buddhist-nlp/tatpa-noisy · Datasets at Hugging Face

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tatrāsya gavaye dṛṣṭe smṛtiḥ samupajāyate / asakṛt dṛṣṭapūrveṣu gorūpāvayaveṣviyam // ata eva turaṅgādau tat sādṛśyena no matiḥ /	hence when the gavaya is seen, there follows the remembrance of the parts of the cow’s body that have been seen before repeatedly. It is for this reason that, there does not arise any idea of the horse and other animals, through that similarity, but it does arise when the gavaya is seen.
vartate gavaye dṛṣṭe ko viśeṣo 'nyathā punaḥ //	otherwise, if there were no such remembrance, what would be the difference (between the case of the cow and that of the horse)? (1547-1549)
prakṛtyaivāsatyapi sādṛśyākhye vastuni kecid gavayāvayavā gogatair avayavaiḥ saha tulyapratyavamarśavikalpahetavaḥ, na sādṛśyaṃ nāmārthāntaramanyatra tulyapratyavamarśahetubhyo 'vayavebhyaḥ, te 'bhyo 'rthāntarasya buddhāvapratibhāsanāt /	In its essence, there is no such thing as Similarity; all that is there is that there are some parts in the Gavaya’s body which bring about the same conceptual notions as certain parts of the cow’s body; and similarity is not any distinct entity, apart, from the said parts which give rise to the same conceptions; that this is so is clear from the fact that nothing apart from these figures in the conception at all.
tasmād gavayadarśanād gogatāvayaveṣveva bhūyodarśanabalāt smṛtirūpam eva ---jāyate jñānaṃ, natu sādṛśyākhyavastugrāhi /	Hence what happens is that on the perception of the Gavaya, there arises a cognition in regard to the parts of the Cow’s body, on account of the repeated perception of these latter in the past;
anyathā hi turagādāvapi bhūyo 'vayavasāmānyayogo 'stīti tatrāpi gavayadarśanād gavīva matiḥ kiṃ na pravarteta / nahyatra kaścid viśeṣo 'sti, ubhayatrāpi sādṛśyasadbhāvāt /	If it were not so, then, in regard to the Horse and other animals also, as the presence of the manifold commonalty of component parts is there, why should not the idea of these other animals appear on the seeing of the Gavaya, in the way as it does in regard to the Cow? There is no difference between the two cases, some degree of similarity being present in both cases.
anyatheti / yadyasakṛn na dṛṣṭāḥ syuḥ /	‘Otherwise’, i.e. if the parts of the cow’s body had not been seen repeatedly.
smṛtitvae tu nāyaṃ doṣo yadevāsakṛddṛṣṭapūrvaṃ tatraiva smṛtir bhavati /	In the case of the resultant cognition being of the nature of Remembrance, this difficulty does not arise; as the Remembrance appears in regard to that same thing which has been repeatedly seen before;
pratiniyataśaktitvāc ca smṛtiprabodhahetūnām //	as the causes that bring about Remembrance are restricted in their scope.
syād etat bhavatu smṛtis tathāpi smṛtir eva kasmād apramāṇam ity āha vijñātetyādi / vijñātārthaprakāśatvān na pramāṇam iyaṃ tataḥ /	Remembrance cannot be a form of valid cognition, because it envisages what is already known. How then could it be regarded as a distinct form of valid cognition? (1550) The following might be urged “Analogical Cognition may be of the nature of Remembrance;
pramāṇāntarabhāvastu kuta eva bhaviṣyati //	but why should Remembrance itself not be regarded as a valid form of Cognition?”
iyam iti / smṛtiḥ //	‘Iyam’ stands for Remembrance.
astu vā vastu sādṛśyaṃ tat tu sāmānyavadgavi / pratiyoginyadṛṣṭe 'pi dṛṣṭam eva puraḥsthitam //	Or, similarity may be an entity, residing in the cow, like the commonalty (or universal); even so, it will have been perceived in the cow standing before the person before he sees the co-relative (gavaya);
tathāca smṛtirūpatvaṃ na kathañcinnivartate /	and as such the cognition of the said similarity following upon the seeing of the gavaya cannot escape from being of the nature of remembrance.
sattāmātreṇa vijñātaṃ sādṛśyaṃ ca gavātmani // gavayena tu sādṛśyamityevaṃ na viniścitam /	[says the other party] “What has been previously seen in the cow is similarity merely existing there, and it has not been definitely ascertained that it is similarity to the gavaya;
pramiṇotyupamānaṃ tu vailakṣaṇyaṃ tataḥ smṛteḥ //	while this latter is what is apprehended by analogical cognition, which, thus, is different from remembrance.” (1551-1553)
bhavatu sādṛśyaṃ vastugati ca sāmānyam iva sarvātmanā parisamāptaṃ, tathāpi gavayadarśanāt pūrvaṃ gavi puro 'vasthite pratyakṣeṇa gṛhyamāṇe tato 'vyatirekāt tadapi puro 'vasthitaṃ sādṛśyaṃ gṛhītam eva gosvarūpavat /	Taking for granted that Similarity is an entity, the Author proceeds to show that, even according to the view of the Mīmāṃsaka, Analogical Cognition cannot be valid: [see verses 1551-1553 above] There may be a real entity in the shape of Similarity; and it may be residing in everything in its entirety. But even so, when, before seeing the Gavaya, the man sees the Cow standing before him, he naturally sees the Similarity which is inseparable from the Cow;
anyathā hyavyatireko na siddhyati /	otherwise the inseparability of the two could not be there.
tataś ca gṛhītagrahaṇāt smṛtirūpatvān na pramāṇam / athāpi syāt sattāmātreṇa pūrvaṃ sādṛśyaṃ gṛhītam, etad gavayaenaitat sādṛśyaṃ gorityanena rūpeṇa na gṛhītaṃ /	And thus, as the subsequent Analogical Cognition would be apprehending only what has been already apprehended, it would not be a form of valid Cognition. The following argument might be urged: “The Similarity seen previously was merely as existing, it was not seen in the form that ‘this is the similarity between this Gavaya and the Cow’;
upamānaṃ tvanenākāreṇa pramiṇoti, tataḥ smṛtirūpatvamasiddham iti // tatrāha yadi nāmetyādinā /	while this is the form in which the Similarity is apprehended by Analogical Cognition; so that it cannot be regarded as being of the nature of Remembrance”.
yadi nāma gṛhītaṃ no nāmnā tenaiva tat purā / gṛhītaṃ tu svarūpeṇa yadasyātmābhidhīyate //	Even if the similarity had not been previously apprehended under that name, it was apprehended all the same, in its own form, which is called its very self.
yadi nāma gavayena sādṛśyam ityanena nāmnā viśiṣṭaṃ godravyaṃ gavayadarśanāt pūrvaṃ na gṛhītaṃ, svarūpeṇa tu gṛhītam eva /	Even though the Similarity has not been previously apprehended under that name, i.e. as ‘Similarity to the Gavaya’, i.e. the animal Cow as similar to the Gavaya may not have been apprehended prior to the seeing of the Gavaya; yet in its own form, it has been already apprehended;
yas tasya svabhāvaḥ sa gṛhīta iti yāvat /	that is, that which forms its very self its essence, nature, has been previously apprehended.
kiṃ tatsvarūpam ity āha yadasyātmābhidhīyata iti /	Question “What is that own form in which it has been apprehended?” Answer: ‘Which is called its very self’;
tena svarūpeṇa svabhāvalakṣaṇena tadgṛhītam iti yāvat //	i.e. that which is called the very self of the Cow, in that form, which constitutes its nature, it has been already apprehended.
yadi nāma gṛhītaṃ tataḥ kimityāha na nāma rūpam ityādi /	Question: “What if it has been already apprehended?”
na nāma rūpaṃ vastūnāṃ yat tasyāgrahaṇe sati /	Answer: [see verse 1555 next] Mere name does not constitute the ‘essence’ of things;
parijñātātmatattvānām apyavijñātatā bhavet //	by virtue of which, when it (the name) has not been apprehended, the things could be regarded as ‘not known’, by people who know the true nature of the self.
nahi vastūnāṃ svarūpaṃ nāma bhavati, yena tasya nāmnaḥ pūrvamagrahaṇe gṛhītasyāpi vastuno na grahaṇaṃ syāt /	The Name does not form the ‘essence’ of things; so that, even if the Name has not been previously known, if the thing happens to become known, it cannot be said to be ‘not known’.
viśeṣataś ca niścayātmakapratyakṣavādino na gṛhītam ityevaṃ na yuktaṃ vaktum //	Specially for the philosopher who holds the view that Sense-perception is of the nature of definitely certain Cognition, it cannot be right to say that the thing, thus known, is not known.
etāvatā ca leśena pramāṇatvavyavasthitau / neyattā syāt pramāṇānām anyathāpi pramāṇataḥ //	If on the strength of the slight element of valid cognition (found in analogical cognition), it were to be regarded as an independent form of cognition, then there could be no limit to the number of such independent forms of cognition;
[p.450] kiñca anena tulya iti jñānādetāvatā leśena pramāṇāntarakalpanāyām atiprasaṅgaḥ syāt /	Further, if the mere idea of ‘being similar to this’, this slight element, found in Analogical Cognition, were to he accepted as the basis for regarding it as a distinct Form of Cognition, then there would be absurdities;
"pratyakṣam anumānaṃ ca śābdaṃ copamayā saha / arthāpattir abhāvaś ca ṣaḍete sādhyasādhakāḥ" // iti neyattā syāt pramāṇānām //	and there could be no limit to the number of forms of Valid Cognition, such as is found in the declaration ‘Sense-perception, Inference, Verbal Cognition, Analogical Cognition, Presumption and Negation are the six means of accomplishing what is to be accomplished.’ (1556)
tamevātiprasaṅgaṃ darśayann āha tarupaṅktyādītyādi /	The Author proceeds to show the Incongruities that the above would lead to: [see verses 1557-1558 next]
tarupaṅktyādisaṃdṛṣṭāvekapādapadarśanāt / dvitīyaśākhivijñānād ādyo 'sāviti niścayaḥ //	When a line of trees and such things are seen, what is actually perceived is only one tree, and yet some idea of the second tree being there, there follows the definite cognition (in regard to the former tree) that ‘this is the first’;
pramāṇāntaramāsaktaṃ sādṛśyādyanapekṣaṇāt / gṛhītagrahaṇān no cetsamānamupamāsvapi //	as it does not depend upon any element of ‘similarity’ or other conditions (attendant upon the well-known forms of cognition). If it is denied in this case, on the ground that it apprehends only what has been already apprehended, then the same might be said in regard to analogical cognitions also.
ādiśabdena pipīlikādipaṅkigrahaṇam /	‘And such things’ is meant to include the line of Ants and so on.
tarupaṅktyādidarśanakāle prathamavṛkṣagrahaṇādādyo 'yaṃ vṛkṣa iti niścayo nopajāyate /	As a matter of fact, when one sees a line of trees, so long as one sees one of the trees only, there is no such definite cognition as that ‘this is the first tree’;
dvitīyavṛkṣopalabdhau tu satyāmādye śākhinyādyo 'yaṃ śākhīti yo 'yaṃ jāyate niścayaḥ sa pramāṇāntaraṃ syāt /	when however, he notices the second tree, there does come about, in reference to the former tree, the idea that ‘this is the first tree’; and this would have to be regarded as a distinct form of Cognition (even if the contention of the Mīmāṃsaka in regard to Analogical cognition were accepted).
kasmāt / sādṛśyādyanapekṣaṇāt / sādṛśyaṃ nāpekṣata iti nopamānam idam /	Why? Because it is a form of cognition not dependent upon any element of Similarity or such other conditions. So that, because it does not depend upon Similarity, therefore it cannot be analogical cognition;
akṣavyāpārānapekṣaṇān na pratyakṣam / liṅgānapekṣaṇānnānumānam /	because it does not depend upon the operation of the Senses, therefore it cannot be Sense-perception; because it does not depend upon an Inferential Indicative, therefore it cannot be Inference;
śabdanirapekṣatvān na śābdam /	because it does not depend upon Words, it cannot be Verbal Cognition;
anyathānupapadyamānadṛṣṭaśrutārthānapekṣatvānnārthāpattiḥ / pramāṇaprameyanivṛttyapekṣaṇānnābhāvaḥ /	because it does not depend upon any seen or heard of fact which would be otherwise inexplicable, therefore it cannot be Presumption -and because it does not depend upon the cessation of Means and Objects of Cognition, therefore it cannot be Negation.
tathā asmāt pūrvam idaṃ paścād dīrghaṃ hrasvam idaṃ mahat / ityevam ādivijñāne pramāniṣṭā prasajyate / iti vaktavyam /	Thus there is room for the absurdity urged in the following declaration ‘This is prior to that, This is posterior to that This is larger than that This is shorter than that all these cognitions would have to be regarded as so many distinct Forms of Cognition, which is highly undesirable’,
smṛtitvād gṛhītagrahaṇān na pramāṇāntarametad iti cet / samānam upamāsvapi / gṛhītagrāhitvam /	It might be urged that “as the cognition in question apprehends what has been already apprehended, it cannot be regarded as Valid Cognition”, this condition, of apprehending what has been already apprehended, is present in Analogical Cognitions also.
upamāsviti vyaktibhedād bahuvacanam //	The plural number in ‘Analogical Cognitions’ is in view of the fact that there are many such Cognitions.
gavayasyopalambhe ca turaṅgādau pravartate /	When one sees the gavaya, there appears the notion of its ‘dissimilarity’ to the horse and other animals;
tadvaisādṛśyavijñānaṃ yat tadanyā pramā na kim // abhāvāntargataṃ no cennaivaṃ bhāvāvalambanāt / anyonyābhāvatāyāṃ vā samaṃ sādṛśyabuddhiṣu //	why cannot this be a distinct form of cognition? If it be urged that “it cannot be so regarded because it is included under negation”, then, the same might be said in regard to the notions of ‘similarity’ which also are included under ‘mutual negation’.
kiñca yathā gavayadarśanād gavi sādharmyajñānaṃ pramāṇāntaraṃ vyavasthāpyate, tathā gavayadarśanāt turaṅgādau vaisādṛśyasya vijñānam api kasmān na pramāṇāntaraṃ vyavasthāpyeta /	Then, again, on seeing the Gavaya, there appears the idea of its similarity in the Cow, and this is regarded as a distinct Form of Cognition; in the same way, when on seeing the Gavaya, there follows the notion of its dissimilarity in the Horse, why cannot this also be regarded as a distinct Form of Cognition?
abhāvapramāṇāntarbhāvān na pramāṇāntaram iti cet /	“It cannot be regarded as a distinct Form of Cognition, as it is included under Negation.”
naitadyuktam /	That cannot be right.
kasmāt /	“Why?”
bhāvāvalambanāt /	Because it envisages a positive entity;
vaisādṛśyaṃ hi sādṛśyābhāvaḥ, tasmād astyevābhāvāntargatir ity āha anyonetyādi /	while Negation envisages a non-entity. “Dissimilarity is only negation of similarity; and hence the notion of dissimilarity is really included under Negation.”
anyonyābhāvatāyāṃ satyāṃ yadya [p.451] bhāvarūpaṃ prameyaṃ vyavasthāpyate tadā, samam tulyam etadīdṛśaṃ prameyaṃ sādṛśyabuddhiṣu upamānatveneṣṭāsu //	‘The same might be said, etc. etc.’ That is to say, if the negative character of a certain object is sought to be based upon its being subject to Mutual Negation, then the same sort of object is found in the case of the notions of Similarity also, which are regarded as ‘Analogical Cognition (1559-1560)
katham ity āha sādṛśyasyetyādi /	Question: “How so?” Answer: [see verse 1561 next]
sādṛśyasya viveko hi yathā tatra pramīyate / sarvāvayavasāmānyaviveko gamyate tathā //	Just as distinction from ‘similarity’ is cognised in that case, so also is distinction from ‘all common parts’ cognised in the other case also.
yathā tatra vaidharmyajñāne sādṛśyavivekaḥ pratīyate tathā sādharmyajñāne 'pi sarvāvayavasāmānyaviyogo gamyata ityabhāvantarbhāvaḥ syād vaisādṛśyajñānavat //	in the same way, in the case of the idea of ‘Similarity’ also, there is perception of difference from (i.e. negation of) the presence of all Common Parts; so that this also can be included under Negation, just like the notion of Dissimilarity.
atraivopapattim āha bhūya ityādi /	In support of the same, an argument is put forward: [see verse 1562 next]
yeneti kāraṇopadeśaḥ /	‘Yena’ indicates the reason for what has been asserted above.
yena yasmāt, sādharmyajñāne bhūyo 'vayavasāmānyayogo 'vagamyate / natu sarvāvayavasāmānyayogas tasmād atrāpyanyonyābhāvaḥ /	What is meant is that because, in the case of the Cognition of Similarity, what is cognised is the ‘presence of several similar parts’, and not the ‘presence of all similar parts’, therefore this is a case of ‘Mutual Negation’.
anyathā yadi sarvāvayavasāmānyayogaḥ syāt, / tadā tattvam gotvaṃ gavayasya prasajyeta //	Otherwise, if all parts were similar, then there would be identity, i.e. the Gavaya would be the same as the Cow.
kaiścid iti / naiyāyikaiḥ /	‘Some people’ i.e. the Naiyāyikas.
ta evam upamānasya lakṣaṇam āhuḥ ---"prasiddhasādharmyāt sādhyasādhanam upamānam" iti /	They have provided the following definition of Analogy “Analogy is that which accomplishes its purpose through similarity to a known object.
prasiddhaṃ sādharmyaṃ prasiddhena vā sādharmyaṃ yasya sa prasiddhasādharmyo gavayaḥ, tasmāt tamāśritya, sādhyasya saṃjñāsaṃjñisambandhasya, sādhanam siddhiḥ, upamānam /	6) The term ‘prasiddhasādharmya’ may mean either ‘through similarity to a known object’, or ‘through well-known similarity’; the ‘object’ of which this ‘similarity’ is known is the Gavaya; ‘through this i.e. on the basis of this, there is ‘accomplishment’ fulfilment of the ‘purpose’ i.e. of the relation of Name and Named;
tathāhyāgamāhitasaṃskārasmṛtyapekṣāt sādharmyajñānāt samākhyāsambandhapratipattir upamānam ityayam evārtho 'nyair anyathā nirdiṣṭaḥ /	Other people have expressed the same idea in other words, as follows: “Certain impressions having been left on the mind by a previous Verbal Cognition, those impressions bring about a Remembrance, this Remembrance leads to the Cognition of Similarity, from which there follows the cognition of the relation to a Name, this last cognition is Analogical Cognition.
gaur iva gavaya ityatideśavākyamāgamaḥ, tenāhito yaḥ saṃskārākhyo guṇaḥ, tatoyātideśavākyārthasmṛtirupajāyate 'raṇye gavayadarśanāt, tām apekṣate yat	The ‘Verbal Cognition’ meant here is that derived from the analogical statement e.g. ‘the Gavaya is like the Cow’, this produces an Impression, a faculty in the Mind, this Impression brings about the remembrance of the said analogical statement, on the occasion of seeing the Gavaya in the present;
sādharmyajñānaṃ tat tathoktam /	on the basis of this Remembrance, there follows a notion of Similarity.
samākhyā saṃjñā, śabda iti yāvat /	‘Samākhyā’ is Name, i.e. the word;
tatrāpītyādinā dūṣaṇam āha	this Name is related to the object;
tatrāpi saṃjñāsambandhapratipattir anākulā /	and the cognition of this Relation is what constitutes Analogical Cognition.”
tathā parigṛhītārthagrahaṇān na pramāṇatā / smṛter ivopamānasya karaṇārthaviyogataḥ //	This is exactly the same idea (that has been set forth in the Nyāyasūtra quoted above). The above view of Analogical Cognition is refuted in the following [see verses 1564-1565 next]
tatrātideśavakyaśravaṇakāle saṃjñāsambandhapratipatteḥ pūrvamevotpannatvātpaścād utpadyamānāyāṃ gṛhītagrahaṇān na pramāṇatvaṃ smṛtivat /	At the time that the statement of analogy is heard, the idea of the relation of Name and Named is already there; if the same idea appears again subsequently, it apprehends what has been already apprehended before, and hence like Remembrance cannot be a valid cognition.
syād etad gṛhītagrāhitvaṃ, bhaviṣyati prāmāṇyaṃ ceti, ko 'tra virodha ity āha karaṇārthaviyogata iti /	It might be urged that “It may apprehend what is already apprehended, and yet it may be a Means of valid cognition; what would be the incongruity in that?”
karaṇārthaḥ sādhakatamatvam, aniṣpādite karmaṇi pravṛttyā //	The answer to this is ‘It is devoid of, etc. etc.’ That is, the ‘true character of Instrument’ consists in being the most effective cause, and a cause is most effective only when it tends to bring about what has not been already brought about.
syād etat pūrvaṃ saṃjñāsambandhapratipattir na jātaiva, tato gṛhītagrahaṇādityasiddho hetur ity āha atha seti /	The following might be urged “There has been no previous idea of the relation of the Name at all; hence the Reason ‘because it apprehends what is already apprehended’ is not admissible”.
yadi pūrvaṃ na saṃjātā saṃjñāsambandhapratipattir abhaviṣyat tadāyam asaugavayo yasya mayā pūrvaṃ saṃjñā śrutetyevamākārāpratipattir nodāyiṣyata //	Answer: [see verse 1566 above] If the cognition of the relation of the Name had not been there, then there could have been no such cognition, later on, as that ‘this is the Gavaya whose name I had heard before’.
atraivopapattimāha tathā hīti /	A further argument to the same effect is stated: [see verse 1567 next]
aviddhakarṇastvāha āgamāt sāmānyena pratipadyate viśeṣapratipattis tūpamānād iti /	Aviddhakarṇa has asserted as follows: “Of the Name, the Man has a general (vague) notion through Verbal Cognition, and it is the definite idea of it that is brought about by Analogy”.
atas tanmatamāśaṅkate upayuktopamāna iti /	This view is set forth in the following [see verse 1568 next]
upayuktopamānaścettulyatvagrahaṇe sati /	The word ‘upayuktopa, etc. etc.’ is one who has heard the statement of analogy.
viśiṣṭo viṣayo gavayaḥ //	‘Particular object’ i.e. the Gavaya.
nanvityādinā pratividhatte /	The answer to the above is provided by the following [see verse 1570 next]
nahi citrāṅgade kaścit tannāmagrahaṇe sati / kālāntareṇa taṃ śabdaṃ vetti cārukirīṭini //	‘Na’ has to be construed with ‘Yujyate’. When the relation of the name has been cognised in regard to one thing, it cannot be right to cognise the same name as applied to another thing;
tasmāt prāg yatra tenedaṃ vikalpapratibimbake /	for, if it did, then there would be incongruities. The possible incongruity is shown in the following [see verses 1571-1573 next]
aṅgadaḥ kaṭakākhyamābharaṇam / citro 'ṅgado yasyāsau tathoktaḥ /	‘Aṅgada’ is an ornament called ‘Kaṭaka’, Armlet. ‘Cītrāṅgada’ is the man who is wearing a ‘citra’ wonderful ‘aṅgada’ armlet.
nahi citrāṅgado yaḥ sa devadatta ityuktaḥ kaścit kālāntare taṃ citrāṅgadaśabdaṃ cārikirīṭini yajñadatte pratipadyate /	When the man with the wonderful armlet has been once spoken of as ‘Devadatta’ (by name) in the statement ‘The man with the wonderful armlet is Devadatta’, and one, on hearing this, has cognised the name as belonging to that person, he does not, at any future time, recognise that expression ‘man with the wonderful bracelet’ as applying to Yajñadatta, who is a ‘man with the beautiful diadem’.
kirīṭam mukuṭaṃ, cāru sa tat kirīṭaṃ yasyāsti sa tathoktaḥ /	‘Kirīṭa’ is diadem; ‘Cārukirīṭa’ is the man with the beautiful diadem.
tasmān mābhūd atiprasaṅga iti / yatraivārthe vikalpasamāropite bāhyārthavyavasāyinyā buddhyā gṛhītaṃ nāma saṃjñā, gavayopalambhe 'pi tatraiva tannāma pratipadyate, natu bāhye svalakṣaṇe gavayākhye /	For the above reasons, in order to avoid the likelihood of the incongruity, when a Name has been recognised by a determinate cognition envisaging an external object, as applicable to a conceptually imposed object, then, if he comes to perceive the Gavaya, he recognises that name as applied to that same conceptually imposed object, and not to the external Specific Individuality of the name of ‘Gavaya’;
tadeva ca vikalpapratibimbakaṃ sāmānyam iti vyavahriyate / tat parikalpitam /	and the same conceptual Image is what is spoken of as the ‘Universal And this is purely imaginary, as it has been discarded above.
kathaṃ tarhi bāhyasvalakṣaṇābhimāna ity āha dṛśyetyādi //	Question: “How then is there the idea of the external Specific Individuality?”
atha svalakṣaṇe śabdādipravṛttau ko virodha ity āha evam ityādi /	Question: “What would be the incongruity if the Word (Name) were applied to the Specific Individuality?”
yataḥ śabdārthaparīkṣāyāṃ vistareṇa svalakṣaṇagocaratvaṃ śabdānāṃ vikalpānāṃ ca nirākṛtam, tasmād vikalpasamāropita eva śabdārthaḥ //	In course of our examination of the Denotation of Words, the idea that Words and Conceptual Contents envisage Specific Individualities, has been rejected in detail. Hence what is expressed by the name must be the conceptually imposed thing.
bhavatu vā teṣāṃ vikalpaśabdānāṃ svalakṣaṇagocaratvam /	We grant for the sake of argument that Words and Conceptual Contents envisage Specific Individualities.
tathāpyanumāna evānta [p.454] rbhāvānnopamānaṃ pramāṇāntaram /	Even so, the Cognition in question becomes included under Inference;
kathaṃ trirūpaliṅgajatvamantareṇāsyānumāne 'ntarbhāva ityāśaṅkya trirūpaliṅgajanyatvaṃ pratipādayannāha trirūpetyādi /	and Analogical Cognition cannot be a distinct form of Cognition. Question: “How can it be included under Inference when it is not brought about by the three-featured Indicative?”
gosadṛśatvaṃ hetuḥ, gavayaśrutigocaratvaṃ sādhyadharmaḥ, saṅketagrahaṇakāle	Answer ‘That it proceeds, etc. etc.’: ‘Similarity to the Cow’ is the Probans; ‘being one to which the name Gavaya is applicable’ is the Probandum;
vikalpabuddhipratibhāsī buddhistho gavayo dṛṣṭāntaḥ /	and ‘the Gavaya present in the Mind, in the shape of the Reflected Conceptual Content, at the time that the Convention became known’ is the Corroborative Instance;
dṛśyamāno gavayo dharmī //	and the Gavaya perceived at the time is the Subject, the Minor Term.
syād etat gauriva gavaya ityetasmin saṅketakāle gavayo buddhau na samārūḍha eva /	The following might be urged: “At the time that the relevant Convention, in the form ‘The Gavaya is like the Cow’, was made, the Gavaya was not present in the Mind at all;
tataścāsiddho dṛṣṭānta ity āha buddhistho 'pītyādi /	hence the Instance cited is madmissible”. The Answer to this is as follows: [see verse 1577 above]

tatrāsya gavaye dṛṣṭe smṛtiḥ samupajāyate / asakṛt dṛṣṭapūrveṣu gorūpāvayaveṣviyam // ata eva turaṅgādau tat sādṛśyena no matiḥ /

hence when the gavaya is seen, there follows the remembrance of the parts of the cow’s body that have been seen before repeatedly. It is for this reason that, there does not arise any idea of the horse and other animals, through that similarity, but it does arise when the gavaya is seen.

vartate gavaye dṛṣṭe ko viśeṣo 'nyathā punaḥ //

otherwise, if there were no such remembrance, what would be the difference (between the case of the cow and that of the horse)? (1547-1549)

prakṛtyaivāsatyapi sādṛśyākhye vastuni kecid gavayāvayavā gogatair avayavaiḥ saha tulyapratyavamarśavikalpahetavaḥ, na sādṛśyaṃ nāmārthāntaramanyatra tulyapratyavamarśahetubhyo 'vayavebhyaḥ, te 'bhyo 'rthāntarasya buddhāvapratibhāsanāt /

In its essence, there is no such thing as Similarity; all that is there is that there are some parts in the Gavaya’s body which bring about the same conceptual notions as certain parts of the cow’s body; and similarity is not any distinct entity, apart, from the said parts which give rise to the same conceptions; that this is so is clear from the fact that nothing apart from these figures in the conception at all.

tasmād gavayadarśanād gogatāvayaveṣveva bhūyodarśanabalāt smṛtirūpam eva ---jāyate jñānaṃ, natu sādṛśyākhyavastugrāhi /

Hence what happens is that on the perception of the Gavaya, there arises a cognition in regard to the parts of the Cow’s body, on account of the repeated perception of these latter in the past;

anyathā hi turagādāvapi bhūyo 'vayavasāmānyayogo 'stīti tatrāpi gavayadarśanād gavīva matiḥ kiṃ na pravarteta / nahyatra kaścid viśeṣo 'sti, ubhayatrāpi sādṛśyasadbhāvāt /

If it were not so, then, in regard to the Horse and other animals also, as the presence of the manifold commonalty of component parts is there, why should not the idea of these other animals appear on the seeing of the Gavaya, in the way as it does in regard to the Cow? There is no difference between the two cases, some degree of similarity being present in both cases.

anyatheti / yadyasakṛn na dṛṣṭāḥ syuḥ /

‘Otherwise’, i.e. if the parts of the cow’s body had not been seen repeatedly.

smṛtitvae tu nāyaṃ doṣo yadevāsakṛddṛṣṭapūrvaṃ tatraiva smṛtir bhavati /

In the case of the resultant cognition being of the nature of Remembrance, this difficulty does not arise; as the Remembrance appears in regard to that same thing which has been repeatedly seen before;

pratiniyataśaktitvāc ca smṛtiprabodhahetūnām //

as the causes that bring about Remembrance are restricted in their scope.

syād etat bhavatu smṛtis tathāpi smṛtir eva kasmād apramāṇam ity āha vijñātetyādi / vijñātārthaprakāśatvān na pramāṇam iyaṃ tataḥ /

Remembrance cannot be a form of valid cognition, because it envisages what is already known. How then could it be regarded as a distinct form of valid cognition? (1550) The following might be urged “Analogical Cognition may be of the nature of Remembrance;

pramāṇāntarabhāvastu kuta eva bhaviṣyati //

but why should Remembrance itself not be regarded as a valid form of Cognition?”

iyam iti / smṛtiḥ //

‘Iyam’ stands for Remembrance.

astu vā vastu sādṛśyaṃ tat tu sāmānyavadgavi / pratiyoginyadṛṣṭe 'pi dṛṣṭam eva puraḥsthitam //

Or, similarity may be an entity, residing in the cow, like the commonalty (or universal); even so, it will have been perceived in the cow standing before the person before he sees the co-relative (gavaya);

tathāca smṛtirūpatvaṃ na kathañcinnivartate /

and as such the cognition of the said similarity following upon the seeing of the gavaya cannot escape from being of the nature of remembrance.

sattāmātreṇa vijñātaṃ sādṛśyaṃ ca gavātmani // gavayena tu sādṛśyamityevaṃ na viniścitam /

[says the other party] “What has been previously seen in the cow is similarity merely existing there, and it has not been definitely ascertained that it is similarity to the gavaya;

pramiṇotyupamānaṃ tu vailakṣaṇyaṃ tataḥ smṛteḥ //

while this latter is what is apprehended by analogical cognition, which, thus, is different from remembrance.” (1551-1553)

bhavatu sādṛśyaṃ vastugati ca sāmānyam iva sarvātmanā parisamāptaṃ, tathāpi gavayadarśanāt pūrvaṃ gavi puro 'vasthite pratyakṣeṇa gṛhyamāṇe tato 'vyatirekāt tadapi puro 'vasthitaṃ sādṛśyaṃ gṛhītam eva gosvarūpavat /

Taking for granted that Similarity is an entity, the Author proceeds to show that, even according to the view of the Mīmāṃsaka, Analogical Cognition cannot be valid: [see verses 1551-1553 above] There may be a real entity in the shape of Similarity; and it may be residing in everything in its entirety. But even so, when, before seeing the Gavaya, the man sees the Cow standing before him, he naturally sees the Similarity which is inseparable from the Cow;

anyathā hyavyatireko na siddhyati /

otherwise the inseparability of the two could not be there.

tataś ca gṛhītagrahaṇāt smṛtirūpatvān na pramāṇam / athāpi syāt sattāmātreṇa pūrvaṃ sādṛśyaṃ gṛhītam, etad gavayaenaitat sādṛśyaṃ gorityanena rūpeṇa na gṛhītaṃ /

And thus, as the subsequent Analogical Cognition would be apprehending only what has been already apprehended, it would not be a form of valid Cognition. The following argument might be urged: “The Similarity seen previously was merely as existing, it was not seen in the form that ‘this is the similarity between this Gavaya and the Cow’;

upamānaṃ tvanenākāreṇa pramiṇoti, tataḥ smṛtirūpatvamasiddham iti // tatrāha yadi nāmetyādinā /

while this is the form in which the Similarity is apprehended by Analogical Cognition; so that it cannot be regarded as being of the nature of Remembrance”.

yadi nāma gṛhītaṃ no nāmnā tenaiva tat purā / gṛhītaṃ tu svarūpeṇa yadasyātmābhidhīyate //

Even if the similarity had not been previously apprehended under that name, it was apprehended all the same, in its own form, which is called its very self.

yadi nāma gavayena sādṛśyam ityanena nāmnā viśiṣṭaṃ godravyaṃ gavayadarśanāt pūrvaṃ na gṛhītaṃ, svarūpeṇa tu gṛhītam eva /

Even though the Similarity has not been previously apprehended under that name, i.e. as ‘Similarity to the Gavaya’, i.e. the animal Cow as similar to the Gavaya may not have been apprehended prior to the seeing of the Gavaya; yet in its own form, it has been already apprehended;

yas tasya svabhāvaḥ sa gṛhīta iti yāvat /

that is, that which forms its very self its essence, nature, has been previously apprehended.

kiṃ tatsvarūpam ity āha yadasyātmābhidhīyata iti /

Question “What is that own form in which it has been apprehended?” Answer: ‘Which is called its very self’;

tena svarūpeṇa svabhāvalakṣaṇena tadgṛhītam iti yāvat //

i.e. that which is called the very self of the Cow, in that form, which constitutes its nature, it has been already apprehended.

yadi nāma gṛhītaṃ tataḥ kimityāha na nāma rūpam ityādi /

Question: “What if it has been already apprehended?”

na nāma rūpaṃ vastūnāṃ yat tasyāgrahaṇe sati /

Answer: [see verse 1555 next] Mere name does not constitute the ‘essence’ of things;

parijñātātmatattvānām apyavijñātatā bhavet //

by virtue of which, when it (the name) has not been apprehended, the things could be regarded as ‘not known’, by people who know the true nature of the self.

nahi vastūnāṃ svarūpaṃ nāma bhavati, yena tasya nāmnaḥ pūrvamagrahaṇe gṛhītasyāpi vastuno na grahaṇaṃ syāt /

The Name does not form the ‘essence’ of things; so that, even if the Name has not been previously known, if the thing happens to become known, it cannot be said to be ‘not known’.

viśeṣataś ca niścayātmakapratyakṣavādino na gṛhītam ityevaṃ na yuktaṃ vaktum //

Specially for the philosopher who holds the view that Sense-perception is of the nature of definitely certain Cognition, it cannot be right to say that the thing, thus known, is not known.

etāvatā ca leśena pramāṇatvavyavasthitau / neyattā syāt pramāṇānām anyathāpi pramāṇataḥ //

If on the strength of the slight element of valid cognition (found in analogical cognition), it were to be regarded as an independent form of cognition, then there could be no limit to the number of such independent forms of cognition;

[p.450] kiñca anena tulya iti jñānādetāvatā leśena pramāṇāntarakalpanāyām atiprasaṅgaḥ syāt /

Further, if the mere idea of ‘being similar to this’, this slight element, found in Analogical Cognition, were to he accepted as the basis for regarding it as a distinct Form of Cognition, then there would be absurdities;

"pratyakṣam anumānaṃ ca śābdaṃ copamayā saha / arthāpattir abhāvaś ca ṣaḍete sādhyasādhakāḥ" // iti neyattā syāt pramāṇānām //

and there could be no limit to the number of forms of Valid Cognition, such as is found in the declaration ‘Sense-perception, Inference, Verbal Cognition, Analogical Cognition, Presumption and Negation are the six means of accomplishing what is to be accomplished.’ (1556)

tamevātiprasaṅgaṃ darśayann āha tarupaṅktyādītyādi /

The Author proceeds to show the Incongruities that the above would lead to: [see verses 1557-1558 next]

tarupaṅktyādisaṃdṛṣṭāvekapādapadarśanāt / dvitīyaśākhivijñānād ādyo 'sāviti niścayaḥ //

When a line of trees and such things are seen, what is actually perceived is only one tree, and yet some idea of the second tree being there, there follows the definite cognition (in regard to the former tree) that ‘this is the first’;

pramāṇāntaramāsaktaṃ sādṛśyādyanapekṣaṇāt / gṛhītagrahaṇān no cetsamānamupamāsvapi //

as it does not depend upon any element of ‘similarity’ or other conditions (attendant upon the well-known forms of cognition). If it is denied in this case, on the ground that it apprehends only what has been already apprehended, then the same might be said in regard to analogical cognitions also.

ādiśabdena pipīlikādipaṅkigrahaṇam /

‘And such things’ is meant to include the line of Ants and so on.

tarupaṅktyādidarśanakāle prathamavṛkṣagrahaṇādādyo 'yaṃ vṛkṣa iti niścayo nopajāyate /

As a matter of fact, when one sees a line of trees, so long as one sees one of the trees only, there is no such definite cognition as that ‘this is the first tree’;

dvitīyavṛkṣopalabdhau tu satyāmādye śākhinyādyo 'yaṃ śākhīti yo 'yaṃ jāyate niścayaḥ sa pramāṇāntaraṃ syāt /

when however, he notices the second tree, there does come about, in reference to the former tree, the idea that ‘this is the first tree’; and this would have to be regarded as a distinct form of Cognition (even if the contention of the Mīmāṃsaka in regard to Analogical cognition were accepted).

kasmāt / sādṛśyādyanapekṣaṇāt / sādṛśyaṃ nāpekṣata iti nopamānam idam /

Why? Because it is a form of cognition not dependent upon any element of Similarity or such other conditions. So that, because it does not depend upon Similarity, therefore it cannot be analogical cognition;

akṣavyāpārānapekṣaṇān na pratyakṣam / liṅgānapekṣaṇānnānumānam /

because it does not depend upon the operation of the Senses, therefore it cannot be Sense-perception; because it does not depend upon an Inferential Indicative, therefore it cannot be Inference;

śabdanirapekṣatvān na śābdam /

because it does not depend upon Words, it cannot be Verbal Cognition;

anyathānupapadyamānadṛṣṭaśrutārthānapekṣatvānnārthāpattiḥ / pramāṇaprameyanivṛttyapekṣaṇānnābhāvaḥ /

because it does not depend upon any seen or heard of fact which would be otherwise inexplicable, therefore it cannot be Presumption -and because it does not depend upon the cessation of Means and Objects of Cognition, therefore it cannot be Negation.

tathā asmāt pūrvam idaṃ paścād dīrghaṃ hrasvam idaṃ mahat / ityevam ādivijñāne pramāniṣṭā prasajyate / iti vaktavyam /

Thus there is room for the absurdity urged in the following declaration ‘This is prior to that, This is posterior to that This is larger than that This is shorter than that all these cognitions would have to be regarded as so many distinct Forms of Cognition, which is highly undesirable’,

smṛtitvād gṛhītagrahaṇān na pramāṇāntarametad iti cet / samānam upamāsvapi / gṛhītagrāhitvam /

It might be urged that “as the cognition in question apprehends what has been already apprehended, it cannot be regarded as Valid Cognition”, this condition, of apprehending what has been already apprehended, is present in Analogical Cognitions also.

upamāsviti vyaktibhedād bahuvacanam //

The plural number in ‘Analogical Cognitions’ is in view of the fact that there are many such Cognitions.

gavayasyopalambhe ca turaṅgādau pravartate /

When one sees the gavaya, there appears the notion of its ‘dissimilarity’ to the horse and other animals;

tadvaisādṛśyavijñānaṃ yat tadanyā pramā na kim // abhāvāntargataṃ no cennaivaṃ bhāvāvalambanāt / anyonyābhāvatāyāṃ vā samaṃ sādṛśyabuddhiṣu //

why cannot this be a distinct form of cognition? If it be urged that “it cannot be so regarded because it is included under negation”, then, the same might be said in regard to the notions of ‘similarity’ which also are included under ‘mutual negation’.

kiñca yathā gavayadarśanād gavi sādharmyajñānaṃ pramāṇāntaraṃ vyavasthāpyate, tathā gavayadarśanāt turaṅgādau vaisādṛśyasya vijñānam api kasmān na pramāṇāntaraṃ vyavasthāpyeta /

Then, again, on seeing the Gavaya, there appears the idea of its similarity in the Cow, and this is regarded as a distinct Form of Cognition; in the same way, when on seeing the Gavaya, there follows the notion of its dissimilarity in the Horse, why cannot this also be regarded as a distinct Form of Cognition?

abhāvapramāṇāntarbhāvān na pramāṇāntaram iti cet /

“It cannot be regarded as a distinct Form of Cognition, as it is included under Negation.”

naitadyuktam /

That cannot be right.

kasmāt /

“Why?”

bhāvāvalambanāt /

Because it envisages a positive entity;

vaisādṛśyaṃ hi sādṛśyābhāvaḥ, tasmād astyevābhāvāntargatir ity āha anyonetyādi /

while Negation envisages a non-entity. “Dissimilarity is only negation of similarity; and hence the notion of dissimilarity is really included under Negation.”

anyonyābhāvatāyāṃ satyāṃ yadya [p.451] bhāvarūpaṃ prameyaṃ vyavasthāpyate tadā, samam tulyam etadīdṛśaṃ prameyaṃ sādṛśyabuddhiṣu upamānatveneṣṭāsu //

‘The same might be said, etc. etc.’ That is to say, if the negative character of a certain object is sought to be based upon its being subject to Mutual Negation, then the same sort of object is found in the case of the notions of Similarity also, which are regarded as ‘Analogical Cognition (1559-1560)

katham ity āha sādṛśyasyetyādi /

Question: “How so?” Answer: [see verse 1561 next]

sādṛśyasya viveko hi yathā tatra pramīyate / sarvāvayavasāmānyaviveko gamyate tathā //

Just as distinction from ‘similarity’ is cognised in that case, so also is distinction from ‘all common parts’ cognised in the other case also.

yathā tatra vaidharmyajñāne sādṛśyavivekaḥ pratīyate tathā sādharmyajñāne 'pi sarvāvayavasāmānyaviyogo gamyata ityabhāvantarbhāvaḥ syād vaisādṛśyajñānavat //

in the same way, in the case of the idea of ‘Similarity’ also, there is perception of difference from (i.e. negation of) the presence of all Common Parts; so that this also can be included under Negation, just like the notion of Dissimilarity.

atraivopapattim āha bhūya ityādi /

In support of the same, an argument is put forward: [see verse 1562 next]

yeneti kāraṇopadeśaḥ /

‘Yena’ indicates the reason for what has been asserted above.

yena yasmāt, sādharmyajñāne bhūyo 'vayavasāmānyayogo 'vagamyate / natu sarvāvayavasāmānyayogas tasmād atrāpyanyonyābhāvaḥ /

What is meant is that because, in the case of the Cognition of Similarity, what is cognised is the ‘presence of several similar parts’, and not the ‘presence of all similar parts’, therefore this is a case of ‘Mutual Negation’.

anyathā yadi sarvāvayavasāmānyayogaḥ syāt, / tadā tattvam gotvaṃ gavayasya prasajyeta //

Otherwise, if all parts were similar, then there would be identity, i.e. the Gavaya would be the same as the Cow.

kaiścid iti / naiyāyikaiḥ /

‘Some people’ i.e. the Naiyāyikas.

ta evam upamānasya lakṣaṇam āhuḥ ---"prasiddhasādharmyāt sādhyasādhanam upamānam" iti /

They have provided the following definition of Analogy “Analogy is that which accomplishes its purpose through similarity to a known object.

prasiddhaṃ sādharmyaṃ prasiddhena vā sādharmyaṃ yasya sa prasiddhasādharmyo gavayaḥ, tasmāt tamāśritya, sādhyasya saṃjñāsaṃjñisambandhasya, sādhanam siddhiḥ, upamānam /

6) The term ‘prasiddhasādharmya’ may mean either ‘through similarity to a known object’, or ‘through well-known similarity’; the ‘object’ of which this ‘similarity’ is known is the Gavaya; ‘through this i.e. on the basis of this, there is ‘accomplishment’ fulfilment of the ‘purpose’ i.e. of the relation of Name and Named;

tathāhyāgamāhitasaṃskārasmṛtyapekṣāt sādharmyajñānāt samākhyāsambandhapratipattir upamānam ityayam evārtho 'nyair anyathā nirdiṣṭaḥ /

Other people have expressed the same idea in other words, as follows: “Certain impressions having been left on the mind by a previous Verbal Cognition, those impressions bring about a Remembrance, this Remembrance leads to the Cognition of Similarity, from which there follows the cognition of the relation to a Name, this last cognition is Analogical Cognition.

gaur iva gavaya ityatideśavākyamāgamaḥ, tenāhito yaḥ saṃskārākhyo guṇaḥ, tatoyātideśavākyārthasmṛtirupajāyate 'raṇye gavayadarśanāt, tām apekṣate yat

The ‘Verbal Cognition’ meant here is that derived from the analogical statement e.g. ‘the Gavaya is like the Cow’, this produces an Impression, a faculty in the Mind, this Impression brings about the remembrance of the said analogical statement, on the occasion of seeing the Gavaya in the present;

sādharmyajñānaṃ tat tathoktam /

on the basis of this Remembrance, there follows a notion of Similarity.

samākhyā saṃjñā, śabda iti yāvat /

‘Samākhyā’ is Name, i.e. the word;

tatrāpītyādinā dūṣaṇam āha

this Name is related to the object;

tatrāpi saṃjñāsambandhapratipattir anākulā /

and the cognition of this Relation is what constitutes Analogical Cognition.”

tathā parigṛhītārthagrahaṇān na pramāṇatā / smṛter ivopamānasya karaṇārthaviyogataḥ //

This is exactly the same idea (that has been set forth in the Nyāyasūtra quoted above). The above view of Analogical Cognition is refuted in the following [see verses 1564-1565 next]

tatrātideśavakyaśravaṇakāle saṃjñāsambandhapratipatteḥ pūrvamevotpannatvātpaścād utpadyamānāyāṃ gṛhītagrahaṇān na pramāṇatvaṃ smṛtivat /

At the time that the statement of analogy is heard, the idea of the relation of Name and Named is already there; if the same idea appears again subsequently, it apprehends what has been already apprehended before, and hence like Remembrance cannot be a valid cognition.

syād etad gṛhītagrāhitvaṃ, bhaviṣyati prāmāṇyaṃ ceti, ko 'tra virodha ity āha karaṇārthaviyogata iti /

It might be urged that “It may apprehend what is already apprehended, and yet it may be a Means of valid cognition; what would be the incongruity in that?”

karaṇārthaḥ sādhakatamatvam, aniṣpādite karmaṇi pravṛttyā //

The answer to this is ‘It is devoid of, etc. etc.’ That is, the ‘true character of Instrument’ consists in being the most effective cause, and a cause is most effective only when it tends to bring about what has not been already brought about.

syād etat pūrvaṃ saṃjñāsambandhapratipattir na jātaiva, tato gṛhītagrahaṇādityasiddho hetur ity āha atha seti /

The following might be urged “There has been no previous idea of the relation of the Name at all; hence the Reason ‘because it apprehends what is already apprehended’ is not admissible”.

yadi pūrvaṃ na saṃjātā saṃjñāsambandhapratipattir abhaviṣyat tadāyam asaugavayo yasya mayā pūrvaṃ saṃjñā śrutetyevamākārāpratipattir nodāyiṣyata //

Answer: [see verse 1566 above] If the cognition of the relation of the Name had not been there, then there could have been no such cognition, later on, as that ‘this is the Gavaya whose name I had heard before’.

atraivopapattimāha tathā hīti /

A further argument to the same effect is stated: [see verse 1567 next]

aviddhakarṇastvāha āgamāt sāmānyena pratipadyate viśeṣapratipattis tūpamānād iti /

Aviddhakarṇa has asserted as follows: “Of the Name, the Man has a general (vague) notion through Verbal Cognition, and it is the definite idea of it that is brought about by Analogy”.

atas tanmatamāśaṅkate upayuktopamāna iti /

This view is set forth in the following [see verse 1568 next]

upayuktopamānaścettulyatvagrahaṇe sati /

The word ‘upayuktopa, etc. etc.’ is one who has heard the statement of analogy.

viśiṣṭo viṣayo gavayaḥ //

‘Particular object’ i.e. the Gavaya.

nanvityādinā pratividhatte /

The answer to the above is provided by the following [see verse 1570 next]

nahi citrāṅgade kaścit tannāmagrahaṇe sati / kālāntareṇa taṃ śabdaṃ vetti cārukirīṭini //

‘Na’ has to be construed with ‘Yujyate’. When the relation of the name has been cognised in regard to one thing, it cannot be right to cognise the same name as applied to another thing;

tasmāt prāg yatra tenedaṃ vikalpapratibimbake /

for, if it did, then there would be incongruities. The possible incongruity is shown in the following [see verses 1571-1573 next]

aṅgadaḥ kaṭakākhyamābharaṇam / citro 'ṅgado yasyāsau tathoktaḥ /

‘Aṅgada’ is an ornament called ‘Kaṭaka’, Armlet. ‘Cītrāṅgada’ is the man who is wearing a ‘citra’ wonderful ‘aṅgada’ armlet.

nahi citrāṅgado yaḥ sa devadatta ityuktaḥ kaścit kālāntare taṃ citrāṅgadaśabdaṃ cārikirīṭini yajñadatte pratipadyate /

When the man with the wonderful armlet has been once spoken of as ‘Devadatta’ (by name) in the statement ‘The man with the wonderful armlet is Devadatta’, and one, on hearing this, has cognised the name as belonging to that person, he does not, at any future time, recognise that expression ‘man with the wonderful bracelet’ as applying to Yajñadatta, who is a ‘man with the beautiful diadem’.

kirīṭam mukuṭaṃ, cāru sa tat kirīṭaṃ yasyāsti sa tathoktaḥ /

‘Kirīṭa’ is diadem; ‘Cārukirīṭa’ is the man with the beautiful diadem.

tasmān mābhūd atiprasaṅga iti / yatraivārthe vikalpasamāropite bāhyārthavyavasāyinyā buddhyā gṛhītaṃ nāma saṃjñā, gavayopalambhe 'pi tatraiva tannāma pratipadyate, natu bāhye svalakṣaṇe gavayākhye /

For the above reasons, in order to avoid the likelihood of the incongruity, when a Name has been recognised by a determinate cognition envisaging an external object, as applicable to a conceptually imposed object, then, if he comes to perceive the Gavaya, he recognises that name as applied to that same conceptually imposed object, and not to the external Specific Individuality of the name of ‘Gavaya’;

tadeva ca vikalpapratibimbakaṃ sāmānyam iti vyavahriyate / tat parikalpitam /

and the same conceptual Image is what is spoken of as the ‘Universal And this is purely imaginary, as it has been discarded above.

kathaṃ tarhi bāhyasvalakṣaṇābhimāna ity āha dṛśyetyādi //

Question: “How then is there the idea of the external Specific Individuality?”

atha svalakṣaṇe śabdādipravṛttau ko virodha ity āha evam ityādi /

Question: “What would be the incongruity if the Word (Name) were applied to the Specific Individuality?”

yataḥ śabdārthaparīkṣāyāṃ vistareṇa svalakṣaṇagocaratvaṃ śabdānāṃ vikalpānāṃ ca nirākṛtam, tasmād vikalpasamāropita eva śabdārthaḥ //

In course of our examination of the Denotation of Words, the idea that Words and Conceptual Contents envisage Specific Individualities, has been rejected in detail. Hence what is expressed by the name must be the conceptually imposed thing.

bhavatu vā teṣāṃ vikalpaśabdānāṃ svalakṣaṇagocaratvam /

We grant for the sake of argument that Words and Conceptual Contents envisage Specific Individualities.

tathāpyanumāna evānta [p.454] rbhāvānnopamānaṃ pramāṇāntaram /

Even so, the Cognition in question becomes included under Inference;

kathaṃ trirūpaliṅgajatvamantareṇāsyānumāne 'ntarbhāva ityāśaṅkya trirūpaliṅgajanyatvaṃ pratipādayannāha trirūpetyādi /

and Analogical Cognition cannot be a distinct form of Cognition. Question: “How can it be included under Inference when it is not brought about by the three-featured Indicative?”

gosadṛśatvaṃ hetuḥ, gavayaśrutigocaratvaṃ sādhyadharmaḥ, saṅketagrahaṇakāle

Answer ‘That it proceeds, etc. etc.’: ‘Similarity to the Cow’ is the Probans; ‘being one to which the name Gavaya is applicable’ is the Probandum;

vikalpabuddhipratibhāsī buddhistho gavayo dṛṣṭāntaḥ /

and ‘the Gavaya present in the Mind, in the shape of the Reflected Conceptual Content, at the time that the Convention became known’ is the Corroborative Instance;

dṛśyamāno gavayo dharmī //

and the Gavaya perceived at the time is the Subject, the Minor Term.

syād etat gauriva gavaya ityetasmin saṅketakāle gavayo buddhau na samārūḍha eva /

The following might be urged: “At the time that the relevant Convention, in the form ‘The Gavaya is like the Cow’, was made, the Gavaya was not present in the Mind at all;

tataścāsiddho dṛṣṭānta ity āha buddhistho 'pītyādi /

hence the Instance cited is madmissible”. The Answer to this is as follows: [see verse 1577 above]