clydeiii/cybersecurity · Datasets at Hugging Face

text stringlengths 4 429
ftp2.homeunix.com
update.ourhobby.com
connectproxy.3322.org
csport.2288.org
* This data is subject to change.
* For the latest data, please visit McAfee Aurora site
http://www.mcafee.com/us/threat_center/operation_aurora.html
Appendix A: Useful URLs related to Aurora
http://www.mcafee.com/us/local_content/reports/how_can_u_tell.pdf
http://www.mcafee.com/us/threat_center/aurora_enterprise.html
http://newsroom.mcafee.com/article_display.cfm?article_id=3613
http://www.mcafee.com/us/threat_center/operation_aurora.html
http://www.avertlabs.com/research/blog/
http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/advisory/979352.mspx
http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2010-0249
http://podcasts.mcafee.com/audioparasitics/AudioParasitics-Episode80-01-2010.mp3
http://community.mcafee.com/groups/operation-aurora
JR03-2010
SHADOWS IN THE CLOUD:
Investigating Cyber Espionage 2.0
JOINT REPORT:
Information Warfare Monitor
Shadowserver Foundation
April 6, 2010
WEB VERSION. Also found here:
http://shadows-in-the-cloud.net
INFOWAR
MONITOR
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - FOREWORD
Foreword
Crime and espionage form a dark underworld of cyberspace. Whereas crime is usually the first to seek out new
opportunities and methods, espionage usually follows in its wake, borrowing techniques and tradecraft. The
Shadows in the Cloud report illustrates the increasingly dangerous ecosystem of crime and espionage and its
embeddedness in the fabric of global cyberspace.
This ecosystem is the product of numerous factors. Attackers employ complex, adaptive attack techniques that
demonstrate high-level ingenuity and opportunism. They take advantage of the cracks and fissures that open up
in the fast-paced transformations of our technological world. Every new software program, social networking
site, cloud computing, or cheap hosting service that is launched into our everyday digital lives creates an
opportunity for this ecosystem to morph, adapt, and exploit.
It has also emerged because of poor security practices of users, from individuals to large organizations. We
take for granted that the information and communications revolution is a relatively new phenomenon, still
very much in the midst of unceasing epochal change. Public institutions have adopted these new technologies
faster than procedures and rules have been created to deal with the radical transparency and accompanying
vulnerabilities they introduce.
Today, data is transferred from laptops to USB sticks, over wireless networks at caf
hot spots, and stored across
cloud computing services whose servers are located in far-off political jurisdictions. These new modalities of
communicating de-concentrate and disperse the targets of exploitation, multiplying the points of exposure
and potential compromise. Paradoxically, documents and data are probably safer in a file cabinet, behind the
bureaucrat
s careful watch, than they are on the PC today.
The ecosystem of crime and espionage is also emerging because of opportunism on the part of actors. Cyber
espionage is the great equalizer. Countries no longer have to spend billions of dollars to build globe-spanning
satellites to pursue high-level intelligence gathering, when they can do so via the web. We have no evidence in
this report of the involvement of the People
s Republic of China (PRC) or any other government in the Shadow
network. But an important question to be entertained is whether the PRC will take action to shut the Shadow
network down. Doing so will help to address long-standing concerns that malware ecosystems are actively
cultivated, or at the very least tolerated, by governments like the PRC who stand to benefit from their exploits
though the black and grey markets for information and data.
Finally, the ecosystem is emerging because of a propitious policy environment
or rather the absence of
one
at a global level. Governments around the world are engaged in a rapid race to militarize cyber space,
to develop tools and methods to fight and win wars in this domain. This arms race creates an opportunity
structure ripe for crime and espionage to flourish. In the absence of norms, principles and rules of mutual
restraint at a global level, a vacuum exists for subterranean exploits to fill.
There is a real risk of a perfect storm in cyberspace erupting out of this vacuum that threatens to subvert
cyberspace itself, either through over-reaction, a spiraling arms race, the imposition of heavy-handed controls,
or through gradual irrelevance as people disconnect out of fear of insecurity.
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - FOREWORD
There is, therefore, an urgent need for a global convention on cyberspace that builds robust mechanisms of
information sharing across borders and institutions, defines appropriate rules of the road for engagement in the
cyber domain, puts the onus on states to not tolerate or encourage mischievous networks whose activities
operate from within their jurisdictions, and protects and preserves this valuable global commons.
Until such a normative and policy shift occurs, the shadows in the cloud may grow into a dark, threatening storm.
Ron Deibert
Director, the Citizen Lab, Munk School of Global Affairs
University of Toronto
Rafal Rohozinski
CEO, The SecDev Group (Ottawa)
JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Acknowledgments
This investigation is a result of a collaboration between the Information Warfare Monitor and the Shadowserver
Foundation. Our ability to share critical information and analytical insights within a dedicated group of
professionals allowed us to uncover and investigate the operation of the network documented in this report.
The Information Warfare Monitor (infowar-monitor.net) is a joint activity of the Citizen Lab, Munk School
of Global Affairs, University of Toronto, and the SecDev Group, an operational consultancy based in Ottawa
specialising in evidence-based research in countries and regions under threat of insecurity and violence. The
Shadowserver Foundation (shadowserver.org) was established in 2004 and is comprised of volunteer security
professionals that investigate and monitor malware, botnets, and malicious attacks. Both the Information
Warfare Monitor and the Shadowserver Foundation aim to understand and accurately report on emerging cyber
threats as they develop.
Steven Adair is a security researcher with the Shadowserver Foundation. He frequently analyzes malware, tracks
botnets, and deals with cyber attacks of all kinds with a special emphasis on those linked to cyber espionage.
Ron Deibert is Director of the Citizen Lab at the Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto. He is
a co-founder and principal investigator of the OpenNet Initiative and Information Warfare Monitor. He is Vice
President, Policy and Outreach, Psiphon Inc., and a principal with the SecDev Group.
Rafal Rohozinski is CEO of the SecDev Group and Psiphon Inc. He is a co-founder and principal investigator of
the OpenNet Initiative and Information Warfare Monitor, and a senior research advisor at the Citizen Lab, Munk

ftp2.homeunix.com

update.ourhobby.com

connectproxy.3322.org

csport.2288.org

* This data is subject to change.

* For the latest data, please visit McAfee Aurora site

http://www.mcafee.com/us/threat_center/operation_aurora.html

Appendix A: Useful URLs related to Aurora

http://www.mcafee.com/us/local_content/reports/how_can_u_tell.pdf

http://www.mcafee.com/us/threat_center/aurora_enterprise.html

http://newsroom.mcafee.com/article_display.cfm?article_id=3613

http://www.mcafee.com/us/threat_center/operation_aurora.html

http://www.avertlabs.com/research/blog/

http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/advisory/979352.mspx

http://www.cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2010-0249

http://podcasts.mcafee.com/audioparasitics/AudioParasitics-Episode80-01-2010.mp3

http://community.mcafee.com/groups/operation-aurora

JR03-2010

SHADOWS IN THE CLOUD:

Investigating Cyber Espionage 2.0

JOINT REPORT:

Information Warfare Monitor

Shadowserver Foundation

April 6, 2010

WEB VERSION. Also found here:

http://shadows-in-the-cloud.net

INFOWAR

MONITOR

JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - FOREWORD

Foreword

Crime and espionage form a dark underworld of cyberspace. Whereas crime is usually the first to seek out new

opportunities and methods, espionage usually follows in its wake, borrowing techniques and tradecraft. The

Shadows in the Cloud report illustrates the increasingly dangerous ecosystem of crime and espionage and its

embeddedness in the fabric of global cyberspace.

This ecosystem is the product of numerous factors. Attackers employ complex, adaptive attack techniques that

demonstrate high-level ingenuity and opportunism. They take advantage of the cracks and fissures that open up

in the fast-paced transformations of our technological world. Every new software program, social networking

site, cloud computing, or cheap hosting service that is launched into our everyday digital lives creates an

opportunity for this ecosystem to morph, adapt, and exploit.

It has also emerged because of poor security practices of users, from individuals to large organizations. We

take for granted that the information and communications revolution is a relatively new phenomenon, still

very much in the midst of unceasing epochal change. Public institutions have adopted these new technologies

faster than procedures and rules have been created to deal with the radical transparency and accompanying

vulnerabilities they introduce.

Today, data is transferred from laptops to USB sticks, over wireless networks at caf

hot spots, and stored across

cloud computing services whose servers are located in far-off political jurisdictions. These new modalities of

communicating de-concentrate and disperse the targets of exploitation, multiplying the points of exposure

and potential compromise. Paradoxically, documents and data are probably safer in a file cabinet, behind the

bureaucrat

s careful watch, than they are on the PC today.

The ecosystem of crime and espionage is also emerging because of opportunism on the part of actors. Cyber

espionage is the great equalizer. Countries no longer have to spend billions of dollars to build globe-spanning

satellites to pursue high-level intelligence gathering, when they can do so via the web. We have no evidence in

this report of the involvement of the People

s Republic of China (PRC) or any other government in the Shadow

network. But an important question to be entertained is whether the PRC will take action to shut the Shadow

network down. Doing so will help to address long-standing concerns that malware ecosystems are actively

cultivated, or at the very least tolerated, by governments like the PRC who stand to benefit from their exploits

though the black and grey markets for information and data.

Finally, the ecosystem is emerging because of a propitious policy environment

or rather the absence of

one

at a global level. Governments around the world are engaged in a rapid race to militarize cyber space,

to develop tools and methods to fight and win wars in this domain. This arms race creates an opportunity

structure ripe for crime and espionage to flourish. In the absence of norms, principles and rules of mutual

restraint at a global level, a vacuum exists for subterranean exploits to fill.

There is a real risk of a perfect storm in cyberspace erupting out of this vacuum that threatens to subvert

cyberspace itself, either through over-reaction, a spiraling arms race, the imposition of heavy-handed controls,

or through gradual irrelevance as people disconnect out of fear of insecurity.

JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - FOREWORD

There is, therefore, an urgent need for a global convention on cyberspace that builds robust mechanisms of

information sharing across borders and institutions, defines appropriate rules of the road for engagement in the

cyber domain, puts the onus on states to not tolerate or encourage mischievous networks whose activities

operate from within their jurisdictions, and protects and preserves this valuable global commons.

Until such a normative and policy shift occurs, the shadows in the cloud may grow into a dark, threatening storm.

Ron Deibert

Director, the Citizen Lab, Munk School of Global Affairs

University of Toronto

Rafal Rohozinski

CEO, The SecDev Group (Ottawa)

JR03-2010 Shadows in the Cloud - ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Acknowledgments

This investigation is a result of a collaboration between the Information Warfare Monitor and the Shadowserver

Foundation. Our ability to share critical information and analytical insights within a dedicated group of

professionals allowed us to uncover and investigate the operation of the network documented in this report.

The Information Warfare Monitor (infowar-monitor.net) is a joint activity of the Citizen Lab, Munk School

of Global Affairs, University of Toronto, and the SecDev Group, an operational consultancy based in Ottawa

specialising in evidence-based research in countries and regions under threat of insecurity and violence. The

Shadowserver Foundation (shadowserver.org) was established in 2004 and is comprised of volunteer security

professionals that investigate and monitor malware, botnets, and malicious attacks. Both the Information

Warfare Monitor and the Shadowserver Foundation aim to understand and accurately report on emerging cyber

threats as they develop.

Steven Adair is a security researcher with the Shadowserver Foundation. He frequently analyzes malware, tracks

botnets, and deals with cyber attacks of all kinds with a special emphasis on those linked to cyber espionage.

Ron Deibert is Director of the Citizen Lab at the Munk School of Global Affairs, University of Toronto. He is

a co-founder and principal investigator of the OpenNet Initiative and Information Warfare Monitor. He is Vice

President, Policy and Outreach, Psiphon Inc., and a principal with the SecDev Group.

Rafal Rohozinski is CEO of the SecDev Group and Psiphon Inc. He is a co-founder and principal investigator of

the OpenNet Initiative and Information Warfare Monitor, and a senior research advisor at the Citizen Lab, Munk