buddhist-nlp/tatpa-noisy · Datasets at Hugging Face

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arthajñānād anyathānupapannādity arthaḥ /	and ‘cognition of the thing’ means that cognition which can be explained otherwise than on the basis of the said Presumption;
anumīyate pramīyata iti yāvat /	‘inferred’ stands for definitely cognised.
evaṃ tarhi sāpyarthāpattirjñānātmiketi tasyā api kuto gatir iti vaktavyam /	In that case, as this Presumption also would be a Cognition, it has to be explained how it is itself cognised.
anyasyā arthāpatter iti cedevaṃ satyanavasthā syāt /	If the answer be that “it is cognised through another Presumption”, then, there would be an infinite regress.
kiṃ ca yadi vastutvamabhāvasyābhyupagamyate tadā yathā pramāṇābhāvo vastu tathā prameyābhāvo 'pīti, tataścābhāvo vastutvāt pratyakṣa eva kimiti nābhyupagamyate /	Then again, if the idea of Negation being an entity is admitted, then, just as the ‘negation of the Means of Cognition’ is an entity, the ‘negation of the object cognised’ also should be an entity; and in that ease, being an entity, why cannot Negation be regarded as cognised through Perception itself? In that case there would be no need for postulating a distinct Means of Cognition for the Cognition of Negation.
yena tadadhigataye 'nyatpramāṇāntaramabhāvākhyaṃ parikalpyeta //	The following Text supports the same idea of Negation being included under Perception: [see verse 1671 above]
kāryādīnām ityādinā pratyakṣāntargatatvam eva samarthayate / kāryādīnām abhāvo hi bhāvo yaḥ kāraṇādinā /	It has been declared (by Kumārila himself, see Text 1655 above) that ‘The Negation of the effect consists in the presence of the Cause’; and this ‘presence of the Cause’ is of a nature character distinct from the Effect;
sa cāparaviviktātmā pratyakṣeṇaiva gamyate //	and it is apprehended by Perception itself;
tathācoktam kāryādīnām abhāvo hi bhāvo yaḥ karaṇādineti, sa ca kāraṇāder bhāvo 'paraviviktātmā kāryādiviviktasvabhāvaḥ, pratyakṣa eveti kimabhāvasyāparaṃ prameyam asti yena pramāṇāntaraṃ syāt /	so that what other aspect of ‘Negation’ is left to be cognised, for the sake of which Negation would be a distinct Means of Cognition This argument may be formulated as follows: When one Means of Cognition has no cognisable object other than that of another Means of Cognition, then it cannot be a distinct Means of Cognition;
yathā saptamaṃ pramāṇaṃ, nāsti ca prameyaṃ pratyakṣam aprameyād vyatiriktamabhāvasyeti vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ //	e.g. a seventh Means of Cognition, ‘Negation’ has no cognisable object apart from what is cognised by Perception; hence the assumption of such a distinct Means of Cognition would be failing in the fulfilment of the wider condition.
atra paro hetvasiddhim udbhāvayann āha svarūpetyādi /	The Opponent urges the ‘inadmissibility’ of the Reason adduced in this argument [see verses 1672-1673 next]
vastuni jñāyate kiñcid rūpaṃ kaiścit kadācana //	“There would have been no object left to be cognised by Negation if objects had only one aspect;
syāt prameyābhāvo yadyekātmakam eva vastu syāt, yāvatā svarūpaparūpābhyāṃ yathākramaṃ sadasadātmatvenobhayātmakaṃ vastu, tasminnubhayātmake vastuni sthite, kiñcid rūpam svabhāvaḥ, kaiścitpramāṇair jñāyate, na sarvaṃ sarvaiḥ /	as a matter of fact, however, objects have two aspects they are existent (positive) in their own form, and non-existent (negative) in the form of other things; there thus being two aspects of every object, there is only a certain aspect of it that is cognised through a certain Means, all aspects are not cognised by all Means of Cognition.
etad eva darśayati pratyakṣetyādi / bhāvāṃśo yadā gṛhyate tadā pratyakṣādīnāṃ pañcānāṃ vyāpāro nābhāvasya, abhāvāṃśe grahītum iṣṭe, tadanutpatter vyāpāraḥ teṣāṃ pratyakṣādīnām anutpatter abhāvasyeti yāvat //	“This same idea is further explained ‘It is only when the Positive aspect, etc. etc.’ When the Positive aspect of the Object is apprehended, then there is the operation of the five Means of Cognition, Perception and the rest, and not of Negation;
syād asiddhatāṃ hetor yadyekasyobhayātmakatvaṃ syāt, yāvatā viruddhamekasyobhayātmakatvam iti pratipādayann āha svarūpam evetyādi /	when however it is the Negative aspect that is meant to be apprehended, then there is operation of the ‘non-appearance of Perception, etc.’, i.e. of ‘Negation’.” (1672-1673) Our Reason would have been ‘inadmissible’ if one and the same thing had both (positive and negative) characters;
svarūpam eva vastūnāṃ nanu vyāvṛttam iṣyate /	as a matter of fact however the presence of two characters in the same object is incongruous.
tenātmanā sadetac ca pratyakṣamamunātmanā //	This is what is shown in the following [see verse 1674 above]
nahi pararūpeṇa vastu vastvantarād vyāvṛttaṃ, kiṃ tarhisvarūpeṇa ataś ca	When the thing is ‘differentiated’ from another thing, it is not in any other form;
svarūpam eva svabhāva eva vastūnāṃ vastvantarād vyāvṛttam upalabhyate /	in fact it is differentiated in its own form; hence it is the form of the thing itself which is apprehended as differentiated from the other thing;
svasvabhāvāvasthānāt /	as it remains in its own form.
yena cātmanā vyāvṛttaṃ, tena tad vastu sadeva nāsat /	That form in which it is differentiated, in that form, the Thing is always existent, never non-existent.
arthakriyāsamarthaṃ ca sadanyadasaducyate /	This thing is perceived in the form in which it is differentiated from other things;
svasādhyāyāṃ samarthaṃ cedanyasyāmakṣamaṃ nanu / tadetaddhi dvirūpatvaṃ naivaikatrāsti vastuni //	so that there is no apprehension of any second form or aspect of that thing. It has thus been shown that the postulating of the two forms (aspects) of things is incompatible with Perception;
anyadevāsamarthaṃ tu yadyanyasyāmitīṣyate /	the following Texts show that it is incompatible with Inference: [see verse 1675-1677 above]
yadarthakriyākāri tat sat, yathā sattvenābhimataṃ rūpaṃ, a{na}}rthakriyākāri cāsattvenābhimataṃ rūpam iti svabhāvahetuḥ /	(A) That which is capable of effective action is ‘existent’, for example that aspect of the thing winch is regarded as ‘existent’; and what is held to be ‘non-existent’ is not capable of effective action; hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.
yau ca parasparaviruddhau na tayor ekasmin vastuni yugapad upalayanaṃ, yathā chāyātapayoḥ śītoṣṇayor vā, parasparaviruddhe ca sadasadrūpe, iti [p.478] vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhiḥ /	(B) Things that are mutually contradictory can never coexist in the same thing, e.g. Light and Shade, or Heat and Cold, the existent and nonexistent aspects are mutually contradictory; so the idea that they coexist is contrary to a universal proposition.
svasādhyāyām ityādinā paro hetor asiddhimudbhāvayati /	The Opponent urges the objection that the Reason adduced is ‘inadmissible’ “The same thing, etc. etc.
tathā hi tadevaikaṃ vastu svasādhyāyām arthakriyāyāṃ samartham, anyasādhyāyāṃ tvasamarthaṃ tataścārthakriyākāritvalakṣaṇo hetur asiddhaḥ / nahi parasādhyām arthakriyām apekṣyārthakriyākāritvaṃ vastunaḥ siddham /	That is to say, one and the same thing is capable of the effective action which can be accomplished by itself, and also incapable of that effective action which can he accomplished by others; hence the Probans based upon the capability for effective action cannot be admissible; because the tiring is not admitted as capable of efficient action, in regard to such action as can be accomplished by others.
naca sadasadrūpayoḥ parasparavirodhaḥ, apekṣābhedāt /	Nor is there any contradiction between ‘existence’ and ‘non-existence’, as the two are in reference to distinct aspects of the thing;
tathā hi svasādhyāmevāpekṣyāsaducyete, syāt parasparavirodhaḥ /	for instance, the thing is called ‘existent’ in reference to such effective action as can be accomplished by itself, and that same thing not another is called ‘non-existent’, in reference to such action as can be accomplished by others;
atra parihāram āha nanu tadeveti /	The answer to this is as follows ‘As a matter of fact, etc. etc’;
yadeva svasādhyāyāṃ samarthaṃ vastusvarūpaṃ tadeva parasādhyāyām asamarthaṃ nānyat /	That same thing -which is ‘capable’ of the action that can be accomplished by itself, is ‘incapable’ of that which can be accomplished by others; and it is not any other thing.
nahyapekṣābhedena śabdabhedād vastu bhidyate /	Things do not differ through difference in their relatives or through difference in words;
niraṃśastvāt tasya /	because the thing is impartite.
taditi / tasmād arthe tat / tasmāt naikatra dvirūpatvam asti /	‘Tat’ stands for ‘tasmāt’, ‘for these reasons For these reasons, the dual character can never belong to the same thing.
athānyadeva rūpam anyasādhyāyām arthakriyāyām asamarthaṃ natu tadevetyāha anyadeveti /	If it be held that “the aspect that is incapable of such action as can be accomplished by others is different from that which is capable of effective action”. This is what is introduced by the words ‘If it is something else, etc. etc.’.
evaṃ tarhi yadarthakriyāsamarthaṃ tadekaṃ vastu, yaccāsamarthaṃ taddvitīyam iti vastudvayam eva kevalaṃ bhavatā pratipāditam, natvekasyobhayātmatvam //	The answer to this is that there are two things; that which is capable of effective action is one thing, and that which is incapable is the second thing; so that in saying what you have said, you have asserted the existence of two things, and not the dual aspect of one and the same thing, (1675-1677)
pramāṇanivṛttimātrātmake tṛtīye 'bhāvalakṣaṇe dūṣaṇam āha abhāvasyetyādi /	The following text points out defects in the third definition of ‘Negation’ put forward that it consists merely in the absence of Means of Cognition: [see verse 1678 above]
pūrvamaṅgīkṛta iti / sātmano 'pariṇāmo vā vijñānaṃ vānyavastunīti vacanāt /	‘Previously accepted’ in the assertion that ‘Negation consists in the non-modification of the Soul or in the cognition of something else’ (Text 1649).
mānamapyevamiṣyatām iti vacanād viṣayādhigamalakṣaṇatvāt pramāṇasya na yuktaṃ nīrūpasya prāmāṇyam iti vakṣyamāṇo 'bhiprāyaḥ //	‘Featureless’, It has been asserted (by Kumārila, see under Text 1657) that “Just as the cognisable Object is negative, so should the Means of cognition also be understood to be”;
nīrūpasya hi vijñānarūpahānau pramāṇatā / na yujyate prameyasya sā hi saṃvittilakṣaṇā //	from which it is clear that the Means or Form of Cognition consists in the apprehension of the Object; hence it cannot be right to attribute the character of ‘Means or Form of Cognition’ to what is entirely featureless;
seti pramāṇatā /	this is what is meant;
yat prameyādhigatirūpaṃ na bhavati na tat pramāṇaṃ, yathā ghaṭādi, prameyādhigatiśūnyaścābhāva iti vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ //	‘This’ i.e. Means or Form of Cognition. That which, is not of the nature of the cognition of things cannot be a ‘Means or Form of Cognition’, e.g. the Jar and such things; and Negation is devoid of the nature of the cognition of things;
taddhetutvāt pramāṇaṃ ceccakṣurādivad ucyate /	hence there is nonapprehension of the wider character (which must mean the absence of the less wide character).
[p.479]	[verse 1680]:
jñānasvarūpaviviktaś ca so 'bhāvo gamyate katham / tadgocarapramābhāvād evaṃ tarhyanavasthitiḥ // vastvabhāvāt pramāṇasya pramābhāvāc ca vastunaḥ /	The following might be urged: “The Eye and the other organs are not of the nature of the cognition of things, and yet, as they serve as causes bringing about the cognition of things, they are called ‘Means of Cognition’;
nāstitā yadi gamyeta bhaved anyonyasaṃśrayaḥ //	the same would be the case with ‘Negation’ also; so that the Reason adduced is not true (Inconclusive)”.
tasmād ekasya yā dṛṣṭiḥ saivānyādṛṣṭirucyate /	This is the argument anticipated and answered in the following [see verse 1680 above]
na ca pramāṇahetutvād upacāreṇa kalpanā yuktā, yato nīrūpasya sarvasāmarthyavirahalakṣaṇatvān na hetutvasambhavo yuktaḥ /	It is not right to make assumptions on the basis of the figurative idea of being the ‘cause of cognition’; because what is entirely featureless and hence devoid of all capacity, cannot be rightly regarded as a Came.
sambhave vā nīrūpatāhāniprasaṅgāt /	If it were so regarded, it would cease to be featureless;
tasyāviśeṣāt tadbhāve vijñānānuparamaprasaṅgāc ca /	Then again, what is itself not known cannot bring about the Cognition of anything else;
kiṃ ca nāsiddhasya gamakatvaṃ yuktam atiprasaṅgād iti pūrvam uktam, sā ca tasyabhāvasya sidhiḥ kathamiti vaktavyaṃ, natātsvata ava tasya sidhiḥ, prame	this has been already explained; so it has to be explained in what way ‘Negation’ itself is known. It cannot be cognised by itself; as if it were so, then the negation, or absence, of the object also would be cognised by itself, and there would be no need for postulating a Means of Cognition in the shape of ‘Negation’;
yābhāvasyāpi svata eva siddhiprasaṅgāt / tataścābhāvakalpanā vyarthā syāt prameyābhāvasiddhyarthatvāt tasyāḥ tasya ca prameyābhāvasya pramāṇābhāvavatsvata eva siddhatvāt /	as this is meant only for the purpose of bringing about the cognition of the negation of the object, and this negation of the object will have been cognised by itself, like the negation of the Means of Cognition.
nāpi svasaṃvittyā tasya siddhiḥ yato jñānarūpavivikto 'sau kathaṃ svasaṃvittyā gamyeta / jñānātmana eva tayādhigamāt /	Nor can it be regarded as cognised by its own Cognition, because, ex hypothesis it is ‘devoid of the form of Cognition’; how then could it be cognised by its own Cognition? It is only what is of the nature of Cognition that can be so cognised.
athānyasmāt tadviṣayapramāṇābhāvāt tat siddhiḥ, tasyāpi tadviṣayasya pramāṇābhāvasya kathaṃ siddhiḥ/ tasyāpyanyataḥ siddhāvanavasthā syāt /	It might be argued that it could be known from another negation of the Means of Cognition bearing upon itself. But then there arises the question how is this latter Negation known? If it were held to be due to yet another Negation, then there would be an infinite regress.
yathoktam "anyathārthasya nāstitvaṃ gamyate 'nupalambhataḥ / upalambhasya nāstitvam anyenetyanavasthitiḥ" //	This has been thus declared: ‘Otherwise the non-existence of the Object is known through Non-apprehension, and the non-existence of the Apprehension is known by another Non-apprehension;
iti /	so there is an infinite regress’.
atha mā bhūd anavasthitiḥ prameyābhāvāt tasya siddhir abhyupagamyate /	In order to avoid this Infinite Regress, it may be held that the Cognition of Negation is due to the absence (Negation) of the Object.
evaṃ satītaretarāśrayatvaṃ prāpnoti /	But in that case there is mutual interdependence.
tathā hi vastunaḥ prameyasyābhāvāt pramāṇābhāvasiddhiḥ tasya siddhau ca prameyābhāvasiddhir iti sphuṭataramevātrāvataratītaretarāśrayadoṣaḥ /	For instance, the Negation of the Means of Cognition is cognised through the cognition of the Negation of the Object, and the negation of the Object is cognised through the Cognition of the negation of the Means of Cognition; thus the defect of mutual interdependence is quite clear.
tadayaṃ guḍapraveśe 'kṣatārāvinirgamaḥ /	Thus you are reduced to that condition where the thrust of the Javelin throws out the Eye-ball!
tasmād ekopalabdhirevānyasyānupalabdhir iti nābhāvo nāma pṛthakpramāṇaṃ pratyakṣāt /	From all this it follows that the Non-apprehension of one thing consists only in the apprehension of another thing, and ‘Negation’ need not be a Means of Cognition different from Perception.
syād etat sāpyekopalabdhiḥ kathaṃ siddhā tatrāpyabhāvavat samānaprasaṅgaityāha sā cetyādi /	The following might be urged: “How is that apprehension of one thing known? What has been urged against the Cognition of Negation would apply to that also”.
sā caikasya dṛṣṭiḥ svayam eva svatantrā siddhā nānyata iti nānavasthāprasaṅgaḥ /	The answer to this is that ‘the said Perception, etc. etc.’ That is, the Perception of the one thing becomes cognised by itself, not through anything else;
kasmāt/ svarūpeṇa prakṛtyaiva, ajaḍarūpatvāt prakāśasvabhāvatvāt /	“Why?” Because, by its very nature, in its own form, it is not-dark, i.e. it is of the nature of Light (which is self-luminous).
naca sattāmātreṇa saṃvittāvatiprasaṅgo 'nyeṣām atadrūpatvāt //	Nor would cognition through mere presence lead to incongruities, as nothing else (except Cognition) is of the nature of Light (i.e. self-luminous).
atha parato buddhisaṃsiddhau kaḥ pradveṣa ity āha buddher ityādi /	Question: “Why should there be this hostility towards the apprehension of Cognition through something else?” Answer: [see verses 1684-1686 next]
[p.480]	[verses 1684-1686]:
tulyayogyātmanas tasmād ekasyaivopalambhanāt /	(1) Some people hold that Cognition is cognisable through the Inferential Indicative;
kecilliṅgasamadhigamyāṃ buddhimicchanti, tacca liṅgamarthajñānaṃ vā kryārūpaṃ indriyārtho vā vyakto vā viṣaya ityādikam /	this Inferential Indicative being either in the form of the idea of a thing, or in that of an Action, or in that of a thing perceptible by the senses, or some manifest object, and so forth.
kecid buddhyantarapratyakṣaṃ buddhimicchanti, na svasaṃvidrūpāṃ, svātmani kāritva{karmatva---}virodhāt /	(2) Others hold that Cognition is perceived through another Cognition, and not self-cognised, because the operation of anything upon itself involves an incongruity.
kecijjñātārthānyathānupapattyā, jñāto 'rtho na siddhyati yadi buddhir na bhavet tasya svayaṃ jaḍarūpatvāt /	i.e. the idea of a thing being known would be inexplicable if the Cognition of the thing were not there, the Cognition itself being by its nature dull (non-intelligent, dark).
ataḥ pakṣatrayam uktam /	Thus these three theories have been put forward.
tasya liṅāditrayasya yaḥ pratyekaṃ paryanuyogaḥ, tasyāpi liṅgādeḥ kutaḥ siddhir iti, tasya sambhave sati bahvayo 'navasthitayaḥ prasarpanti / tathā hi tadapi liṅgāditrayaṃ buddher asiddhāvasiddham iti tasyāpi parataḥsiddhir anveṣṭavyā, tatrāpyaparaliṅgādisamāśrayaṇe sarvatra paryanuyoge cānavasthāprasaṅgaḥ /	Now there being a possibility of objections being brought up against each of these three theories relating to the Inferential Indicative and the rest, such as ‘How is the Inferential Indicative itself known?’, and so forth, there will be several Infinite Regresses creeping in: For instance, the Inferential Indicative and the rest could not be cognised until Cognition is cognised; hence its cognition should be sought for from somewhere else; and for that also, it would be necessary to have recourse to another Inferential Indicative and so forth. This same process being urged against each of the three theories, there would be an endless Infinite Regress.
tasmād ekasyopalambhād anyeṣām asattvaṃ pratīyate, taddeśakālasya niṣedhe	From all this, the right conclusion would be that the apprehension of one tiring brings about the Cognition of the non-existence of other things.
kartavye tulyayogyātmanām eva niṣedhaḥ kāryaḥ /	When one has to deny the time and place of things, the negation (denial) is made of the perceptible things themselves, as it is these latter that stand on the same footing as the thing that has been apprehended;
anyeṣāṃ tatra niṣeddhumaśakyatvāt /	it being impossible to deny anything else.
tādātmyaniṣedhe tu sarvasyaiva niṣedhaḥ kāryo dṛṣṭaḥ, tadanyatvena sarvasya	If sameness were denied, then all would be denied, as has been seen before; because all things become included under ‘what is not that thing which is apprehended’, according to the principle that ‘what is not the same as one thing is another thing (1684 1686)
vyavasthāpanāt /	[verse 1687]: Question:
nanu cākāśe candrābhāvaṃ yadādhyavasyati tadā naikasya tatropalambhaḥ, yenocyate ekopalambhād anyābhāvasiddhir iti, na hyākāśaṃ nāma kiñcit paramārthato 'sti, yaccandraviviktaṃ dṛśyeta /	[Says the Opponent] “When a man notices the absence of the Moon in the Ākāśa, there is no apprehension of any one thing, by virtue of which it could be said that from the apprehension of that one thing follows the apprehension of the non-existence of other things; specially as there is no such real thing as Ākāśa which could he apprehended as devoid of the Moon.
yadapi parair vastu satkalpitaṃ, tadapyatīndriyaṃ, yaś ca kvacit pradeśe śabdābhāvaniścayaḥ, sa kasyopalambhāt /	Even that Ākāśa which others have postulated as something real is beyond the reach of the senses. Then again, when at a certain place the absence of sound is noticed, from the apprehension of what one thing does that follow? It cannot be urged that it follows from the apprehension of the spot on the ground concerned;
na tāvad bhūbhāgopalambhād iti vaktavyam, tasya śabdenātulyayogyāvasthatvāt /	because the ground is not equal to the Sound as regards its perceptibility, because the ground is visible, while the Sound is audible;
tathā hi bhūbhāgaścākṣuṣaḥ, śabdas tu śrāvaṇaḥ, tulyayogyāvasthayośca parasparāpekṣamanyatvamiṣṭam, ekajñānasaṃsargiṇo 'parasparāpekṣamanyatvam iti vacanāt /	and what are meant to be mutually related in the present context are things that stand on the same footing regarding their perceptibility. This is clear from the assertion that ‘one thing is other than the other when both are related to the same cognition and yet are not dependent upon one another Nor can the cognition in question be said to proceed from the apprehension of Time;
nāpi kālasyopalambhād iti vācyam, nahi parā{dā---}rthavyatiriktaḥ kālo 'sti yasyopalambhaḥ syāt /	because there is no such category as ‘Time’ apart from the other categories, whose apprehension could be there.
yo 'pi parair iṣṭāṃśa{sso '}pyatīndriyaḥ //	The Time that is accepted by the other party is also something beyond the senses (1687)
prakāśetyādinā pratividhatte /	The answer to the above is as follows: [see verses 1688-1989 next]
rāśer iti /	‘Of the mass of Light and Shade’;
saṃvittāviti sambandhaḥ /	add ‘on the perception of’;
yasmāt tameva prakāśatamaso rāśimākāśam iti pratipattā pratipadyate, nānyat /	this same mass of Light and Shade is regarded by the observer as ‘Ākāśa’, nothing apart from that.
tathā hi divā niśi vedamindriyanīlasaṅkāśamidaṃ jaladharanikāśam iti vā pratipadyate /	For instance, during the day or night, the man perceives the ‘Ākāśa’ to he ‘like sapphire’ or ‘like the Cloud’;
na cākāśasya parikalpitasya varṇasaṃsthānādir asti /	and for the other party, the Ākāśa. has neither colour nor shape.
tato 'nyasyeti /	‘Anything apart from that’;
prakāśatamorāśivyatirekeṇa paraparikalpitasyākāśasyāsattvāt /	that is, anything like the Ākāśa postulated by the other party has no existence apart from the said Mass of Light and Shade;
sattvevātīndriyatvāt /	and if it does exist, it is not perceptible by the senses.
sarvaśabdaviveko 'pi śrotrajñānasya kāryasyānupalabdhyā gamyata /	As regards the absence of all sounds also, it is cognised through the non-apprehension of its effect in the shape of Auditory Cognition;
sā cānupalabdhir anyeṣāṃ cakṣurādijñānānāṃ saṃvedanāt siddhetyastyevātrāpyekopalambho 'nyavijñānasaṃvedanalakṣaṇaḥ /	and this non -apprehension is cognised through the apprehension of the Visual and other Cognitions; so that here also there is the apprehension of one thing, in the shape of the apprehension of these other Cognitions.
nanu nahi kāryasattayā kāraṇasattā vyāptā, yena sā kāryasattā nivartamānā tām api nivartayet /	Says the Opponent: “All cases of the existence of the Causes are not covered by the existence of the Effect, by virtue of which the existence of the Effect, on its cessation, would preclude the existence of the Cause also.
yato nāvaśyaṃ kāraṇāni varddhati{artavanti---} bhavanti /	That tins cannot be the case is due to the fact that Causes are not always effective (even though present).”
na brūmaḥ sarvā kāraṇasattā kāryasattayā vyāpteti kiṃ tarhi/	[Answer] We do not say that all cases of the existence of the Cause are covered by the existence of the Effect;
viśiṣṭaivāpratibaddhasāmarthyalakṣaṇā, tasyā evātra niṣedhaḥ kriyate, na sarvasyāḥ /	what we say is that particular cases of the existence of the Cause, whose effectiveness is never obstructed, are those that are meant to be excluded by the non-existence of the effect (auditory Perception), not the existence of all causes.

arthajñānād anyathānupapannādity arthaḥ /

and ‘cognition of the thing’ means that cognition which can be explained otherwise than on the basis of the said Presumption;

anumīyate pramīyata iti yāvat /

‘inferred’ stands for definitely cognised.

evaṃ tarhi sāpyarthāpattirjñānātmiketi tasyā api kuto gatir iti vaktavyam /

In that case, as this Presumption also would be a Cognition, it has to be explained how it is itself cognised.

anyasyā arthāpatter iti cedevaṃ satyanavasthā syāt /

If the answer be that “it is cognised through another Presumption”, then, there would be an infinite regress.

kiṃ ca yadi vastutvamabhāvasyābhyupagamyate tadā yathā pramāṇābhāvo vastu tathā prameyābhāvo 'pīti, tataścābhāvo vastutvāt pratyakṣa eva kimiti nābhyupagamyate /

Then again, if the idea of Negation being an entity is admitted, then, just as the ‘negation of the Means of Cognition’ is an entity, the ‘negation of the object cognised’ also should be an entity; and in that ease, being an entity, why cannot Negation be regarded as cognised through Perception itself? In that case there would be no need for postulating a distinct Means of Cognition for the Cognition of Negation.

yena tadadhigataye 'nyatpramāṇāntaramabhāvākhyaṃ parikalpyeta //

The following Text supports the same idea of Negation being included under Perception: [see verse 1671 above]

kāryādīnām ityādinā pratyakṣāntargatatvam eva samarthayate / kāryādīnām abhāvo hi bhāvo yaḥ kāraṇādinā /

It has been declared (by Kumārila himself, see Text 1655 above) that ‘The Negation of the effect consists in the presence of the Cause’; and this ‘presence of the Cause’ is of a nature character distinct from the Effect;

sa cāparaviviktātmā pratyakṣeṇaiva gamyate //

and it is apprehended by Perception itself;

tathācoktam kāryādīnām abhāvo hi bhāvo yaḥ karaṇādineti, sa ca kāraṇāder bhāvo 'paraviviktātmā kāryādiviviktasvabhāvaḥ, pratyakṣa eveti kimabhāvasyāparaṃ prameyam asti yena pramāṇāntaraṃ syāt /

so that what other aspect of ‘Negation’ is left to be cognised, for the sake of which Negation would be a distinct Means of Cognition This argument may be formulated as follows: When one Means of Cognition has no cognisable object other than that of another Means of Cognition, then it cannot be a distinct Means of Cognition;

yathā saptamaṃ pramāṇaṃ, nāsti ca prameyaṃ pratyakṣam aprameyād vyatiriktamabhāvasyeti vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ //

e.g. a seventh Means of Cognition, ‘Negation’ has no cognisable object apart from what is cognised by Perception; hence the assumption of such a distinct Means of Cognition would be failing in the fulfilment of the wider condition.

atra paro hetvasiddhim udbhāvayann āha svarūpetyādi /

The Opponent urges the ‘inadmissibility’ of the Reason adduced in this argument [see verses 1672-1673 next]

vastuni jñāyate kiñcid rūpaṃ kaiścit kadācana //

“There would have been no object left to be cognised by Negation if objects had only one aspect;

syāt prameyābhāvo yadyekātmakam eva vastu syāt, yāvatā svarūpaparūpābhyāṃ yathākramaṃ sadasadātmatvenobhayātmakaṃ vastu, tasminnubhayātmake vastuni sthite, kiñcid rūpam svabhāvaḥ, kaiścitpramāṇair jñāyate, na sarvaṃ sarvaiḥ /

as a matter of fact, however, objects have two aspects they are existent (positive) in their own form, and non-existent (negative) in the form of other things; there thus being two aspects of every object, there is only a certain aspect of it that is cognised through a certain Means, all aspects are not cognised by all Means of Cognition.

etad eva darśayati pratyakṣetyādi / bhāvāṃśo yadā gṛhyate tadā pratyakṣādīnāṃ pañcānāṃ vyāpāro nābhāvasya, abhāvāṃśe grahītum iṣṭe, tadanutpatter vyāpāraḥ teṣāṃ pratyakṣādīnām anutpatter abhāvasyeti yāvat //

“This same idea is further explained ‘It is only when the Positive aspect, etc. etc.’ When the Positive aspect of the Object is apprehended, then there is the operation of the five Means of Cognition, Perception and the rest, and not of Negation;

syād asiddhatāṃ hetor yadyekasyobhayātmakatvaṃ syāt, yāvatā viruddhamekasyobhayātmakatvam iti pratipādayann āha svarūpam evetyādi /

when however it is the Negative aspect that is meant to be apprehended, then there is operation of the ‘non-appearance of Perception, etc.’, i.e. of ‘Negation’.” (1672-1673) Our Reason would have been ‘inadmissible’ if one and the same thing had both (positive and negative) characters;

svarūpam eva vastūnāṃ nanu vyāvṛttam iṣyate /

as a matter of fact however the presence of two characters in the same object is incongruous.

tenātmanā sadetac ca pratyakṣamamunātmanā //

This is what is shown in the following [see verse 1674 above]

nahi pararūpeṇa vastu vastvantarād vyāvṛttaṃ, kiṃ tarhisvarūpeṇa ataś ca

When the thing is ‘differentiated’ from another thing, it is not in any other form;

svarūpam eva svabhāva eva vastūnāṃ vastvantarād vyāvṛttam upalabhyate /

in fact it is differentiated in its own form; hence it is the form of the thing itself which is apprehended as differentiated from the other thing;

svasvabhāvāvasthānāt /

as it remains in its own form.

yena cātmanā vyāvṛttaṃ, tena tad vastu sadeva nāsat /

That form in which it is differentiated, in that form, the Thing is always existent, never non-existent.

arthakriyāsamarthaṃ ca sadanyadasaducyate /

This thing is perceived in the form in which it is differentiated from other things;

svasādhyāyāṃ samarthaṃ cedanyasyāmakṣamaṃ nanu / tadetaddhi dvirūpatvaṃ naivaikatrāsti vastuni //

so that there is no apprehension of any second form or aspect of that thing. It has thus been shown that the postulating of the two forms (aspects) of things is incompatible with Perception;

anyadevāsamarthaṃ tu yadyanyasyāmitīṣyate /

the following Texts show that it is incompatible with Inference: [see verse 1675-1677 above]

yadarthakriyākāri tat sat, yathā sattvenābhimataṃ rūpaṃ, a{na}}rthakriyākāri cāsattvenābhimataṃ rūpam iti svabhāvahetuḥ /

(A) That which is capable of effective action is ‘existent’, for example that aspect of the thing winch is regarded as ‘existent’; and what is held to be ‘non-existent’ is not capable of effective action; hence this is a Reason based upon the nature of things.

yau ca parasparaviruddhau na tayor ekasmin vastuni yugapad upalayanaṃ, yathā chāyātapayoḥ śītoṣṇayor vā, parasparaviruddhe ca sadasadrūpe, iti [p.478] vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhiḥ /

(B) Things that are mutually contradictory can never coexist in the same thing, e.g. Light and Shade, or Heat and Cold, the existent and nonexistent aspects are mutually contradictory; so the idea that they coexist is contrary to a universal proposition.

svasādhyāyām ityādinā paro hetor asiddhimudbhāvayati /

The Opponent urges the objection that the Reason adduced is ‘inadmissible’ “The same thing, etc. etc.

tathā hi tadevaikaṃ vastu svasādhyāyām arthakriyāyāṃ samartham, anyasādhyāyāṃ tvasamarthaṃ tataścārthakriyākāritvalakṣaṇo hetur asiddhaḥ / nahi parasādhyām arthakriyām apekṣyārthakriyākāritvaṃ vastunaḥ siddham /

That is to say, one and the same thing is capable of the effective action which can be accomplished by itself, and also incapable of that effective action which can he accomplished by others; hence the Probans based upon the capability for effective action cannot be admissible; because the tiring is not admitted as capable of efficient action, in regard to such action as can be accomplished by others.

naca sadasadrūpayoḥ parasparavirodhaḥ, apekṣābhedāt /

Nor is there any contradiction between ‘existence’ and ‘non-existence’, as the two are in reference to distinct aspects of the thing;

tathā hi svasādhyāmevāpekṣyāsaducyete, syāt parasparavirodhaḥ /

for instance, the thing is called ‘existent’ in reference to such effective action as can be accomplished by itself, and that same thing not another is called ‘non-existent’, in reference to such action as can be accomplished by others;

atra parihāram āha nanu tadeveti /

The answer to this is as follows ‘As a matter of fact, etc. etc’;

yadeva svasādhyāyāṃ samarthaṃ vastusvarūpaṃ tadeva parasādhyāyām asamarthaṃ nānyat /

That same thing -which is ‘capable’ of the action that can be accomplished by itself, is ‘incapable’ of that which can be accomplished by others; and it is not any other thing.

nahyapekṣābhedena śabdabhedād vastu bhidyate /

Things do not differ through difference in their relatives or through difference in words;

niraṃśastvāt tasya /

because the thing is impartite.

taditi / tasmād arthe tat / tasmāt naikatra dvirūpatvam asti /

‘Tat’ stands for ‘tasmāt’, ‘for these reasons For these reasons, the dual character can never belong to the same thing.

athānyadeva rūpam anyasādhyāyām arthakriyāyām asamarthaṃ natu tadevetyāha anyadeveti /

If it be held that “the aspect that is incapable of such action as can be accomplished by others is different from that which is capable of effective action”. This is what is introduced by the words ‘If it is something else, etc. etc.’.

evaṃ tarhi yadarthakriyāsamarthaṃ tadekaṃ vastu, yaccāsamarthaṃ taddvitīyam iti vastudvayam eva kevalaṃ bhavatā pratipāditam, natvekasyobhayātmatvam //

The answer to this is that there are two things; that which is capable of effective action is one thing, and that which is incapable is the second thing; so that in saying what you have said, you have asserted the existence of two things, and not the dual aspect of one and the same thing, (1675-1677)

pramāṇanivṛttimātrātmake tṛtīye 'bhāvalakṣaṇe dūṣaṇam āha abhāvasyetyādi /

The following text points out defects in the third definition of ‘Negation’ put forward that it consists merely in the absence of Means of Cognition: [see verse 1678 above]

pūrvamaṅgīkṛta iti / sātmano 'pariṇāmo vā vijñānaṃ vānyavastunīti vacanāt /

‘Previously accepted’ in the assertion that ‘Negation consists in the non-modification of the Soul or in the cognition of something else’ (Text 1649).

mānamapyevamiṣyatām iti vacanād viṣayādhigamalakṣaṇatvāt pramāṇasya na yuktaṃ nīrūpasya prāmāṇyam iti vakṣyamāṇo 'bhiprāyaḥ //

‘Featureless’, It has been asserted (by Kumārila, see under Text 1657) that “Just as the cognisable Object is negative, so should the Means of cognition also be understood to be”;

nīrūpasya hi vijñānarūpahānau pramāṇatā / na yujyate prameyasya sā hi saṃvittilakṣaṇā //

from which it is clear that the Means or Form of Cognition consists in the apprehension of the Object; hence it cannot be right to attribute the character of ‘Means or Form of Cognition’ to what is entirely featureless;

seti pramāṇatā /

this is what is meant;

yat prameyādhigatirūpaṃ na bhavati na tat pramāṇaṃ, yathā ghaṭādi, prameyādhigatiśūnyaścābhāva iti vyāpakānupalabdhiḥ //

‘This’ i.e. Means or Form of Cognition. That which, is not of the nature of the cognition of things cannot be a ‘Means or Form of Cognition’, e.g. the Jar and such things; and Negation is devoid of the nature of the cognition of things;

taddhetutvāt pramāṇaṃ ceccakṣurādivad ucyate /

hence there is nonapprehension of the wider character (which must mean the absence of the less wide character).

[p.479]

[verse 1680]:

jñānasvarūpaviviktaś ca so 'bhāvo gamyate katham / tadgocarapramābhāvād evaṃ tarhyanavasthitiḥ // vastvabhāvāt pramāṇasya pramābhāvāc ca vastunaḥ /

The following might be urged: “The Eye and the other organs are not of the nature of the cognition of things, and yet, as they serve as causes bringing about the cognition of things, they are called ‘Means of Cognition’;

nāstitā yadi gamyeta bhaved anyonyasaṃśrayaḥ //

the same would be the case with ‘Negation’ also; so that the Reason adduced is not true (Inconclusive)”.

tasmād ekasya yā dṛṣṭiḥ saivānyādṛṣṭirucyate /

This is the argument anticipated and answered in the following [see verse 1680 above]

na ca pramāṇahetutvād upacāreṇa kalpanā yuktā, yato nīrūpasya sarvasāmarthyavirahalakṣaṇatvān na hetutvasambhavo yuktaḥ /

It is not right to make assumptions on the basis of the figurative idea of being the ‘cause of cognition’; because what is entirely featureless and hence devoid of all capacity, cannot be rightly regarded as a Came.

sambhave vā nīrūpatāhāniprasaṅgāt /

If it were so regarded, it would cease to be featureless;

tasyāviśeṣāt tadbhāve vijñānānuparamaprasaṅgāc ca /

Then again, what is itself not known cannot bring about the Cognition of anything else;

kiṃ ca nāsiddhasya gamakatvaṃ yuktam atiprasaṅgād iti pūrvam uktam, sā ca tasyabhāvasya sidhiḥ kathamiti vaktavyaṃ, natātsvata ava tasya sidhiḥ, prame

this has been already explained; so it has to be explained in what way ‘Negation’ itself is known. It cannot be cognised by itself; as if it were so, then the negation, or absence, of the object also would be cognised by itself, and there would be no need for postulating a Means of Cognition in the shape of ‘Negation’;

yābhāvasyāpi svata eva siddhiprasaṅgāt / tataścābhāvakalpanā vyarthā syāt prameyābhāvasiddhyarthatvāt tasyāḥ tasya ca prameyābhāvasya pramāṇābhāvavatsvata eva siddhatvāt /

as this is meant only for the purpose of bringing about the cognition of the negation of the object, and this negation of the object will have been cognised by itself, like the negation of the Means of Cognition.

nāpi svasaṃvittyā tasya siddhiḥ yato jñānarūpavivikto 'sau kathaṃ svasaṃvittyā gamyeta / jñānātmana eva tayādhigamāt /

Nor can it be regarded as cognised by its own Cognition, because, ex hypothesis it is ‘devoid of the form of Cognition’; how then could it be cognised by its own Cognition? It is only what is of the nature of Cognition that can be so cognised.

athānyasmāt tadviṣayapramāṇābhāvāt tat siddhiḥ, tasyāpi tadviṣayasya pramāṇābhāvasya kathaṃ siddhiḥ/ tasyāpyanyataḥ siddhāvanavasthā syāt /

It might be argued that it could be known from another negation of the Means of Cognition bearing upon itself. But then there arises the question how is this latter Negation known? If it were held to be due to yet another Negation, then there would be an infinite regress.

yathoktam "anyathārthasya nāstitvaṃ gamyate 'nupalambhataḥ / upalambhasya nāstitvam anyenetyanavasthitiḥ" //

This has been thus declared: ‘Otherwise the non-existence of the Object is known through Non-apprehension, and the non-existence of the Apprehension is known by another Non-apprehension;

iti /

so there is an infinite regress’.

atha mā bhūd anavasthitiḥ prameyābhāvāt tasya siddhir abhyupagamyate /

In order to avoid this Infinite Regress, it may be held that the Cognition of Negation is due to the absence (Negation) of the Object.

evaṃ satītaretarāśrayatvaṃ prāpnoti /

But in that case there is mutual interdependence.

tathā hi vastunaḥ prameyasyābhāvāt pramāṇābhāvasiddhiḥ tasya siddhau ca prameyābhāvasiddhir iti sphuṭataramevātrāvataratītaretarāśrayadoṣaḥ /

For instance, the Negation of the Means of Cognition is cognised through the cognition of the Negation of the Object, and the negation of the Object is cognised through the Cognition of the negation of the Means of Cognition; thus the defect of mutual interdependence is quite clear.

tadayaṃ guḍapraveśe 'kṣatārāvinirgamaḥ /

Thus you are reduced to that condition where the thrust of the Javelin throws out the Eye-ball!

tasmād ekopalabdhirevānyasyānupalabdhir iti nābhāvo nāma pṛthakpramāṇaṃ pratyakṣāt /

From all this it follows that the Non-apprehension of one thing consists only in the apprehension of another thing, and ‘Negation’ need not be a Means of Cognition different from Perception.

syād etat sāpyekopalabdhiḥ kathaṃ siddhā tatrāpyabhāvavat samānaprasaṅgaityāha sā cetyādi /

The following might be urged: “How is that apprehension of one thing known? What has been urged against the Cognition of Negation would apply to that also”.

sā caikasya dṛṣṭiḥ svayam eva svatantrā siddhā nānyata iti nānavasthāprasaṅgaḥ /

The answer to this is that ‘the said Perception, etc. etc.’ That is, the Perception of the one thing becomes cognised by itself, not through anything else;

kasmāt/ svarūpeṇa prakṛtyaiva, ajaḍarūpatvāt prakāśasvabhāvatvāt /

“Why?” Because, by its very nature, in its own form, it is not-dark, i.e. it is of the nature of Light (which is self-luminous).

naca sattāmātreṇa saṃvittāvatiprasaṅgo 'nyeṣām atadrūpatvāt //

Nor would cognition through mere presence lead to incongruities, as nothing else (except Cognition) is of the nature of Light (i.e. self-luminous).

atha parato buddhisaṃsiddhau kaḥ pradveṣa ity āha buddher ityādi /

Question: “Why should there be this hostility towards the apprehension of Cognition through something else?” Answer: [see verses 1684-1686 next]

[p.480]

[verses 1684-1686]:

tulyayogyātmanas tasmād ekasyaivopalambhanāt /

(1) Some people hold that Cognition is cognisable through the Inferential Indicative;

kecilliṅgasamadhigamyāṃ buddhimicchanti, tacca liṅgamarthajñānaṃ vā kryārūpaṃ indriyārtho vā vyakto vā viṣaya ityādikam /

this Inferential Indicative being either in the form of the idea of a thing, or in that of an Action, or in that of a thing perceptible by the senses, or some manifest object, and so forth.

kecid buddhyantarapratyakṣaṃ buddhimicchanti, na svasaṃvidrūpāṃ, svātmani kāritva{karmatva---}virodhāt /

(2) Others hold that Cognition is perceived through another Cognition, and not self-cognised, because the operation of anything upon itself involves an incongruity.

kecijjñātārthānyathānupapattyā, jñāto 'rtho na siddhyati yadi buddhir na bhavet tasya svayaṃ jaḍarūpatvāt /

i.e. the idea of a thing being known would be inexplicable if the Cognition of the thing were not there, the Cognition itself being by its nature dull (non-intelligent, dark).

ataḥ pakṣatrayam uktam /

Thus these three theories have been put forward.

tasya liṅāditrayasya yaḥ pratyekaṃ paryanuyogaḥ, tasyāpi liṅgādeḥ kutaḥ siddhir iti, tasya sambhave sati bahvayo 'navasthitayaḥ prasarpanti / tathā hi tadapi liṅgāditrayaṃ buddher asiddhāvasiddham iti tasyāpi parataḥsiddhir anveṣṭavyā, tatrāpyaparaliṅgādisamāśrayaṇe sarvatra paryanuyoge cānavasthāprasaṅgaḥ /

Now there being a possibility of objections being brought up against each of these three theories relating to the Inferential Indicative and the rest, such as ‘How is the Inferential Indicative itself known?’, and so forth, there will be several Infinite Regresses creeping in: For instance, the Inferential Indicative and the rest could not be cognised until Cognition is cognised; hence its cognition should be sought for from somewhere else; and for that also, it would be necessary to have recourse to another Inferential Indicative and so forth. This same process being urged against each of the three theories, there would be an endless Infinite Regress.

tasmād ekasyopalambhād anyeṣām asattvaṃ pratīyate, taddeśakālasya niṣedhe

From all this, the right conclusion would be that the apprehension of one tiring brings about the Cognition of the non-existence of other things.

kartavye tulyayogyātmanām eva niṣedhaḥ kāryaḥ /

When one has to deny the time and place of things, the negation (denial) is made of the perceptible things themselves, as it is these latter that stand on the same footing as the thing that has been apprehended;

anyeṣāṃ tatra niṣeddhumaśakyatvāt /

it being impossible to deny anything else.

tādātmyaniṣedhe tu sarvasyaiva niṣedhaḥ kāryo dṛṣṭaḥ, tadanyatvena sarvasya

If sameness were denied, then all would be denied, as has been seen before; because all things become included under ‘what is not that thing which is apprehended’, according to the principle that ‘what is not the same as one thing is another thing (1684 1686)

vyavasthāpanāt /

[verse 1687]: Question:

nanu cākāśe candrābhāvaṃ yadādhyavasyati tadā naikasya tatropalambhaḥ, yenocyate ekopalambhād anyābhāvasiddhir iti, na hyākāśaṃ nāma kiñcit paramārthato 'sti, yaccandraviviktaṃ dṛśyeta /

[Says the Opponent] “When a man notices the absence of the Moon in the Ākāśa, there is no apprehension of any one thing, by virtue of which it could be said that from the apprehension of that one thing follows the apprehension of the non-existence of other things; specially as there is no such real thing as Ākāśa which could he apprehended as devoid of the Moon.

yadapi parair vastu satkalpitaṃ, tadapyatīndriyaṃ, yaś ca kvacit pradeśe śabdābhāvaniścayaḥ, sa kasyopalambhāt /

Even that Ākāśa which others have postulated as something real is beyond the reach of the senses. Then again, when at a certain place the absence of sound is noticed, from the apprehension of what one thing does that follow? It cannot be urged that it follows from the apprehension of the spot on the ground concerned;

na tāvad bhūbhāgopalambhād iti vaktavyam, tasya śabdenātulyayogyāvasthatvāt /

because the ground is not equal to the Sound as regards its perceptibility, because the ground is visible, while the Sound is audible;

tathā hi bhūbhāgaścākṣuṣaḥ, śabdas tu śrāvaṇaḥ, tulyayogyāvasthayośca parasparāpekṣamanyatvamiṣṭam, ekajñānasaṃsargiṇo 'parasparāpekṣamanyatvam iti vacanāt /

and what are meant to be mutually related in the present context are things that stand on the same footing regarding their perceptibility. This is clear from the assertion that ‘one thing is other than the other when both are related to the same cognition and yet are not dependent upon one another Nor can the cognition in question be said to proceed from the apprehension of Time;

nāpi kālasyopalambhād iti vācyam, nahi parā{dā---}rthavyatiriktaḥ kālo 'sti yasyopalambhaḥ syāt /

because there is no such category as ‘Time’ apart from the other categories, whose apprehension could be there.

yo 'pi parair iṣṭāṃśa{sso '}pyatīndriyaḥ //

The Time that is accepted by the other party is also something beyond the senses (1687)

prakāśetyādinā pratividhatte /

The answer to the above is as follows: [see verses 1688-1989 next]

rāśer iti /

‘Of the mass of Light and Shade’;

saṃvittāviti sambandhaḥ /

add ‘on the perception of’;

yasmāt tameva prakāśatamaso rāśimākāśam iti pratipattā pratipadyate, nānyat /

this same mass of Light and Shade is regarded by the observer as ‘Ākāśa’, nothing apart from that.

tathā hi divā niśi vedamindriyanīlasaṅkāśamidaṃ jaladharanikāśam iti vā pratipadyate /

For instance, during the day or night, the man perceives the ‘Ākāśa’ to he ‘like sapphire’ or ‘like the Cloud’;

na cākāśasya parikalpitasya varṇasaṃsthānādir asti /

and for the other party, the Ākāśa. has neither colour nor shape.

tato 'nyasyeti /

‘Anything apart from that’;

prakāśatamorāśivyatirekeṇa paraparikalpitasyākāśasyāsattvāt /

that is, anything like the Ākāśa postulated by the other party has no existence apart from the said Mass of Light and Shade;

sattvevātīndriyatvāt /

and if it does exist, it is not perceptible by the senses.

sarvaśabdaviveko 'pi śrotrajñānasya kāryasyānupalabdhyā gamyata /

As regards the absence of all sounds also, it is cognised through the non-apprehension of its effect in the shape of Auditory Cognition;

sā cānupalabdhir anyeṣāṃ cakṣurādijñānānāṃ saṃvedanāt siddhetyastyevātrāpyekopalambho 'nyavijñānasaṃvedanalakṣaṇaḥ /

and this non -apprehension is cognised through the apprehension of the Visual and other Cognitions; so that here also there is the apprehension of one thing, in the shape of the apprehension of these other Cognitions.

nanu nahi kāryasattayā kāraṇasattā vyāptā, yena sā kāryasattā nivartamānā tām api nivartayet /

Says the Opponent: “All cases of the existence of the Causes are not covered by the existence of the Effect, by virtue of which the existence of the Effect, on its cessation, would preclude the existence of the Cause also.

yato nāvaśyaṃ kāraṇāni varddhati{artavanti---} bhavanti /

That tins cannot be the case is due to the fact that Causes are not always effective (even though present).”

na brūmaḥ sarvā kāraṇasattā kāryasattayā vyāpteti kiṃ tarhi/

[Answer] We do not say that all cases of the existence of the Cause are covered by the existence of the Effect;

viśiṣṭaivāpratibaddhasāmarthyalakṣaṇā, tasyā evātra niṣedhaḥ kriyate, na sarvasyāḥ /

what we say is that particular cases of the existence of the Cause, whose effectiveness is never obstructed, are those that are meant to be excluded by the non-existence of the effect (auditory Perception), not the existence of all causes.