buddhist-nlp/tatpa-noisy · Datasets at Hugging Face

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sa hyanekāṇusandohasvabhāvau naikarūpavān /	As a matter of fact, Narasiṃha is of the nature of an aggregate of many atoms, and is not endowed with any one uniform form;
yaccitraṃ na tadekaṃ hi nānājātīyaratnavat //	what is variegated (various) cannot be one, as is found in the case of the collection of several kinds of gems.
aikye syān na dvirūpatvān nānākārāvabhāsanam /	If there were one form, there could not be a dual character and the consequent appearance of several shapes;
makṣikāpadamātre 'pi pihite 'nāvṛttiś ca na //	and even if the smallest part of the body that could be covered by the leg of a fly were hidden, the body could not be said to be not-hidden.
ādiśabdena mecakaratnādiparigrahaḥ / sa hīti /	The answer to this is as follows: [see verses 1733-1735 above] The term ‘ādi’ includes the gleaming Sapphire.
narasiṃhaḥ /	‘Sa’ stands for Narasiṃha.
sandohaḥ samūhaḥ /	‘Sandoha’ is aggregate.
rūpamasyāstīti rūpavān /	‘Naikarūpavān’ not having a single form.
ekena rūpavāniti vigrahaḥ / anena dṛṣṭāntasya prativādyasiddhatām āha nahi bauddhaṃ prati narasiṃha eko 'vayavī siddhaḥ, anekāṇusamūhatvāt /	This shows that the Instance cited by the Jaina writer is not one ‘admitted’ by the opposite party; as for the Bauddha, Narasiṃha is not one composite whole, he being only an aggregate of many atoms. The author cites the reason for denying the said oneness What is variegated cannot be one;
tatraikatvanirākaraṇe pramāṇam āha yaccitraṃ na tadekaṃ, yathā nānājātīyaratnasamūhaḥ, citraś ca narasiṃha iti, svabhāvairuddhopalambho vyāpakaviruddhasya vā /	e.g. a collection of several kinds of gems; and Narasiṃha has a variegated form. So that the Jaina reasoning involves an idea contrary to the nature of things.
aikye sati dvirūpatvanimittanānākārāvabhāsānupapattir bādhakaṃ pramāṇampratibhāsabhedanibandhanatvād bhedavyavasthāyāḥ /	The fact that ‘if it were one, it could not have a dual character and consequently there would not be appearance of several forms’, provides an argument against the said ‘unity’; this argument being based on the fact the idea of ‘diversity’ is based entirely upon the appearance of diverse forms.
ekadeśāvaraṇe sarvāvaraṇaprasaṅgaś ca bādhakaṃ pramāṇaṃ, na hyekasyāvṛtatvamanāvṛttatvaṃ ceti yugapad viruddhadharmasaṃsargo yuktaḥ //	‘If any one part of the body were hidden, the whole might become hidden’ (under the Jaina’s idea); this provides another argument against the conclusion of the Jaina writer; because it cannot be right that one and the same thing should have the contradictory characters of being hidden and being not hidden at the same time.
nṛsiṃhabhāgānusyūtapratyabhijñānahetavaḥ / te cāṇavaḥ prakṛtyaiva viśiṣṭapratyayodbhavāt //	By their very nature, the said atoms are the basis of the recognition that envisages the salient features of the man and the lion; as is clear from the fact of its arising from a particular idea.
etenaiva prakāreṇa citraratnādayo gatāḥ / nānātmanā hi vaicitryamekatvena virudhyate //	In this same way are the variegated gems and other cases disposed of. The variegated character, based upon the presence of several forms, is certainly incompatible with unity.
nṛsiṃhayor ye bhāgāstair anusyūtaṃ nirbhāsīkṛtaṃ yat pratyabhijñānaṃ tat tathoktam, evambhūtasya pratyabhijñānasya yadā prakṛtyaiva ta evāṇavo hetavo bhavanti, tadā kimaparamavayavinā kalpitena /	The Recognition that envisages the features of the body of the Man and the Lion (in the body of Narasiṃha), of that the only cause or basis consists of the atoms (composing those features); what then, would be the use of assuming the composite whole (Body)?
sā ca tādṛśī prakṛtiḥ kutas teṣām iti cedāha viśiṣṭapratyayodbhavāt viśiṣṭāt kāraṇād utpatteḥ /	If it be asked Whence this ‘nature’ of the Atoms? The answer is ‘As is dear from the fact of its arising out of a particular Idea’; i.e. because it proceeds from a particular cause;
tatra viśiṣṭaḥ pratyayo gativiśeṣasaṃvartanīyaṃ karma svajātisamudbhūtaḥ kalalādiś ca /	the ‘particular idea’ in this case is in the shape of the past deed leading up to the particular state of existence, and also the factors and other parts of the body peculiar to the particular animal-species.
anenaiva narasiṃhavicāreṇa mecakaratnādayo gatāḥ vyākhyātāḥ, iti na teṣāṃ pṛthak dūṣaṇaṃ vaktavyam //	What has been said regarding the case of Narasiṃha also serves to dispose of the case of the glittering gems, etc.; and it is not necessary to criticise them separately.
arthakriyāsamarthatvaṃ vastutvamabhidhīyate /	‘Being an entity’ is said to consist in ‘capacity for effective, action’;
yadi tasyānugāmitvaṃ sarvaṃ syāt sarvakāryakṛt //	if this were all-pervasive, then every thing would be capable of doing every thing.
eko 'rthajanakastasya bhāvaḥ sāmarthyayogataḥ /	Generally, one thing is held to be productive of another, only by reason of the, presence, in it, of the capacity for that action;
taccāviśiṣṭamanyasminnityanutpādakaḥ katham // [p.493] nīlādyeva ca vastutvam anugāmi yadīṣyate / sitapītādyapi prāptaṃ nīla{saṃ]sādhyakāryakṛt //	if then, that capacity is equally present in another thing, why should not this be productive of the same? If the ‘blue’ and other objects themselves are held to constitute the all-embracing character of ‘entity’, then the white and yellow things also would do what is done by the blue one;
ekam eva tato jātaṃ dvitīyātmavivarjitam / sarvaṃ viśvamato naikam anekākāram asti naḥ //	and in that case, the whole universe would become a single ‘entity devoid of a second; and thus it would not be true that a single thing has several aspects.
tadeva cenna vastutvaṃ kaṇāśimatasattvavat / naikasyānekarūpatvam eva vaḥ syād vibhedataḥ //	If the blue, etc. themselves do not constitute ‘entity’, and this is like the ‘being’ (sattva) posited by ‘Kaṇāda’, then it cannot be as you hold, that one thing cannot have several aspects;
viruddhadharmasaṅgaś ca vastūnāṃ bhedalakṣaṇam / kathañcidanyatheṣṭopi na bhedo nīlapītayoḥ //	as there would be clear difference Further, what constitutes ‘difference’ among things is the presence of contrary properties, and no other kind of ‘difference’ is held to lie between ‘blue’ and ‘yellow this same condition is present between the ‘general’ and the ‘particular’;
anugāmyanyathābhāvāt sa ca sāmānyabhedayoḥ /	because while the former is ‘inclusive’, the latter is otherwise.
vidyate tat kathaṃ nāsti tayor bhedaḥ parisphuṭam //	Why then should not ‘difference’ be admitted as clearly lying between them? (1738-1744)
arthakriyākāri yadrūpaṃ tad vastutvam ucyate nānyat, taccet sarvatrānugāmisarvaṃ sarvārthakriyākāri prāpnoti tenaiva hi rūpeṇa sarve janakā iṣyante /	It has been argued (by the Jaina writer, under Text 1716) that “in the form of entities all things are not-different from one another.” This is answered in the following [see verses 1738-1744 above] The ‘Entity’ is said to be that which is capable of effective action, nothing else. If this capacity is present in all things, then every thing would be capable of doing every thing, It is only in this sense that things are held to be productive.
tasya ca sarvatrāviśiṣṭatvād iti yatkiñcid yataḥ kutaścid utpadyeta /	This capacity then being equally present in all cases, anything might be produced out of anything.
kiṃ ca yadetannīlapītādi, tadeva kiṃ vastutvam āhosvid anyat / yadi tadeva tadā tasyānugāmitvātsitapītādyapi nīlasādhyavastrarañjanādyarthakriyākāri prāpnoti /	Further, is the ‘Entity’ the same as the Blue, the Yellow and other things? Or is it something different? If it is the same, then, as it would be all-pervasive, even the white and yellow could bring about the colouring in the cloth that is brought about by the Blue.
apica dvitīyasya svabhāvasyābhāvāt sarvaṃ jagadekam eva vastujātam iti, ekam anekākāram iti pratijñānārthahāniḥ syāt /	Then again, there being no other character or nature possible, the entire Universe would become a single conglomeration of things; and this would upset the proposition that a single entity has several aspects.
athānyadeva vastutvaṃ nīlādibhyaḥ, kaṇādābhimatasattvavat / yathā kaṇāśinaḥ kaṇādasya, abhimataṃ sattākhyaṃ vyatiriktaṃ vastutvaṃ nāmeti /	If on the other hand, the ‘entity’ is something different, from the Blue, etc., like the ‘Being’ posited by Kaṇāda, i.e. just as Kaṇāda has postulated the ‘Entity’, called ‘Being’, as something different (from the particular things), then it becomes all the more unreasonable to attribute ‘Plurality’ to any single thing;
evam api sutarāmekasyānekatvam ayuktam, ekāntenaiva bhedāt /	Then again, any two things are ‘different’ only when they have contrary poperties, e.g. Hot and Cold;
eva tayor bhedaḥ /	because while the former is ‘inclusive’, the latter is otherwise;
anyathābhāvaḥ ananugāmitvam /	‘otherwise’ i.e. not-Inclusive, ‘exclusive’.
yadi ca viruddhadharmasaṃsarge 'pi bhedo neṣyate, tadā nīlapītayor yo 'pyayaṃ kathañcid aviśeṣarūpeṇa bheda iṣṭaḥ sa na syāt "buddhibhedān na caikatvaṃ rūpādīnāṃ prasajyata" iti vacanāt kumārilena nīlādīnāṃ bhedasyopavarṇitatvāt //	If, even on the presence of contrary properties, difference were not admitted, then there would be no difference even between the Blue and the Yellow, which is admitted in some way, by the other party; Kumārila himself having declared (in Ślokavārtika Sense Perception, 158) that “as their cognitions are different, Colour, etc., cannot be one and the same”; where it has been declared that there is difference among the Blue and other things.
yathā kalmāṣavarṇasya yatheṣṭaṃ varṇanigrahaḥ / citratvād vastuno 'pyevaṃ bhedābhedāvadhāraṇe //	“As in the case of the variegated colour, one may emphasise any one colour as he chooses, because the colour is variegated, in the same way ‘difference’ or ‘non-difference’ of an entity might be emphasised.
[p.494]	(Ślokavārtika-ākṛti, 57-58).
yadā tu śabalaṃ vastu yugapat pratipadyate / tadānyānanyabhedādi sarvam eva pralīyate //	When a thing of a mixed character is cognised simultaneously, then all distinctions like ‘difference’, ‘sameness’ and so forth, disappear (ibid., 62-63).” (1745-1746)
kalmāṣavarṇaḥ śabalo varṇaḥ /	[see verses 1745-1746 above] ‘Kalmūṣa-varṇa’ is the variegated colour.
tasya yathā nīlam iti vā pītam iti vā lohitam iti vetyādinā yatheṣṭaṃ varṇanigraho rūpāvadhāraṇaṃ, tathā citrasya anekarūpasya vastunaḥ svapararūpābhyāṃ sadasadātmanaḥ sāmānyaviśeṣarūpābhyāṃ dvyātmana icchāvaśādbhedābhedāvadhāraṇe /	In this case one can fix upon, as he wishes, upon any of the several colours present regarding the thing either as Blue, or Yellow or Red; in the same manner, in the case of the Entity which has a variegated or mixed character, being existent in its own form, and also non-existent in the form of other things, and also having the two-fold character of the General and the Particular, one can fix upon Unity or Diversity, as he likes.
yadā bhedamavadhārayitum icchati tadā tamavadhārayati, yadā tu yugapat sāmānyaviśeṣātmakaṃ vastu ku{jṇa---}giti pratipadyate tadānyānanyabhedādicodyaṃ pralīyate /	When a man wishes to emphasise the diversity -aspect, then he fixes upon diversity; and when he all at once cognises a, thing as being both General and Particular, then all that has been urged regarding its difference or non-difference, etc. disappears;
nāvataratītyarthaḥ /	i.e, it does not apply at all;
pratyakṣeṇa śabalasya vastunaḥ pratīyamānatvāt /	because what is clearly cognised through Perception is the thing of the mixed character.
tatredam anyānanyādi codyam bhinnebhyo 'śvādipiṇḍebhyo 'nanyatvāt sāmānyasyāpi piṇḍavat svarūpabhedaprasaṅgaḥ, sāmānyādvāpyabhinnatvād abhedo bhedānāṃ sāmānyasyeva prasajyate /	The objection that has been urged regarding the thing being different or non-different, etc. etc. is as follows (a) The General thing being non-different from the Particular things in the shape of the Horse, etc. should also have a diversity of forms like these particular things; (b) the Particular things, being non-different from the General, all Particular things should become the same, like the General thing;
tathā bhedābhedau parasparaṃ sāmānyaviśeṣayoḥ kathaṃ viruddhau syātām / ādiśabdenaikatvānekatve parasparaviruddhe tathā tadeva sāmānyaṃ sa eva viśeṣa, ityevamādi grahītavyam //	(c) how could difference and non-difference, which are mutually contradictory, reside in the General and the Particular? The other objections are such as Unity and Plurality being mutually contradictory, how can one and the same thing be General as well as Particular? (1745-1746)
yadyevaṃ sarvatraiva śabalasya pratītiḥ syān natu kramayaugapadyābhyām ityāśaṅkyāha vastuna ityādi /	It might be argued against the above (argument of Kumārila’s) that ‘If so, then in all cases, there would be cognition of the Mixed Character, and it would not be successive and simultaneous’.
vastuno 'nekarūpasya rūpam iṣṭaṃ vivakṣayā /	When a thing has several forms, one may emphasise any one according to his own whim, either successively or simultaneously;
yugapat kramavṛttibhyāṃ nānyosti vacasāṃ vidhiḥ //	there can be no other way with verbal expressions.
yugapat krameṇa vā yadasya sāmānyaviśeṣādirūpaṃ vyavasthāpyate, tadvivakṣāvaśāt /	As a matter of fact, in the case of everything whether its ‘General’ and ‘Particular’ aspects are emphasised, one after the other or simultaneously, depends upon the wish of the Speaker;
yadā yaugapadyena sadasadrūpe vivakṣati sāmānyaviśeṣarūpaṃ vā tadā tasya rūpaṃ vyavasthāpyate / atha krameṇa vivakṣati sadrūpamasadrūpaṃ sāmānyaviśeṣaṃ vā tadāsya tadvyavasthāpyate /	so that when one wishes to speak of the ‘existence’ and the ‘non-existence’ aspects of a thing, or the ‘General’ and ‘Particular’ aspects of it, simultaneously, he emphasises its form in that way. If he wishes to speak successively, one after the other, of the ‘existence’ and ‘non-existence’ aspects, or the ‘General’ and ‘Particular’ aspects then he emphasises that form.
sarvam eva hi tasya svarūpaṃ kramākramābhyāṃ vyapadiśyate, vicitraratnakośa iva marakatapadmarāgādiriti /	In fact, all its forms are emphasised successively and simultaneously (as one wishes), just like the Emerald and other gems in a Mass of jewels.
atha kramākramau muktvānyena prakāreṇa kasmān na nirdiśyata ity āha nānyo 'sti vacasāṃ vidhir iti /	It may be asked ‘Why cannot it be indicated in a way other than successively or simultaneously?’ The answer to that is ‘There can be no other way, etc. etc.’.
yugapat kramavṛttibhyām ityapekṣaṇīyam /	i.e. no way other than ‘successively or simultaneously’.
vidhiḥ prakāraḥ //	‘Vidhi’ is way, method.
naivam ityādinā pratividhatte /	It cannot be as explained above.
naivaṃ citratvam ekatvaṃ pratiṣiddhaṃ hyanantaram / anekarūpaṃ vaicitryam ekatvenāsahasthitam // [p.495]	that what is ‘variegated’ cannot be ‘one’ has just been pointed out. ‘variegation’ consists in ‘several forms’, and it can never be concomitant with ‘unity’.
te hi yāvanta ākārās tasmin vastuni bhāvikāḥ /	All the real forms that there may be of a certain thing would be so many (different) things;
ekaṃ citram iti parasparaviruddham etad iti "yaccitraṃ na tadekam ityādinā pratipāditam /	and the thing in question itself remains only one. The idea that ‘a single entity is variegated’ involves a contradiction in terms, as already explained under Text 1734 above;
yato vicitram ityanekatvam ucyate /	and the reason for this is that the term ‘variegated’ itself connotes Plurality;
ekatvānekatvayoś ca parasparaparihārasthitilakṣaṇo virodhaḥ /	and between ‘Unity’ and ‘Plurality’ there is ‘contradiction’ consisting in the fact of the presence of one implying the absence of the other.
tasmān naikasmin bhāvikā bahava ākārāḥ sambhavanti /	Consequently one thing cannot have several real forms.
athāpi syus tathāpyekasyānekasya na pratipāditam eva.	Even if it had, this fact would not prove the plurality of the single thing;
tathā hi tāvanty evāparāṇi vastūni jātānīti / yadi paraṃ bhāvikatvena pratipāditaṃ syāt /	as all that it would mean would be that there are so many things come about; but that also only if these forms could be proved to be real.
na tvekasyānekatvaṃ parasparavirodhāt //	But in no case can Plurality belong to what is one, as the two are mutually contradictory.
ekasmād vastuno 'nyatve tādātmyavikalaṃ bhavet /	If a certain thing were excluded from one ‘entity’, it would be devoid of sameness only with that entity;
nākāśapuṣpasaṅkāśaṃ taddhyapyarthakriyākṣamam //	it would not become like the ‘sky-flower’; as it would still be capable of efficient action.
yadi hi vastumātrāt parāvṛttir hetutvena kriyate khapuṣpāviśeṣatve sādhye, tadā hetur asiddhaḥ.	If what is cited as the Reason is ‘exclusion of all entities’, and similarity to the ‘sky-flower’ is meant to be proved by it, then the Reason is ‘inadmissible’;
na hi ghaṭasya vastumātrād vyāvṛttiḥ siddhā, kiṃ tarhi---/	because the exclusion of the Jar from all entities, cannot be admitted;
svasvabhāvaṃ muktvānyasmād vastuviśeṣāt /	all that can be admitted is that it is excluded or differentiated from things other than itself.
atha vastuviśeṣād vyāvṛttir hetutvenopādīyate tadānaikāntiko hetuḥ /	If, on the other hand, the Reason meant to be adduced is exclusion from some things, then it is ‘Inconclusive’.
tathā hi ekasmād ghaṭāder vastuno vyāvṛttaṃ ghaṭādikaṃ vastu paratādātmyavikalaṃ siddhyennatu sarvathā niḥsvabhāvaṃ tasyāpyarthakriyākāritvāt // śaktam ityādinaitad evānaikāntikatvaṃ samarthayate /	For instance, the Jar, excluded or differentiated from the Cloth and other things, could be recognised only as devoid of sameness with the Cloth, and it could not be recognised as absolutely devoid of essence (existence), as even as thus excluded, it would be capable of efficient action, (1750)
śaktaṃ rūpaṃ na caikasya vastuṣvanyeṣu vartate / kāryopalambhanirbhāsabhedāder iti varṇitam //	As a matter of fact, the capable (potent) form of one entity does not reside in other entities, because the effect produced and the form of the apprehension are found to be different and so forth;
atadvastvātmakatvaṃ tu tadaśleṣeṇa yujyate /	‘that a certain entity is not the same as the other’, this alone can follow from the exclusion (of differentiation) therefrom;
nāviśeṣamavastutvaṃ vastulakṣaṇabhāvataḥ //	and not the fact of its being a non-entity devoid of all properties.
yadi hyarthakriyāsāmarthyalakṣaṇaṃ vastutvaṃ nāmānuyāyi syāt tato vyāvṛttasya niḥsvabhāvatā syād arthakriyāsāmarthyalakṣaṇatvād vastunaḥ, yāvatāśaktaṃ rūpaṃ yadekasya nīlādes tadanyeṣu sitādiṣu na vartata iti pūrvam uktam, "nīlādyeva ca vastutvam anugāmi yadīṣyata" ityādinā /	The following Texts show the ‘Inconclusive’ character of the Opponent’s Reason: [see verse 1751-1752 above] If the character of ‘Entity’, consisting of capacity for effective action, were something embracing all ‘entities’ collectively, then alone could the thing differentiated from others be said to be featureless (non-existent), the ‘entity’ being something that is characterised by capacity for effective action. As a matter of fact however, the ‘capable (or potent) form of one entity the Blue for instance cannot subsist in other things, like the white and the rest;
kasmāt ---/	Question: “Why cannot it subsist in other things?”
kāryabhedādupalambhanirbhāsabhedāc ca /	Answer: Because the effect produced is different, and the form of Apprehension (Idea) is different.
upalambho jñānaṃ tasya nirbhāsa ākāraḥ /	and ‘nirbhāsa’ for the form of that Cognition (i.e. the Idea).
ādiśabdenotpādasthitinirodhādaya gṛhyante / tasmāt tadaśle [p.496] ṣeṇa hetunātadvastvātmakam ityeva sādhayituṃ yujyate, nāviśeṣam nirviśeṣaṇam, avastutvaṃ sādhayituṃ yuktam /	The phrase ‘and so forth’ stands for diversities of birth, of existence, of destruction, etc. For these reasons all that ‘non-contact’ differentiation from another entity can prove is only that ‘the entity in question is not the same as this latter’; it cannot prove it to be devoid of properties, a mere non-entity.
kutaḥ/	“Why?”
tatrāpyarthakriyākāritvasya vsatulakṣaṇasya bhāvāt //	Because the capacity for effective action, which constitutes the essence of ‘Entity’, is present in it.
nanu cātyantabhede sati katham anugāmī vastuvastviti pratyayo bhavet / kathaṃ ca khapuṣpād bhedo vastunaḥ siddhyati /	For instance, the Jar, excluded or differentiated from the Cloth and other things, could be recognised only as devoid of sameness with the Cloth, and it could not be recognised as absolutely devoid of essence (existence), as even as thus excluded, it would be capable of efficient action, (1750)
yadi sādṛśyaṃ na bhaved ity āha tadapītyādi / tadapyarthakriyāyogyam iti vastviti kalpane / asamarthaparāvṛttiḥ sādṛśyaṃ tadvikalpitam //	The conception being there that ‘that also is capable of effective action’, there would be this idea that ‘it is an entity’ thus there would be subjective similarity consisting in ‘differentiation from what is incapable’.
tataścātyantabhede 'pi tulyatāsti vikalpitā / bhāvo bhāvāntarais tulyaḥ khapuṣpāt tadviśeṣyate //	Thus, even though there is absolute difference, there is a subjective similarity; and thus an ‘entity’ being ‘equal’ to other entities, becomes distinguished from the ‘sky-flower’.
asamarthaparāvṛttir iti /	‘Differentiation from the Incapable’;
asamarthāḥ vandhyāsutādayaḥ, tebhyaḥ parāvṛttiratadātmatā /	‘the incapables’ meant are such non-entities as ‘the son of the Barren Woman’, there is ‘differentiation’ from these, i.e. the entity is not the same as these.
yataś ca sādṛśyaṃ kalpitam asti, tasmād yaduktaṃ "bhāvo bhāvāntarātulya" iti tadasiddham //	Because the subjective Similarity is there, therefore it cannot be admitted that “If an entity were not equal to other entities, it would not differ from the sky-flower” (as asserted by the Opponent under Text (1710).
nanu yenātmanā vastu samānāparavastunaḥ / vyāvṛttaṃ tat sajātīyais tenaiva sadṛśaṃ yadi // vijñāyeta vijātīyair api tulyatayā tadā /	“If the form in which a certain thing is differentiated from other things, homogeneous and heterogeneous were the same in which it is similar to the homogeneous things, then it should be recognised as similar to the heterogeneous things also;
tasyātmano 'viśiṣṭatvān na ca tajjñāyate tathā //	as the form would be the same in both cases. And yet it is not so recognised.
sajātīyāsamāno 'pi tasmād yena bhavatyayam / ātmanā tat samānaś ca tayor bhedaḥ svabhāvayoḥ //	Hence it follows that the form in which the thing is not similar to the homogeneous things, and the form in which it is similar to these, must be different from one another.” (1755-1757)
sa āha yenātmanā sajātīyavijātīyābhyāṃ vyāvṛttaṃ vastu tenaivātmanā tadvastu yadi sajātīyaiḥ sadṛśaṃ bhavet tadā vijātīyair api tulyatayā	Sumati argues as follows: “That form in which a certain thing is differentiated from homogeneous and heterogeneous things, if, in that same form, it were similar to the homogeneous things, then it should he recognised as similar to the heterogeneous things also;
vijñāyeta tasyātmano 'viśiṣṭatvāt /	as the form would be the same in both cases.
naca jñāyate /	And yet as a matter of fact, it is not so recognised.
tasmādyena svabhāvena sajātīyāsamānopi bhavati, yena ca svabhāvena tatsadṛśo bhavati tayoḥ svabhāvayor bhedo 'bhivāñcitavyaḥ /	Hence it follows that that form in which it is dissimilar to the homogeneous things, and that form in which it is similar to these things, between these two forms, there must be difference.
nanu sa yadi sajātīyaḥ kathaṃ tenāsamāno bhavati, atha tenāsamāno bhavati kathaṃ sajātīya, iti parasparavyāhatam etat /	It might be asked ‘when it is homogeneous to them, how can it be dissimilar? And if it is dissimilar to them, how can it be homogeneous to them? The two are contradictory’.
naiṣa doṣaḥ /	This however does not affect our position.
yataḥ pareṇa sarvam eva vastu sāmānyaviśeṣātmakam iṣṭam, tasmād vastutvādinā sāmānyena sarvam eva sajātīyam ity ucyate viśeṣarūpeṇa tadeva vijātīyam iṣṭam iti tadapekṣayā punar asamāna ityabhidhīyata ityadoṣaḥ /	Because the other party regards everything as having two aspects, the General and the Particular; hence in the ‘General’ aspect, all things are said to be ‘homogeneous’ to that thing, while in its ‘Particular’ aspect, it is held to be ‘heterogeneous’; and in this latter sense, it is said to be dissimilar;
samānā [p.497] paravastuna iti / samānaṃ ca tadaparaṃ ceti samānāparavastu /	The compounds ‘Samānāparavastu’ stands for the ‘Samāna’, the Homogeneous, and the ‘apara’, Contrary, i.e. the Heterogeneous.
aparam ityasamānaṃ śeṣaṃ sugamatvān na vibhaktam //	The rest is easily intelligible, hence it is not explained in detail, (1755-1757)

sa hyanekāṇusandohasvabhāvau naikarūpavān /

As a matter of fact, Narasiṃha is of the nature of an aggregate of many atoms, and is not endowed with any one uniform form;

yaccitraṃ na tadekaṃ hi nānājātīyaratnavat //

what is variegated (various) cannot be one, as is found in the case of the collection of several kinds of gems.

aikye syān na dvirūpatvān nānākārāvabhāsanam /

If there were one form, there could not be a dual character and the consequent appearance of several shapes;

makṣikāpadamātre 'pi pihite 'nāvṛttiś ca na //

and even if the smallest part of the body that could be covered by the leg of a fly were hidden, the body could not be said to be not-hidden.

ādiśabdena mecakaratnādiparigrahaḥ / sa hīti /

The answer to this is as follows: [see verses 1733-1735 above] The term ‘ādi’ includes the gleaming Sapphire.

narasiṃhaḥ /

‘Sa’ stands for Narasiṃha.

sandohaḥ samūhaḥ /

‘Sandoha’ is aggregate.

rūpamasyāstīti rūpavān /

‘Naikarūpavān’ not having a single form.

ekena rūpavāniti vigrahaḥ / anena dṛṣṭāntasya prativādyasiddhatām āha nahi bauddhaṃ prati narasiṃha eko 'vayavī siddhaḥ, anekāṇusamūhatvāt /

This shows that the Instance cited by the Jaina writer is not one ‘admitted’ by the opposite party; as for the Bauddha, Narasiṃha is not one composite whole, he being only an aggregate of many atoms. The author cites the reason for denying the said oneness What is variegated cannot be one;

tatraikatvanirākaraṇe pramāṇam āha yaccitraṃ na tadekaṃ, yathā nānājātīyaratnasamūhaḥ, citraś ca narasiṃha iti, svabhāvairuddhopalambho vyāpakaviruddhasya vā /

e.g. a collection of several kinds of gems; and Narasiṃha has a variegated form. So that the Jaina reasoning involves an idea contrary to the nature of things.

aikye sati dvirūpatvanimittanānākārāvabhāsānupapattir bādhakaṃ pramāṇampratibhāsabhedanibandhanatvād bhedavyavasthāyāḥ /

The fact that ‘if it were one, it could not have a dual character and consequently there would not be appearance of several forms’, provides an argument against the said ‘unity’; this argument being based on the fact the idea of ‘diversity’ is based entirely upon the appearance of diverse forms.

ekadeśāvaraṇe sarvāvaraṇaprasaṅgaś ca bādhakaṃ pramāṇaṃ, na hyekasyāvṛtatvamanāvṛttatvaṃ ceti yugapad viruddhadharmasaṃsargo yuktaḥ //

‘If any one part of the body were hidden, the whole might become hidden’ (under the Jaina’s idea); this provides another argument against the conclusion of the Jaina writer; because it cannot be right that one and the same thing should have the contradictory characters of being hidden and being not hidden at the same time.

nṛsiṃhabhāgānusyūtapratyabhijñānahetavaḥ / te cāṇavaḥ prakṛtyaiva viśiṣṭapratyayodbhavāt //

By their very nature, the said atoms are the basis of the recognition that envisages the salient features of the man and the lion; as is clear from the fact of its arising from a particular idea.

etenaiva prakāreṇa citraratnādayo gatāḥ / nānātmanā hi vaicitryamekatvena virudhyate //

In this same way are the variegated gems and other cases disposed of. The variegated character, based upon the presence of several forms, is certainly incompatible with unity.

nṛsiṃhayor ye bhāgāstair anusyūtaṃ nirbhāsīkṛtaṃ yat pratyabhijñānaṃ tat tathoktam, evambhūtasya pratyabhijñānasya yadā prakṛtyaiva ta evāṇavo hetavo bhavanti, tadā kimaparamavayavinā kalpitena /

The Recognition that envisages the features of the body of the Man and the Lion (in the body of Narasiṃha), of that the only cause or basis consists of the atoms (composing those features); what then, would be the use of assuming the composite whole (Body)?

sā ca tādṛśī prakṛtiḥ kutas teṣām iti cedāha viśiṣṭapratyayodbhavāt viśiṣṭāt kāraṇād utpatteḥ /

If it be asked Whence this ‘nature’ of the Atoms? The answer is ‘As is dear from the fact of its arising out of a particular Idea’; i.e. because it proceeds from a particular cause;

tatra viśiṣṭaḥ pratyayo gativiśeṣasaṃvartanīyaṃ karma svajātisamudbhūtaḥ kalalādiś ca /

the ‘particular idea’ in this case is in the shape of the past deed leading up to the particular state of existence, and also the factors and other parts of the body peculiar to the particular animal-species.

anenaiva narasiṃhavicāreṇa mecakaratnādayo gatāḥ vyākhyātāḥ, iti na teṣāṃ pṛthak dūṣaṇaṃ vaktavyam //

What has been said regarding the case of Narasiṃha also serves to dispose of the case of the glittering gems, etc.; and it is not necessary to criticise them separately.

arthakriyāsamarthatvaṃ vastutvamabhidhīyate /

‘Being an entity’ is said to consist in ‘capacity for effective, action’;

yadi tasyānugāmitvaṃ sarvaṃ syāt sarvakāryakṛt //

if this were all-pervasive, then every thing would be capable of doing every thing.

eko 'rthajanakastasya bhāvaḥ sāmarthyayogataḥ /

Generally, one thing is held to be productive of another, only by reason of the, presence, in it, of the capacity for that action;

taccāviśiṣṭamanyasminnityanutpādakaḥ katham // [p.493] nīlādyeva ca vastutvam anugāmi yadīṣyate / sitapītādyapi prāptaṃ nīla{saṃ]sādhyakāryakṛt //

if then, that capacity is equally present in another thing, why should not this be productive of the same? If the ‘blue’ and other objects themselves are held to constitute the all-embracing character of ‘entity’, then the white and yellow things also would do what is done by the blue one;

ekam eva tato jātaṃ dvitīyātmavivarjitam / sarvaṃ viśvamato naikam anekākāram asti naḥ //

and in that case, the whole universe would become a single ‘entity devoid of a second; and thus it would not be true that a single thing has several aspects.

tadeva cenna vastutvaṃ kaṇāśimatasattvavat / naikasyānekarūpatvam eva vaḥ syād vibhedataḥ //

If the blue, etc. themselves do not constitute ‘entity’, and this is like the ‘being’ (sattva) posited by ‘Kaṇāda’, then it cannot be as you hold, that one thing cannot have several aspects;

viruddhadharmasaṅgaś ca vastūnāṃ bhedalakṣaṇam / kathañcidanyatheṣṭopi na bhedo nīlapītayoḥ //

as there would be clear difference Further, what constitutes ‘difference’ among things is the presence of contrary properties, and no other kind of ‘difference’ is held to lie between ‘blue’ and ‘yellow this same condition is present between the ‘general’ and the ‘particular’;

anugāmyanyathābhāvāt sa ca sāmānyabhedayoḥ /

because while the former is ‘inclusive’, the latter is otherwise.

vidyate tat kathaṃ nāsti tayor bhedaḥ parisphuṭam //

Why then should not ‘difference’ be admitted as clearly lying between them? (1738-1744)

arthakriyākāri yadrūpaṃ tad vastutvam ucyate nānyat, taccet sarvatrānugāmisarvaṃ sarvārthakriyākāri prāpnoti tenaiva hi rūpeṇa sarve janakā iṣyante /

It has been argued (by the Jaina writer, under Text 1716) that “in the form of entities all things are not-different from one another.” This is answered in the following [see verses 1738-1744 above] The ‘Entity’ is said to be that which is capable of effective action, nothing else. If this capacity is present in all things, then every thing would be capable of doing every thing, It is only in this sense that things are held to be productive.

tasya ca sarvatrāviśiṣṭatvād iti yatkiñcid yataḥ kutaścid utpadyeta /

This capacity then being equally present in all cases, anything might be produced out of anything.

kiṃ ca yadetannīlapītādi, tadeva kiṃ vastutvam āhosvid anyat / yadi tadeva tadā tasyānugāmitvātsitapītādyapi nīlasādhyavastrarañjanādyarthakriyākāri prāpnoti /

Further, is the ‘Entity’ the same as the Blue, the Yellow and other things? Or is it something different? If it is the same, then, as it would be all-pervasive, even the white and yellow could bring about the colouring in the cloth that is brought about by the Blue.

apica dvitīyasya svabhāvasyābhāvāt sarvaṃ jagadekam eva vastujātam iti, ekam anekākāram iti pratijñānārthahāniḥ syāt /

Then again, there being no other character or nature possible, the entire Universe would become a single conglomeration of things; and this would upset the proposition that a single entity has several aspects.

athānyadeva vastutvaṃ nīlādibhyaḥ, kaṇādābhimatasattvavat / yathā kaṇāśinaḥ kaṇādasya, abhimataṃ sattākhyaṃ vyatiriktaṃ vastutvaṃ nāmeti /

If on the other hand, the ‘entity’ is something different, from the Blue, etc., like the ‘Being’ posited by Kaṇāda, i.e. just as Kaṇāda has postulated the ‘Entity’, called ‘Being’, as something different (from the particular things), then it becomes all the more unreasonable to attribute ‘Plurality’ to any single thing;

evam api sutarāmekasyānekatvam ayuktam, ekāntenaiva bhedāt /

Then again, any two things are ‘different’ only when they have contrary poperties, e.g. Hot and Cold;

eva tayor bhedaḥ /

because while the former is ‘inclusive’, the latter is otherwise;

anyathābhāvaḥ ananugāmitvam /

‘otherwise’ i.e. not-Inclusive, ‘exclusive’.

yadi ca viruddhadharmasaṃsarge 'pi bhedo neṣyate, tadā nīlapītayor yo 'pyayaṃ kathañcid aviśeṣarūpeṇa bheda iṣṭaḥ sa na syāt "buddhibhedān na caikatvaṃ rūpādīnāṃ prasajyata" iti vacanāt kumārilena nīlādīnāṃ bhedasyopavarṇitatvāt //

If, even on the presence of contrary properties, difference were not admitted, then there would be no difference even between the Blue and the Yellow, which is admitted in some way, by the other party; Kumārila himself having declared (in Ślokavārtika Sense Perception, 158) that “as their cognitions are different, Colour, etc., cannot be one and the same”; where it has been declared that there is difference among the Blue and other things.

yathā kalmāṣavarṇasya yatheṣṭaṃ varṇanigrahaḥ / citratvād vastuno 'pyevaṃ bhedābhedāvadhāraṇe //

“As in the case of the variegated colour, one may emphasise any one colour as he chooses, because the colour is variegated, in the same way ‘difference’ or ‘non-difference’ of an entity might be emphasised.

[p.494]

(Ślokavārtika-ākṛti, 57-58).

yadā tu śabalaṃ vastu yugapat pratipadyate / tadānyānanyabhedādi sarvam eva pralīyate //

When a thing of a mixed character is cognised simultaneously, then all distinctions like ‘difference’, ‘sameness’ and so forth, disappear (ibid., 62-63).” (1745-1746)

kalmāṣavarṇaḥ śabalo varṇaḥ /

[see verses 1745-1746 above] ‘Kalmūṣa-varṇa’ is the variegated colour.

tasya yathā nīlam iti vā pītam iti vā lohitam iti vetyādinā yatheṣṭaṃ varṇanigraho rūpāvadhāraṇaṃ, tathā citrasya anekarūpasya vastunaḥ svapararūpābhyāṃ sadasadātmanaḥ sāmānyaviśeṣarūpābhyāṃ dvyātmana icchāvaśādbhedābhedāvadhāraṇe /

In this case one can fix upon, as he wishes, upon any of the several colours present regarding the thing either as Blue, or Yellow or Red; in the same manner, in the case of the Entity which has a variegated or mixed character, being existent in its own form, and also non-existent in the form of other things, and also having the two-fold character of the General and the Particular, one can fix upon Unity or Diversity, as he likes.

yadā bhedamavadhārayitum icchati tadā tamavadhārayati, yadā tu yugapat sāmānyaviśeṣātmakaṃ vastu ku{jṇa---}giti pratipadyate tadānyānanyabhedādicodyaṃ pralīyate /

When a man wishes to emphasise the diversity -aspect, then he fixes upon diversity; and when he all at once cognises a, thing as being both General and Particular, then all that has been urged regarding its difference or non-difference, etc. disappears;

nāvataratītyarthaḥ /

i.e, it does not apply at all;

pratyakṣeṇa śabalasya vastunaḥ pratīyamānatvāt /

because what is clearly cognised through Perception is the thing of the mixed character.

tatredam anyānanyādi codyam bhinnebhyo 'śvādipiṇḍebhyo 'nanyatvāt sāmānyasyāpi piṇḍavat svarūpabhedaprasaṅgaḥ, sāmānyādvāpyabhinnatvād abhedo bhedānāṃ sāmānyasyeva prasajyate /

The objection that has been urged regarding the thing being different or non-different, etc. etc. is as follows (a) The General thing being non-different from the Particular things in the shape of the Horse, etc. should also have a diversity of forms like these particular things; (b) the Particular things, being non-different from the General, all Particular things should become the same, like the General thing;

tathā bhedābhedau parasparaṃ sāmānyaviśeṣayoḥ kathaṃ viruddhau syātām / ādiśabdenaikatvānekatve parasparaviruddhe tathā tadeva sāmānyaṃ sa eva viśeṣa, ityevamādi grahītavyam //

(c) how could difference and non-difference, which are mutually contradictory, reside in the General and the Particular? The other objections are such as Unity and Plurality being mutually contradictory, how can one and the same thing be General as well as Particular? (1745-1746)

yadyevaṃ sarvatraiva śabalasya pratītiḥ syān natu kramayaugapadyābhyām ityāśaṅkyāha vastuna ityādi /

It might be argued against the above (argument of Kumārila’s) that ‘If so, then in all cases, there would be cognition of the Mixed Character, and it would not be successive and simultaneous’.

vastuno 'nekarūpasya rūpam iṣṭaṃ vivakṣayā /

When a thing has several forms, one may emphasise any one according to his own whim, either successively or simultaneously;

yugapat kramavṛttibhyāṃ nānyosti vacasāṃ vidhiḥ //

there can be no other way with verbal expressions.

yugapat krameṇa vā yadasya sāmānyaviśeṣādirūpaṃ vyavasthāpyate, tadvivakṣāvaśāt /

As a matter of fact, in the case of everything whether its ‘General’ and ‘Particular’ aspects are emphasised, one after the other or simultaneously, depends upon the wish of the Speaker;

yadā yaugapadyena sadasadrūpe vivakṣati sāmānyaviśeṣarūpaṃ vā tadā tasya rūpaṃ vyavasthāpyate / atha krameṇa vivakṣati sadrūpamasadrūpaṃ sāmānyaviśeṣaṃ vā tadāsya tadvyavasthāpyate /

so that when one wishes to speak of the ‘existence’ and the ‘non-existence’ aspects of a thing, or the ‘General’ and ‘Particular’ aspects of it, simultaneously, he emphasises its form in that way. If he wishes to speak successively, one after the other, of the ‘existence’ and ‘non-existence’ aspects, or the ‘General’ and ‘Particular’ aspects then he emphasises that form.

sarvam eva hi tasya svarūpaṃ kramākramābhyāṃ vyapadiśyate, vicitraratnakośa iva marakatapadmarāgādiriti /

In fact, all its forms are emphasised successively and simultaneously (as one wishes), just like the Emerald and other gems in a Mass of jewels.

atha kramākramau muktvānyena prakāreṇa kasmān na nirdiśyata ity āha nānyo 'sti vacasāṃ vidhir iti /

It may be asked ‘Why cannot it be indicated in a way other than successively or simultaneously?’ The answer to that is ‘There can be no other way, etc. etc.’.

yugapat kramavṛttibhyām ityapekṣaṇīyam /

i.e. no way other than ‘successively or simultaneously’.

vidhiḥ prakāraḥ //

‘Vidhi’ is way, method.

naivam ityādinā pratividhatte /

It cannot be as explained above.

naivaṃ citratvam ekatvaṃ pratiṣiddhaṃ hyanantaram / anekarūpaṃ vaicitryam ekatvenāsahasthitam // [p.495]

that what is ‘variegated’ cannot be ‘one’ has just been pointed out. ‘variegation’ consists in ‘several forms’, and it can never be concomitant with ‘unity’.

te hi yāvanta ākārās tasmin vastuni bhāvikāḥ /

All the real forms that there may be of a certain thing would be so many (different) things;

ekaṃ citram iti parasparaviruddham etad iti "yaccitraṃ na tadekam ityādinā pratipāditam /

and the thing in question itself remains only one. The idea that ‘a single entity is variegated’ involves a contradiction in terms, as already explained under Text 1734 above;

yato vicitram ityanekatvam ucyate /

and the reason for this is that the term ‘variegated’ itself connotes Plurality;

ekatvānekatvayoś ca parasparaparihārasthitilakṣaṇo virodhaḥ /

and between ‘Unity’ and ‘Plurality’ there is ‘contradiction’ consisting in the fact of the presence of one implying the absence of the other.

tasmān naikasmin bhāvikā bahava ākārāḥ sambhavanti /

Consequently one thing cannot have several real forms.

athāpi syus tathāpyekasyānekasya na pratipāditam eva.

Even if it had, this fact would not prove the plurality of the single thing;

tathā hi tāvanty evāparāṇi vastūni jātānīti / yadi paraṃ bhāvikatvena pratipāditaṃ syāt /

as all that it would mean would be that there are so many things come about; but that also only if these forms could be proved to be real.

na tvekasyānekatvaṃ parasparavirodhāt //

But in no case can Plurality belong to what is one, as the two are mutually contradictory.

ekasmād vastuno 'nyatve tādātmyavikalaṃ bhavet /

If a certain thing were excluded from one ‘entity’, it would be devoid of sameness only with that entity;

nākāśapuṣpasaṅkāśaṃ taddhyapyarthakriyākṣamam //

it would not become like the ‘sky-flower’; as it would still be capable of efficient action.

yadi hi vastumātrāt parāvṛttir hetutvena kriyate khapuṣpāviśeṣatve sādhye, tadā hetur asiddhaḥ.

If what is cited as the Reason is ‘exclusion of all entities’, and similarity to the ‘sky-flower’ is meant to be proved by it, then the Reason is ‘inadmissible’;

na hi ghaṭasya vastumātrād vyāvṛttiḥ siddhā, kiṃ tarhi---/

because the exclusion of the Jar from all entities, cannot be admitted;

svasvabhāvaṃ muktvānyasmād vastuviśeṣāt /

all that can be admitted is that it is excluded or differentiated from things other than itself.

atha vastuviśeṣād vyāvṛttir hetutvenopādīyate tadānaikāntiko hetuḥ /

If, on the other hand, the Reason meant to be adduced is exclusion from some things, then it is ‘Inconclusive’.

tathā hi ekasmād ghaṭāder vastuno vyāvṛttaṃ ghaṭādikaṃ vastu paratādātmyavikalaṃ siddhyennatu sarvathā niḥsvabhāvaṃ tasyāpyarthakriyākāritvāt // śaktam ityādinaitad evānaikāntikatvaṃ samarthayate /

For instance, the Jar, excluded or differentiated from the Cloth and other things, could be recognised only as devoid of sameness with the Cloth, and it could not be recognised as absolutely devoid of essence (existence), as even as thus excluded, it would be capable of efficient action, (1750)

śaktaṃ rūpaṃ na caikasya vastuṣvanyeṣu vartate / kāryopalambhanirbhāsabhedāder iti varṇitam //

As a matter of fact, the capable (potent) form of one entity does not reside in other entities, because the effect produced and the form of the apprehension are found to be different and so forth;

atadvastvātmakatvaṃ tu tadaśleṣeṇa yujyate /

‘that a certain entity is not the same as the other’, this alone can follow from the exclusion (of differentiation) therefrom;

nāviśeṣamavastutvaṃ vastulakṣaṇabhāvataḥ //

and not the fact of its being a non-entity devoid of all properties.

yadi hyarthakriyāsāmarthyalakṣaṇaṃ vastutvaṃ nāmānuyāyi syāt tato vyāvṛttasya niḥsvabhāvatā syād arthakriyāsāmarthyalakṣaṇatvād vastunaḥ, yāvatāśaktaṃ rūpaṃ yadekasya nīlādes tadanyeṣu sitādiṣu na vartata iti pūrvam uktam, "nīlādyeva ca vastutvam anugāmi yadīṣyata" ityādinā /

The following Texts show the ‘Inconclusive’ character of the Opponent’s Reason: [see verse 1751-1752 above] If the character of ‘Entity’, consisting of capacity for effective action, were something embracing all ‘entities’ collectively, then alone could the thing differentiated from others be said to be featureless (non-existent), the ‘entity’ being something that is characterised by capacity for effective action. As a matter of fact however, the ‘capable (or potent) form of one entity the Blue for instance cannot subsist in other things, like the white and the rest;

kasmāt ---/

Question: “Why cannot it subsist in other things?”

kāryabhedādupalambhanirbhāsabhedāc ca /

Answer: Because the effect produced is different, and the form of Apprehension (Idea) is different.

upalambho jñānaṃ tasya nirbhāsa ākāraḥ /

and ‘nirbhāsa’ for the form of that Cognition (i.e. the Idea).

ādiśabdenotpādasthitinirodhādaya gṛhyante / tasmāt tadaśle [p.496] ṣeṇa hetunātadvastvātmakam ityeva sādhayituṃ yujyate, nāviśeṣam nirviśeṣaṇam, avastutvaṃ sādhayituṃ yuktam /

The phrase ‘and so forth’ stands for diversities of birth, of existence, of destruction, etc. For these reasons all that ‘non-contact’ differentiation from another entity can prove is only that ‘the entity in question is not the same as this latter’; it cannot prove it to be devoid of properties, a mere non-entity.

kutaḥ/

“Why?”

tatrāpyarthakriyākāritvasya vsatulakṣaṇasya bhāvāt //

Because the capacity for effective action, which constitutes the essence of ‘Entity’, is present in it.

nanu cātyantabhede sati katham anugāmī vastuvastviti pratyayo bhavet / kathaṃ ca khapuṣpād bhedo vastunaḥ siddhyati /

For instance, the Jar, excluded or differentiated from the Cloth and other things, could be recognised only as devoid of sameness with the Cloth, and it could not be recognised as absolutely devoid of essence (existence), as even as thus excluded, it would be capable of efficient action, (1750)

yadi sādṛśyaṃ na bhaved ity āha tadapītyādi / tadapyarthakriyāyogyam iti vastviti kalpane / asamarthaparāvṛttiḥ sādṛśyaṃ tadvikalpitam //

The conception being there that ‘that also is capable of effective action’, there would be this idea that ‘it is an entity’ thus there would be subjective similarity consisting in ‘differentiation from what is incapable’.

tataścātyantabhede 'pi tulyatāsti vikalpitā / bhāvo bhāvāntarais tulyaḥ khapuṣpāt tadviśeṣyate //

Thus, even though there is absolute difference, there is a subjective similarity; and thus an ‘entity’ being ‘equal’ to other entities, becomes distinguished from the ‘sky-flower’.

asamarthaparāvṛttir iti /

‘Differentiation from the Incapable’;

asamarthāḥ vandhyāsutādayaḥ, tebhyaḥ parāvṛttiratadātmatā /

‘the incapables’ meant are such non-entities as ‘the son of the Barren Woman’, there is ‘differentiation’ from these, i.e. the entity is not the same as these.

yataś ca sādṛśyaṃ kalpitam asti, tasmād yaduktaṃ "bhāvo bhāvāntarātulya" iti tadasiddham //

Because the subjective Similarity is there, therefore it cannot be admitted that “If an entity were not equal to other entities, it would not differ from the sky-flower” (as asserted by the Opponent under Text (1710).

nanu yenātmanā vastu samānāparavastunaḥ / vyāvṛttaṃ tat sajātīyais tenaiva sadṛśaṃ yadi // vijñāyeta vijātīyair api tulyatayā tadā /

“If the form in which a certain thing is differentiated from other things, homogeneous and heterogeneous were the same in which it is similar to the homogeneous things, then it should be recognised as similar to the heterogeneous things also;

tasyātmano 'viśiṣṭatvān na ca tajjñāyate tathā //

as the form would be the same in both cases. And yet it is not so recognised.

sajātīyāsamāno 'pi tasmād yena bhavatyayam / ātmanā tat samānaś ca tayor bhedaḥ svabhāvayoḥ //

Hence it follows that the form in which the thing is not similar to the homogeneous things, and the form in which it is similar to these, must be different from one another.” (1755-1757)

sa āha yenātmanā sajātīyavijātīyābhyāṃ vyāvṛttaṃ vastu tenaivātmanā tadvastu yadi sajātīyaiḥ sadṛśaṃ bhavet tadā vijātīyair api tulyatayā

Sumati argues as follows: “That form in which a certain thing is differentiated from homogeneous and heterogeneous things, if, in that same form, it were similar to the homogeneous things, then it should he recognised as similar to the heterogeneous things also;

vijñāyeta tasyātmano 'viśiṣṭatvāt /

as the form would be the same in both cases.

naca jñāyate /

And yet as a matter of fact, it is not so recognised.

tasmādyena svabhāvena sajātīyāsamānopi bhavati, yena ca svabhāvena tatsadṛśo bhavati tayoḥ svabhāvayor bhedo 'bhivāñcitavyaḥ /

Hence it follows that that form in which it is dissimilar to the homogeneous things, and that form in which it is similar to these things, between these two forms, there must be difference.

nanu sa yadi sajātīyaḥ kathaṃ tenāsamāno bhavati, atha tenāsamāno bhavati kathaṃ sajātīya, iti parasparavyāhatam etat /

It might be asked ‘when it is homogeneous to them, how can it be dissimilar? And if it is dissimilar to them, how can it be homogeneous to them? The two are contradictory’.

naiṣa doṣaḥ /

This however does not affect our position.

yataḥ pareṇa sarvam eva vastu sāmānyaviśeṣātmakam iṣṭam, tasmād vastutvādinā sāmānyena sarvam eva sajātīyam ity ucyate viśeṣarūpeṇa tadeva vijātīyam iṣṭam iti tadapekṣayā punar asamāna ityabhidhīyata ityadoṣaḥ /

Because the other party regards everything as having two aspects, the General and the Particular; hence in the ‘General’ aspect, all things are said to be ‘homogeneous’ to that thing, while in its ‘Particular’ aspect, it is held to be ‘heterogeneous’; and in this latter sense, it is said to be dissimilar;

samānā [p.497] paravastuna iti / samānaṃ ca tadaparaṃ ceti samānāparavastu /

The compounds ‘Samānāparavastu’ stands for the ‘Samāna’, the Homogeneous, and the ‘apara’, Contrary, i.e. the Heterogeneous.

aparam ityasamānaṃ śeṣaṃ sugamatvān na vibhaktam //

The rest is easily intelligible, hence it is not explained in detail, (1755-1757)