buddhist-nlp/tatpa-noisy · Datasets at Hugging Face

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nāpi vyatirkto 'tiśayaḥ kriyate vyatireke hyasya rūpāder ayam atiśaya iti sambandhāsiddheḥ / tathā hi na tādātmyalakṣaṇaḥ sambandho vyatirekābhyupagamāt /	Nor can a Peculiarity be brought about which is different from the Form, etc.; because as it would be different from them, there could be nothing to determine that ‘this Peculiarity belongs to that Form For instance, the relation between them cannot be that of Identity, as they are held to be different;
anabhyupagame vā pūrvoktadoṣaprasaṅgāt /	if they are not held to be different, then the above objections come in.
nāpi tadutpattilakṣaṇo jāter eva tadutpatteḥ / na cānyaḥ sambandho 'sti ādhārādheyatvādīnāṃ tadutpattyantargatatvāt /	Nor can the relation between them be that of one being produced by the other; as the production of the thing is due to Birth itself. No other kind of relation is possible; those of container and contained being included under that of being produced.
atha tadutpattirabhyupagamyate tanmātrabhāvino viśeṣasya nityotpattiprasaṅgāj jātiḥ kiṅkarī syāt /	If then the relation of being produced from it is held to subsist between the said Peculiarity and Form, etc. then, as the Peculiarity would be capable of being produced by the Form itself alone, it would be produced at all times from that alone;
jātimapekṣyotpādayatīti cet, na hyanupakā [p.514] riṇyāṃ jātāvapekṣāyuktātiprasaṅgāt /	and under the circumstances, what would ‘Birth’ do to it? It might be argued that “the Form produces the Peculiarity, through Birth”, The answer to that is that it cannot be right that there should be any dependence upon the Birth which can render no help at all.
upakāre vā tasyopakārasyātiśayavat tatvānyatvacintāyām anavasthāprasaṅgāt /	If the Birth be held to actually render some help, then in regard to this Help, the question would arise as to its being different or non-different and so forth, just as it arises in the case of the Peculiarity; and this would lead to an infinite regress.
tasmād vyatireke sati sambandho na sidhyati /	From all this it follows that if there is difference, then there can be no relationship.
kiṃ ca tasyātiśayasya pūrvasattvād asatkāryamabhyupagataṃ bhavet /	Further, if it be held that the said ‘Peculiarity’ did not exist before, then it would mean the acceptance of the view that the effect has been nonexistent (which is inconsistent with the opponent’s doctrines).
evaṃ jarayānyathātve kriyamāṇe sthityāvasthiteranityatayā ca nāśe kriyamāṇe, eṣām anyathātvādīnām anyānanyavikalpe sati ye doṣās te jātivajjarādiṣvapi vācyaḥ //	Similarly, if Decay brings about a reversal of character, and if Existence brings about stability, and if Non-eternality brings about destruction, then the question regarding these ‘Reversal’, etc. being different or non-different, will arise, as it arose in connection with Birth; and all the objections then urged would be applicable in the case of these also.
svakāryārambhiṇa ime sāmarthyaniyamātmanā / jātyādayaś ca tadrūpaṃ prākpaścād api vidyate //	These, ‘birth’ and the rest, are productive of their effects, in accordance with the limitations of their nature; and this capacity of theirs is there before as well as after;
samartharūpabhāvāc ca prārabhante na kiṃ tadā / svārurūpāṃ kriyāṃ tasyāḥ prārambhe cāmitādhvatā //	this potent form thus being there at all times, why should they not proceed with the activity in keeping with their nature? At the starting of such activity there can be no limitation on the ‘states (1829-1830)
kiṃ ca jātyādīnāṃ svakāryārambhitvaṃ yat tat samarthasvabhāvaniyamād	Then again, the capacity of ‘Birth’ and the rest to produce their effects is limited to their respective capacity;
iṣṭaṃ, sa ca samarthaḥ svabhāvas teṣāṃ sarvadāstīti sadaiva svakāryārambhitvaprasaṅgaḥ /	and this capacity of theirs is there at all times; hence they should produce their effects at all times.
naca hetupratyayavaikalyaṃ teṣām api sadāvasthitatvāt /	It cannot be urged that there is absence of the ‘Causal Factor’ (which prevents the production). Because the Causal Factor also is there at all times.
tataścātītānāgatāvasthayor jātyādibhir jananādisvakāryakaraṇādekasminnevādhvanyaparimitādhvaprasaṅgaḥ //	Thus then, as Birth and the rest would be producing their effects in the ‘past’ and ‘future’ states also, one and the same ‘state’ should include all the States, of which thus there need be no division.
kiñcātītādayo bhāvāḥ kṣaṇikāḥ syur na vā yadi /	Further, would the ‘past’ and other entities be momentary, or not? If the former, then there is the same absence of restriction.
yaḥ kṣaṇo jāyate tatra vartamāno bhavatyasau / utpadya yo vinaṣṭaś ca so 'tīto bhāvyanāgataḥ //	The ‘moment’ that is born becomes the ‘present’, that which, on being born, becomes destroyed, becomes the ‘past’, and that which is yet to be born becomes the ‘future’.
apica atītānāgatāḥ kṣaṇikā vā syur na vā kṣaṇikā iti pakṣadvayam /	Again, are the Past, Present and Future things momentary or not? These are the two alternatives. If the former, if they are momentary.
tatra yadyādyāḥ kṣaṇikā iti yāvat, tadā saivāmitādhvatā prāptā /	then there is the same absence of restriction.
yaḥ kṣaṇa iti tāmeva darśayati //	The next sentence ‘The Moment, etc. etc.’ shows this same absence of restriction.
athāpyakṣaṇikās te syuḥ kṛtāntas te virudhyate /	If, ox the other hand, the said things are not momentary, then that goes against your doctrine;
kṣaṇikaḥ sarvasaṃskārāḥ siddhānte hi prakāśitāḥ //	under your doctrine it has been shown that all modifications are momentary.
athākṣaṇikā iti pakṣaḥ, evaṃ sati kṛtāntavirodhaḥ kṛtāntaḥ siddhānta ucyate /	If the other alternative is accepted that the Past and the rest are not momentary then it goes against your doctrine. The term ‘Kṛtānta’ stands for Siddhānta, accepted doctrine.
tathā hi kṣaṇikāḥ sarvasaṃskārā iti siddhāntaḥ //	The doctrine referred to is that ‘all modifications are momentary’, (1833) [verse 1834]:
[p.515] kiṃ ca na kevalaṃ siddhāntavirodho mānavirodho 'pi pratijñāyāḥ /	Further, the view in question does not go against your own doctrine only, it is opposed to Reason also.
tathā hi yat sattatsarvaṃ kṣaṇikaṃ yathā vartamānaṃ, santaścātītānāgatāiti niyamāt kṣaṇabhaṅginaḥ prāptāḥ / prāktu kṣaṇabhaṅgādhikāre, pratibandho 'sya hetoḥ prasādhita iti nānaikāntikatvam /	For instance, whatever is existent must be momentary, like the Present thing, the Past and the Future are existent hence they must be momentary. Previously under the treatment of the Momentary Character of things (under Chapter VIII) the Invariable Concomitance of this Probans (Being existent, with the Probandum, Being momentary) has been established.
tathā hi arthakriyākāritvaṃ, sattvalakṣaṇam akṣaṇikasya ca kramayaugapadyābhyām arthakriyāvirodhād arthakriyānivṛttau tallakṣaṇasya sattvasya nivṛttir iti sādhyavipakṣān nivṛttaṃ sattvam //	Further, ‘existence’ is characterised by capacity for effective action: what is not-momentary is not compatible with effective action, either successive or simultaneous; and when there is no effective action, there must be cessation of existence also, which is characterised by effective action. Thus Existence becomes excluded from where the Probandum (momentariness) is absent.
arthakriyāsamarthāḥ syur atītānāgatā ime / na vā sāmarthyasadbhāve vartamānās tadanyavat //	Are these ‘past’ and ‘future’ things capable of effective action? Or not? If they have that capacity, then they must be regarded as ‘present’, like other ‘present’ things.
avartamānatāyāṃ tu sarvaśaktiviyoginaḥ / naṣṭājātāḥ prasajyante vyomatāmarasādivat //	If the ‘past’ and the ‘future’ are not regarded as ‘present’, then they must be devoid of all capacities, just like the ‘sky-lotus’, the ākāśa and other ‘non-produced’ (eternal) things are open to the same objection;
anaikāntikatāklṛpter na tepi vinibandhanam // niyamārthakriyāśaktir bhāvānāṃ pratyayodbhavā /	hence these cannot serve to make our reason ‘inconclusive’, in the case of all entities, their restricted capacity for effective action must be due to some cause;
ahetutve samaṃ sarvamupayujyeta sarvataḥ //	if it were without a cause, everything would be used for everything.
niyatārthakriyāśaktijanma pratyayanirmitam /	In fact, the restricted capacity for effective action must be brought about by a cause;
vartamānasya bhāvasya lakṣaṇaṃ nānyad asti ca //	and there is no other characteristic feature of the ‘present’ thing.
atītānāgatānāṃ ca tadakhaṇḍaṃ samasti vaḥ /	In the case of the ‘past’ and ‘future’ also, the said capacity is there fully complete, according to your view;
tat kiṃ na vartamānatvam amīṣāmanuṣajyate //	wherefore then should not the character of the ‘present’ be attributed to them? (1835-1840)
kiṃ ca ime 'tītānāgatā arthakriyāsamarthā vā syur na vā samarthā iti	Further, there are the two alternatives these Past and Future things are capable of effective action or not capable.
yadi samarthās tadā sāmarthyasadbhāve vartamānāḥ prāpnuvanti, avivādāspadībhūtavartamānavat / prayogaḥ ye ye 'rthakriyāsamarthās te vartamānāḥ, yathāvivādāspadībhūtā vartamānāḥ, arthakriyāsamarthāścātītādaya iti svabhāvahetuprasaṅgaḥ /	If they are capable, then, the capacity being there, the things must be regarded as ‘Present’, like those things whose ‘present’ character is not disputed. The argument may be thus formulated Things that are capable of effective action must be regarded as Present, as those things whose ‘present’ character is not disputed, and the Past and Future things are capable of effective action; hence there is this Reason based upon the nature of things, which provides the Reductio ad absurdum.
na cāyamanaikāntikaḥ, yato vartamānatvanivṛttau naṣṭājātānāṃ sarvasāmarthyaviyogitvaṃ prasajyeta, ākāśāmbhoruhavat / prayogaḥ ye vartamānā na bhavanti te kvacit samarthā api na bhavanti yathāvyomāmbhoruhaṃ, na bhavanti cātītādayo vartamānā iti vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ /	The Probans cannot be said to be ‘Inconclusive’; because the absence of the ‘Present’ character in the Past and Future things would imply the absence of all capacities, just as in the ‘sky-lotus’, The argument may be thus formulated: Things that are not-‘Present’ are also not-efficient for any action, e.g. the ‘sky-lotus’, and the Past and Future things are not ‘Present’;
na cākāśapratisaṅkhyānirodhāpratisaṅkhyānirodhair asaṃskṛtairanekāntas	Nor can this argument be said to be ‘Inconclusive’, in view of the three ‘eternal verities’ Ākāśa, Pratisaṅkhyā-nirodha and Apratisaṅkhyā-nirodha, which do not undergo modifications;
teṣām api pakṣīkaraṇāt /	because these also are included under the Minor Term (Subject of the Syllogism).
ato 'naikāntikatvakalpanāyā nātinibandhanam /	Thus there is no ground for the Reason being regarded as ‘Inconclusive’ (or Doubtful).
tathā hi yeyaṃ pratiniyatārthakriyā [p.516] śaktir bhāvānāṃ sā pratyayodbhavetyaṅgīkartavyam, anyathā yadi nirhetukāsyāt tadā niyamahetor abhāvāt pratiniyatā śaktir bhāvānāṃ na syāt /	Then again, the restricted capacity for effective action that there is in entities, must be admitted to be due to some cause; otherwise, if it were without cause, them there could be nothing to restrict it; and the capacity of things would, in that case, not be restricted (or limited);
tataś ca sarvaṃ sarvasmin kārye upayujyeta /	with the result that each and every thing would be utilised in bringing about each and every effect.
tasmātkṛ{tasmādakru---}tākāśādīnāṃ sāmarthyaniyamo na yukta iti na tair anaikāntikatvakalpanāyā nibandhanam /	Thus it cannot be right to restrict the efficiency of the eternal verities, Ākāśa and the rest. Consequently they do not supply the ground for regarding the Reason as ‘Inconclusive’.
naca prathame hetau saṃdigdhavipakṣavṛttikatā yasmānniyatāyām arthakriyāyāṃ yā śaktis tasyā yadetajjanma hetupratyayanirmitaṃ tadeva vartamānasya lakṣaṇam, etacca vartamānatvalakṣaṇam avikalamatītādiṣvapyastīti nimittāntarābhāvāt kimiti vartamānatā{na} prasajyate //	Nor can it be urged that the former Reason is one whose presence in the contrary of the Probandum is open to suspicion; because the efficiency that pertains to a particular efficient activity, the birth of which is due to causal factors, is what characterises the ‘Present’; and this characteristic of the ‘Present’ is present intact in the Past and Future things also; hence, there being no other basis for this, why should these be not regarded as ‘Present’? (1835-1840)
svargāpavargasaṃsargayatno 'yam aphalas tataḥ /	As a consequence of this, all attempt to attain heaven and final beatitude would be futile;
īhāsādhyaṃ na kiñciddhi phalamatropalakṣyate //	as no fruit is found that could be attained by effort.
kiṃ ca yasyātītānāgataṃ dravyato 'sti tasya phalam api nityam astīti svargāpavargaprāptyartho yatno viphalaḥ syāt, īhāsādhyasya kasyacit phalasyābhāvāt / kiṃ tatra vrataniyamādilakṣaṇāyā īhāyāḥ sāmarthyaṃ syāt /	Then again, for the man for whom the Past and Future are actually present, the fruit of acts also would be there at all times; hence any effort to attain Heaven or Final Beatitude would be futile; as there would be no fruit that could be attained by effort, what would be the efficiency of the Austerities and Penances that constitute ‘effort’? It might be said that “they would have the efficiency to produce the desired results”.
utpādane sāmarthyam iti cet / utpādanaṃ tarhyabhūtvā bhavatīti siddham /	That would mean that the said ‘Production’ of Results is something that was not there before and has come about now.
atha tadapyasti, kasyedānīṃ kva sāmarthyam / vartamānīkaraṇasāmarthyam iti cet /	But even so, what is it that would be efficient? And wherein would it be efficient? “The efficiency would lie in making the results ‘present’”.
deśāntarākarṣaṇaṃ cet / nityaṃ tarhi vastu prasaktaṃ sarvadāvasthitatvāt /	What do you mean by ‘making them present’? If it means ‘bringing them to another place’, then the thing becomes eternal, as it would remain for all time.
arūpāṇāṃ vedanādīnāṃ niṣkriyatvat katham ākarṣaṇaṃ bhavet / yacca tadākarṣaṇaṃ tadabhūtvā bhavatīti siddham /	How too could there be any such ‘bringing’ in the case of Sensations, etc., which are immobile? Even so, this ‘bringing’ would be something that did not exist before, but has now come into existence.
svargaḥ sumerupṛṣṭhādiḥ, apavargo mokṣaḥ, tayoḥ prāptiḥ saṃsargaḥ, tatra yatnovrataniyatādiḥ //	‘Heaven’ stands for the place on the summits of mount Meru. ‘Apavarga’, ‘Final Beatitude’, stands for Deliverance; the ‘Saṃsarga’ of these is their attainment. The ‘effort’ for this consists in Observances and Austerities.
atha nārthakriyāśaktis teṣām abhyupagamyate / yadyevam ata evaiṣām asattvaṃ vyomapuṣpavat //	If, on the other hand, the past and future things are held to be without the capacity for effective action, then, on that ground alone, they would be non-existent, like the ‘sky-flower’, (1842)
atha nārthakriyāsamarthā iti dvitīyapakṣa āśrīyate / evaṃ tarhyata evārthakriyāśūnyatvād asattvaṃ prāpnoti khapuṣpavat /	If then the second alternative view (proposed under Text 1835) is accepted that the Past and Future things are devoid of capacity for effective action, then, in that case, for that very reason, of being devoid of capacity for effective activity, they would have to be regarded as ‘non-existent’, like ‘sky-flowers’;
sarvasāmarthyavivekalakṣaṇatvād asattvasya //	as the only characteristic of ‘non-existence’ consists in the absence of all capacity.
evaṃ tāvad atītānāgatānām asattāsādhakaṃ pramāṇam abhidhāya sattāsādhakaṃ pramāṇamapākartum āha hetava ityādi /	Having thus adduced arguments in favour of the view that the ‘Past’ and the ‘Future’ do not exist, the author proceeds to refute the arguments that have been put forward in support of the view that they do exist;
hetavo bhāvadharmās tu nāsiddhe siddhibhāginaḥ /	[see verse 1843 above]
vartamānatvasiddher vā viruddhā dharmibādhanāt // hetavo hi pūrvoktā adhvasaṃgṛhītatvādityādaya āśrayāsiddhāḥ, atītāder dharmiṇo ' [p.517] siddhatvāt /	The ‘Reasons’ meant here are those adduced by the other party, under the Text 1790; these are ‘Inadmissible in regard to their substratum’; because the things in which they are said to reside are the Past and Future things, and it has been shown that these do not exist;
yathāha "nāsiddhe bhāvadharmo 'sti"iti /	as has been said ‘if the thing is not there, its property cannot be there’.
athāpi siddhāḥ syuḥ, tathāpi vartamānatvasiddher dharmasvarūpaviparītasādhanād viruddhā hetavaḥ //	Even if the said things existed, as they have been proved to have the ‘Present’ character, the Reasons in question would be proving something contrary to the very nature of the Subject;
katham idānīm adhvasaṃgṛhītatvam atītānāgatānāṃ rūpādīnāṃ nirdiṣṭam nahi śaśaviṣāṇam atyantāsadatītamanāgataṃ vā vyavasthāpyata ity āha bhūtvetyādi /	and as such, they would be ‘Contradictory’, (1843) Question: “If that is so, then how is it that Buddhist writers have declared the Past and Future Forms, etc. to be included among the ‘states’? The Past and Future character of non-entities like the Hare’s Horns is never tried to be determined”.
bhūtvā yadvigataṃ rūpaṃ tadatītaṃ prakāśitam / sati pratyayasākalye bhāvi yat tadanāgatam // sattve tu vartamānatvamāsajyeteti sādhitam /	That form which, having come into existence, has ceased to exist, has been described as ‘past’ ‘and that which is to come when the causal factors are complete has been described as ‘future’, if the ‘existence’ of this were insisted upon, then they must be regarded as ‘present’;
vidyamānatvamātraṃ hi vartamānasya lakṣaṇam //	this is what has been just proved; as the only characteristic of the ‘present’ is that it should be existent.
subodham //	This is easily understood.
rūpavedanādibhāvas tarhi kathaṃ nirdiṣṭa ity āha dvayaṃ pratītyeti /	Question: “How is it that the presence of Form, Sensation and the rest has been attributed to these?” Answer: [see verse 1846 next]
dvayaṃ pratītyavijñānaṃ yaduktaṃ tattvadarśinā /	When the seer of truth declared that cognition proceeds from two causes, this teaching was in view of the cognition with an object.
dvividhaṃ hi vijñānaṃ sālambanamanālambanaṃ ca, yat sālāmbanaṃ tadabhisandhāya dvyāśrayavijñānadeśanā bhagavataḥ //	Cognition is of two kinds with object (objective) and without object (purely subjective). It is in reference to the Cognition with Object that Cognition has been taught by the Blessed Lord, as being based upon two substrates.
atha nirālambanam api jñānam astīti katham avasitam ity āha nityeśvarādītyādi /	Question: “How is it known that there is Cognition without Object also?” Answer: [see verse 1848 next]
nityeśvarādibuddhīnāṃ naivālambanam asti hi /	In the case of the cognitions of ‘eternal things’, ‘god’ and so forth, there is no objective background;
śabdanāmādidharmāṇāṃ tadākāraviyuktitaḥ // ādiśabdena pradhānakālādayaḥ parikalpitā gṛhyante / na caitanmantavyaṃ śabdādyālambanā imā buddhaya iti kathayati śabdanāmādītyādi /	as words and names are devoid of the forms of those. ‘And so forth’, includes such other assumed things as Primordial Matter, Time, etc. No such idea should be entertained as that these cognitions have their objective background in the words; this is what is meant by the words
tasyeśvarāderākāro nityatvasakalahetutvādiḥ, yas tayā buddhyādhyavasīyate, tenākāreṇa viyogaḥ śabdasya nāmno vā viprayuktasaṃskāraviśeṣasya /	‘As Words arid Names, etc, etc.’ What is meant is that the ‘form’ of God-such as Eternality, Being the Cause of all things and so forth, that is envisaged in the said cognitions, of that form, the Word or the Name is entirely devoid, which Word or Name does not undergo any modification.
ādiśabdena nimittādeḥ paropagatasyārthapratibimbakādisvabhāvasya //	The term ‘ādi’ in ‘śabdanāmādi’, is meant to include the contingent cause (of Cognition), postulated by other people, in the shape of the Reflected Image of things.
yadi tarhi nirviṣayam api vijñānam asti tat kathaṃ jñānam iti vyapadiśyate tathā hi [p.518] vijānātīti vijñānam iti gīyate, asati ca vijñeye kiṃ vijñānaṃ	Question: “If then there is Cognition without object also, then how is it called ‘Cognition’? Because ‘Cognition’ stands for that which apprehends things; and when there is nothing to be apprehended, how could the cognition be there?”
syād ity āha bodhānugatimātreṇeti /	Answer: [see verse 1849 next]
bodhānugatimātreṇa vijñānam iti cocyate / sā cāsyājaḍarūpatvaṃ prākāśyāt parikalpitam //	It is called ‘cognition’ only by virtue of the presence of the nature of ‘consciousness’; and this ‘consciousness’ also consists in the cognition being not-dark which is deduced from its being luminous.
bodhānugamo 'pi vinā bodhena{na} sambhavatīti cedāha sā ceti /	“The presence of the nature of Consciousness also is not possible without cognition”; in answer to this it is added ‘And this Consciousness, etc. etc.’ ‘Sā’ stands for the presence of the nature of Consciousness;
asya vijñānasya /	‘asya’ i.e. of the Cognition.
kimucyate---, yat tadajaḍarūpatvam, prakāśyavastvantarābhāvāt prakāśāntaravirahāc ca nabhovartyālokavat prakāśarūpatvād abhidhīyate bodharūpateti //	“What is it?” It consists in the Cognition being not-dark; only, on account of there being nothing else to be illumined by it, and also of the absence of any other source of illumination, the Cognition is of the nature of Light itself, like the Light diffused in the atmosphere and it is by virtue of this luminosity that it is called ‘Cognition’.
vipākahetuḥ phalado nātīto 'bhyupagamyate / sadvāsitāt tu vijñānaprabandhāt phalam iṣyate //	What brings about the fruit is the cause of fruition, not anything ‘past’, in fact, the fruit is held to proceed from the ‘chain’ of cognitions impressed by the entity (when present).
vāsitaṃ paramparayā phalotpādanasamartham utpāditam //	‘Impressed’ i.e. rendered capable of producing the fruit, through the long series of ‘causal factors (1850)
yadyevaṃ katham uktaṃ bhagavatā, "asti tat karma yat kṣīṇaṃ niruddhaṃ vipariṇatamityāha" tāmeveti /	Question “If that is so, then how is it that the Blessed Lord has declared that ‘There is Karma, which decays, is obstructed and becomes modified’?” Answer: [see verse 1851 next]
tāmeva vāsanāṃ cetaḥsantatāvadhikṛtya tat / asti karmeti nirdiṣṭaṃ bhaktyā mūlāvināśavat //	In view of the said impression being attributed to the ‘series of cognitions’, the lord has said that ‘there is karma’, which assertion is figurative; as the principal (of the debt) is said to be ‘not destroyed (lost)’.
bhaktyeti upacāreṇa /	‘Bkaktyā’ Figuratively.
yathā mūladravyaprasūtasya hiraṇyādeḥ phalaprabandhasya sa{ma}bhāve vinaṣṭam api mūladravyamavinaṣṭam ity ucyate tadvat karmāpi //	When in the case of a Debt, when the accrued interest has become equal to the Principal, the Principal actually disappears; yet it is said to be ‘not lost In the same way the Karma, Act, also, though past and gone, is spoken of as ‘not gone and destroyed (1851)
upacāreṇa deśanāyāḥ kiṃ prayojanam ity āha ucchedadṛṣṭīti / ucchedadṛṣṭināśāya caivaṃ śāstrā prakāśitam / anyathā śūnyatāsūtre deśanā nīyate katham //	The matter has been explained in this way by the teacher, for the purpose of removing the notion of the utter annihilation (of past acts). Otherwise, how could he explain the teaching imparted in the aphorism declaring the ‘void’? (1852) Question “What was the purpose for which the Teaching was given in figurative language?”
nāstyatītaṃ karmetyukte pāramparyeṇa yat phalotpādanasāmarthyamāhitam atītena karmaṇā tasyāpyabhāvaṃ pratipadyerannityucchedadṛṣṭimāpannāḥ syur vineyā ityasti karmetyuktaṃ bhagavatā /	If it were declared that ‘the Past act does not exist’, it might be understood that there is non-existence of that potency to produce the fruit which had been set going by the past act; and the disciples would come to take up the view of the utter annihilation of the Past and its Effects; it is in view of this possibility that the Lord has said that ‘the Act persists’.
anyathā hi yadyatītaṃ svarūpeṇa syāt tadā paramārthaśūnyatā sūtre deśanā kathaṃ nīyate /	‘Otherwise’ if the Past really persisted, then how could we explain the teaching in the aphorism where we are taught that ‘in reality all is void’?
cakṣur utpadyamānaṃ na kutaścidāgacchati niruddhyamānaṃ na kvacit sannicayaṃ gacchatīti hi cakṣurabhūtvā bhavati bhūtvā ca prativigacchatīti /	As a matter of fact, when the Eye is produced, it does not come from anywhere; similarly when it is destroyed, it does not go away to any other place; what happens is that after having been not in existence, it comes into existence, and having come into existence, it again becomes non-existent.
vartamāne 'dhvanyabhūtvā bhavatīti cen na /	It might be urged that “in the Present state, it comes into existence, after having not been in existence” That is not so;
adhvano bhāvānarthāntaratvāt ta evādhvānas tathāvasthivacanāt /	because the ‘State’ is not anything different from the entity (Eye); as is clear from the assertion that these same (things) are the ‘States’ and they exist as such.
atha svātma [p.519] nyabhūtvā bhavati tathā siddhamanāgataṃ cakṣur nāstīti /	If it be meant that “not having been itself, it becomes itself”; then it would be established that there can be no ‘future’ Eye.
apica sadāvasthitatve saṃskārāṇāṃ hetuphalayor abhāvāt duḥsamudayasatyābhāvaḥ, tadabhāvānnirodhamārgayor api, tataś ca satyacatuṣṭayābhāvāt parijñāprahāṇasākṣāt kriyābhāvanā na yujyante, tadabhāvāc ca phalasthānāṃ pratipannakānāṃ ca pudgalānām abhāva iti sakalam eva pravacanaṃ nirudhyata iti nātītādivastujātakalpanā sādhvī //	Further, if the Modifications are always there, the Cause and Effect would not be there; which would mean that there is no fixed Truth; and this would imply the absence of the two paths of ‘Repression’ (Purification) also; and thus the four Truths being non-existent, there would be no possibility of True Knowledge, Renunciation, Direct Intuition and Meditation. These being not there, there would be non-existence also of the Pudgalas (Bodies) which are near about the regions where the Fruit of Acts come about.
atītānāgatajñānaṃ vibhaktaṃ yogināṃ katham ityatrāha pāramparyeṇetyādi /	It has been asked by the Opponent (under Text 1789) “How have Mystics distinct cognitions of the Past and Future?” The answer to this is as follows: [see verses 1853-1856 above]
pāramparyeṇa sākṣād vā kāryakāraṇatāṃ gatam /	It has become the ‘Effect’ in relation to the ‘Past’, and ‘Cause’ in relation to the ‘Future’,
yadrūpaṃ vartamānasya tadvijānanti yoginaḥ //	‘Vikalpānugatātmabhiḥ’ i.e. with Conceptual (Determinate) Cognitions.
anugacchanti paścāc ca vikalpānugatātmabhiḥ / śuddhalaukikavijñānais tattvato 'viṣayair api //	As regards the Blessed Lord Himself, He does not even have the purely secular cognition, because He is always calm and collected on account of the destruction of all Illusion and Ignorance;
taddhetuphalayor bhūtāṃ bhāvinīṃ caiva sannatiṃ /	The mystics cognise that form of the ‘present’ thing which, directly or indirectly, has become either an effect, or a cause;
tāmāśritya pravartante 'tītanāgatadeśanāḥ // samastakalpanājālarahitajñānasantateḥ /	subsequently, they follow it up with conceptual cognitions, which are purely common (secular) in character, and which are really without objects (without a real objective back-ground).
tathāgatasya vartante 'nābhogenaiva deśanāḥ //	As for the tathāgata himself, his teachings proceed without circumlocution;

nāpi vyatirkto 'tiśayaḥ kriyate vyatireke hyasya rūpāder ayam atiśaya iti sambandhāsiddheḥ / tathā hi na tādātmyalakṣaṇaḥ sambandho vyatirekābhyupagamāt /

Nor can a Peculiarity be brought about which is different from the Form, etc.; because as it would be different from them, there could be nothing to determine that ‘this Peculiarity belongs to that Form For instance, the relation between them cannot be that of Identity, as they are held to be different;

anabhyupagame vā pūrvoktadoṣaprasaṅgāt /

if they are not held to be different, then the above objections come in.

nāpi tadutpattilakṣaṇo jāter eva tadutpatteḥ / na cānyaḥ sambandho 'sti ādhārādheyatvādīnāṃ tadutpattyantargatatvāt /

Nor can the relation between them be that of one being produced by the other; as the production of the thing is due to Birth itself. No other kind of relation is possible; those of container and contained being included under that of being produced.

atha tadutpattirabhyupagamyate tanmātrabhāvino viśeṣasya nityotpattiprasaṅgāj jātiḥ kiṅkarī syāt /

If then the relation of being produced from it is held to subsist between the said Peculiarity and Form, etc. then, as the Peculiarity would be capable of being produced by the Form itself alone, it would be produced at all times from that alone;

jātimapekṣyotpādayatīti cet, na hyanupakā [p.514] riṇyāṃ jātāvapekṣāyuktātiprasaṅgāt /

and under the circumstances, what would ‘Birth’ do to it? It might be argued that “the Form produces the Peculiarity, through Birth”, The answer to that is that it cannot be right that there should be any dependence upon the Birth which can render no help at all.

upakāre vā tasyopakārasyātiśayavat tatvānyatvacintāyām anavasthāprasaṅgāt /

If the Birth be held to actually render some help, then in regard to this Help, the question would arise as to its being different or non-different and so forth, just as it arises in the case of the Peculiarity; and this would lead to an infinite regress.

tasmād vyatireke sati sambandho na sidhyati /

From all this it follows that if there is difference, then there can be no relationship.

kiṃ ca tasyātiśayasya pūrvasattvād asatkāryamabhyupagataṃ bhavet /

Further, if it be held that the said ‘Peculiarity’ did not exist before, then it would mean the acceptance of the view that the effect has been nonexistent (which is inconsistent with the opponent’s doctrines).

evaṃ jarayānyathātve kriyamāṇe sthityāvasthiteranityatayā ca nāśe kriyamāṇe, eṣām anyathātvādīnām anyānanyavikalpe sati ye doṣās te jātivajjarādiṣvapi vācyaḥ //

Similarly, if Decay brings about a reversal of character, and if Existence brings about stability, and if Non-eternality brings about destruction, then the question regarding these ‘Reversal’, etc. being different or non-different, will arise, as it arose in connection with Birth; and all the objections then urged would be applicable in the case of these also.

svakāryārambhiṇa ime sāmarthyaniyamātmanā / jātyādayaś ca tadrūpaṃ prākpaścād api vidyate //

These, ‘birth’ and the rest, are productive of their effects, in accordance with the limitations of their nature; and this capacity of theirs is there before as well as after;

samartharūpabhāvāc ca prārabhante na kiṃ tadā / svārurūpāṃ kriyāṃ tasyāḥ prārambhe cāmitādhvatā //

this potent form thus being there at all times, why should they not proceed with the activity in keeping with their nature? At the starting of such activity there can be no limitation on the ‘states (1829-1830)

kiṃ ca jātyādīnāṃ svakāryārambhitvaṃ yat tat samarthasvabhāvaniyamād

Then again, the capacity of ‘Birth’ and the rest to produce their effects is limited to their respective capacity;

iṣṭaṃ, sa ca samarthaḥ svabhāvas teṣāṃ sarvadāstīti sadaiva svakāryārambhitvaprasaṅgaḥ /

and this capacity of theirs is there at all times; hence they should produce their effects at all times.

naca hetupratyayavaikalyaṃ teṣām api sadāvasthitatvāt /

It cannot be urged that there is absence of the ‘Causal Factor’ (which prevents the production). Because the Causal Factor also is there at all times.

tataścātītānāgatāvasthayor jātyādibhir jananādisvakāryakaraṇādekasminnevādhvanyaparimitādhvaprasaṅgaḥ //

Thus then, as Birth and the rest would be producing their effects in the ‘past’ and ‘future’ states also, one and the same ‘state’ should include all the States, of which thus there need be no division.

kiñcātītādayo bhāvāḥ kṣaṇikāḥ syur na vā yadi /

Further, would the ‘past’ and other entities be momentary, or not? If the former, then there is the same absence of restriction.

yaḥ kṣaṇo jāyate tatra vartamāno bhavatyasau / utpadya yo vinaṣṭaś ca so 'tīto bhāvyanāgataḥ //

The ‘moment’ that is born becomes the ‘present’, that which, on being born, becomes destroyed, becomes the ‘past’, and that which is yet to be born becomes the ‘future’.

apica atītānāgatāḥ kṣaṇikā vā syur na vā kṣaṇikā iti pakṣadvayam /

Again, are the Past, Present and Future things momentary or not? These are the two alternatives. If the former, if they are momentary.

tatra yadyādyāḥ kṣaṇikā iti yāvat, tadā saivāmitādhvatā prāptā /

then there is the same absence of restriction.

yaḥ kṣaṇa iti tāmeva darśayati //

The next sentence ‘The Moment, etc. etc.’ shows this same absence of restriction.

athāpyakṣaṇikās te syuḥ kṛtāntas te virudhyate /

If, ox the other hand, the said things are not momentary, then that goes against your doctrine;

kṣaṇikaḥ sarvasaṃskārāḥ siddhānte hi prakāśitāḥ //

under your doctrine it has been shown that all modifications are momentary.

athākṣaṇikā iti pakṣaḥ, evaṃ sati kṛtāntavirodhaḥ kṛtāntaḥ siddhānta ucyate /

If the other alternative is accepted that the Past and the rest are not momentary then it goes against your doctrine. The term ‘Kṛtānta’ stands for Siddhānta, accepted doctrine.

tathā hi kṣaṇikāḥ sarvasaṃskārā iti siddhāntaḥ //

The doctrine referred to is that ‘all modifications are momentary’, (1833) [verse 1834]:

[p.515] kiṃ ca na kevalaṃ siddhāntavirodho mānavirodho 'pi pratijñāyāḥ /

Further, the view in question does not go against your own doctrine only, it is opposed to Reason also.

tathā hi yat sattatsarvaṃ kṣaṇikaṃ yathā vartamānaṃ, santaścātītānāgatāiti niyamāt kṣaṇabhaṅginaḥ prāptāḥ / prāktu kṣaṇabhaṅgādhikāre, pratibandho 'sya hetoḥ prasādhita iti nānaikāntikatvam /

For instance, whatever is existent must be momentary, like the Present thing, the Past and the Future are existent hence they must be momentary. Previously under the treatment of the Momentary Character of things (under Chapter VIII) the Invariable Concomitance of this Probans (Being existent, with the Probandum, Being momentary) has been established.

tathā hi arthakriyākāritvaṃ, sattvalakṣaṇam akṣaṇikasya ca kramayaugapadyābhyām arthakriyāvirodhād arthakriyānivṛttau tallakṣaṇasya sattvasya nivṛttir iti sādhyavipakṣān nivṛttaṃ sattvam //

Further, ‘existence’ is characterised by capacity for effective action: what is not-momentary is not compatible with effective action, either successive or simultaneous; and when there is no effective action, there must be cessation of existence also, which is characterised by effective action. Thus Existence becomes excluded from where the Probandum (momentariness) is absent.

arthakriyāsamarthāḥ syur atītānāgatā ime / na vā sāmarthyasadbhāve vartamānās tadanyavat //

Are these ‘past’ and ‘future’ things capable of effective action? Or not? If they have that capacity, then they must be regarded as ‘present’, like other ‘present’ things.

avartamānatāyāṃ tu sarvaśaktiviyoginaḥ / naṣṭājātāḥ prasajyante vyomatāmarasādivat //

If the ‘past’ and the ‘future’ are not regarded as ‘present’, then they must be devoid of all capacities, just like the ‘sky-lotus’, the ākāśa and other ‘non-produced’ (eternal) things are open to the same objection;

anaikāntikatāklṛpter na tepi vinibandhanam // niyamārthakriyāśaktir bhāvānāṃ pratyayodbhavā /

hence these cannot serve to make our reason ‘inconclusive’, in the case of all entities, their restricted capacity for effective action must be due to some cause;

ahetutve samaṃ sarvamupayujyeta sarvataḥ //

if it were without a cause, everything would be used for everything.

niyatārthakriyāśaktijanma pratyayanirmitam /

In fact, the restricted capacity for effective action must be brought about by a cause;

vartamānasya bhāvasya lakṣaṇaṃ nānyad asti ca //

and there is no other characteristic feature of the ‘present’ thing.

atītānāgatānāṃ ca tadakhaṇḍaṃ samasti vaḥ /

In the case of the ‘past’ and ‘future’ also, the said capacity is there fully complete, according to your view;

tat kiṃ na vartamānatvam amīṣāmanuṣajyate //

wherefore then should not the character of the ‘present’ be attributed to them? (1835-1840)

kiṃ ca ime 'tītānāgatā arthakriyāsamarthā vā syur na vā samarthā iti

Further, there are the two alternatives these Past and Future things are capable of effective action or not capable.

yadi samarthās tadā sāmarthyasadbhāve vartamānāḥ prāpnuvanti, avivādāspadībhūtavartamānavat / prayogaḥ ye ye 'rthakriyāsamarthās te vartamānāḥ, yathāvivādāspadībhūtā vartamānāḥ, arthakriyāsamarthāścātītādaya iti svabhāvahetuprasaṅgaḥ /

If they are capable, then, the capacity being there, the things must be regarded as ‘Present’, like those things whose ‘present’ character is not disputed. The argument may be thus formulated Things that are capable of effective action must be regarded as Present, as those things whose ‘present’ character is not disputed, and the Past and Future things are capable of effective action; hence there is this Reason based upon the nature of things, which provides the Reductio ad absurdum.

na cāyamanaikāntikaḥ, yato vartamānatvanivṛttau naṣṭājātānāṃ sarvasāmarthyaviyogitvaṃ prasajyeta, ākāśāmbhoruhavat / prayogaḥ ye vartamānā na bhavanti te kvacit samarthā api na bhavanti yathāvyomāmbhoruhaṃ, na bhavanti cātītādayo vartamānā iti vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ /

The Probans cannot be said to be ‘Inconclusive’; because the absence of the ‘Present’ character in the Past and Future things would imply the absence of all capacities, just as in the ‘sky-lotus’, The argument may be thus formulated: Things that are not-‘Present’ are also not-efficient for any action, e.g. the ‘sky-lotus’, and the Past and Future things are not ‘Present’;

na cākāśapratisaṅkhyānirodhāpratisaṅkhyānirodhair asaṃskṛtairanekāntas

Nor can this argument be said to be ‘Inconclusive’, in view of the three ‘eternal verities’ Ākāśa, Pratisaṅkhyā-nirodha and Apratisaṅkhyā-nirodha, which do not undergo modifications;

teṣām api pakṣīkaraṇāt /

because these also are included under the Minor Term (Subject of the Syllogism).

ato 'naikāntikatvakalpanāyā nātinibandhanam /

Thus there is no ground for the Reason being regarded as ‘Inconclusive’ (or Doubtful).

tathā hi yeyaṃ pratiniyatārthakriyā [p.516] śaktir bhāvānāṃ sā pratyayodbhavetyaṅgīkartavyam, anyathā yadi nirhetukāsyāt tadā niyamahetor abhāvāt pratiniyatā śaktir bhāvānāṃ na syāt /

Then again, the restricted capacity for effective action that there is in entities, must be admitted to be due to some cause; otherwise, if it were without cause, them there could be nothing to restrict it; and the capacity of things would, in that case, not be restricted (or limited);

tataś ca sarvaṃ sarvasmin kārye upayujyeta /

with the result that each and every thing would be utilised in bringing about each and every effect.

tasmātkṛ{tasmādakru---}tākāśādīnāṃ sāmarthyaniyamo na yukta iti na tair anaikāntikatvakalpanāyā nibandhanam /

Thus it cannot be right to restrict the efficiency of the eternal verities, Ākāśa and the rest. Consequently they do not supply the ground for regarding the Reason as ‘Inconclusive’.

naca prathame hetau saṃdigdhavipakṣavṛttikatā yasmānniyatāyām arthakriyāyāṃ yā śaktis tasyā yadetajjanma hetupratyayanirmitaṃ tadeva vartamānasya lakṣaṇam, etacca vartamānatvalakṣaṇam avikalamatītādiṣvapyastīti nimittāntarābhāvāt kimiti vartamānatā{na} prasajyate //

Nor can it be urged that the former Reason is one whose presence in the contrary of the Probandum is open to suspicion; because the efficiency that pertains to a particular efficient activity, the birth of which is due to causal factors, is what characterises the ‘Present’; and this characteristic of the ‘Present’ is present intact in the Past and Future things also; hence, there being no other basis for this, why should these be not regarded as ‘Present’? (1835-1840)

svargāpavargasaṃsargayatno 'yam aphalas tataḥ /

As a consequence of this, all attempt to attain heaven and final beatitude would be futile;

īhāsādhyaṃ na kiñciddhi phalamatropalakṣyate //

as no fruit is found that could be attained by effort.

kiṃ ca yasyātītānāgataṃ dravyato 'sti tasya phalam api nityam astīti svargāpavargaprāptyartho yatno viphalaḥ syāt, īhāsādhyasya kasyacit phalasyābhāvāt / kiṃ tatra vrataniyamādilakṣaṇāyā īhāyāḥ sāmarthyaṃ syāt /

Then again, for the man for whom the Past and Future are actually present, the fruit of acts also would be there at all times; hence any effort to attain Heaven or Final Beatitude would be futile; as there would be no fruit that could be attained by effort, what would be the efficiency of the Austerities and Penances that constitute ‘effort’? It might be said that “they would have the efficiency to produce the desired results”.

utpādane sāmarthyam iti cet / utpādanaṃ tarhyabhūtvā bhavatīti siddham /

That would mean that the said ‘Production’ of Results is something that was not there before and has come about now.

atha tadapyasti, kasyedānīṃ kva sāmarthyam / vartamānīkaraṇasāmarthyam iti cet /

But even so, what is it that would be efficient? And wherein would it be efficient? “The efficiency would lie in making the results ‘present’”.

deśāntarākarṣaṇaṃ cet / nityaṃ tarhi vastu prasaktaṃ sarvadāvasthitatvāt /

What do you mean by ‘making them present’? If it means ‘bringing them to another place’, then the thing becomes eternal, as it would remain for all time.

arūpāṇāṃ vedanādīnāṃ niṣkriyatvat katham ākarṣaṇaṃ bhavet / yacca tadākarṣaṇaṃ tadabhūtvā bhavatīti siddham /

How too could there be any such ‘bringing’ in the case of Sensations, etc., which are immobile? Even so, this ‘bringing’ would be something that did not exist before, but has now come into existence.

svargaḥ sumerupṛṣṭhādiḥ, apavargo mokṣaḥ, tayoḥ prāptiḥ saṃsargaḥ, tatra yatnovrataniyatādiḥ //

‘Heaven’ stands for the place on the summits of mount Meru. ‘Apavarga’, ‘Final Beatitude’, stands for Deliverance; the ‘Saṃsarga’ of these is their attainment. The ‘effort’ for this consists in Observances and Austerities.

atha nārthakriyāśaktis teṣām abhyupagamyate / yadyevam ata evaiṣām asattvaṃ vyomapuṣpavat //

If, on the other hand, the past and future things are held to be without the capacity for effective action, then, on that ground alone, they would be non-existent, like the ‘sky-flower’, (1842)

atha nārthakriyāsamarthā iti dvitīyapakṣa āśrīyate / evaṃ tarhyata evārthakriyāśūnyatvād asattvaṃ prāpnoti khapuṣpavat /

If then the second alternative view (proposed under Text 1835) is accepted that the Past and Future things are devoid of capacity for effective action, then, in that case, for that very reason, of being devoid of capacity for effective activity, they would have to be regarded as ‘non-existent’, like ‘sky-flowers’;

sarvasāmarthyavivekalakṣaṇatvād asattvasya //

as the only characteristic of ‘non-existence’ consists in the absence of all capacity.

evaṃ tāvad atītānāgatānām asattāsādhakaṃ pramāṇam abhidhāya sattāsādhakaṃ pramāṇamapākartum āha hetava ityādi /

Having thus adduced arguments in favour of the view that the ‘Past’ and the ‘Future’ do not exist, the author proceeds to refute the arguments that have been put forward in support of the view that they do exist;

hetavo bhāvadharmās tu nāsiddhe siddhibhāginaḥ /

[see verse 1843 above]

vartamānatvasiddher vā viruddhā dharmibādhanāt // hetavo hi pūrvoktā adhvasaṃgṛhītatvādityādaya āśrayāsiddhāḥ, atītāder dharmiṇo ' [p.517] siddhatvāt /

The ‘Reasons’ meant here are those adduced by the other party, under the Text 1790; these are ‘Inadmissible in regard to their substratum’; because the things in which they are said to reside are the Past and Future things, and it has been shown that these do not exist;

yathāha "nāsiddhe bhāvadharmo 'sti"iti /

as has been said ‘if the thing is not there, its property cannot be there’.

athāpi siddhāḥ syuḥ, tathāpi vartamānatvasiddher dharmasvarūpaviparītasādhanād viruddhā hetavaḥ //

Even if the said things existed, as they have been proved to have the ‘Present’ character, the Reasons in question would be proving something contrary to the very nature of the Subject;

katham idānīm adhvasaṃgṛhītatvam atītānāgatānāṃ rūpādīnāṃ nirdiṣṭam nahi śaśaviṣāṇam atyantāsadatītamanāgataṃ vā vyavasthāpyata ity āha bhūtvetyādi /

and as such, they would be ‘Contradictory’, (1843) Question: “If that is so, then how is it that Buddhist writers have declared the Past and Future Forms, etc. to be included among the ‘states’? The Past and Future character of non-entities like the Hare’s Horns is never tried to be determined”.

bhūtvā yadvigataṃ rūpaṃ tadatītaṃ prakāśitam / sati pratyayasākalye bhāvi yat tadanāgatam // sattve tu vartamānatvamāsajyeteti sādhitam /

That form which, having come into existence, has ceased to exist, has been described as ‘past’ ‘and that which is to come when the causal factors are complete has been described as ‘future’, if the ‘existence’ of this were insisted upon, then they must be regarded as ‘present’;

vidyamānatvamātraṃ hi vartamānasya lakṣaṇam //

this is what has been just proved; as the only characteristic of the ‘present’ is that it should be existent.

subodham //

This is easily understood.

rūpavedanādibhāvas tarhi kathaṃ nirdiṣṭa ity āha dvayaṃ pratītyeti /

Question: “How is it that the presence of Form, Sensation and the rest has been attributed to these?” Answer: [see verse 1846 next]

dvayaṃ pratītyavijñānaṃ yaduktaṃ tattvadarśinā /

When the seer of truth declared that cognition proceeds from two causes, this teaching was in view of the cognition with an object.

dvividhaṃ hi vijñānaṃ sālambanamanālambanaṃ ca, yat sālāmbanaṃ tadabhisandhāya dvyāśrayavijñānadeśanā bhagavataḥ //

Cognition is of two kinds with object (objective) and without object (purely subjective). It is in reference to the Cognition with Object that Cognition has been taught by the Blessed Lord, as being based upon two substrates.

atha nirālambanam api jñānam astīti katham avasitam ity āha nityeśvarādītyādi /

Question: “How is it known that there is Cognition without Object also?” Answer: [see verse 1848 next]

nityeśvarādibuddhīnāṃ naivālambanam asti hi /

In the case of the cognitions of ‘eternal things’, ‘god’ and so forth, there is no objective background;

śabdanāmādidharmāṇāṃ tadākāraviyuktitaḥ // ādiśabdena pradhānakālādayaḥ parikalpitā gṛhyante / na caitanmantavyaṃ śabdādyālambanā imā buddhaya iti kathayati śabdanāmādītyādi /

as words and names are devoid of the forms of those. ‘And so forth’, includes such other assumed things as Primordial Matter, Time, etc. No such idea should be entertained as that these cognitions have their objective background in the words; this is what is meant by the words

tasyeśvarāderākāro nityatvasakalahetutvādiḥ, yas tayā buddhyādhyavasīyate, tenākāreṇa viyogaḥ śabdasya nāmno vā viprayuktasaṃskāraviśeṣasya /

‘As Words arid Names, etc, etc.’ What is meant is that the ‘form’ of God-such as Eternality, Being the Cause of all things and so forth, that is envisaged in the said cognitions, of that form, the Word or the Name is entirely devoid, which Word or Name does not undergo any modification.

ādiśabdena nimittādeḥ paropagatasyārthapratibimbakādisvabhāvasya //

The term ‘ādi’ in ‘śabdanāmādi’, is meant to include the contingent cause (of Cognition), postulated by other people, in the shape of the Reflected Image of things.

yadi tarhi nirviṣayam api vijñānam asti tat kathaṃ jñānam iti vyapadiśyate tathā hi [p.518] vijānātīti vijñānam iti gīyate, asati ca vijñeye kiṃ vijñānaṃ

Question: “If then there is Cognition without object also, then how is it called ‘Cognition’? Because ‘Cognition’ stands for that which apprehends things; and when there is nothing to be apprehended, how could the cognition be there?”

syād ity āha bodhānugatimātreṇeti /

Answer: [see verse 1849 next]

bodhānugatimātreṇa vijñānam iti cocyate / sā cāsyājaḍarūpatvaṃ prākāśyāt parikalpitam //

It is called ‘cognition’ only by virtue of the presence of the nature of ‘consciousness’; and this ‘consciousness’ also consists in the cognition being not-dark which is deduced from its being luminous.

bodhānugamo 'pi vinā bodhena{na} sambhavatīti cedāha sā ceti /

“The presence of the nature of Consciousness also is not possible without cognition”; in answer to this it is added ‘And this Consciousness, etc. etc.’ ‘Sā’ stands for the presence of the nature of Consciousness;

asya vijñānasya /

‘asya’ i.e. of the Cognition.

kimucyate---, yat tadajaḍarūpatvam, prakāśyavastvantarābhāvāt prakāśāntaravirahāc ca nabhovartyālokavat prakāśarūpatvād abhidhīyate bodharūpateti //

“What is it?” It consists in the Cognition being not-dark; only, on account of there being nothing else to be illumined by it, and also of the absence of any other source of illumination, the Cognition is of the nature of Light itself, like the Light diffused in the atmosphere and it is by virtue of this luminosity that it is called ‘Cognition’.

vipākahetuḥ phalado nātīto 'bhyupagamyate / sadvāsitāt tu vijñānaprabandhāt phalam iṣyate //

What brings about the fruit is the cause of fruition, not anything ‘past’, in fact, the fruit is held to proceed from the ‘chain’ of cognitions impressed by the entity (when present).

vāsitaṃ paramparayā phalotpādanasamartham utpāditam //

‘Impressed’ i.e. rendered capable of producing the fruit, through the long series of ‘causal factors (1850)

yadyevaṃ katham uktaṃ bhagavatā, "asti tat karma yat kṣīṇaṃ niruddhaṃ vipariṇatamityāha" tāmeveti /

Question “If that is so, then how is it that the Blessed Lord has declared that ‘There is Karma, which decays, is obstructed and becomes modified’?” Answer: [see verse 1851 next]

tāmeva vāsanāṃ cetaḥsantatāvadhikṛtya tat / asti karmeti nirdiṣṭaṃ bhaktyā mūlāvināśavat //

In view of the said impression being attributed to the ‘series of cognitions’, the lord has said that ‘there is karma’, which assertion is figurative; as the principal (of the debt) is said to be ‘not destroyed (lost)’.

bhaktyeti upacāreṇa /

‘Bkaktyā’ Figuratively.

yathā mūladravyaprasūtasya hiraṇyādeḥ phalaprabandhasya sa{ma}bhāve vinaṣṭam api mūladravyamavinaṣṭam ity ucyate tadvat karmāpi //

When in the case of a Debt, when the accrued interest has become equal to the Principal, the Principal actually disappears; yet it is said to be ‘not lost In the same way the Karma, Act, also, though past and gone, is spoken of as ‘not gone and destroyed (1851)

upacāreṇa deśanāyāḥ kiṃ prayojanam ity āha ucchedadṛṣṭīti / ucchedadṛṣṭināśāya caivaṃ śāstrā prakāśitam / anyathā śūnyatāsūtre deśanā nīyate katham //

The matter has been explained in this way by the teacher, for the purpose of removing the notion of the utter annihilation (of past acts). Otherwise, how could he explain the teaching imparted in the aphorism declaring the ‘void’? (1852) Question “What was the purpose for which the Teaching was given in figurative language?”

nāstyatītaṃ karmetyukte pāramparyeṇa yat phalotpādanasāmarthyamāhitam atītena karmaṇā tasyāpyabhāvaṃ pratipadyerannityucchedadṛṣṭimāpannāḥ syur vineyā ityasti karmetyuktaṃ bhagavatā /

If it were declared that ‘the Past act does not exist’, it might be understood that there is non-existence of that potency to produce the fruit which had been set going by the past act; and the disciples would come to take up the view of the utter annihilation of the Past and its Effects; it is in view of this possibility that the Lord has said that ‘the Act persists’.

anyathā hi yadyatītaṃ svarūpeṇa syāt tadā paramārthaśūnyatā sūtre deśanā kathaṃ nīyate /

‘Otherwise’ if the Past really persisted, then how could we explain the teaching in the aphorism where we are taught that ‘in reality all is void’?

cakṣur utpadyamānaṃ na kutaścidāgacchati niruddhyamānaṃ na kvacit sannicayaṃ gacchatīti hi cakṣurabhūtvā bhavati bhūtvā ca prativigacchatīti /

As a matter of fact, when the Eye is produced, it does not come from anywhere; similarly when it is destroyed, it does not go away to any other place; what happens is that after having been not in existence, it comes into existence, and having come into existence, it again becomes non-existent.

vartamāne 'dhvanyabhūtvā bhavatīti cen na /

It might be urged that “in the Present state, it comes into existence, after having not been in existence” That is not so;

adhvano bhāvānarthāntaratvāt ta evādhvānas tathāvasthivacanāt /

because the ‘State’ is not anything different from the entity (Eye); as is clear from the assertion that these same (things) are the ‘States’ and they exist as such.

atha svātma [p.519] nyabhūtvā bhavati tathā siddhamanāgataṃ cakṣur nāstīti /

If it be meant that “not having been itself, it becomes itself”; then it would be established that there can be no ‘future’ Eye.

apica sadāvasthitatve saṃskārāṇāṃ hetuphalayor abhāvāt duḥsamudayasatyābhāvaḥ, tadabhāvānnirodhamārgayor api, tataś ca satyacatuṣṭayābhāvāt parijñāprahāṇasākṣāt kriyābhāvanā na yujyante, tadabhāvāc ca phalasthānāṃ pratipannakānāṃ ca pudgalānām abhāva iti sakalam eva pravacanaṃ nirudhyata iti nātītādivastujātakalpanā sādhvī //

Further, if the Modifications are always there, the Cause and Effect would not be there; which would mean that there is no fixed Truth; and this would imply the absence of the two paths of ‘Repression’ (Purification) also; and thus the four Truths being non-existent, there would be no possibility of True Knowledge, Renunciation, Direct Intuition and Meditation. These being not there, there would be non-existence also of the Pudgalas (Bodies) which are near about the regions where the Fruit of Acts come about.

atītānāgatajñānaṃ vibhaktaṃ yogināṃ katham ityatrāha pāramparyeṇetyādi /

It has been asked by the Opponent (under Text 1789) “How have Mystics distinct cognitions of the Past and Future?” The answer to this is as follows: [see verses 1853-1856 above]

pāramparyeṇa sākṣād vā kāryakāraṇatāṃ gatam /

It has become the ‘Effect’ in relation to the ‘Past’, and ‘Cause’ in relation to the ‘Future’,

yadrūpaṃ vartamānasya tadvijānanti yoginaḥ //

‘Vikalpānugatātmabhiḥ’ i.e. with Conceptual (Determinate) Cognitions.

anugacchanti paścāc ca vikalpānugatātmabhiḥ / śuddhalaukikavijñānais tattvato 'viṣayair api //

As regards the Blessed Lord Himself, He does not even have the purely secular cognition, because He is always calm and collected on account of the destruction of all Illusion and Ignorance;

taddhetuphalayor bhūtāṃ bhāvinīṃ caiva sannatiṃ /

The mystics cognise that form of the ‘present’ thing which, directly or indirectly, has become either an effect, or a cause;

tāmāśritya pravartante 'tītanāgatadeśanāḥ // samastakalpanājālarahitajñānasantateḥ /

subsequently, they follow it up with conceptual cognitions, which are purely common (secular) in character, and which are really without objects (without a real objective back-ground).

tathāgatasya vartante 'nābhogenaiva deśanāḥ //

As for the tathāgata himself, his teachings proceed without circumlocution;