clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

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with one, www.assam2008.net, which we believe to be yet another separate, but possibly affiliated, network.
www.assam2008.net
www.msnxy.net
www.sysroots.net
www.womanld.com
www.womannana.com
www.lookbyturns.com
www.macfeeresponse.com
www.macfeeresponse.org
We were able to observe the file paths associated with malware that were requested by compromised computers. In total, we found that during this period 6,902 unique IPs requested paths associated with the malware
that used these hosts as command and control servers. However, counting the number of infected hosts purely
by IP addresses is problematic. In fact, botnets are generally much smaller than the total sum of unique IP
addresses would suggest (Stone-Gross et al. 2009; Rajab et al. 2007). This network, which is focused on stealing
documents from specific targets, is expected to be small in size.
Figure 5:
Relationship between the DNS Sinkhole and Live Command and Control Servers
This Palantir screen shot captures the relationship between the domain names in our sinkhole (green), the web servers they were formerly hosted on (red) and
the Shadow network
s active domain names (blue).
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 4: TARGETS & EFFECTS
What is more notable is the distribution of compromised computers across countries.
Figure 6:
Locations of Compromised Computers in our Sinkhole
From the recovered IP addresses we were able to identify the following entities of interest:
Honeywell, United States
New York University, United States
University of Western Ontario, Canada
High Commission of India, United Kingdom
Vytautas Magnus University, Lithuania
Kaunas University of Technology, Lithuania
National Informatics Centre, India
New Delhi Railway station (*railnet.gov.in), India
Times of India, India
Petro IT, (reserved123.petroitg.com), India
Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, India
Commission for Science and Technology for Sustainable Development in the South, Pakistan
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 4: TARGETS & EFFECTS
Victim Analysis on the Basis of
Recovered Documents
In total we recovered data from 44 compromised computers. The documents recovered from the OHHDL were
reconstructed from captured network traffic, while the remainder were retrieved from an open directory on
one command and control server. Only seven of the remaining 43 compromised computers (not counting the
OHHDL computer) for which we were able to recover exfiltrated data also checked in with the same control
server. Therefore we can only identify the IP addresses of these seven computers. Five of these seven computers
have IP addresses that are assigned to India, while the remaining two are assigned to Thailand and the PRC. As
noted below, the Chinese IP address represents the attacks on IP addresses along with two test (junk) text files
that appear to have been used for testing the malware.
We determined the country and entity from which the documents were exfiltrated based on the content of the
documents themselves in cases where we did not obtain an IP address. In addition, we assigned two country
codes to the compromised computers: one country code indicates the physical (IP) country in which the computer is located, and the second country code indicates the country of ownership. Thus a compromised computer at a foreign embassy would be assigned a country code based on its geographical region, and a second
based on the home country to which the foreign mission belongs.
Based on geographic location, the vast majority are in India.
Figure 7:
Locations of Compromised Computers from which Documents were Exfiltrated
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 4: TARGETS & EFFECTS
Based on the country of ownership, the results show an even higher number for India.
Figure 8:
Locations of Ownership of Exfiltrated Documents
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 4: TARGETS & EFFECTS
Geographic Victim Distribution
Figure 9:
Geographic distribution of compromised hosts
This screen capture of Palantir
s heatmap application demonstrates the concentrations of (non-unique) IP addresses of compromised hosts. The largest
concentration (red) is in India.
4.3.1 Targets
Diplomatic Missions and Government Entities
Diplomatic missions and government entities exchange sensitive information, which sometimes finds its
way onto unclassified systems. During our investigation, we recovered documents that are extremely sensitive from a national security perspective as well as documents that contain sensitive information that could
be exploited by an adversary for intelligence purposes. We recovered one document that appears to be an
encrypted diplomatic correspondence, two documents classified as
SECRET
, six as
RESTRICTED
, and five
CONFIDENTIAL
. These documents contain sensitive information taken from a member of the National
Security Council Secretariat concerning secret assessments of India
s security situation in the states of Assam,
Manipur, Nagaland and Tripura, as well as concerning the Naxalites and Maoists. In addition, they contain
confidential information taken from Indian embassies regarding India
s international relations with and assessments of activities in West Africa, Russia/Commonwealth of Independent States and the Middle East, as well as
visa applications, passport office circulars and diplomatic correspondence. The attackers also exfiltrated detailed
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 4: TARGETS & EFFECTS
personal information regarding a member of the Directorate General of Military Intelligence. These compromises
and the character of the data exfiltrated extends to non-governmental targets as well. Some of the academics
and journalists that were compromised were interested in and regularly reporting on sensitive topics such as
Jammu and Kashmir.
National Security and Defence
During our investigations we suspected that a variety of military computers had been compromised as well as
the computers of defence-oriented academics and journals. While none of the information obtained was classified, the documents we recovered reveal information regarding sensitive topics. Although there is public information available on these miltary projects, it indicates that the attackers managed to compromise the right set
of individuals that may have knowledge of these systems that is not publicly known. We recovered documents
and presentations relating to the following projects:
Pechora Missile System - an anti-aircraft surface-to-air missile system.
Iron Dome Missile System - a mobile missile defence system (Ratzlav-Katz 2010).
Project Shakti - an artillery combat command and control system (Frontier India 2009).
We also found that documents relating to network centricity (SP
s Land Forces 2008) and network-centric
warfare had been exfiltrated, along with documents detailing plans for intelligence fusion and technologies for
monitoring and analysing network data (Defence Research and Development Organisation 2009).

with one, www.assam2008.net, which we believe to be yet another separate, but possibly affiliated, network.

www.assam2008.net

www.msnxy.net

www.sysroots.net

www.womanld.com

www.womannana.com

www.lookbyturns.com

www.macfeeresponse.com

www.macfeeresponse.org

We were able to observe the file paths associated with malware that were requested by compromised computers. In total, we found that during this period 6,902 unique IPs requested paths associated with the malware

that used these hosts as command and control servers. However, counting the number of infected hosts purely

by IP addresses is problematic. In fact, botnets are generally much smaller than the total sum of unique IP

addresses would suggest (Stone-Gross et al. 2009; Rajab et al. 2007). This network, which is focused on stealing

documents from specific targets, is expected to be small in size.

Figure 5:

Relationship between the DNS Sinkhole and Live Command and Control Servers

This Palantir screen shot captures the relationship between the domain names in our sinkhole (green), the web servers they were formerly hosted on (red) and

the Shadow network

s active domain names (blue).

JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 4: TARGETS & EFFECTS

What is more notable is the distribution of compromised computers across countries.

Figure 6:

Locations of Compromised Computers in our Sinkhole

From the recovered IP addresses we were able to identify the following entities of interest:

Honeywell, United States

New York University, United States

University of Western Ontario, Canada

High Commission of India, United Kingdom

Vytautas Magnus University, Lithuania

Kaunas University of Technology, Lithuania

National Informatics Centre, India

New Delhi Railway station (*railnet.gov.in), India

Times of India, India

Petro IT, (reserved123.petroitg.com), India

Federation of Indian Chambers of Commerce and Industry, India

Commission for Science and Technology for Sustainable Development in the South, Pakistan

JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 4: TARGETS & EFFECTS

Victim Analysis on the Basis of

Recovered Documents

In total we recovered data from 44 compromised computers. The documents recovered from the OHHDL were

reconstructed from captured network traffic, while the remainder were retrieved from an open directory on

one command and control server. Only seven of the remaining 43 compromised computers (not counting the

OHHDL computer) for which we were able to recover exfiltrated data also checked in with the same control

server. Therefore we can only identify the IP addresses of these seven computers. Five of these seven computers

have IP addresses that are assigned to India, while the remaining two are assigned to Thailand and the PRC. As

noted below, the Chinese IP address represents the attacks on IP addresses along with two test (junk) text files

that appear to have been used for testing the malware.

We determined the country and entity from which the documents were exfiltrated based on the content of the

documents themselves in cases where we did not obtain an IP address. In addition, we assigned two country

codes to the compromised computers: one country code indicates the physical (IP) country in which the computer is located, and the second country code indicates the country of ownership. Thus a compromised computer at a foreign embassy would be assigned a country code based on its geographical region, and a second

based on the home country to which the foreign mission belongs.

Based on geographic location, the vast majority are in India.

Figure 7:

Locations of Compromised Computers from which Documents were Exfiltrated

JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 4: TARGETS & EFFECTS

Based on the country of ownership, the results show an even higher number for India.

Figure 8:

Locations of Ownership of Exfiltrated Documents

JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 4: TARGETS & EFFECTS

Geographic Victim Distribution

Figure 9:

Geographic distribution of compromised hosts

This screen capture of Palantir

s heatmap application demonstrates the concentrations of (non-unique) IP addresses of compromised hosts. The largest

concentration (red) is in India.

4.3.1 Targets

Diplomatic Missions and Government Entities

Diplomatic missions and government entities exchange sensitive information, which sometimes finds its

way onto unclassified systems. During our investigation, we recovered documents that are extremely sensitive from a national security perspective as well as documents that contain sensitive information that could

be exploited by an adversary for intelligence purposes. We recovered one document that appears to be an

encrypted diplomatic correspondence, two documents classified as

SECRET

, six as

RESTRICTED

, and five

CONFIDENTIAL

. These documents contain sensitive information taken from a member of the National

Security Council Secretariat concerning secret assessments of India

s security situation in the states of Assam,

Manipur, Nagaland and Tripura, as well as concerning the Naxalites and Maoists. In addition, they contain

confidential information taken from Indian embassies regarding India

s international relations with and assessments of activities in West Africa, Russia/Commonwealth of Independent States and the Middle East, as well as

visa applications, passport office circulars and diplomatic correspondence. The attackers also exfiltrated detailed

JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 4: TARGETS & EFFECTS

personal information regarding a member of the Directorate General of Military Intelligence. These compromises

and the character of the data exfiltrated extends to non-governmental targets as well. Some of the academics

and journalists that were compromised were interested in and regularly reporting on sensitive topics such as

Jammu and Kashmir.

National Security and Defence

During our investigations we suspected that a variety of military computers had been compromised as well as

the computers of defence-oriented academics and journals. While none of the information obtained was classified, the documents we recovered reveal information regarding sensitive topics. Although there is public information available on these miltary projects, it indicates that the attackers managed to compromise the right set

of individuals that may have knowledge of these systems that is not publicly known. We recovered documents

and presentations relating to the following projects:

Pechora Missile System - an anti-aircraft surface-to-air missile system.

Iron Dome Missile System - a mobile missile defence system (Ratzlav-Katz 2010).

Project Shakti - an artillery combat command and control system (Frontier India 2009).

We also found that documents relating to network centricity (SP

s Land Forces 2008) and network-centric

warfare had been exfiltrated, along with documents detailing plans for intelligence fusion and technologies for

monitoring and analysing network data (Defence Research and Development Organisation 2009).