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atītārthāpekṣayā kāryatāṃ gatam, anāgatāpekṣayā kāraṇatām /
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It has become the ‘Effect’ in relation to the ‘Past’, and ‘Cause’ in relation to the ‘Future’,
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vikalpānugatātmabhir iti / savikalpair ity arthaḥ /
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‘Vikalpānugatātmabhiḥ’ i.e. with Conceptual (Determinate) Cognitions.
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tattvato 'viṣayair iti /
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‘Really without objects’;
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āviṣṭābhilāpair jñānaiḥ svalakṣaṇasyāviṣayīkaraṇāt /
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because the Specific Individuality of things cannot be envisaged by Cognitions associated with verbal expressions.
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tat tasmāt /
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‘Tat’ Thus, Therefore.
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hetuphalayoḥ santatiṃ bhūtāṃ bhāvinīṃ cāśritā atītādideśanā yoginām apariśuddhānāṃ pravartante /
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On the basis of the Past and Future series of Causes and Effects, proceed all teachings regarding the Past and the Future, from such Mystics as have not yet reached the Purest (Highest) stage.
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bhagavatas tu tathāgatasya śuddhalaukikam api jñānaṃ nāsti, nityasamāhitatvāt sarvāvidyāprahāṇena /
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As regards the Blessed Lord Himself, He does not even have the purely secular cognition, because He is always calm and collected on account of the destruction of all Illusion and Ignorance;
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vikalpasya cāvidyāsvabhāvatvāt /
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and all that is Conceptual is the product of Ignorance and Illusion.
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"vikalpaḥ svayam evāyam avidyārūpatāṃ gataḥ / svākārambāhyarūpeṇa yasmād āropya vartate" //
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This has been thus declared ‘Conceptual Content itself having assumed the form of Ignorance proceeds to impose its own form in the shape of the External world’.
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iti tasya pūrvapraṇidhānapuṇyajñānasambhārasāmarthyād avāptacintāmaṇisadṛśātmabhāvasyānābhogenaiva deśanāḥ pravartante //
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So that, under the influence of the whole mass of His previous Meditations, Piety and Knowledge, His nature has become like that of the Cintāmaṇi-gem;
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iti traikālyaparīkṣā //
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hence His teachings proceed without circumlocution of any kind.
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KAPITEL LOKAAYATAPARIIK.SAA anādyantamityetat samarthanārthaṃ codyopakramapūrvakam āha yadītyādi /
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[In the Introductory Text, 4.] the Truth has been spoken of as ‘without beginning, without end’. The Author proceeds to set forth arguments in support of this view, starting with the criticism that has been urged against it: [see verse 1857 above]
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yadi nānugatobhāvaḥ kaścid apy atra vidyate /
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‘No entity’ like the Soul, etc. The ‘Soul’ has been already rejected;
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paralokas tadā na syād abhāvāt paralokinaḥ //
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hence it cannot be ‘continuous’, simply because it does not exist at ail;
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[p.520] kaścid iti /
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“If there is no entity that has continuity of existence, then there can be no ‘other world’, because there is nothing that could belong to the ‘other world’.” (1857) [In the Introductory Text, 4.] the Truth has been spoken of as ‘without beginning, without end’.
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ātmādiḥ /
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‘No entity’ like the Soul, etc.
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tatrātmanaḥ pūrvaṃ pratiṣiddhatvād abhāvād eva nānugāmitvaṃ, vijñānādīnāṃ ca kṣaṇikatvāt traikālyaparīkṣāyāṃ cānvayasya niṣiddhatvān nānvayaḥ // natu dehādayaḥ paralokino bhaviṣyantītyāha dehetyādi /
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The ‘Soul’ has been already rejected; hence it cannot be ‘continuous’, simply because it does not exist at ail; as for the Cognition and other entities, they are all momentary, and it has been proved in the Chapter on ‘The Three Points of Time’ that there can be no continuity of these. “The body, the cognition, the sense-organs and the rest being destroyed every moment, they could not pertain to the other world;
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na yuktaṃ paralokitvaṃ nānyaścābhyupagamyate //
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and there is nothing else that is admitted (by you, Buddhists).
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tasmād bhūtaviśeṣebhyo yathā śuktasurādikam / tebhya eva tathā jñānaṃ jāyate vyajyate 'thavā //
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hence consciousness must be regarded as produced from, or manifested by, certain material substances, just like fermented acids, liquors and such things.” (1858-1859)
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ādiśabdena vedanāsaṃjñāsaṃskārāṇāṃ grahaṇam /
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The term ‘and the rest’ includes Feeling (Vedanā) Name-conception (Saṃjñā) and Mental Faculties (Saṃskāra).
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nānyaścābhyupagamyata iti / ātmā /
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‘There is nothing else that is admitted’ in the shape of the ‘Soul’.
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tallokāyatapakṣānulomanam eva jñā{jā---tam /
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Thus this turns out to be the assertion of the view of the Lokāyata (Materialist).
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tathā hi tasyaitat sūtram ---"paralokino 'bhāvātparalokābhāva" iti /
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His aphorisms read as follows: “There being nothing that could belong to the other world, there can be no other world;
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tathā hi pṛthivyāpastejovāyur iti catvāri tattvāni tebhyaścaitanyam iti /
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there are four material substances, Earth, Water, Fire and Air; and from these proceeds Consciousness
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tatra kecid vṛttikārā vyācakṣate utpadyate tebhyaścaitanyam, anye 'bhivyajyata ityāhuḥ, ataḥ pakṣadvayam āha jāyate vyajyate 'thaveti /
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Some commentators upon these aphorisms offer the explanation that Consciousness is produced out of the material substances; others explain that it becomes manifested by them, Hence the author has mentioned both these views ‘produced or manifested’.
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śuktamāmlatvam /
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‘Śukta’ is fermented acid.
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sureti /
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‘Surā’ is intoxicating liquor.
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madajananaśaktiḥ /
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‘And such things’ is meant to include things having the effect of making people unconscious and so forth.
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ādiśabdena mūrchādijananasāmarthyaparigrahaḥ //
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“The names ‘body’, ‘sense-organ’ and so on are applied to particular combinations of earth and other material substances;
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nanu cakṣurādīnāṃ viṣayāṃś ca rūpādīn pratītya vijñānam utpadyata ityatipratītam etat, tat katham ucyate tebhya eva vijñānam ity āha sanniveśaviśeṣa iti /
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An objection is raised ‘As a matter of fact, Consciousness (or Cognition) is always produced on the basis of such causes as the Eye and other Sense-organs, and Objects, in the shape of Colour (Forms); this fact is too well known. How then is it said that Cognition proceeds from those material substances?’
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tathā ca teṣāṃ sūtram tat samudāye viṣsayendriyasaṃjñeti /
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Says the Lokāyata-Sūtra “It is to the combination of these that the names ‘Object’ and ‘Sense-organ’ are applied;
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nahi mahābhūtavyatirekeṇendriyādīni santi tat saṃsthānaviśeṣa eva tat prajñapteḥ /
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the Sense-organ, etc. have no existence apart from the Great Material Substances the idea of those appear only in regard to the combinations of these;
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naca saṃsthānaṃ nāmānyat saṃsthānibhyaḥ /
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and ‘combination’ has no existence apart from the combining elements;
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idaṃ ca mahābhūtacatuṣṭayaṃ pratyakṣasaṃsiddham /
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these four Material Substances are well known by direct Perception.
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na caitad vyatirekeṇānyat tattvam asti pratyakṣasiddham / naca pratyakṣād anyat pramāṇam asti, yenānyasya paralokādeḥ saṃsiddhiḥ syāt //
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Apart from these, there is no other Reality, equally well known by direct Perception; and apart from Perception, there is no other Means of Cognition, which could prove the existence of the ‘other world’ and such things”.
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kāryakāraṇatā nāsti vivādapadacetasoḥ / vibhinnadehavṛttitvād gavāśvajñānayor iva //
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“There can be no relation of cause and effect between the two minds (consciousnesses) under dispute, because they subsist in different bodies, just like the consciousness of the cow and the consciousness of the horse.
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na vivakṣitavijñānajanyā vā matayo matāḥ / jñānatvād anyasantānasambaddhā iva buddhayaḥ //
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Cognitions (consciousness) cannot be the effects of the cognition (consciousness) in question, because they are consciousness, like consciousness connected with another ‘series’.” (1861-1862)
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[p.521] apica yadyatītadehavartinaścetasaḥ prathamajanmacittaṃ prati kāraṇābhāvaḥ syāt, maraṇacittasya cāgāmicittaṃ prati, tadā cittapratibandhānuparamāt paralokakalpanā syāt yāvatā prathamayos tāvad vivādāspadībhūtayoścetasor na kāryakāraṇatāsti bhinnadehavartitvāt gavāśvavartinor iva jñānayoḥ /
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“Further, if the Mind that existed in the past body were the cause of the Mind (Consciousness) in the body now born, and the Mind in the dying body were the cause of the Mind in the future body, then, inasmuch as there would be no cessation in the continuity of the Mind, the existence of the ‘other world’ might be postulated. As a matter of fact, however, there can be no relation of Cause and Effect between the said two Minds in dispute, because they reside in different bodies, just like the Cognition of the Cow and the Cognition of the Horse.
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athavā janmabuddhayo dharmiṇyaḥ, tāsām atītadehavarticaramavijñānajanyatvapratiṣedhaḥ sādhyaḥ, jñānatvād iti sāmānyaṃ hetuḥ, anyasantānavartinyobuddhayo nidarśanam /
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“Or, the produced Cognitions maybe made the ‘Subject’, in regard to which there is denial of the idea of their being produced by the last cognition in the past (dead) body; the ‘Probans’ being the same as before, ‘because they are cognitions’; the ‘Cognitions appearing in other Series’ supply the Corroborative Instance.
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prayogastvevam yadi jñānaṃ, na tadvivakṣitātītadehavarticaramajñānajanyam, jñānatvāt yathānyasantānavarti jñānam /
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“The argument may be formulated as follows: The (present) Cognition cannot be produced by the last Cognition in the Past body, because it is Cognition, like the Cognition appearing in another Series; the Cognitions appearing in the Body in question are all Cognitions;
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jñānarūpāścemā vivakṣitadehavartinyo janmabuddhaya iti viruddhavyāptopalabdhiḥ vivakṣitavijñānajanya{tva}viruddhena jñānatvasya vyāptatvāt //
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inasmuch as ‘being cognition’ is concomitant with the contrary of ‘being produced by the Cognition in the last Body in question”. The dying consciousness of the man beset with affections cannot bring about the contiguity of another mind (or consciousness), because it is dying consciousness, just like the dying consciousness of the person free from the ‘afflictions’ (passions and impurities)”.
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evaṃ tāvad atītajanmaniṣedhaḥ kṛtaḥ /
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The idea of the ‘previous birth’ has thus been denied by the Materialist;
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sāmpratamanāgatajanmaniṣedhāyāha sarāgasyetyādi /
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he proceeds to deny the ‘future birth’: [see verse 1863 above]
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sarāgamaraṇaṃ cittaṃ na cittāntarasandhikṛt / maraṇajñānabhāvena vītakleśasya tadyathā //
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“The Dying Consciousness cannot bring about another Consciousness, because it is Dying Consciousness like the dying Consciousness of the ‘Arhat’, (the Person free from the Afflictions (of Passions, etc.)”.
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kutas tarhi cittasyotpattir ity āha kāyādevetyādi /
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Question: How then does the Consciousness (Mind) come about? Answer: [see verse 1864 next]
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kāyādeva tato jñānaṃ prāṇāpānādyadhiṣṭhitāt /
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“From this it follows that the right view is that consciousness proceeds from the body itself which is equipped with the five life-breaths prāṇa, apāna and the rest;
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yuktaṃ jāyata ityetat kambalāśvataroditam //
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as has been declared by Kambalāśvatara.” (1864)
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tathāca sūtram kāyādeveti / kambalāśvataroditam iti //
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The Sūtra is “It is from the Body itself, etc.” which has been pronounced by Kambalāśvatara.
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kalalādiṣu vijñānam astītyetac ca sāhasam /
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“To assert that consciousness resides in the foetus, etc. is sheer audacity;
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asañjātendriyatvāddhi na tatrārtho 'vagamyate //
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nothing can re cognised at that stage, as the sense-organs are not there;
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na cārthāvagater anyad rūpaṃ jñānasya yujyate /
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and consciousness can have no form other than the cognition of things;
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mūrcchādāvapi tenāsya sadbhāvo nopapadyate //
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it is for this same reason that there is no consciousness in the state of swoon.
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nacāpi śaktirūpeṇa tadā dhīravatiṣṭhate / nirāśrayatvācchaktīnāṃ sthitir na hyavakalpate //
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nor can consciousness exist there in the form of a latent potency; because no potencies can exist without a substratum; and as there is no soul that could be that substratum of consciousness, the body is the only substratum possible for it.
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jñānādhārātmano 'sattve deha eva tadāśrayaḥ / ante dehanivṛttau ca jñānavṛttiḥ kimāśrayā //
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and this Consciousness is known as being produced by the Consciousness in the past body; then how can it be asserted that it proceeds from the Body itself only?
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indriyārtho hi vijñānotpatteḥ, kāraṇam arthādhigamarūpatvāj jñānasya,
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“The Sense-organ and the Object are the cause of the birth of Consciousness; because Consciousness consists only in the apprehension of things;
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kalaladyavasthāyāṃ cendriyārthayor abhāvāt kathaṃ tat kāryaṃ vijñānaṃ syāditi kāraṇānupalabdhā mūrcchādyavasthāyāṃ vijñānābhāvaḥ siddha itisamudāyārthaḥ /
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how then could there appear the effect of these, in the form of Consciousness? Thus it is proved that on account of the absence of the Cause, there can be no Consciousness, even in a swoon. Such is the upshot of the whole.
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naca śaktirūpeṇa tadā vijñānam astīti kalpayituṃ yuktaṃ, jñānāśrayasyātmano naiyāyikādiprakalpitasya vijñānaprabandhasya vā tadānīm abhāvāt /
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“It cannot be right to assert that at that stage the Consciousness is there in the state of latent Potency. Because at that stage, there is no substratum for such a Potency, either in the shape of the ‘Soul’ postulated by the Naiyāyīka, or in that of the ‘Chain of Cognitions’ (postulated by the Buddhist);
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naca nirāśrayā śaktir yuktā /
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and Potency cannot be there without a substratum.
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tasmāt sāmarthyād deha eva tadānīm āśrayaḥ /
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Hence it follows that on the ground of sheer capacity, the Body alone can be the substratum of Consciousness.
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anyasya jñānādhārātmanaḥ jñānādhāraś ca bhāvasya vijñānaprabandhasyātmano vā tadānīm asattvāt /
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For the simple reason that there is nothing else that could be the required substratum, either in the shape of the ‘Chain of Cognitions’ or the ‘Soul Consequently, at the end, when the.
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tataścānte maraṇāvasthāyāṃ dehasyāśrayasya nivṛttau nirāśrayaṃ kathaṃ jñānamavatiṣṭheteti siddho 'nāgatajanmābhāvaḥ //
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Body dies, the substratum in the shape of the Body having ceased to exist, how could the Consciousness exist without a substratum?
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tadanantarasambhūtadehāntarasamāśrayaḥ /
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“Thus it is proved that there can be no Future Birth.” (1865-1868)
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yadi deho 'paro dṛṣṭaḥ katham astīti gamyate // bhinnadehapravṛttaṃ ca gajavājyādicittavat / ekasantatisambaddhaṃ tadvijñānaṃ kathaṃ bhavet // eko jñānāśrayas tasmād anādinidhano naraḥ / saṃsārī kaścid eṣṭavyo yadvā nāstikatā parā //
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“When the other body has not been seen, how can it be understood that the required substratum is the body that is born subsequently? How too could the consciousness, residing in different bodies, be related to the same ‘chain of cognitions’, being like the consciousness of the elephant, the horse and other animals? For these reasons, as the substratum of consciousness, you have either to seek for a beginningless and endless transmigrating personality, or accept pure materialism.” (1869-1871)
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athāpi syān maraṇasamanatarasamudbhūtamantarābhāvikaṃ dehamāśritya cittavṛttir bhaviṣyatīti, tadetad asamyak /
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“It might be argued that the Consciousness would be subsisting in that intermediate body which would be produced immediately after death But that cannot be right;
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nahi maraṇāntaramaparo hi utpadyamāno dṛṣṭaḥ /
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because no such intermediate body has ever been seen appearing immediately after death;
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nacādṛṣṭasyāstitvaniścayo yuktaḥ /
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and there can be no certainty regarding the existence of what has never been seen;
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tasyāsadvyavahāraviṣayatvāt /
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as such a thing is always regarded as non-existent.
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nacaikasantānavartinaścetaso dehāntarasamāśrayaṇaṃ yuktam, gajavājyādicittavadekasantānasambandhitvahāniprasaṅgāt /
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Nor can it be right for the Consciousness of one ‘chain’ to subsist in another body; as in that case the character of being related to the same ‘chain’ would be lost; just as in the case of the Consciousness of the different animals, Elephant, Horse and so forth.
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prayogaḥ yadbhinnadehapravṛttaṃ vijñānaṃ na tadekasantānasambaddhaṃ, yathāgajavājninościttaṃ, bhinnadehavṛttaṃ cāntarābhāvamaraṇabhavayościttam iti vyāpakaviruddhopalambhaprasaṅgaḥ /
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“The argument may be formulated thus: Consciousness appearing in different bodies cannot belong to the same ‘chain’, like the Cognition of the Elephant and that of the Horse, the Consciousness subsisting in the dead body and that subsisting in the succeeding Intermediate Body subsist in different bodies; hence there would be the possibility of the apprehension of what is contrary to the wider conception;
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nacaivaṃ, tasmād viparyayaḥ /
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but as a matter of fact, there is no such apprehension; hence the contrary must be true.
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yadekasantānasambaddhaṃ tadbhinnadehapravṛttaṃ na bhavati, yathā gajacittamaśvadehānāśritam, ekasantānasambaddhaṃ ca prāṇinaścittam iti viruddhavyāptopalabdhiḥ /
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That is, what are related to the same ‘Chain’ cannot subsist in different bodies, e.g. the Consciousness of the Elephant does not subsist in the body of the Horse; the Consciousness of every person is related to the same ‘Chain’; hence there is apprehension of what is concomitant with the contrary;
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bhinnadehapravṛttatvaviruddhenābhinnadehapravṛttatvenaikasantānasambaddhatvasya vyāptatvāt / ekaṃ ityādyupasaṃhāraḥ /
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because ‘being related to the same Chain’ is invariably concomitant with ‘subsisting in the same body’, which is contrary to ‘subsisting in different bodies’. The words ‘For these reasons, etc. etc.’ recapitulates the Materialist’s view.
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ādirutpādo nidhanaṃ nāśaḥ, na vidyete ādinidhane yasyāsā [p.523] vanādinidhanaḥ /
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‘Ādi’ is birth, beginning; ‘nidhana’ is destruction, end; that which has neither beginning nor end is ‘beginningless and endless’.
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nara ityātmā /
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[This use of ‘nāstikatā’ is to be noted;
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yadvā nātikatā paretyanena paralokino 'bhāvāt paralokābhāva ityetat sūtraṃ sūcayati //
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as it affords another indication of the truth that ‘nāstika’ is not the same as ‘Atheist’; ‘nāstikatā’, as we find here, is the view that denies the other World.
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tadatra paraloko 'yaṃ nānyaḥ kaścana vidyate / upādānatadādeyabhūtajñānādisantateḥ // kācinniyatamaryādāvasthaiva parikīrtyate / tasyāścānādyanantāyāḥ paraḥ pūrva iheti ca //
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As regards the ‘other world’, there is no such ‘other world’, apart from the ‘chain of causes and effects, in the form of cognition and the rest what is spoken of as ‘the other world’ or ‘this world’, that is only by way of a certain limit placed upon the said ‘chain’ which is beginningless and endless.
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dṛṣṭamātrasukhāsaktair yathaitāvati kalpyate / paraloko 'nyadeśādis tathātrāsmābhirucyate //
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We regard it to be thus, in the same way as people addicted to the pleasures of the perceptible only assume the ‘other world’ to consist in some other part of the country.
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yadi tadvyatiriktās tu paraloko niṣidhyate / tadā sādhanavaiphalyaṃ tadasattve vivādataḥ //
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If what you are denying is the ‘other world’ different from those just mentioned, then the attempt to prove that denial is futile; as there is no dispute (between us) regarding the non-existence of such ‘other world’.
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santater nanvavastutvānnāvasthāntarasambhavaḥ /
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Objection “the chain being a non-entity, it cannot have different states;
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tatrāvasthāpito lokaḥ paro vā tāttvikaḥ katham //
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how then can the ‘other world’ consisting of these, be anything real?” Answer there is nothing in this;
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naiva santatiśabdena kṣaṇāḥ santānino hi te / sāmastyena prakāśyante lāghavāya vanādivat //
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what are denoted by the term ‘chain’ are the members of the chain, spoken of collectively by that term for the sake of brevity; just like such terms as ‘forest’ and the like.
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tatra ko 'yaṃ paraloko nāma yasya bhavatā niṣedhaḥ kriyate, kiṃ vijñānādiskandhacatuṣṭayād upādānopādeyatvena kāryakāraṇabhūtād anya āhosvittadeva /
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The following Texts answer the above arguments (of the Materialist): [see verses 1869-1871 above] What is the ‘other world’ which yon are denying? Is it something different from the Chain of causes and effects, consisting of Cognition and the other four ‘Phases’ (Skandhas)? Or is it this same Chain?
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na tāvadādyaḥ pakṣaḥ, tasyānabhyupetatvāt /
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The former cannot be right; as no such ‘other world’ has been admitted.
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nahyupādānopādeyabhūtāyā vijñānādisantateranyaḥ paraloko 'trāsti, yasyābhyupagamaḥ syāt /
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In fact, there is nothing apart from the Chain of Causes and Effects, in the shape of Cognition and the rest, which could be accepted.
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kiṃ tarhitasyā jñānādisantater anādyanantāyāḥ kācid eva varṣaśatādyavadhirūpamaryādāvyavasthaiva paralokaḥ pūrva iheti vā vyavasthāpyate /
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What is actually regarded as the ‘other world’, or ‘this world’, or the ‘previous world’, is only by way of a certain limit, in the form of a hundred years or so placed upon the said Chain of Cognition, etc., which is without beginning and without end.
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yathā bhavadbhir dṛṣṭamātrasukhābhiṣaṅgādetāvatīndriyagocara evānyadeśādiḥ paralokāditvena kalpate /
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This is exactly as you (Materialists), who are addicted to merely perceptible pleasures, apply the name ‘other world’ to some other part of this same visible world;
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yathoktam ---"etāvāneva puruṣo yāvānindriyagocaraḥ, tathā punar uktadeśāntaraṃ kālāntaram avasthāntaraṃ vā paraloka" iti /
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as is declared in such assertions as ‘The Man is only so much as is perceptible of the senses’; and again, ‘The other world consists in another place, or another time or another state’.
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yadi tu kāryakāraṇabhūtavijñānādisantānavyatiriktasya paralokasya niṣedhaḥ kriyate tadā siddhasādhyatvāt sādhanavaiphalyaṃ, tathābhūtasya paralokasyānabhyupagatatvāt /
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If, on the other hand, the ‘other world’ that is denied is something different from the said Chain of causes and effects in the shape of Cognition, etc., then, as such a conclusion is already admitted (by both parties), any proving of it would be futile;
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nanu ca santater avastutvāt tasyāmavasthāviśeṣo yo vyavasthāpitaḥ sopyavastveva, tataś ca tatra tasyāṃ santatāvasthāviśeṣe 'vasthāpito 'yaṃ paraloko 'pi napāramārthikaḥ syāt /
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as no such ‘other world’ is postulated by us. An objection is raised “The Chain being a non-entity, any State that is attributed to it must also be a non-entity; under the circumstances, the ‘other world’ based upon such limitation could not be real”.
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naiṣa doṣaḥ /
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Answer This does not affect our position.
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santatiśabdena kṣaṇā eva vastu [p.524] bhūtāḥ santānino vyavahāralāghavāya sāmastyena yugapat prakāśyante, vanādiśabdeneva dhavādayaḥ //1872-
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What the term ‘Chain’ denotes are the members of the chain, which are entities; these being spoken of, for the sake of brevity, and expressed collectively and simultaneously, by the one name ‘Chain’; just in the same way as the Dhava and other trees (which are real) are spoken of collectively as ‘Forest’ (though the Forest as such is not a real entity).
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kathaṃ tarhi santater avastutvaṃ pūrvam uktaṃ santānādīva kāritram ityatra prastāva ity āha ekatvenetyādi /
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Question: “If it is so, then how was it that the Chain was spoken of as a non-entity under Text 1807, where the Chain or Series has been declared to be ‘illusory’ (unreal)?”
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ekatvenāvaklṛptatvān niḥsvabhāvatayā matā / tattvānyatvādyanirdeśyā viyatkamalapaṅktivat //
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It is because it is conceived as ‘one’ (composite), and is featureless and incapable of being indicated either as the same, or as different (from the component members of the chain), that the chain has been regarded as a ‘non-entity’: just like the ‘line of sky-lotuses’.
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sā cānādiranantā ca na siddhiṃ kathamṛcchati / yadyahetukametat syāccittamādyatayā matam // nityahetusamudbhūtaṃ nityaṃ satsvata eva vā / bhūtamātrodbhavaṃ vāpi yadvānyajñānamātrajam //
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As it is, why cannot the chain be accepted as being without beginning and without end? If [it had a beginning and] the first member of the ‘chain’ consisted of the first cognition, this could be held to be either (1) ‘without cause’, or (2) as produced by an eternal cause, or (3) as eternal by itself, or (4) as produced from any substance, or (5) as produced by any other cognition.
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garbhādāvādivijñānaṃ tatrāhetu na yujyate /
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(1) The first cognition would appear at the very inception of the foetus, and it could not come about without cause;
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kādācitkatayā sattvaṃ sarvathāsyānyathā bhavet //
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because otherwise, its existence, which is only occasional, would be quite the reverse (everlasting).
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nāpi nityamanaḥkāladigīśātmādibhiḥ kṛtam /
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(2) Nor could it be brought about by such eternal causes as mind, time, space, god, soul and so forth;
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tata eva sadā sattvaprasaṅgāt tadabhāvataḥ // ekaṃ nityasvabhāvaṃ ca vijñānam iti sāhasam /
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because on that very account it should be eternal. (3) On account of the absence of the said ‘eternal existence’ it would be sheer audacity to assert that the cognition is one and eternal;
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rūpaśabdādicittānāṃ vyaktaṃ bhedopalakṣaṇāt // kṣoṇītejojalādibhyo bhūtebhyo bhūtir asya na /
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as difference is clearly perceived among the cognitions of colour, sound and other things, (4-5) nor could it be produced from, or manifested by, the material substances earth, fire, water and air;
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vyaktir vā sarvacittānāṃ yaugapadyaprasaṅgataḥ //
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as, in that case, all cognitions would be simultaneous;
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