clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

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There are limitations to this approach. For example, multiple attackers could operate on a common infrastructure, perhaps supplied by a group that specialises in malicious hosting or selling registered domain names to
be used as command and control servers. Different groups of attackers could use the same, or very similar,
malware. However, when the malware is not publicly available or for sale, its use remains limited.
During the Shadow investigation we found the Enfal trojan among the instances of malware used by the attackers. The Enfal trojan is not widely available and appears to be in use by affiliated malware networks that
sometimes share a common command and control infrastructure.
In fact, domain names that have been used as Enfal command and control servers by separate, but possibly
affiliated, attackers
assam2008.net, msnxy.net, sysroots.net, womanld.com, womannana.com, lookbyturns.
com, macfeeresponse.com and macfeeresponse.org
have now been incorporated into our sinkhole project.
This allows us to observe compromised computers that are still checking in with the command and control
servers as well as the file paths being requested. In some cases, we can obtain the names of documents located on the compromised computers. These domain names are associated with Enfal and can also be linked
to the active command and control servers in the Shadow network through common command and control
server IP addresses.
Another group of attackers that also used the Enfal trojan were documented in 2008 by Maarten Van
Horenbeeck. He published information concerning his investigation into the targeted malware attacks which
included the use of the Enfal Trojan dating back to 2007. Van Horenbeeck systematically documented a series
of targeted attacks and clearly articulated the methodology of the attackers, one of which is now commonplace.
The attackers leverage social engineering tactics to entice the target into clicking on a malicious link or email
attachment. The malware then exploits a vulnerability in the user
s client side software, such as a browser,
Microsoft Word, Adobe Reader and so on, and begins communicating with a command and control server. Enfal
is recognisable due to the consistent filenames the malware requests from the command and control server,
most notably
/cgi-bin/owpq4.cgi
. Van Horenbeeck identified domain names used by Enfal, *.bluewinnt.
com and *.ggsddup.com, which are still in use today (Van Horenbeeck 2008a; Van Horenbeeck 2008b; Van
Horenbeeck 2007).
While we were unable to find any instances of common command and control infrastructure between the Enfal
network that Van Horenbeeck documented, the methods and tools of these attackers and the Shadow network
are very similar. The common use of the Enfal Trojan suggests that the attackers may be exchanging tools and
techniques. The profile of the victims from two separate Enfal-based networks in our DNS sinkhole suggest
that the attackers have an interest in compromising similar sets of targets. Finally, the failed DNS resolution for
www.assam2008.net found on a computer at the OHHDL also compromised by the Shadow network indicates a
possibly closer connection, or that they at least have both common tools and target sets.
PART 4:
Targets and Effects
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 4: TARGETS & EFFECTS
Compromised Victims: The Evidence
Mistakes on the part of the attackers allowed us to view the attackers
list of victims at four command and
control locations. In addition, we were able to recover exfiltrated data from two locations. This provided us with
a snapshot of the computers that have been compromised by the attacks. Thus, this is not a complete list of all
those compromised by this attacker. Rather, it is simply those checking in with or uploading data to the portions
of the network that we were able to view. Moreover, there was considerable overlap between different methods
of command and control, with individual computers checking in at multiple locations. Therefore, we do not
have consistent data across all compromised computers. There are two categories of victims: those for whom
we only have technical identifying information, such as IP addresses; and those from whom we have recovered
exfiltrated data but for whom we do not have IP addresses. In cases where we do not have IP addresses, the
identity of the victim is determined from the contextual information found within the exfiltrated data itself.
We obtained information on victims from:
a web-based interface that lists cursory information on compromised computers located on one command
and control server;
text files in web-accessible directories on three command and control servers that list detailed information
on compromised computers;
information obtained from email accounts used for command and control of compromised computers
information obtained from one command and control server from which we retrieved exfiltrated documents
(but not necessarily technical identifying information);
information obtained from our DNS sinkhole.
The primary method of identification used in this section is based upon the IP address of the compromised
computer. We looked up the associated IP address in all five Regional Internet Registries (RiR) in order to identify the country and network to which the IP address is assigned. We then performed a reverse Domain Name
System (DNS) look-up on each IP address. DNS is the system that translates domain names into IP addresses;
reverse DNS is a system that translates an IP address into a domain name. This can potentially provide additional information about the entity that has been assigned a particular IP address. If we discovered a domain
name, we then looked up its registration in WHOIS, which is a public database of all domain name registrations
and provides information about who registered the domain name.
It was possible to identify the geographic location of the compromised computer at the country level as well as
the network to which the IP address was assigned. However, in most cases there was little information in the
RiRs pertaining to the exact identity of the compromised entity. Where possible, we note the entity identified by
data obtained from the RiRs.
The following list of compromised computers was generated by parsing information from unique victims, not
solely IP addresses. The attackers assign the compromised computer a name based on the host name of the computer, which allows us to identify unique victims rather than relying only on IP addresses. In fact, several of the
unique victims have multiple IP addresses associated with them, sometimes spanning multiple countries. Here we
have generated a geographic breakdown based on the first IP addresses recorded for each compromised computer.
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 4: TARGETS & EFFECTS
Figure 4:
Locations of Compromised Computers in the Shadow Network
While there is considerable geographic diversity, there is a high concentration of compromised computers
located in India. However, we were only able to identify two of the compromised entities:
Embassy of India, United States
Embassy of Pakistan, United States
4.1.1 Sinkhole
A DNS sinkhole server is a system that is designed to take requests from a botnet or infected systems and record
the incoming information. The sinkhole server is not under the control of the malware authors and can be used
to gain an understanding of a botnet
s operation. There are a few different techiques that are used to sinkhole
botnet traffic. The easiest method is to simply register an expired domain that was previously used to control
victim systems. Being able to do this generally indicates the botnet operator has lost control of the domain, forgotten to renew it, or that the botnet has been abandoned. Another method focuses on reverse-engineering the
malware to determine if it has
fail over
command and control servers or special methods to compute future
domains. This may require that a domain name generation algorithm be discovered and that one must register
the domain names before the attacker does (Stone-Gross et al. 2009).
During the GhostNet investigation we found that a computer at the OHHDL was compromised by both the
GhostNet and what we are now calling the Shadow network. We had a list of serveral domains that were
expiring that we had linked to attacks against OHHDL. We were able to register several of these domain names
in order to gather information about the network
s command and control infrastructure, communication methods,
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 4: TARGETS & EFFECTS
and victim systems. We were able to register and monitor four of the domain names mentioned in Tracking
GhostNet. In addition, we were able to register several others which we linked to the Shadow network along

There are limitations to this approach. For example, multiple attackers could operate on a common infrastructure, perhaps supplied by a group that specialises in malicious hosting or selling registered domain names to

be used as command and control servers. Different groups of attackers could use the same, or very similar,

malware. However, when the malware is not publicly available or for sale, its use remains limited.

During the Shadow investigation we found the Enfal trojan among the instances of malware used by the attackers. The Enfal trojan is not widely available and appears to be in use by affiliated malware networks that

sometimes share a common command and control infrastructure.

In fact, domain names that have been used as Enfal command and control servers by separate, but possibly

affiliated, attackers

assam2008.net, msnxy.net, sysroots.net, womanld.com, womannana.com, lookbyturns.

com, macfeeresponse.com and macfeeresponse.org

have now been incorporated into our sinkhole project.

This allows us to observe compromised computers that are still checking in with the command and control

servers as well as the file paths being requested. In some cases, we can obtain the names of documents located on the compromised computers. These domain names are associated with Enfal and can also be linked

to the active command and control servers in the Shadow network through common command and control

server IP addresses.

Another group of attackers that also used the Enfal trojan were documented in 2008 by Maarten Van

Horenbeeck. He published information concerning his investigation into the targeted malware attacks which

included the use of the Enfal Trojan dating back to 2007. Van Horenbeeck systematically documented a series

of targeted attacks and clearly articulated the methodology of the attackers, one of which is now commonplace.

The attackers leverage social engineering tactics to entice the target into clicking on a malicious link or email

attachment. The malware then exploits a vulnerability in the user

s client side software, such as a browser,

Microsoft Word, Adobe Reader and so on, and begins communicating with a command and control server. Enfal

is recognisable due to the consistent filenames the malware requests from the command and control server,

most notably

/cgi-bin/owpq4.cgi

. Van Horenbeeck identified domain names used by Enfal, *.bluewinnt.

com and *.ggsddup.com, which are still in use today (Van Horenbeeck 2008a; Van Horenbeeck 2008b; Van

Horenbeeck 2007).

While we were unable to find any instances of common command and control infrastructure between the Enfal

network that Van Horenbeeck documented, the methods and tools of these attackers and the Shadow network

are very similar. The common use of the Enfal Trojan suggests that the attackers may be exchanging tools and

techniques. The profile of the victims from two separate Enfal-based networks in our DNS sinkhole suggest

that the attackers have an interest in compromising similar sets of targets. Finally, the failed DNS resolution for

www.assam2008.net found on a computer at the OHHDL also compromised by the Shadow network indicates a

possibly closer connection, or that they at least have both common tools and target sets.

PART 4:

Targets and Effects

JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 4: TARGETS & EFFECTS

Compromised Victims: The Evidence

Mistakes on the part of the attackers allowed us to view the attackers

list of victims at four command and

control locations. In addition, we were able to recover exfiltrated data from two locations. This provided us with

a snapshot of the computers that have been compromised by the attacks. Thus, this is not a complete list of all

those compromised by this attacker. Rather, it is simply those checking in with or uploading data to the portions

of the network that we were able to view. Moreover, there was considerable overlap between different methods

of command and control, with individual computers checking in at multiple locations. Therefore, we do not

have consistent data across all compromised computers. There are two categories of victims: those for whom

we only have technical identifying information, such as IP addresses; and those from whom we have recovered

exfiltrated data but for whom we do not have IP addresses. In cases where we do not have IP addresses, the

identity of the victim is determined from the contextual information found within the exfiltrated data itself.

We obtained information on victims from:

a web-based interface that lists cursory information on compromised computers located on one command

and control server;

text files in web-accessible directories on three command and control servers that list detailed information

on compromised computers;

information obtained from email accounts used for command and control of compromised computers

information obtained from one command and control server from which we retrieved exfiltrated documents

(but not necessarily technical identifying information);

information obtained from our DNS sinkhole.

The primary method of identification used in this section is based upon the IP address of the compromised

computer. We looked up the associated IP address in all five Regional Internet Registries (RiR) in order to identify the country and network to which the IP address is assigned. We then performed a reverse Domain Name

System (DNS) look-up on each IP address. DNS is the system that translates domain names into IP addresses;

reverse DNS is a system that translates an IP address into a domain name. This can potentially provide additional information about the entity that has been assigned a particular IP address. If we discovered a domain

name, we then looked up its registration in WHOIS, which is a public database of all domain name registrations

and provides information about who registered the domain name.

It was possible to identify the geographic location of the compromised computer at the country level as well as

the network to which the IP address was assigned. However, in most cases there was little information in the

RiRs pertaining to the exact identity of the compromised entity. Where possible, we note the entity identified by

data obtained from the RiRs.

The following list of compromised computers was generated by parsing information from unique victims, not

solely IP addresses. The attackers assign the compromised computer a name based on the host name of the computer, which allows us to identify unique victims rather than relying only on IP addresses. In fact, several of the

unique victims have multiple IP addresses associated with them, sometimes spanning multiple countries. Here we

have generated a geographic breakdown based on the first IP addresses recorded for each compromised computer.

JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 4: TARGETS & EFFECTS

Figure 4:

Locations of Compromised Computers in the Shadow Network

While there is considerable geographic diversity, there is a high concentration of compromised computers

located in India. However, we were only able to identify two of the compromised entities:

Embassy of India, United States

Embassy of Pakistan, United States

4.1.1 Sinkhole

A DNS sinkhole server is a system that is designed to take requests from a botnet or infected systems and record

the incoming information. The sinkhole server is not under the control of the malware authors and can be used

to gain an understanding of a botnet

s operation. There are a few different techiques that are used to sinkhole

botnet traffic. The easiest method is to simply register an expired domain that was previously used to control

victim systems. Being able to do this generally indicates the botnet operator has lost control of the domain, forgotten to renew it, or that the botnet has been abandoned. Another method focuses on reverse-engineering the

malware to determine if it has

fail over

command and control servers or special methods to compute future

domains. This may require that a domain name generation algorithm be discovered and that one must register

the domain names before the attacker does (Stone-Gross et al. 2009).

During the GhostNet investigation we found that a computer at the OHHDL was compromised by both the

GhostNet and what we are now calling the Shadow network. We had a list of serveral domains that were

expiring that we had linked to attacks against OHHDL. We were able to register several of these domain names

in order to gather information about the network

s command and control infrastructure, communication methods,

JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 4: TARGETS & EFFECTS

and victim systems. We were able to register and monitor four of the domain names mentioned in Tracking

GhostNet. In addition, we were able to register several others which we linked to the Shadow network along