clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

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possibility of a perfect storm that may result from a lack of international consensus, ill-developed and implemented security practices, a paucity of notification mechanisms, and the growing confluence of cyber crime,
traditional espionage, and the militarization of cyberspace.
About the Shadows in the Cloud Investigation:
Beyond GhostNet
The Tracking GhostNet report revealed a small piece of the underground cyber espionage world. After the
report was published, several of the command and control servers listed in the report and part of the network
went offline. However, targeted cyber attacks against Tibetan interests and various governments did not suddenly cease. The Shadowserver Foundation had also been looking into several similar cyber attacks both prior
to and after the GhostNet report was published. Approximately six months after the report
s publication, the
Shadowserver Foundation and the Information Warfare Monitor began a collaborative effort to further investigate new and related attacks, as well as any remaining parts of GhostNet.
Shadows in the Cloud thus departs from Tracking GhostNet in several ways. Research on cyber security is
rapidly developing, and several groups with widely differing skill sets and experience are working on related areas.
Information sharing, generally speaking, is immature and underdeveloped, often hampered by proprietary
concerns surrounding the commercial market for cyber security services. Progress on research in this area will
only stand to benefit from greater dialogue and information sharing among security researchers. Shadows in the
Cloud was thus undertaken jointly by the Information Warfare Monitor, which itself is a collaborative engagement between a public and private institution, and the Shadowserver Foundation, which is an all-volunteer
watchdog group of security professionals who gather, track and report on malware, botnet activity, and electronic fraud. The Information Warfare Monitor and the Shadowserver Foundation have several complementary
resources and data sets. Combining efforts in this way contributed to a much greater pool of knowledge and
expertise from which to draw strategic choices along each step of the investigation, and for overall analysis.
Lastly, the information sharing that went into Shadows in the Cloud extended to the Office of His Holiness the
Dalai Lama (OHHDL), the Tibetan Government in Exile (TGIE) and Tibetan non-governmental organizations.
Information sharing among victims of network intrusions and espionage is rare. The Tibetan organizations were
willing to provide access and share information with our investigation that proved to be invaluable.
Shadows in the Cloud is also distinct from Tracking GhostNet in terms of the type of data unearthed during the
course of the investigation. With GhostNet, while we were able to monitor the exfiltration of sensitive documents
from computers to which we had field access, we were unable to otherwise determine which documents were
stolen from victims that we had identified, and thus could only infer intentionality on the part of the attackers. In
Shadows, we were able to recover a significant volume of stolen documents, some of which are highly sensitive,
from a drop zone connected to one of the malware networks under observation. Although not unprecedented
among cyber security research, access to stolen documents such as those which are analysed here offers a
unique but partial insight into the type of information that can be leaked out of compromised computers. It may
even help answer some lingering questions about the intentionality and attribution of the attackers, although
that is not clear by any means. We pick up both of these threads in detail in our report below.
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 1: BACKGROUND & CONTEXT
Research Framework
Although the research that we engage in is investigatory, it is not simply a report of the facts per se. Our aim is
to engage the cyber security research community by building upon prior research in a structured, focused manner
through a systematic research framework. Several overarching research questions structure the Shadow investigation and our analysis. We outline these here, and pick up on them throughout our report.
Observation and Characterization of the Ecosystem of Malware
One of the aims of cyber security research is to observe and characterize the evolving nature and complex
ecosystem of today
s malware, botnets, cyber espionage and cyber crime networks. This is not a simple task,
as the ecosystem of malware is very much like a complex adaptive system, only one that is dispersed across
multiple ecosystems, operated by clandestine actors with potential criminal and/or espionage motivations who
have shown a propensity to adapt their techniques to new software tools, social networking platforms and other
technologies. Crimeware networks, which to some extent are the oldest and most widespread malware networks, target generalized population sets in a mostly undiscriminating fashion. Alongside crimeware networks,
however, there are other networks that are more discriminating, often characterized by the use of custom-made
software attacks, and which seek to exploit and infiltrate not random pools of victims but rather deliberately
selected targets. Within each of these two major types of malware networks are likely many sub-types, including networks that specialize in distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks. Confusing matters further is that
toolkits and techniques used in one instance are borrowed from another, making classification difficult and
increasingly questionable. Being able to map the ecosystem of malware, however, is critical for research, policy
and operational matters, and so is one of the primary aims of our research in Shadows in the Cloud (Adair 2010).
From Criminal Exploitation to Political Espionage?
Cyber crime is as old as cyberspace itself, and criminal networks, as alluded to above, are longstanding characteristics of the dark side of the Internet. What is more novel is the use of criminal exploitation kits, techniques
and networks for purposes of political espionage (Villeneuve 2010). Debates about whether or not governments
are actively involved in cyber espionage and computer network exploitation, either through agencies they
control directly or through some kind of privateering, now dominate the headlines and have become part of a
growing politicization of the cyber security arena. One of the aims of our research is to discern to what extent
we can impute motivations behind the attacks we document, to help understand whether in fact the networks
under our observation are part of a criminal network, a political espionage network, an industrial espionage
network, an opportunistic network, or some combination of these. Such questions, it should be pointed out, are
entirely distinct (though not unrelated) to the question of attribution (i.e., who is responsible?).
We hypothesize that political espionage networks may be deliberately exploiting criminal kits, techniques and
networks both to distance themselves from attribution and strategically cultivate a climate of uncertainty. To
answer these questions requires a high degree of nuance, as the information we have been able to obtain is
incomplete, and so a great deal of our analysis rests on inferences made on the basis of multiple data sources
and our fusion methodology (See Box 2, page 3).
Collateral Compromise
Organizations from around the world have moved swiftly to adopt new information and communication
technologies, and have become part of electronically linked communities in the commercial, government, and
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 1: BACKGROUND & CONTEXT
military sectors. They exchange information as a matter of routine, across social networking and cloud computing platforms, using flash drives and other portable devices, and thus become co-dependent on each others
information and computer and network security practices. The vulnerabilities of one actor can quickly and
unintentionally compromise unwitting third parties, which in turn can become the basis for actionable intelligence against those third parties. We hypothesize that there is a high probability for collateral compromise
in any malware network because of this mutual dependence. A key consideration, of course, is how to discern
intended from unintended victims, a problem that is difficult to solve.
Actionable Intelligence around Exfiltrated Data
Related to collateral compromise is the issue of the strategic value of exfiltrated data. Access to this data can
offer important clues about the motivation and attribution of the attackers. It can also provide insight about
the strategic value of the type of data that can be accessed through malware networks. In the course of our
investigation, we assumed that we would get, at best, only a partial picture of the exfiltrated data, but even that
partial picture would provide some potentially meaningful information for those who acquire it. While each individual data point may be of little value, when combined with other data acquired through other means (e.g.,
open source searching) a very detailed operational picture can be assembled. We try to assess and evaluate the
exfiltrated data we were able to access with these issues in mind.
Attribution
Examining attribution is an arduous but important component of any cyber security investigation and has
become a major political issue at the highest levels around several recent cyber attacks. In order to characterise
the attackers, a variety of technical indicators as well as behavioural indicators need to be analysed (Parker et
al. 2004; Parker et al. 2003). These characteristics are interpreted in the context of the nature of the targets and
the objective of the attack. The nature and timing of the attack, the exploit, the malware, and the command and
control infrastructure, are just some of the components that go into determining attribution. Knowing the methods and behaviour of the attackers as well as the character of the tools the attackers use once inside the target
network, the data that the attackers exfiltrate and where that data goes, are also crucial parts of the overall assessment (Bejtlich 2010; Cloppert 2009; Mandiant 2010).
Moreover, historical information and ongoing intelligence collection are crucial when trying to understand the
scope of the threat (Deloitte & Touche LLP, 2010). It is difficult to assess attribution when examining an isolated
attack; it is the broader patterns, connections and contextual information that inform the process. However, it is
uncommon to have a complete data set covering all aspects of the attackers
operations. Some may have access
to data regarding the attackers
activities once inside a particular network. Others may have extensive collections of malware samples and historical data on command and control infrastructure. Others may have information on how the attackers use various exploits, or craft targeted spear phishing emails and other methods focused
on compromising particular targets. Others may have data retrieved from the attackers that indicate the identity

possibility of a perfect storm that may result from a lack of international consensus, ill-developed and implemented security practices, a paucity of notification mechanisms, and the growing confluence of cyber crime,

traditional espionage, and the militarization of cyberspace.

About the Shadows in the Cloud Investigation:

Beyond GhostNet

The Tracking GhostNet report revealed a small piece of the underground cyber espionage world. After the

report was published, several of the command and control servers listed in the report and part of the network

went offline. However, targeted cyber attacks against Tibetan interests and various governments did not suddenly cease. The Shadowserver Foundation had also been looking into several similar cyber attacks both prior

to and after the GhostNet report was published. Approximately six months after the report

s publication, the

Shadowserver Foundation and the Information Warfare Monitor began a collaborative effort to further investigate new and related attacks, as well as any remaining parts of GhostNet.

Shadows in the Cloud thus departs from Tracking GhostNet in several ways. Research on cyber security is

rapidly developing, and several groups with widely differing skill sets and experience are working on related areas.

Information sharing, generally speaking, is immature and underdeveloped, often hampered by proprietary

concerns surrounding the commercial market for cyber security services. Progress on research in this area will

only stand to benefit from greater dialogue and information sharing among security researchers. Shadows in the

Cloud was thus undertaken jointly by the Information Warfare Monitor, which itself is a collaborative engagement between a public and private institution, and the Shadowserver Foundation, which is an all-volunteer

watchdog group of security professionals who gather, track and report on malware, botnet activity, and electronic fraud. The Information Warfare Monitor and the Shadowserver Foundation have several complementary

resources and data sets. Combining efforts in this way contributed to a much greater pool of knowledge and

expertise from which to draw strategic choices along each step of the investigation, and for overall analysis.

Lastly, the information sharing that went into Shadows in the Cloud extended to the Office of His Holiness the

Dalai Lama (OHHDL), the Tibetan Government in Exile (TGIE) and Tibetan non-governmental organizations.

Information sharing among victims of network intrusions and espionage is rare. The Tibetan organizations were

willing to provide access and share information with our investigation that proved to be invaluable.

Shadows in the Cloud is also distinct from Tracking GhostNet in terms of the type of data unearthed during the

course of the investigation. With GhostNet, while we were able to monitor the exfiltration of sensitive documents

from computers to which we had field access, we were unable to otherwise determine which documents were

stolen from victims that we had identified, and thus could only infer intentionality on the part of the attackers. In

Shadows, we were able to recover a significant volume of stolen documents, some of which are highly sensitive,

from a drop zone connected to one of the malware networks under observation. Although not unprecedented

among cyber security research, access to stolen documents such as those which are analysed here offers a

unique but partial insight into the type of information that can be leaked out of compromised computers. It may

even help answer some lingering questions about the intentionality and attribution of the attackers, although

that is not clear by any means. We pick up both of these threads in detail in our report below.

JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 1: BACKGROUND & CONTEXT

Research Framework

Although the research that we engage in is investigatory, it is not simply a report of the facts per se. Our aim is

to engage the cyber security research community by building upon prior research in a structured, focused manner

through a systematic research framework. Several overarching research questions structure the Shadow investigation and our analysis. We outline these here, and pick up on them throughout our report.

Observation and Characterization of the Ecosystem of Malware

One of the aims of cyber security research is to observe and characterize the evolving nature and complex

ecosystem of today

s malware, botnets, cyber espionage and cyber crime networks. This is not a simple task,

as the ecosystem of malware is very much like a complex adaptive system, only one that is dispersed across

multiple ecosystems, operated by clandestine actors with potential criminal and/or espionage motivations who

have shown a propensity to adapt their techniques to new software tools, social networking platforms and other

technologies. Crimeware networks, which to some extent are the oldest and most widespread malware networks, target generalized population sets in a mostly undiscriminating fashion. Alongside crimeware networks,

however, there are other networks that are more discriminating, often characterized by the use of custom-made

software attacks, and which seek to exploit and infiltrate not random pools of victims but rather deliberately

selected targets. Within each of these two major types of malware networks are likely many sub-types, including networks that specialize in distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks. Confusing matters further is that

toolkits and techniques used in one instance are borrowed from another, making classification difficult and

increasingly questionable. Being able to map the ecosystem of malware, however, is critical for research, policy

and operational matters, and so is one of the primary aims of our research in Shadows in the Cloud (Adair 2010).

From Criminal Exploitation to Political Espionage?

Cyber crime is as old as cyberspace itself, and criminal networks, as alluded to above, are longstanding characteristics of the dark side of the Internet. What is more novel is the use of criminal exploitation kits, techniques

and networks for purposes of political espionage (Villeneuve 2010). Debates about whether or not governments

are actively involved in cyber espionage and computer network exploitation, either through agencies they

control directly or through some kind of privateering, now dominate the headlines and have become part of a

growing politicization of the cyber security arena. One of the aims of our research is to discern to what extent

we can impute motivations behind the attacks we document, to help understand whether in fact the networks

under our observation are part of a criminal network, a political espionage network, an industrial espionage

network, an opportunistic network, or some combination of these. Such questions, it should be pointed out, are

entirely distinct (though not unrelated) to the question of attribution (i.e., who is responsible?).

We hypothesize that political espionage networks may be deliberately exploiting criminal kits, techniques and

networks both to distance themselves from attribution and strategically cultivate a climate of uncertainty. To

answer these questions requires a high degree of nuance, as the information we have been able to obtain is

incomplete, and so a great deal of our analysis rests on inferences made on the basis of multiple data sources

and our fusion methodology (See Box 2, page 3).

Collateral Compromise

Organizations from around the world have moved swiftly to adopt new information and communication

technologies, and have become part of electronically linked communities in the commercial, government, and

JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 1: BACKGROUND & CONTEXT

military sectors. They exchange information as a matter of routine, across social networking and cloud computing platforms, using flash drives and other portable devices, and thus become co-dependent on each others

information and computer and network security practices. The vulnerabilities of one actor can quickly and

unintentionally compromise unwitting third parties, which in turn can become the basis for actionable intelligence against those third parties. We hypothesize that there is a high probability for collateral compromise

in any malware network because of this mutual dependence. A key consideration, of course, is how to discern

intended from unintended victims, a problem that is difficult to solve.

Actionable Intelligence around Exfiltrated Data

Related to collateral compromise is the issue of the strategic value of exfiltrated data. Access to this data can

offer important clues about the motivation and attribution of the attackers. It can also provide insight about

the strategic value of the type of data that can be accessed through malware networks. In the course of our

investigation, we assumed that we would get, at best, only a partial picture of the exfiltrated data, but even that

partial picture would provide some potentially meaningful information for those who acquire it. While each individual data point may be of little value, when combined with other data acquired through other means (e.g.,

open source searching) a very detailed operational picture can be assembled. We try to assess and evaluate the

exfiltrated data we were able to access with these issues in mind.

Attribution

Examining attribution is an arduous but important component of any cyber security investigation and has

become a major political issue at the highest levels around several recent cyber attacks. In order to characterise

the attackers, a variety of technical indicators as well as behavioural indicators need to be analysed (Parker et

al. 2004; Parker et al. 2003). These characteristics are interpreted in the context of the nature of the targets and

the objective of the attack. The nature and timing of the attack, the exploit, the malware, and the command and

control infrastructure, are just some of the components that go into determining attribution. Knowing the methods and behaviour of the attackers as well as the character of the tools the attackers use once inside the target

network, the data that the attackers exfiltrate and where that data goes, are also crucial parts of the overall assessment (Bejtlich 2010; Cloppert 2009; Mandiant 2010).

Moreover, historical information and ongoing intelligence collection are crucial when trying to understand the

scope of the threat (Deloitte & Touche LLP, 2010). It is difficult to assess attribution when examining an isolated

attack; it is the broader patterns, connections and contextual information that inform the process. However, it is

uncommon to have a complete data set covering all aspects of the attackers

operations. Some may have access

to data regarding the attackers

activities once inside a particular network. Others may have extensive collections of malware samples and historical data on command and control infrastructure. Others may have information on how the attackers use various exploits, or craft targeted spear phishing emails and other methods focused

on compromising particular targets. Others may have data retrieved from the attackers that indicate the identity