buddhist-nlp/tatpa-noisy · Datasets at Hugging Face

sanskrit stringlengths 4 615	english stringlengths 2 1.3k
kiṃ ca yāvubhayaniścitaikaniścitau tau bhinnau yathā kukṣimūlānubhavanaṭaūbhayaniścitaikaniścite ca dehacaitanye iti svabhāvahetuḥ /	Further, whenever between two things, one is cognised by one while the other is cognised by both, they are different from one another; for instance, Colic Pain and the Dramatic Actor; of the two Cognitions in the two bodies in question, while one is cognised by one, the other is cognised by both; hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.
svenaiveti ātmanaiva //	‘Svenaiva’ By the Cogniser himself.
advayajñānapakṣe tu nāyaṃ hetuḥ prasiddhyati /	This reason is not admissible against the doctrine that ‘cognition (consciousness) alone exists’;
svasya svasyāvabhāsasya vedanāttimirādivat //	as (under that view) what is cognised (by the cognition) is the appearance of itself;
udayānantaradhvaṃsi nairantaryeṇa lakṣyate /	as in the case of the man with defective vision. Further, cognition is always found to be destroyed immediately after appearance;
cetodehasya tādrūpye kṣaṇikatvaṃ na kiṃ matam // yadyevaṃ vijñānamātravādapratikṣepo 'nenaiva hetunā kriyamāṇo durvāraḥ syād ityata āha nāyaṃ hetuḥ prasiddhyatīti /	if then, the body with the cognition is of the same nature as the cognition, why is it not regarded as momentary? (1911-1912) Says the Opponent “If this is so, then nothing can prevent the doctrine of Pure Idealism (that there is Cognition or Consciousness alone) also being rejected on these same grounds”. The Answer to that is as follows: [see verses 1911-1912 above]
asiddhatā hetudoṣo bhavatīti /	‘This Reason is not admissible’;
tathā hi ubhayaniścitatvaṃ vijñānvādino na siddhaṃ svapratibhāsasyaiva sarvadā vedanāt /	For instance, the fact of ‘being cognised by both’ cannot be admitted by the Idealist; as for him what is cognised by the Cognition is always its own appearance;
taimirikadvayadvicandradarśanavat /	as in the case of the man of defective vision seeing two moons.
api ca vilakṣaṇārthavittikāle nirantaramutpādasamanantaravināśi [p.538] cittaṃ spaṣṭaṃ lakṣyate /	Then again, when a particular object is cognised, the Cognition is clearly found to disappear immediately after its appearance;
tataś ca dehasya tādrūpye 'bhyupagamyamāne kṣaṇikatvaprasaṅgaḥ //	hence, if the Body were held to be of the same nature as the Cognition, it should have to be regarded as momentary (like the Cognition).
evaṃ tāvat tādātmyalakṣaṇavṛttir na siddhā atha tadutpattilakṣaṇā vṛttiḥ sā ca tadutpattis tadāśrayadvāreṇa vā syānmanovijñānasya yathā cakṣurādivijñānasya cakṣurādyāśrayeṇa / tadavyabhicārādvā yathā dhūmasyāgnyavyabhicāriṇaḥ /	Thus then it has been proved that the ‘Subsistence’ of Cognitions in the Body cannot be admitted to be of the nature of ‘identity’ (or ‘Sameness’). If ‘the subsistence’ of the Cognition in the Body be held to consist in its being produced from it, then the question is is it ‘produced from it’ in the sense that the Mental Cognition has the Body for its Receptacle (or Substratum), in the way that Visual Perception is produced by the Eye which serves as its receptacle? or, is it ‘produced from it’ in the sense that it is inseparable from it;
tadatra dvividhāpi vṛttir asiddhā /	as the Smoke is inseparable from Fire? Both these forms of ‘Subsistence’ are inadmissible.
tathā hi manodhīr nendriyabuddhivatkāyāśritā niyamena sākṣāt tadvikārāvidhānāt /	Because Mental Cognition does not rest in the Body, like Sense-Cognition; as it does not always follow the changes in the Body.
nāpi tadavinābhāvinī virūpe dhātau kāyamantareṇāpi bhāvābhyupagamāt /	Nor is it invariably concomitant with inseparable from it; because in the case of ‘formless negations’, it is held that there are cognitions without the Body.
tathāpyabhyupagamya siddhatāṃ hetor anaikāntikatām āha tadāśrayeṇa sambhūtes tena vāvyabhicārata iti /	Though the facts are so, yet, for the sake of argument, the Author admits that the Reason is ‘admissible’, but proceeds to show that even so, it is ‘Inconclusive ‘(Doubtful): [see verses 1913-1915 above]
ekasantānabhāvena na cet tatra vibhinnatā / anyatrāpyekasantānabhāvānmābhūd vibhinnatā //	As a matter of fact, there is no incompatibility between the contiguity of other Consciousnesses and the presence of the Consciousness in the Body;
tathā hi cittāntarapratisandhānasya cittadehavṛtteś ca virodhābhāvāt yathā maraṇakṣaṇāt prāgavasthaṃ jīvadavasthābhāvivijñānaṃ pratisandhi karotyeva bhinnadehavṛttam api dehasya kṣaṇikatvādityanaikāntiko hetuḥ / athaikasantānatvena dehasyābhedād abhinnadehavṛttitvaṃ kalpyate tadāntarābhāvikadehe 'pi samānam /	for instance, the Consciousness at the moment preceding death brings about contiguity with the Consciousness in the living body coming into existence at the next moment, even though this latter Consciousness appears in a body other than that of the former; because the Body has only a momentary existence; hence the Reason put forward by the other party is ‘Inconclusive If, on the ground of their occurring in the same Chain, the two Bodies be regarded as one and the same, and on that ground the fact of the Consciousness appearing in the ‘same’ body be assumed, then, the same might be said in the other case also of the Bodies appearing during the stage intervening between the two physical bodies.
tathā hi pañcāyatanalakṣaṇo dehasantānasyāvasthābheda evāyamāmutriko dehaḥ bālavṛddhāvasthābhedavat /	Because the Body appearing in the other regions (at which the inter veiling bodies appear) is only one other state of the Chain of the same Body consisting of the five ‘Receptacles’ (Āyatanas), just like the states of Childhood and old age.
dvitīye 'pi prayoge jñānatvādityasya hetoḥ sādhyavipakṣe bādhakapramāṇānupadarśanād anaikāntikatvaṃ spaṣṭameveti noktam //	In the second argument (of the Opponent) also, the Probans or Reason adduced is ‘because it is Cognition (or Consciousness)’; and no evidence has been adduced to prove that the said Reason is not present where the contrary of the Probandum is known to be present; so that the Reason is clearly ‘Inconclusive’, Doubtful.
kṣīṇāsravasya vijñānamasandhānaṃ kuto matam / parakīyakṛtāntāc cen na prāmāṇyāparigrahāt //	Why has it been held that the consciousness of the person free from the impurities of the affections is non-contiguous? If this view is held in accordance with the doctrine of others, that cannot be right;
na vidyate cittāntarasandhānaṃ yasya tadasandhānam /	‘Noncontiguous’, i.e. that which has no contiguity with another Consciousness.
anena dṛṣṭāntasyānyatarāprasiddhasādhyadharmatām āha /	What is meant to be shown by this is that the Corroborative Instance cited is ‘not admitted’ by either one or the other of the two parties concerned.
tathā hi cārvākasya kutaḥ prasiddhamarhatāṃ na cittāntaraṃ pratisa [p.539] ndhatte maraṇacittam iti /	For instance, how does the Materialist know that in; the case of the. Arhats, the dying Consciousness does not bring about the contiguity of another Consciousness?
athāpi syāt parakīye bauddhe siddhānte paṭhyate kṣīṇā me jātiruṣitaṃ brahmacaryaṃ karaṇīyaṃ nāparamasmād bhavaṃ prajānāmīti ataḥ siddhamasandhānam iti /	It may be that under the Buddhist Philosophy, the following assertion is found ‘My life is at an end, I have led the life of the Student, I have done my duty, I know of no more birth’, and it is in accordance with this faith of the Buddhist that the Materialist has based his assertion that ‘there is no contiguity of the dying Consciousness’.
tadetad ayuktam parakīyasya siddhāntasya prāmāṇyenāparigrahāllokāyatasya kathaṃ tathāprāmāṇyena parigṛhītānniścayaḥ paralokasyāpi niścayaprasaṅgāt / athānyata eva pramāṇāntarāt tadavagataṃ tadeva tarhi kiṃ na sādhanam uktam kim agamakena jāḍyasaṃsūcakenopanyastena na hyanyasya tadasādhanaṃ yena tannābhidhīyate //	how then could he come to have a conviction on the basis of what he does not accept as valid? Specially, in this same way he may come to the decision that the ‘other world’ exists. If it is from any other valid source of knowledge that the Materialist derives the said conviction, then, why has not that same source been cited as the proof? Where was the use of putting up a Reason which does not lead to the desired conclusion and which only indicates sheer stupidity? Certainly that other proof could not be unfit for proving the other conclusion (of the Materialist) for which reason it has not been adduced.
ye ceha sudhiyaḥ kecid apratiṣṭhitanirvṛtīn / jināṃs tadyānaniṣṭhatvaṃ yānayoś ca pracakṣate //	As regards this matter, there are some wise persons who describe the Jinas (Buddhas) as ‘beings’ whose ‘nirvāṇa’ is not ‘absolute and final’, and the two paths as aiming at that same path.
tān pratyayamasiddhaś ca sādhyadharmasamanvitaḥ / dṛṣṭāntaḥ prativādīṣṭasiddhāntāśrayaṇe 'pi te //	For these people the instance cited cannot be admitted to be endowed with the probandum; even though it has been cited (by the materialist) on the basis of the doctrine of the other disputant.
iheti saugate pravacane /	This is what is shown in the following [see verses 1917-1918 above]
sudhiyo mahāyānikāḥ / kecid iti mādhyamikāḥ /	‘This matter’, the doctrine of the Buddhists. ‘Some wise persons’, the Mahāyānist-Mādhyamikas.
te hi buddhānām apratiṣṭhitatvaṃ nirvāṇam āhuḥ /	These people have declared that the ‘Nirvāṇa’ of the Buddhas consists in the absence of absolute finality;
saṃsāranirvāṇayor apratiṣṭhānāt /	on the ground that both ‘Birth-Cycle’ and ‘cessation of conscious existence’ are neither final nor absolute for them.
śrāvakapratyekabuddhayānayoś ca buddhaikayānaniṣṭhatvam āhuḥ /	As regards the Neo-phyte and the Prospective Buddha, these also have the same ‘path of the Buddha’ as their goal;
ekam evedaṃ jñānaṃ yaduta mahāyānam iti vacanāt //	as is clear from such statements as ‘There is only one Path, that of the Mahāyāna’, (1917-1918)
evaṃ dṛṣṭāntadoṣamuktvānaikāntikatvaṃ sādhanadoṣam āha bādhakānabhidhānāc ceti /	Having pointed out the defect in the Corroborative Instance, the Author proceeds to show that the Probans also is open to the charge of being ‘Inconclusive’: [see verse 1919 above]
śaṅkyamānavijātīyasadbhāvād vyabhicāritā // bādhakānabhidhānād iti sandigdhavyatirekitvasya hetuḥ /	‘Inasmuch as, etc. etc.’; this is the reason for the uncertainty regarding the Negative Concomitance [i.e. there is no certainty as to the Probans being absent whenever the Probandum is absent].
śaṅkyamānetyādi tu vyabhicāritāyāḥ /	‘There being a suspicion, etc. etc.’. This is the reason for ‘Inconclusiveness’.
vijātīye sadbhāvo vijātīyasadbhāvaḥ /	‘Vijātīyasadbhāva’ is presence in the contrary.
kasya/ hetor iti gamyate /	“Whose presence?” of the Probans.
śaṅkyamānaścāsau vijātīyasadbhāvaśceti vigrahaḥ /	The compound ‘Śaṅkyamāna, etc. etc.’ is to be expounded as ‘whose presence in the contrary is suspected.’
na vā maraṇatvaprasaṅgo bādhakaṃ pramāṇam paramārthataḥ kasyacid ātmādikasya mriyamāṇasyābhāvāt /	Nor could the contingency of the idea (of Death-Cognition producing another Cognition) being taken to imply the absence of death be taken as serving the purpose of the argument negativing the contrary. Because in reality there is no ‘death’ of anything in the shape of the ‘Soul’ and other things;
kevalaṃ tu visadṛśasantānotpattau viśiṣṭanikāyasamākhyāvasthāviśeṣoparamālloke śāstre ca tathā vyavahāraḥ //	what really happens is that a dissimilar Chain becomes set up, which brings about the cessation of the condition which gave the name to the particular body; and it is this that is spoken of as ‘Death’ in common parlance and also in scientific treatises.
kalalādiṣu vijñānamastītyetan na sāhasam /	There is no audacity in asserting that ‘there is consciousness in the foetus’;
asañjātendriyatve 'pi jñānaṃ tatra na kiṃ bhavet // [p.540] indriyārthabalodbhūtaṃ sarvaṃ vijñānamityadaḥ /	even though the sense-organs have not appeared in it, why cannot cognition be there? In fact the assertion that does involve audacity is that ‘all cognition proceeds from sense-organs and objects’;
sāhasaṃ vedyate yasmāt svapnādāvanyathāpi tat // rūpamarthagater anyadapyasya vyavasīyate /	because the contrary is found to be the case during dreams. In reality, cognition is apprehended also in a form which is distinct from that of the object, as is found in the case of swoon.
mūrcchādāvapi tenāsya sadbhāva upapadyate //	from this it is clear that consciousness can be there in the foetus.
yadi sarvam eva jñānamindriyārthabalenaiva jñāyate tadā sāhasaṃ bhavet, yāvatā svapnādyavasthāyāṃ nīlādipratibhāsaṃ manovijñānamasatyapi cakṣurādīndriye vināpi rūpādinārthena saṃvedyate /	If all Cognition wore apprehended only through the Sense-organs and the Objects, then our assertion would have been an audacious one; as a matter of fact, however, in Dreams and other states there appears Subjective Consciousness envisaging the Blue and other objects, which Subjective Consciousness is apprehended even when there is no Sense-organ nor any Object in the shape of Colour, etc.
nacāpi tasya tadānīṃ kāyendriyamāśraya iti śakyaṃ vaktum, nīlādipratibhāsatvāt /	Nor can it be said that at that time the substratum of the Consciousness consists of the Sense-organ in the body; because what‘figures in the Consciousness is the Blue Object (which is not present in the body);
kāyavijñānasya ca spraṣṭavyaviṣayatvāt /	and every bodily Cognition apprehends only tangible objects.
tasmād arthāvagatirūpaṃ sarvaṃ vijñānam ityayuktam / tena mūrcchādāvapi vijñānasadbhāvo na viruddhyate //	Hence it is not right to say that ‘all Cognition is in the form of the apprehension of things’, It is thus that there is nothing incongruous in asserting the presence of Cognition in the state of swoon and similar conditions.
na cāpi śaktirūpeṇa tathā dhīravatiṣṭhate /	Consciousness is not present in the foetus merely in the form of a potency;
svarūpeṇaiva buddhīnāṃ vyavasthānaṃ tadā matam //	the view held is that consciousnesses are present there in their actual form.
suptamurcchādyavasthāsu ceto neti ca te kutaḥ / niścayo vedanābhāvād iti cet sa kuto gataḥ // yadītthaṃ bhavatas tāsu niścayaḥ sampravartate / na vedmi cittamityevaṃ sati siddhā sacittatā //	Whence do you derive the idea that there is no consciousness during sleep and swoon and such other conditions? If it be argued that “the idea is obtained from the absence of consciousness”, then, the question is how has this absence been cognised? In case your idea proceeds thus “we do not cognise any consciousness at the time”, then that itself proves the presence of consciousness at the time.
syān mataṃ yadi vijñānaṃ daśāsvāsvasti tat katham / na smṛtiḥ pratibuddhādeḥ tadākārā bhaved iti //	It might be argued that “if consciousness is present during the said states, then why is there no remembrance of it on awakening, etc.?” This fact (of non-remembrance) is not effective (in refuting our view);
smaraṇaṃ na pravarteta sadyojātādicittavat //	the absence of remembrance is due to the absence of vividness and other conditions (in the consciousness) as in the case of the consciousness of the newborn infant.
yadi hi suptamūrcchādyavasthāyāṃ cittaṃ nāstīti niścāyakaṃ kiñcit pramāṇaṃ bhaved bhaved virodhaḥ /	There would certainly be an incongruity if there were some means of knowing with certainty that there is no Consciousness at all during the states of sleep, swoon and the like.
svavedanānupalambho 'sti niścāyakaṃ pramāṇam iti cen na /	“There is this means of knowledge available in the fact that there is no consciousness or cognition of the Consciousness itself.” That cannot be right;
svasaṃvedanānupalambhaḥ kutaḥ siddhaḥ / nahi tasyāmavasthāyāṃ saṃvedanābhāvaniścayo 'sti /	how has this absence of the Consciousness of itself been cognised? As ex hypothesi there can be no definite cognition of the absence of Cognition.
yadi ca tāsu mūrcchāvasthāsu na vedmyahaṃ cittam ityevaṃ niścayaḥ pravartatebhavatas tadā tenaiva tathā pravṛttena niścayena sacittatā siddhā /	If also your definite Cognition proceeds in the form that “in sleep, swoon and other states, I am not cognisant of any Consciousness”, then this definite cognition itself proves the existence of Cognition (or Consciousness).
athāpi syād yadi svāpādyavasthāsu cittaṃ syāt kimiti [p.541] pratibuddhādeḥ puruṣasya smaraṇaṃ na bhavet / ādiśabdena vigatamūrcchasya vigatamadasyeti parigrahaḥ /	It might be argued that “if there were Consciousness during sleep and other conditions, then why should not there be remembrance of it on awakening, etc.?’ The ‘etcetera?’ is meant to include the state when the swoon and the intoxication have passed off”.
tadetad asmaraṇamakāraṇamanubhūtābhāvasiddhaye /	But this non-remembrance is not effective in proving that what has been cognised did not exist there.
yadi hyanubhūta ityetāvan mātreṇaiva smaraṇaṃ syāt syād etat yāvatā satyapyanubhave pāṭavābhyāsārthitvādivaikalyāsmaraṇaṃ na bhavati /	It would be so if the mere cognition of a thing meant that there must be remembrance of it. As a matter of fact, however, in many cases, even when there is Cognition, there is no Remembrance, on account of the absence of vividness, repetition and interest in the Cognition;
yathā sadyojātādyavasthāmanubhūtasyāpi cittasya //1923-	just as is found to be the case of the new-born infant, where, even though there is Cognition, there is no Remembrance.
yadyevaṃ katham astitvam asyāsu vyavasīyate /	“If it is so, then how do you postulate the presence of this (consciousness) in these (states)?” (1928a)
pūrvopavarṇitādeva hetor ityavagamyate //	We conclude this from reasons already explained before.
svapnamūrchādyavasthāsu cittaṃ ca yadi neṣyate / mṛtiḥ syāt tatra cotpattau maraṇābhāva eva vā //	If the presence of consciousness is not admitted during the states of sleep, swoon and the like, then there should be death; while if another consciousness is produced, then there would be no death at all.
svatantrā mānasī buddhiścakṣurādyanapekṣaṇāt / svopādānabalenaiva svapnādāviva vartate //	Thus mental (subjective) consciousness must be regarded as independent, as it is not dependent upon the eye, etc. and it is present on the strength of its own cause, just as during dreams, etc. (1928b-1930)
asyeti vijñānasya /	‘Of this’ of the Consciousness.
āsviti svāpādyavasthāsu /	‘In these’, in the states of sleep, etc.
tatra pūrvopavarṇito hetuḥ prabuddhādeḥ puruṣasyādivijñānaṃ svopādānabalodbhavaṃ vijñānatvādābhogādyanantarabhāvismārtādivijñānavat /	The Reason as already explained before is as follows: On awakening, the first Consciousness that the man has must be regarded as arising from its own. Cause, because it is Consciousness, like the Reminiscent Cognition following after experience.
nacāyam anaikāntiko hetuḥ pūrvaṃ kāraṇāntaraniṣedhena pratibandhasya sādhitatvāt /	because on the previous occasion it has been shown by the rejection of the possibility of other causes, that the necessary invariable concomitance is there.
kiṃ ca yadi svāpādyavasthāyāṃ cittaṃ na bhavet tadā maraṇam eva syāt / atha tatra tathābhūte nirmūlamapagatavijñāne dehe punar utpattir iṣyate vijñānasya tadā tatrotpattāviṣyamāṇāyāṃ maraṇābhāvaḥ prāpnoti mṛtasyāpipunar vijñānotpattiprasaṅgāt suptaprabuddhavat /	Then again, if there were no Consciousness during sleep, etc., then there would be Death. If, on the other hand, it be held that “after the Body has become entirely deprived of all Consciousness, another Consciousness is produced (on awakening)”, then, such appearance of Consciousness would mean that there can be no Death at all; because, as in the case of the man awakening from sleep, so in the case of the dead man also, there would be reappearance of Consciousness.
manobuddher eva janmāntarapratisandhāne sāmarthyāt /	Specially as it is only Mental (subjective) Consciousness that has the capacity to link up the next birth;
tathācoktam ---"chedasandhānavairāgyahānim....pattayaḥ" /	as has been thus declared ‘Linking up, Dispassion and the rest are admissible only when the subjective Consciousness is there’.
manovijñāna eveṣṭā iti / ato manobuddhiḥ pūrvabuddhimātrāśrayeti pratipādayann āha svatantretyādi /	From all this it follows that Subjective Consciousness rests entirely upon the previous Consciousness; this is the idea expressed in the words ‘Subjective Consciousness must he regarded as independent’.
svātantrye 'napekṣyatvaṃ hetuḥ /	The reason for this ‘independence’ consists in the fact of its not requiring anything else.
sarvadaiveyaṃ manobuddhiḥ svopādānakāraṇamātrabhāvinī svopādānavyatiriktacakṣurādikāraṇāntarānapekṣaṇāt svapnāvasthāvat //1928-	In all eases, this Subjective Consciousness proceeds entirely from its own Cause, because it does not stand in need of any causes other than its own, in the shape of the Eye, etc.;
tathā hi na vikalpānām indriyārthavyapekṣitā / tadavyāpārabhāve 'pi bhāvād vyomotpalādiṣu //	For instance, conceptual cognitions are not dependent upon sense-organs and objects, because they come about even in the absence of the functioning of these latter, as in the case of the ‘sky-lotus’ and such things.
[p.542] tadavyāpārabhāve 'pīti /	The following Text disposes of the charge of ‘inadmissibility’ against the Reason just stated: [see verse 1931 above]
tayor indriyārthayor avyāpāre 'pīti yāvat /	‘Tadavyāpāra, etc. etc.’ Even when there is no functioning of the Sense-organ and the Object.
nahi yadavyāpāre 'pi yasya bhāvas tat tasya kāraṇaṃ yuktam atiprasaṅgāt //	When one thing comes about without the functioning of the other, this latter cannot be the cause of the former. Tf it were, it would lead to absurdity.
syād etad bhavatu vyomotpalādivikalpa indriyārthānapekṣas tadabhāve 'pi bhāvāt /	The following might be urged “The Conceptual Cognition of the Sky-lotus and such things may be independent of the Sense-organ and the Object, because it comes about even in the absence of these latter;
yastu cakṣuṣi praṇihite nīlādau purovartini viṣaye nīlam etad iti vikalpaḥ pravartate / sa katham indriyārthānapekṣo yena pakṣaikadeśe 'siddho hetur na bhaved ity āha tayor ityādi /	how could the Conceptual Cognition however, which appears when the Eye is fixed upon the Blue object before one, be independent of the Sense-organ and Object, which could save the Probans from being ‘inadmissible’ in regard to a part of the ‘Subject’ (Minor Term)?”
tayor bhāvepyatītādivikalpo yaḥ pravartate /	The answer to this is as follows: [see verses 1932-1933 above]
tayor iti indriyārthayoḥ /	‘Tayoḥ’ of the Sense-organ and the Object.
asadarthaḥ śūnya uparāgo nirbhāso yasyotprekṣitārthādivikalpasya so 'sadarthoparāgo vyomādivikalpaḥ / tena tulyo 'yam api nirviṣaya ity arthaḥ /	‘Asadarthoparāgeṇa’ is ‘that which envisages what does not exist’, i.e. the conception of things like the Sky-lotus, On the same footing as this would be the conception relating to the Past (if Cognitions were dependent upon the actual presence of the Object cognised).
katham /	“How so?”
sarvo hi vikalpaḥ śabdollekhena pravṛtteḥ śabdārthāvabhāsī yaś ca śabdārthāvabhāsī na tatra vasturūpaṃ bhāsate vasturūpe śabdasyāpravṛtteḥ tatra tasyāsaṅketitatvād iti vistareṇa śabdārthaparīkṣāyāṃ pratipāditam /	All Conceptual Cognitions appear as associated with verbal expressions, and hence they envisage verbal expressions also; and that which envisages the verbal expression cannot envisage an entity; because verbal expressions do not bear upon the form of things; as words are not fixed by Convention in relation to the actual form of things. All this has been explained in detail under the Chapter on ‘Word and its Denotation’ (Chapter XVI).
sapakṣe sadbhāvān na viruddho hetuḥ nāpyanaikāntikaḥ svopādānānudbhavatvenirhetukatvaprasaṅgāt //1932-	The Reason is present in everything where the Probandum is known to be present; hence it cannot be regarded as ‘Contradictory’, Nor is it ‘Inconclusive’; because if the Cognition were not produced from its own cause, it would have to be regarded as without cause.
kāyāśritatvān na nirhetukatvam iti ced ityāśaṅkyāha prasuptiketyādi /	It might be argued that “as the Cognition would subsist in the Body, it could not be regarded as without cause”.
prasuptikādyavasthāsu śarīravikṛtāvapi /	When the body is struck with diseases like Paralysis, there is modification in it;
nānyathātvaṃ manobuddhes tasmānneyaṃ tadāśritā //	but that does not make any change in the Subjective Consciousness; hence this Subjective Consciousness cannot be regarded as subsisting in the Body;
prasuptikādirogopaghātena hi dehavikāro 'pi manomater avikārādiyaṃ manomatirna dehāśritā yadvikāreṇa niyamāt sākṣādyanna vikriyate na tat tadāśritaṃ na yathā govikāreṇāvikriyamāṇo 'śvo na ca dehasya vikāreṇa niyamāt sākṣādvikriyate manobuddhiḥ prasuptikāvasthāyām iti vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ //	when one thing does not become directly modified upon the modification of another thing, it cannot be regarded as subsisting in this latter; e.g. the Horse, which is not modified by the modification of the Cow (does not subsist in the Cow); on the modification of the Body, Subjective Consciousness does not always and directly become modified, in the state of Paralysis, etc.; hence there is non-apprehension of the wider character (which implies the absence of the less wide).
svalpīyasītyādinā tadāśritatvaṃ sākṣāt tadvikāravikāritvena vyāptam iti darśayati /	The following text proceeds to show that the character of subsisting in something is invariably concomitant with the character of becoming directly modified on the modification of the latter thing: [see verses 1935-1936 above]
[p.543] tasya cātra vyāpakasyābhāva iti siddhā dehānāśritā buddhiḥ /	As the wider character is absent, it is proved that the Subjective Consciousness does not subsist in the Body.
tat tasmād dehanivṛttāvapi na nivartayiṣyata ityavirodhaḥ /	‘Thus’ therefore even on the cessation of the Body, the Subjective Consciousness shall not cease.
yo hi yadāśrito na bhavati tannivṛttau na niyamena tasya nivṛttiḥ /	There is no incongruity in this. When one thing does not subsist in another, it does not necessarily cease upon the cessation of the latter;
tadyathā gonivṛttau gavayasya na niyamena nivṛttiḥ /	e.g. the cessation of the Cow does not lead to the cessation of the Gavaya;
naca deho manomater āśraya iti vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ //1935-	hence there is non-apprehension of the wider character.
nāto 'nyadehasadbhāvasiddhaye yantrito vayam // naca śakyaniṣedho 'sāvadṛṣṭāvapi saṃśrayāt /	It has been argued above (under Text 1869) that “when the other body has not been seen, how can it be understood that the required substratum is the Body that is born subsequently?”

kiṃ ca yāvubhayaniścitaikaniścitau tau bhinnau yathā kukṣimūlānubhavanaṭaūbhayaniścitaikaniścite ca dehacaitanye iti svabhāvahetuḥ /

Further, whenever between two things, one is cognised by one while the other is cognised by both, they are different from one another; for instance, Colic Pain and the Dramatic Actor; of the two Cognitions in the two bodies in question, while one is cognised by one, the other is cognised by both; hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.

svenaiveti ātmanaiva //

‘Svenaiva’ By the Cogniser himself.

advayajñānapakṣe tu nāyaṃ hetuḥ prasiddhyati /

This reason is not admissible against the doctrine that ‘cognition (consciousness) alone exists’;

svasya svasyāvabhāsasya vedanāttimirādivat //

as (under that view) what is cognised (by the cognition) is the appearance of itself;

udayānantaradhvaṃsi nairantaryeṇa lakṣyate /

as in the case of the man with defective vision. Further, cognition is always found to be destroyed immediately after appearance;

cetodehasya tādrūpye kṣaṇikatvaṃ na kiṃ matam // yadyevaṃ vijñānamātravādapratikṣepo 'nenaiva hetunā kriyamāṇo durvāraḥ syād ityata āha nāyaṃ hetuḥ prasiddhyatīti /

if then, the body with the cognition is of the same nature as the cognition, why is it not regarded as momentary? (1911-1912) Says the Opponent “If this is so, then nothing can prevent the doctrine of Pure Idealism (that there is Cognition or Consciousness alone) also being rejected on these same grounds”. The Answer to that is as follows: [see verses 1911-1912 above]

asiddhatā hetudoṣo bhavatīti /

‘This Reason is not admissible’;

tathā hi ubhayaniścitatvaṃ vijñānvādino na siddhaṃ svapratibhāsasyaiva sarvadā vedanāt /

For instance, the fact of ‘being cognised by both’ cannot be admitted by the Idealist; as for him what is cognised by the Cognition is always its own appearance;

taimirikadvayadvicandradarśanavat /

as in the case of the man of defective vision seeing two moons.

api ca vilakṣaṇārthavittikāle nirantaramutpādasamanantaravināśi [p.538] cittaṃ spaṣṭaṃ lakṣyate /

Then again, when a particular object is cognised, the Cognition is clearly found to disappear immediately after its appearance;

tataś ca dehasya tādrūpye 'bhyupagamyamāne kṣaṇikatvaprasaṅgaḥ //

hence, if the Body were held to be of the same nature as the Cognition, it should have to be regarded as momentary (like the Cognition).

evaṃ tāvat tādātmyalakṣaṇavṛttir na siddhā atha tadutpattilakṣaṇā vṛttiḥ sā ca tadutpattis tadāśrayadvāreṇa vā syānmanovijñānasya yathā cakṣurādivijñānasya cakṣurādyāśrayeṇa / tadavyabhicārādvā yathā dhūmasyāgnyavyabhicāriṇaḥ /

Thus then it has been proved that the ‘Subsistence’ of Cognitions in the Body cannot be admitted to be of the nature of ‘identity’ (or ‘Sameness’). If ‘the subsistence’ of the Cognition in the Body be held to consist in its being produced from it, then the question is is it ‘produced from it’ in the sense that the Mental Cognition has the Body for its Receptacle (or Substratum), in the way that Visual Perception is produced by the Eye which serves as its receptacle? or, is it ‘produced from it’ in the sense that it is inseparable from it;

tadatra dvividhāpi vṛttir asiddhā /

as the Smoke is inseparable from Fire? Both these forms of ‘Subsistence’ are inadmissible.

tathā hi manodhīr nendriyabuddhivatkāyāśritā niyamena sākṣāt tadvikārāvidhānāt /

Because Mental Cognition does not rest in the Body, like Sense-Cognition; as it does not always follow the changes in the Body.

nāpi tadavinābhāvinī virūpe dhātau kāyamantareṇāpi bhāvābhyupagamāt /

Nor is it invariably concomitant with inseparable from it; because in the case of ‘formless negations’, it is held that there are cognitions without the Body.

tathāpyabhyupagamya siddhatāṃ hetor anaikāntikatām āha tadāśrayeṇa sambhūtes tena vāvyabhicārata iti /

Though the facts are so, yet, for the sake of argument, the Author admits that the Reason is ‘admissible’, but proceeds to show that even so, it is ‘Inconclusive ‘(Doubtful): [see verses 1913-1915 above]

ekasantānabhāvena na cet tatra vibhinnatā / anyatrāpyekasantānabhāvānmābhūd vibhinnatā //

As a matter of fact, there is no incompatibility between the contiguity of other Consciousnesses and the presence of the Consciousness in the Body;

tathā hi cittāntarapratisandhānasya cittadehavṛtteś ca virodhābhāvāt yathā maraṇakṣaṇāt prāgavasthaṃ jīvadavasthābhāvivijñānaṃ pratisandhi karotyeva bhinnadehavṛttam api dehasya kṣaṇikatvādityanaikāntiko hetuḥ / athaikasantānatvena dehasyābhedād abhinnadehavṛttitvaṃ kalpyate tadāntarābhāvikadehe 'pi samānam /

for instance, the Consciousness at the moment preceding death brings about contiguity with the Consciousness in the living body coming into existence at the next moment, even though this latter Consciousness appears in a body other than that of the former; because the Body has only a momentary existence; hence the Reason put forward by the other party is ‘Inconclusive If, on the ground of their occurring in the same Chain, the two Bodies be regarded as one and the same, and on that ground the fact of the Consciousness appearing in the ‘same’ body be assumed, then, the same might be said in the other case also of the Bodies appearing during the stage intervening between the two physical bodies.

tathā hi pañcāyatanalakṣaṇo dehasantānasyāvasthābheda evāyamāmutriko dehaḥ bālavṛddhāvasthābhedavat /

Because the Body appearing in the other regions (at which the inter veiling bodies appear) is only one other state of the Chain of the same Body consisting of the five ‘Receptacles’ (Āyatanas), just like the states of Childhood and old age.

dvitīye 'pi prayoge jñānatvādityasya hetoḥ sādhyavipakṣe bādhakapramāṇānupadarśanād anaikāntikatvaṃ spaṣṭameveti noktam //

In the second argument (of the Opponent) also, the Probans or Reason adduced is ‘because it is Cognition (or Consciousness)’; and no evidence has been adduced to prove that the said Reason is not present where the contrary of the Probandum is known to be present; so that the Reason is clearly ‘Inconclusive’, Doubtful.

kṣīṇāsravasya vijñānamasandhānaṃ kuto matam / parakīyakṛtāntāc cen na prāmāṇyāparigrahāt //

Why has it been held that the consciousness of the person free from the impurities of the affections is non-contiguous? If this view is held in accordance with the doctrine of others, that cannot be right;

na vidyate cittāntarasandhānaṃ yasya tadasandhānam /

‘Noncontiguous’, i.e. that which has no contiguity with another Consciousness.

anena dṛṣṭāntasyānyatarāprasiddhasādhyadharmatām āha /

What is meant to be shown by this is that the Corroborative Instance cited is ‘not admitted’ by either one or the other of the two parties concerned.

tathā hi cārvākasya kutaḥ prasiddhamarhatāṃ na cittāntaraṃ pratisa [p.539] ndhatte maraṇacittam iti /

For instance, how does the Materialist know that in; the case of the. Arhats, the dying Consciousness does not bring about the contiguity of another Consciousness?

athāpi syāt parakīye bauddhe siddhānte paṭhyate kṣīṇā me jātiruṣitaṃ brahmacaryaṃ karaṇīyaṃ nāparamasmād bhavaṃ prajānāmīti ataḥ siddhamasandhānam iti /

It may be that under the Buddhist Philosophy, the following assertion is found ‘My life is at an end, I have led the life of the Student, I have done my duty, I know of no more birth’, and it is in accordance with this faith of the Buddhist that the Materialist has based his assertion that ‘there is no contiguity of the dying Consciousness’.

tadetad ayuktam parakīyasya siddhāntasya prāmāṇyenāparigrahāllokāyatasya kathaṃ tathāprāmāṇyena parigṛhītānniścayaḥ paralokasyāpi niścayaprasaṅgāt / athānyata eva pramāṇāntarāt tadavagataṃ tadeva tarhi kiṃ na sādhanam uktam kim agamakena jāḍyasaṃsūcakenopanyastena na hyanyasya tadasādhanaṃ yena tannābhidhīyate //

how then could he come to have a conviction on the basis of what he does not accept as valid? Specially, in this same way he may come to the decision that the ‘other world’ exists. If it is from any other valid source of knowledge that the Materialist derives the said conviction, then, why has not that same source been cited as the proof? Where was the use of putting up a Reason which does not lead to the desired conclusion and which only indicates sheer stupidity? Certainly that other proof could not be unfit for proving the other conclusion (of the Materialist) for which reason it has not been adduced.

ye ceha sudhiyaḥ kecid apratiṣṭhitanirvṛtīn / jināṃs tadyānaniṣṭhatvaṃ yānayoś ca pracakṣate //

As regards this matter, there are some wise persons who describe the Jinas (Buddhas) as ‘beings’ whose ‘nirvāṇa’ is not ‘absolute and final’, and the two paths as aiming at that same path.

tān pratyayamasiddhaś ca sādhyadharmasamanvitaḥ / dṛṣṭāntaḥ prativādīṣṭasiddhāntāśrayaṇe 'pi te //

For these people the instance cited cannot be admitted to be endowed with the probandum; even though it has been cited (by the materialist) on the basis of the doctrine of the other disputant.

iheti saugate pravacane /

This is what is shown in the following [see verses 1917-1918 above]

sudhiyo mahāyānikāḥ / kecid iti mādhyamikāḥ /

‘This matter’, the doctrine of the Buddhists. ‘Some wise persons’, the Mahāyānist-Mādhyamikas.

te hi buddhānām apratiṣṭhitatvaṃ nirvāṇam āhuḥ /

These people have declared that the ‘Nirvāṇa’ of the Buddhas consists in the absence of absolute finality;

saṃsāranirvāṇayor apratiṣṭhānāt /

on the ground that both ‘Birth-Cycle’ and ‘cessation of conscious existence’ are neither final nor absolute for them.

śrāvakapratyekabuddhayānayoś ca buddhaikayānaniṣṭhatvam āhuḥ /

As regards the Neo-phyte and the Prospective Buddha, these also have the same ‘path of the Buddha’ as their goal;

ekam evedaṃ jñānaṃ yaduta mahāyānam iti vacanāt //

as is clear from such statements as ‘There is only one Path, that of the Mahāyāna’, (1917-1918)

evaṃ dṛṣṭāntadoṣamuktvānaikāntikatvaṃ sādhanadoṣam āha bādhakānabhidhānāc ceti /

Having pointed out the defect in the Corroborative Instance, the Author proceeds to show that the Probans also is open to the charge of being ‘Inconclusive’: [see verse 1919 above]

śaṅkyamānavijātīyasadbhāvād vyabhicāritā // bādhakānabhidhānād iti sandigdhavyatirekitvasya hetuḥ /

‘Inasmuch as, etc. etc.’; this is the reason for the uncertainty regarding the Negative Concomitance [i.e. there is no certainty as to the Probans being absent whenever the Probandum is absent].

śaṅkyamānetyādi tu vyabhicāritāyāḥ /

‘There being a suspicion, etc. etc.’. This is the reason for ‘Inconclusiveness’.

vijātīye sadbhāvo vijātīyasadbhāvaḥ /

‘Vijātīyasadbhāva’ is presence in the contrary.

kasya/ hetor iti gamyate /

“Whose presence?” of the Probans.

śaṅkyamānaścāsau vijātīyasadbhāvaśceti vigrahaḥ /

The compound ‘Śaṅkyamāna, etc. etc.’ is to be expounded as ‘whose presence in the contrary is suspected.’

na vā maraṇatvaprasaṅgo bādhakaṃ pramāṇam paramārthataḥ kasyacid ātmādikasya mriyamāṇasyābhāvāt /

Nor could the contingency of the idea (of Death-Cognition producing another Cognition) being taken to imply the absence of death be taken as serving the purpose of the argument negativing the contrary. Because in reality there is no ‘death’ of anything in the shape of the ‘Soul’ and other things;

kevalaṃ tu visadṛśasantānotpattau viśiṣṭanikāyasamākhyāvasthāviśeṣoparamālloke śāstre ca tathā vyavahāraḥ //

what really happens is that a dissimilar Chain becomes set up, which brings about the cessation of the condition which gave the name to the particular body; and it is this that is spoken of as ‘Death’ in common parlance and also in scientific treatises.

kalalādiṣu vijñānamastītyetan na sāhasam /

There is no audacity in asserting that ‘there is consciousness in the foetus’;

asañjātendriyatve 'pi jñānaṃ tatra na kiṃ bhavet // [p.540] indriyārthabalodbhūtaṃ sarvaṃ vijñānamityadaḥ /

even though the sense-organs have not appeared in it, why cannot cognition be there? In fact the assertion that does involve audacity is that ‘all cognition proceeds from sense-organs and objects’;

sāhasaṃ vedyate yasmāt svapnādāvanyathāpi tat // rūpamarthagater anyadapyasya vyavasīyate /

because the contrary is found to be the case during dreams. In reality, cognition is apprehended also in a form which is distinct from that of the object, as is found in the case of swoon.

mūrcchādāvapi tenāsya sadbhāva upapadyate //

from this it is clear that consciousness can be there in the foetus.

yadi sarvam eva jñānamindriyārthabalenaiva jñāyate tadā sāhasaṃ bhavet, yāvatā svapnādyavasthāyāṃ nīlādipratibhāsaṃ manovijñānamasatyapi cakṣurādīndriye vināpi rūpādinārthena saṃvedyate /

If all Cognition wore apprehended only through the Sense-organs and the Objects, then our assertion would have been an audacious one; as a matter of fact, however, in Dreams and other states there appears Subjective Consciousness envisaging the Blue and other objects, which Subjective Consciousness is apprehended even when there is no Sense-organ nor any Object in the shape of Colour, etc.

nacāpi tasya tadānīṃ kāyendriyamāśraya iti śakyaṃ vaktum, nīlādipratibhāsatvāt /

Nor can it be said that at that time the substratum of the Consciousness consists of the Sense-organ in the body; because what‘figures in the Consciousness is the Blue Object (which is not present in the body);

kāyavijñānasya ca spraṣṭavyaviṣayatvāt /

and every bodily Cognition apprehends only tangible objects.

tasmād arthāvagatirūpaṃ sarvaṃ vijñānam ityayuktam / tena mūrcchādāvapi vijñānasadbhāvo na viruddhyate //

Hence it is not right to say that ‘all Cognition is in the form of the apprehension of things’, It is thus that there is nothing incongruous in asserting the presence of Cognition in the state of swoon and similar conditions.

na cāpi śaktirūpeṇa tathā dhīravatiṣṭhate /

Consciousness is not present in the foetus merely in the form of a potency;

svarūpeṇaiva buddhīnāṃ vyavasthānaṃ tadā matam //

the view held is that consciousnesses are present there in their actual form.

suptamurcchādyavasthāsu ceto neti ca te kutaḥ / niścayo vedanābhāvād iti cet sa kuto gataḥ // yadītthaṃ bhavatas tāsu niścayaḥ sampravartate / na vedmi cittamityevaṃ sati siddhā sacittatā //

Whence do you derive the idea that there is no consciousness during sleep and swoon and such other conditions? If it be argued that “the idea is obtained from the absence of consciousness”, then, the question is how has this absence been cognised? In case your idea proceeds thus “we do not cognise any consciousness at the time”, then that itself proves the presence of consciousness at the time.

syān mataṃ yadi vijñānaṃ daśāsvāsvasti tat katham / na smṛtiḥ pratibuddhādeḥ tadākārā bhaved iti //

It might be argued that “if consciousness is present during the said states, then why is there no remembrance of it on awakening, etc.?” This fact (of non-remembrance) is not effective (in refuting our view);

smaraṇaṃ na pravarteta sadyojātādicittavat //

the absence of remembrance is due to the absence of vividness and other conditions (in the consciousness) as in the case of the consciousness of the newborn infant.

yadi hi suptamūrcchādyavasthāyāṃ cittaṃ nāstīti niścāyakaṃ kiñcit pramāṇaṃ bhaved bhaved virodhaḥ /

There would certainly be an incongruity if there were some means of knowing with certainty that there is no Consciousness at all during the states of sleep, swoon and the like.

svavedanānupalambho 'sti niścāyakaṃ pramāṇam iti cen na /

“There is this means of knowledge available in the fact that there is no consciousness or cognition of the Consciousness itself.” That cannot be right;

svasaṃvedanānupalambhaḥ kutaḥ siddhaḥ / nahi tasyāmavasthāyāṃ saṃvedanābhāvaniścayo 'sti /

how has this absence of the Consciousness of itself been cognised? As ex hypothesi there can be no definite cognition of the absence of Cognition.

yadi ca tāsu mūrcchāvasthāsu na vedmyahaṃ cittam ityevaṃ niścayaḥ pravartatebhavatas tadā tenaiva tathā pravṛttena niścayena sacittatā siddhā /

If also your definite Cognition proceeds in the form that “in sleep, swoon and other states, I am not cognisant of any Consciousness”, then this definite cognition itself proves the existence of Cognition (or Consciousness).

athāpi syād yadi svāpādyavasthāsu cittaṃ syāt kimiti [p.541] pratibuddhādeḥ puruṣasya smaraṇaṃ na bhavet / ādiśabdena vigatamūrcchasya vigatamadasyeti parigrahaḥ /

It might be argued that “if there were Consciousness during sleep and other conditions, then why should not there be remembrance of it on awakening, etc.?’ The ‘etcetera?’ is meant to include the state when the swoon and the intoxication have passed off”.

tadetad asmaraṇamakāraṇamanubhūtābhāvasiddhaye /

But this non-remembrance is not effective in proving that what has been cognised did not exist there.

yadi hyanubhūta ityetāvan mātreṇaiva smaraṇaṃ syāt syād etat yāvatā satyapyanubhave pāṭavābhyāsārthitvādivaikalyāsmaraṇaṃ na bhavati /

It would be so if the mere cognition of a thing meant that there must be remembrance of it. As a matter of fact, however, in many cases, even when there is Cognition, there is no Remembrance, on account of the absence of vividness, repetition and interest in the Cognition;

yathā sadyojātādyavasthāmanubhūtasyāpi cittasya //1923-

just as is found to be the case of the new-born infant, where, even though there is Cognition, there is no Remembrance.

yadyevaṃ katham astitvam asyāsu vyavasīyate /

“If it is so, then how do you postulate the presence of this (consciousness) in these (states)?” (1928a)

pūrvopavarṇitādeva hetor ityavagamyate //

We conclude this from reasons already explained before.

svapnamūrchādyavasthāsu cittaṃ ca yadi neṣyate / mṛtiḥ syāt tatra cotpattau maraṇābhāva eva vā //

If the presence of consciousness is not admitted during the states of sleep, swoon and the like, then there should be death; while if another consciousness is produced, then there would be no death at all.

svatantrā mānasī buddhiścakṣurādyanapekṣaṇāt / svopādānabalenaiva svapnādāviva vartate //

Thus mental (subjective) consciousness must be regarded as independent, as it is not dependent upon the eye, etc. and it is present on the strength of its own cause, just as during dreams, etc. (1928b-1930)

asyeti vijñānasya /

‘Of this’ of the Consciousness.

āsviti svāpādyavasthāsu /

‘In these’, in the states of sleep, etc.

tatra pūrvopavarṇito hetuḥ prabuddhādeḥ puruṣasyādivijñānaṃ svopādānabalodbhavaṃ vijñānatvādābhogādyanantarabhāvismārtādivijñānavat /

The Reason as already explained before is as follows: On awakening, the first Consciousness that the man has must be regarded as arising from its own. Cause, because it is Consciousness, like the Reminiscent Cognition following after experience.

nacāyam anaikāntiko hetuḥ pūrvaṃ kāraṇāntaraniṣedhena pratibandhasya sādhitatvāt /

because on the previous occasion it has been shown by the rejection of the possibility of other causes, that the necessary invariable concomitance is there.

kiṃ ca yadi svāpādyavasthāyāṃ cittaṃ na bhavet tadā maraṇam eva syāt / atha tatra tathābhūte nirmūlamapagatavijñāne dehe punar utpattir iṣyate vijñānasya tadā tatrotpattāviṣyamāṇāyāṃ maraṇābhāvaḥ prāpnoti mṛtasyāpipunar vijñānotpattiprasaṅgāt suptaprabuddhavat /

Then again, if there were no Consciousness during sleep, etc., then there would be Death. If, on the other hand, it be held that “after the Body has become entirely deprived of all Consciousness, another Consciousness is produced (on awakening)”, then, such appearance of Consciousness would mean that there can be no Death at all; because, as in the case of the man awakening from sleep, so in the case of the dead man also, there would be reappearance of Consciousness.

manobuddher eva janmāntarapratisandhāne sāmarthyāt /

Specially as it is only Mental (subjective) Consciousness that has the capacity to link up the next birth;

tathācoktam ---"chedasandhānavairāgyahānim....pattayaḥ" /

as has been thus declared ‘Linking up, Dispassion and the rest are admissible only when the subjective Consciousness is there’.

manovijñāna eveṣṭā iti / ato manobuddhiḥ pūrvabuddhimātrāśrayeti pratipādayann āha svatantretyādi /

From all this it follows that Subjective Consciousness rests entirely upon the previous Consciousness; this is the idea expressed in the words ‘Subjective Consciousness must he regarded as independent’.

svātantrye 'napekṣyatvaṃ hetuḥ /

The reason for this ‘independence’ consists in the fact of its not requiring anything else.

sarvadaiveyaṃ manobuddhiḥ svopādānakāraṇamātrabhāvinī svopādānavyatiriktacakṣurādikāraṇāntarānapekṣaṇāt svapnāvasthāvat //1928-

In all eases, this Subjective Consciousness proceeds entirely from its own Cause, because it does not stand in need of any causes other than its own, in the shape of the Eye, etc.;

tathā hi na vikalpānām indriyārthavyapekṣitā / tadavyāpārabhāve 'pi bhāvād vyomotpalādiṣu //

For instance, conceptual cognitions are not dependent upon sense-organs and objects, because they come about even in the absence of the functioning of these latter, as in the case of the ‘sky-lotus’ and such things.

[p.542] tadavyāpārabhāve 'pīti /

The following Text disposes of the charge of ‘inadmissibility’ against the Reason just stated: [see verse 1931 above]

tayor indriyārthayor avyāpāre 'pīti yāvat /

‘Tadavyāpāra, etc. etc.’ Even when there is no functioning of the Sense-organ and the Object.

nahi yadavyāpāre 'pi yasya bhāvas tat tasya kāraṇaṃ yuktam atiprasaṅgāt //

When one thing comes about without the functioning of the other, this latter cannot be the cause of the former. Tf it were, it would lead to absurdity.

syād etad bhavatu vyomotpalādivikalpa indriyārthānapekṣas tadabhāve 'pi bhāvāt /

The following might be urged “The Conceptual Cognition of the Sky-lotus and such things may be independent of the Sense-organ and the Object, because it comes about even in the absence of these latter;

yastu cakṣuṣi praṇihite nīlādau purovartini viṣaye nīlam etad iti vikalpaḥ pravartate / sa katham indriyārthānapekṣo yena pakṣaikadeśe 'siddho hetur na bhaved ity āha tayor ityādi /

how could the Conceptual Cognition however, which appears when the Eye is fixed upon the Blue object before one, be independent of the Sense-organ and Object, which could save the Probans from being ‘inadmissible’ in regard to a part of the ‘Subject’ (Minor Term)?”

tayor bhāvepyatītādivikalpo yaḥ pravartate /

The answer to this is as follows: [see verses 1932-1933 above]

tayor iti indriyārthayoḥ /

‘Tayoḥ’ of the Sense-organ and the Object.

asadarthaḥ śūnya uparāgo nirbhāso yasyotprekṣitārthādivikalpasya so 'sadarthoparāgo vyomādivikalpaḥ / tena tulyo 'yam api nirviṣaya ity arthaḥ /

‘Asadarthoparāgeṇa’ is ‘that which envisages what does not exist’, i.e. the conception of things like the Sky-lotus, On the same footing as this would be the conception relating to the Past (if Cognitions were dependent upon the actual presence of the Object cognised).

katham /

“How so?”

sarvo hi vikalpaḥ śabdollekhena pravṛtteḥ śabdārthāvabhāsī yaś ca śabdārthāvabhāsī na tatra vasturūpaṃ bhāsate vasturūpe śabdasyāpravṛtteḥ tatra tasyāsaṅketitatvād iti vistareṇa śabdārthaparīkṣāyāṃ pratipāditam /

All Conceptual Cognitions appear as associated with verbal expressions, and hence they envisage verbal expressions also; and that which envisages the verbal expression cannot envisage an entity; because verbal expressions do not bear upon the form of things; as words are not fixed by Convention in relation to the actual form of things. All this has been explained in detail under the Chapter on ‘Word and its Denotation’ (Chapter XVI).

sapakṣe sadbhāvān na viruddho hetuḥ nāpyanaikāntikaḥ svopādānānudbhavatvenirhetukatvaprasaṅgāt //1932-

The Reason is present in everything where the Probandum is known to be present; hence it cannot be regarded as ‘Contradictory’, Nor is it ‘Inconclusive’; because if the Cognition were not produced from its own cause, it would have to be regarded as without cause.

kāyāśritatvān na nirhetukatvam iti ced ityāśaṅkyāha prasuptiketyādi /

It might be argued that “as the Cognition would subsist in the Body, it could not be regarded as without cause”.

prasuptikādyavasthāsu śarīravikṛtāvapi /

When the body is struck with diseases like Paralysis, there is modification in it;

nānyathātvaṃ manobuddhes tasmānneyaṃ tadāśritā //

but that does not make any change in the Subjective Consciousness; hence this Subjective Consciousness cannot be regarded as subsisting in the Body;

prasuptikādirogopaghātena hi dehavikāro 'pi manomater avikārādiyaṃ manomatirna dehāśritā yadvikāreṇa niyamāt sākṣādyanna vikriyate na tat tadāśritaṃ na yathā govikāreṇāvikriyamāṇo 'śvo na ca dehasya vikāreṇa niyamāt sākṣādvikriyate manobuddhiḥ prasuptikāvasthāyām iti vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ //

when one thing does not become directly modified upon the modification of another thing, it cannot be regarded as subsisting in this latter; e.g. the Horse, which is not modified by the modification of the Cow (does not subsist in the Cow); on the modification of the Body, Subjective Consciousness does not always and directly become modified, in the state of Paralysis, etc.; hence there is non-apprehension of the wider character (which implies the absence of the less wide).

svalpīyasītyādinā tadāśritatvaṃ sākṣāt tadvikāravikāritvena vyāptam iti darśayati /

The following text proceeds to show that the character of subsisting in something is invariably concomitant with the character of becoming directly modified on the modification of the latter thing: [see verses 1935-1936 above]

[p.543] tasya cātra vyāpakasyābhāva iti siddhā dehānāśritā buddhiḥ /

As the wider character is absent, it is proved that the Subjective Consciousness does not subsist in the Body.

tat tasmād dehanivṛttāvapi na nivartayiṣyata ityavirodhaḥ /

‘Thus’ therefore even on the cessation of the Body, the Subjective Consciousness shall not cease.

yo hi yadāśrito na bhavati tannivṛttau na niyamena tasya nivṛttiḥ /

There is no incongruity in this. When one thing does not subsist in another, it does not necessarily cease upon the cessation of the latter;

tadyathā gonivṛttau gavayasya na niyamena nivṛttiḥ /

e.g. the cessation of the Cow does not lead to the cessation of the Gavaya;

naca deho manomater āśraya iti vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ //1935-

hence there is non-apprehension of the wider character.

nāto 'nyadehasadbhāvasiddhaye yantrito vayam // naca śakyaniṣedho 'sāvadṛṣṭāvapi saṃśrayāt /

It has been argued above (under Text 1869) that “when the other body has not been seen, how can it be understood that the required substratum is the Body that is born subsequently?”