buddhist-nlp/tatpa-noisy · Datasets at Hugging Face

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bhokanavaikalye sati pīnatvād iti hetuḥ / tadanyapuruṣavad iti dṛṣṭāntaḥ /	The Probans is ‘because while going without food during the day, he is fat ‘like another person’ is the Corroborative Instance.
kāryahetuścāyam //	This is a Probans in the form of ‘effect’ (1623)
katham atra kāryakāraṇabhāvaḥ siddha ity āha bhojane ityādi /	Question: “How is the relation of Cause and Effect known in this case?” Answer: [see verse 1624 next]
bhojane sati pīnatvam anvayavyatirekataḥ /	That there is fatness when there is eating is known with certainty through positive and negative concomitance;
niścitaṃ tena sambandhād vastuno vastuto gatiḥ //	and hence the cognition of one thing follows from the other which is thus related to it.
agnidhūmayor ivānvayavavyatirekābhyāṃ pīnatvabhojanayoḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvoniścito yatas tasmād vastunaḥ pīnatvāt kāryatvena sambandhād vastuto bhojanasya gatiryuktā /	The relation of Cause and Effect between Fatness and Eating as between Fire and Smoke, is known with certainty; whereby it is right that there should be cognition of one thing i.e. the Eating (which is the Cause) from another thing i.e. the Fatness, which is related to the former as its effect.
natu vākyād apratibaddhād vākyāntarasya pratītir yuktātiprasaṅgāt //	But it cannot be right that the cognition of one sentence should proceed from another sentence which is not so related to it;
tamevātiprasaṅgaṃ darśayitum āha sarvasambandhetyādi /	The following Text shows what the incongruity would be: [see verse 1625 next]
sarvasambandhaśūnyaṃ hi kathaṃ vākyaṃ pratīyate / ekasmād vākyataḥ sarvaṃ pratīyetānyathā punaḥ //	How can a sentence be cognised, which is devoid of all relationship? otherwise all things would be cognised through a single thing.
sarveṇa sambandhena tādātmyatadutpattilakṣaṇena śūnyaṃ rahitaṃ vākyaṃ kathampratīyeta / naiva /	How can a sentence he cognised, which is devoid of relationship such as that of sameness and origination? It can never be cognised.
anyathā hi sarvasambandhaśūnyam api pratīyeta tadā yataḥkutaścidekasmād vastuno ghaṭādeḥ sarvaṃ ghaṭādi pratīyeta /	Otherwise if a sentence devoid of all relationship were cognised, from any single thing in the shape of the Jar for instance, all jars would become cognised.
nacaivam /	This however does not happen.
tasmāt pratibandhāt pratipattir abhyupagantavyā //	Hence the cognition must be held to follow from a definite relationship (of concomitance).
tathāhyasati sambandhe sati cānavadhārite / gamyamānamidaṃ vākyaṃ prasajyetāpramāṇakam //	When there is no relationship or when, even though existent, the relationship is not definitely known, if the other sentence were indicated, it would be unreliable (invalid), (1626)
sati sambandha ityabhyupagamaḥ /	The idea really is that there is a relationship between the two sentences.
ekadā tāvannāstyeva vākyasya vākyāntareṇa sam [p.466] bandhaḥ, sannapyanavadhāritaḥsambandho 'satprakhya eva /	But if, at any time, there is no relationship between one sentence and another, or if existent, it is not definitely known, and hence is as good as non-existent, if, when the relationship is not definitely known, if the second sentence were indicated, such indication would be invalid;
tataśacānavadhārite sambandhe pratīyamānamapramāṇakaṃ syāt nirnibandhanapratītikaṃ{syat} nirnibandhanā cet pratītiḥ sarvaṃ sarvasmāt pratīyetetyatiprasaṅgo 'nivārya eva //	that is, it would be a baseless cognition; and if baseless cognitions were admitted, then the incongruity of everything being indicated by everything would be inevitable.
sambaddhasya pramāṇatvaṃ sthitaṃ no cennṛpājñayā /	“There is no such royal edict as that ‘that alone is valid which is related’.
pratyakṣasya pramāṇatvaṃ kathaṃ vā saṅkatiṃ vinā //	how does validity attach to perception, in which there is no relationship?” (1627)
tatra paro brūte sambaddhasya prāmāṭam iti yadi, paraṃ nṛpājñaiveyam, nanvatra kācidyuktiḥ /	The following Text anticipates an argument from the Opponent’s standpoint: [see verse 1627 above] The Opponent says: “That validity can attach to only what is related can, at best, be only a Royal Edict;
tathā hi sambaddhasya pramāṇatvam iti yadi nṛpājñā na bhavet, kathaṃ tarhi pratyakṣasya prāmāṇyaṃ saṅgatiṃ vinā sambandhamantareṇeti vaktavyam //	there can be no reason for such an idea. For instance, if it were not a Royal Edict that ‘validity can attach to only what is related’, how could there be any validity in Perception, in which there is no Relationship? This has to be explained”.
atrottaram āha nanviti /	The answer to the above is provided in the following [see verses 1628-1629 next]
nanvasambaddhagamyatve kimanyasyāpi no gatiḥ / nahi sambandhaśūnyatve viśeṣaḥ kaścanekṣyate //	If something unrelated could be cognised, then why should not there be cognition of other things also? Because in the matter of being unrelated, no distinction among things can be perceived.
sambandhād eva mānatvam adhyakṣe 'pi vyavasthitam /	In the case of perception also, validity rests upon relationship only.
saṃvādo hi pramāṇatvaṃ sa cārthādātmalābhataḥ //	The validity of a cognition consists in its being in conformity (with the real state of things), and this conformity depends upon the perception owing its existence to the thing perceived, (1628-1629)
nanvasambaddhaṃ yadi gamyeta tadātiprasaṅgaḥ syād aviśeṣād ityatra bhavatāna kiñciduttaraṃ dattam /	If an unrelated thing could be cognised, then there would be an incongruity, because there could, in that case, be no distinction between one thing and another, the absence of relationship being equally present in all things.
yaccoktaṃ kathaṃ pratyakṣasya vinā sambandhena prāmāṇyam iti, tadapyasaṅgatameva /	As for the question How is there validity in Perception, in which there is no Relationship? it is irrelevant;
tathā hi sambandhaṃ vinā na kenacit pratyakṣaprāmāṇyam abhyupagatam /	because no one regards Perception to be valid, in the absence of a Relationship.
kiṃ tarhisambandhādeva mānatvamadhyakṣepi pratyakṣepi vyavasthitam /	In fact, even in Perception, validity rests upon Relationship only.
atropapattim āha saṃvādo hītyādi / arthaprāpaṇaśaktiḥ saṃvādaḥ prāmāṇyam /	The reason for this is pointed out ‘The validity of a cognition, etc. etc.’ ‘Validity’ consists in conformity, which is the capacity to get at the real thing;
sa ca saṃvādo niyamena pratyakṣasya kathaṃ yukto yadi tato 'rthāt tasyātmalābho na bhavet //	and how could this conformity be unreservedly admitted in the case of Perception, if it did not derive its own existence from the thing perceived? (1628-1629)
anyathā ko doṣa ity āha ataddhetor iti /	The following Text explains what would be wrong if it were otherwise: [see verse 1630 next]
ataddhetor ahetoś ca tat saṃvādo na yujyate /	No such ‘conformity’ with the real state of things concerned can be certain, in a cognition of which the particular object is not the basis, or in one which has no (objective) basis at all.
niyamena samastānāṃ saṃvādo vānyathā bhavet //	Or else, there would be conformity with all (things).
so 'rtho hetur yasya sa tathā, na taddhetur ataddhetuḥ /	The compound ‘ataddhetuḥ’ is to he expounded as ‘na-taddhetuḥ’; ‘taddhetuḥ’ being expounded as that of which the particular object is the (objective) basis;
anyahetuka iti yāvat /	that is, that which is based upon something else;
tasmād ataddhetoḥ pratyakṣād ahetor vā sarvahetuvaikalyena tat saṃvādaḥ arthasaṃvādaḥ, na niyamena syāt /	in such a cognition, and also in a cognition which has no objective basis, i.e. which is devoid of all objective background, there can be no ‘conformity with the real state of the thing concerned’, in all cases.
kiṃ tarhisamastānāṃ sarveṣām arthānāṃ, saṃvādaḥ syād ityatrāpi samānaḥ prasaṅgaḥ //	“What then?” There would be conformity with all things. So that the incongruity is present in this case also.
[p.467] athavā pīno devadatto dinā na bhuṅkta ityetad anvayavākyaṃ kāryaliṅgam ātmīyaṃ kāraṇaṃ vivikṣāṃ viśiṣṭāmanumāpayan hetudharmānumānena dhūme	Or, what the affirmative sentence ‘Devadatta is fat and he eats not during the day’ does is to bring about the inference of its own cause, in the shape of the speaker’s particular ‘desire to speak’, this inference being based upon the Indicative in the shape of the effect of the said desire;
vana{dhūmenenḍana---}vikāravat sāmarthyād rātrau bhuṅkta ityetad vyatirekavākyam api gamayati, natu sākṣād iti pratipādayannāha dvitīyetyādi /	and then it brings about the idea of the contrary sentence ‘He eats at night’, but by implication, not directly, through the inference of the character of the Cause, just as in the ease of smoke, there is implication of its being due to defect in the fuel.
etenānvayavākyāc ca vyatirekagatir matā //	This view is what is expounded in the following [see verse 1631 next]
eteneti hetudharmānumānena natu sākṣāt /	“By tills” i.e. by the Inference of the character of the cause, not directly;
yasmād anvayavākyāt tādṛśī vivakṣā gamyate, yasyāṃ vyatirekavākyam api ni rbhāsate /	because it is from the affirmative sentence that the said ‘desire to speak’ is apprehended, in which ‘desire’, the negative sentence also figures.
anyathā yadi rātribhojanaṃ vivakṣāyāṃ nārūḍhaṃ syāt, bhojanapratiṣedhamātraṃ kevalaṃ pratipādayitum iṣṭaṃ tadā devadatto na bhuṅkta ityevoktaṃ syāt / natu divā, pīna iti /	Otherwise, if the eating at night did not figure in the said ‘desire to speak’, and mere denial of eating were meant, then the statement would have been in the form ‘Devadatta does not eat’ and the terms ‘fat’ and ‘during the day’ would not be there.
vyatirekagatir iti / vyatirekavākyagatiḥ //	Vyatirekagatiḥ’ the cognition of the contrary sentence.
gavayopamitā yā gaur ityatrāha upamāyā iti / upamāyāḥ pramāṇatvaṃ vistareṇa nirākṛte /	It has been asserted (under Text 1599) that “the presence, in the cow, which is likened to the Gavaya”, of the capacity to be apprehended by that cognition is cognised by Analogical Cognition”
svasattayaiva cālambyaṃ svajñānajanakaṃ matam // tat kimatrānyayā śaktyā yad gatyarthamapekṣyate / arthāpatteḥ pramāṇatvam upamānasamāśrayam //	Even granting the validity of Analogical Cognition, the Presumption based upon that cognition cannot be regarded as being a distinct Means or Form of Cognition, as it apprehends what is already apprehended; and also because there is no separate cognisable thing, in the shape of Potency, which could be cognised through it.
yadgatyartham iti / śaktipratītyartham /	‘For the apprehension whereof’ i.e. for the cognition of Potency.
śeṣaṃ subodham //	The rest is easily understood.
abhidhānānyathetyādavarthāpattipūrvikāyā arthāpatter udāharaṇasyānaikāntikatvam āha ananyatvetyādi /	It has been argued (under Text 1600) that “Inasmuch as the Denotation of a word cannot be otherwise defined, we assume the expressive Potency of Words, etc. etc.”;
arthapratyāyanaṃ yadvat pāṇikampādikāraṇam //	where an example has been cited of a Presumption based upon another Presumption.
yathāhyanityānām api pāṇikampākṣinikocādīnām arthapratyāyanaṃ na viruddhaṃ tathā śa [p.468] bdānām ananyatvaviyoge 'pi na virudhyata evetyanaikāntikam evaitad udāharaṇam /	There is no incompatibility in the expression of things by such non-eternal means as the shaking of the hand, winking of the eye and so forth; similarly, even in the absence of the sameness of the Word (at the time of Convention and at the time of Usage), there should be no incompatibility in the expression of things by the Word. So that the Instance that has been cited is Inconclusive.
tatrānyatvamanityatvaṃ nānyatvam ananyatvaṃ nityatvam, iti yāvat //	‘Sameness’ here stands for eternality; ‘being different’ constitutes evanescence; hence ‘being non-different or same’ constitutes eternality.
nanu coktam anityo hi na saṅketavyavahārānuvṛttibhāgiti, atrāha tulyetyādi /	Says the Opponent: “It has been pointed out that if the Word were not eternal, then it could not continue during all the time between the Convention and the Usage.”
pratyāyakatvaṃ śabdānāṃ tathaiva na virudhyate //	The answer to that is as follows: [see verse 1636 above]
yadyapi svalakṣaṇānāṃ kṣaṇikatvād anvayo nāsti, tathāpi kānicit svalakṣaṇāni prakṛtyā pārampartyeṇābhedākārasya bhrāntasya pratyavamarśajñānasya kāraṇāni bhavanti santyekatvena gṛhyamāṇāni pratyāyakāni bhavanti saṅketavaśāt /	Though the Specific Individualities being all momentary, there can be concomitance or continuity of them, yet there are some Specific Individualities which are so constituted that, either directly or indirectly, they become the cause of an illusory conception of sameness; and hence becoming conceived as the same, they become expressive, through Convention;
yathākampanam / pratyāyakam iti śeṣaḥ //	‘Like Shaking’ i.e. just as Shaking ‘is expressive’, (1636)
yathā kampanam ityasya dṛṣṭāntasya paraḥ sādhyavikalatām udbhāvayann āha ---pratyakṣetyādi /	The Opponent urges the objection that “the instance of ‘shaking’ that has been cited is devoid of the Probandum”: [see verse 1637 above]
yathā varṇānāṃ pratyabhijñayā nityatvamiṣṭam asmābhiḥ /	“We hold the letters to be eternal, on the ground of Recognition; in the same way, the gestures made by the Hand also are eternal;
tathā pāṇyādikarmaṇāmapītyanityatvena sādhyena vikalo dṛṣṭānta ityavyabhicāra eva //	hence the ‘Shaking’ (of the Hand) that has been cited is ‘devoid of the Probandum’, [i.e. it is not non-eternal];
yadyevaṃ nityatve sati pāṇyādikarmaṇāṃ kimiti nityam upalabdhir na jāyata	Question: If this is so, and the Gestures of the Hand, etc. are eternal, how is it that these are not cognised always?
ityatrāha vyañjaketyādi /	Answer (from the Opponent): [see verse 1638 above]
kriyāṇām / santatānupalambhatā /	‘These’ i.e. the Gestures, ‘are not apprehended always’;
yathā bhavatām utpādakābhāvān nityopalabdhir na bhavati, tathāsmākaṃ vyañjakābhāvād iti samānaḥ parihāra iti parasyābhiprāyaḥ //	just as, under your theory, the Gestures are not perceived always, because of the absence of the producer, so, under our view also, it is because of the absence of the indicator; so that the same explanation is available for both of us.’ This is what the Opponent means.
naivam ityādinā pratividhatte /	The above argument is answered as follows: [see verses 1639-1640 next]
[p.469] atra dvayī kampanā, yāstāḥ kriyā abhivyaṭgyā iṣṭas tāḥ prakṛtyā jñānotpādanasamarthā vā syur navā /	There are only two alternatives possible regarding the capacity of the Gestures which are held to be ‘indicated’ by certain indicators: By their nature (a) they have the capacity of bringing about cognitions or (b) they do not have this capacity.
tatra sāmarthye sati, santantam nityaṃ, tadbhāvi jñānaṃ prāpnoti /	If they have the said capacity, then the Cognition producible by these should be there always at all times;
tāsāṃ samarthasya svabhāvasya nityatvena kenacid apratibaddhatvāt / anādheyātiśayasya viśeṣamanādhāya pratibaddhumaśakyatvāt /	because their nature, being eternal, could not be obstructed by anything; because a thing to which (on account of its Etemality) no peculiarities can be added, can never, for that reason, be obstructed.
athāsāmarthyaṃ, tadā tadviyoge sāmarthyaviyoge, naiva tadbhāvi jñānaṃ	If, on the other hand, they do not have the capacity, then, in the absence of the capacity, the cognition producible by them could never be there.
syād iti kiṃ vyañjakasya sāmarthyam /	So where would be the use of the Indicator?
tasmāt tāsāṃ kriyāṇāṃ nityatveneṣṭānāṃ na kathañcit saṅgacchante vyañjakatvena kalpitā hetavaḥ / anityānāṃ tvapūrvasvabhāvotpattir vyañjakād iti nyāyyās tān prati vyañjakāḥ /	For these reasons, it is not possible for the Gestures, which are held to be eternal, to have any ‘indicators If they are non-eternal, however, it is possible for a new character to be produced by the Indicators, and hence in this case, the presence of Indicatives would be logical.
yaccoktam ---"tāsāṃ varṇavadeveṣṭaṃ nityatvaṃ pratyabhijñayetyatrāha" pratyabhijñeti /	It has been asserted that “They are held to be eternal, like Letters, on the ground of Recognition”.
nityatve sādhye hetutvena pratyabhijñopanyastā sā pūrvaṃ sthirabhāvaparīkṣāyāṃ nirākṛtā //	for the proving of eternality (the Probandun), Recognition has been put forward as the Probans; and tins Recognition has been already rejected under the examination of the Permanence of Things (Chapter VIII).
yaduktam ---" pramāṇābhāvanirṇītacaitrābhāvaviśeṣitāt" ityatrāha gehetyādi /	It has been argued (under Text 1602 et seq.) that “The absence of Caitra having been cognised through Negation, etc. etc.”. The answer to that is as follows: [see verses 1641-1643 above]
veśmanyapaśyataścaitraṃ na hyarvāg darśanaḥ pramā / tasya jīvanasambandhe kathañcid api vartate // anyathāpīti /	The following might be urged “Even though the man with ordinary powers of vision could not have any means of perceiving the fact of Caitra being alive, yet Inference and the other means of cognition would be always available for him”.
anenānaikāntikatvam āha /	This is what is urged in the following [see verse 1644 above]
atha jīvato devadattasya yo gṛhābhāvaḥ sa ihārthāpattyudāharaṇe hetutvenocyate nābhāvamātram /	‘Through Negation’ as a Means of Cognition, in the shape of the absence of Perception and the other Means of Cognition, the certainty of Caitra’s absence in the house being obtained, it becomes known that the absence in the house is of the living Ghaitra; then due validity would belong to this Presumption as based upon Negation, (1644)
naivaṃ yuktam / kasmāt ---/	The answer to all this is as follows: [see verses 1645-1647 next]
tatrāpi devadattajīvanaṃ saṃśayāt saṃdigdhāsiddhatā hetoḥ syāt /	This shows that Presumption is included under Inference. For instance, Caitra is the Subject, the Minor Term;
aniścaye kāraṇam āha veśmanīti /	Ms being outside is the Probandum;
tasya caitrasya jīvane niścāyakapramāṇābhāvād arvāgdarśinaḥ saṃśaya eva //	‘Being alive and yet not being in the house’ is the Probans, of the nature of an ‘effect’; ‘the man standing in the courtyard’ is the Corroborative Instance per similarity;
atha śabdādinā tasya jīvattāniścaye sati /	‘the man in the house’ is the Corroborative Instance per dissimilarity.
śabdādineti /	‘Sadana’ is House.
taduccāritaśabdaḥ śrūyate, pratyayino vā tasmin kāle kuḍyādyantaritas tapasyan kathayati jīvati caitra iti /	as for the man being alive, this is said to be ascertained in accordance with the doctrines of the other party.
abhāvāc ca pramāṇāt pratyakṣādinivṛttirū [p.470] pāt, sadmani gṛhe, caitrābhāvaniścaye sati, siddho jīvanaviśiṣṭaścaitrābhāva iti, bhavedevāsyā abhāvotthāyā arthāpatteḥ pramāṇatā //	In reality, the Probans is doubtful, as there is no Means for obtaining a certain cognition of his being alive. “But it has been said that there are such means as the Word, etc.” In that case, if Ms being alive has been duly ascertained by means of Word, etc., then that is enough to prove Ms existence outside;
tadāpītyādinā pratividhatte /	what then is there left to be done by Presumption?
tadāpi gehāyuktatvaṃ dṛṣṭyādṛṣṭer viniścitam / atas tatra bahirbhāvo liṅādevāvasīyate //	Thus, it is on the basis of the doctrines of the Opponent that we regard the Probans put forward by us as ‘admissible’, and through the Probans it has been proved that Presumption is included under Inference.
sadmanā yo hyasaṃsṛṣṭo niyataṃ bahirastyasau /	End of Presumption.
arthāpattir iyaṃ tasmād anumānān na bhidyate //	This shows that Presumption is included under Inference.
tathā hi caitro 'tra dharmī, tasya bahirbhāvaḥ sādhyaḥ, jīvane sati gṛhyasaṅgo hetuḥ kāryaḥ /	For instance, Caitra is the Subject, the Minor Term; Ms being outside is the Probandum; ‘Being alive and yet not being in the house’ is the Probans, of the nature of an ‘effect’;
gṛhāṅgaṇasthitaḥ pumān sādharmyadṛṣṭāntaḥ / gṛhāntargatas tu vaidharmyadṛṣṭāntaḥ /	‘the man standing in the courtyard’ is the Corroborative Instance per similarity; ‘the man in the house’ is the Corroborative Instance per dissimilarity.
sadanam gṛham / vyāptir dṛṣṭāntābhyām eva niścitā /	‘Sadana’ is House. The Invariable Concomitance (the Major Premiss) is indicated by the two Instances.
nacāsiddho hetuḥ / yato gehāyuktatvaṃ tāvad dṛśyānupalabdhyā niścitam, jīvanaṃ tu parābhyupagamāt siddham /	The Probans cannot be said to be ‘inadmissible Because absence in the House has been cognised by ‘the non-perception of what should have been perceived, if there’; as for the man being alive, this is said to be ascertained in accordance with the doctrines of the other party.
nahi jīvattāniścāyakaṃ kiñcit pramāṇam asti /	In reality, the Probans is doubtful, as there is no Means for obtaining a certain cognition of his being alive.
nanu ca śabdādir astītyuktam /	“But it has been said that there are such means as the Word, etc.”
evaṃ tarhi yata eva śabdādeḥ pramāṇājjīvanaṃ niścitaṃ tata eva bahirbhāvaḥ siddha iti kim arthāpattyā kartavyam /	In that case, if Ms being alive has been duly ascertained by means of Word, etc., then that is enough to prove Ms existence outside; what then is there left to be done by Presumption?
tasmāt parābhyupagamāt / siddhaṃ hetumabhyupagamyānumāne 'ntarbhāvaḥ pratipādita arthāpatteḥ //	Thus, it is on the basis of the doctrines of the Opponent that we regard the Probans put forward by us as ‘admissible’, and through the Probans it has been proved that Presumption is included under Inference.
ity arthāpattiparīkṣā //	End of Presumption.
abhāvam adhikṛtyāha pramāṇetyādi /	In regard to ‘Negation’ Abhāva the Author sets forth the following views: [see verse 1648 above]
vastusattāvabodhārthaṃ tatrābhāvapramāṇatā // tatra mīmāṃsakānāṃ sadasallakṣaṇayor bhāvābhāvayor vastutvaṃ, sarvasya capadārthasya sadasadrūpeṇa dvyātmakatvamityabhyupagamaḥ /	According to Mīmāṃsakas, entities are of two kinds Positive and Negative, the former being characterised by existence and the latter by non-existence; and they hold that every object has two aspects the existent and the non-existent; thus it being acknowledged that the Object has these two aspects, the existent and the non-existent, in the case of an object Le.

bhokanavaikalye sati pīnatvād iti hetuḥ / tadanyapuruṣavad iti dṛṣṭāntaḥ /

The Probans is ‘because while going without food during the day, he is fat ‘like another person’ is the Corroborative Instance.

kāryahetuścāyam //

This is a Probans in the form of ‘effect’ (1623)

katham atra kāryakāraṇabhāvaḥ siddha ity āha bhojane ityādi /

Question: “How is the relation of Cause and Effect known in this case?” Answer: [see verse 1624 next]

bhojane sati pīnatvam anvayavyatirekataḥ /

That there is fatness when there is eating is known with certainty through positive and negative concomitance;

niścitaṃ tena sambandhād vastuno vastuto gatiḥ //

and hence the cognition of one thing follows from the other which is thus related to it.

agnidhūmayor ivānvayavavyatirekābhyāṃ pīnatvabhojanayoḥ kāryakāraṇabhāvoniścito yatas tasmād vastunaḥ pīnatvāt kāryatvena sambandhād vastuto bhojanasya gatiryuktā /

The relation of Cause and Effect between Fatness and Eating as between Fire and Smoke, is known with certainty; whereby it is right that there should be cognition of one thing i.e. the Eating (which is the Cause) from another thing i.e. the Fatness, which is related to the former as its effect.

natu vākyād apratibaddhād vākyāntarasya pratītir yuktātiprasaṅgāt //

But it cannot be right that the cognition of one sentence should proceed from another sentence which is not so related to it;

tamevātiprasaṅgaṃ darśayitum āha sarvasambandhetyādi /

The following Text shows what the incongruity would be: [see verse 1625 next]

sarvasambandhaśūnyaṃ hi kathaṃ vākyaṃ pratīyate / ekasmād vākyataḥ sarvaṃ pratīyetānyathā punaḥ //

How can a sentence be cognised, which is devoid of all relationship? otherwise all things would be cognised through a single thing.

sarveṇa sambandhena tādātmyatadutpattilakṣaṇena śūnyaṃ rahitaṃ vākyaṃ kathampratīyeta / naiva /

How can a sentence he cognised, which is devoid of relationship such as that of sameness and origination? It can never be cognised.

anyathā hi sarvasambandhaśūnyam api pratīyeta tadā yataḥkutaścidekasmād vastuno ghaṭādeḥ sarvaṃ ghaṭādi pratīyeta /

Otherwise if a sentence devoid of all relationship were cognised, from any single thing in the shape of the Jar for instance, all jars would become cognised.

nacaivam /

This however does not happen.

tasmāt pratibandhāt pratipattir abhyupagantavyā //

Hence the cognition must be held to follow from a definite relationship (of concomitance).

tathāhyasati sambandhe sati cānavadhārite / gamyamānamidaṃ vākyaṃ prasajyetāpramāṇakam //

When there is no relationship or when, even though existent, the relationship is not definitely known, if the other sentence were indicated, it would be unreliable (invalid), (1626)

sati sambandha ityabhyupagamaḥ /

The idea really is that there is a relationship between the two sentences.

ekadā tāvannāstyeva vākyasya vākyāntareṇa sam [p.466] bandhaḥ, sannapyanavadhāritaḥsambandho 'satprakhya eva /

But if, at any time, there is no relationship between one sentence and another, or if existent, it is not definitely known, and hence is as good as non-existent, if, when the relationship is not definitely known, if the second sentence were indicated, such indication would be invalid;

tataśacānavadhārite sambandhe pratīyamānamapramāṇakaṃ syāt nirnibandhanapratītikaṃ{syat} nirnibandhanā cet pratītiḥ sarvaṃ sarvasmāt pratīyetetyatiprasaṅgo 'nivārya eva //

that is, it would be a baseless cognition; and if baseless cognitions were admitted, then the incongruity of everything being indicated by everything would be inevitable.

sambaddhasya pramāṇatvaṃ sthitaṃ no cennṛpājñayā /

“There is no such royal edict as that ‘that alone is valid which is related’.

pratyakṣasya pramāṇatvaṃ kathaṃ vā saṅkatiṃ vinā //

how does validity attach to perception, in which there is no relationship?” (1627)

tatra paro brūte sambaddhasya prāmāṭam iti yadi, paraṃ nṛpājñaiveyam, nanvatra kācidyuktiḥ /

The following Text anticipates an argument from the Opponent’s standpoint: [see verse 1627 above] The Opponent says: “That validity can attach to only what is related can, at best, be only a Royal Edict;

tathā hi sambaddhasya pramāṇatvam iti yadi nṛpājñā na bhavet, kathaṃ tarhi pratyakṣasya prāmāṇyaṃ saṅgatiṃ vinā sambandhamantareṇeti vaktavyam //

there can be no reason for such an idea. For instance, if it were not a Royal Edict that ‘validity can attach to only what is related’, how could there be any validity in Perception, in which there is no Relationship? This has to be explained”.

atrottaram āha nanviti /

The answer to the above is provided in the following [see verses 1628-1629 next]

nanvasambaddhagamyatve kimanyasyāpi no gatiḥ / nahi sambandhaśūnyatve viśeṣaḥ kaścanekṣyate //

If something unrelated could be cognised, then why should not there be cognition of other things also? Because in the matter of being unrelated, no distinction among things can be perceived.

sambandhād eva mānatvam adhyakṣe 'pi vyavasthitam /

In the case of perception also, validity rests upon relationship only.

saṃvādo hi pramāṇatvaṃ sa cārthādātmalābhataḥ //

The validity of a cognition consists in its being in conformity (with the real state of things), and this conformity depends upon the perception owing its existence to the thing perceived, (1628-1629)

nanvasambaddhaṃ yadi gamyeta tadātiprasaṅgaḥ syād aviśeṣād ityatra bhavatāna kiñciduttaraṃ dattam /

If an unrelated thing could be cognised, then there would be an incongruity, because there could, in that case, be no distinction between one thing and another, the absence of relationship being equally present in all things.

yaccoktaṃ kathaṃ pratyakṣasya vinā sambandhena prāmāṇyam iti, tadapyasaṅgatameva /

As for the question How is there validity in Perception, in which there is no Relationship? it is irrelevant;

tathā hi sambandhaṃ vinā na kenacit pratyakṣaprāmāṇyam abhyupagatam /

because no one regards Perception to be valid, in the absence of a Relationship.

kiṃ tarhisambandhādeva mānatvamadhyakṣepi pratyakṣepi vyavasthitam /

In fact, even in Perception, validity rests upon Relationship only.

atropapattim āha saṃvādo hītyādi / arthaprāpaṇaśaktiḥ saṃvādaḥ prāmāṇyam /

The reason for this is pointed out ‘The validity of a cognition, etc. etc.’ ‘Validity’ consists in conformity, which is the capacity to get at the real thing;

sa ca saṃvādo niyamena pratyakṣasya kathaṃ yukto yadi tato 'rthāt tasyātmalābho na bhavet //

and how could this conformity be unreservedly admitted in the case of Perception, if it did not derive its own existence from the thing perceived? (1628-1629)

anyathā ko doṣa ity āha ataddhetor iti /

The following Text explains what would be wrong if it were otherwise: [see verse 1630 next]

ataddhetor ahetoś ca tat saṃvādo na yujyate /

No such ‘conformity’ with the real state of things concerned can be certain, in a cognition of which the particular object is not the basis, or in one which has no (objective) basis at all.

niyamena samastānāṃ saṃvādo vānyathā bhavet //

Or else, there would be conformity with all (things).

so 'rtho hetur yasya sa tathā, na taddhetur ataddhetuḥ /

The compound ‘ataddhetuḥ’ is to he expounded as ‘na-taddhetuḥ’; ‘taddhetuḥ’ being expounded as that of which the particular object is the (objective) basis;

anyahetuka iti yāvat /

that is, that which is based upon something else;

tasmād ataddhetoḥ pratyakṣād ahetor vā sarvahetuvaikalyena tat saṃvādaḥ arthasaṃvādaḥ, na niyamena syāt /

in such a cognition, and also in a cognition which has no objective basis, i.e. which is devoid of all objective background, there can be no ‘conformity with the real state of the thing concerned’, in all cases.

kiṃ tarhisamastānāṃ sarveṣām arthānāṃ, saṃvādaḥ syād ityatrāpi samānaḥ prasaṅgaḥ //

“What then?” There would be conformity with all things. So that the incongruity is present in this case also.

[p.467] athavā pīno devadatto dinā na bhuṅkta ityetad anvayavākyaṃ kāryaliṅgam ātmīyaṃ kāraṇaṃ vivikṣāṃ viśiṣṭāmanumāpayan hetudharmānumānena dhūme

Or, what the affirmative sentence ‘Devadatta is fat and he eats not during the day’ does is to bring about the inference of its own cause, in the shape of the speaker’s particular ‘desire to speak’, this inference being based upon the Indicative in the shape of the effect of the said desire;

vana{dhūmenenḍana---}vikāravat sāmarthyād rātrau bhuṅkta ityetad vyatirekavākyam api gamayati, natu sākṣād iti pratipādayannāha dvitīyetyādi /

and then it brings about the idea of the contrary sentence ‘He eats at night’, but by implication, not directly, through the inference of the character of the Cause, just as in the ease of smoke, there is implication of its being due to defect in the fuel.

etenānvayavākyāc ca vyatirekagatir matā //

This view is what is expounded in the following [see verse 1631 next]

eteneti hetudharmānumānena natu sākṣāt /

“By tills” i.e. by the Inference of the character of the cause, not directly;

yasmād anvayavākyāt tādṛśī vivakṣā gamyate, yasyāṃ vyatirekavākyam api ni rbhāsate /

because it is from the affirmative sentence that the said ‘desire to speak’ is apprehended, in which ‘desire’, the negative sentence also figures.

anyathā yadi rātribhojanaṃ vivakṣāyāṃ nārūḍhaṃ syāt, bhojanapratiṣedhamātraṃ kevalaṃ pratipādayitum iṣṭaṃ tadā devadatto na bhuṅkta ityevoktaṃ syāt / natu divā, pīna iti /

Otherwise, if the eating at night did not figure in the said ‘desire to speak’, and mere denial of eating were meant, then the statement would have been in the form ‘Devadatta does not eat’ and the terms ‘fat’ and ‘during the day’ would not be there.

vyatirekagatir iti / vyatirekavākyagatiḥ //

Vyatirekagatiḥ’ the cognition of the contrary sentence.

gavayopamitā yā gaur ityatrāha upamāyā iti / upamāyāḥ pramāṇatvaṃ vistareṇa nirākṛte /

It has been asserted (under Text 1599) that “the presence, in the cow, which is likened to the Gavaya”, of the capacity to be apprehended by that cognition is cognised by Analogical Cognition”

svasattayaiva cālambyaṃ svajñānajanakaṃ matam // tat kimatrānyayā śaktyā yad gatyarthamapekṣyate / arthāpatteḥ pramāṇatvam upamānasamāśrayam //

Even granting the validity of Analogical Cognition, the Presumption based upon that cognition cannot be regarded as being a distinct Means or Form of Cognition, as it apprehends what is already apprehended; and also because there is no separate cognisable thing, in the shape of Potency, which could be cognised through it.

yadgatyartham iti / śaktipratītyartham /

‘For the apprehension whereof’ i.e. for the cognition of Potency.

śeṣaṃ subodham //

The rest is easily understood.

abhidhānānyathetyādavarthāpattipūrvikāyā arthāpatter udāharaṇasyānaikāntikatvam āha ananyatvetyādi /

It has been argued (under Text 1600) that “Inasmuch as the Denotation of a word cannot be otherwise defined, we assume the expressive Potency of Words, etc. etc.”;

arthapratyāyanaṃ yadvat pāṇikampādikāraṇam //

where an example has been cited of a Presumption based upon another Presumption.

yathāhyanityānām api pāṇikampākṣinikocādīnām arthapratyāyanaṃ na viruddhaṃ tathā śa [p.468] bdānām ananyatvaviyoge 'pi na virudhyata evetyanaikāntikam evaitad udāharaṇam /

There is no incompatibility in the expression of things by such non-eternal means as the shaking of the hand, winking of the eye and so forth; similarly, even in the absence of the sameness of the Word (at the time of Convention and at the time of Usage), there should be no incompatibility in the expression of things by the Word. So that the Instance that has been cited is Inconclusive.

tatrānyatvamanityatvaṃ nānyatvam ananyatvaṃ nityatvam, iti yāvat //

‘Sameness’ here stands for eternality; ‘being different’ constitutes evanescence; hence ‘being non-different or same’ constitutes eternality.

nanu coktam anityo hi na saṅketavyavahārānuvṛttibhāgiti, atrāha tulyetyādi /

Says the Opponent: “It has been pointed out that if the Word were not eternal, then it could not continue during all the time between the Convention and the Usage.”

pratyāyakatvaṃ śabdānāṃ tathaiva na virudhyate //

The answer to that is as follows: [see verse 1636 above]

yadyapi svalakṣaṇānāṃ kṣaṇikatvād anvayo nāsti, tathāpi kānicit svalakṣaṇāni prakṛtyā pārampartyeṇābhedākārasya bhrāntasya pratyavamarśajñānasya kāraṇāni bhavanti santyekatvena gṛhyamāṇāni pratyāyakāni bhavanti saṅketavaśāt /

Though the Specific Individualities being all momentary, there can be concomitance or continuity of them, yet there are some Specific Individualities which are so constituted that, either directly or indirectly, they become the cause of an illusory conception of sameness; and hence becoming conceived as the same, they become expressive, through Convention;

yathākampanam / pratyāyakam iti śeṣaḥ //

‘Like Shaking’ i.e. just as Shaking ‘is expressive’, (1636)

yathā kampanam ityasya dṛṣṭāntasya paraḥ sādhyavikalatām udbhāvayann āha ---pratyakṣetyādi /

The Opponent urges the objection that “the instance of ‘shaking’ that has been cited is devoid of the Probandum”: [see verse 1637 above]

yathā varṇānāṃ pratyabhijñayā nityatvamiṣṭam asmābhiḥ /

“We hold the letters to be eternal, on the ground of Recognition; in the same way, the gestures made by the Hand also are eternal;

tathā pāṇyādikarmaṇāmapītyanityatvena sādhyena vikalo dṛṣṭānta ityavyabhicāra eva //

hence the ‘Shaking’ (of the Hand) that has been cited is ‘devoid of the Probandum’, [i.e. it is not non-eternal];

yadyevaṃ nityatve sati pāṇyādikarmaṇāṃ kimiti nityam upalabdhir na jāyata

Question: If this is so, and the Gestures of the Hand, etc. are eternal, how is it that these are not cognised always?

ityatrāha vyañjaketyādi /

Answer (from the Opponent): [see verse 1638 above]

kriyāṇām / santatānupalambhatā /

‘These’ i.e. the Gestures, ‘are not apprehended always’;

yathā bhavatām utpādakābhāvān nityopalabdhir na bhavati, tathāsmākaṃ vyañjakābhāvād iti samānaḥ parihāra iti parasyābhiprāyaḥ //

just as, under your theory, the Gestures are not perceived always, because of the absence of the producer, so, under our view also, it is because of the absence of the indicator; so that the same explanation is available for both of us.’ This is what the Opponent means.

naivam ityādinā pratividhatte /

The above argument is answered as follows: [see verses 1639-1640 next]

[p.469] atra dvayī kampanā, yāstāḥ kriyā abhivyaṭgyā iṣṭas tāḥ prakṛtyā jñānotpādanasamarthā vā syur navā /

There are only two alternatives possible regarding the capacity of the Gestures which are held to be ‘indicated’ by certain indicators: By their nature (a) they have the capacity of bringing about cognitions or (b) they do not have this capacity.

tatra sāmarthye sati, santantam nityaṃ, tadbhāvi jñānaṃ prāpnoti /

If they have the said capacity, then the Cognition producible by these should be there always at all times;

tāsāṃ samarthasya svabhāvasya nityatvena kenacid apratibaddhatvāt / anādheyātiśayasya viśeṣamanādhāya pratibaddhumaśakyatvāt /

because their nature, being eternal, could not be obstructed by anything; because a thing to which (on account of its Etemality) no peculiarities can be added, can never, for that reason, be obstructed.

athāsāmarthyaṃ, tadā tadviyoge sāmarthyaviyoge, naiva tadbhāvi jñānaṃ

If, on the other hand, they do not have the capacity, then, in the absence of the capacity, the cognition producible by them could never be there.

syād iti kiṃ vyañjakasya sāmarthyam /

So where would be the use of the Indicator?

tasmāt tāsāṃ kriyāṇāṃ nityatveneṣṭānāṃ na kathañcit saṅgacchante vyañjakatvena kalpitā hetavaḥ / anityānāṃ tvapūrvasvabhāvotpattir vyañjakād iti nyāyyās tān prati vyañjakāḥ /

For these reasons, it is not possible for the Gestures, which are held to be eternal, to have any ‘indicators If they are non-eternal, however, it is possible for a new character to be produced by the Indicators, and hence in this case, the presence of Indicatives would be logical.

yaccoktam ---"tāsāṃ varṇavadeveṣṭaṃ nityatvaṃ pratyabhijñayetyatrāha" pratyabhijñeti /

It has been asserted that “They are held to be eternal, like Letters, on the ground of Recognition”.

nityatve sādhye hetutvena pratyabhijñopanyastā sā pūrvaṃ sthirabhāvaparīkṣāyāṃ nirākṛtā //

for the proving of eternality (the Probandun), Recognition has been put forward as the Probans; and tins Recognition has been already rejected under the examination of the Permanence of Things (Chapter VIII).

yaduktam ---" pramāṇābhāvanirṇītacaitrābhāvaviśeṣitāt" ityatrāha gehetyādi /

It has been argued (under Text 1602 et seq.) that “The absence of Caitra having been cognised through Negation, etc. etc.”. The answer to that is as follows: [see verses 1641-1643 above]

veśmanyapaśyataścaitraṃ na hyarvāg darśanaḥ pramā / tasya jīvanasambandhe kathañcid api vartate // anyathāpīti /

The following might be urged “Even though the man with ordinary powers of vision could not have any means of perceiving the fact of Caitra being alive, yet Inference and the other means of cognition would be always available for him”.

anenānaikāntikatvam āha /

This is what is urged in the following [see verse 1644 above]

atha jīvato devadattasya yo gṛhābhāvaḥ sa ihārthāpattyudāharaṇe hetutvenocyate nābhāvamātram /

‘Through Negation’ as a Means of Cognition, in the shape of the absence of Perception and the other Means of Cognition, the certainty of Caitra’s absence in the house being obtained, it becomes known that the absence in the house is of the living Ghaitra; then due validity would belong to this Presumption as based upon Negation, (1644)

naivaṃ yuktam / kasmāt ---/

The answer to all this is as follows: [see verses 1645-1647 next]

tatrāpi devadattajīvanaṃ saṃśayāt saṃdigdhāsiddhatā hetoḥ syāt /

This shows that Presumption is included under Inference. For instance, Caitra is the Subject, the Minor Term;

aniścaye kāraṇam āha veśmanīti /

Ms being outside is the Probandum;

tasya caitrasya jīvane niścāyakapramāṇābhāvād arvāgdarśinaḥ saṃśaya eva //

‘Being alive and yet not being in the house’ is the Probans, of the nature of an ‘effect’; ‘the man standing in the courtyard’ is the Corroborative Instance per similarity;

atha śabdādinā tasya jīvattāniścaye sati /

‘the man in the house’ is the Corroborative Instance per dissimilarity.

śabdādineti /

‘Sadana’ is House.

taduccāritaśabdaḥ śrūyate, pratyayino vā tasmin kāle kuḍyādyantaritas tapasyan kathayati jīvati caitra iti /

as for the man being alive, this is said to be ascertained in accordance with the doctrines of the other party.

abhāvāc ca pramāṇāt pratyakṣādinivṛttirū [p.470] pāt, sadmani gṛhe, caitrābhāvaniścaye sati, siddho jīvanaviśiṣṭaścaitrābhāva iti, bhavedevāsyā abhāvotthāyā arthāpatteḥ pramāṇatā //

In reality, the Probans is doubtful, as there is no Means for obtaining a certain cognition of his being alive. “But it has been said that there are such means as the Word, etc.” In that case, if Ms being alive has been duly ascertained by means of Word, etc., then that is enough to prove Ms existence outside;

tadāpītyādinā pratividhatte /

what then is there left to be done by Presumption?

tadāpi gehāyuktatvaṃ dṛṣṭyādṛṣṭer viniścitam / atas tatra bahirbhāvo liṅādevāvasīyate //

Thus, it is on the basis of the doctrines of the Opponent that we regard the Probans put forward by us as ‘admissible’, and through the Probans it has been proved that Presumption is included under Inference.

sadmanā yo hyasaṃsṛṣṭo niyataṃ bahirastyasau /

End of Presumption.

arthāpattir iyaṃ tasmād anumānān na bhidyate //

This shows that Presumption is included under Inference.

tathā hi caitro 'tra dharmī, tasya bahirbhāvaḥ sādhyaḥ, jīvane sati gṛhyasaṅgo hetuḥ kāryaḥ /

For instance, Caitra is the Subject, the Minor Term; Ms being outside is the Probandum; ‘Being alive and yet not being in the house’ is the Probans, of the nature of an ‘effect’;

gṛhāṅgaṇasthitaḥ pumān sādharmyadṛṣṭāntaḥ / gṛhāntargatas tu vaidharmyadṛṣṭāntaḥ /

‘the man standing in the courtyard’ is the Corroborative Instance per similarity; ‘the man in the house’ is the Corroborative Instance per dissimilarity.

sadanam gṛham / vyāptir dṛṣṭāntābhyām eva niścitā /

‘Sadana’ is House. The Invariable Concomitance (the Major Premiss) is indicated by the two Instances.

nacāsiddho hetuḥ / yato gehāyuktatvaṃ tāvad dṛśyānupalabdhyā niścitam, jīvanaṃ tu parābhyupagamāt siddham /

The Probans cannot be said to be ‘inadmissible Because absence in the House has been cognised by ‘the non-perception of what should have been perceived, if there’; as for the man being alive, this is said to be ascertained in accordance with the doctrines of the other party.

nahi jīvattāniścāyakaṃ kiñcit pramāṇam asti /

In reality, the Probans is doubtful, as there is no Means for obtaining a certain cognition of his being alive.

nanu ca śabdādir astītyuktam /

“But it has been said that there are such means as the Word, etc.”

evaṃ tarhi yata eva śabdādeḥ pramāṇājjīvanaṃ niścitaṃ tata eva bahirbhāvaḥ siddha iti kim arthāpattyā kartavyam /

In that case, if Ms being alive has been duly ascertained by means of Word, etc., then that is enough to prove Ms existence outside; what then is there left to be done by Presumption?

tasmāt parābhyupagamāt / siddhaṃ hetumabhyupagamyānumāne 'ntarbhāvaḥ pratipādita arthāpatteḥ //

Thus, it is on the basis of the doctrines of the Opponent that we regard the Probans put forward by us as ‘admissible’, and through the Probans it has been proved that Presumption is included under Inference.

ity arthāpattiparīkṣā //

End of Presumption.

abhāvam adhikṛtyāha pramāṇetyādi /

In regard to ‘Negation’ Abhāva the Author sets forth the following views: [see verse 1648 above]

vastusattāvabodhārthaṃ tatrābhāvapramāṇatā // tatra mīmāṃsakānāṃ sadasallakṣaṇayor bhāvābhāvayor vastutvaṃ, sarvasya capadārthasya sadasadrūpeṇa dvyātmakatvamityabhyupagamaḥ /

According to Mīmāṃsakas, entities are of two kinds Positive and Negative, the former being characterised by existence and the latter by non-existence; and they hold that every object has two aspects the existent and the non-existent; thus it being acknowledged that the Object has these two aspects, the existent and the non-existent, in the case of an object Le.