clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

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hackers and the PRC
s civilian security services. The caveat to this is that amplifying details are extremely
limited and these relationships are difficult to corroborate. (Northrop Grumman 2009)
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 5: TACKLING CYBER ESPIONAGE
Moreover, the same study found that there is nothing that
suggests that the PLA or state security bureaus intend
to use hacktivist attacks as a component of a CNO campaign
(Northrop Grumman 2009). In addition, there are
a variety of factors, such as the lack of command and control, precision targeting and the inability to maintain
surprise and deception, that argue against the use of non-state hackers as part of the PLA
s CNO strategy.
In fact, the relations between the hacker community and the state is more likely to be a concern of the Ministry
of Public Security (Northrop Grumman 2009; Henderson 2007b). Interestingly, the Ministry of Public Security
has focused primarily on internal security matters, which links with the emphasis on the Tibet-related targets
documented in this report. (the PRC views Tibet as an internal problem.)
5.2.2 Cyber Crime
The activity of cyber criminals in the PRC parallels the activities of cyber criminals around the globe. The
Chinese hacker community has been known to engage in criminal activities, primarily motivated by profit.
Acting independently of state direction, they are involved in the buying and selling of malware, theft of intellectual
property, theft of gaming credentials, fraud, blackmail, music and video piracy, and pornography (Henderson
2007b). This activity is complex and further obfuscated by the move of Eastern European-based criminal
networks into Chinese cyberspace (Vass 2007). Researchers have identified several core components of the
cyber crime ecosystem in the PRC:
Malware Authors
motivated by profit and/or stature within the blackhat community, malware authors leverage their technical skills to create and distribute exploits (including 0day vulnerabilities) as well as trojan
horse programs. Their services are often advertised on discussion forums.
Website Masters/Crackers
by maintaining malicious websites, exploiting vulnerable websites and providing hosting for the command and control capabilities of trojans, the website masters/crackers provide the
infrastructure for cybercrime in the PRC
Envelopes
Stealers
focus on acquiring username and password pairs, known as envelopes, through the
use of malware kits, which are then sold. They operate and maintain networks of infected computers but
purchase services from malware authors and website masters/crackers to compensate for their general lack
of technical skill.
Virtual Asset Stealers/Sellers
by exploiting their knowledge of the underground economy, virtual asset
stealers/sellers purchase compromised credentials from envelopes stealers and sell virtual assets to online
games players, QQ users and others who drive the demand for stolen virtual goods (Choo 2008; Thibodeau
2010; Zhuge et al. 2009).
In additional to politically sensitive information, we did find that personal information, including banking
information, was exfiltrated by the attackers. It is possible that in addition to exploiting the politically sensitive
information the attacks may have also had an interest in exploiting the financial data that was stolen although
we have no direct knowledge of such events occurring.
5.2.3 Overall Assessment
Attribution concerning cyber espionage networks is a complex task, given the inherently obscure modus
operandi of the agents or groups under investigation. Cyber criminals aim to mask their identities, and
the networks investigated in this report are dispersed across multiple platforms and national jurisdictions.
Complicating matters further is the politicization of attribution questions, particularly concerning Chinese inten-
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 5: TACKLING CYBER ESPIONAGE
tions around information warfare. Clearly this investigation and our analysis tracks back directly to the PRC,
and to known entities within the criminal underground of the PRC. There is also an obvious correlation to be
drawn between the victims, the nature of the documents stolen, and the strategic interests of the Chinese state.
But correlations do not equal causation. It is certainly possible that the attackers were directed in some manner
either by sub-contract or privateering
by agents of the Chinese state, but we have no evidence to prove
that assertion. It is also possible that the agents behind the Shadow network are operating for motives other
than political espionage, as our investigation and analysis only uncovered a slice of what is undoubtedly
a larger set of networks. Even more remote, but still at least within the realm of possibility, is the false flag
scenario, that another government altogether is masking a political espionage operation to appear as if it is
coming from within the PRC.
Drawing these different scenarios and alternative explanations together, the most plausible explanation, and the
one supported by the evidence, is that the Shadow network is based out of the PRC by one or more individuals
with strong connections to the Chinese criminal underground. Given the often murky relationships that can exist
between this underground and elements of the state, the information collected by the Shadow network may end
up in the possession of some entity of the Chinese government.
5.3 Notification
Investigations of malware activity, such as that undertaken as part of the Shadow and GhostNet investigations,
can yield information about the network infrastructure of the attackers, information about those who have been
compromised, and confidential or private documents or other data that may have been exfiltrated without prior
knowledge. Access to this information on all levels raises a number of practical, ethical and legal issues, many
of which are unclear given the embryonic nature of the field of inquiry as a whole.
Throughout this investigation, we have been conscious of these issues and have attempted to meet a professional standard in terms of planning and documenting our steps taken in the process of notification. This
entailed research into existing practices and principles, and engagement with the law enforcement, intelligence
and security communities in a number of countries. We were also conscious of the need to comply with the domestic laws in whose context this investigation was undertaken
namely those of India, the United States and
Canada
as well as principles governing all academic research at the University of Toronto, where the Citizen
Lab is located.
Notification itself can be broken down into several categories, each of which entails complicating factors.
First, there is notification that is required to takedown the command and control infrastructure, typically to the
hosting and service provider companies through which the malware networks operate and on which they are
hosted. Complicating matters, these services can be located in numerous national jurisdictions and subject to a
variety of privacy laws and norms. Second, there are issues around notification of victims, such as governments,
businesses, NGOs and individuals. This type of notification is perhaps the most challenging on ethical, practical
and legal grounds. Notification of governments, for example, can be a very sensitive matter, especially if classified documents are involved or information is retrieved that is relevant to national security concerns. The same
holds true of notification to individuals or businesses. At what point should a researcher notify a victim? Who
within the organization, whether it is a government, a business or an NGO, is the appropriate point of contact
for the notification? What if the notification jeopardizes a third party
s security, or leads to some kind of retaliation or retribution? Should researchers notify law enforcement and intelligence agencies in their own countries
before reaching out to foreign governments?
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 5: TACKLING CYBER ESPIONAGE
Existing practices in this area are underdeveloped and largely informal. In part, this reflects the fact that global
cyber security is still an embryonic field. But it also speaks to the very real problem of competitive power
politics at the highest levels of national security, which tend to restrict information sharing in sensitive areas
around cyber crime and espionage. Generally speaking, information sharing among law enforcement and intelligence agencies across borders is tentative at best, with the exception of that which occurs among close allies
with deeply entrenched and long-standing links. Outside of those security communities, notification of services
and governments tends to be restricted to specialist technical communities, telecommunications operators, and
network administrators, if it occurs at all. Consequently, notification of the types referred to above can be ad
hoc and inconsistent, largely contingent on the informal connections among professional communities.

hackers and the PRC

s civilian security services. The caveat to this is that amplifying details are extremely

limited and these relationships are difficult to corroborate. (Northrop Grumman 2009)

JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 5: TACKLING CYBER ESPIONAGE

Moreover, the same study found that there is nothing that

suggests that the PLA or state security bureaus intend

to use hacktivist attacks as a component of a CNO campaign

(Northrop Grumman 2009). In addition, there are

a variety of factors, such as the lack of command and control, precision targeting and the inability to maintain

surprise and deception, that argue against the use of non-state hackers as part of the PLA

s CNO strategy.

In fact, the relations between the hacker community and the state is more likely to be a concern of the Ministry

of Public Security (Northrop Grumman 2009; Henderson 2007b). Interestingly, the Ministry of Public Security

has focused primarily on internal security matters, which links with the emphasis on the Tibet-related targets

documented in this report. (the PRC views Tibet as an internal problem.)

5.2.2 Cyber Crime

The activity of cyber criminals in the PRC parallels the activities of cyber criminals around the globe. The

Chinese hacker community has been known to engage in criminal activities, primarily motivated by profit.

Acting independently of state direction, they are involved in the buying and selling of malware, theft of intellectual

property, theft of gaming credentials, fraud, blackmail, music and video piracy, and pornography (Henderson

2007b). This activity is complex and further obfuscated by the move of Eastern European-based criminal

networks into Chinese cyberspace (Vass 2007). Researchers have identified several core components of the

cyber crime ecosystem in the PRC:

Malware Authors

motivated by profit and/or stature within the blackhat community, malware authors leverage their technical skills to create and distribute exploits (including 0day vulnerabilities) as well as trojan

horse programs. Their services are often advertised on discussion forums.

Website Masters/Crackers

by maintaining malicious websites, exploiting vulnerable websites and providing hosting for the command and control capabilities of trojans, the website masters/crackers provide the

infrastructure for cybercrime in the PRC

Envelopes

Stealers

focus on acquiring username and password pairs, known as envelopes, through the

use of malware kits, which are then sold. They operate and maintain networks of infected computers but

purchase services from malware authors and website masters/crackers to compensate for their general lack

of technical skill.

Virtual Asset Stealers/Sellers

by exploiting their knowledge of the underground economy, virtual asset

stealers/sellers purchase compromised credentials from envelopes stealers and sell virtual assets to online

games players, QQ users and others who drive the demand for stolen virtual goods (Choo 2008; Thibodeau

2010; Zhuge et al. 2009).

In additional to politically sensitive information, we did find that personal information, including banking

information, was exfiltrated by the attackers. It is possible that in addition to exploiting the politically sensitive

information the attacks may have also had an interest in exploiting the financial data that was stolen although

we have no direct knowledge of such events occurring.

5.2.3 Overall Assessment

Attribution concerning cyber espionage networks is a complex task, given the inherently obscure modus

operandi of the agents or groups under investigation. Cyber criminals aim to mask their identities, and

the networks investigated in this report are dispersed across multiple platforms and national jurisdictions.

Complicating matters further is the politicization of attribution questions, particularly concerning Chinese inten-

JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 5: TACKLING CYBER ESPIONAGE

tions around information warfare. Clearly this investigation and our analysis tracks back directly to the PRC,

and to known entities within the criminal underground of the PRC. There is also an obvious correlation to be

drawn between the victims, the nature of the documents stolen, and the strategic interests of the Chinese state.

But correlations do not equal causation. It is certainly possible that the attackers were directed in some manner

either by sub-contract or privateering

by agents of the Chinese state, but we have no evidence to prove

that assertion. It is also possible that the agents behind the Shadow network are operating for motives other

than political espionage, as our investigation and analysis only uncovered a slice of what is undoubtedly

a larger set of networks. Even more remote, but still at least within the realm of possibility, is the false flag

scenario, that another government altogether is masking a political espionage operation to appear as if it is

coming from within the PRC.

Drawing these different scenarios and alternative explanations together, the most plausible explanation, and the

one supported by the evidence, is that the Shadow network is based out of the PRC by one or more individuals

with strong connections to the Chinese criminal underground. Given the often murky relationships that can exist

between this underground and elements of the state, the information collected by the Shadow network may end

up in the possession of some entity of the Chinese government.

5.3 Notification

Investigations of malware activity, such as that undertaken as part of the Shadow and GhostNet investigations,

can yield information about the network infrastructure of the attackers, information about those who have been

compromised, and confidential or private documents or other data that may have been exfiltrated without prior

knowledge. Access to this information on all levels raises a number of practical, ethical and legal issues, many

of which are unclear given the embryonic nature of the field of inquiry as a whole.

Throughout this investigation, we have been conscious of these issues and have attempted to meet a professional standard in terms of planning and documenting our steps taken in the process of notification. This

entailed research into existing practices and principles, and engagement with the law enforcement, intelligence

and security communities in a number of countries. We were also conscious of the need to comply with the domestic laws in whose context this investigation was undertaken

namely those of India, the United States and

Canada

as well as principles governing all academic research at the University of Toronto, where the Citizen

Lab is located.

Notification itself can be broken down into several categories, each of which entails complicating factors.

First, there is notification that is required to takedown the command and control infrastructure, typically to the

hosting and service provider companies through which the malware networks operate and on which they are

hosted. Complicating matters, these services can be located in numerous national jurisdictions and subject to a

variety of privacy laws and norms. Second, there are issues around notification of victims, such as governments,

businesses, NGOs and individuals. This type of notification is perhaps the most challenging on ethical, practical

and legal grounds. Notification of governments, for example, can be a very sensitive matter, especially if classified documents are involved or information is retrieved that is relevant to national security concerns. The same

holds true of notification to individuals or businesses. At what point should a researcher notify a victim? Who

within the organization, whether it is a government, a business or an NGO, is the appropriate point of contact

for the notification? What if the notification jeopardizes a third party

s security, or leads to some kind of retaliation or retribution? Should researchers notify law enforcement and intelligence agencies in their own countries

before reaching out to foreign governments?

JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 5: TACKLING CYBER ESPIONAGE

Existing practices in this area are underdeveloped and largely informal. In part, this reflects the fact that global

cyber security is still an embryonic field. But it also speaks to the very real problem of competitive power

politics at the highest levels of national security, which tend to restrict information sharing in sensitive areas

around cyber crime and espionage. Generally speaking, information sharing among law enforcement and intelligence agencies across borders is tentative at best, with the exception of that which occurs among close allies

with deeply entrenched and long-standing links. Outside of those security communities, notification of services

and governments tends to be restricted to specialist technical communities, telecommunications operators, and

network administrators, if it occurs at all. Consequently, notification of the types referred to above can be ad

hoc and inconsistent, largely contingent on the informal connections among professional communities.