buddhist-nlp/tatpa-noisy · Datasets at Hugging Face

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tathā hi nedaṃ rātribhojanavākyaṃ tena divāvākyena saha kvacid dṛṣṭaṃ yenasambandho bhavet /	For instance, the sentence expressing the fact of eating at night has never been perceived in association with the sentence speaking of not-eating in the day, which fact alone could constitute the relation of concomitance between the two.
nāpyanyalliṅgam asti /	Nor is there any other Inferential Indicative available.
athāpi syād anupalabdhe 'pi sambandhe liṅgatvam asya bhaviṣyatītyāha yadīti /	It might be argued that, “even without the perception of any relation, it could be regarded as an Inferential Indicative”. The answer to that is ‘And if, even when.
yadi hyasiddhasambandhasya liṅgatvaṃ bhavet tadā divāvākyoccāraṇād aśeṣavākyapratipattir bhavet, na rātribhojanavākyasyaiva /	etc. etc.’ That is to say, if it could be an Inferential Indicative even when it is not known to be related, then from the utterance of the sentence speaking of the man not-eating in the day, there should follow the cognition of all sentences, not only of the sentence speaking of eating at night.
kasmāt/ yataḥ sambandharahitatve satyanyato vākyād rātribhojanavākyaṃ na viśiṣyate /	Why? Because, as regards being devoid of relation, the sentence speaking of eating at night does not differ from any other sentence;
sambandhābhāvāt sarvam eva vākyam aviśiṣṭam iti yāvat //	that is, in the point of being not-related, all sentences stand on the same footing, (1593-1598)
upamānapūrvikām āha gavayetyādi / gavayopamitā yā gaus tajjñānagrāhyaśaktatā /	“(5) The cow is likened to the gavaya, a cognition is produced by this likeness, the potency in the object whereby it becomes apprehended by that cognition, is debited on the strength of the said analogical cognition.” (1599)
upamābalasambhūtasāmarthyena pratīyate //	The following Text describes the Presumption based upon Analogical Cognition: [see verse 1599 above]
gavayenopamitasya gopiṇḍasya yeyam upamānajñānena grāhyaśaktatā sā upamānabalena yat sambhūtaṃ sāmarthyam arthāpattis tena mīyate //	(5) When the object, Cow, is likened to the Gavaya, there is in the Cow the capacity to be apprehended by the Analogical Cognition; and this capacity is derived from the strength Presumption based upon that Analogical Cognition.
abhidhā nānyathā siddhyed iti vācakaśaktatām / arthāpattyāvagamyaiva tadananyagateḥ punaḥ // arthāpattyantareṇaiva śabdanityatvaniścayaḥ /	“(6) Inasmuch as the denotation of a word cannot be otherwise defined, we assume the expressive potency of words; and as this potency would not be otherwise possible, we deduce, through another presumption, the eternality of words; [ślokavārtika-arthāpatti, 6-7];
anityo hi na saṅketavyavahārānuvṛttimān //	because what is non-eternal cannot be related to any contention.” (1600-1601)
abhidhānam abhidhā /	‘Abhidhā’ Denotation;
arthapratipādanam iti yāvat /	i.e. expressing of meaning.
sā śabdasya anyathā vācakaśaktyā vinā, na siddhyed ityevaṃ bodhakaśaktatām, avagamya buddhvā, tadananyagateḥ tasyābodhakaśakter anyā gatir nāsti śabdanityatvamantareṇeti, punar arthāpattyantareṇaiva śabdasya nityatvaniścayaḥ /	This could not be done by words, could not be defined, except through Expressive Potency; having thus ‘presumed’ the expressive potency of Word, it is found that this potency would not be otherwise possible, i.e. there is no other way of explaining such a Potency, without recognising the eternality of words; so that this cognition of the eternality of words is also obtained by means of another Presumption.
kathaṃ punar nityatvam antareṇābhidhā na siddhyatītyāha anityo hītyādi /	Question: “Why cannot there be Expressive Potency without eternality?”
tathā hi saṅketakāle dṛṣṭasya yadi vyavahārakāle 'nuvṛttir na bhavet / tadā saṅketakaraṇam arthakam eva syāt /	Answer: ‘Because what is non-eternal, etc. etc.’, That is to say, if what was perceived at the time of the making of the Convention does not continue to exist till the time of being used, then, the making of the Convention would be entirely futile;
vyavahārārthatvāt tasya /	as Convention is set up only for purposes of usage;
yaścānuvartate vyavahārakāle śabdas tena saha pūrvaṃ sambandhasyāgṛhītatvāt /	and the Word that is present at the time of usage is not one with which the connection of the meaning had been set up at the time of the Convention.
athavā tadananyagater iti / tasya [p.460] vyavahārakālabhāvinaḥ śabdasya, saṅketakāladṛṣṭācchabdādananyagater avyatirekaniścayāt /	Or, the text may be explained in another way: ‘Tadananyagateḥ’ since, of the word existing at the time of usage, there is no difference from the word perceived at the time of the making of the Convention.
katham avyatirekaniścaya ity āha anityo hītyādi //	How is it known that there is no difference? Answer Because what is non-eternal, etc. etc.’ (1600-1601)
abhāvapūrvikām arthāpattim āha pramāṇetyādi / pramāṇābhāvanirṇītacaitrābhāvaviśeṣitām / gehāccaitrabahirbhāvasiddhir yā tviha varṇitā //	“(7) The absence of caitra from the house having been cognised through negation, the cognition of the presence of caitra outside the house which is marked by his absence, has been cited; this is to be regarded as another kind of presumption, based upon negation.
tāmabhāvotthitām anyām arthāpattimudāharet / pakṣadharmādyanaṅgatvād bhinnaiṣāpyanumānataḥ //	[Ślokavārtika-arthāpatti, 8-9]. This (presumption) is different from inference, because the minor premiss (probans as residing in the minor term) and the other factors do not form part of it.
bahirdeśaviśiṣṭe 'rthe deśe vā tadviśeṣite / prameye yo grahābhāvaḥ pakṣadharmastvasau katham //	When the object cognised, is either the man connected with the exterior (of the house), or the exterior connected with the man, in either case, how could ‘absence in the house’ serve as the probans (residing in that subject)? [ibid., 10-12].
jīvataś ca gṛhābhāvaḥ pakṣadharmo 'tra kalpyate /	What is regarded as the probans in this case is the ‘absence of the living man in the house’;
tatsaṃvittir bahirbhāvaṃ na cābuddhopajāyate //	and there can be no cognition of this absence without knowing his presence outside the house. [ibid., 19].
gehābhāvas tu yaḥ śuddhau vidyamānatvavarjitaḥ / sa mṛteṣvapi dṛṣṭatvād bahirvṛtter na sādhakaḥ //	As for pure ‘absence in the house’, apart from the idea of his being alive such absence is found in the case of dead persons also, and hence cannot be a proof of his presence outside”. [ibid., 21].
pratyakṣādeḥ pramāṇasyābhāvena nivṛttyā nirṇīto niścito yaścaitrābhāvas tena viśeṣitād gehāt, iha gehe caitro nāstītyataḥ, caitrasya jīvane sati, yābahirbhāvasiddhiḥ bahiścaitro vidyata ityevaṃniścayarūpā, iha bhāṣye, varṇitā śabarasvāminā, tadanyāsāmarthāpattīnām upalakṣaṇārtham udāhṛteti yāvat /	The absence of Caitra has been cognised by the Negation absence, of Perception and other Means of Cognition; the House is qualified by this ascertained absence; i.e. the idea that ‘Caitra is not in the House’; and the presence of Caitra, if he is alive is cognised as being outside of the said House; this cognition, in the form ‘Caitra is outside the house’, has been cited in the Bhāṣya, by Śabarasvāmin;
yathā jīvati devadatte, gṛhe 'darśanena bahirbhāvasyādṛṣṭasya kalpaneti /	that is, only as an indication of the other kinds of Presumption; e.g. when Devadatta is alive, if he is not in the house, there is Presumption of him as being out of the house.
idam abhāvapūrvikāyā arthāpatter udāharaṇam /	This is an example of Presumption based upon Negation.
prāyeṇāsyās tārkikair anumānatvamiṣṭam iti tannirākaraṇam āha pakṣetyādi / yataḥ pakṣadharmādayo 'syā nāṅgaṃ na kāraṇam, ato bhinnaivaiṣānumānāt, pratyakṣavat /	Almost all Naiyāyikās have included Presumption under ‘Inference’. In refutation of this view, Kumārila adds ‘This is different from Inference, etc. etc.’ Inasmuch as the Probans, etc. do not enter into it as factors as its causes this must be different from Inference;
tathā hi bahirdeśena viśiṣṭo 'rthaścaitrādiḥ, caitrādinā vā viśiṣṭo bahirdeśaḥ, tasmin dvividhe 'pi prameye sati, gṛhe caitrāder arthasyābhāvo yaḥ kathaṃ vyadhikaraṇaḥ sanpakṣadharmo bhavet / naiva bhaved ityabhiprāyaḥ /	Because the object of cognition in this case is either Caitra qualified by the place outside the house, or the place outside the house qualified by Caitra; in either case, how could the absence of Caitra, which resides elsewhere (inside the House) serve as the Probans? That is to say, it could never serve as the Probans.
api ca gṛhābhāvaḥ pakṣadharmatvena kalpyamānaḥ kadācijjīvato devadattasya yo gṛhābhāvaḥ sa kalpyate, sāmānyena veti pakṣadvayam /	Then again, if absence in the House were assumed as the Probans, it could be so assumed only in one or the other of two ways i.e. either as the absence of the living Devadatta, in the House, or absence in the House in general.
tatra prathame pakṣe doṣamāha jīvata ityādi / tatsaṃvittir iti /	In the former case, there would be this objection that ‘the absence of the living man, etc. etc.’ ‘there can be no cognition of this absence, etc. etc.
tasya jīvato devadattasya saṃvittiḥ niścayaḥ, sā devadattasya bahirbhāvamabuddhvā na jāyate /	That is, the cognition of the living Devadatta the certainty regarding it would not be possible until his presence outside is definitely known.
anena hetor asiddhatāṃ siddhau vā siddhasādhyatām āha /	What is meant by this is that the Probans in this case would be one that is ‘inadmissible’, and that if it is admissible, it is futile.
dvitīye 'pi pakṣe hetor anaikāntikatvaṃ, mṛteṣvapi devadattādiṣu teṣāṃ [p.461] gṛhyābhāvasya dṛṣṭatvād iti darśayann āha gehābhāvastviti /	If the second alternative is accepted [i.e. absence in the House in general is the Probans’, the Probans would be Inconclusive; as even when Devadatta is dead, people recognise his absence in the House. This is what is shown in the words ‘as for pure absence in the House, etc., etc.
vidyamānatveti / jīvattā //	‘Vidyamānatva’ is being alive.
evaṃ ṣaṭprakārārthāpattiḥ /	With the following Texts begin the refutation of the above view (regarding Presumption as a distinct Means of Cognition).
tatretyādinā dūṣaṇam āha atra lakṣaṇaṃ tāvad ayuktam /	In the first place, the definition that has been provided is not a proper one.
tathā hi ---tenādrustena vina drustaśrutādikoo 'rtho nopapadyata ityadrustakalpanā/	For instance, the definition provided is that ‘Presumption consists in the presuming of an imperceptible fact without which a perceived or heard of fact would not be possible’.
kiṃ tenādṛṣṭena saha kvacid dṛṣṭaśrutasyārthasya sambandho dṛṣṭo atha na/ yadi tu dṛṣṭaḥ, anumānatvaprasaṅgaḥ, sambandhadarśanopāyatvāt /	In connection with this, the following points have to be considered: Has the relation of that imperceptible fact with the perceived and heard of facts been perceived anywhere, or not? If it has been perceived, then the cognition in question becomes an Inference, as brought about by the perception of the said Relation.
atha na saṃsiddhaḥ, evaṃ tarhi vahner dāhakatvavadadāhakatvam api kalpanīyam, adṛṣṭasambandhatvenāviśeṣāt /	If the Relation has not been perceived, then, in that case, the non-burning power of Fire might also be presumed, in the same way as its burning power is; because so far as being not related is concerned, both stand upon the same footing.
atha matamadāhakatvena saha vahner adṛṣṭatvān nādāhakatvaṃ kalpyata iti / evaṃ tarhi dāhakatvam api na kalpanīyam, tenāpi saha kvacid adṛṣṭatvāt /	It might be argued that “inasmuch as Fire has never been actually found to be associated with non-burning power, there can be no presumption of this latter”. But in that case, there should be no presumption of the burning power also; because Fire has never been seen to be associated with that power.
tasmāt sambandhe siddhe sati sambandhinam avinābhāvinaṃ dṛṣṭvā dvitīyasya sambandhinaḥ kalpanā yuktā / evaṃ ca kalpyamāne sambandhadarśanopāyatvād anumāna evāntarbhāvaḥ syāt /	Thus it is only when the relation between two things is well known that, on seeing one of the two invariably concomitant members of that relation, there can be a presumption of the other relative; and when this has been presumed, it is only through the said Relation; and hence this presumption becomes included under ‘Inference’.
udāharaṇānyapyayuktāni /	The examples also that have been cited are not right.
tatra tāvat pratyakṣādiprasiddhasyārthasya catasṛbhir arthāpattibhiḥ śaktiḥ pratīyata ityatra sādhāraṇaṃ dūṣaṇam āha tatra śaktātirekeṇetyādi /	These examples have been cited to show that through four Presumptions one cognises the Potency of something known through Perception and the other Means of Cognition. The author points out the defect that is common to all these: [see verse 1607 next]
tatra śaktātirekeṇa na śaktir nāma kācana /	Apart from the potent object, there is no such thing as ‘potency’, which could be cognised by means of presumption;
yārthāpattyāvagamyeta śaktaścādhyakṣa eva hi //	and as for the potent object, it is cognised through perception itself.
yataḥ śaktir anyā na vastutaḥ sakāśāt, sa ca śaktaḥ padārthaḥ pratyakṣa evetigṛhītagrahaṇād eva na pramāṇam /	Inasmuch as Potency is nothing apart from the Potent object, and the Potent object is cognisable by Perception, Presumption would be apprehending what is already apprehended; and on that ground alone, it could not be regarded as a Means of Valid Cognition.
dāhādīnām ityādinā pratyakṣapūrvikāyā arthāpatter udāharaṇasya viśeṣeṇa dūṣaṇam āha dāhādīnāṃ tu yo hetuḥ pāvakādiḥ samīkṣyate /	The mention of ‘Perception’ in this connection, is only by way of illustration. In the case of such phenomena as burning and the rest, their cause is actually perceived in the form of the fire and the rest, and there is nothing wrong or uncertain in this perception;
asaṃśayāviparyāsaṃ śaktiḥ kānyā bhavet tataḥ // vyatirikte tu kāryeṣu tasyā evopayogataḥ /	what then could ‘potency’ be, apart from those causes? If the ‘potency’ is something different (from the said causes), then as that ‘potency’ would be what brings about the effect, the object (cause) itself would not be an active agent at all (in the bringing about of that effect);
bhāvo 'kāraka eva syād upayoge na bhedinī //	if, on the other hand, the object does bring about the effect, then the potency would not be anything different;
arthakriyāsamarthaṃ hi svarūpaṃ śaktilakṣaṇam /	because the characteristic feature of the ‘object’ is that it should be capable of effective action;
evam ātmā ca bhāvo 'yaṃ pratyakṣād vyavasīyate //	and that the object is so capable is learnt from perception itself.
asaṃśayāviparyāsam iti kriyāviśeṣaṇam etat /	‘There is nothing wrong, etc.’ This compound is to be taken as an adverb (modifying the verb ‘perceived’).
atha vyatiriktā śaktir abhyupagamyate tadā kāryeṣu śakter evopayogād bhāvasyākārakatvaṃ prāpnoti tataścāvastutva [p.462] prasaṅgaḥ /	If the Potency is regarded to be something different from the object, then, in the bringing about of the effect (in the shape of the phenomenon cited), the Potency being the effective agent, the object itself would cease to be an active agent;
arthakriyākāritvalakṣaṇatvād vastutvasya /	as the characteristic of the Entity is that it should be capable of effective action.
atha mābhūd avastutvaprasaṅga ityupayogo 'ṅgīkriyate tadā tasminnupayoge 'ṅgīkriyamāṇe na tarhi sā śaktir bhedinī bhinnā /	If, in order to guard against the object becoming a non-entity, it be admitted that the object does have some action in the bringing about of the effect concerned, then the ‘Potency’ could not be anything different from the object.
rūpāt upayogino bhāvasya svabhāvād eva, arthakriyāsiddheḥ /	Why? Because ‘Potency’ can be only that form or nature, which is capable of effective action;
na kāryasyānyathābhāvād bhavatyetaddhi bhāvataḥ //	it cannot be anything else.
syād etat astyevānyacchakter lakṣaṇam yaduta nityaṃ kāryānyathānupapattyā yadgamyaṃ rūpaṃ sā śaktir iti, kāryānumeyatvaṃ śakter lakṣaṇam /	As regards the verbal expression ‘the Potency of the object’ which implies some sort of a difference between the two, that is meant to discard the notion of any other kind of difference, and is used in this form only with a view to the enquiry as to what ‘Potency’ is, and the answer is that it is the object itself.
naitad yuktaṃ śaktilakṣaṇam /	There is no means of knowing any other characteristic of potency.
etat kāryaṃ yasmāt bhāvāt padārthāt, / bhavati utpadyate, tamsād anyathāpi kāryasyāstitvasambhava iti kiṃ vyatiriktayā śaktyā kalpitayā //	even if such another characteristic were known, there would be no use for it; as the effect would be accomplished by the mere presence of the object. The following might be urged “Capacity for effective action is not the characteristic of Potency; it is something else”.
etad evārthaṃ spaṣṭīkurvann āha jalādītyādi //	The answer to that is as follows: [see verse 1611 above]
naikāntena vibhinnā cecchaktiḥ sāpyubhayātmikā / na virodhād bhavet sā ca pratyakṣānanyatāpi yat //	There is no means of knowing any other characteristic of ‘Potency’, which Means could distinguish Potency from ‘Negation’ in the form of the absence of all capacity.
[p.463] kiṃ tarhibhinnābhinnatvenobhayātmiketyetac ca na yuktam /	Even if such a characteristic were known, it would serve no useful purpose for men who would be seeking for effective action;
pratyakṣatve sthite cāsyāmanumeyatvavāraṇam /	because the needed effective action will have been accomplished by the presence i.e. by the very nature of the Object itself;
kṣataye naiva yenāsmin viṣaye nānumeṣyate // api ca ---"śaktayaḥ sarvabhāvānāṃ kāryārthāpattisādhanā"ityādi yadetad anumeyatvavāraṇaṃ śakteḥ kṛtam, tan na kṣataye 'smākam /	as has been declared in the following words: ‘To persons seeking for effective action, what would be the use of cogitating over what is not fit for effective action? Certainly, the young woman has no need to consider whether the impotent man is ugly or handsome (1611)
yena yasmāt asmin pratyakṣaviṣaye nānumānamiṣyate 'smābhiḥ, parokṣārthapratipattirūpatvāde anumānasya /	What was asserted on the previous occasion was only the fact of the apprehension of sound being dependent on other causes, on the ground that even when its cause was there, it did not come about, because something else was absent;
anena siddhasādhyatām āha //	Existence is not proved directly;
yaduktam "śrotrādiśaktipakṣece"ti, atrāha ye tvityādi / ye tu śrotrādayo bhāvāḥ pratyakṣasya na gocarāḥ /	what is proved is the fact of Auditory and other Perceptions, as the Subject, being dependent upon other causes, on the ground that when the other cause, of its Auditory Perception, in the shape of attention of the mind is not there the Perception does not come about.
nanu ca sattā tu sādhyata eveti pūrvaṃ pratipāditam, tat kathaṃ sattā gamyata ity ucyata ity āha kāraṇāntaretyādi /	This argument is formulated as follows: When even on the presence of something, another thing appears only occasionally (not always), then this latter must be dependent upon other-causes;
bhāve 'pyanyasya taddhetor abhāvād aṅkurādivat //	e.g. even when the soil is there, the Sprout appears only occasionally;
satyapi manaskārādau kadācid bhavati śrotrajñānam iti svabhāvahetuḥ /	even when the attention of the Mind is there, the Auditory Perception comes about only occasionally;
tasmin kāraṇāntarasāpekṣatve sādhite yat kāraṇāntaraṃ tat śrotrādi prasiddham ityanena prakāreṇa sattā gamyata ity ucyate, na tvāhatyetyadoṣaḥ //	this thus is a Reason based upon the nature of things. When this fact of being dependent upon other causes has been established, then it is deduced that that other cause must be the well-known Auditory Organ; that is why it is said that existence is cognised, in this way and not directly.
[p.464]	Hence there is nothing wrong in this.
upādānāsamāne ca deśe jātir nirantaram / raver deśāntaravyāptyā jvālāder iva gamyate //	When the sun reaches another place, what happens always is that it is born (again) in a place different from its original place; this is as it is found in the case of the fire-flame;
sthirātmano viśeṣatvān nānyartheyaṃ prasajyate / tasya deśāntaraprāptiḥ śaktistvanyā nirākṛtā //	a thing that remains permanent is of a totally different kind; otherwise such reaching of another place would not be possible. As regards potency, it has already been shown that it is nothing apart from the thing.
anenānumānāntarbhāvamāha /	This shows that Presumption is included under Inference.
tathā hi yasya yasya deśāntaraprāptirupalabhyate, tasya svopādānakāraṇadeśaparihāreṇa jātiḥ, yathā jvālāder deśāntaraṃ prāpnuvataḥ, deśāntaraprāptiś ca raveriti svabhāvahetuḥ /	For instance, whenever anything is found to reach another place, it is a case of the thing being born in a place other than its original one; as is found to be the case when the fire-flame moves from one place to the other; the Sun is found to be reaching another place; hence this is an Inferential Reason based upon the nature of things.
na cāyam anekāntikaḥ, yataḥ sthirātmana ekarūpasya bhāvasya neyaṃ deśāntaraprāptir yuktā, pūrvadeśāpratiniyatasvabhāvāparityāgāt /	This Reason cannot be regarded as ‘Inconclusive’; because a thing that remaim permanent i.e. an object that always remains in one and the same form cannot reach another place; as it can never renounce its original position;
tyāge vāpūrvotpattir eveti /	if it does renoimce it, it must be in a new- form born again.
idam eva bādhakaṃ pramāṇam /	This is the Reasoning sublating any conclusions to the contrary.
syād etaccaktau sādhyāyām ityam arthāpattir udāhṛtā, notpattau, tat katham asyā arthāpatteranumānāntarbhāva ucyata ity āha śaktistvanyā nirākṛteti //	It might be argued that “This Presumption has been cited as proving the existence of the Potency, not the birth of the thing; how then is it that the Presumption is said to he included under this Inference?”
pīno devetyādau śrutārthāpattyudāharaṇe prāha pīna ityādi /	The answer to this is ‘As regards Potency, etc. etc.’ (1618-1619)
pīno divā na bhuṅkte cetyasminnarthe na niścayaḥ / dveṣamohādibhir yogād anyathāpi vadet pumān //	No certain cognition can result from the assertion that ‘the fat man eats not during the day’, as the speaker might be asserting this through enmity or delusion and such other causes.
anena śābdapramāṇapūrvakatvasyāsiddhatām āha //	What this shows is that there can be no Presumption based upon Verbal Cognition.
syād etannahi vākyenārthagatimapekṣya vākyāntarākṣepaḥ kriyate / kiṃ tarhikevalenaiva / tac ca prathakṣataḥ siddham evetyāha arthagatyanapekṣaṇeti / arthagatyanapekṣeṇa yadi vākyāntaraṃ punaḥ /	If another expressive statement is indicated (in presumption) by the first statement, independently of what is expressed by itself, then that other statement also would indicate another statement. The following might be urged: “It is not that the other assertion is indicated by the first sentence, on the basis of what is expressed by it;
sārthamākṣipyata tena syād ākṣepo vacontare //	it is indicated by the assertion itself; and the assertion itself is directly perceived (heard).”
arthagatir nāpekṣya ityarthagatyanapekṣaṃ vākyaṃ, yena kevalena vākyamātreṇayadi sārthakaṃ vākyāntaramākṣipyate, tadā syād ākṣepo vaco 'ntare rātribhojanavākyād anyasyāpi vākyāntarasyākṣepaḥ prāpnoti /	The sentence is said to be ‘independent of what is expressed by it’ when it f unctions by itself, not through its meaning; when the mere sentence by itself indicates (through Presumption) the other sentence which is expressive of a definite meaning, then that other statement also would indicate another statement; that is, it would be possible for the sentence asserting eating at night to indicate another sentence;
sambandharahitatvenāviśeṣāt /	as the condition of being devoid of relation would be equally present in the case of all.
atha vastupratibandhād arthamākṣipatītyarthagatyapekṣaṇe taddoṣaḥ //	If then it be said that the indication is through what is expressed by the first sentence, then the objection urged before remains in force.
athetyādinā pārābhiprāyamāśaṅkate	In the following Text, the Author anticipates and answers the intention of the Opponent: [see verse 1622 next]
pramāṇāntarato yadvā bhavatvarthagatis tataḥ // atha mābhūd atiprasaṅga iti nyāyād arthagatimapekṣya paropagamanarūpeṇārthagatir iṣyate, [p.465] parasya vaktur āptatvenābhyupagatatvāt / yadvā pramāṇāntarataḥ pratyakṣāder jñānaṃ pīno devadatto divā na bhuṅkta iti /	If, the idea of what is expressed by the sentence is admitted as emanating from the other person, or as brought about by another means of cognition, then the cognition of what is expressed by the later sentence may be regarded as following from that. In order to avoid the incongruity urged above, it might be said that the dependence of what is expressed by the first sentence is also admitted, as emanating from the other person (who has asserted that ‘the fat Devadatta does not eat during the day’) who is known to be reliable;
atra pratividhatte bhavatvityādi /	or as brought about by another Means of Cognition Perception, etc.
bhavatvarthasya rātribhojanasya gatis tataḥ divābhojanavaikalyena viśeṣitātpīnatvāt /	whereby it is known that the fat Devadatta does not eat during the day. The answer to this is ‘Then the cognition, etc. etc.’ That is, the cognition of the fact itself (expressed by the second sentence) might follow from that fact (expressed by the first sentence) i.e, from fatness along with not eating in the day;
natu vākyāntarasya buddhisthasya gamakatvam evaṃ satyanumāna evāntarbhāvānna pramāṇāntaratvaṃ, syād ityabhiprāyaḥ //	and there need be no indication of the sentence in the mind. And in that case, the cognition would become included under Inference, and hence Presumption need not be a separate means of Cognition.
kṣapābhojanasambandhī pumāniṣṭaḥ pratīyate /	What is cognised is the man spoken of as related to eating at night;
divābhojanavaikalyapīnatvena tadanyavat //	on the ground of his being fat while going without food during the day, like another person.
iṣṭaḥ vivakṣitaḥ puruṣaviśeṣo rātribhojanaviśiṣṭaḥ /	‘Iṣṭaḥ’ spoken of, i.e. the Man as related to eating at night.

tathā hi nedaṃ rātribhojanavākyaṃ tena divāvākyena saha kvacid dṛṣṭaṃ yenasambandho bhavet /

For instance, the sentence expressing the fact of eating at night has never been perceived in association with the sentence speaking of not-eating in the day, which fact alone could constitute the relation of concomitance between the two.

nāpyanyalliṅgam asti /

Nor is there any other Inferential Indicative available.

athāpi syād anupalabdhe 'pi sambandhe liṅgatvam asya bhaviṣyatītyāha yadīti /

It might be argued that, “even without the perception of any relation, it could be regarded as an Inferential Indicative”. The answer to that is ‘And if, even when.

yadi hyasiddhasambandhasya liṅgatvaṃ bhavet tadā divāvākyoccāraṇād aśeṣavākyapratipattir bhavet, na rātribhojanavākyasyaiva /

etc. etc.’ That is to say, if it could be an Inferential Indicative even when it is not known to be related, then from the utterance of the sentence speaking of the man not-eating in the day, there should follow the cognition of all sentences, not only of the sentence speaking of eating at night.

kasmāt/ yataḥ sambandharahitatve satyanyato vākyād rātribhojanavākyaṃ na viśiṣyate /

Why? Because, as regards being devoid of relation, the sentence speaking of eating at night does not differ from any other sentence;

sambandhābhāvāt sarvam eva vākyam aviśiṣṭam iti yāvat //

that is, in the point of being not-related, all sentences stand on the same footing, (1593-1598)

upamānapūrvikām āha gavayetyādi / gavayopamitā yā gaus tajjñānagrāhyaśaktatā /

“(5) The cow is likened to the gavaya, a cognition is produced by this likeness, the potency in the object whereby it becomes apprehended by that cognition, is debited on the strength of the said analogical cognition.” (1599)

upamābalasambhūtasāmarthyena pratīyate //

The following Text describes the Presumption based upon Analogical Cognition: [see verse 1599 above]

gavayenopamitasya gopiṇḍasya yeyam upamānajñānena grāhyaśaktatā sā upamānabalena yat sambhūtaṃ sāmarthyam arthāpattis tena mīyate //

(5) When the object, Cow, is likened to the Gavaya, there is in the Cow the capacity to be apprehended by the Analogical Cognition; and this capacity is derived from the strength Presumption based upon that Analogical Cognition.

abhidhā nānyathā siddhyed iti vācakaśaktatām / arthāpattyāvagamyaiva tadananyagateḥ punaḥ // arthāpattyantareṇaiva śabdanityatvaniścayaḥ /

“(6) Inasmuch as the denotation of a word cannot be otherwise defined, we assume the expressive potency of words; and as this potency would not be otherwise possible, we deduce, through another presumption, the eternality of words; [ślokavārtika-arthāpatti, 6-7];

anityo hi na saṅketavyavahārānuvṛttimān //

because what is non-eternal cannot be related to any contention.” (1600-1601)

abhidhānam abhidhā /

‘Abhidhā’ Denotation;

arthapratipādanam iti yāvat /

i.e. expressing of meaning.

sā śabdasya anyathā vācakaśaktyā vinā, na siddhyed ityevaṃ bodhakaśaktatām, avagamya buddhvā, tadananyagateḥ tasyābodhakaśakter anyā gatir nāsti śabdanityatvamantareṇeti, punar arthāpattyantareṇaiva śabdasya nityatvaniścayaḥ /

This could not be done by words, could not be defined, except through Expressive Potency; having thus ‘presumed’ the expressive potency of Word, it is found that this potency would not be otherwise possible, i.e. there is no other way of explaining such a Potency, without recognising the eternality of words; so that this cognition of the eternality of words is also obtained by means of another Presumption.

kathaṃ punar nityatvam antareṇābhidhā na siddhyatītyāha anityo hītyādi /

Question: “Why cannot there be Expressive Potency without eternality?”

tathā hi saṅketakāle dṛṣṭasya yadi vyavahārakāle 'nuvṛttir na bhavet / tadā saṅketakaraṇam arthakam eva syāt /

Answer: ‘Because what is non-eternal, etc. etc.’, That is to say, if what was perceived at the time of the making of the Convention does not continue to exist till the time of being used, then, the making of the Convention would be entirely futile;

vyavahārārthatvāt tasya /

as Convention is set up only for purposes of usage;

yaścānuvartate vyavahārakāle śabdas tena saha pūrvaṃ sambandhasyāgṛhītatvāt /

and the Word that is present at the time of usage is not one with which the connection of the meaning had been set up at the time of the Convention.

athavā tadananyagater iti / tasya [p.460] vyavahārakālabhāvinaḥ śabdasya, saṅketakāladṛṣṭācchabdādananyagater avyatirekaniścayāt /

Or, the text may be explained in another way: ‘Tadananyagateḥ’ since, of the word existing at the time of usage, there is no difference from the word perceived at the time of the making of the Convention.

katham avyatirekaniścaya ity āha anityo hītyādi //

How is it known that there is no difference? Answer Because what is non-eternal, etc. etc.’ (1600-1601)

abhāvapūrvikām arthāpattim āha pramāṇetyādi / pramāṇābhāvanirṇītacaitrābhāvaviśeṣitām / gehāccaitrabahirbhāvasiddhir yā tviha varṇitā //

“(7) The absence of caitra from the house having been cognised through negation, the cognition of the presence of caitra outside the house which is marked by his absence, has been cited; this is to be regarded as another kind of presumption, based upon negation.

tāmabhāvotthitām anyām arthāpattimudāharet / pakṣadharmādyanaṅgatvād bhinnaiṣāpyanumānataḥ //

[Ślokavārtika-arthāpatti, 8-9]. This (presumption) is different from inference, because the minor premiss (probans as residing in the minor term) and the other factors do not form part of it.

bahirdeśaviśiṣṭe 'rthe deśe vā tadviśeṣite / prameye yo grahābhāvaḥ pakṣadharmastvasau katham //

When the object cognised, is either the man connected with the exterior (of the house), or the exterior connected with the man, in either case, how could ‘absence in the house’ serve as the probans (residing in that subject)? [ibid., 10-12].

jīvataś ca gṛhābhāvaḥ pakṣadharmo 'tra kalpyate /

What is regarded as the probans in this case is the ‘absence of the living man in the house’;

tatsaṃvittir bahirbhāvaṃ na cābuddhopajāyate //

and there can be no cognition of this absence without knowing his presence outside the house. [ibid., 19].

gehābhāvas tu yaḥ śuddhau vidyamānatvavarjitaḥ / sa mṛteṣvapi dṛṣṭatvād bahirvṛtter na sādhakaḥ //

As for pure ‘absence in the house’, apart from the idea of his being alive such absence is found in the case of dead persons also, and hence cannot be a proof of his presence outside”. [ibid., 21].

pratyakṣādeḥ pramāṇasyābhāvena nivṛttyā nirṇīto niścito yaścaitrābhāvas tena viśeṣitād gehāt, iha gehe caitro nāstītyataḥ, caitrasya jīvane sati, yābahirbhāvasiddhiḥ bahiścaitro vidyata ityevaṃniścayarūpā, iha bhāṣye, varṇitā śabarasvāminā, tadanyāsāmarthāpattīnām upalakṣaṇārtham udāhṛteti yāvat /

The absence of Caitra has been cognised by the Negation absence, of Perception and other Means of Cognition; the House is qualified by this ascertained absence; i.e. the idea that ‘Caitra is not in the House’; and the presence of Caitra, if he is alive is cognised as being outside of the said House; this cognition, in the form ‘Caitra is outside the house’, has been cited in the Bhāṣya, by Śabarasvāmin;

yathā jīvati devadatte, gṛhe 'darśanena bahirbhāvasyādṛṣṭasya kalpaneti /

that is, only as an indication of the other kinds of Presumption; e.g. when Devadatta is alive, if he is not in the house, there is Presumption of him as being out of the house.

idam abhāvapūrvikāyā arthāpatter udāharaṇam /

This is an example of Presumption based upon Negation.

prāyeṇāsyās tārkikair anumānatvamiṣṭam iti tannirākaraṇam āha pakṣetyādi / yataḥ pakṣadharmādayo 'syā nāṅgaṃ na kāraṇam, ato bhinnaivaiṣānumānāt, pratyakṣavat /

Almost all Naiyāyikās have included Presumption under ‘Inference’. In refutation of this view, Kumārila adds ‘This is different from Inference, etc. etc.’ Inasmuch as the Probans, etc. do not enter into it as factors as its causes this must be different from Inference;

tathā hi bahirdeśena viśiṣṭo 'rthaścaitrādiḥ, caitrādinā vā viśiṣṭo bahirdeśaḥ, tasmin dvividhe 'pi prameye sati, gṛhe caitrāder arthasyābhāvo yaḥ kathaṃ vyadhikaraṇaḥ sanpakṣadharmo bhavet / naiva bhaved ityabhiprāyaḥ /

Because the object of cognition in this case is either Caitra qualified by the place outside the house, or the place outside the house qualified by Caitra; in either case, how could the absence of Caitra, which resides elsewhere (inside the House) serve as the Probans? That is to say, it could never serve as the Probans.

api ca gṛhābhāvaḥ pakṣadharmatvena kalpyamānaḥ kadācijjīvato devadattasya yo gṛhābhāvaḥ sa kalpyate, sāmānyena veti pakṣadvayam /

Then again, if absence in the House were assumed as the Probans, it could be so assumed only in one or the other of two ways i.e. either as the absence of the living Devadatta, in the House, or absence in the House in general.

tatra prathame pakṣe doṣamāha jīvata ityādi / tatsaṃvittir iti /

In the former case, there would be this objection that ‘the absence of the living man, etc. etc.’ ‘there can be no cognition of this absence, etc. etc.

tasya jīvato devadattasya saṃvittiḥ niścayaḥ, sā devadattasya bahirbhāvamabuddhvā na jāyate /

That is, the cognition of the living Devadatta the certainty regarding it would not be possible until his presence outside is definitely known.

anena hetor asiddhatāṃ siddhau vā siddhasādhyatām āha /

What is meant by this is that the Probans in this case would be one that is ‘inadmissible’, and that if it is admissible, it is futile.

dvitīye 'pi pakṣe hetor anaikāntikatvaṃ, mṛteṣvapi devadattādiṣu teṣāṃ [p.461] gṛhyābhāvasya dṛṣṭatvād iti darśayann āha gehābhāvastviti /

If the second alternative is accepted [i.e. absence in the House in general is the Probans’, the Probans would be Inconclusive; as even when Devadatta is dead, people recognise his absence in the House. This is what is shown in the words ‘as for pure absence in the House, etc., etc.

vidyamānatveti / jīvattā //

‘Vidyamānatva’ is being alive.

evaṃ ṣaṭprakārārthāpattiḥ /

With the following Texts begin the refutation of the above view (regarding Presumption as a distinct Means of Cognition).

tatretyādinā dūṣaṇam āha atra lakṣaṇaṃ tāvad ayuktam /

In the first place, the definition that has been provided is not a proper one.

tathā hi ---tenādrustena vina drustaśrutādikoo 'rtho nopapadyata ityadrustakalpanā/

For instance, the definition provided is that ‘Presumption consists in the presuming of an imperceptible fact without which a perceived or heard of fact would not be possible’.

kiṃ tenādṛṣṭena saha kvacid dṛṣṭaśrutasyārthasya sambandho dṛṣṭo atha na/ yadi tu dṛṣṭaḥ, anumānatvaprasaṅgaḥ, sambandhadarśanopāyatvāt /

In connection with this, the following points have to be considered: Has the relation of that imperceptible fact with the perceived and heard of facts been perceived anywhere, or not? If it has been perceived, then the cognition in question becomes an Inference, as brought about by the perception of the said Relation.

atha na saṃsiddhaḥ, evaṃ tarhi vahner dāhakatvavadadāhakatvam api kalpanīyam, adṛṣṭasambandhatvenāviśeṣāt /

If the Relation has not been perceived, then, in that case, the non-burning power of Fire might also be presumed, in the same way as its burning power is; because so far as being not related is concerned, both stand upon the same footing.

atha matamadāhakatvena saha vahner adṛṣṭatvān nādāhakatvaṃ kalpyata iti / evaṃ tarhi dāhakatvam api na kalpanīyam, tenāpi saha kvacid adṛṣṭatvāt /

It might be argued that “inasmuch as Fire has never been actually found to be associated with non-burning power, there can be no presumption of this latter”. But in that case, there should be no presumption of the burning power also; because Fire has never been seen to be associated with that power.

tasmāt sambandhe siddhe sati sambandhinam avinābhāvinaṃ dṛṣṭvā dvitīyasya sambandhinaḥ kalpanā yuktā / evaṃ ca kalpyamāne sambandhadarśanopāyatvād anumāna evāntarbhāvaḥ syāt /

Thus it is only when the relation between two things is well known that, on seeing one of the two invariably concomitant members of that relation, there can be a presumption of the other relative; and when this has been presumed, it is only through the said Relation; and hence this presumption becomes included under ‘Inference’.

udāharaṇānyapyayuktāni /

The examples also that have been cited are not right.

tatra tāvat pratyakṣādiprasiddhasyārthasya catasṛbhir arthāpattibhiḥ śaktiḥ pratīyata ityatra sādhāraṇaṃ dūṣaṇam āha tatra śaktātirekeṇetyādi /

These examples have been cited to show that through four Presumptions one cognises the Potency of something known through Perception and the other Means of Cognition. The author points out the defect that is common to all these: [see verse 1607 next]

tatra śaktātirekeṇa na śaktir nāma kācana /

Apart from the potent object, there is no such thing as ‘potency’, which could be cognised by means of presumption;

yārthāpattyāvagamyeta śaktaścādhyakṣa eva hi //

and as for the potent object, it is cognised through perception itself.

yataḥ śaktir anyā na vastutaḥ sakāśāt, sa ca śaktaḥ padārthaḥ pratyakṣa evetigṛhītagrahaṇād eva na pramāṇam /

Inasmuch as Potency is nothing apart from the Potent object, and the Potent object is cognisable by Perception, Presumption would be apprehending what is already apprehended; and on that ground alone, it could not be regarded as a Means of Valid Cognition.

dāhādīnām ityādinā pratyakṣapūrvikāyā arthāpatter udāharaṇasya viśeṣeṇa dūṣaṇam āha dāhādīnāṃ tu yo hetuḥ pāvakādiḥ samīkṣyate /

The mention of ‘Perception’ in this connection, is only by way of illustration. In the case of such phenomena as burning and the rest, their cause is actually perceived in the form of the fire and the rest, and there is nothing wrong or uncertain in this perception;

asaṃśayāviparyāsaṃ śaktiḥ kānyā bhavet tataḥ // vyatirikte tu kāryeṣu tasyā evopayogataḥ /

what then could ‘potency’ be, apart from those causes? If the ‘potency’ is something different (from the said causes), then as that ‘potency’ would be what brings about the effect, the object (cause) itself would not be an active agent at all (in the bringing about of that effect);

bhāvo 'kāraka eva syād upayoge na bhedinī //

if, on the other hand, the object does bring about the effect, then the potency would not be anything different;

arthakriyāsamarthaṃ hi svarūpaṃ śaktilakṣaṇam /

because the characteristic feature of the ‘object’ is that it should be capable of effective action;

evam ātmā ca bhāvo 'yaṃ pratyakṣād vyavasīyate //

and that the object is so capable is learnt from perception itself.

asaṃśayāviparyāsam iti kriyāviśeṣaṇam etat /

‘There is nothing wrong, etc.’ This compound is to be taken as an adverb (modifying the verb ‘perceived’).

atha vyatiriktā śaktir abhyupagamyate tadā kāryeṣu śakter evopayogād bhāvasyākārakatvaṃ prāpnoti tataścāvastutva [p.462] prasaṅgaḥ /

If the Potency is regarded to be something different from the object, then, in the bringing about of the effect (in the shape of the phenomenon cited), the Potency being the effective agent, the object itself would cease to be an active agent;

arthakriyākāritvalakṣaṇatvād vastutvasya /

as the characteristic of the Entity is that it should be capable of effective action.

atha mābhūd avastutvaprasaṅga ityupayogo 'ṅgīkriyate tadā tasminnupayoge 'ṅgīkriyamāṇe na tarhi sā śaktir bhedinī bhinnā /

If, in order to guard against the object becoming a non-entity, it be admitted that the object does have some action in the bringing about of the effect concerned, then the ‘Potency’ could not be anything different from the object.

rūpāt upayogino bhāvasya svabhāvād eva, arthakriyāsiddheḥ /

Why? Because ‘Potency’ can be only that form or nature, which is capable of effective action;

na kāryasyānyathābhāvād bhavatyetaddhi bhāvataḥ //

it cannot be anything else.

syād etat astyevānyacchakter lakṣaṇam yaduta nityaṃ kāryānyathānupapattyā yadgamyaṃ rūpaṃ sā śaktir iti, kāryānumeyatvaṃ śakter lakṣaṇam /

As regards the verbal expression ‘the Potency of the object’ which implies some sort of a difference between the two, that is meant to discard the notion of any other kind of difference, and is used in this form only with a view to the enquiry as to what ‘Potency’ is, and the answer is that it is the object itself.

naitad yuktaṃ śaktilakṣaṇam /

There is no means of knowing any other characteristic of potency.

etat kāryaṃ yasmāt bhāvāt padārthāt, / bhavati utpadyate, tamsād anyathāpi kāryasyāstitvasambhava iti kiṃ vyatiriktayā śaktyā kalpitayā //

even if such another characteristic were known, there would be no use for it; as the effect would be accomplished by the mere presence of the object. The following might be urged “Capacity for effective action is not the characteristic of Potency; it is something else”.

etad evārthaṃ spaṣṭīkurvann āha jalādītyādi //

The answer to that is as follows: [see verse 1611 above]

naikāntena vibhinnā cecchaktiḥ sāpyubhayātmikā / na virodhād bhavet sā ca pratyakṣānanyatāpi yat //

There is no means of knowing any other characteristic of ‘Potency’, which Means could distinguish Potency from ‘Negation’ in the form of the absence of all capacity.

[p.463] kiṃ tarhibhinnābhinnatvenobhayātmiketyetac ca na yuktam /

Even if such a characteristic were known, it would serve no useful purpose for men who would be seeking for effective action;

pratyakṣatve sthite cāsyāmanumeyatvavāraṇam /

because the needed effective action will have been accomplished by the presence i.e. by the very nature of the Object itself;

kṣataye naiva yenāsmin viṣaye nānumeṣyate // api ca ---"śaktayaḥ sarvabhāvānāṃ kāryārthāpattisādhanā"ityādi yadetad anumeyatvavāraṇaṃ śakteḥ kṛtam, tan na kṣataye 'smākam /

as has been declared in the following words: ‘To persons seeking for effective action, what would be the use of cogitating over what is not fit for effective action? Certainly, the young woman has no need to consider whether the impotent man is ugly or handsome (1611)

yena yasmāt asmin pratyakṣaviṣaye nānumānamiṣyate 'smābhiḥ, parokṣārthapratipattirūpatvāde anumānasya /

What was asserted on the previous occasion was only the fact of the apprehension of sound being dependent on other causes, on the ground that even when its cause was there, it did not come about, because something else was absent;

anena siddhasādhyatām āha //

Existence is not proved directly;

yaduktam "śrotrādiśaktipakṣece"ti, atrāha ye tvityādi / ye tu śrotrādayo bhāvāḥ pratyakṣasya na gocarāḥ /

what is proved is the fact of Auditory and other Perceptions, as the Subject, being dependent upon other causes, on the ground that when the other cause, of its Auditory Perception, in the shape of attention of the mind is not there the Perception does not come about.

nanu ca sattā tu sādhyata eveti pūrvaṃ pratipāditam, tat kathaṃ sattā gamyata ity ucyata ity āha kāraṇāntaretyādi /

This argument is formulated as follows: When even on the presence of something, another thing appears only occasionally (not always), then this latter must be dependent upon other-causes;

bhāve 'pyanyasya taddhetor abhāvād aṅkurādivat //

e.g. even when the soil is there, the Sprout appears only occasionally;

satyapi manaskārādau kadācid bhavati śrotrajñānam iti svabhāvahetuḥ /

even when the attention of the Mind is there, the Auditory Perception comes about only occasionally;

tasmin kāraṇāntarasāpekṣatve sādhite yat kāraṇāntaraṃ tat śrotrādi prasiddham ityanena prakāreṇa sattā gamyata ity ucyate, na tvāhatyetyadoṣaḥ //

this thus is a Reason based upon the nature of things. When this fact of being dependent upon other causes has been established, then it is deduced that that other cause must be the well-known Auditory Organ; that is why it is said that existence is cognised, in this way and not directly.

[p.464]

Hence there is nothing wrong in this.

upādānāsamāne ca deśe jātir nirantaram / raver deśāntaravyāptyā jvālāder iva gamyate //

When the sun reaches another place, what happens always is that it is born (again) in a place different from its original place; this is as it is found in the case of the fire-flame;

sthirātmano viśeṣatvān nānyartheyaṃ prasajyate / tasya deśāntaraprāptiḥ śaktistvanyā nirākṛtā //

a thing that remains permanent is of a totally different kind; otherwise such reaching of another place would not be possible. As regards potency, it has already been shown that it is nothing apart from the thing.

anenānumānāntarbhāvamāha /

This shows that Presumption is included under Inference.

tathā hi yasya yasya deśāntaraprāptirupalabhyate, tasya svopādānakāraṇadeśaparihāreṇa jātiḥ, yathā jvālāder deśāntaraṃ prāpnuvataḥ, deśāntaraprāptiś ca raveriti svabhāvahetuḥ /

For instance, whenever anything is found to reach another place, it is a case of the thing being born in a place other than its original one; as is found to be the case when the fire-flame moves from one place to the other; the Sun is found to be reaching another place; hence this is an Inferential Reason based upon the nature of things.

na cāyam anekāntikaḥ, yataḥ sthirātmana ekarūpasya bhāvasya neyaṃ deśāntaraprāptir yuktā, pūrvadeśāpratiniyatasvabhāvāparityāgāt /

This Reason cannot be regarded as ‘Inconclusive’; because a thing that remaim permanent i.e. an object that always remains in one and the same form cannot reach another place; as it can never renounce its original position;

tyāge vāpūrvotpattir eveti /

if it does renoimce it, it must be in a new- form born again.

idam eva bādhakaṃ pramāṇam /

This is the Reasoning sublating any conclusions to the contrary.

syād etaccaktau sādhyāyām ityam arthāpattir udāhṛtā, notpattau, tat katham asyā arthāpatteranumānāntarbhāva ucyata ity āha śaktistvanyā nirākṛteti //

It might be argued that “This Presumption has been cited as proving the existence of the Potency, not the birth of the thing; how then is it that the Presumption is said to he included under this Inference?”

pīno devetyādau śrutārthāpattyudāharaṇe prāha pīna ityādi /

The answer to this is ‘As regards Potency, etc. etc.’ (1618-1619)

pīno divā na bhuṅkte cetyasminnarthe na niścayaḥ / dveṣamohādibhir yogād anyathāpi vadet pumān //

No certain cognition can result from the assertion that ‘the fat man eats not during the day’, as the speaker might be asserting this through enmity or delusion and such other causes.

anena śābdapramāṇapūrvakatvasyāsiddhatām āha //

What this shows is that there can be no Presumption based upon Verbal Cognition.

syād etannahi vākyenārthagatimapekṣya vākyāntarākṣepaḥ kriyate / kiṃ tarhikevalenaiva / tac ca prathakṣataḥ siddham evetyāha arthagatyanapekṣaṇeti / arthagatyanapekṣeṇa yadi vākyāntaraṃ punaḥ /

If another expressive statement is indicated (in presumption) by the first statement, independently of what is expressed by itself, then that other statement also would indicate another statement. The following might be urged: “It is not that the other assertion is indicated by the first sentence, on the basis of what is expressed by it;

sārthamākṣipyata tena syād ākṣepo vacontare //

it is indicated by the assertion itself; and the assertion itself is directly perceived (heard).”

arthagatir nāpekṣya ityarthagatyanapekṣaṃ vākyaṃ, yena kevalena vākyamātreṇayadi sārthakaṃ vākyāntaramākṣipyate, tadā syād ākṣepo vaco 'ntare rātribhojanavākyād anyasyāpi vākyāntarasyākṣepaḥ prāpnoti /

The sentence is said to be ‘independent of what is expressed by it’ when it f unctions by itself, not through its meaning; when the mere sentence by itself indicates (through Presumption) the other sentence which is expressive of a definite meaning, then that other statement also would indicate another statement; that is, it would be possible for the sentence asserting eating at night to indicate another sentence;

sambandharahitatvenāviśeṣāt /

as the condition of being devoid of relation would be equally present in the case of all.

atha vastupratibandhād arthamākṣipatītyarthagatyapekṣaṇe taddoṣaḥ //

If then it be said that the indication is through what is expressed by the first sentence, then the objection urged before remains in force.

athetyādinā pārābhiprāyamāśaṅkate

In the following Text, the Author anticipates and answers the intention of the Opponent: [see verse 1622 next]

pramāṇāntarato yadvā bhavatvarthagatis tataḥ // atha mābhūd atiprasaṅga iti nyāyād arthagatimapekṣya paropagamanarūpeṇārthagatir iṣyate, [p.465] parasya vaktur āptatvenābhyupagatatvāt / yadvā pramāṇāntarataḥ pratyakṣāder jñānaṃ pīno devadatto divā na bhuṅkta iti /

If, the idea of what is expressed by the sentence is admitted as emanating from the other person, or as brought about by another means of cognition, then the cognition of what is expressed by the later sentence may be regarded as following from that. In order to avoid the incongruity urged above, it might be said that the dependence of what is expressed by the first sentence is also admitted, as emanating from the other person (who has asserted that ‘the fat Devadatta does not eat during the day’) who is known to be reliable;

atra pratividhatte bhavatvityādi /

or as brought about by another Means of Cognition Perception, etc.

bhavatvarthasya rātribhojanasya gatis tataḥ divābhojanavaikalyena viśeṣitātpīnatvāt /

whereby it is known that the fat Devadatta does not eat during the day. The answer to this is ‘Then the cognition, etc. etc.’ That is, the cognition of the fact itself (expressed by the second sentence) might follow from that fact (expressed by the first sentence) i.e, from fatness along with not eating in the day;

natu vākyāntarasya buddhisthasya gamakatvam evaṃ satyanumāna evāntarbhāvānna pramāṇāntaratvaṃ, syād ityabhiprāyaḥ //

and there need be no indication of the sentence in the mind. And in that case, the cognition would become included under Inference, and hence Presumption need not be a separate means of Cognition.

kṣapābhojanasambandhī pumāniṣṭaḥ pratīyate /

What is cognised is the man spoken of as related to eating at night;

divābhojanavaikalyapīnatvena tadanyavat //

on the ground of his being fat while going without food during the day, like another person.

iṣṭaḥ vivakṣitaḥ puruṣaviśeṣo rātribhojanaviśiṣṭaḥ /

‘Iṣṭaḥ’ spoken of, i.e. the Man as related to eating at night.