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tenaivetyādinā pratividhatte	This is answered in the following [see verse 1758 next]
tenaivāsau svabhāvena samāna iti gamyate / ekapratyavamarśasya hetutvenānyabhedataḥ //	It is in that same form that it is understood to be similar, because the cause of such understanding is present, in the shape of being the cause of one and the same conception, as differentiating these from other things.
tenaiva svabhāvena samāna ity ucyate / ekapratyavamarśapratyayakāraṇatvāt /	It is in the same form that it is said to be ‘similar’, because they form the basis of the same conception.
etaduktaṃ bhavati ye hyekapratyavamarśaṃ prati kāraṇabhāvaṃ na pratipadyanteta evāsamānā iti vyavahriyante, ye tu pratipadyante te samānā iti //	What is meant is that those that do not form the basis of the same conception are treated as ‘dissimilar’, while those that do serve as that basis are regarded as ‘similar’.
atha tasyaivaikapratyavamarśasya hetavaḥ kimiti sarve na bhavanti, bhedasyāviśiṣṭatvād ityāśaṅkyāha eketyādi / ekapratyavamarśasya hetavaḥ kecid eva hi / samartharūpaniyamād bhede 'pyakṣāmṛtādivat //	It is only certain things that can serve as the basis of one and the same conception, the restriction being due to the capacity of the form of things, even when there is difference, as is found in the case of the sense-organs and the amṛtā and the like. Question: “Why do not all things become the basis of the same conception, the difference being equally present in all?”
nahi svabhāvāḥ paryanuyogam arhanti kasmād agnirdahatyuṣṇo vā nodakam iti / evaṃ tu yuktaṃ vaktuṃ kuto 'syāyaṃ svabhāva iti, nirhetukatve tvanapekṣasya niyamāyogenātiprasaṅgāt /	No question can be raised regarding the nature of things such as why should Fire, and not Water, bum or be hot? All that can be reasonably asked is to what is this nature due? Tor, if the nature of things were not due to any cause, there could be no restriction, which would lead to incongruities.
tasmāt svahetor iti vaktavyaṃ tasyāpi kuta ityanādihetuparamparā /	Hence it should be said that it is due to its own cause; but then the question would be to what is that due? And so on and on it would go on to a beginningless series (of causes).
akṣamindriyam /	‘Akṣa’ is sense-organ.
amṛtaṃ guḍūcī / ādiśabdaḥ pratyekam abhisambadhyate /	‘Amṛtā’ is the herb Guḍūcī, ‘and the like’ goes with each of the two.
yathā guḍūnyādīnām eva jvarādiśamane śaktir nānyeṣām, indriyaviṣayālokamanaksārādīnāṃ ca viśiṣṭajñānotpādane, tathaikapratyavamarśe 'pi keṣāñcid eva śaktiniyama iti /	What is meant is that it is only the Guḍūcī and other herbs that have the capacity to allay fever and other diseases, not other things. And it is the Sense-Organ, the object, the Light and Attention that have the capacity to produce particular cognitions. In the same way, it is only certain things to which belongs the capacity to bring about a single conception.
yadvākṣaśabdena vibhītakasyābhidhānam ādiśabdaḥ samudāyena sambadhyate //	Or, the term ‘akṣa’ may stand for the Vibhūtaka fruit; and the term ‘and the like’ goes with the whole compound.
nanu nīlādivijñānajananaṃ locanaṃ katham / vyāvṛttarūpabhāgeva nīlādibhyo yadīṣyate // nīlādijñānajanakānnīlāder bhedavadyathā / śrotraṃ na tasya janakaṃ tathā cakṣurapīṣyatām //	“How can the eye be productive of the cognition of the blue and other things, if it is held to have that form alone which is differentiated from the blue and others? in fact, just as the ear is not regarded as productive of the cognition of blue, etc., on account of its being different from the blue, etc. which are productive of the cognition of blue, etc., so also the eye should not be regarded as the cause of that cognition.
janakāddhi parāvṛttaḥ ko 'paro janako bhavet / bhāvastasmāt padārthānām anvayo 'pīti niścayaḥ //	How could any other thing, which is different from the productive cause, be productive of it? from all this follows the conclusion that there must be inclusiveness also among things.” (1760-1762)
yadi nīlādibhyo vyāvṛttirūpabhāgeva locanam iṣyate, nānuvṛttibhāgityavadhāraṇe [p.498] nāha /	“If the Eye be held to be that which has a form exclusive of the Blue, etc., and not any that is inclusive;
tadā nīlādivijñānajanakaṃ locanaṃ na prāpnoti, tajjanakasvabhāvātparāvṛttatvāt /	in that case the Eye cannot be the cause of the perception of the Blue, etc.; because it has been differentiated (excluded) from what is productive of that perception;
yo hi yajjanakasvabhāvāt parāvṛttaḥ sa tajjanako na bhavati, yathā nīlādijñānajanakānnīlāder vyāvṛttaṃ śrotraṃ na tasya nīlādijñānasya janakam /	when a tiring has been excluded from the Cause of a certain thing, it cannot be the Cause of that thing; e.g, the Ear which, being differentiated from the Blue, etc., which are the cause of the perception of the Blue, etc., is not the cause of the perception of the Blue, etc.;
nīlādijñānajanakāc ca nīlāder vyāvṛttaṃ cakṣur iti vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhiprasaṅgaḥ /	the Eye also is (ex hypothesi) differentiated from the Blue, etc., which are the cause of the perception of Blue, etc.;
nacaivaṃ bhavati /	As a matter of fact however, it is not so [i.e. the Eye is not non-productive of the perception of Blue, etc.].
tasmād viparyayaḥ /	Hence the truth should be otherwise than this;
yo hi yajjanakaḥ sa tajjanakasvabhāvāparāvṛttaḥ / yathā nīlajñānajanakaṃ nīlaṃ svasmāt svabhāvāt /	that is, when one thing is productive of another, it cannot be excluded from the nature of being so productive, e.g. the Blue, which is productive of the perception of Blue, cannot be excluded from its own nature;
nīlajñānajanakaṃ ca cakṣur iti svabhāvahetuḥ /	and the Eye is actually productive of the perception of the Blue, etc. So this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.
evaṃ nīlādayor 'pi pakṣatvena vācyāḥ /	In the same way Blue, etc. may be made the Minor Term in the Reasoning.
tasmād asti bhāvānām anvaya iti prasaṅgaviparyayeṇa dṛṣṭāntāsiddhimāha //	From all this it follows that there is inclusiveness among things. Thus through the contrary of the Beductio ad absurdum, it has been shown that the example cited is not admissible.
athāpi syāt tato vyāvṛttaṃ ca bhaviṣyati tajjanakaṃ cetyanaikāntikaṃ prasaṅgasādhanam ity āha anyathetyādi / anyathā nirviśiṣṭatvād bhedena śravaṇādyapi / janakaṃ tasya kiṃ neṣṭaṃ cakṣū rūpādibhedavat //	“If it were not as above, then, ‘differentiation’ being the same in both cases, why is not the ear also regarded as productive of the cognition of blue, etc., just like the eye, which also is different from the colours?” (1763) The following might be urged “The thing could be excluded from the other things and yet be productive of the Cognition; so that the Beductio ad Absurdum is Inconclusive”.
śrotrādīnām api nīlādijñānajanakatvaprasaṅgo viparyaye bādhakaṃ pramāṇaṃ bhedenāviśiṣṭatvāt /	“The possibility of the Ear also being regarded as the cause of the cognition of Blue, etc. is a proof of the contrary of the conclusion (arrived at by the Buddhist); but the difference is the same in both eases.
nīlādibhyo yo bhedaścakṣuṣas tena bhedena śrotrādīnāṃ cakṣurādinā tulyatvāt / yathā cakṣur nīlāder vyāvṛttaṃ tathā śrotram apīti yāvat //	The difference that there is between the Eye and the Blue is the same as the difference between the Ear and the Blue; i.e. the Ear is as different from the Blue, etc, as the Eye is”.
vyāvṛttir ityādinā pratividhatte /	The answer to the above arguments of the Opponent is as follows: [see verses 1764-1775 next]
vyāvṛttiścakṣurādīnāṃ na siddhā janakādiyam / aviśeṣeṇa yat teṣām ādhā{tmā---}pi janako mataḥ //	The ‘exclusion’ (differentiation) of the eye, etc. from the cause (of the cognition of blue) is not admitted, without qualification. Because the nature of the eye, etc. is also regarded as the cause;
svabhāvānnaca bhāvānāṃ vyāvṛttir upapadyate / svabhāvāddhi parāvṛttau naiḥsvābhāvyaṃ prasajyate //	and it is not possible for anything to be ‘excluded’ from its own nature; if there were ‘exclusion’ of a thing from its own nature, the thing would become devoid of all character.
anyasmājjanakāt teṣāṃ vyāvṛttir upavarṇyate /	When ‘exclusion’ is spoken of, it is exclusion from another cause that is meant;
atajjanakarūpatvaṃ vācyaṃ tacceṣṭam eva naḥ // na hyapyutpādakaṃ tasya svarūpeṇaiva varṇyate /	what is meant being that the eye is not of the form of that other cause and this is quite acceptable to us, it is not that what is productive of the cognition is described precisely as it exists.
niyatās tatra te sarve svahetubhyaḥ samutthitāḥ //	In fact, all cognitions proceed from their own specific causes.
ekātmānugatatvāt tu yadyekajanakā ime / ātmaikatrāpi sostīti kim anyaiḥ sahakāribhiḥ // viśeṣāntarevaikalyād eke na janakaṃ yadi / nanu bhedādaśaktāste 'bhede vā vikalāḥ katham //	If, on the ground of their being of the same nature, they were regarded as a single productive cause, then, as the said nature itself is there (as the cause’, what would be the use of other auxiliaries if it be held that ‘on account of defects in other particulars, the one (nature) is not productive (of the cognition)’, then (the answer is that) those causes are incapable (of bringing about the cognition in question), by reason of difference.
yathā tvayaṃ viśeṣepi na sarvaṃ sarvakāraṇam / nānātvasyāviśeṣeti tathaiva niyamo bhavet //	If there were no difference, how could they be defective? Just as, even when there is difference as among particular things, everything is not the cause of every other thing, in the same way, even though there would be no difference in ‘plurality’, yet there would be restriction (of only some causes bringing about some effects).
bhede 'pi janakaḥ kaścit svabhāvaniyamād bhavet /	Even when there is difference, it is only a certain thing that would be productive of the particular effect by reason of its nature.
anvaye tveka ekasya janako 'janakaś ca kim // bhedo 'pyatrāsti cedastu sa kiṃ tasyaiva vastunaḥ / nahi tasyānvayād anyo nanu bhedo na kārakaḥ //	In the case of ‘inclusiveness’, how could the one thing be productive and non-productive of the same one thing? If there is difference in this case also, the difference may be there; but is that difference from that thing only? There can be no difference apart from the ‘inclusive’ (productive cause);
sa eva bhāvikaścārtho yo nāmārthakriyākṣamaḥ /	In fact, that alone is a real entity which is capable of effective action;
sa ca nānveti yo 'nveti kāryaṃ tasmān na jāyate //1773/*	and this entity is non-inclusive; and from what is inclusive, the effect is not produced.
**yaṃ cātmānam abhipretya pumāneṣa pravartate / vidyete tadgatāveva bhedābhedāvakalpitau //	In fact difference and nondifference can be not-imagin ary (real) only in relation to that form or nature in reference to which the man has recourse to activity.
anyathā hyātmanā bhedo vyāvṛttyā ca samānatā / astyeva vastu nānveti pravṛttyādiprasaṅgataḥ //	Otherwise the difference is there by its very ‘nature’, and the ‘general’ character also is there being due to ‘exclusion the thing itself is not ‘inclusive’ (comprehensive);
aviśeṣeṇa tajjanakasvabhāvāt parāvṛttimātraṃ yadi hetutvena varṇyate tadā na siddho hetuḥ / nahi cakṣurādīnāṃ nīlādijñānajanakāt svabhāvād aviśeṣeṇa vyāvṛttiḥ siddhā /	If mere ‘differentiation from the character of the productive’ is put forward without any qualification, as the Probans, then it cannot be ‘admitted Because as a matter of fact it is not admitted that there is unqualified ‘differentiation’ of the Eye, etc. from the character of being productive;
yatas teṣām api cakṣurādīnāṃ yaḥ svabhāvaḥ so 'pi janaka iṣṭaḥ /	for the nature of the Eye, etc. also is regarded as productive;
ko hyatra niyamas tenaiva tat kāryaṃ kartavyaṃ nānyeneti, anyo 'pi kuryāt sopīti na virodhaṃ paśyāmaḥ /	why should then there be any such restriction as that the effect must always be produced by this Cause, not by another? This Cause may produce it, and the other may also produce it; we see no incongruity in this.
yadi tu punar aviśeṣeṇa vyāvṛttiḥ syāt tadā svasvabhāvād api syāt tataś caniḥsvabhāvatāprasaṅgaḥ syāt /	Under the circumstances, if the ‘differentiation of the Eye, etc.’ meant were without reservation of any kind, then there would be their differentiation from their own nature, which would mean that they are ‘devoid of nature or character’ (featureless).
tasmān na svabhāvād bhāvānāṃ vyāvṛttir yuktā /	It is for this reason that there can be no differentiation of things from their own nature.
atha svasvabhāvaṃ muktvānyasmāj janakād vā vyāvṛttiścakṣurādīnāṃ sā	If then, ‘the differentiation of the Eye, etc.’ meant to be the Probans be that from other productive causes (of Cognition) than their own nature, then the Probans is ‘inconclusive’;
hetutvenābhimatā, tadānaikāntikatā hetoḥ, tadā hyanyasmāt svabhāvād vyāvṛttas tatsvabhāvo mābhūt, na tu tadajanakaḥ / yataḥ sarva eva svarūpeṇaiva janako na pararūpeṇa, yena cātmīyena svabhāvenāsau janaka iṣyate tasmāc ca na vyāvṛtta iti katham ajanakaḥ syād ityanaikāntikatā hetoḥ /	as in that case what is differentiated from the other nature may not be of that nature, but it need not cease to be productive (of the cognition); because everything is productive, in its own form, not in the form of something else; and from that nature of itself in which it is held to be productive, it has not been differentiated; why then should it cease to be productive? So that the Probans put up is found to be ‘Inconclusive’.
athātat svabhāvatā paryudāsavṛttyā sādhyate, tadā siddhasādhyatā, parasparaṃ bhāvānāṃ svabhāvavivekasyeṣṭatvāt /	If then, what is meant by ‘not having the nature or character of a certain thing’ is exclusion by way of ‘contradistinction’, then the argument is superfluous; because ‘differentiation of character’ among things mutually is what is admitted by both parties.
atajjanakarūpatvam iti /	The compound ‘atajjanakarūpatvam’ is to be thus explained;
sa cāsau janakaś ca tajjanako rūpādiḥ, tasya rūpaṃ svabhāvaḥ, sa yasya nāsti so 'tajjanakarūpas tadbhāvas tatvam /	‘That other cause’ is the Colour, there is the nature or form of this, which is ‘atajjanakarūpa’, and that which does not possess this form or character of the other Cause (Colour, etc.); that is, it has not the same character or form as Colour, etc.
tasya anyasya yajjanakarūpaṃ tena rahitatvam iti yāvat /	Or, it may be taken as a Karmadhāraya first and then compounded with the negative term as Bahuvrīhi.
tripado vā bahuvrīhiḥ /	Or again, it may be taken as a three-membered Bahuvrīhi.
athai [p.500] kasmin kārye kartavye sa eva teṣāṃ cakṣurādīnāṃ parasparāsaṅkīrṇo janakaḥ svabhāvaḥ kuta āyāto yena sa eva tu kārye niyatāḥ syur ityāśaṅkyāha niyatā iti / yaduktaṃ bhedena nirviśiṣṭatvācchravaṇādyapi janakaḥ tasya kiṃ neṣṭam iti, tadanena parihṛtam /	[The sense remains the same under all these explanations]. There arises the following question: “In the bringing about of a certain effect, why should the independent (unmixed) productive character be attributed to the Eye, etc. themselves, by virtue of which these alone could be restricted to that effect?” The answer to this is that ‘In fact, all cognitions proceed, etc. etc.’ This serves also to answer the objection urged to the effect that “the difference of the Ear from the cognition being the same as that of the Eye, why should not the Ear be regarded as productive of it?”.
tasmāt svabhāvaniyamād bhede 'pi kaścijjanako bhavennāpara iti na kiñcid viruddham /	Thus then the ‘nature’ of things being restricted, even when there is difference, it is only one thing that is productive, not the other.
yadi tu punar ekasvabhāvānugatatvena bhinnā api cakṣurādayo janakāḥ syus tadaikas teṣāṃ svabhāvo janaka ekasminnapi kāraṇe 'stīti tata evaikasmāt kāryotpattiḥ syāt /	If then the Eye, etc, were regarded as productive, on the) ground of their having a common character, though different, then that one nature of them would be productive and hence the only Cause; which would mean that the effect proceeds from that alone;
tataś ca śeṣasahakārikāraṇavaiyarthyaprasaṅgaḥ syāt /	and in that case, the other eoniributary causes would have to be regarded as useless.
atha viśeṣāntaravaikalyānnaikasmāt kāryotpattir iti cet, ye te viśeṣā vikalā iṣyante teṣām aśaktatvāt, kasmāt/	If it be urged that “the one Cause cannot produce the effect, on account of defects in other particulars”, then those particulars that are regarded as ‘defective’ would be incapable, impotent, why? by reason of difference;
bhedāt samarthābhimatād anuyāyinaḥ, svabhāvād anyatvād iti yāvat, nacāśaktasya vaikalye kāryānutpattir yuktā kasyacid anutpattiprasaṅgāt /	because they are different from that comprehensive ‘nature’ which has been regarded as capable (of producing the effect in question); and if what is incapable happen to be defective, then that cannot hamper the production of the effect-; as in that case anything might cease to be produced at all.
athāpi syāt nahyasmābhiḥ sāmānyaviśeṣāṇāṃ parasparamatyantabheda iṣṭaḥ tataś ca bhedādityasiddho hetur ity āha abhede vā vikalāḥ katham iti / sāmānyād viśeṣāṇām abhede 'ṅgīkriyamāṇe na tarhi vaktavyaṃ viśeṣāntaravaikalyād ekaṃ na janakam iti /	It might be urged that “we do not regard the General and Particular aspects of things to be absolutely distinct, and hence the Reason put forward ‘by reason of difference’ becomes inadmissible”. The answer to this is as follows: If there were no difference, how could they be defective? That is, if the Particulars are non-different from the General, then it should not be said that ‘The one thing is not productive by reason of the defective character of particulars’.
atas tasmin sāmānye tiṣṭhatyavikale sati tadavyatirekiṇāṃ viśeṣāṇām api vaikalyāsiddhiḥ /	Hence, when the General is there in its perfect form, those Particulars that are non-different from that General cannot be defective.
nahi yo yadekayogakṣemo na bhavati sa tat svabhāvo yuktaḥ /	When between two things, one does not always share the fate of the other, they cannot be of the same ‘nature’.
apica samāna evāyaṃ prasaṅgo bhavatām api, anvayasyāviśiṣṭatvāt kimiti sarvaḥ sarvaṃ na janayet / yathā bhavatām anvayasyāviśeṣe 'pi sarvaṃ sarvasya janakaṃ na bhavati tathā	Further, the incongruity urged is there in your case also: ‘Presence’ or ‘Inclusion’ being the same in all things, why does not everything produce everything? Just as, in your case, though the Presence or Inclusion is there in all cases, everything does not produce everything, so it would be in our case also.
smākam apīti yat kiñcidetat /	So there is no force in this.
kiṃ ca bhedāviśeṣe 'pi kaścijjanayati nāpara iti janakasvabhāvapratiniyamādevaṃ bhavet, ekasya yaḥ svabhāvo nāsau parasyeti kṛtvā, nacaivaṃ sati kiñcid virudhyate /	Then again, even when the difference is equally present in several things, it is only one thing, not others, that produces a certain effect; and this might be due to the restriction on the productiveness of things, on the principle that the ‘nature’ of one thing is not the ‘nature’ of the other;
yadā tvanugatasyaikātmano janakatvaṃ tadaikasyaikasmin kārye janakatvam ajanakatvaṃ ceti kathaṃ vidhipratiṣedhau yuktāvekādhārau / bhinnādhikaraṇau tu na viruddhāvityata ekasyetyāha / athāpi syānnāsmābhir ekāntenānvaya eveṣṭau yenaikasyaikatra janakatvājanakatvavirodhaḥ syāt /	When however, the productiveness belongs to one comprehensive entity, then one and the same entity would be productive as well as non-productive, how could these two mutually contradictory affirmation and denial subsist in the same entity?There could be no incongruity if they subsisted in different entities. This is what is meant by the words of the text ‘Ekasya, etc.’, ‘How could the one thing be both productive and non-productive, etc. etc.’. The following might be urged “We do not regard anything to be absolutely comprehensive (inclusive), on account of which there would be the incongruity of the same thing being both productive and non-productive of an effect;
kiṃ tarhi/ bhedo 'pyatrāsti /	what we hold is that there is difference also;
tenājanakatvaṃ na viruddham iti /	so that non-productiveness would not be incongruous”,
astu bhedaḥ, sa kiṃ janakasvabhāvād bhedas tasyaivānugatasya janakātmano 'bhīṣṭaḥ, āhosvid anyasyeti vaktavyam /	There may be difference; but it has to be explained whether this difference from the ‘productive’ nature is meant to belong to the same comprehensive ‘productive nature’, or to another.
na tāvat tasyaiva, nahi svabhāvād bhāvasya parāvṛttir yuktā, niḥsvabhāvatvaprasaṅgāt /	It cannot belong to that same; because there can be no exclusion (difference) of a thing from its own nature; as in that case it would become nature-less (devoid of its character).
nāpyanyasya, bhede tasya janakasvabhāvasyāvikalasyājanakatvaṃ yuktam atiprasaṅgāt /	Nor can it belong to another; if it is different, then, as it would be of the productive nature, and not imperfect, it could not be regarded as nonproductive;
bhavatu vā tasyaiva svasvabhāvād bhedas tathāpyekasya janakatvājanakatvavirodho na parihṛta eva / tathā hi bhedād api tasyaikasyākārako bhavet /	We grant that that same thing may be different from its own nature; even so, the incongruity of one and the same thing being both productive and non-productive remains unanswered. For instance, even when the difference is there, it could not be effective in bringing about the one effect in question.
nanu nānyo 'nvayāt kiṃ tarhi/	‘There can be no difference apart from its inclusion (or comprehensiveness);
sa evānvayas tataś ca sa evaikasya [p.501] janakatvājanakatvavirodhas tadavastha eva /	in fact, it would be that same inclusion; so that the incongruity of the same thing being both productive and non-productive would still be there.
anvetītyanvayo janaka eva svabhāva ucyate /	The term ‘anvaya’ (Inclusion) here stands for that which is comprehensive or inclusive, i.e. the productive nature.
nanvityabhimukhīkaraṇam /	The particle ‘nanu’ is meant only to emphasise what is said.
api ca anvayavyatirekābhyāṃ viśeṣebhya eva kāryasiddhes ta eva svalakṣaṇayuktāḥ, na sāmānyārtham, kriyākārilakṣaṇatvād vastutvasya, tataś ca kiṃ sāmānyaṃ svalakṣaṇād bhinnamāhosvidabhinnam iti kimarthakriyārthinas tatra bhedābhedacintayā yasmād yameva svabhāvamarthakriyāyogyamabhisandhāyaiṣa pumānarthakriyārthī pravartate tadgatāveva bhedābhedau cintyete 'rthakriyārthibhir na vyasanitayā /	Then again, it is found from positive and negative concomitance that the Effect is produced from Particulars only, hence these Particulars themselves should be regarded as associated with Specific Individualities, which latter therefore do not necessarily indicate the ‘Universal’ or General aspect of things; because the character of the ‘Entity’ consists in capacity for effective action, Under the circumstances, whether the General is different from the Specific Individuality or non-different from it does not concern the man who seeks only for effective action and who is not concerned with the said difference or non-difference; as a matter of fact, when the Man seeks for effective action, he has recourse to that which he considers fit for that action;
anyathā hi yadyakalpitau bhedābhedau neṣyete tadā tasyārthakriyāyogyasyātmanā svena rūpeṇa bhedaḥ pāramārthiko 'styeva vyāvṛttyā ca vikalpabuddhipratibhāsānurodhinyā kṛtavyavasthā sāmānyatādhyavasitatadbhāvāstyevetyavivāda eva /	‘Otherwise’; i.e. if Difference (Exclusiveness) and Non-difference (Inconclusiveness) are not regarded as real, then, of the thing capable of effective action, there would be real difference or exclusiveness, in its own form, and the General or inclusive character would be there, through the ‘exclusion’ (of all other things), which would be determined by the Conceptual Content. So that there would be no dispute on this point.
iyataivārthakriyārthino bhedasāmānyacintā samāpteti kimanarthakriyākāriṇaḥ sāmānyasya bhedābhedacintayā /	It is only to this extent that the man seeking for activity has recourse to the consideration of Difference in general; and where would there be any need for his considering any such General entity as is not capable of effective action?
athāpi syād vastveva sāmānyam astu, kiṃ parikalpitayā vyāvṛttyetyāha vastvityādi /	It might be argued that “The thing itself may be the General, (the comprehensive factor), why assume exclusion at all?”
yadi paṭādirūpaṃ ghaṭādiranviyāt, tadā madhūdakādyāharaṇārthī paṭādāvapi pravarteteti pravṛttyādeḥ prasaṅgaḥ syāt /	The answer to that is ‘The Thing itself, etc. etc.’ That is, if the form of the Cloth were present in the Jar, then the man seeking to carry Honey or Water might take up the Cloth; and there would be other such incongruous activities.
ādiśabdāt tulyotpattinirodhādiprasaṅgaḥ //	The other likely incongruities meant are all things being produced and destroyed at the same time and so forth.
kalpanāracitasyaiva vaicitryasyopavarṇane / ko nāmātiśayaḥ prokto vipranirgranthakāpilaiḥ //	In case the ‘variegated character’ of things spoken of refers only to conceptual creation (fancy), then what would be the difference in the assertions made by ‘vipras’, ‘nirgranthas’ and ‘kāpilas’? (1776)
vaicitryasyeti / bhedasya //	‘Variegated character’ Difference, Diversity.
varddhamānakabhaṅgena rucakaḥ kriyate tadā / tadā pūrvārthinaḥ śokaḥ prītiścāpyuttarārthinaḥ //	“When the pot is broken up and a dish is made (of the same gold), the man wanting the former becomes sorry, while the man wanting the latter becomes glad, while one wanting only the gold remains neutral.
hemārthinastu mādhyasthyaṃ tasmād vastu trayātmakam / notpādasthitibhaṅgānām abhāve syān matitrayam //	thus the thing has three aspects; and the said three ideas would not be possible if there were no production, continuance and destruction of things.” [Ślokavārtika-vanavāda, 21-22].
sa hyāha utpādasthitināśasvabhāvatvāt sarvam eva vastu tryātmakam /	Kumārila argues as follows: “Inasmuch as all things are capable of being born, continuing to exist and being destroyed, they have three aspects.
ekasmād api prītyādikāryatrayadarśanāt, tathā hi yadā varddhamānakaṃ bhaṅktvā rucakaḥ kriyate, tadā [p.502] varddhamānakārthinaḥ śoka utpadyate, rucakārthinaḥ prītiḥ, suvarṇārthinas tumādhyasthyam /	That this is so is shown by the fact that a single thing can bring about three effects: For instance, when the Pot is broken up and made into a Dish, sorrow is produced in the man who wanted the former, while pleasure is produced in one who wanted the latter, while there is indifference in the man who wanted only gold.
yadi ca vastvekarūpam eva syāt, tadaikākāraiva buddhiḥ syāt, na triprakārā /	If the thing had only one aspect, then the idea produced by it would be of only one kind, not of three kinds.
varddhamānakarucakau bhājanaviśeṣau //	‘Vardhamānaka’ and ‘Rucaka’ are particular kinds of utensils.
syād etat yadi nāma tryātmakaṃ vastviti siddhyati, tathāpi nāśādirūpeṇa tryātmakam ityetat kuta ity āha na nāśena vinetyādi /	The following might be urged (against Kumārila) If it is admitted that the Entity has three aspects, even so, how does it follow that the three aspects consist of Destruction (Continuance and Production)? Answer (from Kumārila): [see verse 1779 above]
tena sāmānyanityateti /	‘It is in this way, etc. etc.’;
yasmāt sthityādinā na mādhyasthyaṃ, tena mādhyasthyasya sthityavinābhāvitvena, sāmānyasyāpi savarṇatvasya, nityatā pratīyate //	Because there can be no indifference without Continuance, therefore i.e. on account of the invariable concomitance between Neutrality and Continuance, the Universal ‘Gold’ is understood to be eternal.
ityetad ityādinā pratividhatte /	The answer to the above arguments of Kumārila is as follows: [see verses 1780-1783 next]
ityetadapi no yuktam asāmānyāśrayatvataḥ /	This is not right; because of the absence of a common substratum;
utpādasthitibhaṅgānām ekārthāśrayatā na hi // samānakālatāprāpteḥ parasparavirodhinām /	production, continuance and destruction cannot have the same substratum; for if they had, it would involve the presence at the same time of all these mutually contradictory properties.
idaṃ tu kṣaṇabhaṅgitve sati sarvam anākulam //	All this would be free from difficulties under the doctrine of ‘perpetual flux’;
varddhamānakabhāvasya kaladhautātmanaḥ katham / ananvaye vināśe hi kasyacicchokasambhavaḥ //	for why should any man be sorry at the absolute destruction of gold in the form of the pot? Why too should there be any joy at the production of the gold in the new form of the dish? As for continuance, there is none, of anything at all.
asāmānyāśrayatvata ityetad grahaṇakavākyam /	The principal sentence is ‘because of the absence of a common substratum’;
asya vyākhyānam utpādasthitītyādi / yadi hi vastvekamapyutpādādisvabhāvena tryātmakaṃ syāt tadā yugapat parasparavirodhina utpādasthitivināśaḥ prāpnuvanti, naca virodhinām ekatra yugapadbhāvo yuktaḥ, anyathā hi virodhitvam eva na syāt /	this is explained in what follows ‘Production, Continuance, etc. etc.’ If a single entity had the three aspects of Production and the rest, then it would mean that all these three Production, Continuance and Destruction are there in the thing at one and the same time; and yet it cannot be possible for these mutually contradictory properties to be present in anything at one and the same time; as otherwise, they would not be contradictories at all.
kathaṃ tarhi matitrayasyotpattir yukteti cet, yathā yuktā tathā śrūyatām itidarśayann āha idaṃ tviti /	Question “How then can there be the three notions described?” In answer to this the Text shows how this is possible ‘All this, etc. etc.’

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