buddhist-nlp/tatpa-noisy · Datasets at Hugging Face

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atha bhedābhāsā, tadā vyāptiḥ sādhyena hetor na saṅgaccheta, viśeṣeṇānvayāyogāt /	If the cognition envisage distinction, then there would be no Invariable Concomitance between the Probans and the Probandum; as there would be no concomitance regarding the qualifying factor;
tataścānaikāntikaṃ syāt /	and to that extent, the Probans would be Inconclusive.
aparāmṛṣṭatadbhedeti /	and does not envisage distinction, etc. etc.
bhedapratibhāsaśūnyā vijātīyaparāvṛttārthamātrādhyavasāyinī /	That is, devoid of all tinge of distinction, envisaging the mere object as excluded from all unlike things;
yathā dhūmādvahnimātrapratītiḥ /	e.g. the cognition of mere Fire, from Smoke.
evambhūtā cet spaṣṭamevānumānaṃ, sambandhadarśanopāyatvāt, dhūmād vahnipratītivat //	If the cognition in question is of this kind, then it is clearly Inference, as brought about by the perception of Relation, as the cognition of Fire, from Smoke.
iti pramāṇāntaraparīkṣā //	the contrary of this is regarded by the wise, as ‘imperceptible’.
KAPITEL SYAADVAADAPARIIK.SAA	Nor can a thing be neither Perceptible nor Imperceptible;
"aṇīyasāpi nāṃśena miśrībhūtāparātmak"amityetat samarthanārthaṃ codyopakramapūrvakam āha nanvityādi /	It might be urged that “the other Means of Cognition bring about the Cognition of the thing concerned after it has been envisaged by Perception”; the answer to that is that ‘it would be futile’;
nanvanekātmakaṃ vastu yathā mecakaratnavat /	as, in that case it would be like any perceptible thing and would cease to be imperceptible.
prakṛtyaiva sadādīnāṃ ko virodhas tathā sati //	if then, it were to produce cognitions directly, how could it be called ‘Imperceptible’?
yaduktam	End of Chapter XIX.
"arthakriyāsamarthaṃ ca sadanyadasaducyate / samāveśo na caikatra tayor yukto virodhataḥ" //	It has been asserted (under Text 1675, above) that ‘What is capable of effective action is said to be existent, other than that is said to be nonexistent, the two cannot exist together in the same substratum, as they are contradictory’,
iti / tadatrāhrīkādayaścodayanti /	Against this, Āhrīka (a Jaina writer) and others urge the following objections:
sarvam eva vastu sāmānyaviśeṣātmakatvenānekātmakaṃ, yathā śabalābhāsaṃ	“Every entity has more than one aspect^ the General and the Particular; just like the lustrous gem which appears to be of variegated colour;
ratnaṃ, tat kathaṃ sadādīnāṃ virodhaḥ, yenocyate "samāveśo na caikatre"ti / ādiśabdena kriyākriyaikatvādayo gṛhyante /	why then should there be any contradiction (incompatibility) between existence and non-existence, in view of which it is said that ‘the two cannot coexist in the same substratum’? The term ‘ādi’ in ‘sadādi’ is meant to include ‘activity and inactivity’, ‘unity’ and so forth”.
yadyapi cedaṃ [p.487] codyaṃ nanu tadevetyādinā parihṛtaṃ, tathāpi vistareṇa pratipādanāya vādāntaraṃ vā darśayituṃ punar ucyate //	Though this objection has been already refuted under Text 1676. by the sentence ‘Nanu tadetaddhi, etc.’, yet it has been introduced here for the purpose of expounding the matter in detail, or for setting forth a fresh theory.
tatra sāmānyaviśeṣātmakatvasādhanāya yathākramamahrīkaḥ prayogadvayamāha bhāva iti /	why then should there be any contradiction (incompatibility) between existence and non-existence, in view of which it is said that ‘the two cannot coexist in the same substratum’? The term ‘ādi’ in ‘sadādi’ is meant to include ‘activity and inactivity’, ‘unity’ and so forth”.
bhāvo bhāvāntarātulyaḥ khapuṣpān na viśiṣyate /	“If an entity were not-equal to (entirely different from) other entities, then it would not differ from the ‘sky-flower’.
atulyatvavihīnaścet tebhyo bhinno na siddhyati //	On the other hand, if it were entirely devoid of non-equality (difference), then it could not be regarded as anything different from those things (1710)
kiñcid vivakṣitaṃ vastu ghaṭādi, sa yadi ghaṭādir bhāvaḥ paṭādinā bhāvāntareṇātulyaḥ syāt tato yadi vyāvṛttaḥ syāt, tadā khapuṣpān na tasya viśeṣaḥ syāt, sarvathā vastvantarād vyāvṛttatvāt, naca vastvantarād vyāvṛttasyānyā gatiḥ sambhavati khapuṣpatāṃ muktvā /	“If a certain thing spoken of the Jar, for instance, were not-equal to (i.e. different from) all other things, such as the Cloth and the like, i.e. if it were always excluded (differentiated) from these, then there would be no difference between the Jar and the ‘Sky-flower’; as it would be always differentiated from all other things; and a thing that is always differentiated from all other things can have no other state save that of the ‘sky-flower’, Consequently, one who is not willing to admit the equality of that thing to the ‘sky-flower’, must admit that it is equal (similar) to other entities, in being an entity;
tasmāt tasya vastunaḥ khapuṣpātulyatvam abhyupagacchatā bhāvāntaratulyatvaṃvastutvaṃ nāma sāmānyamabhyupagantavyam iti siddhaṃ sāmānyātmakatvam /	hence this general character (commonalty), in the shape of the universal ‘entity’, has to be admitted.
viśeṣātmakatvaṃ tarhi katham iti cedatrocyate atulyatvavihīnaścet tebhyo bhinno na siddhyati sa eva ghaṭādibhāvo yadi paṭādinā bhāvena yadatulyatvaṃṭena vihīnaḥ syāt, tena ghaṭādinā yadyatulyo na bhaved iti yāvat /	It may be asked “In what way then is there the Particular?” The answer is ‘If it were entirely devoid of non-equality, then it could not be regarded as different from those things. If that same entity, Jar, were devoid of non-equality to other things like the Cloth, i.e. if it were not non-equal to them, then the Jar could not be regarded as any thing different from the Cloth, etc., in the form ‘This is Jar, that is Cloth’;
bhidyate ca /	just like the specific individuality of things;
tasmād viśeṣātmakatvam api siddham //	hence it becomes established that it has the Particular character also.
vastuno hi nivṛttasya kvānyā sambhavinī gatiḥ /	“If the intended entity is entirely not-equal to other things, then it ceases to be an entity;
lakṣyate nāstitāṃ muktvā tārāpathasarojavat // tasmāt khapuṣpātulyatvam icchatā tasya vastunaḥ / vastutvaṃ nāma sāmānyameṣṭavyaṃ tat samānatā //	for that which is excluded from ‘entity’, where could there be any other position, except non-existence, as in the case of the ‘sky-flower’? Thus then, one who wishes the entity to be not-equal to the ‘sky-flower’ must accept the universal ‘entity’ as the character common to all entities (1711-1713)
anyathā hi na sā buddhirityādinā sāmānyātmakatvasādhanāyopapattyantaramāha anyathā hi na sā buddhir balibhugdaśanādiṣu / vartate niyatā tveṣā bhāveṣveveti kiṃ kṛtam //	“If it were not as asserted, then, to what would this fact be due that the common notion of ‘entity’ does not appear in connection with the ‘crow’s teeth’, while it always appears as restricted to entities alone? If it be urged that the said restriction is due to similarity’, then our answer is that, that same (similarity) is what we call ‘commonalty’.
sārūpyānniyamo 'yaṃ cet sāmānyaṃ ca tadeva naḥ /	This same remark applies also to the view that ‘the said restriction is due to a certain capacity in the nature of things’.
atyantabhinnatā tasmād ghaṭate naiva kasyacit / sarvaṃ hi vasturūpeṇa bhidyate na parasparam //	Absolute difference (from other entities) therefore is not possible for any entity; because entities do not differ from each other, on the point of being ‘entities’.” (1714-1716)
yadi ca bhāvo bhāvāntarātulyaḥ syāt tadā kimiti ghaṭādiṣveva bhāvo bhāva ityabhinnā buddhir bhavati natu kākadantādiṣviti tatra kāraṇaṃ vaktavyam sārūpyaṃ kāraṇam iti cet tadeva tarhi sāmānyam iti siddhaṃ, sāmānyaparyāyatvāt sārūpyasya /	‘If it were not, etc. etc.’ If an entity were ‘not-equal’ to different from every other entity, then how is it that the common idea of ‘being an entity’ is found to appear only in connection with the Jar and such things, and not in connection with the ‘crow’s teeth’ (and other non-entities)? The basis for this has to be explained. It might be urged that ‘the basis for this lies in the similarity (among entities)’. Then it becomes established that- that same Similarity is the ‘Commonalty’, the Common character;
anuyāyinī śaktir asti ghaṭādiṣveva, na kākadantādiṣu, ataḥ svabhāvānugatāśaktiḥ kāraṇam iti cet /	It might be explained that ‘the said comprehensive potency subsists in the Jar and other entities only, and not in the Crow’s Teeth and such non-entities; hence ‘the capacity of the nature of things’ is what forms the basis of the notion in question’.
sāyanenaiva sārūpyeṇopavarṇitā vyākhyātā / sārūpyavadatrāpi samānam uttaram iti yāvat / tasyā eva sāmānyarūpatvaprasaṅgāt /	This view also is dispensed with by what has been just explained; i.e. the answer to this is the same as that to the view regarding ‘Similarity’; because the said capacity may be regarded as the required ‘Commonalty’.
tasmād vasturūpeṇa sarvaṃ ghaṭādi parasparamabhinnam iti siddham //	From all this it follows that, in the form of ‘entities’, all things the Jar and the rest are not-different from one another.
avadhīkṛtavastubhyo vairūpyarahitaṃ yadi / tadvastu na bhaved bhinnaṃ tebhyo 'bhedas tadātmavat //	“If the said entity were entirely devoid of dissimilarity from the other standard entities, then that entity would not be different from these; there would be complete non-difference, as from their own selves.
tebhyaḥ svarūpaṃ bhinnaṃ hi vairūpyamabhidhīyate /	what is called ‘dissimilarity’ is only a form different from those;
vairūpyaṃ na ca bhinnaṃ cetyetadanyonyabādhitam //	hence the idea that ‘there is no dissimilarity, and yet the thing is different’ would involve a self-contradiction.
tasmād bhinnatvam arthānāṃ kathañcidupagacchatā / vairūpyamupagantavyaṃ viśeṣātmakatāpyataḥ //	Consequently, when one has to accept some sort of difference among things, he has to accept ‘dissimilarity’ also, and thence also the ‘particular’ character of things.” (1717-1719)
paṭādibhyo 'rthāntarebhyo yadi ghaṭādi vairūpyeṇa rahitaṃ bhavet tadābhedāt tebhyaḥ paṭādibhyas tadghaṭādi bhinnaṃ na bhaved ātmasvarūpavad abhinnatvaprasaṅgāt /	‘Standard, entities’ the Cloth and the rest (to which the Jar is being compared). If the Jar were entirely devoid of dissimilarity to these other things Cloth, etc. then, there being no difference between them, the Jar could not be any thing different from those things; as it would be non-different from it, like the form of its own self.
tathā hi tebhyaḥ paṭādibhyo yadvibhinnaṃ svarūpaṃ ghaṭādīnāṃ tadeva khaluvairūpyam ucyate nānyat /	For instance, what is called ‘dissimilarity’ is only that form of the Jar which is different from the Cloth,.
tataś ca satyapi vairūpye paṭādīnāṃ naca ghaṭādibhyo bhedo 'stīti svavacanavyāhatiḥ, bhedavairūpyayoḥ paryāyatvāt //	nothing apart from that form; hence to say that ‘there is dissimilarity' in the Cloth, etc., and yet there is no difference from the Jar’, would involve self-contradiction; as ‘difference’ and ‘dissimilarity’ are synonymous terms.
vastvekātmakamevedam anekākāramiṣyate /	“The entity itself is only one in essence, but is regarded as having several aspects;
te cānuvṛttivyāvṛttibuddhigrāhyatayā sthitāḥ //	and these aspects are there in the form of being apprehended by inclusive and exclusive cognitions;
ādyā ete 'nuvṛttatvāt sāmānyam iti kīrtitāḥ / viśeṣāstvabhidhīyante vyāvṛttatvāt tato 'pare //	the former ones, being inclusive, are spoken of as ‘common’ (universal, general), while the latter, being exclusive, are called ‘particular’.
[p.489] ayam atra paramārthaḥ mecakaratnavad ekam eva vastvanekākāram, te cākārāḥkecid anuvṛttibuddhigrāhyāḥ kecid vyāvṛttibuddhigrāhyāḥ /	“The real truth of the matter is as follows: Like the gleaming Sapphire, every entity, while being one, has several aspects; of these aspects, some are apprehended by inclusive notions, and others by exclusive notions.
tatra ye 'nuvṛttibuddhigrāhyās te 'nuvṛttatayā sāmānyam iti kīrtyante, ye tutato 'pare vyāvṛttibuddhigrāhyās te vyāvṛttatvād viśeṣā iti kalpyante, tatrānuvṛttibuddhir bhāvo bhāva ityādyabhedākārā, vyāvṛttibuddhir ghaṭo 'yaṃna paṭa ityevamādibhedākārā //	Those that are apprehended by inclusive notions are inclusive and hence spoken of as ‘Common’, while others, which are apprehended by inclusive notions, are exclusive and hence said to be ‘Particular’. The inclusive notion appears in the one non-distinctive form of ‘Entity’;
tadatra pratividhatte parasparasvabhāvatva ityādi /	while the exclusive notion appears in the distinctive form ‘this in jar, not Cloth’.” (1720-1721)
parasparasvabhāvatve syāt sāmānyaviśeṣayoḥ /	If the ‘general’ and the ‘particular’ were of the nature of each other, commingling and confusion would be inevitable;
sāṅkaryaṃ tattvato nedaṃ dvairūpyam upapadyate //	hence it cannot be possible that every entity has two aspects.
parasparāsvabhāvatve 'pyanayor anuṣajyate / nānātvamevambhāve 'pi dvairūpyaṃ nopapadyate //	If they are not of the nature of each other, then they are diverse (two distinct things), and hence it does not follow that there are ‘two aspects’ (of a single entity).
atra pakṣadvayam, kiṃ yadeva sāmānyaṃ sa eva viśeṣaḥ, āhosvid anyat sāmānyamanyo viśeṣa iti /	There are two alternatives possible: (1) The ‘General’ is the same as the ‘Particular’ and (2) The ‘General’ is something different from the ‘Particular’.
tatra prathame pakṣe sāmānyaviśeṣayoḥ parasparasvabhāvatve sāṅkaryaṃ syāt /	In the former case, the Particular and the General being of the nature of one another, there would be commingling and confusion;
tataścedaṃ sāmānyam ayaṃ viśeṣa iti vibhāgābhāvāt paramārthata ekasya vastuno dvairūpyaṃ nopapadyate /	the result of which would be that it could not be discerned that ‘this is General and that is Particular’; which means that there cannot be two aspects of the same entity.
tatra parasparāsvabhāvatve 'pyaṅgīkriyamāṇe nānātvam svabhāvabhedaḥ sāmānyaviśeṣayoḥ samprasajyate /	If, in order to avoid the confusion, the latter alternative is accepted, even so, the two being regarded as not of the nature of each other, there would be ‘diversity’ difference of nature between the General, and the Particular;
evaṃ hyanayor asāṃkaryaṃ bhaved yadyanayor nānātvaṃ syāt, tataścaivambhāve 'pi nānātve 'pi vastudvayam eva kevalaṃ jātam iti naikasya vastuno dvairūpyaṃ yuktam /	thus there would be no confusion between the two, only if the two were entirely different; but even so, even when the two are different, there are two things, and not two aspects of one thing.
athāpi syāt yadi nāma sāmānyaviśeṣayoḥ parasparaṃ svabhāvaviveko jātas tathāpi sāmānyaviśeṣātmakaṃ vastvabhinnameveti /	The following might be urged Even when there has come about a difference in the nature of the General and the Particular, the entity that exists in the form of the General and the Particular is one and the same”.
tadetat tu parasparaviruddham /	This however will be a contradiction in terms.
tathā hi ekasmād vastunaḥ sāmānyaviśeṣayor abhede 'ṅgīkriyamāṇe katham anayoḥ parasparaṃ svabhāvavivekaḥ siddhyet, ekasmād abhede tayor abhedaprasaṅgād ekavastusvabhāvavat / sāmānyaviśeṣayoś ca parasparaṃ svabhāvaviveke 'ṅgīkriyamāṇe tābhyām abhinnam ekaṃ vastu na siddhyet tābhyām abhinnatvāt tasyāpyekatvenābhimatasya	For instance, if the General and the Particular are regarded as non-different from one and the same thing, how could there be any difference in the nature of those two themselves? Being non-different from one and the same thing, they must be non-different from one another, like the nature of any single entity. When however the difference between the nature of the General and that of the Particular is accepted, there could not be any single thing that would be non-different from those two;
dvitvaprasaṅgāt sāmānyaviśeṣasvarūpavat /	because being non-different from the two, what is meant to be one would have to be regarded as two, like the form of the General and the form of the Particular.
tasmād ekamubhayātmakam iti parasparavyahatam etat //	From all this it follows that the assertion that “every entity has two aspects” involves self-contradiction.
satyapyekasvabhāvatve dharmabhedo 'tra sidhyati /	“Though the entity may be of one nature only, yet it can have different properties;
bhedasaṃsthā{ '}virodhaś ca yathā kārakaśaktiṣu //	there could be no incongruity in the presence of different states (of the same thing); which is found, for example, in the case of the potencies of the active agencies;
na dṛṣṭe 'nupapannaṃ ca yat sāmānyaviśeṣayoḥ / aikātmye 'pīkṣyate bhedalokayātrānuvartanam //	nor can there be any incongruity in what is actually seen; and it is actually seen that even though the general and the particular are aspects of one and the same thing, yet in actual practical life there is difference between them.” (1724-1725)
sa hi codyopakrame parihāraṃ kilātrāha tat sāmānyaviśeṣayoḥ parasparasvabhāvavirahānabhyupagame saṅkīrṇatā prāpnoti /	Sumati has offered the following explanation in connection with the objection urged against the Jaina doctrine: “It has been urged that if the General and the Particular were not regarded as different, there would be confusion.
naiṣa doṣaḥ /	But this does not affect the case at all.
tayor ekasvabhāvatayā satyām api saṅkīrṇatāyāṃ dharmabhedaḥ prasiddhyati kārakaśaktivat /	Though, by reason of their being of the same nature there may be confusion, there can be difference in their properties, as is found to be the case with the potencies of Active Agencies.
tathā hi balāhako vidyotate, balāhakād vidyotata, ityādikāryabhedād bhidyamānātmānaḥ kāraṇaśaktayaḥ samupalabhyante dravyasvabhāvāvyatiriktatayā	For instance, there are such expressions as ‘Balāhako vidyotate’, ‘The Cloud flashes’ (where the Cloud appears as the active Agent), and ‘Balāhakādvidyotate’, ‘flashes from the Clouds’ (where the Cloud appears as the Source, the Ablative); in such cases we find the potencies of the active agencies varying through the diversity of their effects;
saṅkīrṇatāyām api satyām /	even though they being all of the nature of ‘substance’ there is a certain amount of confusion.
tadanabhyupagame lokaśāstravirodho 'vaśyambhāvī /	If this is not admitted., that would be quite contrary to common experience as well as scientific (Grammatical) principles.
api ca na hi dṛṣṭe 'nupapannaṃ nāma /	Then again, there can be no incongruity urged against what is actually seen.
tathā hi sāmānyaviśeṣayor ekavastusvabhāvatve 'pyasaṅkīrṇatāyā bhede 'pi lokayātrānuvartanam upalabhyata eva /	For instance, in the case of the General and the Particular, though they are aspects of one and the same thing, and are quite distinct and never confounded, yet, all practical business is actually found to be carried on on the basis of their difference.
bhedena lokayātrā bhedalokayātrā, sānuvartyate yenaikātmyena tat tathoktam /	The compound ‘bhedalokayātrā’ is to be expounded as ‘Practical business on the basis of difference’; and this is carried On, though the entity is one only embracing both the aspects.
prayogaḥ ekasya vastuno yo bhedavyavahāraḥ sa dharmabhedanibandhanaḥ, yathā kārakaśaktiṣu, bhedavyavahāraścāyam ekasmin vastuni sāmānyaviśeṣalakṣaṇa iti svabhāvahetuḥ //	The argument may be formulated as follows: When any one thing is treated as diverse, it is on the basis of the diversity of its properties, as in the case of the Potencies of active agencies; the idea of the General and Particular being aspects of one and the same thing involves treatment of the thing as diverse; tins is a Reason based upon the nature of things, (1724-1725)
nanvityādinā pratividhatte /	The above argument is answered in the following: [see verse 1726 next]
nanu satyekarūpatve dharmabhedo na siddhyati /	In fact, if the thing has only one form, it cannot have diverse properties;
akalpito vibhedo hi nānātvam abhidhīyate //	a diversity that is not a creation of fancy is what is called ‘plurality’.
anena hetor viruddhatām āha iṣṭaviparītasādhanāt /	This shows that the Reason adduced by the Jaina is ‘contradictory’;
tathā hi pāramārthiko dharmabhedo vādinaḥ sādhayitum iṣṭaḥ, sa cākalpito dharmabhedo na siddhyati, vastuna ekatvābhyupagamāt, tasya caikasya vastuno bhedavirodhāt, yato bheda iti nānātvam abhidhīyate, yac ca nānā tat katham ekaṃsyāt //	inasmuch as it proves the contrary of what is intended to be proved. For instance, what the other party intends to prove is real diversity of properties; but no such ‘diversity of properties’, which is not a creation of fancy is proved by the Reason adduced; as ‘one-ness’ of the thing itself is admitted; and what is one entity cannot be compatible with Diversity;
dṛṣṭānte na kevalaṃ sādhyaśūnyatā, api tu sādhyaviparyayeṇa hetur vyāpta	The Corroborative Instance that has been cited (by the Jaina writer) is ‘devoid of the Probandum’, and the Probans also is one that is concomitant with the contrary of the Probandum.
iti darśayannāha nānātmatvam ityādi /	This is what is shown in the following [see verse 1727 next]
nānātmatvaṃ ca śaktīnāṃ vivakṣāmātranirmitam /	As regards the potencies, their diversity is merely a creation of the speaker’s ‘desire to speak’;
ekatattvātmakatve hi na bhedo 'trāpi yuktimān //	here also no diversity can be reasonable in what is essentially one.
syād etat yadyapi bheda iti nānātvam abhidhīyate, tadeva nānātvam ekasyavastuno bhāvikaṃ kathaṃ viruddhaṃ, yena tadviparītaṃ sādhayad viruddhaṃ bhavedityāha ekam	The following might be urged (by the other party): “Even though Diversity is what is called ‘Plurality’, why should such real Plurality of a single entity be incompatible, by virtue of which the Reason is said to be ‘contradictory’, as proving the contrary of the desired conclusion?”
ityādi /	The answer to this is as follows: [see verses 1728-1729 next]
ekam ity ucyate taddhi yat tadeveti gīyate /	Things are said to be ‘one’ when it is said ‘this is that’;
nānātmakaṃ tu tannāma na tadbhavati yatpunaḥ // [p.491] tadbhāvaścāpyatadbhāvaḥ parasparavirodhataḥ / ekavastuni naivāyaṃ kathañcidavakalpyate //	whereas they are said to be ‘diverse’ when it is said ‘this is not that being that and not being that thus being mutually contradictory, cannot, in any way, be attributed to any one entity. When it is stated categorically that ‘this is that’, t hen the things are said to be ‘one’;
yattadetad iti tattvena vidhīyate tadekamity ucyate, yathā caitanyapuruṣayoḥ /	On the other hand, when the identity between things is denied, they are said to be ‘diverse, different’;
vastunaḥ satas tattvaniṣedhe nānātvaṃ, yathā bhūtacaitanyayoḥ /	as in the ease of Matter and Consciousness.
tataś ca vidhipratiṣedhayor ekatrāyogāt tadbhāvalakṣaṇāt tadbhāvalakṣaṇayorekatvanānātvayoḥ parasparavirodha iti kalpita evaikasya dharmabhedaḥ //	As it is impossible for both affirmation and denial to pertain to any one thing, there is clear contradiction between ‘Unity’ and ‘Plurality’, which are based respectively upon the said identity and difference. Hence any diversity of properties of a single entity can be only a creation of fancy.
vidhānapratiṣedhau hi parasparavirodhinau /	Affirmation and denial are mutually contradictory;
śakyāvekatra no kartuṃ kenacit svasthacetasā //	and they cannot be made by any sane-minded person, in regard to one and the same thing.
nibandhanena bhāvyam, anyathā vastusaṅkaryaṃ syāt /	Question “Why should there be contradiction between Identity and Difference (Affirmation and Denial)?”
tataś ca yattadbhinnaṃ nibandhanaṃ sa eva ca pāramārthikaṃ dharmabhedo 'smākamityāha sajātīyetyādi /	When an entity, excluded from several like and unlike things, is differentiated from this and that, that is called ‘the diversity of properties’.
ekasyāpi tato yuktā kalpitāsaṅkhyarūpatā /	In this way even a single thing may be assumed to have numberless diverse forms;
vāstavaṃ naikabhāvasya dvairūpyam api saṅgatam //	but in reality, no single thing can reasonably have two forms.
sajātīyavijātīyaṃ ca tadanekaṃ ceti karmadhārayaḥ, tasmād vyāvṛttaṃ ca tad vastu ceti vigrahaḥ.	The compound ‘sajātīya, etc. etc.’ is to be expounded as there is first a karmadhāraya compound between ‘like and unlike’ and ‘several’; and from these the entity is ‘excluded’.
tasyaikasya vastunaḥ, tatas tataḥ sajātīyādvijātīyāc ca, yā parāvṛttiḥ sā dharmabhedavyavasthāyā nibandhanam /	When such a single entity is differentiated from this and that, like and unlike thing this is what forms the basis of the idea of the ‘diversity of properties’.
tasmād yataḥ kalpitāpyanekatā sambhavati, tasmād vāstavaṃ dvairūpyam ekasya na saṅgatam /	Thus, inasmuch as there can be an assumed ‘Plurality’, there can be no reason for postulating a real, duality of form for any single thing.
apiśabdena sāmānyena dharmabhedapūrvakatvamātre sādhye siddhasādhyatām api sūcayati //	The particle ‘api’ implies that there would be ‘superfluity’ in the Jaina writer’s argument if what were meant to be proved were the mere fact of the thing having in a general way, a diversity of properties.
narasiṃhādayo ye hi dvairūpyeṇopavarṇitāḥ / teṣām api dvirūpatvaṃ bhāvikaṃ naiva vidyate //	Such entities as Narasiṃha and others which have been described as having dual characters, in their case also the dual character is not real.

atha bhedābhāsā, tadā vyāptiḥ sādhyena hetor na saṅgaccheta, viśeṣeṇānvayāyogāt /

If the cognition envisage distinction, then there would be no Invariable Concomitance between the Probans and the Probandum; as there would be no concomitance regarding the qualifying factor;

tataścānaikāntikaṃ syāt /

and to that extent, the Probans would be Inconclusive.

aparāmṛṣṭatadbhedeti /

and does not envisage distinction, etc. etc.

bhedapratibhāsaśūnyā vijātīyaparāvṛttārthamātrādhyavasāyinī /

That is, devoid of all tinge of distinction, envisaging the mere object as excluded from all unlike things;

yathā dhūmādvahnimātrapratītiḥ /

e.g. the cognition of mere Fire, from Smoke.

evambhūtā cet spaṣṭamevānumānaṃ, sambandhadarśanopāyatvāt, dhūmād vahnipratītivat //

If the cognition in question is of this kind, then it is clearly Inference, as brought about by the perception of Relation, as the cognition of Fire, from Smoke.

iti pramāṇāntaraparīkṣā //

the contrary of this is regarded by the wise, as ‘imperceptible’.

KAPITEL SYAADVAADAPARIIK.SAA

Nor can a thing be neither Perceptible nor Imperceptible;

"aṇīyasāpi nāṃśena miśrībhūtāparātmak"amityetat samarthanārthaṃ codyopakramapūrvakam āha nanvityādi /

It might be urged that “the other Means of Cognition bring about the Cognition of the thing concerned after it has been envisaged by Perception”; the answer to that is that ‘it would be futile’;

nanvanekātmakaṃ vastu yathā mecakaratnavat /

as, in that case it would be like any perceptible thing and would cease to be imperceptible.

prakṛtyaiva sadādīnāṃ ko virodhas tathā sati //

if then, it were to produce cognitions directly, how could it be called ‘Imperceptible’?

yaduktam

End of Chapter XIX.

"arthakriyāsamarthaṃ ca sadanyadasaducyate / samāveśo na caikatra tayor yukto virodhataḥ" //

It has been asserted (under Text 1675, above) that ‘What is capable of effective action is said to be existent, other than that is said to be nonexistent, the two cannot exist together in the same substratum, as they are contradictory’,

iti / tadatrāhrīkādayaścodayanti /

Against this, Āhrīka (a Jaina writer) and others urge the following objections:

sarvam eva vastu sāmānyaviśeṣātmakatvenānekātmakaṃ, yathā śabalābhāsaṃ

“Every entity has more than one aspect^ the General and the Particular; just like the lustrous gem which appears to be of variegated colour;

ratnaṃ, tat kathaṃ sadādīnāṃ virodhaḥ, yenocyate "samāveśo na caikatre"ti / ādiśabdena kriyākriyaikatvādayo gṛhyante /

why then should there be any contradiction (incompatibility) between existence and non-existence, in view of which it is said that ‘the two cannot coexist in the same substratum’? The term ‘ādi’ in ‘sadādi’ is meant to include ‘activity and inactivity’, ‘unity’ and so forth”.

yadyapi cedaṃ [p.487] codyaṃ nanu tadevetyādinā parihṛtaṃ, tathāpi vistareṇa pratipādanāya vādāntaraṃ vā darśayituṃ punar ucyate //

Though this objection has been already refuted under Text 1676. by the sentence ‘Nanu tadetaddhi, etc.’, yet it has been introduced here for the purpose of expounding the matter in detail, or for setting forth a fresh theory.

tatra sāmānyaviśeṣātmakatvasādhanāya yathākramamahrīkaḥ prayogadvayamāha bhāva iti /

why then should there be any contradiction (incompatibility) between existence and non-existence, in view of which it is said that ‘the two cannot coexist in the same substratum’? The term ‘ādi’ in ‘sadādi’ is meant to include ‘activity and inactivity’, ‘unity’ and so forth”.

bhāvo bhāvāntarātulyaḥ khapuṣpān na viśiṣyate /

“If an entity were not-equal to (entirely different from) other entities, then it would not differ from the ‘sky-flower’.

atulyatvavihīnaścet tebhyo bhinno na siddhyati //

On the other hand, if it were entirely devoid of non-equality (difference), then it could not be regarded as anything different from those things (1710)

kiñcid vivakṣitaṃ vastu ghaṭādi, sa yadi ghaṭādir bhāvaḥ paṭādinā bhāvāntareṇātulyaḥ syāt tato yadi vyāvṛttaḥ syāt, tadā khapuṣpān na tasya viśeṣaḥ syāt, sarvathā vastvantarād vyāvṛttatvāt, naca vastvantarād vyāvṛttasyānyā gatiḥ sambhavati khapuṣpatāṃ muktvā /

“If a certain thing spoken of the Jar, for instance, were not-equal to (i.e. different from) all other things, such as the Cloth and the like, i.e. if it were always excluded (differentiated) from these, then there would be no difference between the Jar and the ‘Sky-flower’; as it would be always differentiated from all other things; and a thing that is always differentiated from all other things can have no other state save that of the ‘sky-flower’, Consequently, one who is not willing to admit the equality of that thing to the ‘sky-flower’, must admit that it is equal (similar) to other entities, in being an entity;

tasmāt tasya vastunaḥ khapuṣpātulyatvam abhyupagacchatā bhāvāntaratulyatvaṃvastutvaṃ nāma sāmānyamabhyupagantavyam iti siddhaṃ sāmānyātmakatvam /

hence this general character (commonalty), in the shape of the universal ‘entity’, has to be admitted.

viśeṣātmakatvaṃ tarhi katham iti cedatrocyate atulyatvavihīnaścet tebhyo bhinno na siddhyati sa eva ghaṭādibhāvo yadi paṭādinā bhāvena yadatulyatvaṃṭena vihīnaḥ syāt, tena ghaṭādinā yadyatulyo na bhaved iti yāvat /

It may be asked “In what way then is there the Particular?” The answer is ‘If it were entirely devoid of non-equality, then it could not be regarded as different from those things. If that same entity, Jar, were devoid of non-equality to other things like the Cloth, i.e. if it were not non-equal to them, then the Jar could not be regarded as any thing different from the Cloth, etc., in the form ‘This is Jar, that is Cloth’;

bhidyate ca /

just like the specific individuality of things;

tasmād viśeṣātmakatvam api siddham //

hence it becomes established that it has the Particular character also.

vastuno hi nivṛttasya kvānyā sambhavinī gatiḥ /

“If the intended entity is entirely not-equal to other things, then it ceases to be an entity;

lakṣyate nāstitāṃ muktvā tārāpathasarojavat // tasmāt khapuṣpātulyatvam icchatā tasya vastunaḥ / vastutvaṃ nāma sāmānyameṣṭavyaṃ tat samānatā //

for that which is excluded from ‘entity’, where could there be any other position, except non-existence, as in the case of the ‘sky-flower’? Thus then, one who wishes the entity to be not-equal to the ‘sky-flower’ must accept the universal ‘entity’ as the character common to all entities (1711-1713)

anyathā hi na sā buddhirityādinā sāmānyātmakatvasādhanāyopapattyantaramāha anyathā hi na sā buddhir balibhugdaśanādiṣu / vartate niyatā tveṣā bhāveṣveveti kiṃ kṛtam //

“If it were not as asserted, then, to what would this fact be due that the common notion of ‘entity’ does not appear in connection with the ‘crow’s teeth’, while it always appears as restricted to entities alone? If it be urged that the said restriction is due to similarity’, then our answer is that, that same (similarity) is what we call ‘commonalty’.

sārūpyānniyamo 'yaṃ cet sāmānyaṃ ca tadeva naḥ /

This same remark applies also to the view that ‘the said restriction is due to a certain capacity in the nature of things’.

atyantabhinnatā tasmād ghaṭate naiva kasyacit / sarvaṃ hi vasturūpeṇa bhidyate na parasparam //

Absolute difference (from other entities) therefore is not possible for any entity; because entities do not differ from each other, on the point of being ‘entities’.” (1714-1716)

yadi ca bhāvo bhāvāntarātulyaḥ syāt tadā kimiti ghaṭādiṣveva bhāvo bhāva ityabhinnā buddhir bhavati natu kākadantādiṣviti tatra kāraṇaṃ vaktavyam sārūpyaṃ kāraṇam iti cet tadeva tarhi sāmānyam iti siddhaṃ, sāmānyaparyāyatvāt sārūpyasya /

‘If it were not, etc. etc.’ If an entity were ‘not-equal’ to different from every other entity, then how is it that the common idea of ‘being an entity’ is found to appear only in connection with the Jar and such things, and not in connection with the ‘crow’s teeth’ (and other non-entities)? The basis for this has to be explained. It might be urged that ‘the basis for this lies in the similarity (among entities)’. Then it becomes established that- that same Similarity is the ‘Commonalty’, the Common character;

anuyāyinī śaktir asti ghaṭādiṣveva, na kākadantādiṣu, ataḥ svabhāvānugatāśaktiḥ kāraṇam iti cet /

It might be explained that ‘the said comprehensive potency subsists in the Jar and other entities only, and not in the Crow’s Teeth and such non-entities; hence ‘the capacity of the nature of things’ is what forms the basis of the notion in question’.

sāyanenaiva sārūpyeṇopavarṇitā vyākhyātā / sārūpyavadatrāpi samānam uttaram iti yāvat / tasyā eva sāmānyarūpatvaprasaṅgāt /

This view also is dispensed with by what has been just explained; i.e. the answer to this is the same as that to the view regarding ‘Similarity’; because the said capacity may be regarded as the required ‘Commonalty’.

tasmād vasturūpeṇa sarvaṃ ghaṭādi parasparamabhinnam iti siddham //

From all this it follows that, in the form of ‘entities’, all things the Jar and the rest are not-different from one another.

avadhīkṛtavastubhyo vairūpyarahitaṃ yadi / tadvastu na bhaved bhinnaṃ tebhyo 'bhedas tadātmavat //

“If the said entity were entirely devoid of dissimilarity from the other standard entities, then that entity would not be different from these; there would be complete non-difference, as from their own selves.

tebhyaḥ svarūpaṃ bhinnaṃ hi vairūpyamabhidhīyate /

what is called ‘dissimilarity’ is only a form different from those;

vairūpyaṃ na ca bhinnaṃ cetyetadanyonyabādhitam //

hence the idea that ‘there is no dissimilarity, and yet the thing is different’ would involve a self-contradiction.

tasmād bhinnatvam arthānāṃ kathañcidupagacchatā / vairūpyamupagantavyaṃ viśeṣātmakatāpyataḥ //

Consequently, when one has to accept some sort of difference among things, he has to accept ‘dissimilarity’ also, and thence also the ‘particular’ character of things.” (1717-1719)

paṭādibhyo 'rthāntarebhyo yadi ghaṭādi vairūpyeṇa rahitaṃ bhavet tadābhedāt tebhyaḥ paṭādibhyas tadghaṭādi bhinnaṃ na bhaved ātmasvarūpavad abhinnatvaprasaṅgāt /

‘Standard, entities’ the Cloth and the rest (to which the Jar is being compared). If the Jar were entirely devoid of dissimilarity to these other things Cloth, etc. then, there being no difference between them, the Jar could not be any thing different from those things; as it would be non-different from it, like the form of its own self.

tathā hi tebhyaḥ paṭādibhyo yadvibhinnaṃ svarūpaṃ ghaṭādīnāṃ tadeva khaluvairūpyam ucyate nānyat /

For instance, what is called ‘dissimilarity’ is only that form of the Jar which is different from the Cloth,.

tataś ca satyapi vairūpye paṭādīnāṃ naca ghaṭādibhyo bhedo 'stīti svavacanavyāhatiḥ, bhedavairūpyayoḥ paryāyatvāt //

nothing apart from that form; hence to say that ‘there is dissimilarity' in the Cloth, etc., and yet there is no difference from the Jar’, would involve self-contradiction; as ‘difference’ and ‘dissimilarity’ are synonymous terms.

vastvekātmakamevedam anekākāramiṣyate /

“The entity itself is only one in essence, but is regarded as having several aspects;

te cānuvṛttivyāvṛttibuddhigrāhyatayā sthitāḥ //

and these aspects are there in the form of being apprehended by inclusive and exclusive cognitions;

ādyā ete 'nuvṛttatvāt sāmānyam iti kīrtitāḥ / viśeṣāstvabhidhīyante vyāvṛttatvāt tato 'pare //

the former ones, being inclusive, are spoken of as ‘common’ (universal, general), while the latter, being exclusive, are called ‘particular’.

[p.489] ayam atra paramārthaḥ mecakaratnavad ekam eva vastvanekākāram, te cākārāḥkecid anuvṛttibuddhigrāhyāḥ kecid vyāvṛttibuddhigrāhyāḥ /

“The real truth of the matter is as follows: Like the gleaming Sapphire, every entity, while being one, has several aspects; of these aspects, some are apprehended by inclusive notions, and others by exclusive notions.

tatra ye 'nuvṛttibuddhigrāhyās te 'nuvṛttatayā sāmānyam iti kīrtyante, ye tutato 'pare vyāvṛttibuddhigrāhyās te vyāvṛttatvād viśeṣā iti kalpyante, tatrānuvṛttibuddhir bhāvo bhāva ityādyabhedākārā, vyāvṛttibuddhir ghaṭo 'yaṃna paṭa ityevamādibhedākārā //

Those that are apprehended by inclusive notions are inclusive and hence spoken of as ‘Common’, while others, which are apprehended by inclusive notions, are exclusive and hence said to be ‘Particular’. The inclusive notion appears in the one non-distinctive form of ‘Entity’;

tadatra pratividhatte parasparasvabhāvatva ityādi /

while the exclusive notion appears in the distinctive form ‘this in jar, not Cloth’.” (1720-1721)

parasparasvabhāvatve syāt sāmānyaviśeṣayoḥ /

If the ‘general’ and the ‘particular’ were of the nature of each other, commingling and confusion would be inevitable;

sāṅkaryaṃ tattvato nedaṃ dvairūpyam upapadyate //

hence it cannot be possible that every entity has two aspects.

parasparāsvabhāvatve 'pyanayor anuṣajyate / nānātvamevambhāve 'pi dvairūpyaṃ nopapadyate //

If they are not of the nature of each other, then they are diverse (two distinct things), and hence it does not follow that there are ‘two aspects’ (of a single entity).

atra pakṣadvayam, kiṃ yadeva sāmānyaṃ sa eva viśeṣaḥ, āhosvid anyat sāmānyamanyo viśeṣa iti /

There are two alternatives possible: (1) The ‘General’ is the same as the ‘Particular’ and (2) The ‘General’ is something different from the ‘Particular’.

tatra prathame pakṣe sāmānyaviśeṣayoḥ parasparasvabhāvatve sāṅkaryaṃ syāt /

In the former case, the Particular and the General being of the nature of one another, there would be commingling and confusion;

tataścedaṃ sāmānyam ayaṃ viśeṣa iti vibhāgābhāvāt paramārthata ekasya vastuno dvairūpyaṃ nopapadyate /

the result of which would be that it could not be discerned that ‘this is General and that is Particular’; which means that there cannot be two aspects of the same entity.

tatra parasparāsvabhāvatve 'pyaṅgīkriyamāṇe nānātvam svabhāvabhedaḥ sāmānyaviśeṣayoḥ samprasajyate /

If, in order to avoid the confusion, the latter alternative is accepted, even so, the two being regarded as not of the nature of each other, there would be ‘diversity’ difference of nature between the General, and the Particular;

evaṃ hyanayor asāṃkaryaṃ bhaved yadyanayor nānātvaṃ syāt, tataścaivambhāve 'pi nānātve 'pi vastudvayam eva kevalaṃ jātam iti naikasya vastuno dvairūpyaṃ yuktam /

thus there would be no confusion between the two, only if the two were entirely different; but even so, even when the two are different, there are two things, and not two aspects of one thing.

athāpi syāt yadi nāma sāmānyaviśeṣayoḥ parasparaṃ svabhāvaviveko jātas tathāpi sāmānyaviśeṣātmakaṃ vastvabhinnameveti /

The following might be urged Even when there has come about a difference in the nature of the General and the Particular, the entity that exists in the form of the General and the Particular is one and the same”.

tadetat tu parasparaviruddham /

This however will be a contradiction in terms.

tathā hi ekasmād vastunaḥ sāmānyaviśeṣayor abhede 'ṅgīkriyamāṇe katham anayoḥ parasparaṃ svabhāvavivekaḥ siddhyet, ekasmād abhede tayor abhedaprasaṅgād ekavastusvabhāvavat / sāmānyaviśeṣayoś ca parasparaṃ svabhāvaviveke 'ṅgīkriyamāṇe tābhyām abhinnam ekaṃ vastu na siddhyet tābhyām abhinnatvāt tasyāpyekatvenābhimatasya

For instance, if the General and the Particular are regarded as non-different from one and the same thing, how could there be any difference in the nature of those two themselves? Being non-different from one and the same thing, they must be non-different from one another, like the nature of any single entity. When however the difference between the nature of the General and that of the Particular is accepted, there could not be any single thing that would be non-different from those two;

dvitvaprasaṅgāt sāmānyaviśeṣasvarūpavat /

because being non-different from the two, what is meant to be one would have to be regarded as two, like the form of the General and the form of the Particular.

tasmād ekamubhayātmakam iti parasparavyahatam etat //

From all this it follows that the assertion that “every entity has two aspects” involves self-contradiction.

satyapyekasvabhāvatve dharmabhedo 'tra sidhyati /

“Though the entity may be of one nature only, yet it can have different properties;

bhedasaṃsthā{ '}virodhaś ca yathā kārakaśaktiṣu //

there could be no incongruity in the presence of different states (of the same thing); which is found, for example, in the case of the potencies of the active agencies;

na dṛṣṭe 'nupapannaṃ ca yat sāmānyaviśeṣayoḥ / aikātmye 'pīkṣyate bhedalokayātrānuvartanam //

nor can there be any incongruity in what is actually seen; and it is actually seen that even though the general and the particular are aspects of one and the same thing, yet in actual practical life there is difference between them.” (1724-1725)

sa hi codyopakrame parihāraṃ kilātrāha tat sāmānyaviśeṣayoḥ parasparasvabhāvavirahānabhyupagame saṅkīrṇatā prāpnoti /

Sumati has offered the following explanation in connection with the objection urged against the Jaina doctrine: “It has been urged that if the General and the Particular were not regarded as different, there would be confusion.

naiṣa doṣaḥ /

But this does not affect the case at all.

tayor ekasvabhāvatayā satyām api saṅkīrṇatāyāṃ dharmabhedaḥ prasiddhyati kārakaśaktivat /

Though, by reason of their being of the same nature there may be confusion, there can be difference in their properties, as is found to be the case with the potencies of Active Agencies.

tathā hi balāhako vidyotate, balāhakād vidyotata, ityādikāryabhedād bhidyamānātmānaḥ kāraṇaśaktayaḥ samupalabhyante dravyasvabhāvāvyatiriktatayā

For instance, there are such expressions as ‘Balāhako vidyotate’, ‘The Cloud flashes’ (where the Cloud appears as the active Agent), and ‘Balāhakādvidyotate’, ‘flashes from the Clouds’ (where the Cloud appears as the Source, the Ablative); in such cases we find the potencies of the active agencies varying through the diversity of their effects;

saṅkīrṇatāyām api satyām /

even though they being all of the nature of ‘substance’ there is a certain amount of confusion.

tadanabhyupagame lokaśāstravirodho 'vaśyambhāvī /

If this is not admitted., that would be quite contrary to common experience as well as scientific (Grammatical) principles.

api ca na hi dṛṣṭe 'nupapannaṃ nāma /

Then again, there can be no incongruity urged against what is actually seen.

tathā hi sāmānyaviśeṣayor ekavastusvabhāvatve 'pyasaṅkīrṇatāyā bhede 'pi lokayātrānuvartanam upalabhyata eva /

For instance, in the case of the General and the Particular, though they are aspects of one and the same thing, and are quite distinct and never confounded, yet, all practical business is actually found to be carried on on the basis of their difference.

bhedena lokayātrā bhedalokayātrā, sānuvartyate yenaikātmyena tat tathoktam /

The compound ‘bhedalokayātrā’ is to be expounded as ‘Practical business on the basis of difference’; and this is carried On, though the entity is one only embracing both the aspects.

prayogaḥ ekasya vastuno yo bhedavyavahāraḥ sa dharmabhedanibandhanaḥ, yathā kārakaśaktiṣu, bhedavyavahāraścāyam ekasmin vastuni sāmānyaviśeṣalakṣaṇa iti svabhāvahetuḥ //

The argument may be formulated as follows: When any one thing is treated as diverse, it is on the basis of the diversity of its properties, as in the case of the Potencies of active agencies; the idea of the General and Particular being aspects of one and the same thing involves treatment of the thing as diverse; tins is a Reason based upon the nature of things, (1724-1725)

nanvityādinā pratividhatte /

The above argument is answered in the following: [see verse 1726 next]

nanu satyekarūpatve dharmabhedo na siddhyati /

In fact, if the thing has only one form, it cannot have diverse properties;

akalpito vibhedo hi nānātvam abhidhīyate //

a diversity that is not a creation of fancy is what is called ‘plurality’.

anena hetor viruddhatām āha iṣṭaviparītasādhanāt /

This shows that the Reason adduced by the Jaina is ‘contradictory’;

tathā hi pāramārthiko dharmabhedo vādinaḥ sādhayitum iṣṭaḥ, sa cākalpito dharmabhedo na siddhyati, vastuna ekatvābhyupagamāt, tasya caikasya vastuno bhedavirodhāt, yato bheda iti nānātvam abhidhīyate, yac ca nānā tat katham ekaṃsyāt //

inasmuch as it proves the contrary of what is intended to be proved. For instance, what the other party intends to prove is real diversity of properties; but no such ‘diversity of properties’, which is not a creation of fancy is proved by the Reason adduced; as ‘one-ness’ of the thing itself is admitted; and what is one entity cannot be compatible with Diversity;

dṛṣṭānte na kevalaṃ sādhyaśūnyatā, api tu sādhyaviparyayeṇa hetur vyāpta

The Corroborative Instance that has been cited (by the Jaina writer) is ‘devoid of the Probandum’, and the Probans also is one that is concomitant with the contrary of the Probandum.

iti darśayannāha nānātmatvam ityādi /

This is what is shown in the following [see verse 1727 next]

nānātmatvaṃ ca śaktīnāṃ vivakṣāmātranirmitam /

As regards the potencies, their diversity is merely a creation of the speaker’s ‘desire to speak’;

ekatattvātmakatve hi na bhedo 'trāpi yuktimān //

here also no diversity can be reasonable in what is essentially one.

syād etat yadyapi bheda iti nānātvam abhidhīyate, tadeva nānātvam ekasyavastuno bhāvikaṃ kathaṃ viruddhaṃ, yena tadviparītaṃ sādhayad viruddhaṃ bhavedityāha ekam

The following might be urged (by the other party): “Even though Diversity is what is called ‘Plurality’, why should such real Plurality of a single entity be incompatible, by virtue of which the Reason is said to be ‘contradictory’, as proving the contrary of the desired conclusion?”

ityādi /

The answer to this is as follows: [see verses 1728-1729 next]

ekam ity ucyate taddhi yat tadeveti gīyate /

Things are said to be ‘one’ when it is said ‘this is that’;

nānātmakaṃ tu tannāma na tadbhavati yatpunaḥ // [p.491] tadbhāvaścāpyatadbhāvaḥ parasparavirodhataḥ / ekavastuni naivāyaṃ kathañcidavakalpyate //

whereas they are said to be ‘diverse’ when it is said ‘this is not that being that and not being that thus being mutually contradictory, cannot, in any way, be attributed to any one entity. When it is stated categorically that ‘this is that’, t hen the things are said to be ‘one’;

yattadetad iti tattvena vidhīyate tadekamity ucyate, yathā caitanyapuruṣayoḥ /

On the other hand, when the identity between things is denied, they are said to be ‘diverse, different’;

vastunaḥ satas tattvaniṣedhe nānātvaṃ, yathā bhūtacaitanyayoḥ /

as in the ease of Matter and Consciousness.

tataś ca vidhipratiṣedhayor ekatrāyogāt tadbhāvalakṣaṇāt tadbhāvalakṣaṇayorekatvanānātvayoḥ parasparavirodha iti kalpita evaikasya dharmabhedaḥ //

As it is impossible for both affirmation and denial to pertain to any one thing, there is clear contradiction between ‘Unity’ and ‘Plurality’, which are based respectively upon the said identity and difference. Hence any diversity of properties of a single entity can be only a creation of fancy.

vidhānapratiṣedhau hi parasparavirodhinau /

Affirmation and denial are mutually contradictory;

śakyāvekatra no kartuṃ kenacit svasthacetasā //

and they cannot be made by any sane-minded person, in regard to one and the same thing.

nibandhanena bhāvyam, anyathā vastusaṅkaryaṃ syāt /

Question “Why should there be contradiction between Identity and Difference (Affirmation and Denial)?”

tataś ca yattadbhinnaṃ nibandhanaṃ sa eva ca pāramārthikaṃ dharmabhedo 'smākamityāha sajātīyetyādi /

When an entity, excluded from several like and unlike things, is differentiated from this and that, that is called ‘the diversity of properties’.

ekasyāpi tato yuktā kalpitāsaṅkhyarūpatā /

In this way even a single thing may be assumed to have numberless diverse forms;

vāstavaṃ naikabhāvasya dvairūpyam api saṅgatam //

but in reality, no single thing can reasonably have two forms.

sajātīyavijātīyaṃ ca tadanekaṃ ceti karmadhārayaḥ, tasmād vyāvṛttaṃ ca tad vastu ceti vigrahaḥ.

The compound ‘sajātīya, etc. etc.’ is to be expounded as there is first a karmadhāraya compound between ‘like and unlike’ and ‘several’; and from these the entity is ‘excluded’.

tasyaikasya vastunaḥ, tatas tataḥ sajātīyādvijātīyāc ca, yā parāvṛttiḥ sā dharmabhedavyavasthāyā nibandhanam /

When such a single entity is differentiated from this and that, like and unlike thing this is what forms the basis of the idea of the ‘diversity of properties’.

tasmād yataḥ kalpitāpyanekatā sambhavati, tasmād vāstavaṃ dvairūpyam ekasya na saṅgatam /

Thus, inasmuch as there can be an assumed ‘Plurality’, there can be no reason for postulating a real, duality of form for any single thing.

apiśabdena sāmānyena dharmabhedapūrvakatvamātre sādhye siddhasādhyatām api sūcayati //

The particle ‘api’ implies that there would be ‘superfluity’ in the Jaina writer’s argument if what were meant to be proved were the mere fact of the thing having in a general way, a diversity of properties.

narasiṃhādayo ye hi dvairūpyeṇopavarṇitāḥ / teṣām api dvirūpatvaṃ bhāvikaṃ naiva vidyate //

Such entities as Narasiṃha and others which have been described as having dual characters, in their case also the dual character is not real.