian rocket and space technology company was sentenced to 11 years
for passing sensitive information to China. An alleged agent who defected in Belgium
claimed hundreds of Chinese spies were working within Europe
s industries. These
allegations coincided with an arrest in France for illegal database intrusion of the automotive
components manufacturer Valeo, and a guest researcher in Sweden arrested for stealing
unpublished and unpatented research. Further, Chinese diplomat Chen Yonglin defected to
Australia in 2005, claiming there were over 1,000 Chinese secret agents and informants
within Australia (Luard 2005; Isachenkov 2007). Espionage and technology transfer prosper
in cyber warfare, where being physically present is not required, and attribution becomes
increasingly difficult. It also falls in line with China
s strategy of leapfrogging. By acquiring
foreign military knowledge, China can quickly catch up and begin working at a comparable
level, rather than investing the large amounts of time and effort it would take to acquire this

PAP internal security units can act as light infantry supporting the PLA in local defence

missions. Similarly, the PLA can fill in for the PAP and has done so during the Cultural

Revolution, the Tiananmen Square incident, and flooding of the Yellow River (People's

Armed Police Force Organisation 2007; China's National Defense in 2006; People

s Armed

Police 2005).

Military Intelligence

The General Staff Department carries out staff and operational functions for the PLA and is

responsible for implementing military modernization plans. It serves as the headquarters for

the PLAGF and contains directorates for the PLAN, PLAAF, and SAC, as well as a

department for electronic warfare. The General Staff Department also includes subdepartments for artillery, armoured units, communications, engineering, mobilization,

operations, politics, training, and surveying. Direct control over the four military branches is

sub-divided among the General Staff Department and regional commanders; however the

General Staff Department can assume direct operation control at any time. The General Staff

Department is under the control of the Central Military Commission (General Staff

Department 1997).

The Second Department of the General Staff Headquarters is responsible for collecting

military intelligence. This includes military attach

s at Chinese embassies abroad,

clandestine agents to conduct espionage, and the analysis of publicly available data published

by foreign countries. The Second Department oversees military human intelligence

(HUMINT), open source intelligence (OSINT), and satellite and aerial imagery intelligence

(IMINT) which it disseminates to the Central Military Commission and various branches.

The Second Department has increased its focus on scientific and technological military

intelligence gathering. The Third Department of the General Staff Headquarters is

responsible for monitoring the telecommunications of foreign militaries and producing

reports based on the military information gathered. China operates the most extensive signals

intelligence (SIGINT) network of all the countries in the Asia-Pacific region. Since the

1950s, the Second and Third Departments have maintained a number of secondary and higher

learning institutions for producing recruits, particularly in foreign languages. The Third

Department not only intercepts communication of foreign militaries, but also those of the

PLA, thereby maintaining control and supervision over the different branches and

commanders within all of the military regions (Second Intelligence Department 2005,

General Staff Department 1997).

Other branches of the General Staff Department include the Fourth Department and the

General Political Department (GPD). The Fourth Department (ECM and Radar) is

responsible for electronic intelligence (ELINT) including electronic countermeasures and

maintaining databases on electronic signals. The GPD is responsible for overseeing the

political education required for advancement within the PLA and controls the PLA

s internal

prison system. The International Liaison Department, a branch within the GPD, conducts

propaganda, psychological operations (PSYOPS), and counter-espionage against foreign

intelligence. As with the PAP, many of the departments within the General Staff Department

appear to have significant overlap. The structural details are beyond the scope of this study;

however, they are worth noting, as they pertain to the discussion below of cyber warfare.

Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80

Copyright

2008 Jason Fritz

Technology Transfer

China continues to pursue the acquisition of foreign military technology. Beijing is in

ongoing negotiations with Moscow to obtain multiple weapons systems, and in 2007 signed

arms agreements worth $150 million. Israel has previously supplied advanced military

technology to China. However, under pressure from the US, Israel began to implement strict

military export regulations. China is attempting to remove an embargo placed on lethal

military export from the EU. This embargo was a response to the Tiananmen Square

incident. Opinion on removing the embargo remains divided among EU member states.

According to the 2008 Annual Report to Congress on China

s Military:

China continues a systematic effort to obtain dual-use and military technologies from abroad

through legal and illegal commercial transactions. Many dual-use technologies, such as

software, integrated circuits, computers, electronics, semiconductors, telecommunications,

and information security systems, are vital for the PLA

s transformation into an informationbased, network-enabled force.

Between 1995 and 2008, several high profile cases of Chinese espionage against the US

surfaced. These attempts targeted aerospace programs, space shuttle design, F-16 design,

submarine propulsion, C4ISR data, high-performance computers, nuclear weapons design,

cruise missile data, semiconductors, integrated circuit design, and details of US arms sales to

Taiwan.

Targeted organisations include Northrop Grumman, NASA, Los Alamos

Laboratories, Boeing, Lockheed Martin, Sun Microsystems, and various defence installations.

The Chinese do not limit themselves to high value targets or an elite group of agents. They

obtain any data which may be of value, including legally obtained documents or OSINT,

which may help them piece together the larger picture. China utilizes a decentralized

network of students, business people, scientists, diplomats, and engineers from within the

Chinese Diaspora. The majority of these individuals have legitimate purposes within the host

state; however they are recruited at a later date, or asked for small pieces of information or

favours which can seem harmless in scope to the individual. Attempts are also made to

purchase interests within high technology companies, as well as win political favour with

government officials. For example, there have been repeated allegations that President Bill

Clinton

s decision to sell sophisticated computer and satellite technology to China was

influenced by campaign contributions (Appel 2004; Cooper 2006; Grier 2005; Jordan 2008;

Warrick and Johnson 2008; Lynch 2007; Cox Report 1999; McLaughlin 1999; PRC

Acquisitions of US Technology 1998).

China

s use of espionage to obtain foreign military technology is not restricted to the US. In

2007, the head of a Russian rocket and space technology company was sentenced to 11 years

for passing sensitive information to China. An alleged agent who defected in Belgium

claimed hundreds of Chinese spies were working within Europe

s industries. These

allegations coincided with an arrest in France for illegal database intrusion of the automotive

components manufacturer Valeo, and a guest researcher in Sweden arrested for stealing

unpublished and unpatented research. Further, Chinese diplomat Chen Yonglin defected to

Australia in 2005, claiming there were over 1,000 Chinese secret agents and informants

within Australia (Luard 2005; Isachenkov 2007). Espionage and technology transfer prosper

in cyber warfare, where being physically present is not required, and attribution becomes

increasingly difficult. It also falls in line with China

s strategy of leapfrogging. By acquiring

foreign military knowledge, China can quickly catch up and begin working at a comparable

level, rather than investing the large amounts of time and effort it would take to acquire this