clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

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of those who have been compromised. And finally still others may have the necessary geopolitical knowledge to
interpret the attacks within a broader context.
Often, investigations do not have the luxury of such a full data set and must rely on incomplete information and
partial observations. Further complicating matters is that any of this information is often dependent on mistakes
made by the attackers, which typically lead to slices of an overall network instead of a comprehensive view.
Any questions concerning attribution must therefore always be set against a context of a complete consideration
of alternative explanations and qualified observations.
PART 2:
Methodology and
Investigative Techniques
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 2: METHODOLOGY & INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES
Methodology
The core of the methodology employed in the Shadows in the Cloud investigation rests at the nexus of technical
interrogation, field investigation, data analysis, and geopolitical, contextual research (See Box 2, page 3). No one
method alone is capable of providing a comprehensive understanding of malware networks; it is through their
combination that a complete picture is derived. For example, a technical analysis of exploits and malware used
by attackers alone can provide a great deal of insight into capabilities and targets. The command and control
servers used by the malware can be enumerated, and can sometimes reveal additional information that can be
used to identify those who have been compromised and data that may have been exfiltrated from these targets.
However, the technical analysis of exploits and malware samples alone only provides one crucial data set.
Field research is a critical, although sometimes neglected, component of malware research. While much of the
emphasis in existing malware research is focused on technical analysis of malware samples, this purely technical approach is unlikely to yield a complete picture. For example, through field research we have found compromised computers checking in with command and control servers that we have not seen in malware samples
distributed by the attackers. There is some evidence to suggest that attackers may migrate compromised hosts
to new command and control servers and/or command compromised computers to install new malware that is
not publicly disseminated through spear phishing and other targeted malware attacks. The field research component can thus provide an equally important insight into the attackers
capabilities once the target
s network
is compromised, as well as updated command and control locations. Moreover, it allows for the investigation
of the context surrounding the the target and why the victims may have been targeted in the first place. Finally,
the wider geopolitical considerations, derived from both field investigations and contextual research, place the
collection of information in a broader context that supplies details around issues such as the timing of the attacks, the nature of the exploitation, including the use of any social engineering techniques, and potentially the
identity and motivation of the attackers.
We present our methodology in the following sequence
field investigation first, followed by technical investigations. However, in practice the two are iterative processes. In some circumstances, field investigations begin
first, followed by technical investigations, while in other cases the opposite is true. In this case, a technicalbased investigative technique (sinkhole analysis) is probably the closest to an actual starting point, although
even that method was informed by prior knowledge derived from field and contextual research reaching back
to the Tracking GhostNet report. In almost all circumstances, geopolitical and contextual research informs both
the technical and field research components. In practice, therefore, fusion methodology is a holistic, non-linear
approach, but one that takes place in a very structured and focused fashion.
Field Investigation
Our objective is to ultimately understand the capabilities and motivations of those engaged in targeted malware
attacks. Field research provides critical insight into the methods and operations of the attackers. By analyzing
computers at locations that are routinely targeted by (similar) attackers, we aim to identify portions of command and control infrastructure that the attackers use for particular targets as well as document the type of
data that the attackers exfiltrate from the targets. However, our research aims to be more than just extracting
information from those who have been compromised.
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 2: METHODOLOGY & INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES
The Tracking GhostNet investigation revealed significant compromises at Tibetan-exile and Indian targets. It
was also found that Indian government related entities, both in India proper and throughout the world, had
been thoroughly compromised. These included computers at Indian embassies in Belgium, Serbia, Germany,
Italy, Kuwait, the United States, Zimbabwe, and the High Commissions of India in Cyprus and the United
Kingdom. During the GhostNet investigation we had discovered evidence of multiple infections for which the
information available was incomplete, and to which we wanted to return for follow up. In particular, we found
one piece of malware uploading sensitive documents. Another report published soon after Tracking GhostNet,
entitled
The Gh0st in the Shell: Network Security in the Himalayas,
analysed the network traffic of Air Jaldi,
a community WiFi network in Dharamsala, India. It found that computers in Dharamsala were connecting with
two of the control servers documented in our report (Vallentin et al. 2009).
With the aim of focusing on both these wider pattern of compromises, and the hanging threads from the previous investigation, we worked with our existing approach, informed by the view that collecting data as close
to the intended target as possible was likely to yield actionable evidence of breaches that could be followed
through to their source, lead to wider pools of target sets, and yield information on the attackers.
In conducting the field research we were influenced by the Action Research (AR) literature (Lewin 1946; Curle
1947) that has evolved since the 1940s, as well as other field-based investigation and research techniques. The
AR field-based approach feeds into the fusion methodology that guides our overall investigatory process. It
employs ethical and participatory observations and structured focused interviews. We combined this grounded
research with technical interrogation, including network monitoring activities. As with GhostNet, we were
fortunate to have the cooperation of Tibetan organizations, and benefited tremendously from the willingness of
His Holiness the Dalai Lama and other Tibetans to share information with our investigators. As a result, for the
Shadow investigation we conducted primary field research in Dharamsala, India from August until December
2009. (Dharamsala is the location of the OHHDL as well as the TGIE).
The primary objectives of the field investigations were to research the wider patterns of compromised Indian
and Tibetan related targets, investigate the reports of targeted malware attacks that have emerged from the
Tibetan community, and raise information and computer security awareness within the Tibetan community
and assist in their security planning and implementation. Throughout the field investigation process, we also
investigated the broader social, political, military, and intelligence context. We conducted extensive on-site
interviews with officials in the Tibetan Government-in-Exile, the Office of the Dalai Lama and Tibetan NGOs.
These interviews allowed us to gain an understanding of the security practices and network infrastructure of
compromised locations. We also used network monitoring software during field investigations in order to collect
technical data from compromised computer systems and perform an initial analysis to confirm the existence
of malware and the transfer of information between compromised computers and command and control servers. The network monitoring tools allowed us to collect samples from compromised computers and identify
command and control servers used by the attackers. The network monitoring was undertaken with the explicit
consent of the Tibetan organizations.
While monitoring the network traffic of a local NGO, Common Ground, as part of an Internet security audit,
traffic from a local WiFi mesh network, TennorNet was also captured, revealing malicious activity. An anomaly
was detected when analyzing this traffic: computers in Dharamsala were beaconing or checking in with a command and control server (jdusnemsaz.com/119.84.4.43) located in Chongqing, PRC. The location of Chongqing
is contextually interesting as it has a high concentration of Triads
well known Asian-based organized criminal networks
who have significant connections to the Chinese government and the Chinese Communist Party
(Lam 2009). The Triads have extended their traditional criminal activities to include technology-enabled crime
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 2: METHODOLOGY & INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES
such as
computer software piracy and credit card forgery and fraud
(Choo 2008).
An investigation revealed that the computer on TennorNet generating the malicious traffic belonged to Mr. Serta
Tsultrim, a Tibetan Member of Parliament, editor of of the weekly Tibetan language newspaper Tibet Express
and the director of the Khawa Karpo Tibet Culture Centre. Tsultrim is also the coordinator of the Association of
Tibetan Journalists (ATJ). We probed for his threat perception, and who he felt might be targeting him and why.
We sought to establish his perception of what documents and correspondence might be particularly sensitive.
Tsultrim was particularly concerned about this network being compromised.
Following the discovery of this compromise, we approached the OHHDL and formally requested permission

of those who have been compromised. And finally still others may have the necessary geopolitical knowledge to

interpret the attacks within a broader context.

Often, investigations do not have the luxury of such a full data set and must rely on incomplete information and

partial observations. Further complicating matters is that any of this information is often dependent on mistakes

made by the attackers, which typically lead to slices of an overall network instead of a comprehensive view.

Any questions concerning attribution must therefore always be set against a context of a complete consideration

of alternative explanations and qualified observations.

PART 2:

Methodology and

Investigative Techniques

JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 2: METHODOLOGY & INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES

Methodology

The core of the methodology employed in the Shadows in the Cloud investigation rests at the nexus of technical

interrogation, field investigation, data analysis, and geopolitical, contextual research (See Box 2, page 3). No one

method alone is capable of providing a comprehensive understanding of malware networks; it is through their

combination that a complete picture is derived. For example, a technical analysis of exploits and malware used

by attackers alone can provide a great deal of insight into capabilities and targets. The command and control

servers used by the malware can be enumerated, and can sometimes reveal additional information that can be

used to identify those who have been compromised and data that may have been exfiltrated from these targets.

However, the technical analysis of exploits and malware samples alone only provides one crucial data set.

Field research is a critical, although sometimes neglected, component of malware research. While much of the

emphasis in existing malware research is focused on technical analysis of malware samples, this purely technical approach is unlikely to yield a complete picture. For example, through field research we have found compromised computers checking in with command and control servers that we have not seen in malware samples

distributed by the attackers. There is some evidence to suggest that attackers may migrate compromised hosts

to new command and control servers and/or command compromised computers to install new malware that is

not publicly disseminated through spear phishing and other targeted malware attacks. The field research component can thus provide an equally important insight into the attackers

capabilities once the target

s network

is compromised, as well as updated command and control locations. Moreover, it allows for the investigation

of the context surrounding the the target and why the victims may have been targeted in the first place. Finally,

the wider geopolitical considerations, derived from both field investigations and contextual research, place the

collection of information in a broader context that supplies details around issues such as the timing of the attacks, the nature of the exploitation, including the use of any social engineering techniques, and potentially the

identity and motivation of the attackers.

We present our methodology in the following sequence

field investigation first, followed by technical investigations. However, in practice the two are iterative processes. In some circumstances, field investigations begin

first, followed by technical investigations, while in other cases the opposite is true. In this case, a technicalbased investigative technique (sinkhole analysis) is probably the closest to an actual starting point, although

even that method was informed by prior knowledge derived from field and contextual research reaching back

to the Tracking GhostNet report. In almost all circumstances, geopolitical and contextual research informs both

the technical and field research components. In practice, therefore, fusion methodology is a holistic, non-linear

approach, but one that takes place in a very structured and focused fashion.

Field Investigation

Our objective is to ultimately understand the capabilities and motivations of those engaged in targeted malware

attacks. Field research provides critical insight into the methods and operations of the attackers. By analyzing

computers at locations that are routinely targeted by (similar) attackers, we aim to identify portions of command and control infrastructure that the attackers use for particular targets as well as document the type of

data that the attackers exfiltrate from the targets. However, our research aims to be more than just extracting

information from those who have been compromised.

JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 2: METHODOLOGY & INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES

The Tracking GhostNet investigation revealed significant compromises at Tibetan-exile and Indian targets. It

was also found that Indian government related entities, both in India proper and throughout the world, had

been thoroughly compromised. These included computers at Indian embassies in Belgium, Serbia, Germany,

Italy, Kuwait, the United States, Zimbabwe, and the High Commissions of India in Cyprus and the United

Kingdom. During the GhostNet investigation we had discovered evidence of multiple infections for which the

information available was incomplete, and to which we wanted to return for follow up. In particular, we found

one piece of malware uploading sensitive documents. Another report published soon after Tracking GhostNet,

entitled

The Gh0st in the Shell: Network Security in the Himalayas,

analysed the network traffic of Air Jaldi,

a community WiFi network in Dharamsala, India. It found that computers in Dharamsala were connecting with

two of the control servers documented in our report (Vallentin et al. 2009).

With the aim of focusing on both these wider pattern of compromises, and the hanging threads from the previous investigation, we worked with our existing approach, informed by the view that collecting data as close

to the intended target as possible was likely to yield actionable evidence of breaches that could be followed

through to their source, lead to wider pools of target sets, and yield information on the attackers.

In conducting the field research we were influenced by the Action Research (AR) literature (Lewin 1946; Curle

1947) that has evolved since the 1940s, as well as other field-based investigation and research techniques. The

AR field-based approach feeds into the fusion methodology that guides our overall investigatory process. It

employs ethical and participatory observations and structured focused interviews. We combined this grounded

research with technical interrogation, including network monitoring activities. As with GhostNet, we were

fortunate to have the cooperation of Tibetan organizations, and benefited tremendously from the willingness of

His Holiness the Dalai Lama and other Tibetans to share information with our investigators. As a result, for the

Shadow investigation we conducted primary field research in Dharamsala, India from August until December

2009. (Dharamsala is the location of the OHHDL as well as the TGIE).

The primary objectives of the field investigations were to research the wider patterns of compromised Indian

and Tibetan related targets, investigate the reports of targeted malware attacks that have emerged from the

Tibetan community, and raise information and computer security awareness within the Tibetan community

and assist in their security planning and implementation. Throughout the field investigation process, we also

investigated the broader social, political, military, and intelligence context. We conducted extensive on-site

interviews with officials in the Tibetan Government-in-Exile, the Office of the Dalai Lama and Tibetan NGOs.

These interviews allowed us to gain an understanding of the security practices and network infrastructure of

compromised locations. We also used network monitoring software during field investigations in order to collect

technical data from compromised computer systems and perform an initial analysis to confirm the existence

of malware and the transfer of information between compromised computers and command and control servers. The network monitoring tools allowed us to collect samples from compromised computers and identify

command and control servers used by the attackers. The network monitoring was undertaken with the explicit

consent of the Tibetan organizations.

While monitoring the network traffic of a local NGO, Common Ground, as part of an Internet security audit,

traffic from a local WiFi mesh network, TennorNet was also captured, revealing malicious activity. An anomaly

was detected when analyzing this traffic: computers in Dharamsala were beaconing or checking in with a command and control server (jdusnemsaz.com/119.84.4.43) located in Chongqing, PRC. The location of Chongqing

is contextually interesting as it has a high concentration of Triads

well known Asian-based organized criminal networks

who have significant connections to the Chinese government and the Chinese Communist Party

(Lam 2009). The Triads have extended their traditional criminal activities to include technology-enabled crime

JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 2: METHODOLOGY & INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES

such as

computer software piracy and credit card forgery and fraud

(Choo 2008).

An investigation revealed that the computer on TennorNet generating the malicious traffic belonged to Mr. Serta

Tsultrim, a Tibetan Member of Parliament, editor of of the weekly Tibetan language newspaper Tibet Express

and the director of the Khawa Karpo Tibet Culture Centre. Tsultrim is also the coordinator of the Association of

Tibetan Journalists (ATJ). We probed for his threat perception, and who he felt might be targeting him and why.

We sought to establish his perception of what documents and correspondence might be particularly sensitive.

Tsultrim was particularly concerned about this network being compromised.

Following the discovery of this compromise, we approached the OHHDL and formally requested permission