buddhist-nlp/tatpa-noisy · Datasets at Hugging Face

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yena sadyo jāto 'pi vānarādiśiśuravapātapatanaprabhavaduḥkhān maraṇabhīto mātur atīva kroḍamāśliṣyate prapātādisthānaṃ ca pariharati /	and yet even the newborn young of the monkey becomes afraid of death and the suffering caused by falling from a height, and, on account of that fear, clings more strongly to the mother’s arms; and also avoid the place where there is a precipice.
na hyananubhūteṣṭāniṣṭasādhanaphalāni niyamena jihāsantyupāditsantevātiprasaṅgāt / ayaso 'yaskāntāpasarpaṇadṛṣṭānto 'pyayukta eva nahi tannirhetukaṃ sarvadā sattvādiprasaṅgāt /	Until people have had some actual experience of things bringing pleasure or pain, they never invariably seek to obtain the one and avoid the other. If they did, there would be an absurdity, The example of the Iron being drawn to the Magnet cannot be properly cited in this connection; because that attraction is not without cause;
sahetukatve vā yathā tasya hetur ayaskānto nirdiśyate 'nvayavyatirekasiddhas tathāsyāpi hānopādānānuṣṭhānasya hetur bhāvyaḥ /	If then it has a cause, it is the Magnet that is pointed out to be the cause on the basis of positive and negative concomitance; and some similar cause will have to be found for the action of the child in securing and avoiding certain things.
nacāsau nirdeṣṭuṃ śakyate anyatrābhyāsāt /	No such cause can be indicated, apart from repeated experience.
tasmāt pūrvābhyāsakṛta evāyaṃ bālānām iṣṭāniṣṭopādānaparityāgalakṣaṇo vyavahāra iti siddhā buddher anāditetyabhiprāyaḥ /	Hence it becomes established that the action of children in seeking to obtain and avoiding certain things is due to repeated past experience; and that, on this account, the Cognition must be without beiginning.
tathāca svatantrā mānasītyādinā apica stanapānādāvityādinā ca sādhāraṇaṃ dūṣaṇaṃ vakṣyatītyalaṃ bahunā /	It is for these reasons that the author is going to indicate other objections applicable in common (to all the views of the Materialists) under Texts 1930 and 1940 below, Hence we desist from further details.
kiṃ ca teṣām cārvākāṇāṃ kṣaṇikatvam abhyupagacchatām svopagamaḥ svasiddhānto bādhyate bhūtānāṃ nityatvābhyupagamo bā{dhyate} //1886-	Further, if the Cārvākas admit the momentary character of things, then their own doctrine, that Material substances are everlasting becomes upset.
[p.533]	[The materialist might say] “Let the doctrine be upset;
yadi nyāyānurāgādvaḥ svapakṣe 'pyanapekṣatā / bhūtānyeva na santīti nyāyo 'yaṃ para iṣyatām //	If your love for reason is so great that you have no regard for your own doctrine, then you should accept also the more reasonable view that ‘primary elemental substances do not exist at all’.
atha yuktyupetatvāt kṣaṇikatvamabhyupagamyate tadā vijñaptimātratānayastarhi para utkṛṣṭo 'bhyupagamyatāṃ, tatrāpi yuktyupetatvasyābhyupagamakāraṇasya tulyatvāt //	If you accept the momentary character of things, because it is in accordance with Reason, then you should accept the doctrine that ‘Ideas alone exist’, which is still more reasonable; because reasonableness, which is your criterion for acceptance, is present in this case also.
katham ity āha nāvayavyātmatetyādi /	Question: “How so?” Answer: [see verse 1889 next]
nāvayavyātmatā teṣāṃ nāpi yuktāṇurūpatā /	The primary elemental substances cannot exist in the form of composite wholes, nor in the form of atoms;
ayogāt paramāṇūnām ityetad abhidhāsyate //	because there can be no conjunction of atoms, as is going to be explained.
teṣām iti / mahābhūtānām /	‘Teṣām’ of the Primary Elemental Substances.
abhidhāsyata iti samanantaram eva bahirarthaparīkṣāyām //	‘Going to be explained’, under the next chapter on the Examination of the ‘External World’.
yadi na santyeva bhūtāni kathaṃ tarhi pratibhāsanta ity āha abahistattvarūpāṇītyādinā /	Question: “If the said elements do not exist, then how is it that they figure in Cognitions?” Answer: [see verse 1890 next]
abahistattvarūpāṇi vāsanāparipākataḥ / vijñāne pratibhāsante svapnādāviva nānyataḥ //	Not having any real external form, they figure in cognitions only through the fruition of dispositions; just as during dreams;
anyata iti /	they do not appear anywhere else.
vijñānādanyatra bāhya iti yāvat //	‘Anywhere else’, i.e. apart from Cognition.
kathaṃ tarhi pṛthivītyādivyavahāro lokaśāstrayor ity āha vijñānasyaivetyādi /	Question: “How then is it that people and the scriptures speak of the Earth and other Elemental Substances?” Answer: [see verse 1891 next]
vijñānasyaiva nirbhāsaṃ samāśritya prakalpyate / svapnamāyopamaṃ nedaṃ mahābhūtacatuṣṭayam //	All these four primary elemental substances are assumed on the basis of what appears in cognition, just like breams and illusions. and they have no real existence.
yadi bhūtāni na santi kastarhi jñānaheturityāha tadanyasyetyādi /	Question: “If the elemental substances do not exist, then what is the basis of the Cognition (of these)?”
tadanyasya tadābhāve hetutvaṃ nopapadyate /	It is not possible that what is something different from the cognation should figure in it;
prāgbhūtaṃ bhūtanirbhāsaṃ jñānaṃ tu janayet param // tadanyasyeti /	it is only a previous cognition envisaging the substances that could produce another such cognition.
tasmād vijñānād anyasya bhūtacatuṣṭayasya //	‘Tadanyasya’ something different from the Cognition, in the shape of the four elemental substances.
yadi tat kimupādānaṃ sahakāryathavāsya kim // upādānamabhīṣṭaṃ cet tanayajñānasantatau / pitroḥ śrutādisaṃskāraviśeṣānugamo bhavet //	If the cognition in some other ‘chain’ be held to be the cause (of the first cognition), then (the question is) is that the ‘material cause’ of it, or the ‘contributory cause’? If it is meant to be the material cause, then the learning and culture of the parents should continue in the child’s ‘chain of cognitions’;
upādānatadādeyadharmo 'pi yadvyavasthitaḥ / anvayavyatirekābhyāṃ niścitaś ca svasantatau // svopādānabalodbhūte sahakāritvakalpane /	that such is the nature of the material cause and its effect has been ascertained, through positive and negative concomitance, in connection with one’s own ‘chain if, on the other hand, the cognition of the other ‘chain’ be assumed to be the ‘contributory cause’, of the first cognition, on the basis of its own material cause, then there would be nothing wrong in it.
santānāntaracittasya na kācid vyāhatir bhavet //	It has thus been proved that the first Cognition after birth cannot proceed from any material substance.
tat santānāntaracittaṃ mātrādisambandhi upādānakāraṇaṃ vā syāt, sahakārikāraṇaṃ, vā na tāvad upādānakāraṇaṃ putrajñānasantāne 'pi mātāpitṛśrutādisaṃskārādiviśeṣānutpa{vru---}ttiprasaṅgāt yathā pitroreva svottarabuddhiṣu /	Would this ‘Cognition’ occurring in ‘another Chain’, i.e. the ‘Chain of Cognitions’ of the Parents, be the Material Cause or the Contributory Cause (of the First Cognition under consideration)? It cannot be the Material Cause; as, in that case, it would be possible for the peculiar learning and culture of the Parents to continue in the Son; just as the Parents’ Cognition continues in their own subsequent cognitions.
yasmāduttareṣu kṣaṇeṣu yat pūrvakṣaṇasaṃskārānuvartanam /	It has been found in the case of all Material Causes and their Products that the embellishments of the preceding ‘moment’ continue in the succeeding ‘Moments’;
svasānte 'nvayavyatirekābhyāṃ niścitatvāt /	this having been found, by positive and negative concomitance, to be the case is one’s own ‘Chain’,
atha matam yathaikasmāt pradīpāddīpāntarotpattau na pūrvadīpasaṃskāreṇa sthaulyādilakṣaṇena viśiṣṭasyottarasya dīpasya sambhavaḥ, kiṃ tarhi/	The following might be the opinion suggested “When one lamp is lighted from another Lamp the second lamp is not produced as equipped with the size and other embellishments of the first one, it is produced merely as a lamp without any embellishments;
niḥsaṃskārasya pradīpamātrasyotpattiḥ, anyatastu tasya dīpāntarasya svetva{ndaḥ}nādeḥ sakāśād viśeṣaḥ tadvatsu tadbuddher iti /	it acquires its own embellishments from other sources in the shape of its own wick and oū, etc.; and the same may be the case with the Cognition in question also”.
tan na /	That cannot be so;
yasmāt pradīpādisaṃskāraḥ svāśraye 'pi tāvat santānamavabadhnāti /	because the embellishment of the Lamp sets up a ‘chain’ in its own substratum also;
asthiratvāt tasya /	because it is itself evanescent;
tathāhīndhanāya{pa}caye ta{asa---}syaiva dīpasya tattvaṃ dṛśyate /	that is the reason why on the exhaustion of the ‘fuel’ (in the shape of the oil and wick), the Lamp ceases to exist.
natvevamasthiraḥ śrutādisaṃskāraḥ tasya cirakālamavasthānāt /	The embellishment of Learning and Culture however is not evanescent; as it continues for a long time.
ato na dīpādivanniḥsaṃskārasya buddhimātrasya sambhavo yuktaḥ /	Hence it is not possible for mere Cognition without embellishments to be produced in the manner of the Lamp.
kiṃ ca pradīpādau bahutarālpaparamāṇusañcayotpādānukalpitau viśeṣāviśeṣau na tvekasya vastulakṣaṇasya tatra viśeṣo 'styaviśeṣo vā /	Further, in the case of the Lamp and other things, the presence or absence of peculiarities is determined on the basis of their being aggregates of larger and less number of atoms; of the single thing, as a mere entity, there cannot be either presence or absence of peculiarities.
iha tvekasminneva vastulakṣaṇe śrutādisaṃskāreṇa viśeṣo mātṛbuddhivartini aviśeṣas tu sutabuddhivartinīti kiṃ kena śāsyam /	In the case in question however, the single entity, the Cognition in the mother, would have the peculiarities of the cultural and other embellishments, while when appearing in the son, it would be without these peculiarities; who can impart such a teaching?
kiṃ ca upādānakāraṇatve 'yaṃ prasaṅga ucyate na ca dīpāntaraṃ dīpāntarasyopādānakāraṇaṃ bhinnasantānatvād iti yatkiñcid etat /	Then again, the reductio ad absurdum that has been urged is in regard to the view that one Cognition is the Material Cause of the other; but one Lamp is not the Material Cause of the other Lamp; because it belongs to an entirely different ‘Chain’.
apica yeṣāṃ saṃsvedajātīnāṃ mātaiva nāsti teṣāṃ katham anyavijñānajā buddhirityalaṃ prasaṅgena /	Further, in the case of Beings who have no mother e.g. the sweat-born insects, how could the first Cognition be due to a Cognition in another series? We resist from further argumentation on this subject.
atha sahakārikāraṇam iti pakṣas tadā siddhasādhyatā // tasmād ityāditvasādhane pramāṇayati /	If, on the other hand, it be held that the Cognition of the other Chain is a contributory Cause of the First Cognition, then the argument proves what is already admitted (by all parties) and hence is superfluous.
tasmāt tatrādivijñānaṃ svopādānabalodbhavam / vijñānatvādihetubhya idānīntanacittavat //	Thus then the first cognition must be regarded as arising out of its own material cause, because it is cognition and so forth, like the cognition of the present moment.
prayogaḥ yadvijñānavedanāsaṃskāraskandhacatuṣṭayasvabhāvaṃ vastu tat svopādānabalodbhūtaṃ vijñānāditvāt yathā yauvanādyavasthāsu tadeva skandhacatuṣṭayam vijñānādi [p.535] svabhāvaś ca prathamajanmacittādikalāpa iti svabhāvahetuḥ /	The argument may be formulated as follows: That entity which partakes of the nature of the Four Phases of Cognition, Feeling, Name-Conception, and Mental Faculty, must be regarded as proceeding from its own Material Cause; because it is Cognition, Feeling, etc. etc. just like the same Four Phases during youth and old age; the First Cognition is of the nature of Cognition: hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of the thing.
tatrādivijñānam iti vijñānagrahaṇam upalakṣaṇaṃ /	In the term ‘First Cognition’, the mention of Cognition is only by way of illustration;
vedanādayo 'pi gṛhītavyāḥ //	what is asserted should be -understood to be true of Feeling and the other Phases also.
sādhyaviparyaye hetor bādhakaṃ pramāṇam āha anyahetvityādi /	The following Text puts forward an argument against the contrary of the above conclusion: [see verse 1898 next]
anyahetupratikṣepād ahetutve ca saṃsthite / anyathā niyato dharmo nāyaṃ tasya prasajyate //	As other causes have been rejected, if the cognition were entirely without cause, then, it could not have any particular character at all.
anyeṣāṃ nityamanaḥkāladigīśādīnāṃ pūrvaṃ pratikṣepāt svopādānasya cānabhyupagame 'hetukatvaṃ syāt tataścāyaṃ vijñānāditvalakṣaṇo niyato dharmo	All other causes, in the shape of the eternal things Mind, Time, Space, God and so forth, have been rejected before; and the view that the Cognition arises out of itself is not accepted; the only alternative left is that it should be without cause; but in that case it could not have any such particular (distinguishing) character as Being Cognition and the like.
na syāt / ākasmikasya svabhāvasya niyāmakābhāvena pratiniyamāyogāt /	Because a character or property that is purely accidental cannot serve as a determinant, and hence there could he no determination on the basis of that.
ato nirhetukatve niyatavijñānādidharmānupapattir bādhakaṃ pramāṇaṃ kādācitkatvānupapattiś ca //	Thus the causelessness of Cognition would be open to rejection by the incongruity of there being no possibility of the appearance of such distinguishing characters as that of Being Cognition and the like;
evam atītaṃ janma prasādhyānāgatam api prasādhayituṃ pramāṇayann āha maraṇetyādi /	Having thus established the fact of there being a ‘previous’ birth, the author proceeds to establish the ‘future’ birth also: [see verse 1899 above]
maraṇakṣaṇavijñānaṃ svopādeyodayakṣamam / rāgiṇo hīnasaṅgatvāt pūrvavijñānavat tathā // yat sarāgaṃ cittaṃ tat svopādeyacittāntarodayasamarthaṃ sarāgatvāt pūrvāvasthācittavat sarāgaṃ ca maraṇacittam iti svabhāvehetuḥ /	The Cognition or Consciousness that is beset with affections is capable of producing its effect in the shape of another Cognition, because it is beset with affections, like the Consciousness during the previous state; and the Consciousness at the moment of death is beset with affections; hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.
nacāsiddho hetuḥ yato yadbhogādipratipakṣanairātmyadarśanaviyuktaṃ cittaṃ tatsarvaṃ sarāgam eva pratipakṣaviyuktatvāt suratabhogacittavad iti /	This Reason cannot be said to be ‘inadmissible’; because as a matter of fact, the Consciousness that is dissociated from the idea of ‘Void’, which is opposed to all experience, is always beset with affections; because It is dissociated from its opposite, just like the Consciousness during intercourse.
nāpyanaikāntika etāvanmātrahetukatvāc cittāntarodayasyetyavikalakāraṇānupapattir bādhakaṃ pramāṇam //	Nor is the Reason ‘Inconclusive’ (Doubtful); because the appearance of another Cognition is always due to this much only. Hence the reason against the contrary of the conclusion would consist in the impossibility of there being a fully efficient cause.
etad eva darśayati yena rūpeṇetyādi /	The same point is further elucidated: [see verse 1900 next]
yena rūpeṇa vijñānaṃ janayatpariniścitam / prākpaścād api tadbibhrad akhaṇḍaṃ kiṃ na kārakam //	In the form in which the cognition produced a definite cognition in the past, why cannot it, in the same unalloyed form, be productive of it in future also? (1900)
svarūpam svabhāvam iti yāvat //	‘In the same form’ i.e. bearing the same form or character.
parapakṣe ca tajjñānaṃ kāyādeveti saṃsthitiḥ /	“According to the other view, the idea is that consciousness proceeds from the body itself;
dṛṣṭāntau tat kathaṃ siddhau sādhyadharmasamanvitau //	how then can the two corroborative instances be admitted to be equipped with the probandum?” (1901)
nanu kāyasya hetutvaṃ prāgeva vinivāritam / cetaso yugapat prāpter abhāvāccātirekiṇaḥ //	The idea of the body being the cause (of cognition) has been already discarded, on the ground of its involving the possibility of all cognitions appearing simultaneously, on account of there being no other (contributory) causes.
ābhogaśubhacittādibhāvitvena viniścitam / smṛtirāgādivijñānaṃ tanniṣeddhuṃ na pāryate //	As a matter of fact, it is found that cognition in the form of remembrance, affection and so forth (which are cognitions) actually proceeds from pleasurable experiences and pleasant reminiscences of the same [which also are cognitions];
[p.536]	and this cannot be denied.
nirhrāsātiśayau dṛṣṭau buddhīnāṃ pū{rvabhāvinaḥ / śrutaśilpādikābhyāsaviśeṣahrāsavṛddhitaḥ} // {manaskāre tu} viguṇe jñātavyārthāntarāgrahāt /	Then again, it is also seen that deterioration and improvement in one’s later cognitions are brought about by deterioration and improvement in the practice of the learning and arts. It is also seen that when the functioning of the mind is defective, there is no apprehension of other things.
jñānasya jñānahetutvaṃ na yāti vacanīyatām //	On account of all these facts, the idea of cognition proceeding from cognition cannot be objected to.
vi{bhinnadehavṛttitvāditi hetor asiddhatā /	The reason ‘because they subsist in different bodies’ cannot be admissible.
amūrtacetaso} vṛttiḥ kā vā koyeṣvapātinaḥ //	because how can there be any subsistence of the cognition, which is incorporeal and hence not liable to fall down, in the bodies? (1906)
tathā hi svopādānodbhavatvaṃ svopādeyodayakṣamatvaṃ ca sādhyadharmaḥ /	“The Probandum, that is desired to be proved, is that the Cognition proceeds from its own Material Cause and produces its own product;
yasya ca nityaṃ kāyādeva vijñānam utpadyata iti darśanaṃ tasya na kvacidyathoktasādhyadharmatvasamanvito dṛṣṭāntaḥ siddha iti katham idānīntanacittavatpūrvaijñānavad ityetayor dṛṣṭāntayor upanyāsa iti /	according to the other Party, however, Cognition is always produced from the Body itself; so that for him there can be no Instance which fulfils the conditions of the Probandum; why then has the Buddhist put forward the two instances of(the present Cognition’ and ‘the previous Cognition’?” [The answer to this is as follows] [see verses 1902-1905 above] [verses 1902-1905]:
naiṣa doṣaḥ /	There is no force in the above objection.
pūrvam eva kāyasya hetutvaṃ niṣiddhaṃ "cetaso yaugapadyaprasaṅga" ityanena /	It has been already shown that the Body cannot be the cause of Cognition, on the ground that that would involve the simultaneity of Cognitions;
apekṣaṇīyasya sahakārikāraṇasyātirekiṇo 'bhāvāt nityasyāpekṣānupapatteḥ /	because there is no other contributory cause which would be needed;
anityapakṣe tu pūrvoktaṃ vartamānaṃ ca dūṣaṇam /	if on the other hand, it is not eternal, then the previous and the present, both objections, would be applicable.
na cābhyupagamamātreṇa pramāṇasiddhasyāpyasiddhatvaṃ yuktam atiprasaṅgāt	As a matter of fact, what is proved by proper means of Cognition cannot be set aside by mere assertion; as otherwise there would be incongruities;
tathāca na kiñcit kasyacit sādhanaṃ syāt /	so that nothing could be the cause of anything at all.
yathāha nāniṣṭer dūṣaṇaṃ sarvam iti /	This is what has been described in the words ‘mere disagreeableness cannot render things objectionable’.
kiṃ ca yadābhogacittasamanantaraṃ smaraṇamutpadyamānaṃ supariniścitaṃ tadā śubhādicittād rāgaḥ /	Further, it is found that after a pleasurable experience, when there is remembrance of it in a definite form, there proceeds, from this pleasurable Cognition, a feeling of love and attachment ‘How beautiful she is!
tathā hi sā sundarīti taruṇīti tanūdarīti sumukhīti cetyādi śubhaṃ cintayatāṃ rāgiṇāṃ rāga utpadyate tathā samānenāpakṛtamatha kariṣyapyayam apakarotītyādi cintayataś ca dveṣa utpadyamāno niścitaḥ sa katham apahnotuṃ śakyate viśeṣataḥ pratyakṣamātravādinā /	when one goes on contemplating upon it there appears in the mind of the man inclined to be passionate, the passion of Love. Similarly when some one causes one an injury, one goes on thinking of it ‘He has done me this injury, he has done it in the past he is going to do it again’ and so forth; thereupon there appears Hatred. How can all this be denied;
tathā pūrvabhāvinaḥ śrutaśilpādyabhyāsaviśeṣasyotkarṣāpakarṣābhyām uttarabuddhīnāṃ samutkarṣāpakarṣau dṛṣṭau tathārthāntaravyāsaṅgena manaskāravaiguṇyād arthāntarāgrahaṇaṃ dṛṣṭam iti jñānasya jñānahetutvaṃ yuktiyuktatvād avacanīyam / na tu bhūtānāṃ yuktivirodhāt /	specially by one who takes Ms stand upon Sense-perception (as the only Bight means of Cognition)? Similarly, when there is deterioration and improvement in the previous practice of Learning and Arts, it is found that there are corresponding deterioration and improvement in the subsequent Cognitions. And it is found that, when the Mind is attracted elsewhere and the functioning of the Mind is defective, there is no perception of other things. From all this it is clear that the idea that Cognition is the Cause of Cognition, is in accordance with reason and should not be objected to;
ata eva jñānasya jñānahetutvapratipādanāt /	also because it has been actually proved that Cognition is the Cause of cognitions.
kāryakāraṇatetyādau prathame prasaṅge vibhinnadehavṛttitvādityasya hetor asiddhatā tathā hi yadi tāvad ādhārādheyalakṣaṇā vṛttirabhipretā sā sutarāṃ cittasyāpatanadharmaṇaḥ kāyeṣvasiddhā satyapi kāryakāraṇabhāve cittasyāmūrtatvenāpatanadharmakatvāt /	Under Text 1861, it has been argued (by the Materialist) that) “there cannot be any relation of Cause and Effect between the two Cognitions under dispute, because they subsist in different bodies”; this Reason there put forward is not admissible. Because, if the ‘subsistence’ meant is that of the nature of ‘container and contained’, then such subsistence in the Bodies is entirely impossible for Cognition, which is not liable to fall; because even though the causal relation may be there, the Cognition, which is incorporeal, could never be liable to fall;
na cāpatanadharmakasyādhāro yukto 'kiñcitkaratvāt //	and for what is not liable to fall, no container is needed, as it could serve no useful purpose.
jalādīnāṃ tarhi kiṃ kurvannādhāraḥ syād ity āha syād ityādi /	Question: “What then would the Container (or Receptacle) do in the case of Water and such things?”
[p.537]	Answer: [see verses 1907-1908 next]
syādāśrayo jalādīnāṃ patanapratiṣedhataḥ /	In the case of water and other things, the receptacle (container) would be there as serving to prevent their falling down.
cetasāmagatīnāṃ ca kimādhāraiḥ prayojanam //	in the case of cognitions however, which are devoid of movement (and hence of falling), what would be the use of receptacles (or containers)? (1907)
tādātmyena sthitir vṛttiriha cet parikalpyate /	If then, the ‘subsistence’ (of the cognitions in the bodies) be assumed to be of the nature of ‘identification’ (sameness’, that also cannot be right.
sāpyayayuktā na hi jñānaṃ yuktaṃ kāyātmakaṃ tava //	because for you, cognition cannot be of the nature of the body.
prakṛ{kśi---}tyādimūrtasya svopādānadeśaparihāreṇotpadyamānasyopādānadeśotpādahetutvādādhāro gamanapratibandhād vyavasthāpyate /	[verse 1907]: In the ease of Earth, etc. which are corporeal, things are produced on the spot where the material, cause exists, and never in a place where that cause does not exist; hence that which serves as preventive of their moving away from that place is regarded as the Receptacle (Substratum, Container).
na tvamūrtasya śakyaṃ tathā vyavasthāpayitum /	No such thing is possible in the ease of what is incorporeal.
atha tādātmyalakṣaṇā vṛttirabhipretā sāpi na siddhā /	If what is meant by ‘Subsistence’ is ‘being of the same nature’, that also cannot be admitted.
nahi tava bahirarthābhiniveśino vaktuṃ yuktaṃ kāyātmakaṃ vijñānam iti /	For you, who insist upon the External Things only, it cannot be right to assert that ‘Cognition is of the nature of the Body’;
mama tu yuktaṃ vijñānamātravādina ālayavijñānasvabhāvatvāt kāyasyetyabhiprāyaḥ //	though it is all right for me who posit the Cognition only; and for whom the Body also is of the nature of the Ālayavijñāna (a series or chain of Cognitions).
kasmān na yuktam ity āha tādātmye ityādi /	Question: “Why cannot it be right (to assert that Cognition is of the nature of the Body)?”
tādātmye hi yathā kāyo vispaṣṭaṃ vedyate paraiḥ / rāgadveṣādiceto 'pi tathā kiṃ na pravedyate // svenaiva vedyate ceto dehastu svaparair api /	If the cognition is of the same nature as the body, then why is not the consciousness (cognition) of love, hatred, etc. not perceived by others as clearly as the body is? In fact, cognition is cognised by the cogniser himself alone, while the body is cognised by himself as well as by others.
yau caivaṃ tau vibhidyete kukṣimūlanaṭāviva //	things that are so cognised are always distinct, e.g. colic pain and the dramatic actor.
tathā hi dehe gṛhyamāṇe parai rāgādīnām api grahaṇaṃ prāpnotyavyatirekāt /	When the Body of a man is perceived by another man, it should be possible for the latter to perceive the Love, Hatred, etc, also of the former;
naca vipraśaktyānekāntaḥ tasyās tadānīm apratyakṣatvāt / natu caitanyasyāpratyakṣatvaṃ ātmanāpyagrahaṇaprasaṅgāt /	as the two are not different. Nor can the premiss be falsified on the basis of occult powers (whereby the feelings of others are perceived); because at the time concerned no such powers are noticeable. Nor can Consciousness be regarded as incognisable;

yena sadyo jāto 'pi vānarādiśiśuravapātapatanaprabhavaduḥkhān maraṇabhīto mātur atīva kroḍamāśliṣyate prapātādisthānaṃ ca pariharati /

and yet even the newborn young of the monkey becomes afraid of death and the suffering caused by falling from a height, and, on account of that fear, clings more strongly to the mother’s arms; and also avoid the place where there is a precipice.

na hyananubhūteṣṭāniṣṭasādhanaphalāni niyamena jihāsantyupāditsantevātiprasaṅgāt / ayaso 'yaskāntāpasarpaṇadṛṣṭānto 'pyayukta eva nahi tannirhetukaṃ sarvadā sattvādiprasaṅgāt /

Until people have had some actual experience of things bringing pleasure or pain, they never invariably seek to obtain the one and avoid the other. If they did, there would be an absurdity, The example of the Iron being drawn to the Magnet cannot be properly cited in this connection; because that attraction is not without cause;

sahetukatve vā yathā tasya hetur ayaskānto nirdiśyate 'nvayavyatirekasiddhas tathāsyāpi hānopādānānuṣṭhānasya hetur bhāvyaḥ /

If then it has a cause, it is the Magnet that is pointed out to be the cause on the basis of positive and negative concomitance; and some similar cause will have to be found for the action of the child in securing and avoiding certain things.

nacāsau nirdeṣṭuṃ śakyate anyatrābhyāsāt /

No such cause can be indicated, apart from repeated experience.

tasmāt pūrvābhyāsakṛta evāyaṃ bālānām iṣṭāniṣṭopādānaparityāgalakṣaṇo vyavahāra iti siddhā buddher anāditetyabhiprāyaḥ /

Hence it becomes established that the action of children in seeking to obtain and avoiding certain things is due to repeated past experience; and that, on this account, the Cognition must be without beiginning.

tathāca svatantrā mānasītyādinā apica stanapānādāvityādinā ca sādhāraṇaṃ dūṣaṇaṃ vakṣyatītyalaṃ bahunā /

It is for these reasons that the author is going to indicate other objections applicable in common (to all the views of the Materialists) under Texts 1930 and 1940 below, Hence we desist from further details.

kiṃ ca teṣām cārvākāṇāṃ kṣaṇikatvam abhyupagacchatām svopagamaḥ svasiddhānto bādhyate bhūtānāṃ nityatvābhyupagamo bā{dhyate} //1886-

Further, if the Cārvākas admit the momentary character of things, then their own doctrine, that Material substances are everlasting becomes upset.

[p.533]

[The materialist might say] “Let the doctrine be upset;

yadi nyāyānurāgādvaḥ svapakṣe 'pyanapekṣatā / bhūtānyeva na santīti nyāyo 'yaṃ para iṣyatām //

If your love for reason is so great that you have no regard for your own doctrine, then you should accept also the more reasonable view that ‘primary elemental substances do not exist at all’.

atha yuktyupetatvāt kṣaṇikatvamabhyupagamyate tadā vijñaptimātratānayastarhi para utkṛṣṭo 'bhyupagamyatāṃ, tatrāpi yuktyupetatvasyābhyupagamakāraṇasya tulyatvāt //

If you accept the momentary character of things, because it is in accordance with Reason, then you should accept the doctrine that ‘Ideas alone exist’, which is still more reasonable; because reasonableness, which is your criterion for acceptance, is present in this case also.

katham ity āha nāvayavyātmatetyādi /

Question: “How so?” Answer: [see verse 1889 next]

nāvayavyātmatā teṣāṃ nāpi yuktāṇurūpatā /

The primary elemental substances cannot exist in the form of composite wholes, nor in the form of atoms;

ayogāt paramāṇūnām ityetad abhidhāsyate //

because there can be no conjunction of atoms, as is going to be explained.

teṣām iti / mahābhūtānām /

‘Teṣām’ of the Primary Elemental Substances.

abhidhāsyata iti samanantaram eva bahirarthaparīkṣāyām //

‘Going to be explained’, under the next chapter on the Examination of the ‘External World’.

yadi na santyeva bhūtāni kathaṃ tarhi pratibhāsanta ity āha abahistattvarūpāṇītyādinā /

Question: “If the said elements do not exist, then how is it that they figure in Cognitions?” Answer: [see verse 1890 next]

abahistattvarūpāṇi vāsanāparipākataḥ / vijñāne pratibhāsante svapnādāviva nānyataḥ //

Not having any real external form, they figure in cognitions only through the fruition of dispositions; just as during dreams;

anyata iti /

they do not appear anywhere else.

vijñānādanyatra bāhya iti yāvat //

‘Anywhere else’, i.e. apart from Cognition.

kathaṃ tarhi pṛthivītyādivyavahāro lokaśāstrayor ity āha vijñānasyaivetyādi /

Question: “How then is it that people and the scriptures speak of the Earth and other Elemental Substances?” Answer: [see verse 1891 next]

vijñānasyaiva nirbhāsaṃ samāśritya prakalpyate / svapnamāyopamaṃ nedaṃ mahābhūtacatuṣṭayam //

All these four primary elemental substances are assumed on the basis of what appears in cognition, just like breams and illusions. and they have no real existence.

yadi bhūtāni na santi kastarhi jñānaheturityāha tadanyasyetyādi /

Question: “If the elemental substances do not exist, then what is the basis of the Cognition (of these)?”

tadanyasya tadābhāve hetutvaṃ nopapadyate /

It is not possible that what is something different from the cognation should figure in it;

prāgbhūtaṃ bhūtanirbhāsaṃ jñānaṃ tu janayet param // tadanyasyeti /

it is only a previous cognition envisaging the substances that could produce another such cognition.

tasmād vijñānād anyasya bhūtacatuṣṭayasya //

‘Tadanyasya’ something different from the Cognition, in the shape of the four elemental substances.

yadi tat kimupādānaṃ sahakāryathavāsya kim // upādānamabhīṣṭaṃ cet tanayajñānasantatau / pitroḥ śrutādisaṃskāraviśeṣānugamo bhavet //

If the cognition in some other ‘chain’ be held to be the cause (of the first cognition), then (the question is) is that the ‘material cause’ of it, or the ‘contributory cause’? If it is meant to be the material cause, then the learning and culture of the parents should continue in the child’s ‘chain of cognitions’;

upādānatadādeyadharmo 'pi yadvyavasthitaḥ / anvayavyatirekābhyāṃ niścitaś ca svasantatau // svopādānabalodbhūte sahakāritvakalpane /

that such is the nature of the material cause and its effect has been ascertained, through positive and negative concomitance, in connection with one’s own ‘chain if, on the other hand, the cognition of the other ‘chain’ be assumed to be the ‘contributory cause’, of the first cognition, on the basis of its own material cause, then there would be nothing wrong in it.

santānāntaracittasya na kācid vyāhatir bhavet //

It has thus been proved that the first Cognition after birth cannot proceed from any material substance.

tat santānāntaracittaṃ mātrādisambandhi upādānakāraṇaṃ vā syāt, sahakārikāraṇaṃ, vā na tāvad upādānakāraṇaṃ putrajñānasantāne 'pi mātāpitṛśrutādisaṃskārādiviśeṣānutpa{vru---}ttiprasaṅgāt yathā pitroreva svottarabuddhiṣu /

Would this ‘Cognition’ occurring in ‘another Chain’, i.e. the ‘Chain of Cognitions’ of the Parents, be the Material Cause or the Contributory Cause (of the First Cognition under consideration)? It cannot be the Material Cause; as, in that case, it would be possible for the peculiar learning and culture of the Parents to continue in the Son; just as the Parents’ Cognition continues in their own subsequent cognitions.

yasmāduttareṣu kṣaṇeṣu yat pūrvakṣaṇasaṃskārānuvartanam /

It has been found in the case of all Material Causes and their Products that the embellishments of the preceding ‘moment’ continue in the succeeding ‘Moments’;

svasānte 'nvayavyatirekābhyāṃ niścitatvāt /

this having been found, by positive and negative concomitance, to be the case is one’s own ‘Chain’,

atha matam yathaikasmāt pradīpāddīpāntarotpattau na pūrvadīpasaṃskāreṇa sthaulyādilakṣaṇena viśiṣṭasyottarasya dīpasya sambhavaḥ, kiṃ tarhi/

The following might be the opinion suggested “When one lamp is lighted from another Lamp the second lamp is not produced as equipped with the size and other embellishments of the first one, it is produced merely as a lamp without any embellishments;

niḥsaṃskārasya pradīpamātrasyotpattiḥ, anyatastu tasya dīpāntarasya svetva{ndaḥ}nādeḥ sakāśād viśeṣaḥ tadvatsu tadbuddher iti /

it acquires its own embellishments from other sources in the shape of its own wick and oū, etc.; and the same may be the case with the Cognition in question also”.

tan na /

That cannot be so;

yasmāt pradīpādisaṃskāraḥ svāśraye 'pi tāvat santānamavabadhnāti /

because the embellishment of the Lamp sets up a ‘chain’ in its own substratum also;

asthiratvāt tasya /

because it is itself evanescent;

tathāhīndhanāya{pa}caye ta{asa---}syaiva dīpasya tattvaṃ dṛśyate /

that is the reason why on the exhaustion of the ‘fuel’ (in the shape of the oil and wick), the Lamp ceases to exist.

natvevamasthiraḥ śrutādisaṃskāraḥ tasya cirakālamavasthānāt /

The embellishment of Learning and Culture however is not evanescent; as it continues for a long time.

ato na dīpādivanniḥsaṃskārasya buddhimātrasya sambhavo yuktaḥ /

Hence it is not possible for mere Cognition without embellishments to be produced in the manner of the Lamp.

kiṃ ca pradīpādau bahutarālpaparamāṇusañcayotpādānukalpitau viśeṣāviśeṣau na tvekasya vastulakṣaṇasya tatra viśeṣo 'styaviśeṣo vā /

Further, in the case of the Lamp and other things, the presence or absence of peculiarities is determined on the basis of their being aggregates of larger and less number of atoms; of the single thing, as a mere entity, there cannot be either presence or absence of peculiarities.

iha tvekasminneva vastulakṣaṇe śrutādisaṃskāreṇa viśeṣo mātṛbuddhivartini aviśeṣas tu sutabuddhivartinīti kiṃ kena śāsyam /

In the case in question however, the single entity, the Cognition in the mother, would have the peculiarities of the cultural and other embellishments, while when appearing in the son, it would be without these peculiarities; who can impart such a teaching?

kiṃ ca upādānakāraṇatve 'yaṃ prasaṅga ucyate na ca dīpāntaraṃ dīpāntarasyopādānakāraṇaṃ bhinnasantānatvād iti yatkiñcid etat /

Then again, the reductio ad absurdum that has been urged is in regard to the view that one Cognition is the Material Cause of the other; but one Lamp is not the Material Cause of the other Lamp; because it belongs to an entirely different ‘Chain’.

apica yeṣāṃ saṃsvedajātīnāṃ mātaiva nāsti teṣāṃ katham anyavijñānajā buddhirityalaṃ prasaṅgena /

Further, in the case of Beings who have no mother e.g. the sweat-born insects, how could the first Cognition be due to a Cognition in another series? We resist from further argumentation on this subject.

atha sahakārikāraṇam iti pakṣas tadā siddhasādhyatā // tasmād ityāditvasādhane pramāṇayati /

If, on the other hand, it be held that the Cognition of the other Chain is a contributory Cause of the First Cognition, then the argument proves what is already admitted (by all parties) and hence is superfluous.

tasmāt tatrādivijñānaṃ svopādānabalodbhavam / vijñānatvādihetubhya idānīntanacittavat //

Thus then the first cognition must be regarded as arising out of its own material cause, because it is cognition and so forth, like the cognition of the present moment.

prayogaḥ yadvijñānavedanāsaṃskāraskandhacatuṣṭayasvabhāvaṃ vastu tat svopādānabalodbhūtaṃ vijñānāditvāt yathā yauvanādyavasthāsu tadeva skandhacatuṣṭayam vijñānādi [p.535] svabhāvaś ca prathamajanmacittādikalāpa iti svabhāvahetuḥ /

The argument may be formulated as follows: That entity which partakes of the nature of the Four Phases of Cognition, Feeling, Name-Conception, and Mental Faculty, must be regarded as proceeding from its own Material Cause; because it is Cognition, Feeling, etc. etc. just like the same Four Phases during youth and old age; the First Cognition is of the nature of Cognition: hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of the thing.

tatrādivijñānam iti vijñānagrahaṇam upalakṣaṇaṃ /

In the term ‘First Cognition’, the mention of Cognition is only by way of illustration;

vedanādayo 'pi gṛhītavyāḥ //

what is asserted should be -understood to be true of Feeling and the other Phases also.

sādhyaviparyaye hetor bādhakaṃ pramāṇam āha anyahetvityādi /

The following Text puts forward an argument against the contrary of the above conclusion: [see verse 1898 next]

anyahetupratikṣepād ahetutve ca saṃsthite / anyathā niyato dharmo nāyaṃ tasya prasajyate //

As other causes have been rejected, if the cognition were entirely without cause, then, it could not have any particular character at all.

anyeṣāṃ nityamanaḥkāladigīśādīnāṃ pūrvaṃ pratikṣepāt svopādānasya cānabhyupagame 'hetukatvaṃ syāt tataścāyaṃ vijñānāditvalakṣaṇo niyato dharmo

All other causes, in the shape of the eternal things Mind, Time, Space, God and so forth, have been rejected before; and the view that the Cognition arises out of itself is not accepted; the only alternative left is that it should be without cause; but in that case it could not have any such particular (distinguishing) character as Being Cognition and the like.

na syāt / ākasmikasya svabhāvasya niyāmakābhāvena pratiniyamāyogāt /

Because a character or property that is purely accidental cannot serve as a determinant, and hence there could he no determination on the basis of that.

ato nirhetukatve niyatavijñānādidharmānupapattir bādhakaṃ pramāṇaṃ kādācitkatvānupapattiś ca //

Thus the causelessness of Cognition would be open to rejection by the incongruity of there being no possibility of the appearance of such distinguishing characters as that of Being Cognition and the like;

evam atītaṃ janma prasādhyānāgatam api prasādhayituṃ pramāṇayann āha maraṇetyādi /

Having thus established the fact of there being a ‘previous’ birth, the author proceeds to establish the ‘future’ birth also: [see verse 1899 above]

maraṇakṣaṇavijñānaṃ svopādeyodayakṣamam / rāgiṇo hīnasaṅgatvāt pūrvavijñānavat tathā // yat sarāgaṃ cittaṃ tat svopādeyacittāntarodayasamarthaṃ sarāgatvāt pūrvāvasthācittavat sarāgaṃ ca maraṇacittam iti svabhāvehetuḥ /

The Cognition or Consciousness that is beset with affections is capable of producing its effect in the shape of another Cognition, because it is beset with affections, like the Consciousness during the previous state; and the Consciousness at the moment of death is beset with affections; hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.

nacāsiddho hetuḥ yato yadbhogādipratipakṣanairātmyadarśanaviyuktaṃ cittaṃ tatsarvaṃ sarāgam eva pratipakṣaviyuktatvāt suratabhogacittavad iti /

This Reason cannot be said to be ‘inadmissible’; because as a matter of fact, the Consciousness that is dissociated from the idea of ‘Void’, which is opposed to all experience, is always beset with affections; because It is dissociated from its opposite, just like the Consciousness during intercourse.

nāpyanaikāntika etāvanmātrahetukatvāc cittāntarodayasyetyavikalakāraṇānupapattir bādhakaṃ pramāṇam //

Nor is the Reason ‘Inconclusive’ (Doubtful); because the appearance of another Cognition is always due to this much only. Hence the reason against the contrary of the conclusion would consist in the impossibility of there being a fully efficient cause.

etad eva darśayati yena rūpeṇetyādi /

The same point is further elucidated: [see verse 1900 next]

yena rūpeṇa vijñānaṃ janayatpariniścitam / prākpaścād api tadbibhrad akhaṇḍaṃ kiṃ na kārakam //

In the form in which the cognition produced a definite cognition in the past, why cannot it, in the same unalloyed form, be productive of it in future also? (1900)

svarūpam svabhāvam iti yāvat //

‘In the same form’ i.e. bearing the same form or character.

parapakṣe ca tajjñānaṃ kāyādeveti saṃsthitiḥ /

“According to the other view, the idea is that consciousness proceeds from the body itself;

dṛṣṭāntau tat kathaṃ siddhau sādhyadharmasamanvitau //

how then can the two corroborative instances be admitted to be equipped with the probandum?” (1901)

nanu kāyasya hetutvaṃ prāgeva vinivāritam / cetaso yugapat prāpter abhāvāccātirekiṇaḥ //

The idea of the body being the cause (of cognition) has been already discarded, on the ground of its involving the possibility of all cognitions appearing simultaneously, on account of there being no other (contributory) causes.

ābhogaśubhacittādibhāvitvena viniścitam / smṛtirāgādivijñānaṃ tanniṣeddhuṃ na pāryate //

As a matter of fact, it is found that cognition in the form of remembrance, affection and so forth (which are cognitions) actually proceeds from pleasurable experiences and pleasant reminiscences of the same [which also are cognitions];

[p.536]

and this cannot be denied.

nirhrāsātiśayau dṛṣṭau buddhīnāṃ pū{rvabhāvinaḥ / śrutaśilpādikābhyāsaviśeṣahrāsavṛddhitaḥ} // {manaskāre tu} viguṇe jñātavyārthāntarāgrahāt /

Then again, it is also seen that deterioration and improvement in one’s later cognitions are brought about by deterioration and improvement in the practice of the learning and arts. It is also seen that when the functioning of the mind is defective, there is no apprehension of other things.

jñānasya jñānahetutvaṃ na yāti vacanīyatām //

On account of all these facts, the idea of cognition proceeding from cognition cannot be objected to.

vi{bhinnadehavṛttitvāditi hetor asiddhatā /

The reason ‘because they subsist in different bodies’ cannot be admissible.

amūrtacetaso} vṛttiḥ kā vā koyeṣvapātinaḥ //

because how can there be any subsistence of the cognition, which is incorporeal and hence not liable to fall down, in the bodies? (1906)

tathā hi svopādānodbhavatvaṃ svopādeyodayakṣamatvaṃ ca sādhyadharmaḥ /

“The Probandum, that is desired to be proved, is that the Cognition proceeds from its own Material Cause and produces its own product;

yasya ca nityaṃ kāyādeva vijñānam utpadyata iti darśanaṃ tasya na kvacidyathoktasādhyadharmatvasamanvito dṛṣṭāntaḥ siddha iti katham idānīntanacittavatpūrvaijñānavad ityetayor dṛṣṭāntayor upanyāsa iti /

according to the other Party, however, Cognition is always produced from the Body itself; so that for him there can be no Instance which fulfils the conditions of the Probandum; why then has the Buddhist put forward the two instances of(the present Cognition’ and ‘the previous Cognition’?” [The answer to this is as follows] [see verses 1902-1905 above] [verses 1902-1905]:

naiṣa doṣaḥ /

There is no force in the above objection.

pūrvam eva kāyasya hetutvaṃ niṣiddhaṃ "cetaso yaugapadyaprasaṅga" ityanena /

It has been already shown that the Body cannot be the cause of Cognition, on the ground that that would involve the simultaneity of Cognitions;

apekṣaṇīyasya sahakārikāraṇasyātirekiṇo 'bhāvāt nityasyāpekṣānupapatteḥ /

because there is no other contributory cause which would be needed;

anityapakṣe tu pūrvoktaṃ vartamānaṃ ca dūṣaṇam /

if on the other hand, it is not eternal, then the previous and the present, both objections, would be applicable.

na cābhyupagamamātreṇa pramāṇasiddhasyāpyasiddhatvaṃ yuktam atiprasaṅgāt

As a matter of fact, what is proved by proper means of Cognition cannot be set aside by mere assertion; as otherwise there would be incongruities;

tathāca na kiñcit kasyacit sādhanaṃ syāt /

so that nothing could be the cause of anything at all.

yathāha nāniṣṭer dūṣaṇaṃ sarvam iti /

This is what has been described in the words ‘mere disagreeableness cannot render things objectionable’.

kiṃ ca yadābhogacittasamanantaraṃ smaraṇamutpadyamānaṃ supariniścitaṃ tadā śubhādicittād rāgaḥ /

Further, it is found that after a pleasurable experience, when there is remembrance of it in a definite form, there proceeds, from this pleasurable Cognition, a feeling of love and attachment ‘How beautiful she is!

tathā hi sā sundarīti taruṇīti tanūdarīti sumukhīti cetyādi śubhaṃ cintayatāṃ rāgiṇāṃ rāga utpadyate tathā samānenāpakṛtamatha kariṣyapyayam apakarotītyādi cintayataś ca dveṣa utpadyamāno niścitaḥ sa katham apahnotuṃ śakyate viśeṣataḥ pratyakṣamātravādinā /

when one goes on contemplating upon it there appears in the mind of the man inclined to be passionate, the passion of Love. Similarly when some one causes one an injury, one goes on thinking of it ‘He has done me this injury, he has done it in the past he is going to do it again’ and so forth; thereupon there appears Hatred. How can all this be denied;

tathā pūrvabhāvinaḥ śrutaśilpādyabhyāsaviśeṣasyotkarṣāpakarṣābhyām uttarabuddhīnāṃ samutkarṣāpakarṣau dṛṣṭau tathārthāntaravyāsaṅgena manaskāravaiguṇyād arthāntarāgrahaṇaṃ dṛṣṭam iti jñānasya jñānahetutvaṃ yuktiyuktatvād avacanīyam / na tu bhūtānāṃ yuktivirodhāt /

specially by one who takes Ms stand upon Sense-perception (as the only Bight means of Cognition)? Similarly, when there is deterioration and improvement in the previous practice of Learning and Arts, it is found that there are corresponding deterioration and improvement in the subsequent Cognitions. And it is found that, when the Mind is attracted elsewhere and the functioning of the Mind is defective, there is no perception of other things. From all this it is clear that the idea that Cognition is the Cause of Cognition, is in accordance with reason and should not be objected to;

ata eva jñānasya jñānahetutvapratipādanāt /

also because it has been actually proved that Cognition is the Cause of cognitions.

kāryakāraṇatetyādau prathame prasaṅge vibhinnadehavṛttitvādityasya hetor asiddhatā tathā hi yadi tāvad ādhārādheyalakṣaṇā vṛttirabhipretā sā sutarāṃ cittasyāpatanadharmaṇaḥ kāyeṣvasiddhā satyapi kāryakāraṇabhāve cittasyāmūrtatvenāpatanadharmakatvāt /

Under Text 1861, it has been argued (by the Materialist) that) “there cannot be any relation of Cause and Effect between the two Cognitions under dispute, because they subsist in different bodies”; this Reason there put forward is not admissible. Because, if the ‘subsistence’ meant is that of the nature of ‘container and contained’, then such subsistence in the Bodies is entirely impossible for Cognition, which is not liable to fall; because even though the causal relation may be there, the Cognition, which is incorporeal, could never be liable to fall;

na cāpatanadharmakasyādhāro yukto 'kiñcitkaratvāt //

and for what is not liable to fall, no container is needed, as it could serve no useful purpose.

jalādīnāṃ tarhi kiṃ kurvannādhāraḥ syād ity āha syād ityādi /

Question: “What then would the Container (or Receptacle) do in the case of Water and such things?”

[p.537]

Answer: [see verses 1907-1908 next]

syādāśrayo jalādīnāṃ patanapratiṣedhataḥ /

In the case of water and other things, the receptacle (container) would be there as serving to prevent their falling down.

cetasāmagatīnāṃ ca kimādhāraiḥ prayojanam //

in the case of cognitions however, which are devoid of movement (and hence of falling), what would be the use of receptacles (or containers)? (1907)

tādātmyena sthitir vṛttiriha cet parikalpyate /

If then, the ‘subsistence’ (of the cognitions in the bodies) be assumed to be of the nature of ‘identification’ (sameness’, that also cannot be right.

sāpyayayuktā na hi jñānaṃ yuktaṃ kāyātmakaṃ tava //

because for you, cognition cannot be of the nature of the body.

prakṛ{kśi---}tyādimūrtasya svopādānadeśaparihāreṇotpadyamānasyopādānadeśotpādahetutvādādhāro gamanapratibandhād vyavasthāpyate /

[verse 1907]: In the ease of Earth, etc. which are corporeal, things are produced on the spot where the material, cause exists, and never in a place where that cause does not exist; hence that which serves as preventive of their moving away from that place is regarded as the Receptacle (Substratum, Container).

na tvamūrtasya śakyaṃ tathā vyavasthāpayitum /

No such thing is possible in the ease of what is incorporeal.

atha tādātmyalakṣaṇā vṛttirabhipretā sāpi na siddhā /

If what is meant by ‘Subsistence’ is ‘being of the same nature’, that also cannot be admitted.

nahi tava bahirarthābhiniveśino vaktuṃ yuktaṃ kāyātmakaṃ vijñānam iti /

For you, who insist upon the External Things only, it cannot be right to assert that ‘Cognition is of the nature of the Body’;

mama tu yuktaṃ vijñānamātravādina ālayavijñānasvabhāvatvāt kāyasyetyabhiprāyaḥ //

though it is all right for me who posit the Cognition only; and for whom the Body also is of the nature of the Ālayavijñāna (a series or chain of Cognitions).

kasmān na yuktam ity āha tādātmye ityādi /

Question: “Why cannot it be right (to assert that Cognition is of the nature of the Body)?”

tādātmye hi yathā kāyo vispaṣṭaṃ vedyate paraiḥ / rāgadveṣādiceto 'pi tathā kiṃ na pravedyate // svenaiva vedyate ceto dehastu svaparair api /

If the cognition is of the same nature as the body, then why is not the consciousness (cognition) of love, hatred, etc. not perceived by others as clearly as the body is? In fact, cognition is cognised by the cogniser himself alone, while the body is cognised by himself as well as by others.

yau caivaṃ tau vibhidyete kukṣimūlanaṭāviva //

things that are so cognised are always distinct, e.g. colic pain and the dramatic actor.

tathā hi dehe gṛhyamāṇe parai rāgādīnām api grahaṇaṃ prāpnotyavyatirekāt /

When the Body of a man is perceived by another man, it should be possible for the latter to perceive the Love, Hatred, etc, also of the former;

naca vipraśaktyānekāntaḥ tasyās tadānīm apratyakṣatvāt / natu caitanyasyāpratyakṣatvaṃ ātmanāpyagrahaṇaprasaṅgāt /

as the two are not different. Nor can the premiss be falsified on the basis of occult powers (whereby the feelings of others are perceived); because at the time concerned no such powers are noticeable. Nor can Consciousness be regarded as incognisable;