buddhist-nlp/tatpa-noisy · Datasets at Hugging Face

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vṛttānto maithunādisamudācāraḥ /	‘Doings’ Intercourse and the like.
sabhāgā sadṛśī gatir yāsau varāhīprabhṛtīnāṃ tās tathocyante /	‘Sabhāgagati, etc. etc.’ females of the same kind, i.e. the sow and the doe.
tābhiḥ saha samparkaḥ samavadhānam / vikriyeti / viplutiḥ /	When there is contact proximity of these, there is ‘perturbation’ disturbance, i.e. desire for intercourse.
avaśyaṃ caitadavaseyam abhyāsabalādeva rāgādīnāṃ svarasapravṛttir iti /	It must be admitted that the feelings of Love, etc. appear by themselves, as the effect of habitual experience in the past;
tathā hi ye prajñāśīlādayaḥ saṃsārānucitāḥ saṃsāre nābhyastāḥ te svarasenāyatnena na vartante /	because such qualities as wisdom, gentleness and the rest, which are not habitually practised in the world, are not found to appear by themselves like Pride, etc.;
madādivad iti vaidharmyadṛṣṭāntaḥ /	this is an instance of dissimilarity.
mado darpaḥ /	‘Pride’ is haughtiness.
anyathā madādivat prajñādīnām api svarasena pravṛttiḥ syāt //	Otherwise, like Pride, etc., Wisdom and the rest also would appear by themselves.
kecid āhuḥ śleṣmaṇaḥ sakāśād rāgaḥ pittāddveṣo vātān moha iti /	Some people have held the following view: “Love proceeds from Phlegm (in the physical constitution of the Body), Hatred from Bile, and Delusion from Wind”.
tatrāha balāsādītyādi /	The answer to that is as follows: [see verses 1960-1961 above]
tatra balāsaḥ śleṣmā /	‘Balāsa’ is Phlegm.
pūrvavad iti / yathā viṣayeṣu vyabhicāra uktaḥ "pratisaṅkhyānasadbhāve tadbhāve 'pyatadudbhāvādi"tyādinā /	‘As in the previous case’, in the case of objects, as shown under Text 1950 above.
kiṃ ca śleṣmādyupacayāpacayābhyāṃ na rāgādīnām upacayāpacayau bhavataḥ /	Then again, as a matter of fact, there is no increase and decrease in the feelings of Love, etc. upon increase and decrease of Phlegm.
naca yadbhedādyasya bhedo na bhavati tat tasya kāryaṃ yuktam atiprasaṅgāt / tathā śleṣmaṇo 'pi tīvradveṣo dṛṣṭo natu tīvrarāgaḥ, pittaprakṛtirapi tīvrarāgo dṛṣṭo na tīvradveṣādir iti sāṅkaryaṃ dṛśyate /	And when the change in one thing does not bring about a change in the other, the former cannot be the cause of the latter, Similarly, fierce Hatred, and not fierce Love, has been seen to appear in one with preponderance of Phlegm; while one with preponderance of Bile is found to have fierce Love, not fierce Hatred;
na ca yamantareṇa yasya bhāvaḥ sa tasya hetur yuktaḥ /	and when one thing appears without the other, this latter cannot be the cause of the former.
yadavastho rāgī dṛṣṭas tadavastho 'pi dveṣītyato 'pi vyabhicārān na śleṣmādidharmā rāgādayaḥ /	Further, the man with Love is often found to be in the same condition as the man with Hatred. From these non-concomitances, it follows that the feelings of Love, etc. are not the effects of Phlegm, etc. ‘Tasmāt’ Thus;
tasmād ityupasaṃhāraḥ /	this sums up the chapter.
yadabhyāsapūrvakā iti / yasminnabhyāso yadabhyāsaḥ, sa pūrvakaṃ kāraṇaṃ yeṣām iti vigrahaḥ //1960-	‘Yadabhyāsa, etc. etc.’ The compound is to be expounded as ‘Repeated experience during which is the cause of the feelings in question’.
ihatyetyādinā parakīyaṃ codyamāśaṅkate	The following texts set forth the objections of the other party: [see verses 1962-1963 above]
aviśeṣeṇa sādhye tu hetor asya viruddhatā /	The sense of the objection is as follows:
tathaivānyabhavābhyāsahetutvavinivartanāt // tatredaṃ codyam aihalaukikābhyāsapūrvatvaṃ vādyabhāvināṃ sādhyaṃ, pāralaukikābhyāsapūrvatvam vā aviseśena vābyasapūrvatvāmātraṃ, tasminsidhesāmartātpāralaukikābyasapūrvatvamistaṃ sidhaṃ bhāvatīti, pakśatrayaṃ iṣṭaṃ siddhaṃ bhavatīti pakṣatrayam /	“In reference to the feelings of Love, etc. appearing for the first time, what is it that is desired to be proved (1) Is it that they proceed from repeated experience during present life? Or (2) that they proceed from the repeated experience during other lives? Or (3) that they proceed only from mere ‘repeated experience’ without any qualifications? As, if this is proved, then by implication, it becomes proved that they are due to experiences of the ‘other world’; these are the only alternative views possible.
tatra prathame pakṣe dṛṣṭeṣṭabādhanaṃ nahyādyabhāvināṃ rāgādīnām ihatyābhyāsapūrvatvaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ, nāpi ceṣṭaṃ paralokavādineti dṛṣṭeṣṭayor bādhanam /	“(1) If it is the first, then there is ‘bādhana’ of it incompatibility with facts of perception; because in fact, the Love, etc. in question are never found to appeal from experience dining the present life-and there is ‘bādhana’ denial also of what is desired by the upholder of the ‘other world’.
dvitīye 'pi pakṣe sādhyavikalo dṛṣṭāntaḥ nahi kvacillokāyatasya pāralaukikābhyāsapūrvatvasamanvito dṛṣṭānto 'sti /	“(2) Under the second view, the Corroborative Instance cited becomes devoid of the Proband urn; because for the Materialist, there can be no instance where the feelings proceed from experiences of past lives.
tṛtīye 'pi pakṣe viruddhatā hetoḥ, tathaiva dṛṣṭāntavadeva, anyabhavābhyāsapūrvatvasyeṣṭasyābhāvasādhanāt //1962-	“(3) Under the third view, the Reason becomes ‘contradictory’; as, like the Corroborative Instance, it proves only the negation of the desired idea of the feelings being due to experiences during other lives.” (1962-1963)
sāmānyenaivetyādinā pratividhatte /	The above objection is answered in the following [see verse 1964 next]
sāmānyenaiva sādhyatvaṃ naca hetor viruddhatā /	Nor is the Reason ‘Contradictory’. “Why?”
nahi tena virodho 'sya yena tadvinivartayet //	In this way, the beginninglessness (of things) becomes established.
[p.550] tṛtīya evātra pakṣo 'bhipretaḥ, na ca hetor viruddhatā kasmāt/	End of Chapter on Materialism. It is the third of the above alternative views that is meant by us. Nor is the Reason ‘Contradictory’. “Why?”
nahi tenānyabhavābhyāsapūrvatvenāsya rāgāditvasya kvacid virodho 'sti / yena tat pāralaukikābhyāsapūrvatvaṃ nivartayet /	Because there is no incompatibility between ‘being produced from past experience’ and ‘Love and other feelings’, by virtue of which incompatibility, the idea of ‘being due to past experience’ could be set aside.
apica ayaṃ lokaḥ paraloka ityavasthābhedakṛtavyavasthāmātram etat / bālayauvanādibhedavat /	Further, such notions as ‘this world’ and ‘the other world’ are based on differences in the state or condition of things, and the differences of childhood, youth and so forth.
anāditvaṃ tvanena prakāreṇa sādhyata iti nātrābhiniveṣṭavyam/ {prativādinnibhamityetat}{---} //	In this way, the beginninglessness (of things) becomes established. Hence this should not be emphasised as it amounts to the view-point of other disputants (Naiyāyika, Mīmāṃsaka, etc.).
KAPITEL Bahirarthaparīkṣā	End of Chapter on Materialism.
prativivādisannibham ityetat / pratītyasamutpādaviśeṣaṇasamarthanārtham idānīṃ vijñānavādīdamupakṣipati /	Under the Introductory Texts, ‘Pratītya -samutpāda’, ‘Intervolved Chain of Causation’, has been described as ‘pratibimbādissannibham’, ‘resembling the Reflection of things’.
tatra vijñaptimātram evedaṃ traidhātukaṃ tac ca vijñānaṃ pratisattvasantānabhedād anantam aviśuddhaṃ cānadhiagatatattvānāṃ viśuddhaṃ ca prahīṇācaraṇānāṃ pratikṣaṇavisarāru ca sarvaprāṇabhṛtāmojāyate natvekamevāvikāri	In support of this assertion the Idealist sets forth as follows: This entire universe comprising the threefold phenomena (Subjective or Immaterial, Objective or Material, and Imaginary or Fictitious) is mere ‘Ideation’; and this Ideation or Idea, through the diversity of ‘chains’ varying with each individual ‘Being’, is endless, and impure for persons who have not realised the Truth, hut pure, for those whose ‘Karma’ has been wiped off;
yathopaniṣaddhādinām iti vijñānavādīnāṃ bauddhānāṃ matam /	it is not one and unmodifiable, as held by the ‘followers of the Upaniṣads’ (Vedāntins). Such is the view of the Idealist Buddhists.
tatrābhyāṃ prakārābhyāṃ vijñaptimātratābhīṣṭā bāhyasya pṛthivyādisvabhāvasya grāhyasyābhāve grāhakatvasyabhāvāt /	The idea of the entire universe being mere Idea is got at by the following two methods: (1) Anything external, in the form of Earth, etc., which could be apprehended, being non-existent, there can be no apprehender;
satyapi vā santānāntare grāhyagrāhakalakṣaṇavaidhuryāt /	or (2) even though existent, in another ‘Chain’, the two factors would be devoid of the character of the ‘apprehender’ and ‘apprehended’.
tatra prayogaḥ yadyajjñānaṃ tat tat grāhyagrāhakatvadvayarahitaṃ jñānabhāvahetuḥ /	Every Cognition is devoid of both ‘apprehended’ and ‘apprehender’ because it is Cognition, like the Cognition of the Reflected Image; and the Visual and other Perceptions of the Healthy man are Cognition; hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.
nacāvyāptirasya hetor mantavyā /	The Reason cannot be regarded as ‘not concomitant’ (with the Probandum);
tathā hi na tāvat pṛthivyācibāhyo 'rtho 'sya grāhyo vidyate tasyaikānekasvabhāvaśūnyatvāt /	because, for the Cognition, there does not exist any such apprehended object as the ‘external world’, in the shape of the Earth, etc.; because such a world would be devoid of one as well as of several forms.
prayogaḥ yadekānekasvabhāvaṃ na bhavati na tat sattvena grāhyaṃ prekṣāvatā yathā vyomotpalam ekānekasvabhāvarahitāś ca parābhimatāḥ pṛthivyādaya iti vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ /	This argument may be formulated as follows: That which is not of one or several forms cannot be regarded by an intelligent man as ‘existent’, e.g. the ‘sky-lotus’; and the Earth, etc. postulated by other people are devoid of one and several forms;
tṛtīyarāśyantarābhāvenaikatvānekatvābhyāṃ sattvasya vyāptatvād vyāpyavyāpakabhāvānupapattir viparyaye bādhakaṃ pramāṇam iti nānaikāntikatānantarasya hetoḥ /	hence there is non-apprehension in them of the wider character as, no third alternative possible, existence is invariably concomitant with the presence of one or several forms; and the impossibility of the relation of ‘pervaded and pervader’ (that which is concomitant, and that with which it is concomitant) would be the reason that would reject any idea to the contrary;
nāpi viruddhatā, sapakṣe bhāvāt /	hence the Reason adduced cannot be regarded as ‘Inconclusive Nor can it be regarded as ‘Contradictory’;
atrāsya hetor asiddhatām udbhāvayan, yathoktam "bhūtānyeva na santīti nyāyo 'yaṃ para iṣyatā"miti asyāś ca pratijñāyāḥ pratyakṣādivirodhamādarśayan, prathamasya hetor avyāptim eva pratipādayituṃ para āha yadi jñātātirekeṇetyādi /	because it is present everywhere where the Probandum is known to be present. In bringing forward against this Reason, the charge of being ‘inadmissible’, the Opponent has argued thus ‘You may accept the principle that the material substances do not exist at all’; and while proceeding to show that such a Proposition would be contrary to perceptible facts, the Opponent explains that the first Reason is not concomitant (with the Probandum), in the following [see verses 1965-1966 above]
yadi jñātātirekeṇa nāsti bhūtacatuṣṭayam /	‘Distinctly’, This indicates the fact of the four substances being something distinct from Cognition;
tat kimetannu vicchinnaṃ vispaṣṭam avabhāsate // tasyaivaṃ pratibhāse 'pi nāstitopagame sati /	and ‘clearly’ indicates that it is clearly perceived. This same idea is further strengthened by a Reductio ad Absurdum ‘Even when so, etc. etc.’.
[p.551] vicchinnam ityanena jñānād vyatiriktasya grāhyasya siddhimādarśayati, vispaṣṭam ityanena tu pratyakṣatām /	Under the Introductory Texts, ‘Pratītya -samutpāda’, ‘Intervolved Chain of Causation’, has been described as ‘pratibimbādissannibham’, ‘resembling the Reflection of things’.
etad eva prasaṅgena draḍhayann āha tasyaivam ityādinā //1965-	In support of this assertion the Idealist sets forth as follows: This entire universe comprising the threefold phenomena (Subjective or Immaterial, Objective or Material, and Imaginary or Fictitious) is mere ‘Ideation’;
bhāsamāna ityādinā pratividhatte /	The argument, may be formulated as follows;
bhāsamānaḥ kimātmāyaṃ bāhyo 'rthaḥ pratibhāsate / paramāṇusvabhāvaḥ kiṃ kiṃ vāvayavilakṣaṇaḥ //	Every Cognition is devoid of both ‘apprehended’ and ‘apprehender’ because it is Cognition, like the Cognition of the Reflected Image; and the Visual and other Perceptions of the Healthy man are Cognition; hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.
na tāvat paramāṇūnām ākāraḥ prativedyate / niraṃśānekamūrttābha{nāṃ---} pratyayāprativedanāt //	The Reason cannot be regarded as ‘not concomitant’ (with the Probandum); because, for the Cognition, there does not exist any such apprehended object as the ‘external world’, in the shape of the Earth, etc.;
vyapetabhāgabhedā hi bhāseran paramāṇavaḥ /	‘Distinctly’, This indicates the fact of the four substances being something distinct from Cognition;
nānyathādhyakṣatā teṣām ātmākārāsamarpaṇāt //	This same idea is further strengthened by a Reductio ad Absurdum ‘Even when so, etc. etc.’.
tatra pratyakṣasiddho 'rtho bāhyo bhavannaneko vā paramāṇuto 'bhinno bhavet, ekovā tairārabdho 'vayavī, sthūlo 'nārabdho veti pakṣāḥ /	If the external object were cognised by Perception, it could be so either (1) as one and not-different from the Atoms, or (2) as one, but in the form of a composite whole composed of the Atoms; or (3) as a single gross object (by itself) not composed of parts.
tatra na tāvad ādyaḥ, niraṃśānām anekeṣām aṇūnāṃ mūrtānāṃ grāhakasya pratyayasyāprativedanāt /	It cannot be the first of these; that is, it cannot be held to be cognised as one and not-different from the Atoms; because there is no recognition in the Cognition (of the object) of several impartite corporeal atoms;
nityaṃ sthūlākārasyaiva jñānasyānubhūyamānatvāt / pratyaye teṣām aprativedanād iti saptamyantasya pāṭho 'samastaḥ /	in fact, what is actually recognised in Consciousness is the idea of something gross, If the reading is ‘pratyaye aprativedanāt’, there is to be no compounding.
prayogaḥ yaḥ pratikṣābhimate pratyaye na pratibhāsate svenākāreṇa, na sa pratyakṣatvena grahītavyaḥ, yathā gagananalinam, na pratibhāsate ca pratyakṣābhimate pratyaye sthūlākāropagrāhiṇi paramāṇur aneko mūrta iti vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ /	The argument may be formulated as follows That which does not appear in its own form in the Cognition which is held to be Perception, should not be regarded as ‘perceived’, for instance, the ‘sky-lotus’; the Atom, many and corporeal, does not appear in this form in the Cognition which is held to be Perception, which always apprehends the gross form; thus there is no apprehension of the wider- character (which would imply perceptibility);
ātmākārapratibhāsitvena pratyakṣasya vyāptatvāt / tāmeva vyāptiṃ pratipādayann āha vyapetetyādi //1967-	because ‘Perceptibility’ is invariably concomitant with ‘appearance of its own form This same invariable concomitance is shown by the words ‘If the Atoms, etc., etc.’ (1967-1969)
athāpi syāt samuditā evotpadyante vinaśyanti ceti siddhāntānnaikaikaparamāṇupratibhāsa iti, yathoktaṃ bhadantaśubhaguptena	The following might be urged “In as much as we hold the doctrine that the Atoms are always produced, and also perish, in the aggregated form, there can be no appearance of the Atoms singly;
"pratyekaparamāṇūnāṃ svātantryeṇāsti sambhavaḥ /	as has been asserted by Bhadanta-Śubhagupta ‘Atoms cannot come about one by one, each independently by itself;
ato 'pi paramāṇūnām ekaikāpratibhāsanam" // iti /	that also is the reason why they do not appear singly in consciousness’.”
tadetad uttaram iti darśayann āha sāhityenāpīti /	The following Text shows that this is no answer to the argument urged, above (under 1967 et seq.).
labdhāpacayaparyantaṃ rūpaṃ teṣāṃ samasti cet /	[see verses 1970-1971 above] ‘Under those conditions’ in the aggregated form.
kathaṃ nāma na te mūrttā bhaveyur vedanādivat //	Further, if the Atoms are impartite (indivisible), then they should not bo regarded as corporeal;
kiṃ ca yadi niraṃśāḥ paramāṇavo na tarhi [p.552] mūrttā ityabhyupagantavyam iti svavacanavirodhaṃ pratijñāyām āha labdhāpacayetyādi / labdho 'pacayaparyanto yena rūpeṇa svabhāvena, tat tathoktam /	so that the present assertion of the Opponent involves a self-contradiction. This is what is shown by the words “If it be said, etc. etc.’ ‘Labdhāpa, etc.’ means ‘that form or character which has reached the lowest limit of dimunition’.
etad uktaṃ bhavati yadyapacīyamānāvayavavibhāgenāpacīyamānasvabhāvā na bhavanti, yadi niraṃśā iti yāvat, tadā na mūrttā vedanādivat siddhyanti viśeṣābhāvāt //	That is to say, if the Atoms are not liable to dimunition through the diminishing contacts of component parts, i.e. if they are indivisible, without parts, they must be regarded as ‘incorporeal’, like Sensations and Feelings, as there would be no distinction between them.
tulyetādinā bhadantaśubhaguptasya parihāramāśaṅkate	The following Text anticipates the answer that may be given by Bhadanta-Śubhagupta: [see verse 1972 next]
kṣaṇikā iti bhāvāś ca niścīyante pramāṇataḥ / aṇavastviti gamyante kathaṃ pītasitādayaḥ //	He has offered the following answer “In the case of sound and other things what are perceived are several similar ‘Moments’ coming into existence one after the other;
sthūlatvaṃ vastudharmo hi siddhaṃ dharmidvaye 'pi na /	and yet there is an illusion of there being a permanent entity;
atha deśavitānena sthitarūpaṃ tathoditam / tathāpi bhrāntavijñānabhāsirūpeṇa saṃśayaḥ //	in the same manner, in the case of Atoms, what are perceived simultaneously are so many homogeneous Atoms present in an unbroken chain, which gives rise to the mental delusion that what is perceived is a gross object.
tasmād atiśayaḥ ko 'sya kāryasaṃvādanaṃ yadi //	Thus the Reason adduced above in Text 1968 is ‘inadmissible’.” (1972) The answer to this is as follows: [see verses 1973-1979 next]
[p.553] liṅgāgamavyāpārānapekṣamityavadhāra{ṇe}na darśayati /	What is meant by the emphasising particle ‘eva’, ‘entirely is the fact of there being no dependence upon the Inferential Indicative or the Reliable Word.
tathā hi pratyakṣamaviśeṣeṇotpanām api sadyatraivāṃśe yathā parigṛhītākāraparāmarśaṃ janayati sa eva pratyakṣaṃ iṣyate vyavahārayogyatayā yatra tu na janayati tad gṛhītam apya gṛhītaprakhyam /	What is meant is that, even though Perception comes about, it does so, in an unspecified (indeterminate) form; and yet that factor alone is regarded as ‘Perceived’ for practical purposes in regard to which it produces a Re-cognition of the form actually apprehended; while that factor with regard to which it does not produce this Re-cognition is as good as not-apprehended, even though it might be apprehended.
tataś ca nāsiddho hetuḥ / yataḥ pratyayāprativedanādityatra pratyakṣābhimate pratyaye parāmarśahetāvapratibhāsanādityayam artho 'bhipretaḥ /	Hence our Reason cannot be regarded as ‘inadmissible Specially because what is meant by the clause ‘Pratyayāprativedanāt’ (in Text 1968) is that ‘it does not figure in that cognition which is meant to be Perception, and which is put forward as the Reason in the Minor Premiss.’
yaccoktam sthūla iti mānasa eṣa vibhrama iti tadapyasamyak /	It has been argued (in Text 1972) that “the idea of grossness is a mental illusion”.
tathā hi pramāṇenāpi siddhe sati syād vibhramavyavasthā / yathā kṣaṇikatvasya pramāṇena siddhatvānnityatvagraho bhrānto vyavasthāpyate /	because if the Atom, had been established by suitable proof, then alone could the idea of grossness be regarded as wrong or illusory; as it is only when the momentary character of things has been established by suitable proof, that the idea of permanence is regarded as wrong.
naca tathā pramāṇena paramāṇavaḥ siddhās teṣām eva vicāryamāṇatvāt / naceyaṃ sthūlabhrāntir mānasī spaṣṭapratibhāsanāt /	As a matter of fact however, the Atoms have not yet been established; as they form the subject of the present investigation. Further, this ‘illusion of grossness’ cannot be said to be ‘mental’, as it appears quite clearly;
naca vikalpānubaddhasya spaṣṭākāro yuktaḥ sāmānyākārasyāspaṣṭatvāt / naca sāmānyākāram antareṇa vikalpo yuktaḥ /	while what is confined to mere Conceptual Thought can never be clear; because the generic form is always indistinct; and without the generic form, there can be no Conceptual Thought.
syād etat / anityatādivad aṇavo 'pi siddhā eva pramāṇataḥ /	The following might be urged: “Like the non-eternality of things, Atoms also are actually established by suitable proofs.
tathā hi yadyatsthūlaṃ tat tat sūkṣmapracayātmakam yathā parvatādayaḥ sthūlaṃ cādyacākṣuṣamavayavidravyam iti svabhāvahetuḥ /	For instance, whatever is gross is only of the nature of the aggregate of minute things, as for example, the Hill and other things; and the first visually perceived object is gross; hence this is a Reason based on the nature of things.
cākṣuṣagrahaṇamacākṣuṣasya dvyaṇukāder vyavacchedāya /	The qualification ‘visually’ has been added for the purpose of excluding the ‘Atomic Diad’ (which is not visually perceived).”
tatra yadi sthūlatvād iti pāramārthikaṃ sthūlatvaṃ ca vastudharmamāśrityocyate hetus tadā sādhyadharmiṇi dṛṣṭāntadharmiṇi ca dharmidvaye 'pi prativādino na siddhaṃ sthūlatvam iti tadā hetur asiddho dṛṣṭāntaś ca sādhanavikalaḥ /	The answer to this is as follows: In the premiss ‘because it is gross’, if it is real ‘grossness’, as a property of the thing, that is put forward as the Probans (Reason), then such ‘grossness’ is not admitted by your disputant (the Buddhist) either in the Probandum or in the Corroborative Instance; and in that case the Probans is ‘inadmissible’ and the Corroborative Instance is ‘devoid of the Probandum’.
atha yadetaddeśavitānena pratibhāsamānamavicāraramaṇīyamāgopālādi prasiddhaṃ rūpaṃ sthūlatvād ity ucyate tadā bhrānte 'pi svapnādijñāne paramāṇupracayamantareṇāpi tathā pratibhāsi rūpam astīti hetor anaikāntikatā /	If, on the other hand, the ‘grossness’ meant is that which appears as extended in space, which cannot stand the test of investigation, and which is well-known to all common people, down to the veriest cowherd, then, even in the ease of illusory cognition like Dream, such ‘gross form’ actually figures in Consciousness, even though there is no ‘aggregate of Atoms’ at the time;
athābhrāntatve satīti viśeṣamupādīyate tadā vijñānavādinaṃ prati svasthanetrādijñānākārasya yāvat svapnādijñānākārād vyatireko viśeṣo na prasādhyate tāvan na kvacid abhrāntatvaṃ siddham iti viśeṣaṇam apyasiddham /	and hence your Probans becomes ‘Inconclusive’. If, in order to avoid tins difficulty, you add the qualification ‘there being no illusion’, then, so far as the Idealist is concerned, so long as the difference, between the visual cognition produced under normal conditions on the one hand and the cognition produced during dreams on the other, is not established, there is no Cognition that can be accepted as being ‘free from illusion’;
syād etad astyeva svasthanetrādijñānasya svapnādijñānād arthakriyāsaṃvādena viśeṣa iti /	The following might be urged: “Between the normal healthy visual cognition and the Dream-cognition, the difference is quite clear in that while the former is compatible with effective action, the latter is not”.
tatra ko 'yam arthakriyāsaṃvādo nāma / yadi bāhyārthaprāptiḥ sā na siddhā bāhyārthasiddhes tasyaiva sādhyatvenaprastutatvāt /	The answer to this is What is this ‘compatibility with effective action?’ If it is the reaching of the external object, then, that is not yet established; in fact, it is for the establishing of the external object that the Reason has been put forward.
athābhimatārthakriyāvabhāsijñānam evārthakriyāsaṃvādaḥ, tadāyam anyathāpi bāhyārthālambanam antareṇāpi sambhāvyata iti tathā hetor anaikāntikataiva /	If, on the? other hand, ‘compatibility with effective action’ be held to consist in the Cognition envisaging the desired effective action, then, otherwise also, i.e. even without the external object, such compatibility would be possible; so that the Reason adduced is clearly ‘Inconclusive’.
katham anyathāpi sambhāvyata ity āha sāmarthyaniyamāddhetor iti /	Question: “How would it be possible otherwise?” Answer: ‘On account of the capacity for action being restricted,’;
hetoḥ samanantarapratyayasya sāmarthyabhedaniyamāt /	i.e. because the capacity of the cause, consisting in the immediately preceding Cognition, is restricted;
kaścid eva hi samanantarapratyayaḥ kiñcid vijñānaṃ janayituṃ samartho na sarvaḥ sarvam /	that is, a certain preceding Cognition is capable of bringing about only a particular Cognition; all are not able to produce all;
yathā bhavatā bāhye 'rthe iti tata eva niyamaḥ siddhaḥ //	for example, your own ‘External Object’; which also proves that there is restriction in the capacity of things.
[p.554] tulyam ityādinā sumater digambarasya matenāprativedanādityasya hetor asiddhatām udbhāvayati /	The following texts urge the defect of ‘inadmissibility’ in the Probans adduced by the Buddhist, ‘because it is not recognised in consciousness’, from the view-point of Sumati, the Digambara (Jaina): [see verses 1980-1983 above]
tat sāmānyaviśeṣātmarūpatvāt sarvavastunaḥ / tulyātulyasvarūpatvād dvirūpā aṇavaḥ smṛtāḥ //	Sumati has argued as follows: All things have two aspects the Universal and. the Particular; consequently Atoms exist in two forms the common and the uncommon;
tatra samānaṃ yadrūpaṃ tadindriyair gṛhyate nāsamānam /	of these, it is the Common form that is apprehended by the Senses, not the uncommon form.
tataścaikākāraṃ vijñānam aṇuṣvaviruddham iti pratyakṣasiddhāḥ paramāṇava	In this way there is nothing incongruous in there being one uniform Cognition apprehending all Atoms; and thus it is by Perception that Atoms become established.
apratiṣṭham /	‘Confounded’ indefinite;
ekasyāpi rūpasya pratiniścitasyābhāvāt //	in as much as it implies no one definite form.
nanu ca dvirūpaṃ vastviti niścitarūpam uktam eva, satyam uktam ayuktaṃ tūktamiti darśayann āha	Says the Opponent “The assertion that ‘things have two forms’ is quite definite True, that, assertion is there; but the assertion is not right. This is what is shown in the following [see verses 1984-1985 above]
dve hi rūpe kathaṃ nāma yukte ekasya vastunaḥ /	For instance, if there are two forms of a thing, different from one another, then there are two things;
parasparātmatāyāṃ tu taddvairūpyaṃ virudhyate /	as the two forms, being different from one another, would be two different things;

vṛttānto maithunādisamudācāraḥ /

‘Doings’ Intercourse and the like.

sabhāgā sadṛśī gatir yāsau varāhīprabhṛtīnāṃ tās tathocyante /

‘Sabhāgagati, etc. etc.’ females of the same kind, i.e. the sow and the doe.

tābhiḥ saha samparkaḥ samavadhānam / vikriyeti / viplutiḥ /

When there is contact proximity of these, there is ‘perturbation’ disturbance, i.e. desire for intercourse.

avaśyaṃ caitadavaseyam abhyāsabalādeva rāgādīnāṃ svarasapravṛttir iti /

It must be admitted that the feelings of Love, etc. appear by themselves, as the effect of habitual experience in the past;

tathā hi ye prajñāśīlādayaḥ saṃsārānucitāḥ saṃsāre nābhyastāḥ te svarasenāyatnena na vartante /

because such qualities as wisdom, gentleness and the rest, which are not habitually practised in the world, are not found to appear by themselves like Pride, etc.;

madādivad iti vaidharmyadṛṣṭāntaḥ /

this is an instance of dissimilarity.

mado darpaḥ /

‘Pride’ is haughtiness.

anyathā madādivat prajñādīnām api svarasena pravṛttiḥ syāt //

Otherwise, like Pride, etc., Wisdom and the rest also would appear by themselves.

kecid āhuḥ śleṣmaṇaḥ sakāśād rāgaḥ pittāddveṣo vātān moha iti /

Some people have held the following view: “Love proceeds from Phlegm (in the physical constitution of the Body), Hatred from Bile, and Delusion from Wind”.

tatrāha balāsādītyādi /

The answer to that is as follows: [see verses 1960-1961 above]

tatra balāsaḥ śleṣmā /

‘Balāsa’ is Phlegm.

pūrvavad iti / yathā viṣayeṣu vyabhicāra uktaḥ "pratisaṅkhyānasadbhāve tadbhāve 'pyatadudbhāvādi"tyādinā /

‘As in the previous case’, in the case of objects, as shown under Text 1950 above.

kiṃ ca śleṣmādyupacayāpacayābhyāṃ na rāgādīnām upacayāpacayau bhavataḥ /

Then again, as a matter of fact, there is no increase and decrease in the feelings of Love, etc. upon increase and decrease of Phlegm.

naca yadbhedādyasya bhedo na bhavati tat tasya kāryaṃ yuktam atiprasaṅgāt / tathā śleṣmaṇo 'pi tīvradveṣo dṛṣṭo natu tīvrarāgaḥ, pittaprakṛtirapi tīvrarāgo dṛṣṭo na tīvradveṣādir iti sāṅkaryaṃ dṛśyate /

And when the change in one thing does not bring about a change in the other, the former cannot be the cause of the latter, Similarly, fierce Hatred, and not fierce Love, has been seen to appear in one with preponderance of Phlegm; while one with preponderance of Bile is found to have fierce Love, not fierce Hatred;

na ca yamantareṇa yasya bhāvaḥ sa tasya hetur yuktaḥ /

and when one thing appears without the other, this latter cannot be the cause of the former.

yadavastho rāgī dṛṣṭas tadavastho 'pi dveṣītyato 'pi vyabhicārān na śleṣmādidharmā rāgādayaḥ /

Further, the man with Love is often found to be in the same condition as the man with Hatred. From these non-concomitances, it follows that the feelings of Love, etc. are not the effects of Phlegm, etc. ‘Tasmāt’ Thus;

tasmād ityupasaṃhāraḥ /

this sums up the chapter.

yadabhyāsapūrvakā iti / yasminnabhyāso yadabhyāsaḥ, sa pūrvakaṃ kāraṇaṃ yeṣām iti vigrahaḥ //1960-

‘Yadabhyāsa, etc. etc.’ The compound is to be expounded as ‘Repeated experience during which is the cause of the feelings in question’.

ihatyetyādinā parakīyaṃ codyamāśaṅkate

The following texts set forth the objections of the other party: [see verses 1962-1963 above]

aviśeṣeṇa sādhye tu hetor asya viruddhatā /

The sense of the objection is as follows:

tathaivānyabhavābhyāsahetutvavinivartanāt // tatredaṃ codyam aihalaukikābhyāsapūrvatvaṃ vādyabhāvināṃ sādhyaṃ, pāralaukikābhyāsapūrvatvam vā aviseśena vābyasapūrvatvāmātraṃ, tasminsidhesāmartātpāralaukikābyasapūrvatvamistaṃ sidhaṃ bhāvatīti, pakśatrayaṃ iṣṭaṃ siddhaṃ bhavatīti pakṣatrayam /

“In reference to the feelings of Love, etc. appearing for the first time, what is it that is desired to be proved (1) Is it that they proceed from repeated experience during present life? Or (2) that they proceed from the repeated experience during other lives? Or (3) that they proceed only from mere ‘repeated experience’ without any qualifications? As, if this is proved, then by implication, it becomes proved that they are due to experiences of the ‘other world’; these are the only alternative views possible.

tatra prathame pakṣe dṛṣṭeṣṭabādhanaṃ nahyādyabhāvināṃ rāgādīnām ihatyābhyāsapūrvatvaṃ dṛṣṭaṃ, nāpi ceṣṭaṃ paralokavādineti dṛṣṭeṣṭayor bādhanam /

“(1) If it is the first, then there is ‘bādhana’ of it incompatibility with facts of perception; because in fact, the Love, etc. in question are never found to appeal from experience dining the present life-and there is ‘bādhana’ denial also of what is desired by the upholder of the ‘other world’.

dvitīye 'pi pakṣe sādhyavikalo dṛṣṭāntaḥ nahi kvacillokāyatasya pāralaukikābhyāsapūrvatvasamanvito dṛṣṭānto 'sti /

“(2) Under the second view, the Corroborative Instance cited becomes devoid of the Proband urn; because for the Materialist, there can be no instance where the feelings proceed from experiences of past lives.

tṛtīye 'pi pakṣe viruddhatā hetoḥ, tathaiva dṛṣṭāntavadeva, anyabhavābhyāsapūrvatvasyeṣṭasyābhāvasādhanāt //1962-

“(3) Under the third view, the Reason becomes ‘contradictory’; as, like the Corroborative Instance, it proves only the negation of the desired idea of the feelings being due to experiences during other lives.” (1962-1963)

sāmānyenaivetyādinā pratividhatte /

The above objection is answered in the following [see verse 1964 next]

sāmānyenaiva sādhyatvaṃ naca hetor viruddhatā /

Nor is the Reason ‘Contradictory’. “Why?”

nahi tena virodho 'sya yena tadvinivartayet //

In this way, the beginninglessness (of things) becomes established.

[p.550] tṛtīya evātra pakṣo 'bhipretaḥ, na ca hetor viruddhatā kasmāt/

End of Chapter on Materialism. It is the third of the above alternative views that is meant by us. Nor is the Reason ‘Contradictory’. “Why?”

nahi tenānyabhavābhyāsapūrvatvenāsya rāgāditvasya kvacid virodho 'sti / yena tat pāralaukikābhyāsapūrvatvaṃ nivartayet /

Because there is no incompatibility between ‘being produced from past experience’ and ‘Love and other feelings’, by virtue of which incompatibility, the idea of ‘being due to past experience’ could be set aside.

apica ayaṃ lokaḥ paraloka ityavasthābhedakṛtavyavasthāmātram etat / bālayauvanādibhedavat /

Further, such notions as ‘this world’ and ‘the other world’ are based on differences in the state or condition of things, and the differences of childhood, youth and so forth.

anāditvaṃ tvanena prakāreṇa sādhyata iti nātrābhiniveṣṭavyam/ {prativādinnibhamityetat}{---} //

In this way, the beginninglessness (of things) becomes established. Hence this should not be emphasised as it amounts to the view-point of other disputants (Naiyāyika, Mīmāṃsaka, etc.).

KAPITEL Bahirarthaparīkṣā

End of Chapter on Materialism.

prativivādisannibham ityetat / pratītyasamutpādaviśeṣaṇasamarthanārtham idānīṃ vijñānavādīdamupakṣipati /

Under the Introductory Texts, ‘Pratītya -samutpāda’, ‘Intervolved Chain of Causation’, has been described as ‘pratibimbādissannibham’, ‘resembling the Reflection of things’.

tatra vijñaptimātram evedaṃ traidhātukaṃ tac ca vijñānaṃ pratisattvasantānabhedād anantam aviśuddhaṃ cānadhiagatatattvānāṃ viśuddhaṃ ca prahīṇācaraṇānāṃ pratikṣaṇavisarāru ca sarvaprāṇabhṛtāmojāyate natvekamevāvikāri

In support of this assertion the Idealist sets forth as follows: This entire universe comprising the threefold phenomena (Subjective or Immaterial, Objective or Material, and Imaginary or Fictitious) is mere ‘Ideation’; and this Ideation or Idea, through the diversity of ‘chains’ varying with each individual ‘Being’, is endless, and impure for persons who have not realised the Truth, hut pure, for those whose ‘Karma’ has been wiped off;

yathopaniṣaddhādinām iti vijñānavādīnāṃ bauddhānāṃ matam /

it is not one and unmodifiable, as held by the ‘followers of the Upaniṣads’ (Vedāntins). Such is the view of the Idealist Buddhists.

tatrābhyāṃ prakārābhyāṃ vijñaptimātratābhīṣṭā bāhyasya pṛthivyādisvabhāvasya grāhyasyābhāve grāhakatvasyabhāvāt /

The idea of the entire universe being mere Idea is got at by the following two methods: (1) Anything external, in the form of Earth, etc., which could be apprehended, being non-existent, there can be no apprehender;

satyapi vā santānāntare grāhyagrāhakalakṣaṇavaidhuryāt /

or (2) even though existent, in another ‘Chain’, the two factors would be devoid of the character of the ‘apprehender’ and ‘apprehended’.

tatra prayogaḥ yadyajjñānaṃ tat tat grāhyagrāhakatvadvayarahitaṃ jñānabhāvahetuḥ /

Every Cognition is devoid of both ‘apprehended’ and ‘apprehender’ because it is Cognition, like the Cognition of the Reflected Image; and the Visual and other Perceptions of the Healthy man are Cognition; hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.

nacāvyāptirasya hetor mantavyā /

The Reason cannot be regarded as ‘not concomitant’ (with the Probandum);

tathā hi na tāvat pṛthivyācibāhyo 'rtho 'sya grāhyo vidyate tasyaikānekasvabhāvaśūnyatvāt /

because, for the Cognition, there does not exist any such apprehended object as the ‘external world’, in the shape of the Earth, etc.; because such a world would be devoid of one as well as of several forms.

prayogaḥ yadekānekasvabhāvaṃ na bhavati na tat sattvena grāhyaṃ prekṣāvatā yathā vyomotpalam ekānekasvabhāvarahitāś ca parābhimatāḥ pṛthivyādaya iti vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ /

This argument may be formulated as follows: That which is not of one or several forms cannot be regarded by an intelligent man as ‘existent’, e.g. the ‘sky-lotus’; and the Earth, etc. postulated by other people are devoid of one and several forms;

tṛtīyarāśyantarābhāvenaikatvānekatvābhyāṃ sattvasya vyāptatvād vyāpyavyāpakabhāvānupapattir viparyaye bādhakaṃ pramāṇam iti nānaikāntikatānantarasya hetoḥ /

hence there is non-apprehension in them of the wider character as, no third alternative possible, existence is invariably concomitant with the presence of one or several forms; and the impossibility of the relation of ‘pervaded and pervader’ (that which is concomitant, and that with which it is concomitant) would be the reason that would reject any idea to the contrary;

nāpi viruddhatā, sapakṣe bhāvāt /

hence the Reason adduced cannot be regarded as ‘Inconclusive Nor can it be regarded as ‘Contradictory’;

atrāsya hetor asiddhatām udbhāvayan, yathoktam "bhūtānyeva na santīti nyāyo 'yaṃ para iṣyatā"miti asyāś ca pratijñāyāḥ pratyakṣādivirodhamādarśayan, prathamasya hetor avyāptim eva pratipādayituṃ para āha yadi jñātātirekeṇetyādi /

because it is present everywhere where the Probandum is known to be present. In bringing forward against this Reason, the charge of being ‘inadmissible’, the Opponent has argued thus ‘You may accept the principle that the material substances do not exist at all’; and while proceeding to show that such a Proposition would be contrary to perceptible facts, the Opponent explains that the first Reason is not concomitant (with the Probandum), in the following [see verses 1965-1966 above]

yadi jñātātirekeṇa nāsti bhūtacatuṣṭayam /

‘Distinctly’, This indicates the fact of the four substances being something distinct from Cognition;

tat kimetannu vicchinnaṃ vispaṣṭam avabhāsate // tasyaivaṃ pratibhāse 'pi nāstitopagame sati /

and ‘clearly’ indicates that it is clearly perceived. This same idea is further strengthened by a Reductio ad Absurdum ‘Even when so, etc. etc.’.

[p.551] vicchinnam ityanena jñānād vyatiriktasya grāhyasya siddhimādarśayati, vispaṣṭam ityanena tu pratyakṣatām /

Under the Introductory Texts, ‘Pratītya -samutpāda’, ‘Intervolved Chain of Causation’, has been described as ‘pratibimbādissannibham’, ‘resembling the Reflection of things’.

etad eva prasaṅgena draḍhayann āha tasyaivam ityādinā //1965-

In support of this assertion the Idealist sets forth as follows: This entire universe comprising the threefold phenomena (Subjective or Immaterial, Objective or Material, and Imaginary or Fictitious) is mere ‘Ideation’;

bhāsamāna ityādinā pratividhatte /

The argument, may be formulated as follows;

bhāsamānaḥ kimātmāyaṃ bāhyo 'rthaḥ pratibhāsate / paramāṇusvabhāvaḥ kiṃ kiṃ vāvayavilakṣaṇaḥ //

Every Cognition is devoid of both ‘apprehended’ and ‘apprehender’ because it is Cognition, like the Cognition of the Reflected Image; and the Visual and other Perceptions of the Healthy man are Cognition; hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.

na tāvat paramāṇūnām ākāraḥ prativedyate / niraṃśānekamūrttābha{nāṃ---} pratyayāprativedanāt //

The Reason cannot be regarded as ‘not concomitant’ (with the Probandum); because, for the Cognition, there does not exist any such apprehended object as the ‘external world’, in the shape of the Earth, etc.;

vyapetabhāgabhedā hi bhāseran paramāṇavaḥ /

‘Distinctly’, This indicates the fact of the four substances being something distinct from Cognition;

nānyathādhyakṣatā teṣām ātmākārāsamarpaṇāt //

This same idea is further strengthened by a Reductio ad Absurdum ‘Even when so, etc. etc.’.

tatra pratyakṣasiddho 'rtho bāhyo bhavannaneko vā paramāṇuto 'bhinno bhavet, ekovā tairārabdho 'vayavī, sthūlo 'nārabdho veti pakṣāḥ /

If the external object were cognised by Perception, it could be so either (1) as one and not-different from the Atoms, or (2) as one, but in the form of a composite whole composed of the Atoms; or (3) as a single gross object (by itself) not composed of parts.

tatra na tāvad ādyaḥ, niraṃśānām anekeṣām aṇūnāṃ mūrtānāṃ grāhakasya pratyayasyāprativedanāt /

It cannot be the first of these; that is, it cannot be held to be cognised as one and not-different from the Atoms; because there is no recognition in the Cognition (of the object) of several impartite corporeal atoms;

nityaṃ sthūlākārasyaiva jñānasyānubhūyamānatvāt / pratyaye teṣām aprativedanād iti saptamyantasya pāṭho 'samastaḥ /

in fact, what is actually recognised in Consciousness is the idea of something gross, If the reading is ‘pratyaye aprativedanāt’, there is to be no compounding.

prayogaḥ yaḥ pratikṣābhimate pratyaye na pratibhāsate svenākāreṇa, na sa pratyakṣatvena grahītavyaḥ, yathā gagananalinam, na pratibhāsate ca pratyakṣābhimate pratyaye sthūlākāropagrāhiṇi paramāṇur aneko mūrta iti vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ /

The argument may be formulated as follows That which does not appear in its own form in the Cognition which is held to be Perception, should not be regarded as ‘perceived’, for instance, the ‘sky-lotus’; the Atom, many and corporeal, does not appear in this form in the Cognition which is held to be Perception, which always apprehends the gross form; thus there is no apprehension of the wider- character (which would imply perceptibility);

ātmākārapratibhāsitvena pratyakṣasya vyāptatvāt / tāmeva vyāptiṃ pratipādayann āha vyapetetyādi //1967-

because ‘Perceptibility’ is invariably concomitant with ‘appearance of its own form This same invariable concomitance is shown by the words ‘If the Atoms, etc., etc.’ (1967-1969)

athāpi syāt samuditā evotpadyante vinaśyanti ceti siddhāntānnaikaikaparamāṇupratibhāsa iti, yathoktaṃ bhadantaśubhaguptena

The following might be urged “In as much as we hold the doctrine that the Atoms are always produced, and also perish, in the aggregated form, there can be no appearance of the Atoms singly;

"pratyekaparamāṇūnāṃ svātantryeṇāsti sambhavaḥ /

as has been asserted by Bhadanta-Śubhagupta ‘Atoms cannot come about one by one, each independently by itself;

ato 'pi paramāṇūnām ekaikāpratibhāsanam" // iti /

that also is the reason why they do not appear singly in consciousness’.”

tadetad uttaram iti darśayann āha sāhityenāpīti /

The following Text shows that this is no answer to the argument urged, above (under 1967 et seq.).

labdhāpacayaparyantaṃ rūpaṃ teṣāṃ samasti cet /

[see verses 1970-1971 above] ‘Under those conditions’ in the aggregated form.

kathaṃ nāma na te mūrttā bhaveyur vedanādivat //

Further, if the Atoms are impartite (indivisible), then they should not bo regarded as corporeal;

kiṃ ca yadi niraṃśāḥ paramāṇavo na tarhi [p.552] mūrttā ityabhyupagantavyam iti svavacanavirodhaṃ pratijñāyām āha labdhāpacayetyādi / labdho 'pacayaparyanto yena rūpeṇa svabhāvena, tat tathoktam /

so that the present assertion of the Opponent involves a self-contradiction. This is what is shown by the words “If it be said, etc. etc.’ ‘Labdhāpa, etc.’ means ‘that form or character which has reached the lowest limit of dimunition’.

etad uktaṃ bhavati yadyapacīyamānāvayavavibhāgenāpacīyamānasvabhāvā na bhavanti, yadi niraṃśā iti yāvat, tadā na mūrttā vedanādivat siddhyanti viśeṣābhāvāt //

That is to say, if the Atoms are not liable to dimunition through the diminishing contacts of component parts, i.e. if they are indivisible, without parts, they must be regarded as ‘incorporeal’, like Sensations and Feelings, as there would be no distinction between them.

tulyetādinā bhadantaśubhaguptasya parihāramāśaṅkate

The following Text anticipates the answer that may be given by Bhadanta-Śubhagupta: [see verse 1972 next]

kṣaṇikā iti bhāvāś ca niścīyante pramāṇataḥ / aṇavastviti gamyante kathaṃ pītasitādayaḥ //

He has offered the following answer “In the case of sound and other things what are perceived are several similar ‘Moments’ coming into existence one after the other;

sthūlatvaṃ vastudharmo hi siddhaṃ dharmidvaye 'pi na /

and yet there is an illusion of there being a permanent entity;

atha deśavitānena sthitarūpaṃ tathoditam / tathāpi bhrāntavijñānabhāsirūpeṇa saṃśayaḥ //

in the same manner, in the case of Atoms, what are perceived simultaneously are so many homogeneous Atoms present in an unbroken chain, which gives rise to the mental delusion that what is perceived is a gross object.

tasmād atiśayaḥ ko 'sya kāryasaṃvādanaṃ yadi //

Thus the Reason adduced above in Text 1968 is ‘inadmissible’.” (1972) The answer to this is as follows: [see verses 1973-1979 next]

[p.553] liṅgāgamavyāpārānapekṣamityavadhāra{ṇe}na darśayati /

What is meant by the emphasising particle ‘eva’, ‘entirely is the fact of there being no dependence upon the Inferential Indicative or the Reliable Word.

tathā hi pratyakṣamaviśeṣeṇotpanām api sadyatraivāṃśe yathā parigṛhītākāraparāmarśaṃ janayati sa eva pratyakṣaṃ iṣyate vyavahārayogyatayā yatra tu na janayati tad gṛhītam apya gṛhītaprakhyam /

What is meant is that, even though Perception comes about, it does so, in an unspecified (indeterminate) form; and yet that factor alone is regarded as ‘Perceived’ for practical purposes in regard to which it produces a Re-cognition of the form actually apprehended; while that factor with regard to which it does not produce this Re-cognition is as good as not-apprehended, even though it might be apprehended.

tataś ca nāsiddho hetuḥ / yataḥ pratyayāprativedanādityatra pratyakṣābhimate pratyaye parāmarśahetāvapratibhāsanādityayam artho 'bhipretaḥ /

Hence our Reason cannot be regarded as ‘inadmissible Specially because what is meant by the clause ‘Pratyayāprativedanāt’ (in Text 1968) is that ‘it does not figure in that cognition which is meant to be Perception, and which is put forward as the Reason in the Minor Premiss.’

yaccoktam sthūla iti mānasa eṣa vibhrama iti tadapyasamyak /

It has been argued (in Text 1972) that “the idea of grossness is a mental illusion”.

tathā hi pramāṇenāpi siddhe sati syād vibhramavyavasthā / yathā kṣaṇikatvasya pramāṇena siddhatvānnityatvagraho bhrānto vyavasthāpyate /

because if the Atom, had been established by suitable proof, then alone could the idea of grossness be regarded as wrong or illusory; as it is only when the momentary character of things has been established by suitable proof, that the idea of permanence is regarded as wrong.

naca tathā pramāṇena paramāṇavaḥ siddhās teṣām eva vicāryamāṇatvāt / naceyaṃ sthūlabhrāntir mānasī spaṣṭapratibhāsanāt /

As a matter of fact however, the Atoms have not yet been established; as they form the subject of the present investigation. Further, this ‘illusion of grossness’ cannot be said to be ‘mental’, as it appears quite clearly;

naca vikalpānubaddhasya spaṣṭākāro yuktaḥ sāmānyākārasyāspaṣṭatvāt / naca sāmānyākāram antareṇa vikalpo yuktaḥ /

while what is confined to mere Conceptual Thought can never be clear; because the generic form is always indistinct; and without the generic form, there can be no Conceptual Thought.

syād etat / anityatādivad aṇavo 'pi siddhā eva pramāṇataḥ /

The following might be urged: “Like the non-eternality of things, Atoms also are actually established by suitable proofs.

tathā hi yadyatsthūlaṃ tat tat sūkṣmapracayātmakam yathā parvatādayaḥ sthūlaṃ cādyacākṣuṣamavayavidravyam iti svabhāvahetuḥ /

For instance, whatever is gross is only of the nature of the aggregate of minute things, as for example, the Hill and other things; and the first visually perceived object is gross; hence this is a Reason based on the nature of things.

cākṣuṣagrahaṇamacākṣuṣasya dvyaṇukāder vyavacchedāya /

The qualification ‘visually’ has been added for the purpose of excluding the ‘Atomic Diad’ (which is not visually perceived).”

tatra yadi sthūlatvād iti pāramārthikaṃ sthūlatvaṃ ca vastudharmamāśrityocyate hetus tadā sādhyadharmiṇi dṛṣṭāntadharmiṇi ca dharmidvaye 'pi prativādino na siddhaṃ sthūlatvam iti tadā hetur asiddho dṛṣṭāntaś ca sādhanavikalaḥ /

The answer to this is as follows: In the premiss ‘because it is gross’, if it is real ‘grossness’, as a property of the thing, that is put forward as the Probans (Reason), then such ‘grossness’ is not admitted by your disputant (the Buddhist) either in the Probandum or in the Corroborative Instance; and in that case the Probans is ‘inadmissible’ and the Corroborative Instance is ‘devoid of the Probandum’.

atha yadetaddeśavitānena pratibhāsamānamavicāraramaṇīyamāgopālādi prasiddhaṃ rūpaṃ sthūlatvād ity ucyate tadā bhrānte 'pi svapnādijñāne paramāṇupracayamantareṇāpi tathā pratibhāsi rūpam astīti hetor anaikāntikatā /

If, on the other hand, the ‘grossness’ meant is that which appears as extended in space, which cannot stand the test of investigation, and which is well-known to all common people, down to the veriest cowherd, then, even in the ease of illusory cognition like Dream, such ‘gross form’ actually figures in Consciousness, even though there is no ‘aggregate of Atoms’ at the time;

athābhrāntatve satīti viśeṣamupādīyate tadā vijñānavādinaṃ prati svasthanetrādijñānākārasya yāvat svapnādijñānākārād vyatireko viśeṣo na prasādhyate tāvan na kvacid abhrāntatvaṃ siddham iti viśeṣaṇam apyasiddham /

and hence your Probans becomes ‘Inconclusive’. If, in order to avoid tins difficulty, you add the qualification ‘there being no illusion’, then, so far as the Idealist is concerned, so long as the difference, between the visual cognition produced under normal conditions on the one hand and the cognition produced during dreams on the other, is not established, there is no Cognition that can be accepted as being ‘free from illusion’;

syād etad astyeva svasthanetrādijñānasya svapnādijñānād arthakriyāsaṃvādena viśeṣa iti /

The following might be urged: “Between the normal healthy visual cognition and the Dream-cognition, the difference is quite clear in that while the former is compatible with effective action, the latter is not”.

tatra ko 'yam arthakriyāsaṃvādo nāma / yadi bāhyārthaprāptiḥ sā na siddhā bāhyārthasiddhes tasyaiva sādhyatvenaprastutatvāt /

The answer to this is What is this ‘compatibility with effective action?’ If it is the reaching of the external object, then, that is not yet established; in fact, it is for the establishing of the external object that the Reason has been put forward.

athābhimatārthakriyāvabhāsijñānam evārthakriyāsaṃvādaḥ, tadāyam anyathāpi bāhyārthālambanam antareṇāpi sambhāvyata iti tathā hetor anaikāntikataiva /

If, on the? other hand, ‘compatibility with effective action’ be held to consist in the Cognition envisaging the desired effective action, then, otherwise also, i.e. even without the external object, such compatibility would be possible; so that the Reason adduced is clearly ‘Inconclusive’.

katham anyathāpi sambhāvyata ity āha sāmarthyaniyamāddhetor iti /

Question: “How would it be possible otherwise?” Answer: ‘On account of the capacity for action being restricted,’;

hetoḥ samanantarapratyayasya sāmarthyabhedaniyamāt /

i.e. because the capacity of the cause, consisting in the immediately preceding Cognition, is restricted;

kaścid eva hi samanantarapratyayaḥ kiñcid vijñānaṃ janayituṃ samartho na sarvaḥ sarvam /

that is, a certain preceding Cognition is capable of bringing about only a particular Cognition; all are not able to produce all;

yathā bhavatā bāhye 'rthe iti tata eva niyamaḥ siddhaḥ //

for example, your own ‘External Object’; which also proves that there is restriction in the capacity of things.

[p.554] tulyam ityādinā sumater digambarasya matenāprativedanādityasya hetor asiddhatām udbhāvayati /

The following texts urge the defect of ‘inadmissibility’ in the Probans adduced by the Buddhist, ‘because it is not recognised in consciousness’, from the view-point of Sumati, the Digambara (Jaina): [see verses 1980-1983 above]

tat sāmānyaviśeṣātmarūpatvāt sarvavastunaḥ / tulyātulyasvarūpatvād dvirūpā aṇavaḥ smṛtāḥ //

Sumati has argued as follows: All things have two aspects the Universal and. the Particular; consequently Atoms exist in two forms the common and the uncommon;

tatra samānaṃ yadrūpaṃ tadindriyair gṛhyate nāsamānam /

of these, it is the Common form that is apprehended by the Senses, not the uncommon form.

tataścaikākāraṃ vijñānam aṇuṣvaviruddham iti pratyakṣasiddhāḥ paramāṇava

In this way there is nothing incongruous in there being one uniform Cognition apprehending all Atoms; and thus it is by Perception that Atoms become established.

apratiṣṭham /

‘Confounded’ indefinite;

ekasyāpi rūpasya pratiniścitasyābhāvāt //

in as much as it implies no one definite form.

nanu ca dvirūpaṃ vastviti niścitarūpam uktam eva, satyam uktam ayuktaṃ tūktamiti darśayann āha

Says the Opponent “The assertion that ‘things have two forms’ is quite definite True, that, assertion is there; but the assertion is not right. This is what is shown in the following [see verses 1984-1985 above]

dve hi rūpe kathaṃ nāma yukte ekasya vastunaḥ /

For instance, if there are two forms of a thing, different from one another, then there are two things;

parasparātmatāyāṃ tu taddvairūpyaṃ virudhyate /

as the two forms, being different from one another, would be two different things;