clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

text stringlengths 4 429
establishes China as a dominant power within the Asia-Pacific Region. China lacks force
projection beyond its region, primarily do to the lack of a blue water navy and aircraft carrier
fleet, but also due to limits in missile technology and air-defence penetration, and opposition
by foreign powers such as the United States. China seeks to become self-sufficient in many
of these key capabilities. Once they have leapfrogged and are no longer trying to catch up,
the Chinese will no longer need such widescale technology transfer, and they will possess the
might to shape the international system, rather than be bound by one that was created by
foreign powers.
Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80
Copyright
2008 Jason Fritz
2. A New Era
History has demonstrated that the advantage often goes to those who develop a technology
first. The great naval voyages of Ming admiral Zhang He were unprecedented for their time
and helped establish China as a suzerain of the wider Asian region. However, the mid-15th
century saw China retreat to xenophobic and isolationist policies that paved the way towards
China
s decline and opened the door for colonialism (see Dick 2006). This lesson has not
been lost among Chinese officials, and it is often used to spur initiatives such as their stated
desire to be the first to mine the moon for helium-3 (China
s Space Program 2005). The
information revolution has given more power to individuals and increased globalization
through the interconnectedness of economies, rapid dissemination of news, and improved
access to communication and information of all types. Any attempt to compete on a global
level without the use of these technologies would place the PRC at a significant military and
financial disadvantage. For this reason, the benefits of electronic reliance outweigh the risks
involved. Further, it is impossible for a state to develop a defence against cyber warfare
without simultaneously learning how to execute attacks themselves.
The US is the sole superpower, making it a benchmark for military competitiveness. Beijing
also views the US as a potential adversary, in particular due to perceptions of the US military
attempting to encircle China with bases in nearby states and opposition to China
modernization goals, to concerns over any forceful application of the One China Policy, and
to concerns over a range of internal affairs issues. China seeks to learn from US mistakes and
successes, using American expertise and field-tested military experience to accelerate
China
s development. The People
s Republic also focuses on weaknesses in the US military
in order to improve upon the American example and to expose asymmetric advantages. For
these reasons it is important to examine where the US is headed in military thinking and
development, as China is likely to follow (Derene 2008; Lasker 2005; Liang Xiangsui 1999).
Network-Centric Warfare
The US has viewed the internet as a potential tool of warfare since its inception. Arpanet, a
precursor of modern internet, was heavily funded by the US military, with a particular
emphasis on its research collaboration benefits. Despite fears of cyber terrorism post 9/11,
the US continues to place increasing reliance on the internet as a security tool. This can be
seen in the restructuring of US intelligence agencies and the creation of new online exchange
such as Intellipedia and A-Space (Shaughnessy 2008; Magnuson 2006). Militarily, the
information revolution has given rise to an increasing reliance on situational awareness,
weather monitoring, surveillance, communication, and precision strikes. Chinese military
strategists have made special note of the US reliance on, and dominance with, electronic
means in the Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraqi conflicts (Tellis 2007; Center for Strategic and
International Studies 2003; Liang and Xiangsui 1999).
Since the 1990s the US has put emphasis on developing network-centric warfare (NCW).
NCW seeks to translate an information advantage, enabled in part by information technology,
into a military advantage through the networking of well informed, geographically-dispersed
forces. Originally described as a system of systems, it includes intelligence sensors,
command and control systems, and precision weapons that enable enhanced situational
awareness, rapid target assessment, and distributed weapon assignment. In essence, NCW
translates to information superiority, which requires the reduction of hard categorization,
because compartmentalizing military branches can stem the flow of information. In 2001, the
Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80
Copyright
2008 Jason Fritz
Pentagon began investing in peer-to-peer software as a means to spread information while
supplying redundancy and robustness. The US Department of Defense has sought the
creation of the Global Information Grid (GIG) as a backbone of NCW. All advanced
weapons platforms, sensor systems, and command and control centres are eventually to be
linked via the GIG. Collecting, processing, storing, disseminating, and managing classified
security information on demand will be made globally available to soldiers, policymakers,
and support personnel to achieve information superiority (Alberts 2002; Alberts, Garstka, and
Stein 2000).
Vice President Richard Cheney stated in 2004:
With less than half of the ground forces and two-thirds of the military aircraft used 12 years
ago in Desert Storm, we have achieved a far more difficult objective . . . . In Desert Storm, it
usually took up to two days for target planners to get a photo of a target, confirm its
coordinates, plan the mission, and deliver it to the bomber crew. Now we have near real-time
imaging of targets with photos and coordinates transmitted by e-mail to aircraft already in
flight. In Desert Storm, battalion, brigade, and division commanders had to rely on maps,
grease pencils, and radio reports to track the movements of our forces. Today, our
commanders have a real-time display of our armed forces on their computer screen
(Raduege 2004).
Information Operations
In 2003, under the direction of former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the US
expanded on NCW in a document titled the Information Operations Roadmap. Now
declassified, it was obtained under the Freedom of Information Act by George Washington
University
s National Security Archive. Information Operations (IO) calls for NCW to
become a core military branch along with the Army, Navy, Air Force, Intelligence, and
Space. To accomplish this it requires the development of a comprehensive education
program to enlist new recruits, and an overhaul of the organizational structure of current
military branches in an attempt to break down barriers that hinder information exchange and
progress. IO activities include PSYOPS troops who try to manipulate the adversary
thoughts and beliefs, military deception and disinformation, media warfare, electronic
warfare (EW), and computer network operations (CNO). Thus Information Operations
Roadmap stands as an another example of the US commitment to transform military
capabilities to keep pace with emerging threats and to exploit new opportunities afforded by
innovation and rapidly developing information technologies.
IO seeks to
dominate the electromagnetic spectrum
, in an attempt to

establishes China as a dominant power within the Asia-Pacific Region. China lacks force

projection beyond its region, primarily do to the lack of a blue water navy and aircraft carrier

fleet, but also due to limits in missile technology and air-defence penetration, and opposition

by foreign powers such as the United States. China seeks to become self-sufficient in many

of these key capabilities. Once they have leapfrogged and are no longer trying to catch up,

the Chinese will no longer need such widescale technology transfer, and they will possess the

might to shape the international system, rather than be bound by one that was created by

foreign powers.

Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80

Copyright

2008 Jason Fritz

2. A New Era

History has demonstrated that the advantage often goes to those who develop a technology

first. The great naval voyages of Ming admiral Zhang He were unprecedented for their time

and helped establish China as a suzerain of the wider Asian region. However, the mid-15th

century saw China retreat to xenophobic and isolationist policies that paved the way towards

China

s decline and opened the door for colonialism (see Dick 2006). This lesson has not

been lost among Chinese officials, and it is often used to spur initiatives such as their stated

desire to be the first to mine the moon for helium-3 (China

s Space Program 2005). The

information revolution has given more power to individuals and increased globalization

through the interconnectedness of economies, rapid dissemination of news, and improved

access to communication and information of all types. Any attempt to compete on a global

level without the use of these technologies would place the PRC at a significant military and

financial disadvantage. For this reason, the benefits of electronic reliance outweigh the risks

involved. Further, it is impossible for a state to develop a defence against cyber warfare

without simultaneously learning how to execute attacks themselves.

The US is the sole superpower, making it a benchmark for military competitiveness. Beijing

also views the US as a potential adversary, in particular due to perceptions of the US military

attempting to encircle China with bases in nearby states and opposition to China

modernization goals, to concerns over any forceful application of the One China Policy, and

to concerns over a range of internal affairs issues. China seeks to learn from US mistakes and

successes, using American expertise and field-tested military experience to accelerate

China

s development. The People

s Republic also focuses on weaknesses in the US military

in order to improve upon the American example and to expose asymmetric advantages. For

these reasons it is important to examine where the US is headed in military thinking and

development, as China is likely to follow (Derene 2008; Lasker 2005; Liang Xiangsui 1999).

Network-Centric Warfare

The US has viewed the internet as a potential tool of warfare since its inception. Arpanet, a

precursor of modern internet, was heavily funded by the US military, with a particular

emphasis on its research collaboration benefits. Despite fears of cyber terrorism post 9/11,

the US continues to place increasing reliance on the internet as a security tool. This can be

seen in the restructuring of US intelligence agencies and the creation of new online exchange

such as Intellipedia and A-Space (Shaughnessy 2008; Magnuson 2006). Militarily, the

information revolution has given rise to an increasing reliance on situational awareness,

weather monitoring, surveillance, communication, and precision strikes. Chinese military

strategists have made special note of the US reliance on, and dominance with, electronic

means in the Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraqi conflicts (Tellis 2007; Center for Strategic and

International Studies 2003; Liang and Xiangsui 1999).

Since the 1990s the US has put emphasis on developing network-centric warfare (NCW).

NCW seeks to translate an information advantage, enabled in part by information technology,

into a military advantage through the networking of well informed, geographically-dispersed

forces. Originally described as a system of systems, it includes intelligence sensors,

command and control systems, and precision weapons that enable enhanced situational

awareness, rapid target assessment, and distributed weapon assignment. In essence, NCW

translates to information superiority, which requires the reduction of hard categorization,

because compartmentalizing military branches can stem the flow of information. In 2001, the

Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80

Copyright

2008 Jason Fritz

Pentagon began investing in peer-to-peer software as a means to spread information while

supplying redundancy and robustness. The US Department of Defense has sought the

creation of the Global Information Grid (GIG) as a backbone of NCW. All advanced

weapons platforms, sensor systems, and command and control centres are eventually to be

linked via the GIG. Collecting, processing, storing, disseminating, and managing classified

security information on demand will be made globally available to soldiers, policymakers,

and support personnel to achieve information superiority (Alberts 2002; Alberts, Garstka, and

Stein 2000).

Vice President Richard Cheney stated in 2004:

With less than half of the ground forces and two-thirds of the military aircraft used 12 years

ago in Desert Storm, we have achieved a far more difficult objective . . . . In Desert Storm, it

usually took up to two days for target planners to get a photo of a target, confirm its

coordinates, plan the mission, and deliver it to the bomber crew. Now we have near real-time

imaging of targets with photos and coordinates transmitted by e-mail to aircraft already in

flight. In Desert Storm, battalion, brigade, and division commanders had to rely on maps,

grease pencils, and radio reports to track the movements of our forces. Today, our

commanders have a real-time display of our armed forces on their computer screen

(Raduege 2004).

Information Operations

In 2003, under the direction of former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the US

expanded on NCW in a document titled the Information Operations Roadmap. Now

declassified, it was obtained under the Freedom of Information Act by George Washington

University

s National Security Archive. Information Operations (IO) calls for NCW to

become a core military branch along with the Army, Navy, Air Force, Intelligence, and

Space. To accomplish this it requires the development of a comprehensive education

program to enlist new recruits, and an overhaul of the organizational structure of current

military branches in an attempt to break down barriers that hinder information exchange and

progress. IO activities include PSYOPS troops who try to manipulate the adversary

thoughts and beliefs, military deception and disinformation, media warfare, electronic

warfare (EW), and computer network operations (CNO). Thus Information Operations

Roadmap stands as an another example of the US commitment to transform military

capabilities to keep pace with emerging threats and to exploit new opportunities afforded by

innovation and rapidly developing information technologies.

IO seeks to

dominate the electromagnetic spectrum

, in an attempt to