clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

text stringlengths 4 429
p. 37
p. 40
Part VI: Conclusions
p. 42
Bibliography and Suggested Readings
p. 45
Glossary
p. 51
PART 1:
Background and Context
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 1: BACKGROUND & CONTEXT
Introduction - Building upon GhostNet
Research into computer network exploitation, cyber espionage, malware and botnets has expanded in recent
years from a relatively small cottage industry involving primarily technical experts to a major global phenomenon
which now includes academia, defence, intelligence, law enforcement, and the private sector. The rapid rise of
this industry is in part a recognition of the significant threat that these global criminal ecosystems represent to
critical infrastructure, government systems, personal privacy, commerce, and defense. Several high profile cases
and events, including the attacks on Google and other American companies in December 2009, underscore the
growing threat environment and suggest that these attacks are becoming the norm rather than an exception.
Policymakers are responding with legislation, institutional reforms and new initiatives, and an already sizable
market for cyber security services is mushrooming into a multi-billion dollar global industry.
This report aims to contribute to research and debate in this domain. Its release is strategic, coming roughly one
year after the publication of Tracking GhostNet (See Box 1, below).
Box 1. Tracking GhostNet: Lessons Learned
Tracking Ghostnet: Investigating a Cyber Espionage Network was the product of a ten-month investigation and
analysis focused on allegations of Chinese cyber espionage against the Tibetan community. The research entailed
field-based investigations in India, Europe and North America working directly with affected Tibetan organizations,
including the Private Office of the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan Government-in-Exile, and several Tibetan NGOs in Europe
and North America. The fieldwork generated extensive data that allowed us to examine Tibetan information security
practices, as well as capture evidence of malware that had penetrated Tibetan computer systems. We also engaged
in extensive data analysis and technical investigation of web-based interfaces to command and control servers that
were used by attackers to send instructions to, and receive data from compromised computers.
The report documented a wide ranging network of compromised computers, including at least 1,295 spread across
103 countries, 30 percent of which we identified and determined to be
high-value
targets, including ministries
of foreign affairs, embassies, international organizations, news organizations, and a computer located at NATO
headquarters. Although there was circumstantial evidence pointing to elements within the People
s Republic of
China, our investigation concluded that there was not enough evidence to implicate the Chinese government itself
and attribution behind GhostNet remains a mystery.
The report
s aftermath was a learning experience. The data that had been collected during the GhostNet investigation
included sensitive information about compromised computers in over a hundred countries. Many of the victims
were understandably concerned about which of their computers were targeted and compromised, and came to us
for information. On our side, we felt unsure about the protocol around information sharing, and were in an awkward
position to be able to give information over to governments and affected parties directly without being entirely clear
about whom would be responsible and whether or not our interlocutors were appropriate authorities. The notification
problems around Ghostnet informed our approach to the Shadows in the Cloud investigation, including being more
conscious from the outset of documenting our notification procedures.
The title of the report
Shadows in the Cloud: An Investigation into Cyber Espionage 2.0
is suggestive of
several threads that wind their way through the investigation. First, the malware networks we document and
analyze are to a large degree organized and operated through the misuse of social networking and cloud computing platforms, including Google, Baidu, Yahoo!, and Twitter, in addition to traditional command and control
servers. Second, although we are able to piece together circumstantial evidence that provides the location and
possible associations of the attackers, their actual identities and motivations remain illusory. We catch a glimpse
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 1: BACKGROUND & CONTEXT
of a shadow of attribution in the cloud, in other words, but have no positive identification. The 2.0 designation
also contains a double entendre: it refers to a generational shift we believe is unfolding in malware networks in
multiple dimensions, from what were once primarily simple to increasingly complex, adaptive systems spread
across redundant services and platforms, and from criminal and industrial-based exploitation to political, military, and intelligence-focused espionage. The 2.0 reference is also meant to note how the Shadow investigation
is both a re-engagement with, but also a departure from, its predecessor: the Tracking GhostNet investigation.
This report is a continuation of Tracking GhostNet, but also represents a significantly new investigation yielding
different and more nuanced evidence and analysis of the evolving cybercrime and cyber espionage environment. As with GhostNet, we are interested in better understanding the evolving nature and complex ecosystem
of today
s malware networks and see this investigation as helping to build a knowledge base around cyber security research. In this respect, Shadows in the Cloud is very much a work-in-progress, insofar as we began this
investigation by picking up several threads that were left open-ended or unanswered in the original GhostNet
investigation, and expect to continue to examine threads that are left hanging in this report.
The aim of this present investigation is to further refine the methodologies used to investigate and analyze
malware networks through a fusion methodology, which combines network-based technical interrogation, data
analysis and visualization, and field-based contextual investigations (See Box 2, below). The combination of
methods from different disciplines is a critical and common feature of both the GhostNet and Shadow investigations and analyses. Network-based technical interrogation, open source data mining and analysis (using tools
such as Google), key informant interviews and field-based investigations on their own can accomplish a great
deal, but it is through their fusion that a more comprehensive and nuanced understanding can be achieved.
Box 2. Operationalizing the Fusion Methodology
Over the past decade we have been developing a fusion methodology for investigating the exercise of political
power in cyberspace. This approach combines quantitative, qualitative and technical data, and draws on
multidisciplinary analysis techniques to derive results. In our field investigations, we conduct research among
affected target audiences and employ techniques that include interviews, long-term in situ interaction with our
partners, and technical data collection involving system monitoring, network reconnaissance, and interrogation.
Data and in situ analysis from field investigations are then taken to the lab where they are analysed using a variety
of data fusion and visualization methods, based around the Palantir data fusion system. Leads developed on
the basis of in-field activities are pursued through technical investigations and the resulting data and analysis
outputs are shared with our in-field teams and partners for verification and for generating additional entry points
for follow-on field investigations. We then interpret results from these investigations through a variety of theoretical
lenses drawing from disciplines of political science, international relations, sociology, risk analysis, and criminology
(among others). We believe that through this mixed methods interdisciplinary approach we are able to develop a
richer understanding than would be possible from studies that focus solely on technical analysis or that primarily
consist of legal, policy or theoretical investigations.
The Shadow investigation began as a follow-up of unexplored paths discovered during the GhostNet investigation. It started in the offices of Tibetan organizations who suspected they were targets of cyber espionage, and
broadened to include a much wider list of victims. The investigation used a number of techniques, including
a DNS sinkhole we established by registering domains that had previously been used by the attackers targeting Tibetan institutions, such as a computer system at the offices of the Dalai Lama. This reinforces our view
that the combination of technical analysis and field investigation forms a fruitful starting point of inquiry that
ultimately leads to important insights into the attackers
capabilities, the ability to investigate a much wider
domain of infected targets, and a contextual understanding of the attackers.
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 1: BACKGROUND & CONTEXT
As was the case with GhostNet, dozens of high-level government networks, embassies, international organizations and others have been penetrated, and confidential, sensitive, and private documents stolen. The Shadows
report underscores the interconnected and complex challenges of cyber security. In particular, it points to the

p. 37

p. 40

Part VI: Conclusions

p. 42

Bibliography and Suggested Readings

p. 45

Glossary

p. 51

PART 1:

Background and Context

JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 1: BACKGROUND & CONTEXT

Introduction - Building upon GhostNet

Research into computer network exploitation, cyber espionage, malware and botnets has expanded in recent

years from a relatively small cottage industry involving primarily technical experts to a major global phenomenon

which now includes academia, defence, intelligence, law enforcement, and the private sector. The rapid rise of

this industry is in part a recognition of the significant threat that these global criminal ecosystems represent to

critical infrastructure, government systems, personal privacy, commerce, and defense. Several high profile cases

and events, including the attacks on Google and other American companies in December 2009, underscore the

growing threat environment and suggest that these attacks are becoming the norm rather than an exception.

Policymakers are responding with legislation, institutional reforms and new initiatives, and an already sizable

market for cyber security services is mushrooming into a multi-billion dollar global industry.

This report aims to contribute to research and debate in this domain. Its release is strategic, coming roughly one

year after the publication of Tracking GhostNet (See Box 1, below).

Box 1. Tracking GhostNet: Lessons Learned

Tracking Ghostnet: Investigating a Cyber Espionage Network was the product of a ten-month investigation and

analysis focused on allegations of Chinese cyber espionage against the Tibetan community. The research entailed

field-based investigations in India, Europe and North America working directly with affected Tibetan organizations,

including the Private Office of the Dalai Lama, the Tibetan Government-in-Exile, and several Tibetan NGOs in Europe

and North America. The fieldwork generated extensive data that allowed us to examine Tibetan information security

practices, as well as capture evidence of malware that had penetrated Tibetan computer systems. We also engaged

in extensive data analysis and technical investigation of web-based interfaces to command and control servers that

were used by attackers to send instructions to, and receive data from compromised computers.

The report documented a wide ranging network of compromised computers, including at least 1,295 spread across

103 countries, 30 percent of which we identified and determined to be

high-value

targets, including ministries

of foreign affairs, embassies, international organizations, news organizations, and a computer located at NATO

headquarters. Although there was circumstantial evidence pointing to elements within the People

s Republic of

China, our investigation concluded that there was not enough evidence to implicate the Chinese government itself

and attribution behind GhostNet remains a mystery.

The report

s aftermath was a learning experience. The data that had been collected during the GhostNet investigation

included sensitive information about compromised computers in over a hundred countries. Many of the victims

were understandably concerned about which of their computers were targeted and compromised, and came to us

for information. On our side, we felt unsure about the protocol around information sharing, and were in an awkward

position to be able to give information over to governments and affected parties directly without being entirely clear

about whom would be responsible and whether or not our interlocutors were appropriate authorities. The notification

problems around Ghostnet informed our approach to the Shadows in the Cloud investigation, including being more

conscious from the outset of documenting our notification procedures.

The title of the report

Shadows in the Cloud: An Investigation into Cyber Espionage 2.0

is suggestive of

several threads that wind their way through the investigation. First, the malware networks we document and

analyze are to a large degree organized and operated through the misuse of social networking and cloud computing platforms, including Google, Baidu, Yahoo!, and Twitter, in addition to traditional command and control

servers. Second, although we are able to piece together circumstantial evidence that provides the location and

possible associations of the attackers, their actual identities and motivations remain illusory. We catch a glimpse

JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 1: BACKGROUND & CONTEXT

of a shadow of attribution in the cloud, in other words, but have no positive identification. The 2.0 designation

also contains a double entendre: it refers to a generational shift we believe is unfolding in malware networks in

multiple dimensions, from what were once primarily simple to increasingly complex, adaptive systems spread

across redundant services and platforms, and from criminal and industrial-based exploitation to political, military, and intelligence-focused espionage. The 2.0 reference is also meant to note how the Shadow investigation

is both a re-engagement with, but also a departure from, its predecessor: the Tracking GhostNet investigation.

This report is a continuation of Tracking GhostNet, but also represents a significantly new investigation yielding

different and more nuanced evidence and analysis of the evolving cybercrime and cyber espionage environment. As with GhostNet, we are interested in better understanding the evolving nature and complex ecosystem

of today

s malware networks and see this investigation as helping to build a knowledge base around cyber security research. In this respect, Shadows in the Cloud is very much a work-in-progress, insofar as we began this

investigation by picking up several threads that were left open-ended or unanswered in the original GhostNet

investigation, and expect to continue to examine threads that are left hanging in this report.

The aim of this present investigation is to further refine the methodologies used to investigate and analyze

malware networks through a fusion methodology, which combines network-based technical interrogation, data

analysis and visualization, and field-based contextual investigations (See Box 2, below). The combination of

methods from different disciplines is a critical and common feature of both the GhostNet and Shadow investigations and analyses. Network-based technical interrogation, open source data mining and analysis (using tools

such as Google), key informant interviews and field-based investigations on their own can accomplish a great

deal, but it is through their fusion that a more comprehensive and nuanced understanding can be achieved.

Box 2. Operationalizing the Fusion Methodology

Over the past decade we have been developing a fusion methodology for investigating the exercise of political

power in cyberspace. This approach combines quantitative, qualitative and technical data, and draws on

multidisciplinary analysis techniques to derive results. In our field investigations, we conduct research among

affected target audiences and employ techniques that include interviews, long-term in situ interaction with our

partners, and technical data collection involving system monitoring, network reconnaissance, and interrogation.

Data and in situ analysis from field investigations are then taken to the lab where they are analysed using a variety

of data fusion and visualization methods, based around the Palantir data fusion system. Leads developed on

the basis of in-field activities are pursued through technical investigations and the resulting data and analysis

outputs are shared with our in-field teams and partners for verification and for generating additional entry points

for follow-on field investigations. We then interpret results from these investigations through a variety of theoretical

lenses drawing from disciplines of political science, international relations, sociology, risk analysis, and criminology

(among others). We believe that through this mixed methods interdisciplinary approach we are able to develop a

richer understanding than would be possible from studies that focus solely on technical analysis or that primarily

consist of legal, policy or theoretical investigations.

The Shadow investigation began as a follow-up of unexplored paths discovered during the GhostNet investigation. It started in the offices of Tibetan organizations who suspected they were targets of cyber espionage, and

broadened to include a much wider list of victims. The investigation used a number of techniques, including

a DNS sinkhole we established by registering domains that had previously been used by the attackers targeting Tibetan institutions, such as a computer system at the offices of the Dalai Lama. This reinforces our view

that the combination of technical analysis and field investigation forms a fruitful starting point of inquiry that

ultimately leads to important insights into the attackers

capabilities, the ability to investigate a much wider

domain of infected targets, and a contextual understanding of the attackers.

JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 1: BACKGROUND & CONTEXT

As was the case with GhostNet, dozens of high-level government networks, embassies, international organizations and others have been penetrated, and confidential, sensitive, and private documents stolen. The Shadows

report underscores the interconnected and complex challenges of cyber security. In particular, it points to the