buddhist-nlp/tatpa-noisy · Datasets at Hugging Face

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syād eṣā mandanetrasya svaccha{lpa---}dhūmādyadṛṣṭivat //	The answer to that is as follows: [see verses 1937-1938 above]
ayam atrābhiprāyaḥ paraloko 'tra sādhayitumiṣṭaḥ sa ca kathaṃ siddhyati yadibuddhir anādyanantā siddhyet /	What is meant is as follows: What is meant to be proved is the existence of the ‘other world’; and how can it be proved? It can be proved if it is shown that Consciousness is without beginning and without end;
asyā evāvasthāviśeṣaḥ paralokaprajñaptau /	as it is only an aspect of Consciousness that figures in the Idea of the ‘other world’;
na tu dehe āru{rū---}pyadhātau dehābhāve 'pi paralokābhyupagamāt /	this Idea cannot subsist in the Body, which is a material object with a shape; as the ‘other world’ is held to be there even when the Body is not there.
sā cec cittasantatir anādyanantā siddhā siddho naḥ paraloka iti nānyadehasiddhaye yatnaḥ kriyate 'smābhir niṣphalatvāt /	If the ‘Chain of Cognitions’ is proved to be without beginning and without end, then the existence of our ‘other World’ also becomes proved. Hence we do not put forth any effort towards proving the existence of the other Body; as it would be useless.
naca tasyādṛṣṭimātreṇa niṣedhaḥ śakyate kartum /	Simply because the other body is not seen, it cannot be denied;
tathā hyeṣādṛṣṭir jātiviśeṣe bhāvanādivaikalyān mandanetrasya bhavataḥ satyapi tasmin dehe syād api nanu brūmo '{tanudhūmā---darśanavad iti nānupalabdhimātreṇa pratiṣedhaḥ siddhyati /	as this not-seeing may be due to the absence of necessary attention, as happens in the case of the man with defective eyesight, even though the body may be there all right; as it happens when there is a scanty line of smoke; so that mere non-perception does not prove non-existence.
tathā hi sajātiśuddhadivyākṣadṛśyottarābhavo varṇyate /	In fact a subsequent body is described as actually perceived by persons of pure birth and super-normal vision.
ata eva sāṅkhyaparikalpitātivāhikaśarīrasyāpyapratikṣepaḥ /	For these same reasons, there can be no denial of the ‘migratory body’ (Liṅgaśarīra) postulated by the Sāṃkhya.
pūrvakālabhavasyāpi deśaviprakarṣannopalambhaḥ syāt dūrataradeśotpatteḥ svabhāvaviprakarṣād vā piśācādidehavat / aviprakarṣe 'pyarvāgdarśinā so 'yaṃ prāṇī pataṅgādyātmatāṃ gata iti niścetumaśakyatvāt /	In the case of the previously-born body also, it is just possible that, there may be non-perception due to the remoteness of place; due either to its being produced at a remote place, or to the difference in its character, as in the case of Ghosts and Goblins. Even when the bodies are not remote, people with normal vision can never cognise with certainty that it is such and such a being who has become born as a bird;
acintyaśaktibhaiṣajyopayogena parāvṛttadehavat //1937-	just as there is no recognition in cases where the body is changed by means of the use of medicines with unthinkable potency.
kathaṃ tarhi bhinnāśrayāśrayāṇi jñānānyekasantānasambaddhānyucyanta ity āha bhinnadehāśritatve 'pīti /	Question: “How is it then that Cognitions appearing in different substrata are spoken of as belonging to the same Chain?”
[p.544]	Answer: [see verses 1939-1941 next]
tadviśeṣānukārata iti / tasya janmāntaravartino jñānasya yo viśeṣas tamanukurvantyaihikāni jñānāni /	‘By reason of the later Cognition, etc. etc.’ That, is, the Cognitions of the present life appear with the same peculiarities as the Cognitions of the previous life.
tathā coktam "abhyāsayogena śubhāśubhāni karmāṇi sātmyena bhavanti puṃsām /	This has been thus declared ‘Through repeated practice, good and evil deeds appear in the nature of men;
yadaprayatnena vinopadeśājjanmāntare svapna ivācaranti" /	and these same appear in future lives, without any instruction, like a dream’.
tatra yaduktaṃ cārvākeṇa ihalokaparalokaśarīrayor bhinnatvāt tadgatayor api cittayor naikaḥ santāna ityādi /	The Materialist has argued as follows: “The Body in this world and the Body in the ‘other world’ being entirely different, the Chain of the Cognitions in those two bodies cannot be one and the same;
garbhādau prathamaṃ vijñānaṃ vivādagocarāpannaikasantānikaṃ na bhavati bhinnaśarīratvān mahiṣavarāhādivijñānavad iti /	so that the first Cognition that appears in the Foetus cannot belong to the same Chain as the Cognition under dispute, because they belong to different bodies, like the Cognitions of the Buffalo, the Boar and other animals”,
tadanena pratikṣiptaṃ bhavati /	This also becomes refuted by what has been said above.
apica ito 'pi paralokaḥ siddhaḥ / tathā hi yo yo vikalpaḥ sa śabdānubhavābhyāsapūrvakaḥ vikalpatvāt yauvanādyavasthābhāvivikalpavat /	Then again, for the following reason also the existence of the ‘other world’ should be admitted: Every Conceptual Cognition is preceded by the repeated Cognition of words, because it is Conceptual, like the Conceptual Thoughts occurring in youth and old age;
vikalpapaścāyaṃ sadyojātānāṃ stanapānādyabhilāṣadivikalpa iti svabhāvahetuḥ /	the Conceptual Cognition involved in the desire for sucking the breast and so forth appearing in newborn infants is Conceptual; hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.
nacāśrayāsiddho hetuḥ /	The Reason cannot be said to be one which has an unadmitted substratum;
yato uditastanapānādikāryeṇāsau sadyojātānāṃ stanapānādyabhilāṣādir	because the existence of the Minor Term in the shape of the desire for sucking the breast, etc., is proved by such effects in newborn infants as crying and actual breast-sucking;
nahi śa{ra---}ktir vidveṣādirūpeṇāvikalpayato ruditastanapānādisambhavo yuktaḥ /	such crying and breast-sucking cannot be possible in one who has no conception of liking and disliking.
nāpi svarūpāsiddha iti pratipādayati sa ca sarvo vikalpātmeti / saḥ stanapānābhilāṣādiḥ / sarvo vikalpātmā vikalpasvabhāvaḥ /	Nor is the Reason ‘inadmissible by itself’; this is shown by the words ‘all this is of the nature of Conceptual, etc. etc. All this’ i.e. the desire for breast-sucking, etc, is of the nature of Conceptual Thought;
prārthanādyākāratayānubhūyamānatvāt /	because it is apprehended as something sought after.
nāpyanaikāntika iti darśayann āha sa ca nāmānuṣaṅgavāniti / sa iti vikalpaḥ /	That the Reason is not ‘Inconclusive’ is shown by the words ‘is associated with names ‘Saḥ’ stands for Conceptual Cognition.
yasmāt sarvo vikalpaḥ śabdollekhena pravṛtter nāmānuṣaktaḥ / sa ca nāmānuṣaṅgo vikalpasya saṅketābhyāsamantareṇa na sambhavatīti pūrvaṃ vistareṇa pratipāditam asmābhiḥ //1939-	Inasmuch as Conceptual Cognition is associated with verbal expression, it is said to be ‘associated with names’, This ‘association with names’, of the Conceptual Cognition is not possible without repeated Convention; as has been explained by us already in detail.
athāpi syād bhavatu nāma nāmānuṣaṅgo 'bhyāsapūrvakas tathāpyasau neṣṭaprasādhanaḥ /	The following might be urged: “There may be association with names due to repeated practice;
kiṃ tarhiaihalaukikābhyāsapūrvatvam eva viparītaṃ sādhayatītyāha nanāmarūpam ityādi /	in fact, it only proves the contrary, i.e. the fact of being preceded (and produced) by repeated practice during the present life.”
etad uktaṃ bhavati /	The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 1942 above]
[p.545] tannāmetyādinā yathoktaṃ pramāṇārtham upasaṃharati	The following Text sums up the purport of the above arguments: [see verse 1943 above]
taditi tasmād ity arthaḥ //	‘Tat’ stands for ‘tasmāt’, ‘For these reasons’.
yannāmetyādinā pramāṇaphalaṃ darśayati	The following text describes the upshot of the above arguments: [see verse 1944 above]
nāmnaḥ śabdasya saṃstavaḥ paricayo 'nubhava iti yāvat, tasyābhyāsaḥ punar utpādaḥ / yasmin bhave nāmasambhavābhyāso yannāmasambhavābhyāsa iti, saptamīti yogavibhāgāt samāsaḥ /	‘Name’ verbal expression. ‘Cognition’ apprehension, knowledge; ‘abhyāsa’, repeated appearance. The compound ‘yannāma, etc, etc,’ is to be expounded as ‘that birth during which there has been repeated cognition of the Name’, this compound being in accordance with a particular rule (of Pāṇini’s) ‘Saptamī, etc.’;
tenāhitā yā vāsanā tasyāḥ paripākaḥ svānurūpaḥ kāryotpādane vṛttilābhaḥ tato jāta iti vyutpattikramaḥ /	these Impressions have this ‘fruition’, development, attainment of their full character, by producing their effects; and it is from this ‘fruition’ that the said Conceptual Cognition is born.
teṣām iti / sadyojātānām //	‘Of the said persons’ i.e. of new-born infaṇts.
nāmābhyāsetyādinā parakīyaṃ prasaṅgasādhanam āśaṅkate ---	The following Text sets forth the opponent’s Reductio ad absurdum argument against the above view: [see verse 1945 above]
yadi pūrvasaṅketābhyāsād vikalpasya pravṛttis tadā bāladārakasya pūrvasaṅketānusmaraṇaprasaṅgaḥ /	“If the Conceptual Cognition proceeds from the repeated Cognition of the Convention during previous lives, then the newborn child should have remembrance of the past Convention;
nahyabhyāsānuvṛttiḥ smaraṇamantareṇa yuktā /	because the continuity of a habit could not be possible without remembrance;
vāgminām iva vispaṣṭavākpravṛttiprasaṅgaś ca /	also the child should have clear speech like eloquent speakers;
tataś ca saṅketakaraṇānarthakyaṃ syāt / na caivaṃ bhavati / tasmāt smaraṇābhāvāt, vispaṣṭavāco 'pravṛtteś ca, pūrvābhyāsapūrvatvaṃ	and in that case, there would be no need for the setting up of any Conventions during the present life, And yet none of these things happens, Hence it follows that, as there is no Remembrance, and there is no clear speech, the idea that the Conceptual Cognition is preceded and produced by repeated Cognition is incompatible with facts”.
viruddham iti prasaṅgaviparyayeṇa dharmasvarūpanirākaraṇamukhena pratijñādoṣam āha //	By means of this Reductio ad absurdum, which rejects the very nature of the Major Term, the Opponent shows that the final Conclusion (of the Buddhist) is defective.
paṭīyasetyādinā prasaṅgaviparyaye ca hetor anaikāntikatvam āha	In the following Text, the author points out that the Reason put forward iṇ this Reductio ad absurdum is ‘Inconclusive’ (Doubtful);
na syādāsām iyaṃ vṛttiḥ sannipātadaśāsviva //	[see verse 1946 above]
nahi pūrvābhyāsaḥ sarvadā smaraṇādinā vyāpto yena smaraṇādikaṃ pravartayet /	As a matter of fact, Repeated Cognition is not invariably concomitant with Remembrance, etc.; by virtue of which concomitance it should always produce the said Remembrance;
tannivṛttau vā nivarteta /	or should cease on the cessation of the same.
tathā svapne 'pi pūrvābhyāsānuvṛttir bhaven na ca smaraṇam /	Because it is quite possible that there may be continuance of the previous habit, and yet there may be no Remembrance.
sannipātagrahaṇam upalakṣaṇam /	The mention of the ‘high complicated fever’ is only by way of illustration.
patīyaseti / garbhaparivāsāt /	‘Powerful impediments’ due to existence in the mother’s womb.
paripākākulatvata iti / [p.546] vāsanāparipākasyākulatvam /	‘The development becomes hampered’ That is the full development of the Impressions becomes hampered;
yathānubhūtapratiniyatadeśakālasvabhāvādibhedarūpeṇāpravṛttiḥ /	i.e. it does not proceed in exact accordance with the peculiarities of the particular place, time and character of things as previously cognised.
tatra yaduktaṃ cārvākeṇa jātismaraṇamasiddham /	This answers the following argument of the Materialist: “Remembrance of previous birth cannot be admitted;
ekagrāmāgatānāṃ sarveṣāṃ smaraṇād iti /	because there is Remembrance of all men coming from the same village”.
tathā hi ekagrāmāgatā api sarve na smaranti /	The fact of the matter is that even those coming from the same village do not have the Remembrance;
yatas tatra kecana teṣāṃ madhye ye mandamatayas te muṣitasmṛtayo bhavantyeva /	as among them there are some who are dull-witted who lose their memory.
āsāmiti vācām //	‘Tāsām’ stands for the words, speech.
svalpīyānapi yeṣāṃ tu nopaghāto mahātmanām / śrūyante visphuṭā vācas teṣāṃ sā ca smṛtiḥ sphuṭā //	In the case of those high-souled men, where there is not the slightest impediment, clear speech is actually heard and they do have clear remembrance of them also.
mahātmanām iti / puṇyavatām //	‘High-souled men’ Men of exceptionally pure life.
punar api paralokasiddhāvupapattyantaram āha rāgadveṣādayaścetyādi /	As a matter of fact, all these feelings of love, hatred and the rest become strong through habit and repetition, as has been ascertained by positive and negative concomitance.
ihatyābhyāsarahitās te ye prathamabhāvinaḥ /	These feelings, appearing for the first time (in the child), are entirely devoid of any habit and repetition during the present life;
ko hetor janmanas teṣāṃ yadi na syād bhavāntaram // na hyālambanasānnidhyās teṣāṃ janmopapadyate / pratisaṅkhyānasadbhāve tadbhāve 'pyatadudbhavāt //	what then is the cause of their appearance, if there is no other life? Their appearance cannot be due to the presence of their (external) excitants; because even when these excitants are present, the feelings in question do not appear, if there is disgust;
pratisaṅkhyānivṛttau ca teṣāṃ prābalyadarśanāt / naṣṭājātepi viṣaye viparyāsābhivṛddhitaḥ {naḥ---} //	and when this disgust ceases, they are found to be strong, even in connection with past and future things, when the counterfeelings appear in intensified form.
śubhātmīyasthirādīṃś ca samāropyāṅganādiṣu / rāgādayaḥ pravartante tadrūpā viṣayā naca //	The feelings of love, hatred and the rest are found to proceed in regard to women and other things, when the man attributes to them goodness, devotedness and constancy and so forth; even though these qualities may not be actually there.
tadanālambanā eva sadṛśābhyāsaśaktitaḥ / ihatyā api vartante rāgāditvādyathottare //	For these reasons, these feelings appearing in this life must be regarded as appearing, without the excitants being actually present, through the force of the habitual appearance of similar feelings in the past, because they are feelings of love, etc., like these same feelings appearing subsequently.
prayogaḥ rāgadveṣerṣyāmadamānādīnāṃ tathā prajñākaruṇāmaitryadīnāñca yat pāṭavaṃ tadabhyāsapūrvakam, yathehaiva janmani paṭumandayathoktaguṇasyapuruṣasyābhyāsavaśād dṛṣṭam /	The argument may be thus formulated: The strength of the feelings of Love, Hatred, Jealousy, Haughtiness and Pride, etc., as also Wisdom, Compassion, Sympathy and so forth is due to habitual practice; just as during the present life, it is found in men possessed of the varying degrees' of these feelings;
asti dehādāvatra janmani teṣu teṣvadṛṣṭaihalaukikābhyāsasyāpi kasyacit puruṣasya tat pāṭavam iti kāryahetuḥ /	during the present life, there is in the Body, etc. of a man, a degree of strength of the feelings, which is not due to any such practice during the present life; so this is a Reason based upon the relation of cause and effect.
anvayavyatirekābhyāṃ kāryakāraṇabhāvasya niścitatvād iti nāsiddho hetuḥ /	As all such relations of cause and effect are determined by positive and negative concomitance, the Reason cannot be said to be ‘inadmissible’.
ata evāha anvayavyatirekābhyāṃ bhavantaḥ pariniścitā iti /	This is what is meant by the words ‘Ascertained by positive, etc. etc.’.
[p.547] aparalaukikābhyāsapūrvatvasādhanād viruddho hetur iti cen na /	It cannot be urged that “the Reason is ‘contradictory’, as cited in proof of the fact of the feelings due to habitual repetition during other lives
ihatyābhyāsarahitās te ye prathamabhāvinaḥ paṭavo rāgādaya ityayuktam aparalaukikābhyāsapūrvatvasādhanam /	What is meant is that these feelings as appearing for the first time during the present life have not been habitually repeated during this life; this may not be a Reason directly proving the fact of these feelings being due to habitual practice during previous lives;
na cāhetukaṃ yuktam, nityaṃ sattvādiprasaṅgāt /	if it were without cause, it would be there at all times;
tasmād yadi janmāntaraṃ {na}bhavet teṣām rāgādīnāṃ paṭūnāṃ janmanaḥutpatteḥ, ko hetuḥ syāt /	hence if another life were not there, what could be the cause of the strength of the said feelings of Love, Hatred, etc.? Hence the conclusion is that the habitual repetition during past lives is the cause of the said strength of the feelings;
tasmāj janmāntarīya evābhyāso hetur iti siddhaḥ paralokaḥ /	and thus the ‘other world’ becomes established. The external objective excitant cannot be the cause of the feelings in question;
nacālambanaṃ kāraṇam, ālambanasya bhāve 'pi rāgādīnāṃ kadācid aśubhādipratisaṅkhyānasadbhāve satyanutpatteḥ /	because in many cases, even when these excitants are there, the feelings of Love, etc. do not appear at all, if there happen to be present a feeling of Disgust against the evil character of the things.
aśubhādyālambanā rāgādipratipakṣabhūtā prajñā pratisaṅkhyānam /	The term ‘pratisaṅkhyāna’, ‘disgust’ stands for that counter-feeling against Love, etc., which is based upon the idea of evil.
asatyālambane rāgādīnām utpattidarśanān na yukta ālambanavaśāt tadbhāvaḥ /	Sometimes, even when the excitant is not there, the said feelings of Love, etc. actually appear. Hence the presence of the feelings cannot be due to the presence of the excitants.
tathā hi atītānāgate 'pi viṣaye saṅkalpavaśād abhivṛddhasukhādiviparyāsasya puṃsaḥ pratisaṅkhyānanivṛttau teṣāṃ rāgādīnāṃ prabalatvaṃ dṛśyate /	Then again, even in regard to past and future things, the feelings are found to be strong in the man in whom the feeling of Disgust has ceased, and feelings due to the absence of pleasure have become intensified through strong desire.
nahi yadbhāvābhāvayor yasya bhāvābhāvāviparyayas tat tasya kāraṇaṃ yuktam atiprasaṅgāt /	And when there is no change in the presence or absence of a certain thing, or the presence or absence of another thing, the one cannot be the cause of the other;
ito 'pi nālambanavaśād bhāvādīnāṃ pravṛttiḥ / tathā hi yadi yathālambanam eva pravarterannevamālambanavaśāt pravṛttāḥ syur yathā nīlādijñānaṃ na caivaṃ pravartante /	For the following reason also, the feelings of Love, etc. cannot be due to the presence of the excitants: Because, if the feelings appeared exactly in accordance with the excitants, they would proceed from the excitant exactly in the same manner as the Cognition of Blue and other things (which always proceeds in accordance with these things); the feelings however do not proceed in this way;
kiṃ tarhi ātmīyanityasukhādyākārānanubhūtānevāropayanto 'ṅganādiṣu pravartante /	on the contrary, the said feelings appear in regard to the Woman and other things, in men who attribute to the woman the form of their own lasting pleasure, etc. which have not been experienced at ail;
na ca śubhādirūpā viṣayāḥ / na ca yadyadākāraśūnyaṃ tat tasyālambanaṃ yuktam atiprasaṅgāt /	and yet the objects (woman, etc.) are not actually possessed of the said form of goodness, etc. and when a thing is devoid of a certain form, it cannot be the excitant or basis of the Cognition of that form;
tat tasmād āropitaviṣayatvena nirālambanā rāgādayaḥ / tataś ca siddhamādyāḥ prathamabhāvino 'pīha janmani ye rāgādayas te sajātīyābhyāsavaśāt pravartanta iti //1948-	‘Tat’ i.e. for these reasons, the feelings of Love, etc. as pertaining to imposed things must be regarded as devoid of an objective basis (or excitant); and from this it follows that the said feelings of Love, etc., when they appear for the first time during present life, proceed from the repeated experience of similar feelings in the past.
viṣayopanipāte tu sukhaduḥkhādisambhavāḥ /	When the objects are present, there appear pleasure, etc.;
tasmāt samānajātīyavāsanāparipākajāḥ // rāgadveṣādayaḥ kleśāḥ pratisaṅkhyānavidviṣām / ayoniśonama{saumanaḥ---}skāravidheyānāṃ yathābalam //	from this pleasure, etc. proceed the ‘afflictions’ of love, hate and the rest, being the outcome of the fruition of the impressions left by similar past feelings, in men who are devoid of wisdom and are subject to evil propensities (?) In accordance with the potency of things.
sākṣāt tu viṣayā naiva rāgadveṣādihetavaḥ /	Directly, the objects are not the cause of the feelings;
ekaḥ kleśo hi tatra syāt sarveṣāṃ tasya bodhavat //	if they were, a single affliction would be the cause of them all, in regard to the object, like the cognition of things.
eṣa hi kramaḥ viṣayopanipāte satīndriyajaṃ sukham utpadyate /	The process is as follows: When the Object is present, there appears pleasure born of the sense-organ concerned;
tasmāc ca sukhāt pratisaṅkhyānavaikalye satyāsmādiviparyāsalakṣaṇāyo 'niśo{sau---}manaskāre sthitānāṃ [p.548] pūrvarāgādyāhitavāsanāparipāko bhavati tato rāgādayaḥ kleśāḥ pravartanta iti na sākṣād viṣayāḥ kāraṇam /	from this Pleasure, proceed the ‘Afflictions’ of Love, etc., in men devoid of wisdom (and dispassion) and subject to evil propensities and tendencies, out of the fruition of the Impressions left by the previously experienced feelings of Love, etc.; so that the Objects are not the direct cause of the feelings.
syād etat svarāddhāntopavarṇanamātrameva kevalam, natvatra kācidyuktirityāha eka ityādi /	The following might be urged: “You are only expounding your own doctrine; you state no reasons”. The answer to this is ‘A single Affliction, etc. etc.’.
eka iti ekākāraḥ /	‘Single’ i.e. of a single kind.
tatreti viṣaye / tasyeti viṣayasya /	‘Tatra’ in regard to the object. ‘Tasya’ of the object.
bodhavad iti / nīlādigrāhakākāravat /	‘Like the Cognition of things’ i.e. like the Cognition apprehending the form of the Blue and other things.
nacaikākāras tatra kleśaḥ pravartate /	As a matter of fact however, a single ‘Affliction’ is not what actually appears;
tathā hi ekasmin strīrūpe kasyacid rāgaḥ kasyacid dveṣaḥ kasyacidīrṣyetyanekākārasya pravṛttir dṛśyate //1954-	for instance, in regard to the single object in the shape of the body of the Woman, while in one man the feeling aroused is that of Love, in another it is Hate, while in yet another, mere jealousy; so that there are several kinds of ‘Afflictions’ (Feelings) that appear.
syād etan na pūrvābhyāsādiha janmanyādyarāgādayaḥ / kiṃ tarhianyeṣāṃ maithunādisamācāradarśanāt paropadeśādvetyāha anyavṛttyupalambhenetyādi /	The appearance of the feelings cannot be due either to the perception of the doings of others, or to hearing of things from other persons; because such is not found to be the case always. The following might be urged: “The feelings of Love, etc. that appear during the present life cannot be the effect of repeated experience in the past;
anyavṛttyupalambhena parebhyaḥ śravaṇena vā /	they arise either from the seeing of the actual act done by others, or from the advice of other persons”.
anyeṣāṃ vṛttiścaritam iti yāvat //	This is answered in the following [see verse 1957 above] ‘Vṛtti’ stands for doings.
adṛṣṭetyādinā tameva vyabhicāraṃ darśayati /	The following text shows how that is not found to be the case always: [see verse 1958 next]
adṛṣṭāśrutavṛttāntā varāhahariṇādayaḥ / sabhāgagatisamparke prayāntyeva hi vikriyām //	Boars, bucks and other animals, who have never seen or heard of the doings, become perturbed at the touch of females of their own kind.

syād eṣā mandanetrasya svaccha{lpa---}dhūmādyadṛṣṭivat //

The answer to that is as follows: [see verses 1937-1938 above]

ayam atrābhiprāyaḥ paraloko 'tra sādhayitumiṣṭaḥ sa ca kathaṃ siddhyati yadibuddhir anādyanantā siddhyet /

What is meant is as follows: What is meant to be proved is the existence of the ‘other world’; and how can it be proved? It can be proved if it is shown that Consciousness is without beginning and without end;

asyā evāvasthāviśeṣaḥ paralokaprajñaptau /

as it is only an aspect of Consciousness that figures in the Idea of the ‘other world’;

na tu dehe āru{rū---}pyadhātau dehābhāve 'pi paralokābhyupagamāt /

this Idea cannot subsist in the Body, which is a material object with a shape; as the ‘other world’ is held to be there even when the Body is not there.

sā cec cittasantatir anādyanantā siddhā siddho naḥ paraloka iti nānyadehasiddhaye yatnaḥ kriyate 'smābhir niṣphalatvāt /

If the ‘Chain of Cognitions’ is proved to be without beginning and without end, then the existence of our ‘other World’ also becomes proved. Hence we do not put forth any effort towards proving the existence of the other Body; as it would be useless.

naca tasyādṛṣṭimātreṇa niṣedhaḥ śakyate kartum /

Simply because the other body is not seen, it cannot be denied;

tathā hyeṣādṛṣṭir jātiviśeṣe bhāvanādivaikalyān mandanetrasya bhavataḥ satyapi tasmin dehe syād api nanu brūmo '{tanudhūmā---darśanavad iti nānupalabdhimātreṇa pratiṣedhaḥ siddhyati /

as this not-seeing may be due to the absence of necessary attention, as happens in the case of the man with defective eyesight, even though the body may be there all right; as it happens when there is a scanty line of smoke; so that mere non-perception does not prove non-existence.

tathā hi sajātiśuddhadivyākṣadṛśyottarābhavo varṇyate /

In fact a subsequent body is described as actually perceived by persons of pure birth and super-normal vision.

ata eva sāṅkhyaparikalpitātivāhikaśarīrasyāpyapratikṣepaḥ /

For these same reasons, there can be no denial of the ‘migratory body’ (Liṅgaśarīra) postulated by the Sāṃkhya.

pūrvakālabhavasyāpi deśaviprakarṣannopalambhaḥ syāt dūrataradeśotpatteḥ svabhāvaviprakarṣād vā piśācādidehavat / aviprakarṣe 'pyarvāgdarśinā so 'yaṃ prāṇī pataṅgādyātmatāṃ gata iti niścetumaśakyatvāt /

In the case of the previously-born body also, it is just possible that, there may be non-perception due to the remoteness of place; due either to its being produced at a remote place, or to the difference in its character, as in the case of Ghosts and Goblins. Even when the bodies are not remote, people with normal vision can never cognise with certainty that it is such and such a being who has become born as a bird;

acintyaśaktibhaiṣajyopayogena parāvṛttadehavat //1937-

just as there is no recognition in cases where the body is changed by means of the use of medicines with unthinkable potency.

kathaṃ tarhi bhinnāśrayāśrayāṇi jñānānyekasantānasambaddhānyucyanta ity āha bhinnadehāśritatve 'pīti /

Question: “How is it then that Cognitions appearing in different substrata are spoken of as belonging to the same Chain?”

[p.544]

Answer: [see verses 1939-1941 next]

tadviśeṣānukārata iti / tasya janmāntaravartino jñānasya yo viśeṣas tamanukurvantyaihikāni jñānāni /

‘By reason of the later Cognition, etc. etc.’ That, is, the Cognitions of the present life appear with the same peculiarities as the Cognitions of the previous life.

tathā coktam "abhyāsayogena śubhāśubhāni karmāṇi sātmyena bhavanti puṃsām /

This has been thus declared ‘Through repeated practice, good and evil deeds appear in the nature of men;

yadaprayatnena vinopadeśājjanmāntare svapna ivācaranti" /

and these same appear in future lives, without any instruction, like a dream’.

tatra yaduktaṃ cārvākeṇa ihalokaparalokaśarīrayor bhinnatvāt tadgatayor api cittayor naikaḥ santāna ityādi /

The Materialist has argued as follows: “The Body in this world and the Body in the ‘other world’ being entirely different, the Chain of the Cognitions in those two bodies cannot be one and the same;

garbhādau prathamaṃ vijñānaṃ vivādagocarāpannaikasantānikaṃ na bhavati bhinnaśarīratvān mahiṣavarāhādivijñānavad iti /

so that the first Cognition that appears in the Foetus cannot belong to the same Chain as the Cognition under dispute, because they belong to different bodies, like the Cognitions of the Buffalo, the Boar and other animals”,

tadanena pratikṣiptaṃ bhavati /

This also becomes refuted by what has been said above.

apica ito 'pi paralokaḥ siddhaḥ / tathā hi yo yo vikalpaḥ sa śabdānubhavābhyāsapūrvakaḥ vikalpatvāt yauvanādyavasthābhāvivikalpavat /

Then again, for the following reason also the existence of the ‘other world’ should be admitted: Every Conceptual Cognition is preceded by the repeated Cognition of words, because it is Conceptual, like the Conceptual Thoughts occurring in youth and old age;

vikalpapaścāyaṃ sadyojātānāṃ stanapānādyabhilāṣadivikalpa iti svabhāvahetuḥ /

the Conceptual Cognition involved in the desire for sucking the breast and so forth appearing in newborn infants is Conceptual; hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.

nacāśrayāsiddho hetuḥ /

The Reason cannot be said to be one which has an unadmitted substratum;

yato uditastanapānādikāryeṇāsau sadyojātānāṃ stanapānādyabhilāṣādir

because the existence of the Minor Term in the shape of the desire for sucking the breast, etc., is proved by such effects in newborn infants as crying and actual breast-sucking;

nahi śa{ra---}ktir vidveṣādirūpeṇāvikalpayato ruditastanapānādisambhavo yuktaḥ /

such crying and breast-sucking cannot be possible in one who has no conception of liking and disliking.

nāpi svarūpāsiddha iti pratipādayati sa ca sarvo vikalpātmeti / saḥ stanapānābhilāṣādiḥ / sarvo vikalpātmā vikalpasvabhāvaḥ /

Nor is the Reason ‘inadmissible by itself’; this is shown by the words ‘all this is of the nature of Conceptual, etc. etc. All this’ i.e. the desire for breast-sucking, etc, is of the nature of Conceptual Thought;

prārthanādyākāratayānubhūyamānatvāt /

because it is apprehended as something sought after.

nāpyanaikāntika iti darśayann āha sa ca nāmānuṣaṅgavāniti / sa iti vikalpaḥ /

That the Reason is not ‘Inconclusive’ is shown by the words ‘is associated with names ‘Saḥ’ stands for Conceptual Cognition.

yasmāt sarvo vikalpaḥ śabdollekhena pravṛtter nāmānuṣaktaḥ / sa ca nāmānuṣaṅgo vikalpasya saṅketābhyāsamantareṇa na sambhavatīti pūrvaṃ vistareṇa pratipāditam asmābhiḥ //1939-

Inasmuch as Conceptual Cognition is associated with verbal expression, it is said to be ‘associated with names’, This ‘association with names’, of the Conceptual Cognition is not possible without repeated Convention; as has been explained by us already in detail.

athāpi syād bhavatu nāma nāmānuṣaṅgo 'bhyāsapūrvakas tathāpyasau neṣṭaprasādhanaḥ /

The following might be urged: “There may be association with names due to repeated practice;

kiṃ tarhiaihalaukikābhyāsapūrvatvam eva viparītaṃ sādhayatītyāha nanāmarūpam ityādi /

in fact, it only proves the contrary, i.e. the fact of being preceded (and produced) by repeated practice during the present life.”

etad uktaṃ bhavati /

The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 1942 above]

[p.545] tannāmetyādinā yathoktaṃ pramāṇārtham upasaṃharati

The following Text sums up the purport of the above arguments: [see verse 1943 above]

taditi tasmād ity arthaḥ //

‘Tat’ stands for ‘tasmāt’, ‘For these reasons’.

yannāmetyādinā pramāṇaphalaṃ darśayati

The following text describes the upshot of the above arguments: [see verse 1944 above]

nāmnaḥ śabdasya saṃstavaḥ paricayo 'nubhava iti yāvat, tasyābhyāsaḥ punar utpādaḥ / yasmin bhave nāmasambhavābhyāso yannāmasambhavābhyāsa iti, saptamīti yogavibhāgāt samāsaḥ /

‘Name’ verbal expression. ‘Cognition’ apprehension, knowledge; ‘abhyāsa’, repeated appearance. The compound ‘yannāma, etc, etc,’ is to be expounded as ‘that birth during which there has been repeated cognition of the Name’, this compound being in accordance with a particular rule (of Pāṇini’s) ‘Saptamī, etc.’;

tenāhitā yā vāsanā tasyāḥ paripākaḥ svānurūpaḥ kāryotpādane vṛttilābhaḥ tato jāta iti vyutpattikramaḥ /

these Impressions have this ‘fruition’, development, attainment of their full character, by producing their effects; and it is from this ‘fruition’ that the said Conceptual Cognition is born.

teṣām iti / sadyojātānām //

‘Of the said persons’ i.e. of new-born infaṇts.

nāmābhyāsetyādinā parakīyaṃ prasaṅgasādhanam āśaṅkate ---

The following Text sets forth the opponent’s Reductio ad absurdum argument against the above view: [see verse 1945 above]

yadi pūrvasaṅketābhyāsād vikalpasya pravṛttis tadā bāladārakasya pūrvasaṅketānusmaraṇaprasaṅgaḥ /

“If the Conceptual Cognition proceeds from the repeated Cognition of the Convention during previous lives, then the newborn child should have remembrance of the past Convention;

nahyabhyāsānuvṛttiḥ smaraṇamantareṇa yuktā /

because the continuity of a habit could not be possible without remembrance;

vāgminām iva vispaṣṭavākpravṛttiprasaṅgaś ca /

also the child should have clear speech like eloquent speakers;

tataś ca saṅketakaraṇānarthakyaṃ syāt / na caivaṃ bhavati / tasmāt smaraṇābhāvāt, vispaṣṭavāco 'pravṛtteś ca, pūrvābhyāsapūrvatvaṃ

and in that case, there would be no need for the setting up of any Conventions during the present life, And yet none of these things happens, Hence it follows that, as there is no Remembrance, and there is no clear speech, the idea that the Conceptual Cognition is preceded and produced by repeated Cognition is incompatible with facts”.

viruddham iti prasaṅgaviparyayeṇa dharmasvarūpanirākaraṇamukhena pratijñādoṣam āha //

By means of this Reductio ad absurdum, which rejects the very nature of the Major Term, the Opponent shows that the final Conclusion (of the Buddhist) is defective.

paṭīyasetyādinā prasaṅgaviparyaye ca hetor anaikāntikatvam āha

In the following Text, the author points out that the Reason put forward iṇ this Reductio ad absurdum is ‘Inconclusive’ (Doubtful);

na syādāsām iyaṃ vṛttiḥ sannipātadaśāsviva //

[see verse 1946 above]

nahi pūrvābhyāsaḥ sarvadā smaraṇādinā vyāpto yena smaraṇādikaṃ pravartayet /

As a matter of fact, Repeated Cognition is not invariably concomitant with Remembrance, etc.; by virtue of which concomitance it should always produce the said Remembrance;

tannivṛttau vā nivarteta /

or should cease on the cessation of the same.

tathā svapne 'pi pūrvābhyāsānuvṛttir bhaven na ca smaraṇam /

Because it is quite possible that there may be continuance of the previous habit, and yet there may be no Remembrance.

sannipātagrahaṇam upalakṣaṇam /

The mention of the ‘high complicated fever’ is only by way of illustration.

patīyaseti / garbhaparivāsāt /

‘Powerful impediments’ due to existence in the mother’s womb.

paripākākulatvata iti / [p.546] vāsanāparipākasyākulatvam /

‘The development becomes hampered’ That is the full development of the Impressions becomes hampered;

yathānubhūtapratiniyatadeśakālasvabhāvādibhedarūpeṇāpravṛttiḥ /

i.e. it does not proceed in exact accordance with the peculiarities of the particular place, time and character of things as previously cognised.

tatra yaduktaṃ cārvākeṇa jātismaraṇamasiddham /

This answers the following argument of the Materialist: “Remembrance of previous birth cannot be admitted;

ekagrāmāgatānāṃ sarveṣāṃ smaraṇād iti /

because there is Remembrance of all men coming from the same village”.

tathā hi ekagrāmāgatā api sarve na smaranti /

The fact of the matter is that even those coming from the same village do not have the Remembrance;

yatas tatra kecana teṣāṃ madhye ye mandamatayas te muṣitasmṛtayo bhavantyeva /

as among them there are some who are dull-witted who lose their memory.

āsāmiti vācām //

‘Tāsām’ stands for the words, speech.

svalpīyānapi yeṣāṃ tu nopaghāto mahātmanām / śrūyante visphuṭā vācas teṣāṃ sā ca smṛtiḥ sphuṭā //

In the case of those high-souled men, where there is not the slightest impediment, clear speech is actually heard and they do have clear remembrance of them also.

mahātmanām iti / puṇyavatām //

‘High-souled men’ Men of exceptionally pure life.

punar api paralokasiddhāvupapattyantaram āha rāgadveṣādayaścetyādi /

As a matter of fact, all these feelings of love, hatred and the rest become strong through habit and repetition, as has been ascertained by positive and negative concomitance.

ihatyābhyāsarahitās te ye prathamabhāvinaḥ /

These feelings, appearing for the first time (in the child), are entirely devoid of any habit and repetition during the present life;

ko hetor janmanas teṣāṃ yadi na syād bhavāntaram // na hyālambanasānnidhyās teṣāṃ janmopapadyate / pratisaṅkhyānasadbhāve tadbhāve 'pyatadudbhavāt //

what then is the cause of their appearance, if there is no other life? Their appearance cannot be due to the presence of their (external) excitants; because even when these excitants are present, the feelings in question do not appear, if there is disgust;

pratisaṅkhyānivṛttau ca teṣāṃ prābalyadarśanāt / naṣṭājātepi viṣaye viparyāsābhivṛddhitaḥ {naḥ---} //

and when this disgust ceases, they are found to be strong, even in connection with past and future things, when the counterfeelings appear in intensified form.

śubhātmīyasthirādīṃś ca samāropyāṅganādiṣu / rāgādayaḥ pravartante tadrūpā viṣayā naca //

The feelings of love, hatred and the rest are found to proceed in regard to women and other things, when the man attributes to them goodness, devotedness and constancy and so forth; even though these qualities may not be actually there.

tadanālambanā eva sadṛśābhyāsaśaktitaḥ / ihatyā api vartante rāgāditvādyathottare //

For these reasons, these feelings appearing in this life must be regarded as appearing, without the excitants being actually present, through the force of the habitual appearance of similar feelings in the past, because they are feelings of love, etc., like these same feelings appearing subsequently.

prayogaḥ rāgadveṣerṣyāmadamānādīnāṃ tathā prajñākaruṇāmaitryadīnāñca yat pāṭavaṃ tadabhyāsapūrvakam, yathehaiva janmani paṭumandayathoktaguṇasyapuruṣasyābhyāsavaśād dṛṣṭam /

The argument may be thus formulated: The strength of the feelings of Love, Hatred, Jealousy, Haughtiness and Pride, etc., as also Wisdom, Compassion, Sympathy and so forth is due to habitual practice; just as during the present life, it is found in men possessed of the varying degrees' of these feelings;

asti dehādāvatra janmani teṣu teṣvadṛṣṭaihalaukikābhyāsasyāpi kasyacit puruṣasya tat pāṭavam iti kāryahetuḥ /

during the present life, there is in the Body, etc. of a man, a degree of strength of the feelings, which is not due to any such practice during the present life; so this is a Reason based upon the relation of cause and effect.

anvayavyatirekābhyāṃ kāryakāraṇabhāvasya niścitatvād iti nāsiddho hetuḥ /

As all such relations of cause and effect are determined by positive and negative concomitance, the Reason cannot be said to be ‘inadmissible’.

ata evāha anvayavyatirekābhyāṃ bhavantaḥ pariniścitā iti /

This is what is meant by the words ‘Ascertained by positive, etc. etc.’.

[p.547] aparalaukikābhyāsapūrvatvasādhanād viruddho hetur iti cen na /

It cannot be urged that “the Reason is ‘contradictory’, as cited in proof of the fact of the feelings due to habitual repetition during other lives

ihatyābhyāsarahitās te ye prathamabhāvinaḥ paṭavo rāgādaya ityayuktam aparalaukikābhyāsapūrvatvasādhanam /

What is meant is that these feelings as appearing for the first time during the present life have not been habitually repeated during this life; this may not be a Reason directly proving the fact of these feelings being due to habitual practice during previous lives;

na cāhetukaṃ yuktam, nityaṃ sattvādiprasaṅgāt /

if it were without cause, it would be there at all times;

tasmād yadi janmāntaraṃ {na}bhavet teṣām rāgādīnāṃ paṭūnāṃ janmanaḥutpatteḥ, ko hetuḥ syāt /

hence if another life were not there, what could be the cause of the strength of the said feelings of Love, Hatred, etc.? Hence the conclusion is that the habitual repetition during past lives is the cause of the said strength of the feelings;

tasmāj janmāntarīya evābhyāso hetur iti siddhaḥ paralokaḥ /

and thus the ‘other world’ becomes established. The external objective excitant cannot be the cause of the feelings in question;

nacālambanaṃ kāraṇam, ālambanasya bhāve 'pi rāgādīnāṃ kadācid aśubhādipratisaṅkhyānasadbhāve satyanutpatteḥ /

because in many cases, even when these excitants are there, the feelings of Love, etc. do not appear at all, if there happen to be present a feeling of Disgust against the evil character of the things.

aśubhādyālambanā rāgādipratipakṣabhūtā prajñā pratisaṅkhyānam /

The term ‘pratisaṅkhyāna’, ‘disgust’ stands for that counter-feeling against Love, etc., which is based upon the idea of evil.

asatyālambane rāgādīnām utpattidarśanān na yukta ālambanavaśāt tadbhāvaḥ /

Sometimes, even when the excitant is not there, the said feelings of Love, etc. actually appear. Hence the presence of the feelings cannot be due to the presence of the excitants.

tathā hi atītānāgate 'pi viṣaye saṅkalpavaśād abhivṛddhasukhādiviparyāsasya puṃsaḥ pratisaṅkhyānanivṛttau teṣāṃ rāgādīnāṃ prabalatvaṃ dṛśyate /

Then again, even in regard to past and future things, the feelings are found to be strong in the man in whom the feeling of Disgust has ceased, and feelings due to the absence of pleasure have become intensified through strong desire.

nahi yadbhāvābhāvayor yasya bhāvābhāvāviparyayas tat tasya kāraṇaṃ yuktam atiprasaṅgāt /

And when there is no change in the presence or absence of a certain thing, or the presence or absence of another thing, the one cannot be the cause of the other;

ito 'pi nālambanavaśād bhāvādīnāṃ pravṛttiḥ / tathā hi yadi yathālambanam eva pravarterannevamālambanavaśāt pravṛttāḥ syur yathā nīlādijñānaṃ na caivaṃ pravartante /

For the following reason also, the feelings of Love, etc. cannot be due to the presence of the excitants: Because, if the feelings appeared exactly in accordance with the excitants, they would proceed from the excitant exactly in the same manner as the Cognition of Blue and other things (which always proceeds in accordance with these things); the feelings however do not proceed in this way;

kiṃ tarhi ātmīyanityasukhādyākārānanubhūtānevāropayanto 'ṅganādiṣu pravartante /

on the contrary, the said feelings appear in regard to the Woman and other things, in men who attribute to the woman the form of their own lasting pleasure, etc. which have not been experienced at ail;

na ca śubhādirūpā viṣayāḥ / na ca yadyadākāraśūnyaṃ tat tasyālambanaṃ yuktam atiprasaṅgāt /

and yet the objects (woman, etc.) are not actually possessed of the said form of goodness, etc. and when a thing is devoid of a certain form, it cannot be the excitant or basis of the Cognition of that form;

tat tasmād āropitaviṣayatvena nirālambanā rāgādayaḥ / tataś ca siddhamādyāḥ prathamabhāvino 'pīha janmani ye rāgādayas te sajātīyābhyāsavaśāt pravartanta iti //1948-

‘Tat’ i.e. for these reasons, the feelings of Love, etc. as pertaining to imposed things must be regarded as devoid of an objective basis (or excitant); and from this it follows that the said feelings of Love, etc., when they appear for the first time during present life, proceed from the repeated experience of similar feelings in the past.

viṣayopanipāte tu sukhaduḥkhādisambhavāḥ /

When the objects are present, there appear pleasure, etc.;

tasmāt samānajātīyavāsanāparipākajāḥ // rāgadveṣādayaḥ kleśāḥ pratisaṅkhyānavidviṣām / ayoniśonama{saumanaḥ---}skāravidheyānāṃ yathābalam //

from this pleasure, etc. proceed the ‘afflictions’ of love, hate and the rest, being the outcome of the fruition of the impressions left by similar past feelings, in men who are devoid of wisdom and are subject to evil propensities (?) In accordance with the potency of things.

sākṣāt tu viṣayā naiva rāgadveṣādihetavaḥ /

Directly, the objects are not the cause of the feelings;

ekaḥ kleśo hi tatra syāt sarveṣāṃ tasya bodhavat //

if they were, a single affliction would be the cause of them all, in regard to the object, like the cognition of things.

eṣa hi kramaḥ viṣayopanipāte satīndriyajaṃ sukham utpadyate /

The process is as follows: When the Object is present, there appears pleasure born of the sense-organ concerned;

tasmāc ca sukhāt pratisaṅkhyānavaikalye satyāsmādiviparyāsalakṣaṇāyo 'niśo{sau---}manaskāre sthitānāṃ [p.548] pūrvarāgādyāhitavāsanāparipāko bhavati tato rāgādayaḥ kleśāḥ pravartanta iti na sākṣād viṣayāḥ kāraṇam /

from this Pleasure, proceed the ‘Afflictions’ of Love, etc., in men devoid of wisdom (and dispassion) and subject to evil propensities and tendencies, out of the fruition of the Impressions left by the previously experienced feelings of Love, etc.; so that the Objects are not the direct cause of the feelings.

syād etat svarāddhāntopavarṇanamātrameva kevalam, natvatra kācidyuktirityāha eka ityādi /

The following might be urged: “You are only expounding your own doctrine; you state no reasons”. The answer to this is ‘A single Affliction, etc. etc.’.

eka iti ekākāraḥ /

‘Single’ i.e. of a single kind.

tatreti viṣaye / tasyeti viṣayasya /

‘Tatra’ in regard to the object. ‘Tasya’ of the object.

bodhavad iti / nīlādigrāhakākāravat /

‘Like the Cognition of things’ i.e. like the Cognition apprehending the form of the Blue and other things.

nacaikākāras tatra kleśaḥ pravartate /

As a matter of fact however, a single ‘Affliction’ is not what actually appears;

tathā hi ekasmin strīrūpe kasyacid rāgaḥ kasyacid dveṣaḥ kasyacidīrṣyetyanekākārasya pravṛttir dṛśyate //1954-

for instance, in regard to the single object in the shape of the body of the Woman, while in one man the feeling aroused is that of Love, in another it is Hate, while in yet another, mere jealousy; so that there are several kinds of ‘Afflictions’ (Feelings) that appear.

syād etan na pūrvābhyāsādiha janmanyādyarāgādayaḥ / kiṃ tarhianyeṣāṃ maithunādisamācāradarśanāt paropadeśādvetyāha anyavṛttyupalambhenetyādi /

The appearance of the feelings cannot be due either to the perception of the doings of others, or to hearing of things from other persons; because such is not found to be the case always. The following might be urged: “The feelings of Love, etc. that appear during the present life cannot be the effect of repeated experience in the past;

anyavṛttyupalambhena parebhyaḥ śravaṇena vā /

they arise either from the seeing of the actual act done by others, or from the advice of other persons”.

anyeṣāṃ vṛttiścaritam iti yāvat //

This is answered in the following [see verse 1957 above] ‘Vṛtti’ stands for doings.

adṛṣṭetyādinā tameva vyabhicāraṃ darśayati /

The following text shows how that is not found to be the case always: [see verse 1958 next]

adṛṣṭāśrutavṛttāntā varāhahariṇādayaḥ / sabhāgagatisamparke prayāntyeva hi vikriyām //

Boars, bucks and other animals, who have never seen or heard of the doings, become perturbed at the touch of females of their own kind.