clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

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to audit network traffic to determine whether we could identify similar beacon packets associated with the
command and control server (jdusnemsaz.com/119.84.4.43). A representative of OHHDL agreed that we could
access the office network under an agreement similar to the initial GhostNet investigation. In consultation with
OHHDL staff, we focused our attention on the desktop machines that were most likely to be compromised, and
commenced a network tap of a number of workstations. Interestingly, it was one of these workstations that
was the origin of the GhostNet investigation, where we had observed sensitive documents being exfiltrated in
September 2008. Almost immediately we identified malicious traffic connecting with the command and control
server (jdusnemsaz.com/119.84.4.43).
Our next step was to refer to the management interface in the ICSA-certified Cyberoam firewall that the OHHDL
had installed in their network as part of their extensive upgrading of security procedures in the wake of the
GhostNet breach. We isolated all outbound traffic to the command and control server and identified any other
machines on the office Local Area Network that were currently, or had recently, been communicating with the
command and control server. From the Cyberoam interface we were able to identify one other machine that was
compromised. We proceeded to tap the traffic from this machine and began to see domain names associated
with the distributed social media command and control channels that we would later identify in the lab as part
of the command and control infrastructure. Similarly, the lab investigation was able to reconstruct the documents
that were exfiltrated from OHHDL machines and we were able to brief OHHDL on the extent of the breach.
Technical Investigative Activities
Our technical investigation was comprised of several interrelated components:
DNS Sinkholing - Through registering expired domain names previously used in cyber espionage attacks as
command and control servers, we were are able to observe incoming connections from still-compromised
computers. This allowed us to collect information on the methods of the attackers as well as the nature of
the victims.
Malware Analysis - We collected malware samples from a variety of attacks that allowed us to determine
the exploits the attackers used, the theme used to lure targets into executing the malware, as well as the
command and control servers used by the attackers. We also analysed additional malware found on servers
under the control of the attackers. Malware samples consisted primarily of the files with the PDF, DOC, PPT
and EXE file extensions.
Command and Control Server Topography - We were able to map out the command and control infrastructure of the attackers by linking information from the sinkhole, the field investigations and the malware analysis. We collected the domain names, URL paths and IP addresses used by the attackers. This allowed us to find
links between our research and other command and control servers observed in other attacks in prior research.
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 2: METHODOLOGY & INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES
Victim Identification - We were able to identify victims that the attackers had compromised by analyzing
sinkhole server connections, recovering documents that had been exfiltrated, and viewing control panels
used by the attackers to direct the compromised computers.
Data Recovery - We were able to retrieve documents that had been sent to drop zones from victim systems
and stolen by the attackers.
We carried out this research carefully, guided by principles rooted in the computer security field (Burstein 2008;
Cooke et al. 2005; Stone-Gross et al. 2009; Smith and Toppel 2009). Our aim was to understand and document
the activities of the attackers as well as gather enough information to enable notification of those who had been
compromised. The principles that guided our field and technical investigations include the following:
We collected network data in the field from computers that had been compromised by malware with the
consent of the owners of the computers.
We monitored command and control infrastructure and recovered exfiltrated data in order to gather enough
information to understand the activities of the attackers and obtain enough information to enable notification of the victims before moving to notify the service providers and hosting companies to seek to have the
networks shut down.
We worked with government authorities in multiple jurisdictions to notify those who had been compromised and to take down the attacker
s command and control infrastructure.
We were careful to store and handle all of the data we collected in a secure manner.
PART 3:
Mapping the
Shadows in the Cloud
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 3: MAPPING THE SHADOWS IN THE CLOUD
In order for us to begin to map the Shadows in the Cloud, it was important for us to have clear starting points.
The first and easiest starting point that we identified was to look back at what was related to and still operational from the previous Tracking GhostNet report. We focused primarily on the domains described in GhostNet
and set out to see what we could learn from them in their current state. The second was to continue collecting
and analyzing information on attacks gleaned from field research and reports that were shared with us by thirdparties. Each of these starting points branched off from one another and crossed paths in various ways, revealing at least two distinct cyber espionage networks.
We previously mentioned that a large portion of the domain names mentioned in Tracking GhostNet went offline
following the initial report. As a result, several of the domain names described in it were abandoned. The domains ultimately expired and were available for re-registration. This gave us the opportunity to take over these
domains and monitor any connections that might come to them. Doing this allowed us to see connections from
victims that were still infected, and learn more about how the command and control server was configured. The
Shadowserver Foundation has utilized this technique for a long time (Higgins 2008).
The investigation was broadened further when field research by the Information Warfare Monitor crossed paths
with research being done by the Shadowserver Foundation. The field research revealed that a computer system
in the OHHDL had been compromised by at least two different types of malware associated with targeted
malware intrusions. Based on our understanding of the malware, the domains and on-going research, we assess
that this compromise also involved at least two different cyber espionage groups and potentially even a third
one. Analysis of several malware components and their associated command and control servers ultimately led
to the discovery of an accessible drop zone for documents being siphoned off compromised systems.
The attackers
command and control infrastructure is a critical component of maintaining persistent access to
compromised computers. Through this infrastructure, the attackers issue commands to the compromised machines as well as exfiltrate data to drop zones or to the command and control servers themselves. By carefully
examining the relationships between command and control servers we were able to map out the extent of one
such network and link it with other similar malware networks.
This report focuses on only one of these networks, one that we have named the Shadow network. This is a
complex network that leveraged social networking websites, webmail providers, free hosting providers and
services from some of the largest companies on the Internet as disposable command and control locations.
The first layer of control used blogs, newsgroups, and social networking services to maintain persistent control
as these system are unlikely to be detected as malicious. As compromised computers accessed these services,
they received another command and control location, often located on free web hosting providers. The command and control servers on the free hosting services are often disabled over time
most likely due to reports
of malicious activity. When the command and control servers on free web hosting services were disabled, the
compromised systems would receive commands from the social networking layer and then beacon (i.e., attempt
a connection) to a more stable inner core of dedicated systems located in the PRC. Unlike the command and
control servers on free web hosting services, these dedicated servers hosted in the PRC have proven to be quite
stable over time.
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 3: MAPPING THE SHADOWS IN THE CLOUD
Analysis of Data while in the Field
During the field investigation we collected samples of network traffic from computers at the OHHDL and other
Tibetan-related locations. Inspection of network traffic from these computers revealed that at least three of them
were compromised and were communicating with the same set of command and control servers. The traffic
analysis revealed that these systems were all connecting to the domain jdusnemsaz.com. At the time it resolved
to the IP address 119.84.4.43, which is assigned to China Telecom in the province of Chongqing, PRC. The commands sent by the command and control server were identical to malware we found at the Tibetan NGO Drewla
and the OHHDL during our GhostNet investigation a year earlier, although were not part of the network that
was described in that initial report.
There is a similarity between the commands sent by the command and control server jdusnemsaz.com and
a previously identified control server, lookbytheway.net. In both cases, the network traffic captured from the
compromised computers revealed that the malware was exfiltrating sensitive documents.
Table 1: Command and Control: Similarities with previous attacks
OHHDL (T)
Nov 2009

to audit network traffic to determine whether we could identify similar beacon packets associated with the

command and control server (jdusnemsaz.com/119.84.4.43). A representative of OHHDL agreed that we could

access the office network under an agreement similar to the initial GhostNet investigation. In consultation with

OHHDL staff, we focused our attention on the desktop machines that were most likely to be compromised, and

commenced a network tap of a number of workstations. Interestingly, it was one of these workstations that

was the origin of the GhostNet investigation, where we had observed sensitive documents being exfiltrated in

September 2008. Almost immediately we identified malicious traffic connecting with the command and control

server (jdusnemsaz.com/119.84.4.43).

Our next step was to refer to the management interface in the ICSA-certified Cyberoam firewall that the OHHDL

had installed in their network as part of their extensive upgrading of security procedures in the wake of the

GhostNet breach. We isolated all outbound traffic to the command and control server and identified any other

machines on the office Local Area Network that were currently, or had recently, been communicating with the

command and control server. From the Cyberoam interface we were able to identify one other machine that was

compromised. We proceeded to tap the traffic from this machine and began to see domain names associated

with the distributed social media command and control channels that we would later identify in the lab as part

of the command and control infrastructure. Similarly, the lab investigation was able to reconstruct the documents

that were exfiltrated from OHHDL machines and we were able to brief OHHDL on the extent of the breach.

Technical Investigative Activities

Our technical investigation was comprised of several interrelated components:

DNS Sinkholing - Through registering expired domain names previously used in cyber espionage attacks as

command and control servers, we were are able to observe incoming connections from still-compromised

computers. This allowed us to collect information on the methods of the attackers as well as the nature of

the victims.

Malware Analysis - We collected malware samples from a variety of attacks that allowed us to determine

the exploits the attackers used, the theme used to lure targets into executing the malware, as well as the

command and control servers used by the attackers. We also analysed additional malware found on servers

under the control of the attackers. Malware samples consisted primarily of the files with the PDF, DOC, PPT

and EXE file extensions.

Command and Control Server Topography - We were able to map out the command and control infrastructure of the attackers by linking information from the sinkhole, the field investigations and the malware analysis. We collected the domain names, URL paths and IP addresses used by the attackers. This allowed us to find

links between our research and other command and control servers observed in other attacks in prior research.

JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 2: METHODOLOGY & INVESTIGATIVE TECHNIQUES

Victim Identification - We were able to identify victims that the attackers had compromised by analyzing

sinkhole server connections, recovering documents that had been exfiltrated, and viewing control panels

used by the attackers to direct the compromised computers.

Data Recovery - We were able to retrieve documents that had been sent to drop zones from victim systems

and stolen by the attackers.

We carried out this research carefully, guided by principles rooted in the computer security field (Burstein 2008;

Cooke et al. 2005; Stone-Gross et al. 2009; Smith and Toppel 2009). Our aim was to understand and document

the activities of the attackers as well as gather enough information to enable notification of those who had been

compromised. The principles that guided our field and technical investigations include the following:

We collected network data in the field from computers that had been compromised by malware with the

consent of the owners of the computers.

We monitored command and control infrastructure and recovered exfiltrated data in order to gather enough

information to understand the activities of the attackers and obtain enough information to enable notification of the victims before moving to notify the service providers and hosting companies to seek to have the

networks shut down.

We worked with government authorities in multiple jurisdictions to notify those who had been compromised and to take down the attacker

s command and control infrastructure.

We were careful to store and handle all of the data we collected in a secure manner.

PART 3:

Mapping the

Shadows in the Cloud

JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 3: MAPPING THE SHADOWS IN THE CLOUD

In order for us to begin to map the Shadows in the Cloud, it was important for us to have clear starting points.

The first and easiest starting point that we identified was to look back at what was related to and still operational from the previous Tracking GhostNet report. We focused primarily on the domains described in GhostNet

and set out to see what we could learn from them in their current state. The second was to continue collecting

and analyzing information on attacks gleaned from field research and reports that were shared with us by thirdparties. Each of these starting points branched off from one another and crossed paths in various ways, revealing at least two distinct cyber espionage networks.

We previously mentioned that a large portion of the domain names mentioned in Tracking GhostNet went offline

following the initial report. As a result, several of the domain names described in it were abandoned. The domains ultimately expired and were available for re-registration. This gave us the opportunity to take over these

domains and monitor any connections that might come to them. Doing this allowed us to see connections from

victims that were still infected, and learn more about how the command and control server was configured. The

Shadowserver Foundation has utilized this technique for a long time (Higgins 2008).

The investigation was broadened further when field research by the Information Warfare Monitor crossed paths

with research being done by the Shadowserver Foundation. The field research revealed that a computer system

in the OHHDL had been compromised by at least two different types of malware associated with targeted

malware intrusions. Based on our understanding of the malware, the domains and on-going research, we assess

that this compromise also involved at least two different cyber espionage groups and potentially even a third

one. Analysis of several malware components and their associated command and control servers ultimately led

to the discovery of an accessible drop zone for documents being siphoned off compromised systems.

The attackers

command and control infrastructure is a critical component of maintaining persistent access to

compromised computers. Through this infrastructure, the attackers issue commands to the compromised machines as well as exfiltrate data to drop zones or to the command and control servers themselves. By carefully

examining the relationships between command and control servers we were able to map out the extent of one

such network and link it with other similar malware networks.

This report focuses on only one of these networks, one that we have named the Shadow network. This is a

complex network that leveraged social networking websites, webmail providers, free hosting providers and

services from some of the largest companies on the Internet as disposable command and control locations.

The first layer of control used blogs, newsgroups, and social networking services to maintain persistent control

as these system are unlikely to be detected as malicious. As compromised computers accessed these services,

they received another command and control location, often located on free web hosting providers. The command and control servers on the free hosting services are often disabled over time

most likely due to reports

of malicious activity. When the command and control servers on free web hosting services were disabled, the

compromised systems would receive commands from the social networking layer and then beacon (i.e., attempt

a connection) to a more stable inner core of dedicated systems located in the PRC. Unlike the command and

control servers on free web hosting services, these dedicated servers hosted in the PRC have proven to be quite

stable over time.

JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 3: MAPPING THE SHADOWS IN THE CLOUD

Analysis of Data while in the Field

During the field investigation we collected samples of network traffic from computers at the OHHDL and other

Tibetan-related locations. Inspection of network traffic from these computers revealed that at least three of them

were compromised and were communicating with the same set of command and control servers. The traffic

analysis revealed that these systems were all connecting to the domain jdusnemsaz.com. At the time it resolved

to the IP address 119.84.4.43, which is assigned to China Telecom in the province of Chongqing, PRC. The commands sent by the command and control server were identical to malware we found at the Tibetan NGO Drewla

and the OHHDL during our GhostNet investigation a year earlier, although were not part of the network that

was described in that initial report.

There is a similarity between the commands sent by the command and control server jdusnemsaz.com and

a previously identified control server, lookbytheway.net. In both cases, the network traffic captured from the

compromised computers revealed that the malware was exfiltrating sensitive documents.

Table 1: Command and Control: Similarities with previous attacks

OHHDL (T)

Nov 2009