clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

text stringlengths 4 429
OHHDL (D)
Nov 2009
TIBETAN MP
Oct 2009
Drewla
Sep 2008
jdusnemsaz.com
119.84.4.43
jdusnemsaz.com
119.84.4.43
jdusnemsaz.com
119.84.4.43
lookbytheway.net
221.5.250.98
/two/zq2009/index.php
NQueryFileop
/two/zq2009/index.php
NQueryFileop
/two/zq2009/index.php
NQueryFileop
/cgi-bin/NQueryFileop
NQueryFileop
Further analysis of the network traffic also revealed that at least one of the systems was infected with additional
malware not associated with the aforementioned command and control servers. The system was attempting
DNS resolutions of multiple hostnames. Two of the hostnames resolved to IP addresses but were not available
when the system attempted to communicate to them. The other hostname did not resolve at all.
The failed DNS resolution was for www.assam2008.net, which is a domain that has been used by a different
group of attackers in the past in conjunction with the Enfal trojan, and suggests a limited connection between
the current malware under investigation and malware used in previous attacks on other targets. This domain
name was available for registration and was added to our ongoing sinkhole project.
While recording network traffic in the field, we observed the attackers removing two senstive documents from
the OHHDL (see fig. 1, page 15). The data was compressed using CAB, split into 100kb chunks when necessary, encoded with base64, and then uploaded to a command and control server. In this case, data was being
uploaded to c2etejs.com, which is hosted on the same IP address (119.84.4.43) as jdusnemsaz.com.
We reconstructed the documents that were exfiltrated from the OHHDL:
letters - current.doc
and
letters - master
2009.doc (see fig. 2, page 15).
The documents contained over 1,500 letters sent from the Dalai Lama
s office
between January and November 2009. While many of the letters are perfunctory
responses to various invitations
and interview requests
they allow the attackers to collect information on anyone contacting the Dalai Lama
office. Moreover, there are some communications contained within these documents that could be considered sensitive, such as communications between the OHHDL and Offices of Tibet around the world. Some communications
contain generic information of the Dalai Lama
s travelling details including schedule of appearances
but very
little that could not be established through open sources and publicly available information on the internet.
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 3: MAPPING THE SHADOWS IN THE CLOUD
Figure 1:
A screen capture of a sensitive document being uploaded to a command and control server.
Figure 2:
The Word Documents Exfiltrated from the OHHDL
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 3: MAPPING THE SHADOWS IN THE CLOUD
Technical Investigation
During the technical investigation we examined the data collected from the field, third-party sources, and from
our DNS sinkhole project in order to determine the attack vectors used to exploit and compromise the victims.
While we were unable to determine how any one individual computer came to be compromised, we documented a variety of exploits used by the attackers. We mapped out the broader command and control infrastructure
by discovering new pieces of malware located on servers that we identified, and catalogued any new servers
that these instances of malware were configured with. We also looked at domains that were co-hosted on the
same servers we had already identified, and used searches to identify Twitter, Google Groups, Blogspot, Baidu
Blogs, blog.com, and Yahoo! Mail accounts that were misused by the attackers to update compromised computers with new command and control locations. We also discovered a panel or listing of compromised computers.
During our investigation into one of the servers we made a significant discovery: we were able to recover data
that was being exfiltrated by the attackers from compromised computers. These documents were only available
on the command and control server for a short time after being uploaded by the compromised systems, as the
attackers frequently removed them at irregular time intervals.
3.2.1 Attack Vectors / Malware
Victims of cyber espionage are often specifically targeted by the attacker and not by happenstance. While it is
possible for a cyber criminal to mass-distribute malware across the Internet with specific intent to compromise
a select set of individuals or organizations, it is not likely to be the most effective tool for the intended job. The
differences in approaches, based on an analysis of tools and kits, can therefore provide some insight into the
branching of cyber espionage from cyber crime, or at least help distinguish more
connected
attackers from
less connected
ones. The varying levels of sophistication in tools, research and delivery set these actors apart,
can make them more or less effective, and establish their level of connection within the underground community. A very sophisticated attacker, for example, will likely be part of a network in the criminal underground
that has access to the latest exploits and kits that generate files with exploits to install their malicious payload.
These kits and files are not readily available to the average cyber criminal. A slightly less sophisticated attacker
might have access to the same kits and exploits once the vulnerability has been publicly disclosed, but prior to
there being a security patch issued for them. While from time to time various methods of generating malicious
PDFs and other document types will appear on websites like the Metasploit (www.metasploit.com) and milw0rm (www.milw0rm.com), the vast majority of these exploits and kits are not available publicly.
The ability to successfully compromise a target relies on more than just code designed to exploit vulnerabilities
in software
it requires
exploiting the human element
as well (Nolan and Levesque 2005). The digital traces
individuals leave behind on the Internet can be used to manipulate trust, and are used by attackers to encourage
targets to execute malicious code on their systems. The first phase of a targeted attack usually involves an
information acquisition phase,
in which information on potential targets is compiled from a variety of public
sources, including social and professional networking sites, conference proceedings, academic papers and project
information, in order to generate a profile of the target (Smith and Toppel 2009).
Targeted malware attacks often leverage publicly available information to make their social engineering attempts
more plausible. Individuals are much more likely to become victims of targeted attacks if malware is sent to
them from what appears to be an acquaintance or a colleague (Jagatic et al. 2007). Targeted malware attacks
are, in many cases, personalised at the individual or organizational level. Moreover, an attacker may leverage
the credentials of a previously compromised acquaintance to add increased levels of legitimacy to the attack. As
a result, the attackers are able to convince the target into executing malicious code on their own computer, thus

OHHDL (D)

Nov 2009

TIBETAN MP

Oct 2009

Drewla

Sep 2008

jdusnemsaz.com

119.84.4.43

jdusnemsaz.com

119.84.4.43

jdusnemsaz.com

119.84.4.43

lookbytheway.net

221.5.250.98

/two/zq2009/index.php

NQueryFileop

/two/zq2009/index.php

NQueryFileop

/two/zq2009/index.php

NQueryFileop

/cgi-bin/NQueryFileop

NQueryFileop

Further analysis of the network traffic also revealed that at least one of the systems was infected with additional

malware not associated with the aforementioned command and control servers. The system was attempting

DNS resolutions of multiple hostnames. Two of the hostnames resolved to IP addresses but were not available

when the system attempted to communicate to them. The other hostname did not resolve at all.

The failed DNS resolution was for www.assam2008.net, which is a domain that has been used by a different

group of attackers in the past in conjunction with the Enfal trojan, and suggests a limited connection between

the current malware under investigation and malware used in previous attacks on other targets. This domain

name was available for registration and was added to our ongoing sinkhole project.

While recording network traffic in the field, we observed the attackers removing two senstive documents from

the OHHDL (see fig. 1, page 15). The data was compressed using CAB, split into 100kb chunks when necessary, encoded with base64, and then uploaded to a command and control server. In this case, data was being

uploaded to c2etejs.com, which is hosted on the same IP address (119.84.4.43) as jdusnemsaz.com.

We reconstructed the documents that were exfiltrated from the OHHDL:

letters - current.doc

and

letters - master

2009.doc (see fig. 2, page 15).

The documents contained over 1,500 letters sent from the Dalai Lama

s office

between January and November 2009. While many of the letters are perfunctory

responses to various invitations

and interview requests

they allow the attackers to collect information on anyone contacting the Dalai Lama

office. Moreover, there are some communications contained within these documents that could be considered sensitive, such as communications between the OHHDL and Offices of Tibet around the world. Some communications

contain generic information of the Dalai Lama

s travelling details including schedule of appearances

but very

little that could not be established through open sources and publicly available information on the internet.

JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 3: MAPPING THE SHADOWS IN THE CLOUD

Figure 1:

A screen capture of a sensitive document being uploaded to a command and control server.

Figure 2:

The Word Documents Exfiltrated from the OHHDL

JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 3: MAPPING THE SHADOWS IN THE CLOUD

Technical Investigation

During the technical investigation we examined the data collected from the field, third-party sources, and from

our DNS sinkhole project in order to determine the attack vectors used to exploit and compromise the victims.

While we were unable to determine how any one individual computer came to be compromised, we documented a variety of exploits used by the attackers. We mapped out the broader command and control infrastructure

by discovering new pieces of malware located on servers that we identified, and catalogued any new servers

that these instances of malware were configured with. We also looked at domains that were co-hosted on the

same servers we had already identified, and used searches to identify Twitter, Google Groups, Blogspot, Baidu

Blogs, blog.com, and Yahoo! Mail accounts that were misused by the attackers to update compromised computers with new command and control locations. We also discovered a panel or listing of compromised computers.

During our investigation into one of the servers we made a significant discovery: we were able to recover data

that was being exfiltrated by the attackers from compromised computers. These documents were only available

on the command and control server for a short time after being uploaded by the compromised systems, as the

attackers frequently removed them at irregular time intervals.

3.2.1 Attack Vectors / Malware

Victims of cyber espionage are often specifically targeted by the attacker and not by happenstance. While it is

possible for a cyber criminal to mass-distribute malware across the Internet with specific intent to compromise

a select set of individuals or organizations, it is not likely to be the most effective tool for the intended job. The

differences in approaches, based on an analysis of tools and kits, can therefore provide some insight into the

branching of cyber espionage from cyber crime, or at least help distinguish more

connected

attackers from

less connected

ones. The varying levels of sophistication in tools, research and delivery set these actors apart,

can make them more or less effective, and establish their level of connection within the underground community. A very sophisticated attacker, for example, will likely be part of a network in the criminal underground

that has access to the latest exploits and kits that generate files with exploits to install their malicious payload.

These kits and files are not readily available to the average cyber criminal. A slightly less sophisticated attacker

might have access to the same kits and exploits once the vulnerability has been publicly disclosed, but prior to

there being a security patch issued for them. While from time to time various methods of generating malicious

PDFs and other document types will appear on websites like the Metasploit (www.metasploit.com) and milw0rm (www.milw0rm.com), the vast majority of these exploits and kits are not available publicly.

The ability to successfully compromise a target relies on more than just code designed to exploit vulnerabilities

in software

it requires

exploiting the human element

as well (Nolan and Levesque 2005). The digital traces

individuals leave behind on the Internet can be used to manipulate trust, and are used by attackers to encourage

targets to execute malicious code on their systems. The first phase of a targeted attack usually involves an

information acquisition phase,

in which information on potential targets is compiled from a variety of public

sources, including social and professional networking sites, conference proceedings, academic papers and project

information, in order to generate a profile of the target (Smith and Toppel 2009).

Targeted malware attacks often leverage publicly available information to make their social engineering attempts

more plausible. Individuals are much more likely to become victims of targeted attacks if malware is sent to

them from what appears to be an acquaintance or a colleague (Jagatic et al. 2007). Targeted malware attacks

are, in many cases, personalised at the individual or organizational level. Moreover, an attacker may leverage

the credentials of a previously compromised acquaintance to add increased levels of legitimacy to the attack. As

a result, the attackers are able to convince the target into executing malicious code on their own computer, thus