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saumanasyādisambhava eva rāgādidarśanāt satyapi puṣṭyādau tadasambhave cādarśanāt / ato na puṣṭyādi sākṣān manomater vikārakam /
In fact, it is only when the Mind is happy and at peace that Love is found to appear; and it is often found not to appear when the Body is vigorous. From all tins it follows that vigorousness, etc. of the Body cannot be the cause of Subjective Consciousness.
ata eva ca sākṣād anupakāritvāt sahakārikāraṇam api na dehas tasyā iti siddham /
From all this it also follows that, on account of its affording no direct help, the Body cannot be the Contributory Cause of Subjective Consciousness;
sākṣād evopakāriṇāmaṅkurādiṣu kṣityādīnāṃ sahakāritvaprasiddheḥ anyathātiprasaṅgaḥ syāt /
because in the case of the Sprout, it has been found that the Contributory causes are only those that have a direct bearing upon it, e.g. the Soil, Moisture, etc. If it were not so, there would be incongruities.
tasmāt sajātīyapūrvabījaprabodhapravṛttaya eva rāgādayaḥ / dehapuṣṭiyauvanakālādayas tu keṣāñcitpratisaṅkhyānābhyāsavikalānāṃ tadvāsanāprabodhahetavo bhavanti /
Love and other feelings therefore must be regarded as proceeding from the awakening of an antecedent homogeneous seed. As for vigorousness of the Body, youth and so forth, these are found to give rise to Love, etc. by enlivening the impressions of the past, in men who have had no practice at meditation and are hence without the requisite wisdom.
bhavatu vā sākṣād upakārī deho manomateḥ svopādānapravṛttāyāḥ kadācit /
Even granting that sometimes the Body has a direct bearing upon Subjective Consciousness, when this latter proceeds from its own material cause;
tathāpi na dehanivṛttāv api tasyā nivṛttiḥ siddhyati /
even so, it does not follow that it ceases upon the cessation of the Body.
yathā vahninivṛttāvapi na ghaṭādivinivṛttiḥ svopādānapravṛttatvād iti nāniṣṭāpattiḥ /
For instance, even on the cessation of Fire, the Jar does not cease to exist, because it has proceeded from its own material causes;
nāpyanaikāntikatā hetor atiprasaṅgāt / nāpi viruddhatā sapakṣe bhāvāt /
Nor is the Reason ‘Inconclusive’; for, if it were, then there would be incongruities. Nor again is the Reason ‘Contradictory’, as it is present in all cases where the Probandum is known to be present.
ato nopādānakāraṇaṃ dehaḥ /
Thus it is proved that the Body cannot be the Material Cause of Subjective Consciousness;
nāpi sahakārikāraṇam iti siddhaṃ manomateḥ pūrvapūrvabuddhiprabhavatvam eva /
nor can it be the Contributory Cause; from all which it follows that Subjective Consciousness proceeds from preceding cognitions one after the other occurring in the same ‘Chain’.
syād etat yayoḥ sahasthitiniyamas tāvupādānopādeyabhūtau yathā pradīpaprabhe /
The following argument might be urged: “When any two things are found to be invariably concomitant with one another (always found to exist together), they must be regarded as Material Cause and Effect; as in the case of the Lamp and the Light;
asti ca sahasthitiniyamaḥ śarīramanovijñānayor iti svabhāvahetuḥ /
there is such invariable concomitance between the Body and the Subjective Consciousness;
tadayamanyatarāsiddho hetuḥ /
hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things”.
virūpe dhātau śarīramantareṇāpi manomater avasthānābhyupagamāt /
Because in certain eases, where the Mind-essence is devoid of material form, Subjective Consciousness is present even though there is no body.
nāpīṣṭasiddhir manomater api dehaṃ pratyupādānatvaprasaṅgāt /
Nor does the argument put forward quite prove what is meant to be proved;
anaikāntikatā ca /
The Reason adduced is ‘Inconclusive’ also;
hetubhedād api sahāvasthānasambhavāt /
as the said concomitance is possible even when the cause is different;
yathāgnitāmradravattayoḥ /
as between Fire and fluidity of (melted) Copper.
tathā hi vahnisahakāritāmraṃ dravatāmārabhate na kevalam evam ihāpi dehasyopādānaṃ kalalādi manovijñānasahakāri dehamuttaramārabhate ityatas tayoḥ saha sthānaṃ nopādānopādeyabhāvād ityato 'nekānta eva /
For instance, it is only with Fire as the contributory cause, that Copper produces Fluidity, not otherwise; similarly, in the case in question, the Foetus, which is the material cause of the Body, produces the next body, which is the contributory cause of Subjective Consciousness; so that the concomitance between the Body and the Subjective Consciousness is not due to the one being the material cause of the other; to tins extent, the Reason adduced is ‘Inconclusive’, ‘Doubtful
athāpi syāt yadyapyuttarakālaṃ manodhīḥ pūrvapūrvabuddhiprabhavā bhavati tathāpi yā prathamakālabhāvinī tasyā dehopādānatvād ato nānāditvasiddhir iti /
“Even though the Subjective Consciousness appearing subsequently proceeds from each proceeding Consciousness (cognition), yet that which appears for the first time must have proceeded from the Body; hence it cannot be regarded as beginningless”.
tadetad asamyak /
This is not right.
na hyasyāḥ kalpanāyāḥ kiñcitsādhakaṃ pramāṇam astīti pratipāditametat /
There is no proof in support of such an assumption, as has been explained already.
bādhakam api nāstīti cen na /
It cannot be said that “there is no proof to the contrary either”;
vidyata eva bādhakam /
because there certainly is proof to the contrary.
tathā hi yadi dehāt sakṛdutpannā satī manodhīḥ paścāt sajātisamudbhavā syāt tadottarakālaṃ sarvadaiva pūrvapūrvamanovijñānasamudbhavaiva syāt navijātīyacakṣurādivijñānasamudbhavā na hi dhūmo 'gneḥ sakṛdbhūya paścād anyato vijātīyād udbhavati /
For instance, if the Mental Cognition (Subjective Consciousness) were once at the outset produced out of the Body and then subsequently came to be produced out of each preceding homogeneous Cognition, then for ever afterwards it would be produced out of preceding homogeneous cognitions, and never out of heterogeneous cognitions produced through the Eye and other organs; when once the Smoke has been produced by Fire, it is never, later on, produced from anything not homogeneous to itself.
naca manomatir uttarakālaṃ manovijñānasamudbhavaivānubhūyate /
As a matter of fact, Mental Cognition is not always found to be produced by Mental Cognitions only;
naca yadyataḥ prathamataramudayamāsādayat samupalabdhaṃ tat tato 'nyato bhavitum arhati ahetukatvaprasaṅgāt /
when one thing has been found to appear immediately, after another thing, the former cannot be held to proceed from anything other than the latter; as in that case, it would have to be regarded as being without cause.
[p.530] prathamataraṃ vā niyatacakṣurādivijñānasamanantaramudayamāsādayantī manodhīr anubhūyata iti /
As regards Mental Cognition, it is found to appear immediately after the visual and other cognitions;
ato 'pratiniyatavijñānamātrabhāvinīti siddham /
hence it becomes established that it can follow from any Cognition without restriction.
kiṃ ca yadi prathamakāla eva manomater upādānakāraṇaṃ deho nottarakālaṃ tadā dehanirapekṣā sā kiṃ na pravarteta nahyanupakāriṇi dehe tasyāḥ kācid apekṣā yuktā /
Further, if it is only at the earlier stage that the Body is the material cause of the Mental Cognition, and not at the later stages, then why should it not proceed entirely independently of the Body? It is not right that it should depend upon the Body which does not help it in any way.
yasyāpi tada{va---}buddhantarapūrvikā buddhis tasyāpi kevalāṃ kiṃ na pravartata iti cen na /
It might be urged “In your case also, where one cognition is preceded and brought about by another cognition, why should not the Cognition proceed by itself alone?” There can be no force in.
pravartata eva /
this, as it does so proceed;
yathā virūpe dhātau /
as in the case where the Mind-element is without material embodiment;
yānurūpe spṛhāvatī sā tat sāpekṣā vartata ityanupālambha eva /
when a Cognition wants another Cognition, it is dependent upon that; this is only natural and should not be objected to.
athottarakālaṃ dehasyāpyupakāritvamaṅgīkriyate tadānekavijñānaprabandhaprasavaprasaṅgaḥ /
If it is held that “at the later stages also the Body does help the mental Cognition”, then there would be the incongruity of several chains of Cognition proceeding at once;
śarīrasyāparavijñānopādānabhūtasyāvikalasya tajjanakatvenāvasthitatvāt / tathā hi yadyadevotpadyate dehād vijñānaṃ tat tadaparaṃ pṛthakpṛthagvijñānaṃ santanotītyekasya prāṇinaḥ pratikṣaṇam aprameyavijñānasantānāḥ prasūyeran /
as the Body which is the Material Cause of the other Cognition would be present there in its efficient form and would be productive of the same. Because whichever Cognition is produced from the Body sets going its own ‘chain of cognitions’ which is different from the other Chains; in this way therefore for a single person there would be issuing forth, at every moment, innumerable ‘Chains of Cognition’, But such is never found to be the case.
athāpi syād uttarakālaṃ dehasya nopādānakāraṇatvena pṛthagupakāritvam iṣṭam /
It might be argued that “when the Body helps the Cognition at the later stages, it does not help as its Material Cause;
kiṃ tarhiprabandhena svopādānataḥ pravartamānāyā manodhiya uttarottarakāryaprasavaṃ prati sahakāritvād upakārī deha ityato na dehanirapekṣā sā pravartata iti /
it is only as a Contributory Cause that it helps the Mental Cognition that has been produced out of itself as the Material Cause, in bringing about each of its succeeding effects; so that the Body helps as a contributory cause, and the Cognition does not function entirely independently of the Body at any stage.”
etad api mithyā /
This also cannot be true.
nahi yo yasya yathā janakatvena prasiddhaḥ sa taṃ janayannanyathā janayati viśeṣābhāvāt /
When one thing is known to be productive of another thing in a certain way, it cannot produce it in any other way; as there is no difference in the conditions.
tathā hy ālokādir anupahatacakṣur vijñānaṃ pratyālambanabhāvena janakatvam
For instance, the Light, having served as productive of visual Cognition as its basis, does not produce it in another way;
anubhūya na punas tasyānyathā janako bhavati / yadāha
as has been thus declared ‘Apart from apprehensibility, there is no other characteristic of the apprehensible thing;
sākṣān na hyanyathā buddhe rūpādirupakārakaḥ" //
Colour and other things cannot otherwise be helpful to the Cognition’.
anyathā kāryasya kāraṇakṛtasvabhāvabhedābhedasya vyavasthānaṃ na syāt tadgatopakārānanuvidhānāt /
If it were not so, there could be no certainty regarding the difference and non-difference of the Effect from the character brought about by its Cause; as it would not be following in the wake of the help rendered by it;
tataścāhetukatvaprasaṅgaḥ /
and this would mean that the Effect is without a Cause.
naca prathamakālaṃ dehasya vijñānaṃ prati sākṣājjanakatvavyatirekeṇānyadupādānatvaṃ tvayā gṛhītam /
Then again, at the first stage, apart from the Body being directly productive of the Cognition, you have not noticed in it any other character of the Material Cause.
sākṣād upakāritvam eva /
What you have apprehended is merely the fact of its being a directly contributory cause.
taccottarakālamapyastīti kiṃ nopādānakāraṇaṃ syāt / athānyat pūrvam api mābhūt paścādvadaviśeṣāt /
And as this is present at the later stages also, why should it not be the Material Cause at those stages also? Otherwise, as at the later stages, so at the first stage also, it may not be the Material Cause at all;
nacottarakālam api pūrvavijñānasahakārī deha evottarabuddherupādānaṃ bhaviṣyatīti śakyaṃ vaktum pūrvaṃ vistareṇopādānatvasya niṣiddhatvāt /
It will not be right to argue that “At the later stages also, it is the Body itself which, along with the preceding Cognition, would be the Material Cause of each succeeding Cognition Because the possibility of its being such a Material Cause has been already rejected in detail;
prathamajanmabuddher api buddhyantarapūrvakatvaprasaṅgāt /
and also because in that case, the first initial Cognition also would have to be regarded as preceded and produced by another Cognition.
ata evānityabhūtapakṣepyetadācāryīyaṃ dūṣaṇaṃ sutarāṃ śliṣyate / yadāha ---"dehāt sakṛdutpannā dhīryadi svajātyā niyamyate parataścet samarthasya dehasya viratiḥ kutaiti /
It is for these reasons that even under the view that material substances are impermanent, the following objection urged by the Teacher, remains applicable ‘If the Cognition, once produced from the Body, becomes restricted to its own kind, through something else, then why should there be cessation of the Efficient Body?’
tasmāt siddhā manobuddher anāditā /
From all this it follows that Mental Cognition (Subjective Consciousness) is without beginning.
athavā sarvaiva buddhir aviśeṣeṇānādiḥ siddhā /
Or it may be understood, that all Cognition, without exception, is without beginning.
tathā hi ādibuddhir bhavantī akṣabuddhir vā bhavet manobuddhir vā /
Because if the Cognition had a beginning, then, when the Cognition would appear first of all, would it be Sensuous Cognition or Mental Cognition? It could not be Sensuous Cognition;
na tāvad ādyaḥ pakṣaḥ suptamūrcchānyacittānāṃ satyapyakṣe 'nuguṇamanaskārābhāvād akṣabuddher anutpatteḥ /
because in the case of men asleep, or in a swoon, or with mind elsewhere, even though the Sense-organs are there, the Sensuous Cognition does not appear, on account of the absence of the mental functions.
ato na kevalam indriyamakṣabuddheḥ kāra [p.531] ṇam /
Hence it is understood that the Sense-organs alone cannot be the cause of Sensuous Cognition;
api tu manaskāraviśeṣasāpekṣam iti niścīyate / anvayavyatirekasamadhigamyatvāt karyakāraṇabhāvasya /
they can be so only through the help of a particular functioning of the Mind; and it should be so understood because the causal relation between things is always determined by positive and negative concomitance.
na cāpi yato yat prathamataramutpadyamānaṃ niścitaṃ tat tato 'nyasmāt prathamataram udayam āsādayaty ahetukatvaprasaṅgāt /
When too one thing has been ascertained to be produced, at first, from a certain other thing, it cannot obtain appearance before that from any third thing; as such appearance would be without a cause;
dhūma ivānagneḥ /
as for example, if Smoke were held to proceed from non-fire.
prathamataraṃ cākṣabuddhir utpadyamānānuguṇamanaskārasāpekṣaivotpadyata iti /
When the Sensuous Cognition has come about first of ah, it does so only through a favourable mental operation;
tasmān na kevalam indriyamasyāḥ kadācit kāraṇam iti siddham /
hence it becomes established that the Sense-organ alone can never be its cause;
anyathā nirhetukatvaprasaṅgo bādhakaṃ pramāṇam /
otherwise it would be without a cause; this is an argument that annuls the said view.
nāpi manobuddhir iti pakṣaḥ /
Nor can the first Cognition be a Mental Cognition (the second alternative put forth on bottom of p.
nahi sākṣairanupalabdhe 'rthe svātantryeṇa pravartate andhabadhirādyabhāvaprasaṅgāt /
As a matter of fact, it never appears independently by itself in reference to anything not apprehended by the senses; if it did, there would be no deaf or blind persons.
pravartatāṃ vā kiṃ sā savikalpikā āhosvid avikalpiketi vaktavyam /
Even if it did appear so, it should be explained if it would be conceptual (determinate) or non-conceptual (indeterminate)? It could not be conceptual;
tathā hi vikalpaḥ pravartamānaḥ sarvaṃ eva bodhakaśabdākārānusyūta eva vartate antarjalpākāratayā nityamanubhūyamānatvāt /
whenever Conceptual Thought operates it operates always as associated with verbal expression, expressive of the concept; because it is always found to appear in the form of an internal (unexpressed) verbal presentation;
sā ca vācakaśabdākāratā vikalpasya saṅketagrahaṇavaśād vā bhavet yadvā vācakātmanaḥ śabdarūpasya jñānātmadharmarūpatvād bodharūpavacchabdārthagrahaṇād veti vikalpāt /
and this expressive verbal form of the Conceptual Thought could proceed either (a) from the comprehension of Convention, or (b) from the fact of Word in the expressive form being a property of the Cognition itself, like the form of consciousness, or (c) from the comprehension of the meaning of the Word.
tatra na tāvat saṅketagrahaṇād iti pakṣaḥ pūrvaṃ saṅketasyāgṛhītatvāt /
(а) It cannot be true that it proceeds from the comprehension of Convention; because the Convention has not yet been comprehended.
nāpi dvitīyaḥ pakṣaḥ /
(b) Nor can the second alternative be accepted;
tathā hi dvividhaḥ śabdātmā svalakṣaṇarūpaḥ sāmānyalakṣaṇarūpaś ca tatrayas tāvat svalakṣaṇarūpastasyāvācakatvānubhavākāratayā jñānasya savikalpakatvaṃ nāpyasau jñānasyātmagato dharmo nīlādivad bahirūpeṇa bhāsanāt /
because the essence-form of the Word is twofold ‘Specific Individuality’ and ‘Universal’, Of these the ‘Specific Individuality’ of the Word is always apprehended in an inexpressive form; hence on that basis, the Cognition could (not) be conceptual (determinate). Nor is it a property of the Cognition itself, as it always appears as something external, like the Blue and other objects.
anyathā hi nīlādīnām api jñānadharmatvaṃ syāt /
If then, it were the property of the Cognition itself, then the Blue and other things also might be the property of the Cognition itself;
aviśeṣāt /
as there would be nothing to distinguish between the two eases.
tataś ca vijñānamātrameva viśvaṃ syāt na bhūtapariṇāmarūpam /
In that case the entire universe would be mere Cognition, and not a modification of Material Substances.
nanu sākārajñānapakṣe nīlādiprakāro jñānasyātmagata eva dharmo bahīrūpeṇa bhāsate tat kimucyate bahīrūpeṇa bhāsanājjñānātmadharmo na bhavatīti /
Objection: “According to the view that Cognition has forms, the Blue and other things are of the very essence of the Cognition, and it is these that appear as external; what then is it that is meant by the assertion that ‘because they appear in the external form they cannot be properties of the Cognition’?”
satyam etat /
True;
kiṃ tu bāhyārthoparāgitayā jñānasya tathā pratibhāsanān nātmagato 'sau jñānasyeti vyavasthāpyate /
but the very fact of Cognition appearing in a form tainted by the external object leads us to conclude that it forms the essence, not of the Cognition, but of the external object;
tatraiva tasya nijatvāt /
as therein lies its own essence.
jñāne tu tasyārthopadhānakṛtatvenāgantukatvāt /
In the Cognition it appears only on account of certain circumstances and is purely adventitious.
tasmān na svalakṣaṇarūpaḥ śabdātmā vācako nāpyasau jñānātmadharmaḥ /
From all this it follows that the Word in the form of ‘Specific Individuality’ cannot be expressive; nor can it be the property of the Cognition itself.
sāmānyalakṣaṇarūpas tu yadyapi vācakas tathāpyasau jñānātmadharmo na bhavati / bāhyaparaśabdasvalakṣaṇaśrotrāvaseye tasya yojyamānatvāt na jñātmani /
As regards Word in the form of the ‘Universal’, though that is expressive, yet it cannot be a property of the Cognition itself; because it is tacked on, not to the Cognition itself but, to that which is comprehended on the hearing of the Specific Individuality of the Word appertaining to the external thing.
na hyanyagataṃ sāmānyamanyatra yojyate jñāne 'tiprasaṅgāt /
The ‘Universal’ of one thing cannot be tacked on to another thing; if it were, then there would be incongruities in the Cognition;
evaṃ hi gotvamāśvādāvapi yojyeta /
as in that case the Universal • Cow’ could be tacked on to the Horse.
nacāgṛhītaśabdasvalakṣaṇe dharmiṇi taddharmo vācakātmā yojayituṃ śakyate /
And until the thing, in the shape of the Specific Individuality has been apprehended, it is not possible to tack on to it that property which is expressive;
dharmāṇāṃ dharmiparatantratayā svātantryeṇāgrahaṇāt /
for the simple reason that Properties are always dependent upon the Objects to which they belong, and as such cannot be apprehended by themselves.
nāpi vikalpena svalakṣaṇātmā dharmī grahītuṃ śakyate /
And the thing in the form of ‘Specific Individuality’ cannot be apprehended by conceptual thought;
tasya sāmānyalakṣaṇaviṣayatvāt / tasmād anādisvalakṣaṇānubhavāhitavāsanāprabodhajanmāno vikalpā iti siddham /
as this latter always envisages the ‘Universal’, Hence it becomes established that all Conceptual Thoughts have their source in the awakening of the Tendencies created by the beginningless apprehension of ‘Specific Individualities’.
nāpi śabdārthagrahaṇād iti pakṣaḥ na hyarthe śabdāḥ santi tadātmāno [p.532] vā avyutpannasyāpi pratītiprasaṅgāt /
(c) Nor, lastly, could the fact of the conceptual thought having the form of the expressive Word be due to the comprehension of what is expressed by the Word. Because words do not subsist in the object; nor are they of the nature of objects;
kiṃ ca anityādirūpeṇārthasyāviśeṣe 'pi na vikalpaḥ sarvānākārānyugapadvikalpayati / ākārāntaravyavacchedena pratiniyataikākāropagraheṇaiva vikalpasyotpatteḥ /
Further, though all objects are similar in so far as they are impermanent, yet Conceptual Thought cannot envisage them all at one and the same time; as each Conceptual Thought appears only in respect of certain well-defined objects with special forms, as differentiated from other forms.
ataścaikākāravikalpena kāraṇaṃ vaktavyam /
Hence the Cause that is pointed out should be through a conceptual thought that appertains to a single form.
na cābhyāsāt tadanyadvaktuṃ śakyam yathā kuṇapādivikalpānām /
Such a cause cannot be indicated to be any other except Repeated Practice; as is found in the case of the Conceptual Thoughts appertaining to dead bodies (?).
tataś ca pūrvābhyāsavaśena vikalpakasya pravṛtter anādir vikalpakabuddhir iti siddham /
Thus then as the Conceptual Thought proceeds through previous repeated practice, it becomes proved that the Conceptual Cognition is without beginning.
athāvikalpaketi pakṣas tadā na kadācid vikalpikā buddhir utpadyate /
53, line 7 of the original) that ‘the first Mental Cognition (or Subjective Consciousness) is non-conceptual Because under that view there would never be any Conceptual Cognition at all.
proktanītyā saṅketavaśād uttarakālam utpadyata iti cen na /
It might be argued that “in the manner explained before, it could appear later on on the basis of Conception”. But that cannot be;
nirvikalpakajñāne sthitasya bhraṃśaḥ{pumsaḥ} saṅketasya kartumaśakyatvāt /
so long as the man rests upon non-conceptual cognition, he cannot set up any Convention.
tathā hi na yāvacchabdasāmānyamarthasāmānyaṃ vā buddhāvavabhāsate na tāvat saṅketaḥ śakyate kartum / naca vikalpe vijñāne sāmānyaṃ pratyavabhāsate /
Because no Convention can be set up until the Universal Word or the Universal Thing figures in the Cognition; what does figure in the Cognition however is the Specific Individuality, and no Convention can be made either in relation to it or upon its basis;
na ca saṅketakāladṛṣṭasya svalakṣaṇasya vyavahārakāle 'sti sambhava iti na svalakṣaṇe saṅketakaraṇāt pūrvaṃ vikalpo 'vaśyābhyupagantavyaḥ /
because it is meant for the purposes of Usage, while the Specific Individuality that is seen at the time of the Convention can never be present at the time of usage; consequently it has to be admitted that there is Conceptual Thought before the Convention is made relating to the Specific Individuality.
sa cābhyāsamantareṇa na siddhyatīti siddhānāditā /
so that there also it becomes established that the Cognition in question is without beginning.
api ca yadi pūrvajanmābhyāsāhitavāsanānvayāt prathamajanmabhāvinī neṣyate buddhis tadā sadyojātasya sataḥ śiśostiryaggatasyāpīdaṃ sukhasya sādhanam iva duḥkhasyeti vyavasāyaḥ kathaṃ bhavet / yena sukhasādhanaṃ stanādikam anvicchati /
Then again, if it is not admitted that ‘the first Cognition at birth is due to the continuity of the impressions left by the repeated experiences of previous lives’, then, how would you account for the idea in the new-born babe, even among animals of a certain thing being a source of pleasure and another a source of pain? It is by virtue of such ideas that it seeks for the mother’s breasts which it regards as a source of pleasure, and it cries out when it does not find it, or having found it suddenly stops crying and proceeds to feed itself.
na hyanena kadācit stanādeḥ kṣutpīḍādyupaśamanādihetutvamanubhūtam /
Certainly during its present life, the baby has never experienced the fact of the breasts being the means of allaying the pangs of hunger.
nacāpi prapātapatanāder upahatikāraṇatā /
Nor has it had any experience of falling from a precipice being a source of hurt and pain;