clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

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as well as common command and control server locations there were several binaries whose functionality differed significantly.
We discovered that two of the binaries were using Yahoo! Mail accounts as an element of command and control. More specifically, in addition to checking in with the Yahoo! Mail accounts, new malicious binaries were
pushed to the compromised computers from the email account.
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 3: MAPPING THE SHADOWS IN THE CLOUD
Table 3: Malware Connecting to Yahoo! Mail Accounts
Filename
setup.exe
7e2e37c78bc594342e498d6299c19158
[email protected]
www.indexindian.com
Download
sites.google.com/site/wwwfox99/Home/
Filename
20090930165916978
abef3f0396688bfca790f8bbedac3e0d
[email protected]
Although the second binary failed to connect to a web-based command and control server, a memory dump
revealed three additional email adresses ([email protected], [email protected] and ctliliwoy5@
yahoo.com) as well as the well known domain name www.indexindian.com and the URL of another malicious
binary hosted on sites.google.com/site/wwwfox99/.
This malware sample connected to a command and control server and downloaded additional components
(docBack.gif, nscthttp.gif, top.gif, tor.gif) that allowed it to connect to the Tor anonymity network. The reason
behind the attackers integration of Tor into their malware remains unclear.
Table 4: Malware with Tor
Filename
20091221165850243
2ca46bcdfda08adc94ab41d3ed049ab6
cxingpeng.byethost9.com
Tor (www.torproject.org) is an anonymity system that defends users from traffic analysis attacks in which
attackers attempt to monitor users
online behaviour. Tor is used by journalists, human rights advocates, and
those in locations that are subject to Internet censorship. It is also used by law enforcement and many others
who require anonymity.
In 2007, a computer security researcher, Dan Egerstad collected data and email login credentials for a variety of
embassies around the world by monitoring the traffic exiting from Tor exit nodes, an anonymous communications
network. He was able to obtain user names and passwords for a variety of email accounts, and recovered data associated with the Dalai Lama
s office as well as India
s Defence Research and Development Organization (Zetter 2007a).
Tor does not automatically encrypt everything that a user does online. Unless the end-point of a connection
is encrypted, the data passing through an exit node in the Tor network will be in plain text. Since anyone can
operate a Tor exit node, it is possible for a malicious user to intercept the plain text communications passing
through it. However, Egerstad believes that the entities whose credentials and data he was able to collect were not
using Tor themselves. Rather, he concluded that attackers may have been using the Tor network as a mechanism
to exfiltrate data:
The embassy employees were likely not using Tor nor even knew what Tor was. Instead, we suspected
that the traffic he sniffed belonged to someone who had hacked the accounts and was eavesdropping on
them via the Tor network. As the hacked data passed through Egerstad
s Tor exit nodes, he was able to
read it as well (Zetter 2007b).
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 3: MAPPING THE SHADOWS IN THE CLOUD
Table 5: Enfal
Filename
20090924152410520
9f0b3d0672425081cb7a988691535cbf
www.indexnews.org
On one of the command and control severs, we also discovered that the attackers were using Enfal, a well
known Trojan. The malware connected to www.indexnews.org and requested the following file paths: /cgi-bin/
Owpq4.cgi and /httpdocs/mm/[HOSTNAME]_20090610/Cmwhite. We explore the broader connections and
significance of use of Enfal in section 3.3.1 below.
Command and Control Infrastructure
Figure 3:
The Shadow Network
s Command and Control Infrastructure
This Palantir screen capture demonstrates the integration of social networking and blogging platforms (green), domain names (blue) and web servers (red).
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 3: MAPPING THE SHADOWS IN THE CLOUD
The attackers
command and control infrastructure consists of three interrelated components. The first
component consists of intermediaries that simply contain links, which can be updated, to command and control
servers. During our investigation we found that such intermediaries included Twitter, Google Groups, Blogspot,
Baidu Blogs, and blog.com. The attackers also used Yahoo! Mail accounts as a command and control component
in order to send new malicious binaries to compromised computers. On at least one occasion the attackers also
used Google Pages to host malware. To be clear, the attackers were misusing these systems, not exploiting any
vulnerability in these platforms. In total, we found three Twitter accounts, five Yahoo! Mail accounts, twelve
Google Groups, eight Blogspot blogs, nine Baidu blogs, one Google Sites and sixteen blogs on blog.com that were
being used as part of the attacker
s infrastructure. The attackers simply created accounts on these services and
used them as a mechanism to update compromised computers with new command and control server information. Even a vigilant network administrator looking for rogue connections exiting the network may overlook
such connections as they are routine and generally considered to be safe web sites. The use of social networking platforms, blogs and other services offered by trusted companies allows the attackers to maintain control
of compromised computers even if direct connections to the command and control servers are blocked at the
firewall level. The compromised computers can simply be updated through these unblocked intermediaries to
point to a new, as yet unknown, control server.
Such techniques are not new per se, and nothing in and of itself was invented by the Shadow attackers that had
not been done before (See Box 3). Rather, the attackers are learning from the experiences of others and adapting
the techniques to meet their needs. By using these kind of intermediaries and platforms, the attackers are able
to conceal their activities and maintain a resilient command and control infrastructure. In the Shadow case, the
attackers did not rely on only one social networking, cloud computing or Web 2.0 service, but rather used a
variety of such services in combination with one another.
Box 3: Social Network Sites as Control Channels for Malware Networks
The use of social networking sites as elements of command and control for malware networks is not novel. The attackers
leverage the normal operation of these systems in order to maintain control over compromised system. In 2009,
researchers found that Twitter, Jaiku, Tumblr, Google Groups, Google AppEngine and Facebook had all been used as the
command and control structure for malware. In August 2009, Arbor Networks
Jose Nazario found that Twitter was being
used as a command and control component for a malware network. In this case, the malware was an information stealer
focused on extracting banking credentials from compromised computers located mostly in Brazil. Twitter was not the only
channel being used by the attackers. They also used accounts on Jaiku and Tumblr (Nazario 2009a). Furthermore, Arbor
Networks found another instance of malware that used the Google AppEngine to deliver malicious URLs to compromised
computers (Nazario 2009b). The Unmask Parasites blog found that obfuscated scripts embedded in compromised web
sites used the Twitter API to obscure their activities. While the method was clever, the code was unreliable and appeared
to have been abandoned by the attackers (Unmask Parasites 2009). Symantec found that Google Groups were being

as well as common command and control server locations there were several binaries whose functionality differed significantly.

We discovered that two of the binaries were using Yahoo! Mail accounts as an element of command and control. More specifically, in addition to checking in with the Yahoo! Mail accounts, new malicious binaries were

pushed to the compromised computers from the email account.

JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 3: MAPPING THE SHADOWS IN THE CLOUD

Table 3: Malware Connecting to Yahoo! Mail Accounts

Filename

setup.exe

7e2e37c78bc594342e498d6299c19158

[email protected]

www.indexindian.com

Download

sites.google.com/site/wwwfox99/Home/

Filename

20090930165916978

abef3f0396688bfca790f8bbedac3e0d

[email protected]

Although the second binary failed to connect to a web-based command and control server, a memory dump

revealed three additional email adresses ([email protected], [email protected] and ctliliwoy5@

yahoo.com) as well as the well known domain name www.indexindian.com and the URL of another malicious

binary hosted on sites.google.com/site/wwwfox99/.

This malware sample connected to a command and control server and downloaded additional components

(docBack.gif, nscthttp.gif, top.gif, tor.gif) that allowed it to connect to the Tor anonymity network. The reason

behind the attackers integration of Tor into their malware remains unclear.

Table 4: Malware with Tor

Filename

20091221165850243

2ca46bcdfda08adc94ab41d3ed049ab6

cxingpeng.byethost9.com

Tor (www.torproject.org) is an anonymity system that defends users from traffic analysis attacks in which

attackers attempt to monitor users

online behaviour. Tor is used by journalists, human rights advocates, and

those in locations that are subject to Internet censorship. It is also used by law enforcement and many others

who require anonymity.

In 2007, a computer security researcher, Dan Egerstad collected data and email login credentials for a variety of

embassies around the world by monitoring the traffic exiting from Tor exit nodes, an anonymous communications

network. He was able to obtain user names and passwords for a variety of email accounts, and recovered data associated with the Dalai Lama

s office as well as India

s Defence Research and Development Organization (Zetter 2007a).

Tor does not automatically encrypt everything that a user does online. Unless the end-point of a connection

is encrypted, the data passing through an exit node in the Tor network will be in plain text. Since anyone can

operate a Tor exit node, it is possible for a malicious user to intercept the plain text communications passing

through it. However, Egerstad believes that the entities whose credentials and data he was able to collect were not

using Tor themselves. Rather, he concluded that attackers may have been using the Tor network as a mechanism

to exfiltrate data:

The embassy employees were likely not using Tor nor even knew what Tor was. Instead, we suspected

that the traffic he sniffed belonged to someone who had hacked the accounts and was eavesdropping on

them via the Tor network. As the hacked data passed through Egerstad

s Tor exit nodes, he was able to

read it as well (Zetter 2007b).

JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 3: MAPPING THE SHADOWS IN THE CLOUD

Table 5: Enfal

Filename

20090924152410520

9f0b3d0672425081cb7a988691535cbf

www.indexnews.org

On one of the command and control severs, we also discovered that the attackers were using Enfal, a well

known Trojan. The malware connected to www.indexnews.org and requested the following file paths: /cgi-bin/

Owpq4.cgi and /httpdocs/mm/[HOSTNAME]_20090610/Cmwhite. We explore the broader connections and

significance of use of Enfal in section 3.3.1 below.

Command and Control Infrastructure

Figure 3:

The Shadow Network

s Command and Control Infrastructure

This Palantir screen capture demonstrates the integration of social networking and blogging platforms (green), domain names (blue) and web servers (red).

JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 3: MAPPING THE SHADOWS IN THE CLOUD

The attackers

command and control infrastructure consists of three interrelated components. The first

component consists of intermediaries that simply contain links, which can be updated, to command and control

servers. During our investigation we found that such intermediaries included Twitter, Google Groups, Blogspot,

Baidu Blogs, and blog.com. The attackers also used Yahoo! Mail accounts as a command and control component

in order to send new malicious binaries to compromised computers. On at least one occasion the attackers also

used Google Pages to host malware. To be clear, the attackers were misusing these systems, not exploiting any

vulnerability in these platforms. In total, we found three Twitter accounts, five Yahoo! Mail accounts, twelve

Google Groups, eight Blogspot blogs, nine Baidu blogs, one Google Sites and sixteen blogs on blog.com that were

being used as part of the attacker

s infrastructure. The attackers simply created accounts on these services and

used them as a mechanism to update compromised computers with new command and control server information. Even a vigilant network administrator looking for rogue connections exiting the network may overlook

such connections as they are routine and generally considered to be safe web sites. The use of social networking platforms, blogs and other services offered by trusted companies allows the attackers to maintain control

of compromised computers even if direct connections to the command and control servers are blocked at the

firewall level. The compromised computers can simply be updated through these unblocked intermediaries to

point to a new, as yet unknown, control server.

Such techniques are not new per se, and nothing in and of itself was invented by the Shadow attackers that had

not been done before (See Box 3). Rather, the attackers are learning from the experiences of others and adapting

the techniques to meet their needs. By using these kind of intermediaries and platforms, the attackers are able

to conceal their activities and maintain a resilient command and control infrastructure. In the Shadow case, the

attackers did not rely on only one social networking, cloud computing or Web 2.0 service, but rather used a

variety of such services in combination with one another.

Box 3: Social Network Sites as Control Channels for Malware Networks

The use of social networking sites as elements of command and control for malware networks is not novel. The attackers

leverage the normal operation of these systems in order to maintain control over compromised system. In 2009,

researchers found that Twitter, Jaiku, Tumblr, Google Groups, Google AppEngine and Facebook had all been used as the

command and control structure for malware. In August 2009, Arbor Networks

Jose Nazario found that Twitter was being

used as a command and control component for a malware network. In this case, the malware was an information stealer

focused on extracting banking credentials from compromised computers located mostly in Brazil. Twitter was not the only

channel being used by the attackers. They also used accounts on Jaiku and Tumblr (Nazario 2009a). Furthermore, Arbor

Networks found another instance of malware that used the Google AppEngine to deliver malicious URLs to compromised

computers (Nazario 2009b). The Unmask Parasites blog found that obfuscated scripts embedded in compromised web

sites used the Twitter API to obscure their activities. While the method was clever, the code was unreliable and appeared

to have been abandoned by the attackers (Unmask Parasites 2009). Symantec found that Google Groups were being