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and Mig-19 respectively. The Sino-Soviet split was a significant setback to the PLAAF as
was resource competition with the missile and nuclear divisions of the military. China
aircraft industry received a boost during the Vietnam War by providing aircraft for North
Vietnam.
During the 1980s, the PLAAF underwent significant restructuring, opting for a more
streamlined force and increased training. Due to the Sino-Soviet Split, the PLAAF turned to
Western states for military expertise. Western states saw China as a counterbalance to the
Soviet Union; however support dissolved following the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident.
Reverse engineering of Soviet weaponry continued with the Chinese aircraft F-7 being an
illegitimate copy of the MiG-21, and the F-8 incorporating various Soviet designs.
Gorbachev
s 1989 visit to China marked an end to the Sino-Soviet split. The newborn and
economically struggling state of Russia used the transfer of military technology and expertise
to China as a way to sustain its own aerospace industry (Moore 2000).
The collapse of The Soviet Union, and concerns over a Taiwan conflict that could draw in the
United States, reinvigorated the PLAAF
s modernization program. In the 1990s, China
began development of fourth generation fighters, including the J-10 and a collaboration with
Pakistan on the JF-17. China continued focusing on improved pilot training and retiring
obsolete aircraft, preferring quality over quantity. The PLAAF is currently developing its
own fifth generation stealth craft and increasing Command, Control, Communications,
Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems for all its
fighters.
In addition to jet fighter aircraft,
China is upgrading its B-6 bomber fleet (originally adapted
from the Russian Tu-16) with a new variant which, when operational, will be armed with a
new long-range cruise missile
(Annual Report to Congress 2008). China is also developing
Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft utilizing Russian and possibly Israeli
technology; and is making progress in tanker aircraft used for in-flight refuelling and airlift
planes. These are important steps in obtaining the capability to conduct operations beyond
China
s borders (China's National Defense in 2006; Allen 2005).
Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80
Copyright
2008 Jason Fritz
Production of indigenous Chinese aircraft has been lacklustre. Most of the designs require
foreign expertise which is then reverse engineered. The technology obtained is often one
generation old at the time of acquisition, as states do not want to give up their advantage.
Further, to reverse engineer they not only need the aircraft itself, but also high-precision and
technologically advanced machine tools, electronics and components, skilled personnel, and
facilities. By the time the technology is fully understood, and indigenous versions produced,
the aircraft may be two or three generations behind the latest models of the world
s advanced
military forces. China is not alone in this difficulty. Except for the five largest industrial
arms producers (France, Germany, Russia, the UK, and the US), other countries that have
attempted to produce indigenously designed combat aircraft, such as Israel, South Africa,
India, Taiwan, and South Korea, have abandoned their efforts and returned to importing
systems from one of the five main producers. One reason is the economy of scale involved
with financing research, development, and production of all of the systems and sub-systems
that compose modern combat aircraft (Moore 2000; see also Allen, Krumel and Pollack
1995). Despite these difficulties, China remains committed to producing indigenous aircraft.
Continued purchase of foreign technology demonstrates that the Chinese believe reverse
engineering and then upgrading is the best approach to establish themselves as a selfsufficient producer in the future. In other words, the PRC aspires to become one of the elite
weapons producers, but it does not want to wait for the infrastructure to evolve; it wants to
leapfrog these capabilities.
Space
The PLA is responsible for the Chinese space program. China was the fifth nation in the
world to place a satellite in orbit, the third nation to put a human into space, and the third
nation to successfully test an anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) capable of destroying an enemy
satellite in low earth orbit. China
s manned space activities have received substantial support
from Russia. This can be seen in the design of the Shenzhou spacecraft, which closely
resembles the Russian Soyuz spacecraft. Although China
s commercial space program has
utility for non-military research, it also demonstrates space launch and control capabilities
that have direct military application. All taikonauts have been selected from members of the
PLAAF, and the PLA has deployed space-based systems for military purposes. These
include imagery intelligence satellite systems such as the ZiYan series and JianBing series,
synthetic aperture satellites (SAR) such as JianBing-5, the BeiDou satellite navigation
network, and secured communication satellites such as FengHuo-1. China launched its 100th
Long March series rocket in 2007, and continues to put more sophisticated and diverse
satellites into orbit. The PRC is developing the Long March 5, an improved heavy-lift rocket
that will be able to lift larger reconnaissance satellites into low-earth orbit or communications
satellites into geosynchronous orbits by 2012. It expects to replace all foreign-produced
satellites in its inventory with indigenously produced sun-synchronous and geo-stationary
models by 2010 (Annual Report to Congress 2008; Center for Strategic and International
Studies 2003).
Many of China
s space assets are dual use, having financial and prestige benefits in addition
to military applications. The Ziyuan-2 series, the Yaogan-1 and -2, the Haiyang-1B, the
CBERS-1 and -2 satellites, and the Huanjing satellites, offer ocean surveillance, disaster and
environmental monitoring, and high resolution imaging in the visible, infrared, and radar
spectrums. New electro-optical satellites are capable of penetrating night and weather with a
1/10 meter resolution, providing near continuous targeting data for the PLA forces. In the
arena of navigation and timing, China has five BeiDou satellites with 20 meter accuracy over
Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80
Copyright
2008 Jason Fritz
the region. The PRC also uses the Russian GLONASS navigation system and is a primary
investor in the European Union
s Galileo navigation system. China has developed small
satellite design and production facilities, and is developing microsatellites, satellites which
weigh less than 100 kilograms. These satellites offer remote sensing, imagery, and radar, and
could allow China to rapidly replace or expand its satellite force in the event of war or a
disruption to the network. The country is also improving its ability to track and identify
foreign satellites, which is an essential component in the event of counter-space operations.
China
s successful test of an ASAT weapon demonstrates an ability to strike enemy assets in
low earth orbit. This acts as a deterrent to conflict and demonstrates the PRC

and Mig-19 respectively. The Sino-Soviet split was a significant setback to the PLAAF as

was resource competition with the missile and nuclear divisions of the military. China

aircraft industry received a boost during the Vietnam War by providing aircraft for North

Vietnam.

During the 1980s, the PLAAF underwent significant restructuring, opting for a more

streamlined force and increased training. Due to the Sino-Soviet Split, the PLAAF turned to

Western states for military expertise. Western states saw China as a counterbalance to the

Soviet Union; however support dissolved following the 1989 Tiananmen Square incident.

Reverse engineering of Soviet weaponry continued with the Chinese aircraft F-7 being an

illegitimate copy of the MiG-21, and the F-8 incorporating various Soviet designs.

Gorbachev

s 1989 visit to China marked an end to the Sino-Soviet split. The newborn and

economically struggling state of Russia used the transfer of military technology and expertise

to China as a way to sustain its own aerospace industry (Moore 2000).

The collapse of The Soviet Union, and concerns over a Taiwan conflict that could draw in the

United States, reinvigorated the PLAAF

s modernization program. In the 1990s, China

began development of fourth generation fighters, including the J-10 and a collaboration with

Pakistan on the JF-17. China continued focusing on improved pilot training and retiring

obsolete aircraft, preferring quality over quantity. The PLAAF is currently developing its

own fifth generation stealth craft and increasing Command, Control, Communications,

Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems for all its

fighters.

In addition to jet fighter aircraft,

China is upgrading its B-6 bomber fleet (originally adapted

from the Russian Tu-16) with a new variant which, when operational, will be armed with a

new long-range cruise missile

(Annual Report to Congress 2008). China is also developing

Airborne Early Warning and Control (AEW&C) aircraft utilizing Russian and possibly Israeli

technology; and is making progress in tanker aircraft used for in-flight refuelling and airlift

planes. These are important steps in obtaining the capability to conduct operations beyond

China

s borders (China's National Defense in 2006; Allen 2005).

Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80

Copyright

2008 Jason Fritz

Production of indigenous Chinese aircraft has been lacklustre. Most of the designs require

foreign expertise which is then reverse engineered. The technology obtained is often one

generation old at the time of acquisition, as states do not want to give up their advantage.

Further, to reverse engineer they not only need the aircraft itself, but also high-precision and

technologically advanced machine tools, electronics and components, skilled personnel, and

facilities. By the time the technology is fully understood, and indigenous versions produced,

the aircraft may be two or three generations behind the latest models of the world

s advanced

military forces. China is not alone in this difficulty. Except for the five largest industrial

arms producers (France, Germany, Russia, the UK, and the US), other countries that have

attempted to produce indigenously designed combat aircraft, such as Israel, South Africa,

India, Taiwan, and South Korea, have abandoned their efforts and returned to importing

systems from one of the five main producers. One reason is the economy of scale involved

with financing research, development, and production of all of the systems and sub-systems

that compose modern combat aircraft (Moore 2000; see also Allen, Krumel and Pollack

1995). Despite these difficulties, China remains committed to producing indigenous aircraft.

Continued purchase of foreign technology demonstrates that the Chinese believe reverse

engineering and then upgrading is the best approach to establish themselves as a selfsufficient producer in the future. In other words, the PRC aspires to become one of the elite

weapons producers, but it does not want to wait for the infrastructure to evolve; it wants to

leapfrog these capabilities.

Space

The PLA is responsible for the Chinese space program. China was the fifth nation in the

world to place a satellite in orbit, the third nation to put a human into space, and the third

nation to successfully test an anti-satellite weapon (ASAT) capable of destroying an enemy

satellite in low earth orbit. China

s manned space activities have received substantial support

from Russia. This can be seen in the design of the Shenzhou spacecraft, which closely

resembles the Russian Soyuz spacecraft. Although China

s commercial space program has

utility for non-military research, it also demonstrates space launch and control capabilities

that have direct military application. All taikonauts have been selected from members of the

PLAAF, and the PLA has deployed space-based systems for military purposes. These

include imagery intelligence satellite systems such as the ZiYan series and JianBing series,

synthetic aperture satellites (SAR) such as JianBing-5, the BeiDou satellite navigation

network, and secured communication satellites such as FengHuo-1. China launched its 100th

Long March series rocket in 2007, and continues to put more sophisticated and diverse

satellites into orbit. The PRC is developing the Long March 5, an improved heavy-lift rocket

that will be able to lift larger reconnaissance satellites into low-earth orbit or communications

satellites into geosynchronous orbits by 2012. It expects to replace all foreign-produced

satellites in its inventory with indigenously produced sun-synchronous and geo-stationary

models by 2010 (Annual Report to Congress 2008; Center for Strategic and International

Studies 2003).

Many of China

s space assets are dual use, having financial and prestige benefits in addition

to military applications. The Ziyuan-2 series, the Yaogan-1 and -2, the Haiyang-1B, the

CBERS-1 and -2 satellites, and the Huanjing satellites, offer ocean surveillance, disaster and

environmental monitoring, and high resolution imaging in the visible, infrared, and radar

spectrums. New electro-optical satellites are capable of penetrating night and weather with a

1/10 meter resolution, providing near continuous targeting data for the PLA forces. In the

arena of navigation and timing, China has five BeiDou satellites with 20 meter accuracy over

Culture Mandala, Vol. 8, No. 1, October 2008, pp.28-80

Copyright

2008 Jason Fritz

the region. The PRC also uses the Russian GLONASS navigation system and is a primary

investor in the European Union

s Galileo navigation system. China has developed small

satellite design and production facilities, and is developing microsatellites, satellites which

weigh less than 100 kilograms. These satellites offer remote sensing, imagery, and radar, and

could allow China to rapidly replace or expand its satellite force in the event of war or a

disruption to the network. The country is also improving its ability to track and identify

foreign satellites, which is an essential component in the event of counter-space operations.

China

s successful test of an ASAT weapon demonstrates an ability to strike enemy assets in

low earth orbit. This acts as a deterrent to conflict and demonstrates the PRC