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knowledge independently.
Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80
Copyright
2008 Jason Fritz
Doctrine/Strategy
Chinese military doctrine and strategy remain focused on modernization. Beijing has not
explicitly laid out an official grand strategy. This may be due to disagreement within the
government, or done intentionally to hide true motives and avoid being bound by them.
Much of the writings published by the PRC are contradictory or ambiguous, using modern
and ancient foundations, while being disseminated by varied sources. However, several
points which are continually emphasized may point to a general consensus. These include
modernization of weapons, equipment and training; accelerating the RMA; improving
education and training of the PLA and the CPC;
informationized
(xinxihua) warfare; and
scientific development. China seeks to maintain domestic and regional stability while
developing its economic, military, technologic, scientific, and soft power. It also seeks a
balance between military and economic development, believing they are mutually dependant.
Beijing maintains its One China Policy in relation to Taiwan, and claims sovereignty over the
Parcel and Spratly islands and adjacent waterways (China's National Defense 2006).
Deng Xiaoping, representing second generation leadership after Mao, sought to avoid
international responsibilities and limitations, as they could slow down development of the
military and economy. The third generation leadership of Jiang Zemin did look outward,
promoting a multipolar world in the face of the post-Cold War unipolarity under the US, just
as fourth generation leader Hu Jintao promoted the ideology of a Harmonious World (hexie
shijie) which places more emphasis on international relations (Lam 2004; Zheng and Tok
2007). However the PRC continues to avoid concrete stances through concepts of noninterference, diversity, and equality. It compares itself to other states through Comprehensive
National Power (CNP - zonghe guoli), using qualitative and quantitative values, and not
accepting traditional Western categorizations (see Pillsbury 2000). For example, China
includes the economy, soft power, and domestic stability as factors of CNP. This is
important, because it shows a correlativity which holds relevance for cyber warfare. Under
CNP the economy, soft power, and domestic stability can be seen as military matters.
Further, maintaining the status quo in regards to Taiwan and the Spratly islands may not be
China
s long-term intention, but rather a way to stall efforts while it builds up military
strength, strength which can include economic and international influence.
Despite not wanting to become embroiled in concrete commitments to military strategy,
Chinese leaders cannot ignore the interconnectedness of the modern world, and they have
realized the necessity of international cooperation. For example, the need for resources has
fuelled China
s global presence. The PRC is the world
s second largest importer of
petroleum. As the country
s economy grows and the middle class expands, the demand for
fossil fuel resources will continue to grow. This creates a need for sound international
relations with exporting nations and the need for securing transportation routes, such as the
Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea. These are intertwined with the politics and
military affairs of the states involved. Competition with the US for these resources has often
led to China making agreements with nations the US opposes on several points, such as
Angola, Chad, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Sudan,
Venezuela, and Yemen (Hanson 2008; Brookes 2006).
Beijing may be using these countries simply because there is less competition for resource
access in the case of these suppliers. However, the result is often international criticism of
China as these states may be violating human rights or supporting terrorism. Moreover,
Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80
Copyright
2008 Jason Fritz
Beijing
s methods of befriending these exporters comes into question, especially in regards to
arms being traded or availability of finance which may be supporting controversial policies.
China currently lacks the power projection to protect critical sea lanes from disruption or to
deter international criticism. Crucial to extended power projection is the blue water navy
which would benefit from online technology transfer and the further development of C4ISR.
Online PSYOPS and media warfare would enhance China
s soft power. Beijing believes that
economic growth is critical to military development; economic growth creates a greater
energy demand, which in turns creates a greater military demand, thus the two form a
positive feedback loop (Ikenberry 2008; China's National Defense in 2006).
While Beijing recognizes the need for international cooperation, it remains cautious. The
country suffered greatly from foreign incursions within the last century. Colonialism by
Western powers, Japanese occupation in World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War,
and border conflicts with India, the Soviet Union, and Vietnam are all kept fresh through
China
s historical discourse. Despite China
s long history, these events are of special note as
they are within living memory, and these events were present during the founding and
duration of the CPC
s rule.
Ensuring the survival of the CPC shapes China
s strategic outlook. In order to bolster
domestic support for policies, nationalism has been emphasized over communist ideology.
This can be seen with government organised protests against Japan over visits by Japanese
leaders to WWII war shrines and protests against the publishing of Japanese school text
books which downplay Japan
s atrocities against the Chinese. These protests often coincide
with other strategic interests, such as territorial disputes in the East China Sea, which are
often unbeknownst to the casual observer or participant. The mobilization of nationalism can
also be seen during the holding of a US reconnaissance plane in 2001, and the mistaken
bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999. The 2008 Olympics further
demonstrated how China could garner national support in the face of a widening wealth gap,
forced relocation, corruption, and environmental degradation. These events demonstrate a
strategic value in public manipulation through nationalism; one that is interconnected with
military affairs, and one which is increasingly turning to online assets (see Faiola 2005).
Several conclusions can be drawn from the status of the PLA. China is committed to
modernizing its military, primarily through the purchase or illicit acquisition of foreign
technology and subsequently reverse engineering that technology so it can be produced
domestically. The PLA has placed an importance on trimming down its size, favouring
quality over quantity. The PLA
s weaponry often lags one or two generations behind that of
Western military powers. However, the total force base still poses a significant deterrent, and

knowledge independently.

Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80

Copyright

2008 Jason Fritz

Doctrine/Strategy

Chinese military doctrine and strategy remain focused on modernization. Beijing has not

explicitly laid out an official grand strategy. This may be due to disagreement within the

government, or done intentionally to hide true motives and avoid being bound by them.

Much of the writings published by the PRC are contradictory or ambiguous, using modern

and ancient foundations, while being disseminated by varied sources. However, several

points which are continually emphasized may point to a general consensus. These include

modernization of weapons, equipment and training; accelerating the RMA; improving

education and training of the PLA and the CPC;

informationized

(xinxihua) warfare; and

scientific development. China seeks to maintain domestic and regional stability while

developing its economic, military, technologic, scientific, and soft power. It also seeks a

balance between military and economic development, believing they are mutually dependant.

Beijing maintains its One China Policy in relation to Taiwan, and claims sovereignty over the

Parcel and Spratly islands and adjacent waterways (China's National Defense 2006).

Deng Xiaoping, representing second generation leadership after Mao, sought to avoid

international responsibilities and limitations, as they could slow down development of the

military and economy. The third generation leadership of Jiang Zemin did look outward,

promoting a multipolar world in the face of the post-Cold War unipolarity under the US, just

as fourth generation leader Hu Jintao promoted the ideology of a Harmonious World (hexie

shijie) which places more emphasis on international relations (Lam 2004; Zheng and Tok

2007). However the PRC continues to avoid concrete stances through concepts of noninterference, diversity, and equality. It compares itself to other states through Comprehensive

National Power (CNP - zonghe guoli), using qualitative and quantitative values, and not

accepting traditional Western categorizations (see Pillsbury 2000). For example, China

includes the economy, soft power, and domestic stability as factors of CNP. This is

important, because it shows a correlativity which holds relevance for cyber warfare. Under

CNP the economy, soft power, and domestic stability can be seen as military matters.

Further, maintaining the status quo in regards to Taiwan and the Spratly islands may not be

China

s long-term intention, but rather a way to stall efforts while it builds up military

strength, strength which can include economic and international influence.

Despite not wanting to become embroiled in concrete commitments to military strategy,

Chinese leaders cannot ignore the interconnectedness of the modern world, and they have

realized the necessity of international cooperation. For example, the need for resources has

fuelled China

s global presence. The PRC is the world

s second largest importer of

petroleum. As the country

s economy grows and the middle class expands, the demand for

fossil fuel resources will continue to grow. This creates a need for sound international

relations with exporting nations and the need for securing transportation routes, such as the

Strait of Malacca and the South China Sea. These are intertwined with the politics and

military affairs of the states involved. Competition with the US for these resources has often

led to China making agreements with nations the US opposes on several points, such as

Angola, Chad, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Kazakhstan, Nigeria, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Sudan,

Venezuela, and Yemen (Hanson 2008; Brookes 2006).

Beijing may be using these countries simply because there is less competition for resource

access in the case of these suppliers. However, the result is often international criticism of

China as these states may be violating human rights or supporting terrorism. Moreover,

Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80

Copyright

2008 Jason Fritz

Beijing

s methods of befriending these exporters comes into question, especially in regards to

arms being traded or availability of finance which may be supporting controversial policies.

China currently lacks the power projection to protect critical sea lanes from disruption or to

deter international criticism. Crucial to extended power projection is the blue water navy

which would benefit from online technology transfer and the further development of C4ISR.

Online PSYOPS and media warfare would enhance China

s soft power. Beijing believes that

economic growth is critical to military development; economic growth creates a greater

energy demand, which in turns creates a greater military demand, thus the two form a

positive feedback loop (Ikenberry 2008; China's National Defense in 2006).

While Beijing recognizes the need for international cooperation, it remains cautious. The

country suffered greatly from foreign incursions within the last century. Colonialism by

Western powers, Japanese occupation in World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War,

and border conflicts with India, the Soviet Union, and Vietnam are all kept fresh through

China

s historical discourse. Despite China

s long history, these events are of special note as

they are within living memory, and these events were present during the founding and

duration of the CPC

s rule.

Ensuring the survival of the CPC shapes China

s strategic outlook. In order to bolster

domestic support for policies, nationalism has been emphasized over communist ideology.

This can be seen with government organised protests against Japan over visits by Japanese

leaders to WWII war shrines and protests against the publishing of Japanese school text

books which downplay Japan

s atrocities against the Chinese. These protests often coincide

with other strategic interests, such as territorial disputes in the East China Sea, which are

often unbeknownst to the casual observer or participant. The mobilization of nationalism can

also be seen during the holding of a US reconnaissance plane in 2001, and the mistaken

bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in 1999. The 2008 Olympics further

demonstrated how China could garner national support in the face of a widening wealth gap,

forced relocation, corruption, and environmental degradation. These events demonstrate a

strategic value in public manipulation through nationalism; one that is interconnected with

military affairs, and one which is increasingly turning to online assets (see Faiola 2005).

Several conclusions can be drawn from the status of the PLA. China is committed to

modernizing its military, primarily through the purchase or illicit acquisition of foreign

technology and subsequently reverse engineering that technology so it can be produced

domestically. The PLA has placed an importance on trimming down its size, favouring

quality over quantity. The PLA

s weaponry often lags one or two generations behind that of

Western military powers. However, the total force base still poses a significant deterrent, and