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used as command and control for another instance of malware. In this case, a private Google group was used by the
attackers to send commands to compromised computers which then uploaded their responses to the same Group
(Symantec 2009a) Symantec also found an instance of malware that used Facebook status messages as a mechanism
of command and control. (Symantec 2009b). The use of these social networking and Web 2.0 tools allows the attackers
to leverage the normal operation of these tools to obscure the command and control functions of malware.
One platform leveraged by the attackers in particularly interesting ways was the webmail service provided by
Yahoo!. We discovered five Yahoo! Mail accounts being used by the attackers as a component of command and
control. Once a computer was compromised, the malware connected to the Yahoo! Mail accounts using Yahoo
API and created a unique folder in the Inbox of the mail account, into which an email was inserted containing
the computer
s name, operating system and IP address. The attacker would then send an email to the account
containing a command or a command along with additional malware as an attachment. The next time that a
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 3: MAPPING THE SHADOWS IN THE CLOUD
compromised computer checks in with the email account, it then downloads and executes the malicious attachment. Upon execution, the compromised computer placed an acknowledgement mail in the Yahoo! Mail Inbox.
The email addresses used by the attackers were:
The attackers used these Yahoo! Mail accounts as command and control in conjunction with traditional mechanisms, such as HTTP connections to web servers. Therefore, even if the traditional web-based command and
control channels were shut down the attacker could retain control using the Yahoo! Mail mechanism.
Moreover, the web-based component of command and control was also resilient. We found that command and
control servers were being operated on free hosting sites and on free domain providers such co.tv and net.ru.
We found command and control servers on the following free web hosting providers:
byethost9.com
6te.net
justfree.com
sqweebs.com
yourfreehosting.net
kilu.de
5gighost.com
hostaim.com
5webs.net
55fast.com
surge8.com
In addition we found servers on free domains provided by co.tv and net.ru. All of the IP addresses to which the
sub-domains of these control servers resolve are in the United States, with the exception of one that is hosted in
Germany. The command and control servers on free hosting are:
changemore.hostaim.com
choesang.5gighost.com
freegate.kilu.de
freesp.6te.net
hardso.yourfreehosting.net
scjoinsign.sqweebs.com
tshkung01.justfree.com
www.99fm.co.tv
www.j5yr.co.tv
zcagua.6te.net
cxingpeng.byethost9.com
lobsang.net.ru
freesp.55fast.com
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 3: MAPPING THE SHADOWS IN THE CLOUD
iloveusy.justfree.com
zenob.surge8.com
bigmouse.5webs.net
As some of the free hosting accounts became unavailable, the attacker
s modified blog posts on the intermediaries to point to new command and control servers, most often to servers that appear to be the core of the
network. The core command and control servers reside on domain names that appear to be registered by the
attackers themselves and on dedicated servers. These control servers are:
c2etejs.com
erneex.com
idefesvn.com
jdusnemsaz.com
peose.com
indexnews.org
lookbytheway.net
microsoftnews.net
tibetcommunication.com
intoplink.com
indexindian.com
All of these domain names are hosted in the PRC.
The first group of domain names (c2etejs.com, erneex.com, idefesvn.com, jdusnemsaz.com, peose.com) were
all hosted on the same IP address
119.84.4.43
but moved to another IP address
210.51.7.155
which
is associated with the more well known domain names indexindian.com and tibetcommunication.com. The
domains indexnews.org and lookbytheway.net are on 61.188.87.27, microsoftnews.net is on 61.188.87.79, and
intoplink.com is on 60.160.182.113. The domains indexindian.com, indexnews.org and lookbytheway.net are
well known malware domain names associated with more than one instance of malware.
3.3.1 Malware Connections: Enfal
One of our objectives in this report was to explore the broader ecosystem of malware. While analysis of individual
attacks may yield interesting data, a broader understanding of connections between malware networks allows us
to better understand the methods, targets and capabilities of the attackers. Based on the malware tools and
command and control infrastructure collected as part of the Shadows in the Cloud investigation we were able to
draw connections between the Shadow network and at least two other, possibly affiliated, malware networks.
When grouping malware networks together we interpret relationships between the command and control
infrastructures, characteristics of the malware, attack vectors and exploits used, and any identifying information
left behind by the attackers. This allows us to track the activities of similar yet distinct groups of attackers over
time. More importantly, this historical perspective allows us to apply a granular level of analysis when investigating attacks, rather than simply grouping attackers and malware together by the country of origin. When
grouping malware we focus on:
IP address relationships - the historical relationship between command and control domains that resolve to
same IP addresses over time.
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - PART 3: MAPPING THE SHADOWS IN THE CLOUD
Malware connection relationships - malware found on one command and control server that connects to a
different command and control server.
Malware file path relationships - the presence of distinctive file paths on multiple command and control
servers.