clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

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The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) is based in
Thailand and facilitates development in the Asia-Pacific region. We assess that a computer at UNESCAP has
been compromised based on the documents exfiltrated by the attackers. In addition to information concerning a variety of conferences and presentations, there were also internal Mission Report documents regarding
travel and events in the region.
PART 5:
Tackling Cyber Espionage
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 5: TACKLING CYBER ESPIONAGE
5.1 Attribution and Cyber Crime / Cyber Espionage
During this investigation we collected malware samples used by the attackers, which were primarily PDFs that
exploited vulnerabilities in Adobe Acrobat and Adobe Reader. In addition, we collected malware used by the attackers after successfully compromising a targeted system as well as network traffic captured from the OHHDL.
We were able to map out the command and control infrastructure of the attackers and in several cases view
data that allowed us to identify targets that had been compromised and recover exfiltrated documents. We did
not have access to data regarding specific attacks on any of the targets we have identified. In other words, we
cannot definitely tell how any one individual target was compromised. And, more importantly, we do not have
data regarding the behaviour of the attackers once inside the target
s network.
However, we do have two key pieces of information: the first is an email address used in a document in the
attackers
possession that provided steps on how the attackers could use Yahoo! Mail as a command and control
server; the second is the IP addresses used by the attackers to send emails from Yahoo! Mail accounts used as
command and control servers.
Email addresses used by the attackers have proven to provide critical clues in past investigations. Following the
release of the GhostNet investigation, The Dark Visitor
a blog that researches Chinese hacking activities
investigated one of the email addresses we published that was used to register the domain names the attackers
utilized as command and control servers. While these were not GhostNet domain names, one of them is the
same as one used by the attackers in this investigation: lookbytheway.net (Henderson 2009a).
The email address used to register lookbytheway.net is [email protected]. The Dark Visitor found
forum posts made by [email protected], who also used the alias
lost33.
Further searching revealed
individual who was associated with Xfocus, Isbase,
two popular Chinese hacking forums, and
seems to have
studied under Glacier
(Henderson 2009b). Glacier is known as
Godfather of the Chinese Trojan
(Henderson
2007a), and an association with him indicates lost33
s connections to the hacking underground in the PRC. Using
information found on lost33
s blog, The Dark Visitor was able to find another blog used by lost33, now operating
under the alias
damnfootman
, and had a text chat conversation with him on the Chinese instant messenger
service QQ, where the individual admitted to being the owner of the email address [email protected].
From this information, The Dark Visitor was able to determine this individual has connections to the forums of
Xfocus and Isbase (the Green Army), NSfocus and Eviloctal, as well as connections to the hackers Glacier and
Sunwear. He was born on July 24, 1982, lives in Chengdu, Sichuan, and attended the University of Electronic
Science and Technology of China, which is also located in Chengdu.
Our investigation also indicated strong links to Chengdu, Sichuan. The attacker used Yahoo! Mail accounts as command and control servers, from which the attacker sent emails containing new malware to the already compromised
targets. All of the IP addresses the attacker used when sending these emails are located in Chengdu, Sichuan.
We were able to retrieve a document from the attackers that indicated the steps neccessary to use Yahoo! Mail
accounts as command and control servers. There was also an account used by the attackers in this document
for testing purposes. Searches for this email address returned several advertisements for apartment rentals in
Chengdu, Sichuan.
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 5: TACKLING CYBER ESPIONAGE
The infrastructure of this particular network is tied to individuals in Chengdu, Sichuan. At least one of these individuals has ties to the underground hacking community in the PRC and to the University of Electronic Science
and Technology of China in Chengdu. Interestingly, when the Honker Union of China, one of the largest hacking groups in the PRC, was re-established in 2005, its new leader was a student at the University of Electronic
Science and Technology in Chengdu. Chengdu is also the location of one of the People
s Liberation Army
(PLA)
s technical reconnaissance bureaus tasked with signals intelligence collection. While it would be disingenuous to ignore these correlations entirely, they are loose at best and certainly do not meet the requirements
of determining motivation and attribution. However, the links between the command and control infrastructure
and individuals in the PRC provide a variety of scenarios that point toward attribution.
5.1.2 Patriotic Hacking
The PRC has a vibrant hacker community that has been tied to targeted attacks in the past, and has been linked
through informal channels to elements of the Chinese state, although the nature and extent of the connections
remains unclear. One common theme regarding attribution relating to attacks emerging from the PRC concerns
variations of a privateering model, in which the state authorizes private persons to perform attacks against
enemies of the state. This model emerged because studies have shown that there is no direct government control over the loosely connected groups of hackers in the PRC (Henderson 2007b). Even within the privateering
approach there is much dispute regarding the exact relationship. The degrees of the reported relationship vary
between
authorize
to
tacit consent
to
tolerate
(Henderson 2007b).
However, this ambiguous relationship does not mean that there is no connection between the activities of
Chinese hackers and the state. The PRC
s intelligence collection is based on the gathering of bits of information
across a broad range of sources:
China relies on a broad informal network of students, tourists, teachers, and foreign workers inside of
host nations to collect small bits of information to form a composite picture of the environment. Rather
than set a targeted goal for collection, they instead rely on sheer weight of information to form a clear
understanding of the situation. (Henderson 2007b)
As a result, information that is independently obtained by the Chinese hacker community is likely to find its
way to elements within the Chinese state. However, the Chinese state is not monolithic. It is a complex entity
that includes cooperation and competition amoung a variety of entities, including the Communist Party, the PLA
and the Government of China. In addition, within each of those entities there are factions and rivalries. Further
complicating matters is that there are reported relationships between the edges of the government and networks
of organized crime in the PRC, as in many other countries (Bakken 2005; Keith and Lin 2005). These complex
relationships further complicate our understanding of the connections between the Chinese hacker community
and the Chinese state.
While the PLA is developing computer network operations (CNO), as are the armed forces of a wide variety of
countries, its relationship with the hacker community appears to be minimal, as a recent study reports:
Little evidence exists in open sources to establish firm ties between the PLA and China
s hacker community,
however, research did uncover limited cases of apparent collaboration between more elite individual

The United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) is based in

Thailand and facilitates development in the Asia-Pacific region. We assess that a computer at UNESCAP has

been compromised based on the documents exfiltrated by the attackers. In addition to information concerning a variety of conferences and presentations, there were also internal Mission Report documents regarding

travel and events in the region.

PART 5:

Tackling Cyber Espionage

JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 5: TACKLING CYBER ESPIONAGE

5.1 Attribution and Cyber Crime / Cyber Espionage

During this investigation we collected malware samples used by the attackers, which were primarily PDFs that

exploited vulnerabilities in Adobe Acrobat and Adobe Reader. In addition, we collected malware used by the attackers after successfully compromising a targeted system as well as network traffic captured from the OHHDL.

We were able to map out the command and control infrastructure of the attackers and in several cases view

data that allowed us to identify targets that had been compromised and recover exfiltrated documents. We did

not have access to data regarding specific attacks on any of the targets we have identified. In other words, we

cannot definitely tell how any one individual target was compromised. And, more importantly, we do not have

data regarding the behaviour of the attackers once inside the target

s network.

However, we do have two key pieces of information: the first is an email address used in a document in the

attackers

possession that provided steps on how the attackers could use Yahoo! Mail as a command and control

server; the second is the IP addresses used by the attackers to send emails from Yahoo! Mail accounts used as

command and control servers.

Email addresses used by the attackers have proven to provide critical clues in past investigations. Following the

release of the GhostNet investigation, The Dark Visitor

a blog that researches Chinese hacking activities

investigated one of the email addresses we published that was used to register the domain names the attackers

utilized as command and control servers. While these were not GhostNet domain names, one of them is the

same as one used by the attackers in this investigation: lookbytheway.net (Henderson 2009a).

The email address used to register lookbytheway.net is [email protected]. The Dark Visitor found

forum posts made by [email protected], who also used the alias

lost33.

Further searching revealed

individual who was associated with Xfocus, Isbase,

two popular Chinese hacking forums, and

seems to have

studied under Glacier

(Henderson 2009b). Glacier is known as

Godfather of the Chinese Trojan

(Henderson

2007a), and an association with him indicates lost33

s connections to the hacking underground in the PRC. Using

information found on lost33

s blog, The Dark Visitor was able to find another blog used by lost33, now operating

under the alias

damnfootman

, and had a text chat conversation with him on the Chinese instant messenger

service QQ, where the individual admitted to being the owner of the email address [email protected].

From this information, The Dark Visitor was able to determine this individual has connections to the forums of

Xfocus and Isbase (the Green Army), NSfocus and Eviloctal, as well as connections to the hackers Glacier and

Sunwear. He was born on July 24, 1982, lives in Chengdu, Sichuan, and attended the University of Electronic

Science and Technology of China, which is also located in Chengdu.

Our investigation also indicated strong links to Chengdu, Sichuan. The attacker used Yahoo! Mail accounts as command and control servers, from which the attacker sent emails containing new malware to the already compromised

targets. All of the IP addresses the attacker used when sending these emails are located in Chengdu, Sichuan.

We were able to retrieve a document from the attackers that indicated the steps neccessary to use Yahoo! Mail

accounts as command and control servers. There was also an account used by the attackers in this document

for testing purposes. Searches for this email address returned several advertisements for apartment rentals in

Chengdu, Sichuan.

JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 5: TACKLING CYBER ESPIONAGE

The infrastructure of this particular network is tied to individuals in Chengdu, Sichuan. At least one of these individuals has ties to the underground hacking community in the PRC and to the University of Electronic Science

and Technology of China in Chengdu. Interestingly, when the Honker Union of China, one of the largest hacking groups in the PRC, was re-established in 2005, its new leader was a student at the University of Electronic

Science and Technology in Chengdu. Chengdu is also the location of one of the People

s Liberation Army

(PLA)

s technical reconnaissance bureaus tasked with signals intelligence collection. While it would be disingenuous to ignore these correlations entirely, they are loose at best and certainly do not meet the requirements

of determining motivation and attribution. However, the links between the command and control infrastructure

and individuals in the PRC provide a variety of scenarios that point toward attribution.

5.1.2 Patriotic Hacking

The PRC has a vibrant hacker community that has been tied to targeted attacks in the past, and has been linked

through informal channels to elements of the Chinese state, although the nature and extent of the connections

remains unclear. One common theme regarding attribution relating to attacks emerging from the PRC concerns

variations of a privateering model, in which the state authorizes private persons to perform attacks against

enemies of the state. This model emerged because studies have shown that there is no direct government control over the loosely connected groups of hackers in the PRC (Henderson 2007b). Even within the privateering

approach there is much dispute regarding the exact relationship. The degrees of the reported relationship vary

between

authorize

to

tacit consent

to

tolerate

(Henderson 2007b).

However, this ambiguous relationship does not mean that there is no connection between the activities of

Chinese hackers and the state. The PRC

s intelligence collection is based on the gathering of bits of information

across a broad range of sources:

China relies on a broad informal network of students, tourists, teachers, and foreign workers inside of

host nations to collect small bits of information to form a composite picture of the environment. Rather

than set a targeted goal for collection, they instead rely on sheer weight of information to form a clear

understanding of the situation. (Henderson 2007b)

As a result, information that is independently obtained by the Chinese hacker community is likely to find its

way to elements within the Chinese state. However, the Chinese state is not monolithic. It is a complex entity

that includes cooperation and competition amoung a variety of entities, including the Communist Party, the PLA

and the Government of China. In addition, within each of those entities there are factions and rivalries. Further

complicating matters is that there are reported relationships between the edges of the government and networks

of organized crime in the PRC, as in many other countries (Bakken 2005; Keith and Lin 2005). These complex

relationships further complicate our understanding of the connections between the Chinese hacker community

and the Chinese state.

While the PLA is developing computer network operations (CNO), as are the armed forces of a wide variety of

countries, its relationship with the hacker community appears to be minimal, as a recent study reports:

Little evidence exists in open sources to establish firm ties between the PLA and China

s hacker community,

however, research did uncover limited cases of apparent collaboration between more elite individual