clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

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School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto.
Nart Villeneuve is the Chief Security Officer at the SecDev Group, Director of Operations of Psiphon Inc. and
a senior SecDev research fellow at the Citizen Lab at the Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto
where he focuses on electronic surveillance, targeted malware and politically motivated digital attacks.
Greg Walton conducted and coordinated the primary field-based research for the Shadow investigation in His
Holiness the Dalai Lama
s Office and the Tibetan Government-in-Exile in Dharamsala, India. Greg is a SecDev
Group associate and editor of the Information Warfare Monitor website. He is the SecDev Fellow at the Citizen
Lab at the Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto.
This report represents a collective activity and numerous others also contributed to the research effort. This
includes individuals in India, who for security reasons we cannot name. We are also grateful to the Office of His
Holiness the Dalai Lama. The research of the Citizen Lab and the Information Warfare Monitor is supported by
a generous grant from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, in-kind and staff contributions from
the SecDev Group, and a generous donation of software from Palantir Technologies Inc. We are very grateful to
Masashi Crete-Nishihata (Citizen Lab) and Arnav Manchanda (SecDev Group) for research assistance, and to
Jane Gowan (Agent 5 Design and Citizen Lab) for layout and design.
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
Executive Summary
Shadows in the Cloud documents a complex ecosystem of cyber espionage that systematically compromised
government, business, academic, and other computer network systems in India, the Offices of the Dalai Lama,
the United Nations, and several other countries. The report also contains an analysis of data which were stolen
from politically sensitive targets and recovered during the course of the investigation. These include documents
from the Offices of the Dalai Lama and agencies of the Indian national security establishment. Data containing
sensitive information on citizens of numerous third-party countries, as well as personal, financial, and business
information, were also exfiltrated and recovered during the course of the investigation. The report analyzes the
malware ecosystem employed by the Shadows
attackers, which leveraged multiple redundant cloud computing
systems, social networking platforms, and free web hosting services in order to maintain persistent control while
operating core servers located in the People
s Republic of China (PRC). Although the identity and motivation
of the attackers remain unknown, the report is able to determine the location (Chengdu, PRC) as well as some
of the associations of the attackers through circumstantial evidence. The investigation is the product of an
eight month, collaborative activity between the Information Warfare Monitor (Citizen Lab and SecDev) and the
Shadowserver Foundation. The investigation employed a fusion methodology, combining technical interrogation
techniques, data analysis, and field research, to track and uncover the Shadow cyber espionage network.
Summary of Main Findings
Complex cyber espionage network - Documented evidence of a cyber espionage network that compromised government, business, and academic computer systems in India, the Office of the Dalai Lama, and the United Nations.
Numerous other institutions, including the Embassy of Pakistan in the United States, were also compromised. Some of
these institutions can be positively identified, while others cannot.
Theft of classified and sensitive documents - Recovery and analysis of exfiltrated data, including one document that
appears to be encrypted diplomatic correspondence, two documents marked
SECRET
, six as
RESTRICTED
, and
five as
CONFIDENTIAL
. These documents are identified as belonging to the Indian government. However, we do not
have direct evidence that they were stolen from Indian government computers and they may have been compromised
as a result of being copied onto personal computers. The recovered documents also include 1,500 letters sent from the
Dalai Lama
s office between January and November 2009. The profile of documents recovered suggests that the attackers targeted specific systems and profiles of users.
Evidence of collateral compromise - A portion of the recovered data included visa applications submitted to Indian
diplomatic missions in Afghanistan. This data was voluntarily provided to the Indian missions by nationals of 13 countries as part of the regular visa application process. In a context like Afghanistan, this finding points to the complex nature
of the information security challenge where risks to individuals (or operational security) can occur as a result of a data
compromise on secure systems operated by trusted partners.
Command-and-control infrastructure that leverages cloud-based social media services - Documentation of a complex and tiered command and control infrastructure, designed to maintain persistence. The infrastructure made use of
freely available social media systems that include Twitter, Google Groups, Blogspot, Baidu Blogs, blog.com and Yahoo!
Mail. This top layer directed compromised computers to accounts on free web hosting services, and as the free hosting
servers were disabled, to a stable core of command and control servers located in the PRC.
Links to Chinese hacking community - Evidence of links between the Shadow network and two individuals living in
Chengdu, PRC to the underground hacking community in the PRC.
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - TABLE OF CONTENTS
Table of Contents
Part I: Background and Context
Introduction - Building upon GhostNet
About the Shadows in the Cloud Investigation - Beyond GhostNet
Research Framework
Part II: Methodology and Investigative Techniques
Methodology
Field Investigation
Technical Investigative Activities
Part III: Mapping the Shadows in the Cloud
3.2.
Analysis of Data while in the Field
Technical Investigation
Command and Control Infrastructure
Part IV: Targets and Effects
4.2.
Compromised Victims: the evidence
Victim Analysis on the basis of recovered documents
Part V: Tackling Cyber Espionage
Attribution and cyber crime / cyber espionage
Notification
p. 1
p. 2
p. 4
p. 5
p. 7
p. 8
p. 8
p. 10
p. 12
p. 14
p. 16
p. 20
p. 25
p. 26
p. 30
p. 36

School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto.

Nart Villeneuve is the Chief Security Officer at the SecDev Group, Director of Operations of Psiphon Inc. and

a senior SecDev research fellow at the Citizen Lab at the Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto

where he focuses on electronic surveillance, targeted malware and politically motivated digital attacks.

Greg Walton conducted and coordinated the primary field-based research for the Shadow investigation in His

Holiness the Dalai Lama

s Office and the Tibetan Government-in-Exile in Dharamsala, India. Greg is a SecDev

Group associate and editor of the Information Warfare Monitor website. He is the SecDev Fellow at the Citizen

Lab at the Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto.

This report represents a collective activity and numerous others also contributed to the research effort. This

includes individuals in India, who for security reasons we cannot name. We are also grateful to the Office of His

Holiness the Dalai Lama. The research of the Citizen Lab and the Information Warfare Monitor is supported by

a generous grant from the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation, in-kind and staff contributions from

the SecDev Group, and a generous donation of software from Palantir Technologies Inc. We are very grateful to

Masashi Crete-Nishihata (Citizen Lab) and Arnav Manchanda (SecDev Group) for research assistance, and to

Jane Gowan (Agent 5 Design and Citizen Lab) for layout and design.

JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Executive Summary

Shadows in the Cloud documents a complex ecosystem of cyber espionage that systematically compromised

government, business, academic, and other computer network systems in India, the Offices of the Dalai Lama,

the United Nations, and several other countries. The report also contains an analysis of data which were stolen

from politically sensitive targets and recovered during the course of the investigation. These include documents

from the Offices of the Dalai Lama and agencies of the Indian national security establishment. Data containing

sensitive information on citizens of numerous third-party countries, as well as personal, financial, and business

information, were also exfiltrated and recovered during the course of the investigation. The report analyzes the

malware ecosystem employed by the Shadows

attackers, which leveraged multiple redundant cloud computing

systems, social networking platforms, and free web hosting services in order to maintain persistent control while

operating core servers located in the People

s Republic of China (PRC). Although the identity and motivation

of the attackers remain unknown, the report is able to determine the location (Chengdu, PRC) as well as some

of the associations of the attackers through circumstantial evidence. The investigation is the product of an

eight month, collaborative activity between the Information Warfare Monitor (Citizen Lab and SecDev) and the

Shadowserver Foundation. The investigation employed a fusion methodology, combining technical interrogation

techniques, data analysis, and field research, to track and uncover the Shadow cyber espionage network.

Summary of Main Findings

Complex cyber espionage network - Documented evidence of a cyber espionage network that compromised government, business, and academic computer systems in India, the Office of the Dalai Lama, and the United Nations.

Numerous other institutions, including the Embassy of Pakistan in the United States, were also compromised. Some of

these institutions can be positively identified, while others cannot.

Theft of classified and sensitive documents - Recovery and analysis of exfiltrated data, including one document that

appears to be encrypted diplomatic correspondence, two documents marked

SECRET

, six as

RESTRICTED

, and

five as

CONFIDENTIAL

. These documents are identified as belonging to the Indian government. However, we do not

have direct evidence that they were stolen from Indian government computers and they may have been compromised

as a result of being copied onto personal computers. The recovered documents also include 1,500 letters sent from the

Dalai Lama

s office between January and November 2009. The profile of documents recovered suggests that the attackers targeted specific systems and profiles of users.

Evidence of collateral compromise - A portion of the recovered data included visa applications submitted to Indian

diplomatic missions in Afghanistan. This data was voluntarily provided to the Indian missions by nationals of 13 countries as part of the regular visa application process. In a context like Afghanistan, this finding points to the complex nature

of the information security challenge where risks to individuals (or operational security) can occur as a result of a data

compromise on secure systems operated by trusted partners.

Command-and-control infrastructure that leverages cloud-based social media services - Documentation of a complex and tiered command and control infrastructure, designed to maintain persistence. The infrastructure made use of

freely available social media systems that include Twitter, Google Groups, Blogspot, Baidu Blogs, blog.com and Yahoo!

Mail. This top layer directed compromised computers to accounts on free web hosting services, and as the free hosting

servers were disabled, to a stable core of command and control servers located in the PRC.

Links to Chinese hacking community - Evidence of links between the Shadow network and two individuals living in

Chengdu, PRC to the underground hacking community in the PRC.

JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Contents

Part I: Background and Context

Introduction - Building upon GhostNet

About the Shadows in the Cloud Investigation - Beyond GhostNet

Research Framework

Part II: Methodology and Investigative Techniques

Methodology

Field Investigation

Technical Investigative Activities

Part III: Mapping the Shadows in the Cloud

3.2.

Analysis of Data while in the Field

Technical Investigation

Command and Control Infrastructure

Part IV: Targets and Effects

4.2.

Compromised Victims: the evidence

Victim Analysis on the basis of recovered documents

Part V: Tackling Cyber Espionage

Attribution and cyber crime / cyber espionage

Notification

p. 1

p. 2

p. 4

p. 5

p. 7

p. 8

p. 10

p. 12

p. 14

p. 16

p. 20

p. 25

p. 26

p. 30

p. 36