buddhist-nlp/tatpa-noisy · Datasets at Hugging Face

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kāritraṃ sarvadā nāsti sadā dharmaś ca varṇyate / dharmānnānyac ca kāritraṃ vyaktaṃ devaviceṣṭitam //	Activity is not there always, and the entity is described as being there at all times, and yet the activity is said to be non-different from the entity; certainly this is conduct worthy of a divine being!
kāritrāntarasāpekṣā tatrāpyadhvasthitir yadi / tulyaḥ paryanuyogo 'yaṃ nanu sarvatra dhāvati //	Even if it be held that the existence of the states (in the activity itself) is dependent upon other activities, the same question would be equally well raised against that view also.
evaṃ tarhi rūpādidharmo na sadāstīti prasaktaṃ kāritrād avyatiriktatvād	Under the circumstances, it comes to this that the Entities, Colour and the rest, do not exist at all times, as they are non-different from Activity.
ityāha sadā dharmaśceti /	This is shown in the Text ‘The Entity, etc. etc.’
evam api dharmād anyat kāritraṃ prasajyata ity āha dharmānnānyac ca kāritram /	For the following reason also the Activity must be something different from the Entity ‘And the Activity is non-different, etc. etc.’.
devāḥ īśvarādayaḥ, te hi yuktāyuktamanālocya svātantryeṇaiva vartanta ititeṣāṃ yathāceṣṭitaṃ yuktinirapekṣaṃ svātantryeṇa pravṛttis tadvadetad iti yāvat /	‘Divine Beings’ God and the like; who act and live independently, not minding what is proper and what is improper; and just as their behaviour is unreasonable, so also is the conduct of the philosopher under review.
kiṃ ca yadi kāritrasya kāritramantareṇānāgatāditvam iṣyate, na tarhi vaktavyam adhvānaḥ kāritreṇa vyavasthitā iti, vyabhicārāt /	Then again, if the Activity itself is regarded as ‘future’, without another Activity, then it should not be said that the states are determined by Activity; as that would not be true; inasmuch as in the case of Activity itself its ‘future’ and other states are determined on the basis of its own existence;
yathā kāritrasya svarūpasattāpekṣayānāgatāditvaṃ vyavasthāpyate, evaṃ	and in the same manner the ‘future’ and other states of Entities also could be determined on the basis of their own existence.
bhāvānām apyanāgatāditvaṃ bhaviṣyatīti kiṃ kāritrakalpanayā / atha mābhūd vyabhicāradoṣa iti kāritrasyāpi kāritram abhyupagamyate, tadātatrāpi vyatirekādicintayā tulyaḥ paryanuyogaḥ /	In order to avoid this objection it might be held that, in the case of Activity also, there would be another Activity, which would be the determining factor. But in that case also the same question as to its being different or non-different from the former Activity, would arise. And this would be open to the further defect that it would involve an infinite regress.
anavasthādoṣaś ca //	they have been regarded as occasional;
yaduktamananyatve 'pi kāritraṃ sārvakālikaṃ prāpnoti dharmasvarūpavad aviśeṣād iti /	because the entity itself is produced in that way. It has been pointed out that if the Activity is non-different from the Entity, it must be there at all times, like the form or nature of the Entity itself.
atra bhadantasahantabhadra āha	Bhadanta-Sahantabhadra has offered an answer to that, which is anticipated and answered in the following [see verses 1804-1805 above]
svarūpād vyatirikto 'pi dṛṣṭaḥ sapratighatvavat /	“As a matter of fact, Properties distinct from the Entity and yet qualifying it have been found;
nahi sapratighatvādiḥ padārthasyānugāminaḥ /	for example, the character of Resistance and the like found in Earth and other things.
svarūpād vyatiriktopi viśeṣako dharmo dṛṣṭo yathā sapratighatvādiḥ pṛthivyādīnām, te hi padārthatvenāviśiṣṭā api sapratighā apratighāḥ sanidarśanāanidarśanā iti svarūpād vyatiriktair dharmair viśiṣṭāḥ pratīyante tadvat	These things Earth, etc, as Categories, are all the same; and yet these are found to be ‘resistant’ and ‘non-resistant’, ‘similar’ and ‘dissimilar’, thus being qualified by properties which are distinct from the form of the things themselves. In the same manner, the Entity could be qualified by Activity, which may be different from the Entity itself.”
tadetat prakṛtānupakārakam /	This explanation will not help the present topic.
tathā hi idam atra prakṛtam, padārthāt kāritrasyābhede 'bhyupagamyamāne satyekasyaiva padārthasyātmabhūtakāritrasyāviśeṣāt tadvaśād ayam adhvavibhāgo nāvakalpata iti /	The topic under consideration is this If the Activity is regarded as non-different from the Thing, then there can be no distinction in the Activity which, being of the same nature as the Entity, could not serve to determine the distinction among the states (as ‘Past’, etc.).
pṛthivyādayastu parasparamanyonyalakṣaṇabhedāsaṅgābhinnā iti yuktaṃ yat kecit sapratighā bhavanti kecid apratighā eva yathā vedanādayaḥ /	As regards Earth and the other things (that have been cited by Bhadanta-Sahantabhadra), they are distinct from one another by reason of their being associated with mutually divergent characters, and hence it is that while some are ‘resistant’, others are ‘non-resistant’; as is found in the case of ‘Sensation’, etc.;
natu ya evāpratighās ta eva sapratighā iti, yato na kaścid eko 'nugāmī padārthātmāsti pṛthivyādīnāṃ yat sapratighatvādidharmaḥ kādācitko bhavet /	but it is not that those same are ‘non-resistant’ which are ‘resistant’; and this for the same reason that there is no comprehensive entity in the form of ‘Category’, by virtue of which the qualities of ‘Resistance’, etc. could be occasional.
bhāvasya niravayavasya tathā sajātīyavijātīyavyāvṛttasyodbhava iti na svarūpāvyatirikto dharma ekasya bhedako yuktaḥ //	In fact, what happens is that the Entity itself, which is impartite, and is ‘excluded from like and unlike things’, is produced in that way. For these reasons it is not right that any property, other than the form of the Entity itself, should distinguish any single Entity.
kathaṃ rūpasya sapratighatvam iti vyatirekīva vyapadeśo yadi svarūpāvyatiriktau dharmo bhedako na bhaved ity āha anākṣiptetyādi /	Question: “How then is it that there is such an expression as ‘Rūpasya sapratighatvam,’, ‘Resistance of the Form’, where the two appear as different from one another, if a property non-different from a thing cannot serve to distinguish it?”
anākṣiptānyabhedena bhāva eva tathocyate / tadrūpasyeti śabdena cetaso vāsanāpi ca //	It is the entity itself, when it does not indicate ‘difference from other things’, that is spoken of by the words ‘it is of the form’; just as ‘disposition’ is spoken of as ‘of the mind’.
anākṣiptānyabhedeneti /	‘When it does not, etc. etc.’;
bhedāntarapratikṣepeṇetyarthaḥ /	that is, when it ignores the difference from, other things.
tathocyata iti / vyatirekīva / taditi /	‘Spoken of as, etc.’ i.e. as if it were something different.
sapratighatvam / śabdeneti rūpasya{sa} pratighatvam ityanena /	‘It is of the form, etc.’ ‘It’ stands for ‘Resistance’. ‘By the words’, i.e. by the expression ‘Resistance of the Form’.
apiceti samudāyo nipāta ivārthe dṛṣṭavyaḥ //	An example is cited ‘As Disposition, etc. etc.’. The term ‘api ca’ should be understood in the cumulative sense.
yathā dharmanairantaryotpattiḥ santāna ity ucyate, na cāsau dharmavyatiriktas tadavibhāgena gṛhyamāṇatvāt, naca dharmamātram, ekakṣaṇasyāpi santānatvaprasaṅgāt, naca nāsti, tat kāryasadbhāvād iti /	If the ‘activity’ is described as ‘neither same nor different’, like the ‘chain’, etc., then it becomes purely ‘illusory’; and thus being purely imaginary, like the ‘chain’, it could serve no useful purpose in regard to any effect; as it is only a real entity that is capable of effective action.
āha ca santatikāryaṃ ceṣṭaṃ, na vidyate sāpi santatiḥ kācit / tadvad avagaccha yuktyā kāritreṇādhvasaṃsiddhim iti, atrāha tattvānyatvetyādi /	Thus then, as the presence of the ‘activity’ would not be real, any determining of the states based upon that ‘activity’ could not be real. The same writer (Bhadanta-Sahantabhadra) has argued as follows: “Activity is not something different from the Entity, as it is not found to have any nature apart from that.
[p.510]	Nor is it the Entity only;
tattvānyatvaprakārābhyām avācyamatha varṇyate / santānādīva kāritraṃ syād evaṃ sāṃvṛtaṃ nanu //	because even though it forms its very nature, yet it is non-existent at times. Nor is it a particular (form of it), as the Activity has had no previous existence.
ataś ca kalpitatvena tat kvacinnopayujyate / kārye santativadyasmād vastvevārthakriyākṣamam // sannidhānaṃ ca tasyedaṃ bhāvikaṃ neti tat kṛtam /	In fact, the ‘Activity’ is like the ‘Chain’ (Series); the consecutive birth of the Entity is called the ‘Chain’ (or Series), and yet it is not something different from the Entity, as it is always apprehended as not-separate from it; nor is it the Entity only, as in that ease even a single ‘Moment’ would have to be regarded as the ‘Chain’;
adhvatrayavyavasthānaṃ tāttvikaṃ nopapadyate //1809/	and yet with all this, it cannot be said that the Chain does not exist;
santānādīveti /	because its effects are found to exist.
ādiśabdena samūhādiparigrahaḥ /	‘Like the Chain, etc.’ the ‘etc.’ is meant to include the ‘Aggregate’ and such things.
yathā santānibhyas tattvānyatvenāvācyatvāt pudgalavat santāno niḥsvabhāvaḥ {tatha kāritraṃ nisvabhavaṃ} syāt svabhāve hi sati tattvamanyatvaṃ vāvaśyambhāvi, tataś ca tatkāritraṃ kalpitatvān na kvacit kārye santativad upayujyeta /	in the same way the ‘Activity’ in question also would be featureless; when there is some feature (or form), it is necessary that it should be either different or non-different. Thus then, the Activity in question being purely imaginary, it could not serve any useful purpose in the bringing about of any effect; just like the ‘Chain’, The ‘Chain’, which is purely a creature of fancy, does not serve any useful purpose towards any effect, because it is featureless;
svabhāvapratibaddhatvāt kāryodayasya /	and the appearance of an effect is inseparably connected with some feature (or character).
tasmād vastveva santānisvabhāvamarthakriyākṣamam / na santānaḥ kalpitaḥ / tataś ca kāritrasya prajñaptisattvāt prāganu paścād api na paramārthataḥ sannidhānam astīti tadvaśād adhvatrayavyavasthānam api kalpitam eva syān nabhāvikam //	Hence it is only an entityr which has the form of a ‘link in the chain’ that is capable of effective action, not the imaginary ‘Chain’, From this it follows that the ‘Activity’ in question having a purely imaginary existence, there can be no real presence of it, either before or after anything, and consequently any notions of the distinct ‘states’ determined upon the basis of such Activity must also be imaginary, not real.
kāritrākhyā phalākṣepaśaktir yā śabdagocarā /	Firstly, the activity in question consists in ‘the capacity to throw out results’ and is capable of being spoken of;
śakter eva ca vastutvāt sā prajñaptisatī katham // taccedam iṣyate rūpaṃ dāhapākādikāryakṛt / atītānāgatāvasthaṃ kiṃ tadevābhyupeyate // tadeva cet kathaṃ nāma tasyaivaikātmanaḥ sataḥ /	how can it be said to have an imaginary existence, when the capacity op things is an entity? Secondly, the form that is admitted to be bringing about such effects as burning, cooking and the like, is this same form held to be in the ‘past’, ‘present’ and ‘future’ states? If it is the same, how can activity, inactivity and cessation of activity belong to the entity that has a single form? How can these mutually contradictory modes be present in what is only one and undifferentiated? If it is argued that “because it abandons one ‘state’ and then takes up another, that entity cannot be undifferentiated, which passes through the states”, then the question arises are these ‘states’ different from the entity? [The other party answers] “no;
akriyā ca kriyā cāpi kriyāviratirityapi //	as in that case, the entity would not be an active agent.
prakārāḥ katham ete hi yujyante nāma vastuni //	because it is only through the existence of the ‘states’ that the existence of the effects is apprehended.” (1810-1815)
ekāvasthāparityāge parāvasthāparigrahāt /	Says the other party “It may be that the Activity has a purely imaginary existence;
naivaitannirviśiṣṭaṃ ced vastvadhvastviti kalpyate //	and hence the distinction of the states based thereupon may also be only imaginary;
kiṃ vai bhāvād vibhidyante 'vasthā nākartṛtāptitaḥ /	what is the harm in that?” This is the view taken up in the following [see verses 1810-1815 above]
[p.511] phalākṣepaśaktir hi dharmāṇāṃ kāritram iti bhavatā varṇitam /	You (Sahantabhadra) have explained that the capacity of entities to throw up their effects is what is meant by ‘Activity’;
sāca phalākṣepaśaktiḥ prajñaptisatī {kathaṃ} bhavet / naiva bhaved iti yāvat /	now, how can this capacity to throw up effects have a merely imaginary existence? That is, it can never be so.
tataś ca tadvaśād adhvavyavasthānaṃ tāttvikameveṣṭaṃ bhavatīti bhāvaḥ /	Consequently the distinction of the ‘states’ based thereupon should also be accepted as real.
kiṃ ca yadetad dāhapākādyarthakriyākāri vahnyādirūpam upalabhyate, kiṃ tadevātītānāgatāvasthamāhosvid anyat / yadi tadeva, katham ekasminnirviśiṣṭe 'smin rūpādike vastunyakriyādayaḥ parasparaviruddhā dharmā yujyante / yena yathākramamanāgatavartamānātītavyavasthā syāt /	Further, the Form of Fire is found to be one that is capable of such efficient actions as those of Burning, Cooking, etc.; is this the same that continues in the ‘Past’ and other states? Or is it different-? If it remains the same, then how can such contradictory properties as ‘activity’, ‘inactivity’ and ‘cessation from activity’ belong to the said form winch is one and the same, totally undifferentiated? And it is only through the presence of these properties that the Entity could have such states as the ‘Future’, ‘Present’ and ‘Past’ respectively.
yadi hi viruddhadharmādhyāse 'pyekatvaṃ syāt utsannā tarhi bhedavyavasthā, tataś ca sarvam eva jagadekam eva syāt /	If, even in the presence of contradictory properties, the entity remained the same, then all ideas of Difference would become uprooted, and the entire universe would have to be regarded as one only.
ekatve ca sahotpattyādiprasaṅgaḥ /	And such one-ness would mean that all things should be produced together at one and the same time.
athāpyavasthāparityāgaparigrahabhedena bhinnatvād adhvasu vastu na nirviśiṣṭam iti kalpate, evam api kiṃ tā avasthā bhāvād bhinnā āhosvid abhinnā itivaktavyam /	It might be argued that “By virtue of the variations undergone in the process of abandoning one state and taking up another, the Entity in the three states is not entirely undifferentiated”. But even so, are these states different or non-different (from the Entity)? This has got to be explained.
para āha neti /	Bays the other Party “They are not different;
bhidyante bhāvād iti sambandhaḥ /	i.e. they do not differ from the Entities.
kasmāt/ bhāvasyākartṛtāptitaḥ akartṛtvaprasaṅgāt /	‘Why?’ Because, in that case the Entity could not be an active agent; i.e. it would be inactive;
anvayavyatirekābhyāṃ tāsām evāvasthānāṃ kāryaṃ prati sāmarthyasiddheḥ //	as through positive and negative concomitance, it has been ascertained that efficient activity (causal efficiency) to produce effects belongs to the states only.
atra dūṣaṇam āha abhedam ityādi /	The objections against this last view [that “the States are not different from the Entity”] are pointed out in the following [see verses 1816-1820 next]
abhedamanumanyante katham adhvasu vastunaḥ / tā abhūtvā bhavantyaś ca naśyantyaś ca tadātmikāḥ //	How do these people accept the view that there is non-difference between the entity and the states? They (the states), not having been in existence, come into existence and then become destroyed;
avasthāyāṃ ca madhyāyāṃ svarūpeṇaiva kārakam / tat tadeva svarūpaṃ ca daśayoranyayor api // tadā kriyākriyābhraṃśau katham asya tayor matau / pararūpeṇa kartṛtve prāptāsyākartṛtā punaḥ //	how then could they be the same as the entity? In the middle ‘state’, the entity is ‘active’ in its own form, then, as the same form persists in other two states also, how could ‘activity’ and ‘cessation of activity’ be there in these two states? If it is ‘active’, in the form of something else, then it ceases to be active again.
atītānāgatāvasthamanyaccedanalādikam / tat sāṅkaryādidoṣo 'yam asmin pakṣe nirāspadaḥ //	if, lastly, it be held that the fire and other things, in the past and future states, are different from the same in the present state, then it is true that there would be no room for the objection that comingling and confusion would be involved;
tadidānīm abhūtvaiva kāryayogyaṃ prajāyate / na ca tiṣṭhati bhūtveti siddhāsyānanvayātmatā //	but even so, as the entity in the middle (present) state becomes capable of fruitful action only when it comes into existence after the time during which it was not in existence, and after having come into existence, it does not continue to exist, there would be no continuity of existence for the entity.
vastunaḥ sakāśād abhedaṃ katham avasthā{{sva}numanyante pratipadyante / naiva /	How can any one accept the view that the states are non-different from the Entity? No one can accept it.
yasmād abhūtvā bhavantyavasthā bhūtvā ca vinaśyanti /	Because the States come into existence after having been non-existent, and after having come into existence, they become destroyed;
naca tathā vastviṣṭam, sarvadāstitvābhyupagamāt /	while nothing like this happens to the Entity; because it has been held to be existent at all times.
tataś ca kathaṃ tā abhūtvā bhavantyo vinaśyantyaś ca tadātmikā yuktāḥ / naiva /	Under the circumstances, having been non-existent, then coming into existence and then ceasing to exist, how could the States be the same in essence as the Entity? They can never be so;
bhinnayogakṣematvāt /	because, they stand upon entirely different footings.
anyathā hi tadātmatvenāsām api sadāstitvaprasaṅgo vastu [p.512] svabhāvavat, tato 'vyatirekād vastuno vābhūtvābhāvādiprasaṅgo 'vasthāsvarūpavat /	Otherwise, being the same as the Entity, the States also would have to be regarded as existing at all times, just like the nature of the Entity; because they are non-different from the Entity; or (conversely) the Entity itself would have to be regarded as subject to non-existence before existence and so forth, like the form of the States,
bhavatu cāvasthābhedaparakalpanā, tathāpi viruddhadharmādhyāso na parihṛtaeva, tathā hi vastu madhyāvasthāyāṃ kiṃ svarūpeṇa kārakamāhosvit pararūpeṇa yadi svarūpeṇa tadeva svarūpam anyoyor api daśayor atītānāgatāvasthayor astīti katham asya kārakasvabhāvasya kriyākriyābhraṃśau syātām /	Even granting the assumption that the States are non-different from the Entity, the objection based upon the attributing to them of mutually contradictory properties still remains unanswered. For instance, when the Entity is in the ‘middle’ (Present) state, is it active in its own form? Or in the form of something else? If it is active in its own form, then, as that same form would be there in the Past and Future states also, how could this form of the active entity become active and inactive?
atha pararūpeṇa, tadāsyākartṛtā punaḥ prapatetyavastuprasaṅgaḥ /	If it is active in the form of something else, then it ceases to be active; and hence becomes a non-entity.
evaṃ tāvat tadeva vahnyādirūpam atītānāgatāvasthāyāṃ na yuktam /	Thus it is clear that it is not right to say that the same form is there in the Past and Future states also.
athānyat, asmin pakṣe na bhavatyekatra kriyākriyādiparasparāhatadharmasāṅkaryādidoṣaḥ, bhinnatvād vastunaḥ /	If then there is some other form (of the Entity) in these States, then, under this view, there would be no room for the objection that it involves the confusion and comingling in the same thing of mutually contradictory properties of Activity and Inactivity, because the Entity would not be the same.
syād etat yadyapi kāryayogyam abhūtvā jāyate, bhūtvā ca vigacchatīti tathāpyatītānāgatāvathāyām akāryayogyaṃ vastu vidyata eva, tataś ca na	But (the other difficulty will remain, that) if the Entity, Fire, which is capable of such action as Burning and Cooking, comes into existence after having been non-existent, and having come into existence, it disappears, this is incompatible with the doctrine of the permanent existence oi the Entity;
sadāstitvābhyupagamavirodha ity āha sa eveti /	because there is no continuity of existence.
sa eva bhāviko bhāvo ya evāyaṃ kriyākṣamaḥ /	As a matter of fact, that entity alone is real which is capable of action;
sa ca nāsti tayor yosti na tasmāt kāryasambhavaḥ //	hence from that which is not so in the two states, no effect can proceed.
sa eveti arthakriyākṣamaḥ /	‘That alone’ which is capable of action.
tayor iti atītānāgatāvasthayoḥ /	‘In the two states’ in the Past and Future states.
yostīti akāryayogyaḥ //	‘That which is not so’ i.e. not capable of action.
athāpi syāt atītasya sabhāgahetvādeḥ kāryayogyatvam iṣyata eva, tataścāsiddham etan na tasmāt kāryasambhava ity āha atītaśceti /	Such a past entity would be one that has come into existence, not having been there before, and as such it would clearly be ‘present’, just like any other ‘present’ entity;
vartamāno 'nyavat prāptaḥ kādācitkatayāpi ca // sadā sattvamasattvaṃ vāhetutve 'nyānapekṣaṇāt /	also because it would be occasional. If an entity has no cause, it can be either eternally existent or non-existent, because it would not be dependent upon anything else.
hetor niyatasattvaś ca vartamāno 'rtha ucyate //	That however, which has its existence dependent upon a cause must be called ‘present’.
pratisaṅkhyānirodhādivailakṣaṇyaṃ parair matam /	Then again, other people have postulated that ‘modification’ of form, etc. is different in character from ‘pratīsaṅkhyānirodha’ (dissociation from impurities brought about by transcendental knowledge), and other ‘eternal verities’;
saṃskṛtatvaṃ ca rūpāder jātisthityādiyogataḥ //	and this ‘modification’ or embellishment of form and other things, comes about through birth, existence, etc.;
tatra jātir viśeṣaṃ kaṃ janayantyabhidhīyate / janikāsyeti tadrūpād ajātādaparaṃ param //	now what is that peculiarity by producing which, birth is said to be ‘productive’ of the thing? Is it something non-different from the ‘unborn’ form? Or different from it? If the peculiarity is non-different from the form, then there can be no ‘production’ of it;
sattvāt prāgapi niṣpatter niṣpattyuttarakālavat //	as it would, in that case, be there even before the ‘birth just as after it.
anyastvatiśayo nāsti vyatirekād asaṅgateḥ /	As for a different peculiarity, there can be no such, because by reason of this difference, there can be no relation between them.
asatkāryaprasaṅgaś ca tasya pūrvam asattvataḥ //	Further, as it would not be existent before, it would involve the notion that the effect was not existent (which is incompatible with the opponent’s doctrines).
anyathātve sthitau nāśe cānyānanyavikalpayoḥ / jarādiviṣayā doṣā eva evānuṣaṅgiṇaḥ //	Similarly if there were ‘reversal of character’, ‘continuance’ and ‘destruction’ (brought about respectively by the embellishments of ‘decay’, ‘stability’ and ‘non-eternality’), the objections based upon their being ‘different or non-different’, ‘decay’ and the rest, would be applicable to these also.
anyavad iti / avivādāspadībhūtavartamānavat /	‘Just like any other present Entity’ i.e. any other Entity whose ‘present’ character is not disputed.
kādācitkatayāpi ceti /	‘Also because it would be occasional’;
vartamāno 'nyavat prāpta iti sambandhaḥ /	this also goes with ‘it would be Present’.
na cāyaṃ heturananvayaḥ, tathā hi hetupratyayajanito yo 'rthaḥ sa vartamāna	The Reason here put forward cannot be regarded as Irrelevant. Because as a matter of fact that thing is called ‘Present’ which has been produced by the Causal Link (or Factor);
ucyate, yaś ca kādācitkaḥ so 'vaśyaṃ hetupratyayanimittaḥ, yasmād ahetukasya dveeva gatī yaduta sadā sattvamasattvaṃ vā, anyānapekṣaṇāt, tasmādyaḥ kādācitkaḥ so 'vaśyaṃ hetupratyayanirmitasattvaḥ yaś ca hetupratyayanirmitasattvaḥ	and what is occasional must owe its birth to a Causal Factor; because for that which has no cause, there are only two conditions possible perpetual existence or non-existence; for the simple reason that its existence is not dependent upon anything else; hence what is occasional must have an existence that is brought about by a Causal Factor, and thus it becomes established that, that which has its existence brought about by a Causal Factor must be ‘Present’;
vartamānatvena kādācitkatvasya vyāptiḥ /	that is to say, ‘Being Present’ is invariably concomitant with ‘being occasional’.
kiṃ ca yadyatītānāgataṃ dravyato 'sti tadā sarvasaṃskārāṇāṃ śāśvatatvaprasaṅgaḥ /	Further, if the Entity is really objectively ‘Past’ and ‘Future’, then all ‘Embellishments’ (or Modifications) would be everlasting;
tataś ca pratisaṅkhyānirodhādibhyo rūpādīnāṃ viśeṣo na prāpnoti /	and in that case, there would be no difference between Form, etc. and the ‘Dissociation from Impurities by transcendental knowledge’ and other ‘eternal verities’.
atha rūpādeḥ saṃskṛtalakṣaṇayogāt saṃskṛtatvaṃ nākāśādīnāṃ, tena bhavatipratisaṅkhyānirodhāder vailakṣaṇyaṃ rūpāder iti parair mataṃ, tadetad asamyak, tathā hi jātir jarāsthitir anityatā ceti catvārīmāni saṃskṛtalakṣaṇāni /	It might be argued that it is only the Form and such things as are actually found to be embellished (or modified) that can be regarded as ‘modified’ not Ākāśa and the other Eternal Verities; so that there would be clear difference between Form, etc. and the said ‘Eternal Verities This is the view that has been held by other people. This however cannot be right. Because there are four marks of modification (1) Birth, (2) Decay, (3) Existence, and (4) Non-eternality.
tatra jātirjanayati, sthitiḥ sthāpayati, jarā jarayati, anityatā vināśayatītyevaṃ jānanādireṣāṃ vyāpāra iṣṭaḥ /	Among these, Birth produces things, Existence leads to their continuance, Decay leads to their decadence, and Non-eternality destroys them; hence among these, the functions of Producing and the rest have been held to be present.
tatra jātis tāvat kaṃ viśeṣaṃ janayantī satyasya rūpāder janiketyabhidhīyate kiṃ tasmād rūpādeḥ param vyatiriktamāhosvid aparam avyatiriktaṃ viśeṣaṃ janayantīti pakṣadvayam /	Now the question arises What is that Peculiarity which Birth produces by virtue of which it comes to be spoken of as ‘productive’ of the Form, etc.? Is this Peculiarity something different from the Form, etc.? Or non-different from them? These are the only two possible alternatives. It cannot be non-different from Form, etc.;
tatra na tāvad avyatiriktaṃ yasmād asau viśeṣo jātivyāpārāt prāgapi niṣpannatvād aśakyakriyaḥ niṣpattyuttarakālavat / nahi niṣpannasya kriyāyuktānavasthāprasaṅgāt /	because the Peculiarity in question would, in that case, be an accomplished thing even before the functioning of ‘Birth’, and as such it would be incapable of being brought about, just as after its accomplishment; what is already an accomplished entity cannot be brought about again; if it were, then there would be an infinite regress.

kāritraṃ sarvadā nāsti sadā dharmaś ca varṇyate / dharmānnānyac ca kāritraṃ vyaktaṃ devaviceṣṭitam //

Activity is not there always, and the entity is described as being there at all times, and yet the activity is said to be non-different from the entity; certainly this is conduct worthy of a divine being!

kāritrāntarasāpekṣā tatrāpyadhvasthitir yadi / tulyaḥ paryanuyogo 'yaṃ nanu sarvatra dhāvati //

Even if it be held that the existence of the states (in the activity itself) is dependent upon other activities, the same question would be equally well raised against that view also.

evaṃ tarhi rūpādidharmo na sadāstīti prasaktaṃ kāritrād avyatiriktatvād

Under the circumstances, it comes to this that the Entities, Colour and the rest, do not exist at all times, as they are non-different from Activity.

ityāha sadā dharmaśceti /

This is shown in the Text ‘The Entity, etc. etc.’

evam api dharmād anyat kāritraṃ prasajyata ity āha dharmānnānyac ca kāritram /

For the following reason also the Activity must be something different from the Entity ‘And the Activity is non-different, etc. etc.’.

devāḥ īśvarādayaḥ, te hi yuktāyuktamanālocya svātantryeṇaiva vartanta ititeṣāṃ yathāceṣṭitaṃ yuktinirapekṣaṃ svātantryeṇa pravṛttis tadvadetad iti yāvat /

‘Divine Beings’ God and the like; who act and live independently, not minding what is proper and what is improper; and just as their behaviour is unreasonable, so also is the conduct of the philosopher under review.

kiṃ ca yadi kāritrasya kāritramantareṇānāgatāditvam iṣyate, na tarhi vaktavyam adhvānaḥ kāritreṇa vyavasthitā iti, vyabhicārāt /

Then again, if the Activity itself is regarded as ‘future’, without another Activity, then it should not be said that the states are determined by Activity; as that would not be true; inasmuch as in the case of Activity itself its ‘future’ and other states are determined on the basis of its own existence;

yathā kāritrasya svarūpasattāpekṣayānāgatāditvaṃ vyavasthāpyate, evaṃ

and in the same manner the ‘future’ and other states of Entities also could be determined on the basis of their own existence.

bhāvānām apyanāgatāditvaṃ bhaviṣyatīti kiṃ kāritrakalpanayā / atha mābhūd vyabhicāradoṣa iti kāritrasyāpi kāritram abhyupagamyate, tadātatrāpi vyatirekādicintayā tulyaḥ paryanuyogaḥ /

In order to avoid this objection it might be held that, in the case of Activity also, there would be another Activity, which would be the determining factor. But in that case also the same question as to its being different or non-different from the former Activity, would arise. And this would be open to the further defect that it would involve an infinite regress.

anavasthādoṣaś ca //

they have been regarded as occasional;

yaduktamananyatve 'pi kāritraṃ sārvakālikaṃ prāpnoti dharmasvarūpavad aviśeṣād iti /

because the entity itself is produced in that way. It has been pointed out that if the Activity is non-different from the Entity, it must be there at all times, like the form or nature of the Entity itself.

atra bhadantasahantabhadra āha

Bhadanta-Sahantabhadra has offered an answer to that, which is anticipated and answered in the following [see verses 1804-1805 above]

svarūpād vyatirikto 'pi dṛṣṭaḥ sapratighatvavat /

“As a matter of fact, Properties distinct from the Entity and yet qualifying it have been found;

nahi sapratighatvādiḥ padārthasyānugāminaḥ /

for example, the character of Resistance and the like found in Earth and other things.

svarūpād vyatiriktopi viśeṣako dharmo dṛṣṭo yathā sapratighatvādiḥ pṛthivyādīnām, te hi padārthatvenāviśiṣṭā api sapratighā apratighāḥ sanidarśanāanidarśanā iti svarūpād vyatiriktair dharmair viśiṣṭāḥ pratīyante tadvat

These things Earth, etc, as Categories, are all the same; and yet these are found to be ‘resistant’ and ‘non-resistant’, ‘similar’ and ‘dissimilar’, thus being qualified by properties which are distinct from the form of the things themselves. In the same manner, the Entity could be qualified by Activity, which may be different from the Entity itself.”

tadetat prakṛtānupakārakam /

This explanation will not help the present topic.

tathā hi idam atra prakṛtam, padārthāt kāritrasyābhede 'bhyupagamyamāne satyekasyaiva padārthasyātmabhūtakāritrasyāviśeṣāt tadvaśād ayam adhvavibhāgo nāvakalpata iti /

The topic under consideration is this If the Activity is regarded as non-different from the Thing, then there can be no distinction in the Activity which, being of the same nature as the Entity, could not serve to determine the distinction among the states (as ‘Past’, etc.).

pṛthivyādayastu parasparamanyonyalakṣaṇabhedāsaṅgābhinnā iti yuktaṃ yat kecit sapratighā bhavanti kecid apratighā eva yathā vedanādayaḥ /

As regards Earth and the other things (that have been cited by Bhadanta-Sahantabhadra), they are distinct from one another by reason of their being associated with mutually divergent characters, and hence it is that while some are ‘resistant’, others are ‘non-resistant’; as is found in the case of ‘Sensation’, etc.;

natu ya evāpratighās ta eva sapratighā iti, yato na kaścid eko 'nugāmī padārthātmāsti pṛthivyādīnāṃ yat sapratighatvādidharmaḥ kādācitko bhavet /

but it is not that those same are ‘non-resistant’ which are ‘resistant’; and this for the same reason that there is no comprehensive entity in the form of ‘Category’, by virtue of which the qualities of ‘Resistance’, etc. could be occasional.

bhāvasya niravayavasya tathā sajātīyavijātīyavyāvṛttasyodbhava iti na svarūpāvyatirikto dharma ekasya bhedako yuktaḥ //

In fact, what happens is that the Entity itself, which is impartite, and is ‘excluded from like and unlike things’, is produced in that way. For these reasons it is not right that any property, other than the form of the Entity itself, should distinguish any single Entity.

kathaṃ rūpasya sapratighatvam iti vyatirekīva vyapadeśo yadi svarūpāvyatiriktau dharmo bhedako na bhaved ity āha anākṣiptetyādi /

Question: “How then is it that there is such an expression as ‘Rūpasya sapratighatvam,’, ‘Resistance of the Form’, where the two appear as different from one another, if a property non-different from a thing cannot serve to distinguish it?”

anākṣiptānyabhedena bhāva eva tathocyate / tadrūpasyeti śabdena cetaso vāsanāpi ca //

It is the entity itself, when it does not indicate ‘difference from other things’, that is spoken of by the words ‘it is of the form’; just as ‘disposition’ is spoken of as ‘of the mind’.

anākṣiptānyabhedeneti /

‘When it does not, etc. etc.’;

bhedāntarapratikṣepeṇetyarthaḥ /

that is, when it ignores the difference from, other things.

tathocyata iti / vyatirekīva / taditi /

‘Spoken of as, etc.’ i.e. as if it were something different.

sapratighatvam / śabdeneti rūpasya{sa} pratighatvam ityanena /

‘It is of the form, etc.’ ‘It’ stands for ‘Resistance’. ‘By the words’, i.e. by the expression ‘Resistance of the Form’.

apiceti samudāyo nipāta ivārthe dṛṣṭavyaḥ //

An example is cited ‘As Disposition, etc. etc.’. The term ‘api ca’ should be understood in the cumulative sense.

yathā dharmanairantaryotpattiḥ santāna ity ucyate, na cāsau dharmavyatiriktas tadavibhāgena gṛhyamāṇatvāt, naca dharmamātram, ekakṣaṇasyāpi santānatvaprasaṅgāt, naca nāsti, tat kāryasadbhāvād iti /

If the ‘activity’ is described as ‘neither same nor different’, like the ‘chain’, etc., then it becomes purely ‘illusory’; and thus being purely imaginary, like the ‘chain’, it could serve no useful purpose in regard to any effect; as it is only a real entity that is capable of effective action.

āha ca santatikāryaṃ ceṣṭaṃ, na vidyate sāpi santatiḥ kācit / tadvad avagaccha yuktyā kāritreṇādhvasaṃsiddhim iti, atrāha tattvānyatvetyādi /

Thus then, as the presence of the ‘activity’ would not be real, any determining of the states based upon that ‘activity’ could not be real. The same writer (Bhadanta-Sahantabhadra) has argued as follows: “Activity is not something different from the Entity, as it is not found to have any nature apart from that.

[p.510]

Nor is it the Entity only;

tattvānyatvaprakārābhyām avācyamatha varṇyate / santānādīva kāritraṃ syād evaṃ sāṃvṛtaṃ nanu //

because even though it forms its very nature, yet it is non-existent at times. Nor is it a particular (form of it), as the Activity has had no previous existence.

ataś ca kalpitatvena tat kvacinnopayujyate / kārye santativadyasmād vastvevārthakriyākṣamam // sannidhānaṃ ca tasyedaṃ bhāvikaṃ neti tat kṛtam /

In fact, the ‘Activity’ is like the ‘Chain’ (Series); the consecutive birth of the Entity is called the ‘Chain’ (or Series), and yet it is not something different from the Entity, as it is always apprehended as not-separate from it; nor is it the Entity only, as in that ease even a single ‘Moment’ would have to be regarded as the ‘Chain’;

adhvatrayavyavasthānaṃ tāttvikaṃ nopapadyate //1809/

and yet with all this, it cannot be said that the Chain does not exist;

santānādīveti /

because its effects are found to exist.

ādiśabdena samūhādiparigrahaḥ /

‘Like the Chain, etc.’ the ‘etc.’ is meant to include the ‘Aggregate’ and such things.

yathā santānibhyas tattvānyatvenāvācyatvāt pudgalavat santāno niḥsvabhāvaḥ {tatha kāritraṃ nisvabhavaṃ} syāt svabhāve hi sati tattvamanyatvaṃ vāvaśyambhāvi, tataś ca tatkāritraṃ kalpitatvān na kvacit kārye santativad upayujyeta /

in the same way the ‘Activity’ in question also would be featureless; when there is some feature (or form), it is necessary that it should be either different or non-different. Thus then, the Activity in question being purely imaginary, it could not serve any useful purpose in the bringing about of any effect; just like the ‘Chain’, The ‘Chain’, which is purely a creature of fancy, does not serve any useful purpose towards any effect, because it is featureless;

svabhāvapratibaddhatvāt kāryodayasya /

and the appearance of an effect is inseparably connected with some feature (or character).

tasmād vastveva santānisvabhāvamarthakriyākṣamam / na santānaḥ kalpitaḥ / tataś ca kāritrasya prajñaptisattvāt prāganu paścād api na paramārthataḥ sannidhānam astīti tadvaśād adhvatrayavyavasthānam api kalpitam eva syān nabhāvikam //

Hence it is only an entityr which has the form of a ‘link in the chain’ that is capable of effective action, not the imaginary ‘Chain’, From this it follows that the ‘Activity’ in question having a purely imaginary existence, there can be no real presence of it, either before or after anything, and consequently any notions of the distinct ‘states’ determined upon the basis of such Activity must also be imaginary, not real.

kāritrākhyā phalākṣepaśaktir yā śabdagocarā /

Firstly, the activity in question consists in ‘the capacity to throw out results’ and is capable of being spoken of;

śakter eva ca vastutvāt sā prajñaptisatī katham // taccedam iṣyate rūpaṃ dāhapākādikāryakṛt / atītānāgatāvasthaṃ kiṃ tadevābhyupeyate // tadeva cet kathaṃ nāma tasyaivaikātmanaḥ sataḥ /

how can it be said to have an imaginary existence, when the capacity op things is an entity? Secondly, the form that is admitted to be bringing about such effects as burning, cooking and the like, is this same form held to be in the ‘past’, ‘present’ and ‘future’ states? If it is the same, how can activity, inactivity and cessation of activity belong to the entity that has a single form? How can these mutually contradictory modes be present in what is only one and undifferentiated? If it is argued that “because it abandons one ‘state’ and then takes up another, that entity cannot be undifferentiated, which passes through the states”, then the question arises are these ‘states’ different from the entity? [The other party answers] “no;

akriyā ca kriyā cāpi kriyāviratirityapi //

as in that case, the entity would not be an active agent.

prakārāḥ katham ete hi yujyante nāma vastuni //

because it is only through the existence of the ‘states’ that the existence of the effects is apprehended.” (1810-1815)

ekāvasthāparityāge parāvasthāparigrahāt /

Says the other party “It may be that the Activity has a purely imaginary existence;

naivaitannirviśiṣṭaṃ ced vastvadhvastviti kalpyate //

and hence the distinction of the states based thereupon may also be only imaginary;

kiṃ vai bhāvād vibhidyante 'vasthā nākartṛtāptitaḥ /

what is the harm in that?” This is the view taken up in the following [see verses 1810-1815 above]

[p.511] phalākṣepaśaktir hi dharmāṇāṃ kāritram iti bhavatā varṇitam /

You (Sahantabhadra) have explained that the capacity of entities to throw up their effects is what is meant by ‘Activity’;

sāca phalākṣepaśaktiḥ prajñaptisatī {kathaṃ} bhavet / naiva bhaved iti yāvat /

now, how can this capacity to throw up effects have a merely imaginary existence? That is, it can never be so.

tataś ca tadvaśād adhvavyavasthānaṃ tāttvikameveṣṭaṃ bhavatīti bhāvaḥ /

Consequently the distinction of the ‘states’ based thereupon should also be accepted as real.

kiṃ ca yadetad dāhapākādyarthakriyākāri vahnyādirūpam upalabhyate, kiṃ tadevātītānāgatāvasthamāhosvid anyat / yadi tadeva, katham ekasminnirviśiṣṭe 'smin rūpādike vastunyakriyādayaḥ parasparaviruddhā dharmā yujyante / yena yathākramamanāgatavartamānātītavyavasthā syāt /

Further, the Form of Fire is found to be one that is capable of such efficient actions as those of Burning, Cooking, etc.; is this the same that continues in the ‘Past’ and other states? Or is it different-? If it remains the same, then how can such contradictory properties as ‘activity’, ‘inactivity’ and ‘cessation from activity’ belong to the said form winch is one and the same, totally undifferentiated? And it is only through the presence of these properties that the Entity could have such states as the ‘Future’, ‘Present’ and ‘Past’ respectively.

yadi hi viruddhadharmādhyāse 'pyekatvaṃ syāt utsannā tarhi bhedavyavasthā, tataś ca sarvam eva jagadekam eva syāt /

If, even in the presence of contradictory properties, the entity remained the same, then all ideas of Difference would become uprooted, and the entire universe would have to be regarded as one only.

ekatve ca sahotpattyādiprasaṅgaḥ /

And such one-ness would mean that all things should be produced together at one and the same time.

athāpyavasthāparityāgaparigrahabhedena bhinnatvād adhvasu vastu na nirviśiṣṭam iti kalpate, evam api kiṃ tā avasthā bhāvād bhinnā āhosvid abhinnā itivaktavyam /

It might be argued that “By virtue of the variations undergone in the process of abandoning one state and taking up another, the Entity in the three states is not entirely undifferentiated”. But even so, are these states different or non-different (from the Entity)? This has got to be explained.

para āha neti /

Bays the other Party “They are not different;

bhidyante bhāvād iti sambandhaḥ /

i.e. they do not differ from the Entities.

kasmāt/ bhāvasyākartṛtāptitaḥ akartṛtvaprasaṅgāt /

‘Why?’ Because, in that case the Entity could not be an active agent; i.e. it would be inactive;

anvayavyatirekābhyāṃ tāsām evāvasthānāṃ kāryaṃ prati sāmarthyasiddheḥ //

as through positive and negative concomitance, it has been ascertained that efficient activity (causal efficiency) to produce effects belongs to the states only.

atra dūṣaṇam āha abhedam ityādi /

The objections against this last view [that “the States are not different from the Entity”] are pointed out in the following [see verses 1816-1820 next]

abhedamanumanyante katham adhvasu vastunaḥ / tā abhūtvā bhavantyaś ca naśyantyaś ca tadātmikāḥ //

How do these people accept the view that there is non-difference between the entity and the states? They (the states), not having been in existence, come into existence and then become destroyed;

avasthāyāṃ ca madhyāyāṃ svarūpeṇaiva kārakam / tat tadeva svarūpaṃ ca daśayoranyayor api // tadā kriyākriyābhraṃśau katham asya tayor matau / pararūpeṇa kartṛtve prāptāsyākartṛtā punaḥ //

how then could they be the same as the entity? In the middle ‘state’, the entity is ‘active’ in its own form, then, as the same form persists in other two states also, how could ‘activity’ and ‘cessation of activity’ be there in these two states? If it is ‘active’, in the form of something else, then it ceases to be active again.

atītānāgatāvasthamanyaccedanalādikam / tat sāṅkaryādidoṣo 'yam asmin pakṣe nirāspadaḥ //

if, lastly, it be held that the fire and other things, in the past and future states, are different from the same in the present state, then it is true that there would be no room for the objection that comingling and confusion would be involved;

tadidānīm abhūtvaiva kāryayogyaṃ prajāyate / na ca tiṣṭhati bhūtveti siddhāsyānanvayātmatā //

but even so, as the entity in the middle (present) state becomes capable of fruitful action only when it comes into existence after the time during which it was not in existence, and after having come into existence, it does not continue to exist, there would be no continuity of existence for the entity.

vastunaḥ sakāśād abhedaṃ katham avasthā{{sva}numanyante pratipadyante / naiva /

How can any one accept the view that the states are non-different from the Entity? No one can accept it.

yasmād abhūtvā bhavantyavasthā bhūtvā ca vinaśyanti /

Because the States come into existence after having been non-existent, and after having come into existence, they become destroyed;

naca tathā vastviṣṭam, sarvadāstitvābhyupagamāt /

while nothing like this happens to the Entity; because it has been held to be existent at all times.

tataś ca kathaṃ tā abhūtvā bhavantyo vinaśyantyaś ca tadātmikā yuktāḥ / naiva /

Under the circumstances, having been non-existent, then coming into existence and then ceasing to exist, how could the States be the same in essence as the Entity? They can never be so;

bhinnayogakṣematvāt /

because, they stand upon entirely different footings.

anyathā hi tadātmatvenāsām api sadāstitvaprasaṅgo vastu [p.512] svabhāvavat, tato 'vyatirekād vastuno vābhūtvābhāvādiprasaṅgo 'vasthāsvarūpavat /

Otherwise, being the same as the Entity, the States also would have to be regarded as existing at all times, just like the nature of the Entity; because they are non-different from the Entity; or (conversely) the Entity itself would have to be regarded as subject to non-existence before existence and so forth, like the form of the States,

bhavatu cāvasthābhedaparakalpanā, tathāpi viruddhadharmādhyāso na parihṛtaeva, tathā hi vastu madhyāvasthāyāṃ kiṃ svarūpeṇa kārakamāhosvit pararūpeṇa yadi svarūpeṇa tadeva svarūpam anyoyor api daśayor atītānāgatāvasthayor astīti katham asya kārakasvabhāvasya kriyākriyābhraṃśau syātām /

Even granting the assumption that the States are non-different from the Entity, the objection based upon the attributing to them of mutually contradictory properties still remains unanswered. For instance, when the Entity is in the ‘middle’ (Present) state, is it active in its own form? Or in the form of something else? If it is active in its own form, then, as that same form would be there in the Past and Future states also, how could this form of the active entity become active and inactive?

atha pararūpeṇa, tadāsyākartṛtā punaḥ prapatetyavastuprasaṅgaḥ /

If it is active in the form of something else, then it ceases to be active; and hence becomes a non-entity.

evaṃ tāvat tadeva vahnyādirūpam atītānāgatāvasthāyāṃ na yuktam /

Thus it is clear that it is not right to say that the same form is there in the Past and Future states also.

athānyat, asmin pakṣe na bhavatyekatra kriyākriyādiparasparāhatadharmasāṅkaryādidoṣaḥ, bhinnatvād vastunaḥ /

If then there is some other form (of the Entity) in these States, then, under this view, there would be no room for the objection that it involves the confusion and comingling in the same thing of mutually contradictory properties of Activity and Inactivity, because the Entity would not be the same.

syād etat yadyapi kāryayogyam abhūtvā jāyate, bhūtvā ca vigacchatīti tathāpyatītānāgatāvathāyām akāryayogyaṃ vastu vidyata eva, tataś ca na

But (the other difficulty will remain, that) if the Entity, Fire, which is capable of such action as Burning and Cooking, comes into existence after having been non-existent, and having come into existence, it disappears, this is incompatible with the doctrine of the permanent existence oi the Entity;

sadāstitvābhyupagamavirodha ity āha sa eveti /

because there is no continuity of existence.

sa eva bhāviko bhāvo ya evāyaṃ kriyākṣamaḥ /

As a matter of fact, that entity alone is real which is capable of action;

sa ca nāsti tayor yosti na tasmāt kāryasambhavaḥ //

hence from that which is not so in the two states, no effect can proceed.

sa eveti arthakriyākṣamaḥ /

‘That alone’ which is capable of action.

tayor iti atītānāgatāvasthayoḥ /

‘In the two states’ in the Past and Future states.

yostīti akāryayogyaḥ //

‘That which is not so’ i.e. not capable of action.

athāpi syāt atītasya sabhāgahetvādeḥ kāryayogyatvam iṣyata eva, tataścāsiddham etan na tasmāt kāryasambhava ity āha atītaśceti /

Such a past entity would be one that has come into existence, not having been there before, and as such it would clearly be ‘present’, just like any other ‘present’ entity;

vartamāno 'nyavat prāptaḥ kādācitkatayāpi ca // sadā sattvamasattvaṃ vāhetutve 'nyānapekṣaṇāt /

also because it would be occasional. If an entity has no cause, it can be either eternally existent or non-existent, because it would not be dependent upon anything else.

hetor niyatasattvaś ca vartamāno 'rtha ucyate //

That however, which has its existence dependent upon a cause must be called ‘present’.

pratisaṅkhyānirodhādivailakṣaṇyaṃ parair matam /

Then again, other people have postulated that ‘modification’ of form, etc. is different in character from ‘pratīsaṅkhyānirodha’ (dissociation from impurities brought about by transcendental knowledge), and other ‘eternal verities’;

saṃskṛtatvaṃ ca rūpāder jātisthityādiyogataḥ //

and this ‘modification’ or embellishment of form and other things, comes about through birth, existence, etc.;

tatra jātir viśeṣaṃ kaṃ janayantyabhidhīyate / janikāsyeti tadrūpād ajātādaparaṃ param //

now what is that peculiarity by producing which, birth is said to be ‘productive’ of the thing? Is it something non-different from the ‘unborn’ form? Or different from it? If the peculiarity is non-different from the form, then there can be no ‘production’ of it;

sattvāt prāgapi niṣpatter niṣpattyuttarakālavat //

as it would, in that case, be there even before the ‘birth just as after it.

anyastvatiśayo nāsti vyatirekād asaṅgateḥ /

As for a different peculiarity, there can be no such, because by reason of this difference, there can be no relation between them.

asatkāryaprasaṅgaś ca tasya pūrvam asattvataḥ //

Further, as it would not be existent before, it would involve the notion that the effect was not existent (which is incompatible with the opponent’s doctrines).

anyathātve sthitau nāśe cānyānanyavikalpayoḥ / jarādiviṣayā doṣā eva evānuṣaṅgiṇaḥ //

Similarly if there were ‘reversal of character’, ‘continuance’ and ‘destruction’ (brought about respectively by the embellishments of ‘decay’, ‘stability’ and ‘non-eternality’), the objections based upon their being ‘different or non-different’, ‘decay’ and the rest, would be applicable to these also.

anyavad iti / avivādāspadībhūtavartamānavat /

‘Just like any other present Entity’ i.e. any other Entity whose ‘present’ character is not disputed.

kādācitkatayāpi ceti /

‘Also because it would be occasional’;

vartamāno 'nyavat prāpta iti sambandhaḥ /

this also goes with ‘it would be Present’.

na cāyaṃ heturananvayaḥ, tathā hi hetupratyayajanito yo 'rthaḥ sa vartamāna

The Reason here put forward cannot be regarded as Irrelevant. Because as a matter of fact that thing is called ‘Present’ which has been produced by the Causal Link (or Factor);

ucyate, yaś ca kādācitkaḥ so 'vaśyaṃ hetupratyayanimittaḥ, yasmād ahetukasya dveeva gatī yaduta sadā sattvamasattvaṃ vā, anyānapekṣaṇāt, tasmādyaḥ kādācitkaḥ so 'vaśyaṃ hetupratyayanirmitasattvaḥ yaś ca hetupratyayanirmitasattvaḥ

and what is occasional must owe its birth to a Causal Factor; because for that which has no cause, there are only two conditions possible perpetual existence or non-existence; for the simple reason that its existence is not dependent upon anything else; hence what is occasional must have an existence that is brought about by a Causal Factor, and thus it becomes established that, that which has its existence brought about by a Causal Factor must be ‘Present’;

vartamānatvena kādācitkatvasya vyāptiḥ /

that is to say, ‘Being Present’ is invariably concomitant with ‘being occasional’.

kiṃ ca yadyatītānāgataṃ dravyato 'sti tadā sarvasaṃskārāṇāṃ śāśvatatvaprasaṅgaḥ /

Further, if the Entity is really objectively ‘Past’ and ‘Future’, then all ‘Embellishments’ (or Modifications) would be everlasting;

tataś ca pratisaṅkhyānirodhādibhyo rūpādīnāṃ viśeṣo na prāpnoti /

and in that case, there would be no difference between Form, etc. and the ‘Dissociation from Impurities by transcendental knowledge’ and other ‘eternal verities’.

atha rūpādeḥ saṃskṛtalakṣaṇayogāt saṃskṛtatvaṃ nākāśādīnāṃ, tena bhavatipratisaṅkhyānirodhāder vailakṣaṇyaṃ rūpāder iti parair mataṃ, tadetad asamyak, tathā hi jātir jarāsthitir anityatā ceti catvārīmāni saṃskṛtalakṣaṇāni /

It might be argued that it is only the Form and such things as are actually found to be embellished (or modified) that can be regarded as ‘modified’ not Ākāśa and the other Eternal Verities; so that there would be clear difference between Form, etc. and the said ‘Eternal Verities This is the view that has been held by other people. This however cannot be right. Because there are four marks of modification (1) Birth, (2) Decay, (3) Existence, and (4) Non-eternality.

tatra jātirjanayati, sthitiḥ sthāpayati, jarā jarayati, anityatā vināśayatītyevaṃ jānanādireṣāṃ vyāpāra iṣṭaḥ /

Among these, Birth produces things, Existence leads to their continuance, Decay leads to their decadence, and Non-eternality destroys them; hence among these, the functions of Producing and the rest have been held to be present.

tatra jātis tāvat kaṃ viśeṣaṃ janayantī satyasya rūpāder janiketyabhidhīyate kiṃ tasmād rūpādeḥ param vyatiriktamāhosvid aparam avyatiriktaṃ viśeṣaṃ janayantīti pakṣadvayam /

Now the question arises What is that Peculiarity which Birth produces by virtue of which it comes to be spoken of as ‘productive’ of the Form, etc.? Is this Peculiarity something different from the Form, etc.? Or non-different from them? These are the only two possible alternatives. It cannot be non-different from Form, etc.;

tatra na tāvad avyatiriktaṃ yasmād asau viśeṣo jātivyāpārāt prāgapi niṣpannatvād aśakyakriyaḥ niṣpattyuttarakālavat / nahi niṣpannasya kriyāyuktānavasthāprasaṅgāt /

because the Peculiarity in question would, in that case, be an accomplished thing even before the functioning of ‘Birth’, and as such it would be incapable of being brought about, just as after its accomplishment; what is already an accomplished entity cannot be brought about again; if it were, then there would be an infinite regress.