buddhist-nlp/tatpa-noisy · Datasets at Hugging Face

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na kevalaṃ na cakṣur gocara ityapi śabdārthaḥ /	‘Even in the mind’ the term ‘even’ means ‘it is not only not seen, (but also not present in the mind)’.
yadi buddhau gosārūpyānugataṃ na kiñcit pratibhāseta tadāyaṃ sadṛśo gavetikimāśritya saṅketaḥ kriyeta kriyate, ca samayaḥ, tasmād buddhistho gosārūpyānugata ākāraḥ kaścit samayakāle pratibhāsate ityabhyupagantavyam //	If there is nothing that appears in the Mind as qualified by similarity to the Cow, then, at the time that the Convention is made in the form ‘it is similar to the Cow’, on what thing is this Convention based? And yet, such a Convention is actually made hence it has to be admitted that at the time of the making of the Convention, there is something present in the Mind which is qualified by similarity to the Cow.
na sambandhyatiriktaś ca sambandho 'stīti sādhitam /	It has been proved that the relation has no existence apart from the relatives;
prāgeva samaye śabdo gṛhītaḥ śrotracetasā //	on the previous occasion, at the time of the convention, the name was perceived by auditory perception;
cakṣuṣā dṛśyate cāsāvagrato 'vasthitaḥ paśuḥ /	and later on the animal standing before the man is seen with the eye;
pṛthagvijñātayoreṣā yuktā na ghaṭanā pramā //	apart from these two already thus cognised, any mingling up of the two could not be valid cognition.
gṛhītapratisandhānāt sugandhimadhuratvavat / tannāmayogasaṃvittiḥ smārtatāṃ nātivartate //	as in the case of the notions of ‘fragrant’ and ‘sweet thus the notion of the connection of the name cannot escape prom being op' the nature of remembrance.
anena gṛhītagrahaṇād aprāmāṇyam āha sādhitam iti /	What is meant is that the Cognition in question cannot be valid, as it apprehends what has been already apprehended.
guṇapadārthaparīkṣāyām /	‘It has been proved’ in course of our examination of the Category of Quality.
syād etat yadyapi pṛthaksambandhinau gṛhītau śrotrādicetasā, tayoś ca ghaṭanopamayā kriyate, tasmād ghaṭanayā prāmāṇyam upamānasya syād ity āha pṛthag ityādi /	The following might be urged: “The two Relatives may have been cognised by auditory and other perceptions; it is the commingling of the two that is done by Analogical Cognition; and it is in this commingling that lies the validity of Analogical Cognition The answer to this is ‘Apart from these two, etc. etc.’
sugandhimadhurādivad iti / sapramyarthe vatiḥ /	‘As in the case of the notions, etc. etc.’ The affix ‘vati’ has the force of the Locative.
yathā yadetad buddhastvanubhūyamānaṃ tan madhuraṃ tat sugandhī [p.455] tyādau viṣayegṛhītasaṃyojanātmakaṃ jñānaṃ na pramāṇaṃ tathedam api na bhavitum arhatītyarthaḥ /	The sense is that there are such notions as ‘This thing that I have perceived is fragrant and sweet’, where there is a commingling of things already apprehended, which are not regarded as valid; so would, the Cognition in Question also be.
tat tasmāt, nāmayogasaṃvittiḥ saṃjñāsambandhajñānaṃ, smārttatāṃ nātivartate yathoktanītyā //	‘Tat’ Thus, therefore. ‘Nāmayoga, etc.’ the cognition of the connection of the Name. ‘Can escape, etc. etc.’ as already explained.
anantopāyajanyāś ca samākhyāyogasaṃvidaḥ /	Notions of connection with names are produced by endless means, even apart from similarity;
sādharmyamanapekṣyāpi jāyante narapādiṣu //	as is found in the case of such names as ‘nampa’ (king) and the like.
samākhyāyogasaṃvida iti /	The following might be urged: “The connection of the Name is nowhere created through similarity;
saṃjñāsambandhajñānāni /	‘Notions, etc. etc.’ i.e. notions of the relation of Names.
narapādiṣviti / rājādiṣu //	‘As in the case, etc. etc.’ i.e. of ‘King’ and such names.
tadevāntopāyajanyatvaṃ pradarśayitum udāharaṇam āha sitātapatretyādi /	An example is cited of the manner in which notions of Names are brought about by endless means: [see verse 1581 next]
sitātapatrāpihitabradhnapādo narādhipaḥ / teṣāṃ madhya iti prokta upadeśaviśeṣataḥ // kālāntareṇa taddṛṣṭau tannāmāsyeti yā matiḥ /	‘That person is the king who is protected from the rays of the sun by the white umbrella’, having been told thus, the man, later on, sees such a person, and through the said advice, comes to have the notion that ‘this is the person bearing the name king’.
sā tadānyāpramā prāptā sādharmyādyanapekṣaṇāt //	An example is cited of the manner in which notions of Names are brought about by endless means: [see verses 1581 above]
yathāhi kaścit kañcid brūte gaccha bhrātaramunā kāryeṇa, paśya narādhipatiṃ buhubhir gajaturagādirūḍhaiḥ puruṣai, saha gacchantam iti / sa pratyāha kas teṣāṃ madhye narādhipatir iti /	Someone says to another man ‘Brother, please go for this business, and see the King passing along with many persons riding elephants and horses’, The other man says ‘Which one among them is the King?’ The first man replies ‘Among them, that person is the King who is protected from the Sun’s rays by the white Umbrella’.
tasya tamupadeśaṃ gṛhītvā gatasya dṛṣṭvā taṃ yathoktaviśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭaṃ rājānam ayasam asau narādhipatināmeti yā buddhir utpadyate sāpi bhavan matena	Bearing this instruction in his mind, the man goes forward, and when he sees such a person as described to him, there appears in his mind the idea that ‘this is the person named King’. Now, according to you (Naiyāyika) this also would have to be regarded as a distinct form of valid Cognition why? Because it has not been brought about by similarity or any such conditions.
pramāṇāntaramāpatitam /	as the probans cited is not invariably concomitant (with the probandum);
kasmāt---/ sādṛśyādyanapekṣaṇāt /	and specially because nothing is put forward which would negative the contrary of the desired conclusion.
anena pramāṇaṣaṭkānantarbhāvaṃ darśayati //	Further, in this way, you would be running counter to the doctrine of ‘four forms of cognition’.
aviddhakarṇastu dve eva pramāṇe svalakṣaṇasāmānyalakṣaṇābhyāṃ cānyatprameyaṃ nāstīti, etad vighaṭanārthaṃ pramāṇayati pratyakṣamanumānavyatiriktapramāṇāntarasadvitīyaṃ pramāṇatvāt anumānavat /	Aviddhakarṇa notices the view that “there are only two Means (or Forms) of Cognition; and there is no object of Cognition apart from Specific Individuality and Commonalty (or the Universal)”; and in refutation of this view, he puts forward the following arguments: “(a) Perception has its companion in the shape of a form of Cognition in addition to Inference, because it is a form of Cognition, like Inference.
anumānaṃ vā pratyakṣavyatiriktapramāṇāntarasadvitīyaṃ pramāṇatvāt, pratyakṣavat /	Or (d) The Universal has for its companion, a cognisable object in addition to the Specific Individuality, because it is cognisable, like the Specific Individuality.”
tathā svalakṣaṇaṃ sāmānyalakṣaṇavyatiriktaprameyārthāntarasadvitīyaṃ prameyatvāt, sāmānyalakṣaṇavat /	‘Saṅgatam’ connected, related. This is only by way of illustration; it should be understood to apply to. the proving of the existence of other cognisable things also.
sāmānyalakṣaṇaṃ vā svalakṣaṇavyatiriktaprameyāntarasadvitīyaṃ prameyatvāt, svalakṣaṇavad iti /	because their presence in the contrary of the Probandum is open to suspicion. Then again, what is asserted goes against the doctrine that restricts the number of the Forms of Cognition to four;
etad evāha anya iti /	This also would be contravened;
[p.456]	so enough of this.
anyaḥ pramāntarāstitvaṃ sādhayatyanumābalāt / pratyakṣamanumābhinnapramāṇāntarasaṅgatam //	“Another party seeks to prove the existence of another form of cognition, on the strength of inference, thus perception is connected with a form of cognition different from inference, because it is a form of cognition, like inference.
anumāvat pramāṇatvād anumāpyevam eva ca / {naiva}mapratibandho 'yaṃ hetur bādhāprakāśanāt //	as the probans cited is not invariably concomitant (with the probandum); and specially because nothing is put forward which would negative the contrary of the desired conclusion.
catuṣṭvaṃ ca pramāṇānāṃ vyāhanyetaivam eva te /	Further, in this way, you would be running counter to the doctrine of ‘four forms of cognition’.
yat tatra parihāras te sa evātra bhaviṣyati //	The answer that you would have to that would also serve here.
saṅgatam sambaddhaṃ sadvitīyam iti yāvat /	‘Saṅgatam’ connected, related. This is only by way of illustration;
upalakṣaṇametat prameyāntarasādhanasyāpi boddhavyam /	it should be understood to apply to. the proving of the existence of other cognisable things also.
sādhyavipakṣe hetor bādhakasyāprakāśanān na sādhyasādhanayoḥ pratibandha upadarśita ityanaikāntikāḥ sarva eva hetavaḥ, saṃdigdhavipakṣavyāvṛttikatvāt /	Nothing has been mentioned by way of negativing the Probans in the contrary of the Probandum; hence there can be no Invariable Concomitance between the Probans and the Probandum. Consequently all that has been cited as the Probans is Inconclusive; because their presence in the contrary of the Probandum is open to suspicion.
kiṃ ca pratyakṣānumānopamānaśabdāni catvāri pramāṇānīti saṅkhyāniyamo vyāhanyeta, anenaiva prakāreṇa pramāṇāntarasadbhāvāt /	Then again, what is asserted goes against the doctrine that restricts the number of the Forms of Cognition to four; as in the way shown, the existence of other forms of cognition also might be proved.
tathā hi śakyamidam abhidhātum pratyakṣam anumānopamānaśabdavyatiriktapramāṇāntarasadvitīyaṃ pramāṇatvād anumānavad iti /	For instance, it can be said that ‘Perception has for its companion a Form of Cognition other than Inference, Analogical Cognition and Verbal Cognition, because it is a Form of Cognition, like Inference’. Further Cognisable Things have been held to fall under three classes viz.: Universal, Particular and Particular-Universal.
tadapi vyāhanyeta, tenaiva prakāreṇa prameyāntarasādhanasambhavāt /	This also would be contravened; as in the same way the existence of other Cognisable Things also may be proved.
yo 'tra bhavataḥ parihāraḥ so 'smākam api bhaviṣyatītyalaṃ bahunā //	Whatever answer you may have to these criticisms will serve my purpose also;
ityupamānavicāraḥ //	so enough of this.
arthāpattim adhikṛtyāha pramāṇaṣaṭketyādi / pramāṇaṣaṭkavijñāto yatrārtho nānyathā bhavan /	“If a certain fact, cognised through the six means of cognition. is found to be otherwise inexplicable, and thence leads to the assumption of some other fact, this is called ‘arthāpatti’ ‘presumption’”.
adṛṣṭaṃ kalpayatyanyaṃ sārthāpattir udāhṛtā //	The following has been urged in regard to ‘Presumption’ (which has been regarded as an independent Means or Form of Cognition, by Mīmāṃsakas): [see verse 1587 above]
yatra deśakālādau pratyakṣānumānopamānaśābdārthāpattyabhāvalakṣaṇaiḥ ṣaḍbhiḥ pramāṇaiḥ paricchinno 'rtho 'nyathā nopapadyate yadyevambhūto 'rtho na bhaved ityevaṃ yā parokṣārthaviṣayā kalpanā sārthāpattiḥ pramāṇam /	In regard to Time, Place, etc., when a certain fact has been duly cognised through the six Means of Cognition, in the shape of Perception, Inference, Analogy, Word, Presumption and Negation, and it is found to be otherwise inexplicable, if a certain other fact were not. there, then the assumption of this other fact is made pertaining to what is not perceptible; this assumption is the Means of Cognition called ‘Presumption’.
udāhṛteti śabarasvāminā /	‘Called’ i.e. by Śabarasvāmin; who says (under Sū.
yathoktam ---" dṛṣṭaḥ śruto vārtho 'nyathā nopapadyata ityadṛṣṭakalpanā /	5) ‘Presumption consists in the presuming of something not seen, on the ground that a fact already perceived or heard of would not be possible without that presumption;
tadyathā jīvati devadatte gṛhādarśanena bahirbhāvakalpaneti" /	for instance, it is found that Devadatta, who is alive, is not in the house, and this non-existence in the house (which is seen) leads to the presumption that he is somewhere outside the house’.
dṛṣṭaḥ ---śābdavyatiriktapramāṇapañcakādhigataḥ, śrutaḥ śābdapramāṇāvagataḥ //	In this passage, the term ‘seen’ stands for ‘cognised through the five means of Cognitions other than Word’; and ‘heard of’ stands for ‘cognised by means of the Word (1587)
tatra ṣaṭpramāṇapūrvikāyā arthāpatter yathākramamudāharaṇānyāha tatretyādi /	“If a certain fact, cognised through the six means of cognition. is found to be otherwise inexplicable, and thence leads to the assumption of some other fact, this is called ‘arthāpatti’ ‘presumption’”.
[p.457]	who says (under Sū.
tatra pratyakṣato jñātād dāhāddahanaśaktitā /	In this passage, the term ‘seen’ stands for ‘cognised through the five means of Cognitions other than Word’;
vahneranumitāt sūrye yānāt tacchaktiyogitā //	(2) the assumption of the mobility of the sun based upon the inferred fact of its going from place to place.
śaktayaḥ sarvabhāvānāṃ kāryārthāpattisādhanāḥ /	(3) the potencies of all things are presumed on the basis of the inexplicability of the effects produced by them;
apūrvās tāś ca gamyante sambandhagrahaṇādṛte //	and all such potencies that become cognised are such as have not been known already, and these are cognised without any idea of the relation (of concomitance).” (1588-1589)
tatra pratyakṣapūrvikārthāpattir yathā pratyakṣeṇa dāham anubhūya vahner dāhaśaktikalpanā / anumānapūrvikā yathā deśāntaraprāptyānumitād gamanāt sūryasya gamanaśaktiyogakalpanā /	(1) An example of Presumption based upon Perception is the following Having perceived the fact of burning by Fire, there is Presumption of the presence of Burning Power of Fire. (2) An example of Presumption based upon Inference is the following When the fact of the Sun’s moving from place to place has been inferred, this leads to the Presumption of the presence of mobility in the Sun.
śaktayaś ca sarvadā sarvapadārthānāṃ kāryārthāpattisādhanā iti /	(3) The potencies of all things are always presumed on the basis of the inexplicability otherwise of the effects produced by them.
iyam apyarthāpattiḥ kadācit pratyakṣapūrvikaiva, yadā pratyakṣeṇa kāryam upalabhya kāraṇasya śaktiravagamyate /	This Presumption (of Potencies) itself is based sometimes on Perception; e.g. when one perceives the effect and thence presumes the potency in the Cause;
yadā tvanumānādinā kāryam avagamya kāraṇaśaktiravagamyate tadānumānādpūrvikā bhavati kāryārthāpattiḥ / kāryasyānyathānupapattiḥ sādhanaṃ pramāṇaṃ yāsāṃ tās tathoktāḥ /	when however the effect is known through Inference or some other means of Cognition, and thence the Potency of the Cause is presumedl, then the Presumption is based upon Inference or some other Means of Cognition. The compound ‘Kāryārthāpatti, etc.’ is to be expounded as ‘those whose cognition is brought about by the otherwise inexplicability of the effect;
na ca kāraṇaśaktiḥ pūrvam eva gṛhīteti śakyaṃ vaktum, yasmād apūrvās tāś	the fact that the effect cannot be explained except on the basis of the Potencies)’. It cannot be said that the Potency of the Cause is already known;
ca śaktayo gamyante sarvadaiva /	because the said Potencies that are cognised are always such as are not already known;
tenādhigatārthādhigantṛtvaṃ nāstīti bhavatyeva prāmāṇyam /	so that the cognition does not apprehend what has been already apprehended; and hence this must be regarded as a Form of Valid Cognition.
tatraitat syāt kāryeṇa liṅgenānumeyāḥ śaktayo nārthāpattipramāṇagamyā ityāha sambandhagrahaṇādṛta iti /	It might be argued that ‘Potencies are always inferred from the effects, they are not presumed’. The answer to this is that the cognitions in question are brought about without any idea of the relation (of Concomitance, necessary in all Inference);
yasmāt sambandhagrahaṇamantareṇa gamyante tasmānnānumeyāḥ //	hence they cannot be regarded as Inference.
tameva sambandhagrahaṇābhāvaṃ pratipādayann āha naceti /	The following text proceeds to show the said absence of any idea of the Relation: [see verse 1590 next]
na cāsāṃ pūrvasambandho na vānyo gṛhyate 'dhunā /	“The relation of these potencies has not been previously cognised; nor is it cognised now;
kāryaiḥ saha yataḥ syātāṃ pakṣadharmānvayāviha //	and it is only on the basis of such cognitions that there could be the two premisses.” (1590)
na cāsāṃ śaktīnām anumānakālāt pūrvaṃ kāryaiḥ saha sambandho gṛhīto yathā buddhidhūmayor mahānasādau, tāsām atīndriyatvāt /	Prior to the time of Inference, the relation of the Potencies to the effects has not been cognised, in the way in which the relation of Fire and Smoke is previously recognised in the kitchen; because the Potencies are not perceptible.
anenānvayābhāva uktaḥ /	This shows that there can be no Major Premiss (asserting the Invariable Concomitance).
nāpyadhunānumānakāle gṛhyate sambandho 'tīndriyatvād eva /	‘Nor is it cognised now’ at the time of Inference; for the same reason that they are not perceptible.
anena pakṣadharmābhāva uktaḥ /	This shows that there can be no Minor Premiss.
nahi kāraṇādhāraśaktīnāṃ kāryaṃ dharmo 'yukteḥ //	The effect cannot be regarded as a property of the Potencies residing in the Cause, as there can be no ground for this idea.
śrotrādiśaktipakṣe vā yāvān hetuḥ prayujyate / sarvo 'sāvāśrayāsiddho dharmyasiddheḥ prasajyate //	“In the case of proving the potency of the ear, etc., whatever probans might be put forward, would all be found to be ‘of unknown substratum’;
kiṃ ca yadā śrotrādigatāḥ śaktayaḥ pakṣīkriyante tadā śrotrādiśaktipakṣe yāvān hetuḥ prayujyate śaktisādhanāya sarvo 'sau hetur āśrayāsiddhaḥ syāt, āśrayabhūtānāṃ śaktīnām asiddhatvāt /	Then again, in a case where the Potencies of the Ear, etc. are made the Subject of the Inference, whatever Probans (Reason) might be put forward, for the proving of the said Potencies, would all be ‘of unknown substratum’; because the Potencies would be their substratum, and these are not known (as yet).
tasmāt kāryārthāpattisādhanāḥ sarvāḥ śaktayo nānumeyāḥ //	From all this it follows that all Potencies are cognisable through Presumption, not through Inference.
pīno divā na bhuṅkte cetyevamādivacaḥśrutau /	“(4) ‘He is corpulent and does not eat during the day’ On hearing such words, one concludes that the man eats at night;
rātribhojanavijñānaṃ śrutārthāpattirucyate //	and this is presumption based upon what is heard.” [Ślokavārtika-arthāpatti.
[p.458] tatra śābdapramāṇapūrvikārthāpattir yathā pīno devadatto 'kṛtarasāyano divā na bhuṅte ityevam ādivacanaśravaṇād arvāgrātrau bhuṅkta ityevam ādyarthakalpanā //	(4) Presumption based upon Verbal Cognition is there when, on hearing the words that ‘Devadatta is corpulent without medication, and does not eat during the day’, one concludes that the man eats beforehand at night.
syān matam pīno devadāto dinā na bhuṅkte ityasyaiva vākyasyāyam arthaḥ pratīyate rātrau bhuṅkta ityata āha na rātrādipadārthaśceti /	“As a matter of fact, the idea of the night (and the man eating at night) cannot be derived from the sentence speaking of the day (and the man not eating); because what is expressed by the words of the latter has no connection with eating at night.
na rātryādipadārthaś ca divāvākye ca gamyate /	Nor is there any contradistinction whereby the latter could indicate the eating at night.
na bhedo yena tadvākyaṃ tasya syāt pratipādikam / anyārthavyāpṛtatvāc ca na dvitīyārthakalpanā //	Nor can a second (and totally different) meaning be attributed to the words (speaking of the day); because these are already taken up in expressing another idea.
tasmād vākyāntareṇāyaṃ buddhisthena pratīyate / tenānāgāmikatve 'pi yat tadvākyaṃ pratīyate // pramāṇaṃ tasya vaktavyaṃ pratyakṣādiṣu yadbhavet /	Thus then, this sentence (in the mind), though it is not actually verbally expressed, is yet duly cognised, and it has to be pointed out which one among the means of cognition, perception and the rest, it is which brings about the cognition of the said (unspoken) sentence.
natvanuccarite vākye pratyakṣaṃ tāvad iṣyate // nānumānaṃ nahīdaṃ hi dṛṣṭāntena saha kvacit /	As the sentence is not actually spoken, it could not be perception; nor could it be inference, because the sentence has never been found to be concomitant with the other factor;
yadi tvanupalabdhepi sambandhe liṅgateṣyate // taduccāramātreṇa sarvavākyagatir bhavet /	and if, even when this relation (of concomitance) has never been perceived, the factor concerned were regarded as an inferential indicative, then the utterance of any one sentence might bring about the cognition of all sentences;
sambandharahitatvena nānyatas tadviśiṣyate //	because on the point of being unrelated, there would be no distinction between one sentence and another.” (1593-1598) [Ślokavārtika-arthāpatti, 56-61.]
dvividho hi vākyārtho bhavet, yaduta saṃsargo bhedaś ca /	There are two kinds of meaning possible in a sentence in the form of (a) Connection and (b) Contradistinction;
tatra saṃsargaḥ parasparaṃ padārthānām abhedaḥ kṣīrodakavat / bhedaś ca vyavacchedyavyavacchedakabhāvenāvasthānam / yadvā niyatasādhyasādhanasambandhaḥ saṃsargaḥ /	of these ‘Connection’ consists in the unification or commingling of things expressed by the words like Milk and Water, and ‘Contradistinction’ consists in these things expressed standing in the relation of excluder and excluded; or ‘Connection’ consists in the well-known relation of cause and affect, and ‘Contradistinction’ in the exclusion of the unlike.
so 'yaṃ dviprakāro 'pi vākyārtho na sambhavati / tathā hi divādīnāṃ padānāṃ yo 'rthā divādayas teṣāṃ na saṃsargarūpo	In neither of these two forms could the (unspoken) sentence ‘He eats at night’ be the meaning of the (spoken) sentence ‘He eats not in the day For instance, the words of the sentence ‘He eats not in the day’ denote the Day and so forth;
rātribhojanārthaḥ, atyantavilakṣaṇatvāt /	and these have no ‘Connection’ with eating at night; as the two are entirely different.
nāpi bhedarūpo divādipadānāmarātrādivyavacchedenāpravṛtteḥ /	Nor is there ‘Contradistinction’ between them; because the word ‘day’ is never used in the sense of the negation of non-night.
atha matam rātrau bhuṅkta ityayam aparo dvitīyo 'rtho divādivākyasyaivetyāha anyārtheti / divādibhojanapratiṣedha evopakṣīṇatvān na śaknotyaparaṃ tadaiva rātrādibhojanapratipādanaṃ kartum iti na dvitīyārthakalpanā / tasmād vākyāntarasyām artho rātrau bhuṅkta iti /	It might be argued that “That he eats at night is another meaning of the same sentence ‘He eats not in the day’.” The answer to this is ‘Nor can a second meaning, etc. etc.’ There can be no assumption of another meaning for the same sentence, as it is entirely taken up in expressing the idea of the man not eating in the day and hence cannot express the other idea that he eats at night, Consequently the idea of the man eating at night must be expressed by another sentence.
aśābdatvaṃ darśayati anāgamikatvepīti /	‘Present in the mind’ This shows that the cognition is not Verbal.
aśābdatve 'pi / yathoktanītyā śābdatvābhāvasya pratipāditatvāt / yat tad rātrau bhuṅkta ityetad vākyaṃ pratīyate tasya vākyasya grāhakaṃ pramāṇaṃ vaktavyam /	‘Though it is not verbally expressed’, i.e. even though it is not Verbal, due to words; as in the manner shown above, it cannot be verbal cognition. For the cognition, then, of the sentence ‘He eats at night’ which is understood (in the Mind), some ‘Means’ will have to be pointed out;
[p.459] yat pramāṇaṃ pratyakṣādīnām anyatamadbhavet /	which could only be one out of Perception and the rest.
naca bhavati /	And yet it cannot be any of these.
tasmāt pramāṇāntaramevedam iti bhāvaḥ /	Hence it must be an entirely distinct Means of Cognition, This is what is meant.
tadeva pratyakṣādīnām anyatamatvam asya nirākurvann āha nanvityādi / tatrānuccāritasya rātribhojanavākyasya na yuktaṃ pratyakṣatvam aśrūyamāṇatvāt /	The idea of the required Means being one from among Perception and the rest is next refuted ‘As the sentence, etc. etc.’ The sentence expressing the idea of the man eating at night, not being actually spoken, cannot be of the nature of Perception, because it is not heard.
nāpyanumānatvaṃ sambandhābhāvāt /	Nor can it be of the nature of Inference, because there is no relation (of concomitance).

na kevalaṃ na cakṣur gocara ityapi śabdārthaḥ /

‘Even in the mind’ the term ‘even’ means ‘it is not only not seen, (but also not present in the mind)’.

yadi buddhau gosārūpyānugataṃ na kiñcit pratibhāseta tadāyaṃ sadṛśo gavetikimāśritya saṅketaḥ kriyeta kriyate, ca samayaḥ, tasmād buddhistho gosārūpyānugata ākāraḥ kaścit samayakāle pratibhāsate ityabhyupagantavyam //

If there is nothing that appears in the Mind as qualified by similarity to the Cow, then, at the time that the Convention is made in the form ‘it is similar to the Cow’, on what thing is this Convention based? And yet, such a Convention is actually made hence it has to be admitted that at the time of the making of the Convention, there is something present in the Mind which is qualified by similarity to the Cow.

na sambandhyatiriktaś ca sambandho 'stīti sādhitam /

It has been proved that the relation has no existence apart from the relatives;

prāgeva samaye śabdo gṛhītaḥ śrotracetasā //

on the previous occasion, at the time of the convention, the name was perceived by auditory perception;

cakṣuṣā dṛśyate cāsāvagrato 'vasthitaḥ paśuḥ /

and later on the animal standing before the man is seen with the eye;

pṛthagvijñātayoreṣā yuktā na ghaṭanā pramā //

apart from these two already thus cognised, any mingling up of the two could not be valid cognition.

gṛhītapratisandhānāt sugandhimadhuratvavat / tannāmayogasaṃvittiḥ smārtatāṃ nātivartate //

as in the case of the notions of ‘fragrant’ and ‘sweet thus the notion of the connection of the name cannot escape prom being op' the nature of remembrance.

anena gṛhītagrahaṇād aprāmāṇyam āha sādhitam iti /

What is meant is that the Cognition in question cannot be valid, as it apprehends what has been already apprehended.

guṇapadārthaparīkṣāyām /

‘It has been proved’ in course of our examination of the Category of Quality.

syād etat yadyapi pṛthaksambandhinau gṛhītau śrotrādicetasā, tayoś ca ghaṭanopamayā kriyate, tasmād ghaṭanayā prāmāṇyam upamānasya syād ity āha pṛthag ityādi /

The following might be urged: “The two Relatives may have been cognised by auditory and other perceptions; it is the commingling of the two that is done by Analogical Cognition; and it is in this commingling that lies the validity of Analogical Cognition The answer to this is ‘Apart from these two, etc. etc.’

sugandhimadhurādivad iti / sapramyarthe vatiḥ /

‘As in the case of the notions, etc. etc.’ The affix ‘vati’ has the force of the Locative.

yathā yadetad buddhastvanubhūyamānaṃ tan madhuraṃ tat sugandhī [p.455] tyādau viṣayegṛhītasaṃyojanātmakaṃ jñānaṃ na pramāṇaṃ tathedam api na bhavitum arhatītyarthaḥ /

The sense is that there are such notions as ‘This thing that I have perceived is fragrant and sweet’, where there is a commingling of things already apprehended, which are not regarded as valid; so would, the Cognition in Question also be.

tat tasmāt, nāmayogasaṃvittiḥ saṃjñāsambandhajñānaṃ, smārttatāṃ nātivartate yathoktanītyā //

‘Tat’ Thus, therefore. ‘Nāmayoga, etc.’ the cognition of the connection of the Name. ‘Can escape, etc. etc.’ as already explained.

anantopāyajanyāś ca samākhyāyogasaṃvidaḥ /

Notions of connection with names are produced by endless means, even apart from similarity;

sādharmyamanapekṣyāpi jāyante narapādiṣu //

as is found in the case of such names as ‘nampa’ (king) and the like.

samākhyāyogasaṃvida iti /

The following might be urged: “The connection of the Name is nowhere created through similarity;

saṃjñāsambandhajñānāni /

‘Notions, etc. etc.’ i.e. notions of the relation of Names.

narapādiṣviti / rājādiṣu //

‘As in the case, etc. etc.’ i.e. of ‘King’ and such names.

tadevāntopāyajanyatvaṃ pradarśayitum udāharaṇam āha sitātapatretyādi /

An example is cited of the manner in which notions of Names are brought about by endless means: [see verse 1581 next]

sitātapatrāpihitabradhnapādo narādhipaḥ / teṣāṃ madhya iti prokta upadeśaviśeṣataḥ // kālāntareṇa taddṛṣṭau tannāmāsyeti yā matiḥ /

‘That person is the king who is protected from the rays of the sun by the white umbrella’, having been told thus, the man, later on, sees such a person, and through the said advice, comes to have the notion that ‘this is the person bearing the name king’.

sā tadānyāpramā prāptā sādharmyādyanapekṣaṇāt //

An example is cited of the manner in which notions of Names are brought about by endless means: [see verses 1581 above]

yathāhi kaścit kañcid brūte gaccha bhrātaramunā kāryeṇa, paśya narādhipatiṃ buhubhir gajaturagādirūḍhaiḥ puruṣai, saha gacchantam iti / sa pratyāha kas teṣāṃ madhye narādhipatir iti /

Someone says to another man ‘Brother, please go for this business, and see the King passing along with many persons riding elephants and horses’, The other man says ‘Which one among them is the King?’ The first man replies ‘Among them, that person is the King who is protected from the Sun’s rays by the white Umbrella’.

tasya tamupadeśaṃ gṛhītvā gatasya dṛṣṭvā taṃ yathoktaviśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭaṃ rājānam ayasam asau narādhipatināmeti yā buddhir utpadyate sāpi bhavan matena

Bearing this instruction in his mind, the man goes forward, and when he sees such a person as described to him, there appears in his mind the idea that ‘this is the person named King’. Now, according to you (Naiyāyika) this also would have to be regarded as a distinct form of valid Cognition why? Because it has not been brought about by similarity or any such conditions.

pramāṇāntaramāpatitam /

as the probans cited is not invariably concomitant (with the probandum);

kasmāt---/ sādṛśyādyanapekṣaṇāt /

and specially because nothing is put forward which would negative the contrary of the desired conclusion.

anena pramāṇaṣaṭkānantarbhāvaṃ darśayati //

Further, in this way, you would be running counter to the doctrine of ‘four forms of cognition’.

aviddhakarṇastu dve eva pramāṇe svalakṣaṇasāmānyalakṣaṇābhyāṃ cānyatprameyaṃ nāstīti, etad vighaṭanārthaṃ pramāṇayati pratyakṣamanumānavyatiriktapramāṇāntarasadvitīyaṃ pramāṇatvāt anumānavat /

Aviddhakarṇa notices the view that “there are only two Means (or Forms) of Cognition; and there is no object of Cognition apart from Specific Individuality and Commonalty (or the Universal)”; and in refutation of this view, he puts forward the following arguments: “(a) Perception has its companion in the shape of a form of Cognition in addition to Inference, because it is a form of Cognition, like Inference.

anumānaṃ vā pratyakṣavyatiriktapramāṇāntarasadvitīyaṃ pramāṇatvāt, pratyakṣavat /

Or (d) The Universal has for its companion, a cognisable object in addition to the Specific Individuality, because it is cognisable, like the Specific Individuality.”

tathā svalakṣaṇaṃ sāmānyalakṣaṇavyatiriktaprameyārthāntarasadvitīyaṃ prameyatvāt, sāmānyalakṣaṇavat /

‘Saṅgatam’ connected, related. This is only by way of illustration; it should be understood to apply to. the proving of the existence of other cognisable things also.

sāmānyalakṣaṇaṃ vā svalakṣaṇavyatiriktaprameyāntarasadvitīyaṃ prameyatvāt, svalakṣaṇavad iti /

because their presence in the contrary of the Probandum is open to suspicion. Then again, what is asserted goes against the doctrine that restricts the number of the Forms of Cognition to four;

etad evāha anya iti /

This also would be contravened;

[p.456]

so enough of this.

anyaḥ pramāntarāstitvaṃ sādhayatyanumābalāt / pratyakṣamanumābhinnapramāṇāntarasaṅgatam //

“Another party seeks to prove the existence of another form of cognition, on the strength of inference, thus perception is connected with a form of cognition different from inference, because it is a form of cognition, like inference.

anumāvat pramāṇatvād anumāpyevam eva ca / {naiva}mapratibandho 'yaṃ hetur bādhāprakāśanāt //

as the probans cited is not invariably concomitant (with the probandum); and specially because nothing is put forward which would negative the contrary of the desired conclusion.

catuṣṭvaṃ ca pramāṇānāṃ vyāhanyetaivam eva te /

Further, in this way, you would be running counter to the doctrine of ‘four forms of cognition’.

yat tatra parihāras te sa evātra bhaviṣyati //

The answer that you would have to that would also serve here.

saṅgatam sambaddhaṃ sadvitīyam iti yāvat /

‘Saṅgatam’ connected, related. This is only by way of illustration;

upalakṣaṇametat prameyāntarasādhanasyāpi boddhavyam /

it should be understood to apply to. the proving of the existence of other cognisable things also.

sādhyavipakṣe hetor bādhakasyāprakāśanān na sādhyasādhanayoḥ pratibandha upadarśita ityanaikāntikāḥ sarva eva hetavaḥ, saṃdigdhavipakṣavyāvṛttikatvāt /

Nothing has been mentioned by way of negativing the Probans in the contrary of the Probandum; hence there can be no Invariable Concomitance between the Probans and the Probandum. Consequently all that has been cited as the Probans is Inconclusive; because their presence in the contrary of the Probandum is open to suspicion.

kiṃ ca pratyakṣānumānopamānaśabdāni catvāri pramāṇānīti saṅkhyāniyamo vyāhanyeta, anenaiva prakāreṇa pramāṇāntarasadbhāvāt /

Then again, what is asserted goes against the doctrine that restricts the number of the Forms of Cognition to four; as in the way shown, the existence of other forms of cognition also might be proved.

tathā hi śakyamidam abhidhātum pratyakṣam anumānopamānaśabdavyatiriktapramāṇāntarasadvitīyaṃ pramāṇatvād anumānavad iti /

For instance, it can be said that ‘Perception has for its companion a Form of Cognition other than Inference, Analogical Cognition and Verbal Cognition, because it is a Form of Cognition, like Inference’. Further Cognisable Things have been held to fall under three classes viz.: Universal, Particular and Particular-Universal.

tadapi vyāhanyeta, tenaiva prakāreṇa prameyāntarasādhanasambhavāt /

This also would be contravened; as in the same way the existence of other Cognisable Things also may be proved.

yo 'tra bhavataḥ parihāraḥ so 'smākam api bhaviṣyatītyalaṃ bahunā //

Whatever answer you may have to these criticisms will serve my purpose also;

ityupamānavicāraḥ //

so enough of this.

arthāpattim adhikṛtyāha pramāṇaṣaṭketyādi / pramāṇaṣaṭkavijñāto yatrārtho nānyathā bhavan /

“If a certain fact, cognised through the six means of cognition. is found to be otherwise inexplicable, and thence leads to the assumption of some other fact, this is called ‘arthāpatti’ ‘presumption’”.

adṛṣṭaṃ kalpayatyanyaṃ sārthāpattir udāhṛtā //

The following has been urged in regard to ‘Presumption’ (which has been regarded as an independent Means or Form of Cognition, by Mīmāṃsakas): [see verse 1587 above]

yatra deśakālādau pratyakṣānumānopamānaśābdārthāpattyabhāvalakṣaṇaiḥ ṣaḍbhiḥ pramāṇaiḥ paricchinno 'rtho 'nyathā nopapadyate yadyevambhūto 'rtho na bhaved ityevaṃ yā parokṣārthaviṣayā kalpanā sārthāpattiḥ pramāṇam /

In regard to Time, Place, etc., when a certain fact has been duly cognised through the six Means of Cognition, in the shape of Perception, Inference, Analogy, Word, Presumption and Negation, and it is found to be otherwise inexplicable, if a certain other fact were not. there, then the assumption of this other fact is made pertaining to what is not perceptible; this assumption is the Means of Cognition called ‘Presumption’.

udāhṛteti śabarasvāminā /

‘Called’ i.e. by Śabarasvāmin; who says (under Sū.

yathoktam ---" dṛṣṭaḥ śruto vārtho 'nyathā nopapadyata ityadṛṣṭakalpanā /

5) ‘Presumption consists in the presuming of something not seen, on the ground that a fact already perceived or heard of would not be possible without that presumption;

tadyathā jīvati devadatte gṛhādarśanena bahirbhāvakalpaneti" /

for instance, it is found that Devadatta, who is alive, is not in the house, and this non-existence in the house (which is seen) leads to the presumption that he is somewhere outside the house’.

dṛṣṭaḥ ---śābdavyatiriktapramāṇapañcakādhigataḥ, śrutaḥ śābdapramāṇāvagataḥ //

In this passage, the term ‘seen’ stands for ‘cognised through the five means of Cognitions other than Word’; and ‘heard of’ stands for ‘cognised by means of the Word (1587)

tatra ṣaṭpramāṇapūrvikāyā arthāpatter yathākramamudāharaṇānyāha tatretyādi /

“If a certain fact, cognised through the six means of cognition. is found to be otherwise inexplicable, and thence leads to the assumption of some other fact, this is called ‘arthāpatti’ ‘presumption’”.

[p.457]

who says (under Sū.

tatra pratyakṣato jñātād dāhāddahanaśaktitā /

In this passage, the term ‘seen’ stands for ‘cognised through the five means of Cognitions other than Word’;

vahneranumitāt sūrye yānāt tacchaktiyogitā //

(2) the assumption of the mobility of the sun based upon the inferred fact of its going from place to place.

śaktayaḥ sarvabhāvānāṃ kāryārthāpattisādhanāḥ /

(3) the potencies of all things are presumed on the basis of the inexplicability of the effects produced by them;

apūrvās tāś ca gamyante sambandhagrahaṇādṛte //

and all such potencies that become cognised are such as have not been known already, and these are cognised without any idea of the relation (of concomitance).” (1588-1589)

tatra pratyakṣapūrvikārthāpattir yathā pratyakṣeṇa dāham anubhūya vahner dāhaśaktikalpanā / anumānapūrvikā yathā deśāntaraprāptyānumitād gamanāt sūryasya gamanaśaktiyogakalpanā /

(1) An example of Presumption based upon Perception is the following Having perceived the fact of burning by Fire, there is Presumption of the presence of Burning Power of Fire. (2) An example of Presumption based upon Inference is the following When the fact of the Sun’s moving from place to place has been inferred, this leads to the Presumption of the presence of mobility in the Sun.

śaktayaś ca sarvadā sarvapadārthānāṃ kāryārthāpattisādhanā iti /

(3) The potencies of all things are always presumed on the basis of the inexplicability otherwise of the effects produced by them.

iyam apyarthāpattiḥ kadācit pratyakṣapūrvikaiva, yadā pratyakṣeṇa kāryam upalabhya kāraṇasya śaktiravagamyate /

This Presumption (of Potencies) itself is based sometimes on Perception; e.g. when one perceives the effect and thence presumes the potency in the Cause;

yadā tvanumānādinā kāryam avagamya kāraṇaśaktiravagamyate tadānumānādpūrvikā bhavati kāryārthāpattiḥ / kāryasyānyathānupapattiḥ sādhanaṃ pramāṇaṃ yāsāṃ tās tathoktāḥ /

when however the effect is known through Inference or some other means of Cognition, and thence the Potency of the Cause is presumedl, then the Presumption is based upon Inference or some other Means of Cognition. The compound ‘Kāryārthāpatti, etc.’ is to be expounded as ‘those whose cognition is brought about by the otherwise inexplicability of the effect;

na ca kāraṇaśaktiḥ pūrvam eva gṛhīteti śakyaṃ vaktum, yasmād apūrvās tāś

the fact that the effect cannot be explained except on the basis of the Potencies)’. It cannot be said that the Potency of the Cause is already known;

ca śaktayo gamyante sarvadaiva /

because the said Potencies that are cognised are always such as are not already known;

tenādhigatārthādhigantṛtvaṃ nāstīti bhavatyeva prāmāṇyam /

so that the cognition does not apprehend what has been already apprehended; and hence this must be regarded as a Form of Valid Cognition.

tatraitat syāt kāryeṇa liṅgenānumeyāḥ śaktayo nārthāpattipramāṇagamyā ityāha sambandhagrahaṇādṛta iti /

It might be argued that ‘Potencies are always inferred from the effects, they are not presumed’. The answer to this is that the cognitions in question are brought about without any idea of the relation (of Concomitance, necessary in all Inference);

yasmāt sambandhagrahaṇamantareṇa gamyante tasmānnānumeyāḥ //

hence they cannot be regarded as Inference.

tameva sambandhagrahaṇābhāvaṃ pratipādayann āha naceti /

The following text proceeds to show the said absence of any idea of the Relation: [see verse 1590 next]

na cāsāṃ pūrvasambandho na vānyo gṛhyate 'dhunā /

“The relation of these potencies has not been previously cognised; nor is it cognised now;

kāryaiḥ saha yataḥ syātāṃ pakṣadharmānvayāviha //

and it is only on the basis of such cognitions that there could be the two premisses.” (1590)

na cāsāṃ śaktīnām anumānakālāt pūrvaṃ kāryaiḥ saha sambandho gṛhīto yathā buddhidhūmayor mahānasādau, tāsām atīndriyatvāt /

Prior to the time of Inference, the relation of the Potencies to the effects has not been cognised, in the way in which the relation of Fire and Smoke is previously recognised in the kitchen; because the Potencies are not perceptible.

anenānvayābhāva uktaḥ /

This shows that there can be no Major Premiss (asserting the Invariable Concomitance).

nāpyadhunānumānakāle gṛhyate sambandho 'tīndriyatvād eva /

‘Nor is it cognised now’ at the time of Inference; for the same reason that they are not perceptible.

anena pakṣadharmābhāva uktaḥ /

This shows that there can be no Minor Premiss.

nahi kāraṇādhāraśaktīnāṃ kāryaṃ dharmo 'yukteḥ //

The effect cannot be regarded as a property of the Potencies residing in the Cause, as there can be no ground for this idea.

śrotrādiśaktipakṣe vā yāvān hetuḥ prayujyate / sarvo 'sāvāśrayāsiddho dharmyasiddheḥ prasajyate //

“In the case of proving the potency of the ear, etc., whatever probans might be put forward, would all be found to be ‘of unknown substratum’;

kiṃ ca yadā śrotrādigatāḥ śaktayaḥ pakṣīkriyante tadā śrotrādiśaktipakṣe yāvān hetuḥ prayujyate śaktisādhanāya sarvo 'sau hetur āśrayāsiddhaḥ syāt, āśrayabhūtānāṃ śaktīnām asiddhatvāt /

Then again, in a case where the Potencies of the Ear, etc. are made the Subject of the Inference, whatever Probans (Reason) might be put forward, for the proving of the said Potencies, would all be ‘of unknown substratum’; because the Potencies would be their substratum, and these are not known (as yet).

tasmāt kāryārthāpattisādhanāḥ sarvāḥ śaktayo nānumeyāḥ //

From all this it follows that all Potencies are cognisable through Presumption, not through Inference.

pīno divā na bhuṅkte cetyevamādivacaḥśrutau /

“(4) ‘He is corpulent and does not eat during the day’ On hearing such words, one concludes that the man eats at night;

rātribhojanavijñānaṃ śrutārthāpattirucyate //

and this is presumption based upon what is heard.” [Ślokavārtika-arthāpatti.

[p.458] tatra śābdapramāṇapūrvikārthāpattir yathā pīno devadatto 'kṛtarasāyano divā na bhuṅte ityevam ādivacanaśravaṇād arvāgrātrau bhuṅkta ityevam ādyarthakalpanā //

(4) Presumption based upon Verbal Cognition is there when, on hearing the words that ‘Devadatta is corpulent without medication, and does not eat during the day’, one concludes that the man eats beforehand at night.

syān matam pīno devadāto dinā na bhuṅkte ityasyaiva vākyasyāyam arthaḥ pratīyate rātrau bhuṅkta ityata āha na rātrādipadārthaśceti /

“As a matter of fact, the idea of the night (and the man eating at night) cannot be derived from the sentence speaking of the day (and the man not eating); because what is expressed by the words of the latter has no connection with eating at night.

na rātryādipadārthaś ca divāvākye ca gamyate /

Nor is there any contradistinction whereby the latter could indicate the eating at night.

na bhedo yena tadvākyaṃ tasya syāt pratipādikam / anyārthavyāpṛtatvāc ca na dvitīyārthakalpanā //

Nor can a second (and totally different) meaning be attributed to the words (speaking of the day); because these are already taken up in expressing another idea.

tasmād vākyāntareṇāyaṃ buddhisthena pratīyate / tenānāgāmikatve 'pi yat tadvākyaṃ pratīyate // pramāṇaṃ tasya vaktavyaṃ pratyakṣādiṣu yadbhavet /

Thus then, this sentence (in the mind), though it is not actually verbally expressed, is yet duly cognised, and it has to be pointed out which one among the means of cognition, perception and the rest, it is which brings about the cognition of the said (unspoken) sentence.

natvanuccarite vākye pratyakṣaṃ tāvad iṣyate // nānumānaṃ nahīdaṃ hi dṛṣṭāntena saha kvacit /

As the sentence is not actually spoken, it could not be perception; nor could it be inference, because the sentence has never been found to be concomitant with the other factor;

yadi tvanupalabdhepi sambandhe liṅgateṣyate // taduccāramātreṇa sarvavākyagatir bhavet /

and if, even when this relation (of concomitance) has never been perceived, the factor concerned were regarded as an inferential indicative, then the utterance of any one sentence might bring about the cognition of all sentences;

sambandharahitatvena nānyatas tadviśiṣyate //

because on the point of being unrelated, there would be no distinction between one sentence and another.” (1593-1598) [Ślokavārtika-arthāpatti, 56-61.]

dvividho hi vākyārtho bhavet, yaduta saṃsargo bhedaś ca /

There are two kinds of meaning possible in a sentence in the form of (a) Connection and (b) Contradistinction;

tatra saṃsargaḥ parasparaṃ padārthānām abhedaḥ kṣīrodakavat / bhedaś ca vyavacchedyavyavacchedakabhāvenāvasthānam / yadvā niyatasādhyasādhanasambandhaḥ saṃsargaḥ /

of these ‘Connection’ consists in the unification or commingling of things expressed by the words like Milk and Water, and ‘Contradistinction’ consists in these things expressed standing in the relation of excluder and excluded; or ‘Connection’ consists in the well-known relation of cause and affect, and ‘Contradistinction’ in the exclusion of the unlike.

so 'yaṃ dviprakāro 'pi vākyārtho na sambhavati / tathā hi divādīnāṃ padānāṃ yo 'rthā divādayas teṣāṃ na saṃsargarūpo

In neither of these two forms could the (unspoken) sentence ‘He eats at night’ be the meaning of the (spoken) sentence ‘He eats not in the day For instance, the words of the sentence ‘He eats not in the day’ denote the Day and so forth;

rātribhojanārthaḥ, atyantavilakṣaṇatvāt /

and these have no ‘Connection’ with eating at night; as the two are entirely different.

nāpi bhedarūpo divādipadānāmarātrādivyavacchedenāpravṛtteḥ /

Nor is there ‘Contradistinction’ between them; because the word ‘day’ is never used in the sense of the negation of non-night.

atha matam rātrau bhuṅkta ityayam aparo dvitīyo 'rtho divādivākyasyaivetyāha anyārtheti / divādibhojanapratiṣedha evopakṣīṇatvān na śaknotyaparaṃ tadaiva rātrādibhojanapratipādanaṃ kartum iti na dvitīyārthakalpanā / tasmād vākyāntarasyām artho rātrau bhuṅkta iti /

It might be argued that “That he eats at night is another meaning of the same sentence ‘He eats not in the day’.” The answer to this is ‘Nor can a second meaning, etc. etc.’ There can be no assumption of another meaning for the same sentence, as it is entirely taken up in expressing the idea of the man not eating in the day and hence cannot express the other idea that he eats at night, Consequently the idea of the man eating at night must be expressed by another sentence.

aśābdatvaṃ darśayati anāgamikatvepīti /

‘Present in the mind’ This shows that the cognition is not Verbal.

aśābdatve 'pi / yathoktanītyā śābdatvābhāvasya pratipāditatvāt / yat tad rātrau bhuṅkta ityetad vākyaṃ pratīyate tasya vākyasya grāhakaṃ pramāṇaṃ vaktavyam /

‘Though it is not verbally expressed’, i.e. even though it is not Verbal, due to words; as in the manner shown above, it cannot be verbal cognition. For the cognition, then, of the sentence ‘He eats at night’ which is understood (in the Mind), some ‘Means’ will have to be pointed out;

[p.459] yat pramāṇaṃ pratyakṣādīnām anyatamadbhavet /

which could only be one out of Perception and the rest.

naca bhavati /

And yet it cannot be any of these.

tasmāt pramāṇāntaramevedam iti bhāvaḥ /

Hence it must be an entirely distinct Means of Cognition, This is what is meant.

tadeva pratyakṣādīnām anyatamatvam asya nirākurvann āha nanvityādi / tatrānuccāritasya rātribhojanavākyasya na yuktaṃ pratyakṣatvam aśrūyamāṇatvāt /

The idea of the required Means being one from among Perception and the rest is next refuted ‘As the sentence, etc. etc.’ The sentence expressing the idea of the man eating at night, not being actually spoken, cannot be of the nature of Perception, because it is not heard.

nāpyanumānatvaṃ sambandhābhāvāt /

Nor can it be of the nature of Inference, because there is no relation (of concomitance).