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sthirarūpaṃ parair iṣṭaṃ taddhi bhūtacatuṣṭayam /
as the other party regard these substances as of permanent form;
sahakārivyapekṣāpi sthire pūrvam apākṛtam //
and the idea of a permanent thing requiring the help of auxiliaries has been already rejected.
yā tvekatvena kalpitā santatiḥ sā tattvānyatvābhyāmavācyatvād avastutvenābhimatā ākāśāmbhoruhapaṅktivad iti, na tasyā avasthāviśeṣe paralokavyavasthāsmābhiḥ kriyate /
That ‘Chain’ which has been postulated as one has been found to be incapable of being indicated as the same as, or different from, the members of the Chain, and on that ground, it has been regarded as a ‘non-entity’;
athāsyā eva vijñānādisantateḥ paralokasaṃjñitāyāḥ pratiṣedhaḥ kriyate,
and we do not base our notion of the ‘other world’ upon the states of any such one ‘Chain If it is this ‘Chain of Cognitions, etc.’, called the ‘other world’,.
tadā tasyās tāvat svarūpaniṣedhadvāreṇa paralokaniṣedho na śakyate kartuṃ, dṛṣṭasyāpahnotumaśakyatvāt /
which you are denying, then, it cannot be right to deny this ‘other world’ on the basis of the denial of the very form or existence of the said ‘Chain’; because what is actually perceived cannot be denied.
anādyanantatvadharmāniṣedhadvāreṇa / sā ceyam anādyanantā kathaṃ na siddhyati /
All the denial that could be made of it would be with regard to its qualities of beginninglessness and endlessness, But why cannot these endlessness and beginninglessness, be accepted?
yadi yattajjanmacittamādyatayā mataṃ nirhetukaṃ vā syāt, nityavijñāneśvarādihetusamudbhūtaṃ vā, yadvā svata eva nityaṃ, bhūtamātrād utpannaṃ vā, anyasantā [p.525] navartijñānahetukaṃ veti pañca pakṣāḥ /
If beginninglessness is denied, and the first cognition at birth is held to be the first cognition (the beginning), then this initial cognition would be either (1) without cause, or (2) produced by an eternal cause, like an eternal Cognition or God and so forth, or (3) it would itself be eternal, or (4) it would be produced from any Substance, or (5) produced by a Cognition appearing in another ‘chain’. These are the five alternatives possible.
yadi hi svasantānavartipūrvapūrvajñānahetukaṃ pūrvameva cittaṃ syāt tadāsyād anāditā cittasantater nānyathetyabhiprāyeṇaiṣāṃ pakṣāṇām upanyāsaḥ /
If each cognition in the chain were the effect of another previous cognition in the same Chain, then alone could the Chain be beginningless, not otherwise. That is why the Author has set forth these alternatives that are possible (under the idea of the Chain being not beginningless, and then to show the untenability of every one of these alternatives).
tatra na tāvadādyaḥ pakṣo nityasattvādiprasaṅgāt /
(1) The first alternative cannot be accepted; as under that view the Cognition would have permanent existence.
apekṣayā hi bhāvāḥ kādācitkā bhavanti, yaś ca nirhetukaḥ sa na kiñcid apekṣyata iti kimiti virameta /
Things are occasional only when they are dependent upon other things, and what is without cause is not dependent upon anything, why then should it cease to exist?
nāpi dvitīyapakṣo 'ta eva nityasattvaprasaṅgāt /
(2) Nor is the second alternative tenable; as for that same reason it would be eternal.
kāraṇavaikalyāddhi kāryāṇām asattvaṃ, yaccāvikalakāraṇaṃ tat kimiti na bhaved iti vaktavyam /
Effects become non-existent only by reason of the absence of their cause; when the cause is present in its perfect form, you have to explain why the effect should not come about,
nāpi tṛtīyaḥ pakṣaḥ kasmāt/
(3) Nor can the third alternative be accepted.
tadabhāvataḥ sadā sattvābhāvataḥ /
“Why?” Because of the absence of permanent existence.
ekam ityādinā tameva tadabhāvaṃ darśayati / anena pratijñāyāḥ pratyakṣe virodham āha kṣoṇītyādinā caturthaṃ pakṣaṃ nirākaroti /
The same absence is further emphasised by the words ‘It would be sheer audacity, etc. etc.’, This points out the fact of the Opponent’s Proposition being contrary to perceived facts. (4) The sentence ‘Nor could, etc, etc.’ rejects the fourth alternative.
nityeśvarādihetusamudbhavapakṣavadatrāpi tulyo doṣaḥ, yato mahābhūtacatuṣṭayaṃ parair nityam iṣṭam /
‘Kṣoṇī’ is Earth, This alternative is open to the same objections as the second one that it proceeds from the Eternal God, etc.; because the four Major Elemental Substances are held by the other party to be eternal.
naca sahakārikāraṇāpekṣaṇānukrameṇa nityādutpattir iti yuktaṃ vaktum, nityasyānupakāriṇi sahakāriṇi nāpekṣeti nirloṭhitaprāyatvāt //1878-
It will not be right to urge that “the production of the Cognition from an Eternal Cause would be possible as it would be dependent upon auxiliary causes”; because it has been thoroughly established that an eternal cause cannot depend upon an auxiliary, as it can render no help to it.
atha kṣaṇikam evedaṃ parair apyabhidhīyate /
[The refutation of the fifth alternatives follows under Text 1893.]
kathaṃ svopagamas teṣām eva sati na bādhyate // bādhyatāṃ kāmametat tu nyāyyamityupagamyate /
If the other party assert that “these elemental substances are momentary (not eternal)”, then, in that case, why cannot their own doctrine be regarded as rejected by this? (1886)
athedaṃ mahābhūtacatuṣṭayaṃ paraiścārvākaiḥ kṣaṇikamabhyupagamyate yathoktadoṣabhayāt tadāpi doṣa evetyabhiprāyaḥ /
If the four Major Elemental Substances are described by the other party as momentary, with a, view to escape from the objections urged above, then also, there are objections against him. This is what is meant.
tathā hi na tāvad buddhidehayoḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvasiddhau kiñcit pramāṇam
[These objections against the view that Cognition proceeds from the elemental substances, Earth, etc.
asti parasya, yena tadvyavahāraḥ siddhyet /
are now set forth in detail.]
prayogaḥ yatra yadbhāvasiddhau kiñcit pramāṇam asti parasya yena tadvyavahāraḥ prekṣāvatā kāryaḥ, yathā vahnau śītavyavahāraḥ / nāsti ca buddhidehayoḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvasiddhau kiñcit pramāṇam iti vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ /
For instance, there is nothing to prove that between Cognition and the Body (made up of the material substances), there subsists the relation of Cause and Effect, on the basis whereof the usage of the other party could be justified. This argument may be thus formulated: When there is no evidence in support of a certain thing having a particular character, no sane man should treat that thing as being of that character;
na cāsiddhatā hetoḥ tathā hi pratyakṣānupalambhasādhanaḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvaḥ sa cānvayād vyatirekād vā viśiṣṭādeva niścīyate na darśanādarśanamātreṇa /
there is no evidence in support of t he presence of a causal relation between the Body and Cognition, hence the wider proposition is not available. Nor can the Reason be held to be ‘inadmissible Because the causal relation is always based upon Perception and Non-apprehension; and as such, it can be ascertained through particular positive or negative concomitance (Premiss), not by mere perception or non-perception.
tatrānvayāt kāryaniścaye kartavye yeṣām upalambhe saty upalabdhalakṣaṇaprāptaṃ pūrvam anupalabdhaṃ sadupalabhyata ityevam āśrayaṇīyam. anyathā hi yadyupalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptam anupalabdham ityevaṃ nāpekṣeta tadā tatra kāryasya prāgapi sattvam anyato vā deśe 'pagamanaṃ{sambāvyeta} /
When the fact of a certain thing being the effect of a particular cause is going to be ascertained through positive concomitance, what is to be found out is if the thing in question is one which is perceptible and which, being not seen before, is seen when the other thing (the Cause) is seen otherwise, if it were not found out if the thing is perceptible and was not seen before, then it might be thought that the thing (Effect) might have been there even before the Cause appeared, or it might have gone to some other place.
yena kāraṇāt prāgavasthitāḥ kuṭyādayas teṣāṃ kāraṇatā na niṣiddhā syāt /
So that there would be nothing in the idea of the Tree and such other things, which have been existing before the cause in question, being the cause of the effect concerned.
[p.526] upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptānupalambhopadarśane tu sā niṣiddhā bhavati /
This possibility becomes averted by noting that the effect is one that could be perceived and is yet not perceived;
tatra tasyā vyabhicārāt /
as this condition is not fulfilled in the case of false causality.
evaṃ tāvad anvayāt kāryaniścayaḥ /
In this way the fact of a certain thi ng being the effect of a certain cause becomes ascertained through positive concomitance.
vyatirekādapi kāryaniścaye satsu tadanyeṣu samartheṣu taddhetuṣu yasyaikasyābhāve na bhavatītyevam āśrayaṇīyam, anyathā hi kevalaṃ tadabhāve na bhavatītyupadarśane sandigdhamatra tasya sāmarthyaṃ syāt, anyasyāpi tat samarthasyābhāvāt, tataś caivam api sambhāvyeta anyad eva tatra samartham asti, tadabhāvāt tannivṛttaṃ yat punar etan nivṛttau satyām asya nivṛttir upalabhyate sāyadṛcchāsaṃvādaḥ /
In the ascertainment of the fact of a certain thing being the effect of a certain cause through negative concomitance, it has to be found out what is that thing during the absence of which the effect in question does not appear, even though other efficient causes are there; otherwise, if all that were ascertained were that it does not appear when the other is absent, it would be doubtful if that particular cause is really efficient enough to bring about that effect; as other causes efficient for that purpose are also absent; so that it might be conceivable that “these latter are the real causes of the effect; and it is the absence of these to which the absence is due;
mātṛvivāhocitadeśajanmanaḥ piṇḍakharjūrasyānyatra deśe mātṛvivāhābhāve satyabhāvavat /
just as in the case of the absence of date-palm, which grows in a place where the ‘Mātṛvivāha’ (?) generally grows, during the absence of this latter.
tasmāt samartheṣv iti viśeṣaṇīyam /
Hence the qualification, ‘other efficient causes being present’, has to be added.
evaṃ hi tasyaiva kāraṇatvaṃ niścīyate, tadvyatirekasyaivānuvidhānāt /
It is in this way that it is fully ascertained that the thing in question only can be the cause of the effect concerned;
na hy anupakāriṇo vyatirekaḥ kenacid anuvidhīyate 'tiprasaṅgāt /
There is no such following of the absence of anything which renders no help in the bringing about of the effect;
evam anvayavyatirekābhyām asaṃdigdhaṃ kāryakāraṇatvaṃ pratīyate nānyathā /
Thus it is only through positive and negative concomitance that the relation of Cause and Effect can be ascertained, not in any other way.
na cedṛśo 'nvayo vyatireko vā kāyacittayor niścito 'sti /
There is no such positive or negative concomitance between the Body and the Cognition.
tathā hi na tāvat svadehabuddhyor anvayaniścayaḥ śakyate kartuṃ garbhādau prākcittotpatteḥ kevalakāyopalambhābhāvāt, na hi cittamantareṇopalambho bhavati /
For instance, there can be no certainty regarding the positive concomitance between one’s own Body and Cognition; because in the Foetus, before the appearance of the Cognition, the Body alone is not perceived;
paraśarīre 'pi cetaso 'nupalabdhiprāptatvān na paurvāparyagrahaṇam asti /
nor is it perceived apart from the Cognition. As regards the Body of another person also, the Cognition is not one that could be perceptible;
tato nānvayaniścayaḥ /
and hence there is no perception of any order of sequence.
nāpi vyatirekaniścayaḥ /
Nor can there be any certainty regarding negative concomitance;
tatrāpi hi na tāvad ātmadehavyatirekeṇa svabuddhivyatireko jñātuṃ śakyaḥ, sarvathā svayam abhāvāt /
it is possible to know that when one’s own body is absent, his own cognition also is absent, because the man himself is absent;
nāpi paradehavyatirekeṇa tat sambandhinyā buddhir vyatireko niścetuṃ pāryate /
but it can by no means be ascertained that in the absence of another man’s body, his cognition also is absent.
tadbuddher anupalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptatvena dehanivṛttāvapi buddhivyatireke saṃśayāt /
Because that man’s cognition not being perceptible, even on the absence of his body, there may be doubts regarding the absence of his cognition.
ata eva kuṭyādau dehābhāve 'pi na buddhivyatirekaniścayaḥ /
It is for this reason that, even in the case of Trees, though the Body is not there, it is not certain that the Cognition is not there;
tatrāpi tat sattāyām anupalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptatvena saṃśayāt /
as in this case also there will be the suspicion that its presence is not amenable to perception.
kāraṇānāṃ kāryavattvāt{tvam---} api ca dehaviśeṣaparigrahahetos tṛṣṇāviparyāsalakṣaṇasyasvakāraṇasyābhāvāt kiṃ tatra kuṭyādau buddher abhāva āhosvid dehavyatirekād iti saṃśayaḥ /
It cannot be right to be certain of absence on the basis of the absence of vibration, etc., as it is not necessary that causes must necessarily produce their effects. It would be always a matter of doubt whether the absence of Cognition in the Tree is due to the absence of the Body or to the absence of its Cause in the shape of the absence of Desire which would be the cause of its having a particular body.
tasmānnāsiddho hetuḥ /
Thus the Reason adduced by us is not ‘inadmissible’.
nāpi viruddhaḥ sapakṣe bhāvāt / nāpyanaikāntiko 'tiprasaṅgāt prekṣāvatvahāniprasaṅgāc ca /
Nor is it ‘contradictory’; as it is present in all cases where the Probandum is known to be present. Nor again can it be ‘Inconclusive’; as that would lead to incongruities;
tava tarhi buddher na dehaḥ kāraṇam ityatra kiṃ bādhakaṃ pramāṇam iti cen na samastyeva pramāṇam /
Question “What is there to prove that the contrary of the Proposition ‘The Body cannot be the cause of the Cognition’ is not true?” Answer: This has no force; as the proof is there;
tathā ca manomater na dehaḥ kāraṇam ityatra svatantrā mānasī buddhirityādinā pramāṇam upadarśayiṣyati /
for instance, that ‘the Body cannot be the cause of the purely subjective Cognition’ is going to be proved under Text 1930 ‘Mental Consciousness is independent, self-sufficient, etc. etc.’;
tasyā eva dehāntarapratisandhānaṃ pratyadhipattyāddehānāśritatve siddhe paralokasiddheḥ /
specially as it is this subjective Consciousness itself which serves as the dominant cause in bringing about the contact of other bodies;
kiṃ ca manomater dehaḥ kāraṇaṃ bhavatu, eko 'vayavirūpo vā bhedavad aneko vāparamāṇusañcayātmakaḥ, yadvā sendriyo 'nindriyo vā, kimupādānakāraṇamāhosvit sahakārikāraṇam iti vikalpyate tatra na tāvad eko 'vayavī yuktaḥ, [p.527] tasyapūrvaniṣiddhatvāt /
Then again, the Body may be the Cause of the subjective Consciousness. But would it be so in the form of the single composite whole, or in diverse forms, in the form of an aggregate of atoms? Would it be the cause along with the sense-organs? Or without the sense-organs? Would it be the material (constituent) cause? Or the contributory cause? These are the alternatives possible. Now, the Body, as a single composite whole, cannot be the Cause of Cognition; as the very idea of the ‘composite whole’ has been already rejected.
caturmahābhūtātmakatvahāniprasaṅgāc ca na hyekasya svabhāvacatuṣṭayaṃ yuktam anekavyavahārocchedaprasaṅgāt /
And also because such an idea would militate against the notion that the cause consists of the Four Major Elemental Substances; as a single thing could not have four forms; as, if it did, then there would be an end of all notions of ‘plurality
na{ca} syādanekaparamāṇusañcayātmako 'ṅgīkartavyaḥ /
Nor can the Body in the form of the aggregate of atoms be accepted (as the Cause of Cognition).
te ca paramāṇavaḥ pratyekaṃ vā hetavaḥ syuḥ samuditā vā /
Will the Cause consist of the Atoms severally or collectively? It cannot be severally;
na tāvat pratyekaṃ, pratibījāṅkurotpādavat pratiparamāṇuvikalpotpattiprasaṅgāt / nāpi samuditāḥ, nāsikādyekāṅgavaikalye 'pi mānasānutpādāpatteḥ, kṣityādīnama anyatarāpāye 'ṅkurānutpattivat /
Nor could it be collectively; as in that case, the defect in anyone of the limbs like the Nose for instance, would lead to the contingency of no Cognition being produced at all; just as the defect in even one of the various ingredients of the Cause of the sprout, in the shape of the soil, for instance, makes it impossible for the sprout to appear.
nahi sāmagrīpratibaddhaṃ kāryamanyatarābhāve bhavati, tat pratibaddhasvabhāvatvahāniprasaṅgāt /
In fact, whenever an effect is dependent upon a concatenation of cause-conditions, it does not come about, when even one of those conditions is absent; if it did, it would not be dependent upon them.
atha yathā sannidhānaṃ sarvo 'pi caitanyasya hetavaḥ / evaṃ tarhi vikalāvikalāṅgadehajanitayor viśeṣeṇa bhavitavyaṃ kāraṇabhedāt /
It might be held that “all the atoms are the cause of Cognition, according as they happen to be in proximity”, But in that case, there should be some difference between the effect as produced by a perfect cause and that produced by a defective cause; as the two causes would be different;
anyathā kāryasya bhedo nirhetukaḥ syāt /
otherwise the distinction in the cause would be pointless.
na vāvikalāṅgasya sataḥ paścād vikalāṅgatāyām upajātāyāṃ kaścin manomater viśeṣo 'sti /
As a matter of fact, when a cause that has been perfect in all its parts happens subsequently to be defective in certain parts, there is not found any difference in the subjective Cognition at all;
śrutādisaṃskārasya tadānīm apyavikalasyaivānuvṛtteḥ / gajādidehavartinī ca manomatir atiśayavatī prāpnto na manuṣyadhīḥ /
and this is due to the fact that the impressions of past auditory and other cognitions continue intact, It is only in the case of Animals, like the Elephant for instance, that there are changes in the subjective Consciousness, not in the case of human beings;
ye bālyaśarīram anujanmānas te mandadhiyaḥ mahāśarīrāstu paṭudhiyaḥ /
the animals in the infantile stage of the body are dull, while those that have acquired a larger body are cleverer;
kāraṇasya nirhrāsātiśayābhyāṃ kāryasya nirhrāsātiśayayogadarśanāt /
the improvement and deterioration of the Cause, in this case, are found to bring about improvement and deterioration in the Effect;
nahi yadbhedadyasya bhedo na bhavati tat tasya kāryaṃ yuktam atiprasaṅgāt /
hence when, between two things, the changes in one do not lead to changes in the other, one cannot be the Effect of the other; otherwise there would be absurdity;
kāryabhedasya ca nirhetukatvaprasaṅgāc ca /
and the changes in the Effect would be without cause.
nāpi sendriya iti pakṣaḥ / tathāhīndriyātpratyekaṃ vā manomatiḥ syāt samastād vā / na tāvat pratyekam ekaikendriyāpāye 'pi manomater avikalatvāt /
Nor can the other alternative view be accepted, that the Body along with the Sense-organs is the cause of subjective Consciousness. For, here also, would the subjective Consciousness proceed from each of the sense-organs severally? or from all of them collectively? It could not proceed from each severally;
tathā hi prasuptikādirogādinā kāryendriyādīnām upāye 'pi manodhīravikṛtaikāvikalāṃ svasattāmanubhavati /
For instance, even when the motor-organs have become disabled by Paralysis and other diseases, the subjective Consciousness remains intact and enjoys a perfect state of existence.
naca yasya vikāre 'pi yan na vikriyate tat tat kāryaṃ yuktam atiprasaṅgāt /
And when between two things, the changes in one do not bring about changes in the other, one cannot be the Effect of the other; otherwise there would be incongruities.
kiṃ ca cakṣurādivijñānavat pratiniyatārthagrāhitā nirvikalpatvam arthasannidhānasāpekṣavṛttikatā ca prāpnoti abhinnakāraṇatvāt /
Further, under the view under consideration, subjective Consciousness would have to be regarded as (a) apprehending only particular things, (b) as being free from conceptual content (indeterminate), (c) as being dependent upon the presence of the object, just like the Visual and other sense-cognitions;
yugapad anekavikalpotpattiprasaṅgāc ca /
and also because there would be the possibility of several conceptions appearing at the same time.
nāpi samastād iti pakṣaḥ ekendriyābhāve 'pyabhāvaprasaṅgāt /
as in that case, there could be no Subjective Consciousness, even when one of the Sense-organs would be absent (disabled);
ekasahakāryapāye 'ṅkurādyapāyavat /
just like the absence of the Sprout on the absence of even one of its contributory causes.
nāpyanindriya iti pakṣaḥ kalevaracyutasyāpi pāṇyādes taddhetutvaprasaṅgāt /
Nor can the other alternative view be accepted tha “Subjective Consciousness proceeds from the Body without the Sense-organs”, As under that view, it would be possible for the said Consciousness to proceed from the Hand and such other parts of the body even when severed from the Body.
viśiṣṭasya hetutve sendriya eveṣṭaḥ syāt /
If it were held that a qualified Body is the cause, then it would come to this that the cause consists of the Body as along with the Sense-organs;
nahi sendriyādanyo viśiṣṭaḥ śakyate darśayitum /
as no qualified Body can be shown other than the Body with the Sense-organs.
nāpyupādānakāraṇam iti pakṣaḥ /
Nor again can the view be accepted that “the Body is the material (constituent) cause of Subjective Consciousness”.
tathā hi yaḥ kāryagatāśeṣaviśeṣānuyāyinaḥ svabhāvasya sadā cātmasattāpratyupasthānatas tadupakārī yasya vikārāpādanamantareṇa kāryamaśakyavikāraṃ sa eva kāraṇaviśeṣa upādānatvena prasiddhaḥ /
Because that particular cause is accepted as the ‘Material Cause’ of a certain Effect which is found to fulfil the two conditions viz.: (1) that it helps, by its presence, the entire nature of the Effect embracing all its peculiar features, and (2) that the Effect undergoes no change except upon changes in the said Cause;
yathā pūrvapūrvo mṛdātmā kalāpa uttarottarasya ghaṭasaṃjñitasya kāryakalāpasyopādānam /
as is found in the case where the Clay is held to be the ‘material cause’ of the Jar as it passes successively through all the modifications proceeding from the clod of clay to the finished product called ‘Jar’.
ata eva yo yadvikārayitum icchati sa tadupādānavikāreṇaiva tadvikārayati nānyathā /
It is for this reason that when one desires to modify a certain thing he modifies it by modifying its material cause, not in any other way.
na hyupādāne pūrvasminnapratibaddhasāmarthye sati kāryasyottarasyotpi [p.528] tsunaḥkenacit pratighātaḥ śakyeta kartum / yathā ghaṭāder uttarasyotpatsyamānasya kāryasya pūrvakaṃ mṛdātmānam apratibaddhya{dyā---} samarthakṣaṇotpādanataḥ śakyate na vikārāpādānaṃ{---} kartum /
When an antecedent Material Cause is there without having its potency impeded in any way, no one can impede the appearance of the subsequent Effect going to be produced. For instance, in the case of the Jar, no modification can be made in the effect to be produced, without having brought about a ‘moment’ in the Clay incapable of further efficiency.
sarvatraiva ca vikārotpādane 'yam eva kramo yadutāsamarthāntaropādānakṣaṇotpādanam/
In fact, in the bringing about of all modifications, the process is the same that of producing of a ‘moment’ (entity) incapable of producing another ‘moment’;
anyathā na kiñcit sākṣād viruddhaṃ sambhavati /
if it were not so, nothing could be directly contrary to anything.
yadi hi sambhavet kāryasyāpi kāraṇavikārāpādanavat sākṣād vikārāpādanaṃ syāt, nopādānavikārāpādanadvāreṇaiva /
If such direct modification were possible, then, as the Cause, so the effect also could be modified directly by itself, not through the bringing about of a like modification in its material cause.
yat punaḥ pradīpamadhikṛtyaiva deśāntaravartinyās tat prabhāyā antarāvaraṇena vikārāpādanaṃ kriyate tan na tasyāḥ sākṣāt pradīpa upādānakāraṇam /
It is true that in the case of the Lamp, there is a modification brought about, in its outspreading light by putting up an intervening screen without modifying the Light at all; but in this case the Lamp is not the direct Material Cause of the Light;
kiṃ tarhipūrvapūrvaḥ prabhākṣaṇaḥ /
each Light-moment is the cause of the Light-moment that follows it;
tathaivāsamarthakṣaṇāntarotpādanalakṣaṇavikārāpādanāt / āvaraṇena prabhā pratihanyate /
so that what happens is that the screen brings about a modification in the shape of a ‘moment’ devoid of further causal efficiency, and thereby practically destroys the Light at that, point.
yat punar vastvadhikṛtyaiva yadvikāryate na tat tadutpādānaṃ yathā gavayamadhikṛtya gaurvikāryamāṇaḥ /
In a case where a thing is modified without modifying an entity, it is not a case of Material Cause; when, for instance, the Oow is modified without modifying the Gavaya.
avikṛtya ca śarīraṃ manomater aniṣṭācaraṇādinā durmanaskṛtādilakṣaṇasya vikārasyopādānaṃ kriyata iti vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhiḥ /
In the case in question, however, it is found that, without modifying the Body, the Subjective Consciousness is subjected, by wrong-doing, to modifications, such as evil intentions and the like. So that here there would be apprehension of something contrary to the wider premiss (that there can be no modification in the effect without modifications in the Cause;
nanu cāhāraścāpā{pākā---}dinā dehasya pṛṣṭyādivikāre sati rāgādilakṣaṇā manomater vikārāpattirdṛśyata eva /
Objection: “When there is modification in the Body, in the shape of being well-nourished and strong, which is brought about by good food, there is actually perceived a modification in the Subjective Consciousness, in the shape of Love and Hatred, etc.”
yadi nāma dṛśyate tataḥ kim / nahyetāvatā hetor asiddhatvam /
What does it matter if such modification is seen? This alone does not make our Reason inadmissible.
tathā hi yadavikāro 'pi yasya vikārāpādānaṃ sambhavati na tat tadupādānamityetāvan mātramiha vivakṣitam /
For example, all that is meant by us is that, when between two things, the modification of one is possible without modification of the other, then the one cannot be the Material Cause of the other.
sambhavanti ca kasyacidavasthāyām aniṣṭācaraṇādinā dehavikārāpādanamantareṇaiva buddhir vikārāpādanam iti kuto 'siddhatvaṃ hetoḥ / nacāpyevambhūtāt kādācitkāt tadīyavikārānuvidhānāt tadupādānatvaṃ
It is quite possible that under certain circumstances, without any modification in the Body, there is modification in the Subjective Consciousness by wrong-doing. Consequently why should our Reason be ‘inadmissible’? But on the basis of occasional stray instances of modification (of the Subjective Consciousness due to modification in the Body) it cannot be right to regard the one as the Material Cause of the other.
evaṃ hi viṣayasyāpyupādānatvaṃ syāt /
As, in this way, the object also might become the Material Cause (of Cognition).
tathā hi śārdūlaśoṇitādibībhatsaviṣayadarśanādibalenāpi kasyacit kātaramanasaḥ saṃjāyata eva mohādilakṣaṇo manaso vikāraḥ na caitāvatā sā manomatis tadāśritā bhavati /
For instance, when one sees such disgusting things as the blood of the tiger, etc., there appears a modification in the mind of a cowardly person, in the shape of swoon and so forth; and yet this does not make the said Subjective Consciousness a material effect of that blood.
kāmaśokādivitarkeṇa ca manasyupahate dehavikāradarśanāddehasyāpi tadupādānatāprasaṅgāt kintu niyamena sākṣāc ca yasyaiva yo vikāramanuvidhatte sa tadupādāno yuktaḥ /
Again, when the Mind is beset with vascillations due to love or grief and such causes, there come about certain modifications in the Body; and on the basis of this the Body might come to be regarded as having the Mind for its Material Cause.
naca rāgādilakṣaṇo vikāro niyamena śarīrapoṣādito bhavati /
Modifications of the Mind in the shape of Love, Hate, etc. do not always follow from the strength and vigour of the Body;
kasyacit paripuṣṭaśarīrasyāpi pratisaṅkhyānavato 'sambhavāt / tathā parikṣīṇavapuṣo 'pyayonirsaumanaskārabahulasya puṃsas tiryaggatasya ca kasyacid apacitaparimāṇasyāpyatīva rāgādidarśanāt /
as it is not found to follow in the case of the vigorous man who has attained wisdom. Conversely, even a man or an animal with a weak body and poor development, who happens to have no opportunities for sexual and other indulgences, has his mind beset with much Love and Hate, etc. And when one thing comes about in the absence of another thing, one cannot be rightly regarded as the Cause of the other.
na ca yadabhāve 'pi yad bhavati tat tasya kāryaṃ yuktamatiprasaṅgāt /
If it were so regarded, there would be incongruities.
nāpi sākṣād dehād rāgādiḥ sambhavati ayonisaumanaskādivyavahitatvāt /
Love and Hate, etc. do not proceed directly from the Body; the absence of opportunities for sexual and other indulgences being the necessary intervening conditions.
tatrāmadehavatas tasmin sukhādau tat sādhane ca nityādiviparyāsaparigatamanaso mamedam anugrā [p.529] hakam upaghātakaṃ cetyātmopakārakapratikṛtyādivikalpas tatas tatparitoṣadaurmanasyādisambhavatas tasmāc ca sukhādiviṣayādhyavasāyādiprasūtaya ityetaccānvayavyatirekābhyāṃ pratītam eva /
in such cases, the man, who has a body and a soul and has his mind beset with the notion of impermanence attaching to Pleasures and their Means, sometimes feels that what obstructs his pleasure does him good as well as harm; and thence follows the idea of the two alternatives of loving (the benefactor) and hating (the obstructor); thence follow (respectively) good-will and ill-will; from all this proceed the notions of Pleasure and other things. All this is well-known through positive and negative concomitance.