clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

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All of these issues were grappled with in the aftermath of the Tracking GhostNet report, and throughout the
course of the Shadow investigation. Our experiences in the aftermath of GhostNet, where notification was left
incomplete, prompted a more deliberate and self-conscious approach with the Shadow investigation. We were
also fortunate to have within our collaboration the experiences of the Shadowserver Foundation, whose counsel
on notification helped in making decisions about timing and contacts.
By the end of November 2009, we were confident in our access to the basic command and control infrastructure
and identification of some of the key documents at hand. Upon the realization that some information about
individual Canadians was compromised, we notified Canadian authorities in December 2009 about the investigation, the compromise of Canadian-related information, and requested assistance on outreach with one of the
victims, namely the Indian government. At the same time, we independently explored whom we might contact
in the Indian government, including making inquiries with Canada
s Department of Foreign Affairs. By February
2010, we were able to find on our own what we thought was an appropriate contact in the Indian government, and
gave a detailed notification to the National Technology Research Organization. Our notification for takedown of
the command and control infrastructure came later in the investigation, after we had collected and analyzed all
of the information related to this report, but prior to its release.
Our experiences illustrate the intricate, nuanced and often confusing landscape of global cyber security notification practices. The notification process will continue after the publication of this report.
PART 6:
Conclusions
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 6: CONCLUSIONS
Shadows in the Cloud points to a disturbing complex ecosystem of malware. Although malware networks,
cyber crime and espionage have been around for years, the evidence presented here shows how these networks
can be aggressively adaptive systems, multipying and regenerating across multiple vectors and platforms, and
exploting the vulnerabilties within the latest Web 2.0 technologies to expand their reach and impact. Although
there is rich detail to what is uncovered in the Shadow investigation, so much of the origins, architecture and
aims of these networks ultimately remain a mystery and await further investigation and analysis. However, even
with the partial insights and fleeting glimpses acquired here, we can draw some conclusions and implications
for further research, policy and operations.
First, the research here shows, as with Tracking GhostNet, how even a relatively small research sample
this case Tibetan organizations
can expand, upon investigation and analysis, into an astonishingly large pool
of victims. The connections drawn out here beg the question of what would emerge if the research began with a
different group, from a different region of the world, with a different target set of compromised actors? Clearly,
an area of methodological advantage for both the Tracking GhostNet and the Shadows in the Cloud investigations was to have access in the field to compromised computers and be able to work outwards in a structured
and systematic fashion, using a combination of technical investigations and data analysis. An area of further
research is to extend such efforts to other locations in other regions of the world. Such investigations may reveal
other malware networks, or entirely new and unanticipated modes of crime and espionage.
Second, Shadows in the Cloud underscores the extent to which the global networked society into which we
have evolved socially, politically, economically, and militarily carries with it an underground ecoystem that is
equally networked, though far less visible to those whom it compromises. Governments, organizations and
other actors around the world have been quick to adopt computerized public and administration systems,
including state security actors. Their investments into these technologies have developed at a much faster rate
than the appropriate security policies and practices (Deibert and Rohozinski 2010).
Although the Government of India was the most victimized according to what we uncovered in Shadows in the
Cloud
and that certainly should yield a major consideration of public policy and security for that country
observations about India in this respect need to be qualified in at least two ways. First, Shadows in the Cloud
reports only on observations and existing evidence, which by definition remain partial. There could be other
countries victimized, involving these very same malware networks attackers, but of which we are unaware
because of our limited samples. Second, and most importantly, there are numerous other countries and international organizations that are targeted here, perhaps not to the same extent, but targeted and infiltrated nonetheless. We can only infer what type of data was exfiltrated from these other actors that is of strategic value.
Overall, however, the key point to draw is that networked societies can be compromised through networks in
which they are invariably linked and mutually dependent.
Third, and related, Shadows in the Cloud demonstrates clearly the potential for collateral compromise, one
of the key hypotheses informing our research framework. This investigation indicates that data leakage from
malware networks can compromise unwitting third parties who are not initially targeted by the attackers. Data
contained on compromised machines can also contain valuable information on third parties that while on
its own may not be significant, but when pieced together with other information can provide actionable and
operational intelligence. The policy and operational implications of collateral compromise are serious and wideranging, and reinforce that security is only as strong as the weakest link in a chain. In today
s networked world,
such chains are complex, overlapping and dispersed across numerous technological platforms crossing multiple
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 6: CONCLUSIONS
national jurisdictions. Paying attention to domestic cyber security is therefore only a partial solution to a much
wider problem. Today, no country or organization is a secure island in the global sea of information.
Fourth, another implication raised by Shadows in the Cloud is for criminal networks to be repurposed for political
espionage as part of an evolution in signals intelligence. Although our conclusions are necessarily circumscribed
by our lack of complete information in this respect, we may be seeing a blurring of the lines in malware genotypes among crimeware and more politically-motivated attacks. Part of that blurring may be deliberate on the
part of actors wishing to obscure attribution, but part of it may also be a newly emerging and largely organic
market for espionage products that was either contained or nonexistent in the past, and which now supplements the market for industrial espionage. This market may present opportunities for actors that, in turn, produce a refinement in their approach or methodology. Criminal actors may troll for targets widely as a first cut,
triaging among the available sources of information to zero-in on those that yield commercial value on both the
industrial and political espionage markets. Such a development would pose major policy and operational issues,
and accelerate existing trends down the road of cyber privateering.
Finally, a major implication of the findings of Shadows in the Cloud relates to the evolution towards cloud
computing, social networking and peer-to-peer networking technologies that characterize much of the global
networked society today. These new modes of information storage and communication carry with them many
conveniences and so now are fully integrated into personal life, business, government and social organization.
But as shown in the Shadow investigation, these new platforms are also being used as vectors of malware
propagation and command and control (Office of Privacy Commissioner of Canada 2010).
It is often said that dark clouds carry with them silver linings, but in this case the clouds contain within them
a dark hidden core. As we document above, blog hosting sites, social networking forums and mail groups were
turned into support structures and command and control systems for a malignant enterprise. The very same
characteristics of those social networking and cloud platforms which make them so attractive to the legitimate
user
reliability, distribution, redundancy and so forth
were what attracted our attackers to them in setting
up their network. Clouds provide criminals and espionage networks with convenient cover, tiered defences,
redundancy, cheap hosting and conveniently distributed command and control architectures. They also provide
a stealthy and very powerful mode of infiltrating targets who have become accustomed to clicking on links and
opening PDFs and other documents as naturally as opening an office door. What is required now is a much
greater reflection on what it will take, in terms of personal computing, corporate responsibility and government
policy, to acculturate a greater sensibility around cloud security.
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - BIBLIOGRAPHY & SUGGESTED READINGS
Bibliography
Adair, Steven. January 19, 2010.
Cyber Espionage: Death by 1000 Cuts,
Shadowserver Foundation,
http://www.shadowserver.org/wiki/pmwiki.php/Calendar/20100119 (accessed April 1, 2010).
Bakken, B
rge, ed. 2005. Crime, Punishment, and Policing in China. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
Bejtlich, Richard. January 22, 2010.
Attribution Using 20 Characteristics,
TaoSecurity,

All of these issues were grappled with in the aftermath of the Tracking GhostNet report, and throughout the

course of the Shadow investigation. Our experiences in the aftermath of GhostNet, where notification was left

incomplete, prompted a more deliberate and self-conscious approach with the Shadow investigation. We were

also fortunate to have within our collaboration the experiences of the Shadowserver Foundation, whose counsel

on notification helped in making decisions about timing and contacts.

By the end of November 2009, we were confident in our access to the basic command and control infrastructure

and identification of some of the key documents at hand. Upon the realization that some information about

individual Canadians was compromised, we notified Canadian authorities in December 2009 about the investigation, the compromise of Canadian-related information, and requested assistance on outreach with one of the

victims, namely the Indian government. At the same time, we independently explored whom we might contact

in the Indian government, including making inquiries with Canada

s Department of Foreign Affairs. By February

2010, we were able to find on our own what we thought was an appropriate contact in the Indian government, and

gave a detailed notification to the National Technology Research Organization. Our notification for takedown of

the command and control infrastructure came later in the investigation, after we had collected and analyzed all

of the information related to this report, but prior to its release.

Our experiences illustrate the intricate, nuanced and often confusing landscape of global cyber security notification practices. The notification process will continue after the publication of this report.

PART 6:

Conclusions

JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 6: CONCLUSIONS

Shadows in the Cloud points to a disturbing complex ecosystem of malware. Although malware networks,

cyber crime and espionage have been around for years, the evidence presented here shows how these networks

can be aggressively adaptive systems, multipying and regenerating across multiple vectors and platforms, and

exploting the vulnerabilties within the latest Web 2.0 technologies to expand their reach and impact. Although

there is rich detail to what is uncovered in the Shadow investigation, so much of the origins, architecture and

aims of these networks ultimately remain a mystery and await further investigation and analysis. However, even

with the partial insights and fleeting glimpses acquired here, we can draw some conclusions and implications

for further research, policy and operations.

First, the research here shows, as with Tracking GhostNet, how even a relatively small research sample

this case Tibetan organizations

can expand, upon investigation and analysis, into an astonishingly large pool

of victims. The connections drawn out here beg the question of what would emerge if the research began with a

different group, from a different region of the world, with a different target set of compromised actors? Clearly,

an area of methodological advantage for both the Tracking GhostNet and the Shadows in the Cloud investigations was to have access in the field to compromised computers and be able to work outwards in a structured

and systematic fashion, using a combination of technical investigations and data analysis. An area of further

research is to extend such efforts to other locations in other regions of the world. Such investigations may reveal

other malware networks, or entirely new and unanticipated modes of crime and espionage.

Second, Shadows in the Cloud underscores the extent to which the global networked society into which we

have evolved socially, politically, economically, and militarily carries with it an underground ecoystem that is

equally networked, though far less visible to those whom it compromises. Governments, organizations and

other actors around the world have been quick to adopt computerized public and administration systems,

including state security actors. Their investments into these technologies have developed at a much faster rate

than the appropriate security policies and practices (Deibert and Rohozinski 2010).

Although the Government of India was the most victimized according to what we uncovered in Shadows in the

Cloud

and that certainly should yield a major consideration of public policy and security for that country

observations about India in this respect need to be qualified in at least two ways. First, Shadows in the Cloud

reports only on observations and existing evidence, which by definition remain partial. There could be other

countries victimized, involving these very same malware networks attackers, but of which we are unaware

because of our limited samples. Second, and most importantly, there are numerous other countries and international organizations that are targeted here, perhaps not to the same extent, but targeted and infiltrated nonetheless. We can only infer what type of data was exfiltrated from these other actors that is of strategic value.

Overall, however, the key point to draw is that networked societies can be compromised through networks in

which they are invariably linked and mutually dependent.

Third, and related, Shadows in the Cloud demonstrates clearly the potential for collateral compromise, one

of the key hypotheses informing our research framework. This investigation indicates that data leakage from

malware networks can compromise unwitting third parties who are not initially targeted by the attackers. Data

contained on compromised machines can also contain valuable information on third parties that while on

its own may not be significant, but when pieced together with other information can provide actionable and

operational intelligence. The policy and operational implications of collateral compromise are serious and wideranging, and reinforce that security is only as strong as the weakest link in a chain. In today

s networked world,

such chains are complex, overlapping and dispersed across numerous technological platforms crossing multiple

JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 6: CONCLUSIONS

national jurisdictions. Paying attention to domestic cyber security is therefore only a partial solution to a much

wider problem. Today, no country or organization is a secure island in the global sea of information.

Fourth, another implication raised by Shadows in the Cloud is for criminal networks to be repurposed for political

espionage as part of an evolution in signals intelligence. Although our conclusions are necessarily circumscribed

by our lack of complete information in this respect, we may be seeing a blurring of the lines in malware genotypes among crimeware and more politically-motivated attacks. Part of that blurring may be deliberate on the

part of actors wishing to obscure attribution, but part of it may also be a newly emerging and largely organic

market for espionage products that was either contained or nonexistent in the past, and which now supplements the market for industrial espionage. This market may present opportunities for actors that, in turn, produce a refinement in their approach or methodology. Criminal actors may troll for targets widely as a first cut,

triaging among the available sources of information to zero-in on those that yield commercial value on both the

industrial and political espionage markets. Such a development would pose major policy and operational issues,

and accelerate existing trends down the road of cyber privateering.

Finally, a major implication of the findings of Shadows in the Cloud relates to the evolution towards cloud

computing, social networking and peer-to-peer networking technologies that characterize much of the global

networked society today. These new modes of information storage and communication carry with them many

conveniences and so now are fully integrated into personal life, business, government and social organization.

But as shown in the Shadow investigation, these new platforms are also being used as vectors of malware

propagation and command and control (Office of Privacy Commissioner of Canada 2010).

It is often said that dark clouds carry with them silver linings, but in this case the clouds contain within them

a dark hidden core. As we document above, blog hosting sites, social networking forums and mail groups were

turned into support structures and command and control systems for a malignant enterprise. The very same

characteristics of those social networking and cloud platforms which make them so attractive to the legitimate

user

reliability, distribution, redundancy and so forth

were what attracted our attackers to them in setting

up their network. Clouds provide criminals and espionage networks with convenient cover, tiered defences,

redundancy, cheap hosting and conveniently distributed command and control architectures. They also provide

a stealthy and very powerful mode of infiltrating targets who have become accustomed to clicking on links and

opening PDFs and other documents as naturally as opening an office door. What is required now is a much

greater reflection on what it will take, in terms of personal computing, corporate responsibility and government

policy, to acculturate a greater sensibility around cloud security.

JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - BIBLIOGRAPHY & SUGGESTED READINGS

Bibliography

Adair, Steven. January 19, 2010.

Cyber Espionage: Death by 1000 Cuts,

Shadowserver Foundation,

http://www.shadowserver.org/wiki/pmwiki.php/Calendar/20100119 (accessed April 1, 2010).

Bakken, B

rge, ed. 2005. Crime, Punishment, and Policing in China. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Bejtlich, Richard. January 22, 2010.

Attribution Using 20 Characteristics,

TaoSecurity,