buddhist-nlp/tatpa-noisy · Datasets at Hugging Face

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tatra sadasadrūpeṇobhayātmake vastuni vyavasthite, yasmin vasturūpe vastvaṃśe 'sadrūpākhye, pramāṇapañcakam arthāpattiparyantaṃ na jāyate /	the non-existent aspect of the object, the five Means of Cognition, ending with ‘Presumption’, do not function, for what? for the comprehension of the existence of that object, d.e. for apprehending the existent aspect of the object, in the case of such cognisable object, in the shape of its non-existent aspect, ‘Negation’ is the only Means of Cognition. This shows only the object cognisable by this Means of Cognition, not the form of the Cognition itself. Question: What then is the form of this Cognition?
kimartham/	Answer: [see verse 1649 next]
vastusattāvabodhārtham vastunaḥ sattāṃśāvabodhārtham / tatra abhāvāṃśe [p.471] prameye, abhāvasya pramāṇatā /	and they hold that every object has two aspects the existent and the non-existent; thus it being acknowledged that the Object has these two aspects, the existent and the non-existent, in the case of an object Le.
anena viṣayo 'sya kevalo nirdiṣṭo natu svarūpam //	This shows only the object cognisable by this Means of Cognition, not the form of the Cognition itself.
svarūpamasya tarhi kīdṛśīm ity āha pratyakṣāder ityādi /	Question: What then is the form of this Cognition? Answer: [see verse 1649 next]
sātmano 'pariṇāmo vā vijñānaṃ vānyavastuni // pratyakṣāder arthāpattiparyantasyānutpattiḥ pramāṇābhāva iṣyate.	What is regarded to be ‘Negation, a Means of Cognition’ is the non-functioning of Perception and the other Means of Cognition. The term ‘pramāṇabhāva’ may be taken either as the Genitive Tatpuruṣa Compound, or as the Kārmadhāraya.
kvacit pāṭhaḥ pramāṇe 'bhāva iti. tatra nirdhāraṇe saptamī, jātāvekavacanam. pramāṇānāṃ madhye 'bhāvaḥ pramāṇam ity arthaḥ.	In some places the reading is ‘pramāṇe-abhavaḥ’, in which the meaning of the Locative ending would be ‘among Pramāṇas’, the singular number in ‘pramāṇe’ being due to all Pramāṇas being referred to as a class.
yathoktaṃ śabarasvāminā abhāvo 'pi pramāṇābhāvo nāstītyarthasyāsannikṛṣṭasyeti.	Thus has Śabarasvāmin declared (under Sū. 5) ‘Negation consists in the absence of the Means of Cognition and it gives rise to the notion of a certain unseen object not existing’.
atha keyam anutpattir ity āha sātmano 'pariṇāmo vā vijñānaṃ vānyavastunīti. sā pratyakṣāder anutpattiḥ, niṣedhyābhimataghaṭādipadārthajñānarūpeṇāpariṇataṃ sāmyāvasthamātmadravyam ucyate, ghaṭādiviviktabhūtalajñānaṃ vā.	Question “What is this non-functioning (of the Means of Cognition)?” Answer: ‘This may consist, etc. etc.’ This i.e. the non-functioning of Perception and the rest, may be said to consist in the Soul in a state of rest, not becoming modified into the form of the cognition of the Jar or any such thing which may be meant to be denied; or it may consist in the cognition of the spot on the ground as devoid of the said Jar, etc.
nanu cābhāva iti vastuviraha ucyate /	Objection: It is the absence of things that is called ‘Abhāva’, ‘Negation’;
tat kathaṃ vastutvam asya, nahi vastu viraho bhavatīty āśaṅkya vastutvam abhāvasya pratipādayann āha pramābhāvād iti / pramābhāvāc ca vastūnām abhāvaḥ sampratīyate /	how then can it be an entity? Certainly the absence cannot be an entity. Anticipating’ this objection, the Mīmāṃsaka proceeds to prove that Negation is an entity: [see verse 1650 above] If the ‘Negation of the Means of Cognition’ were not an entity, then, as a non-entity, it would have no capacity at all;
caturdhā ca vibhinno 'sau prāgabhāvādibhedataḥ //	nor would there be any division of Negation into the four kinds of ‘Previous Negation’ and so forth.
yadi pramāṇābhāvo vastu na bhavet tataś ca sarvasāmarthyaśūnyatvād asyeti tato nābhāvapratītiḥ syāt, prāgabhāvādibhedena caturdhā ca bhedo 'bhāvasya na syāt, nacaivam, tasmād abhāvapratītyanyathānupapattyā caturdhā bhedena lokasya vyavahārānyathānupapattyā cābhāvasya vastutvam /	And yet this is not so. Hence inasmuch as the Idea of Negation cannot be otherwise explained, and as the well-known fourfold division also of it cannot be otherwise accounted for, Negation must be regarded as an entity.
etaccārthāpattyākhyaṃ pramāṇadvayam ityeke /	Some people hold that these two ‘Presumptions’ afford the proof for Negation being an entity.
anye tu caturdhā ca vibhinno 'sāvityetadanumānam iti varṇayanti /	Others however explain that the sentence (in the Text) to the effect ‘It is divided under four heads’ embodies an Inference;
evaṃ ca pramāṇayanti abhāvo vastu bhidyamānatvāt ghaṭādivad iti //	and they formulate it as follows: Negation is an entity, because it is divided, like the Jar and other things.
kathaṃ punar asya caturdhā bheda iti pratipādayann āha kṣīre dadhītyādi /	The following Texts proceed to show how ‘it is divided under four heads’: [see verses 1651-1654 next]
kṣīre dadhyādi yannāsti prāgabhāvaḥ sa kalpyate / nāstitā payaso dadhni pradhvaṃsābhāvalakṣaṇam // gavi yo 'śvādyabhāvaś ca so 'nyonyābhāva ucyate / pararūpaṃ na tasyāsti nāstitāsyātmanā tataḥ //	When in reference to the cause such as Clay or Milk, people have the idea of the effect the Jar or the Curd not being there, this is called ‘Previous Negation’, If this ‘Previous Negation’ were not an entity, the product, Curd, would always be there in the Milk. In the same way, when in reference to the Curd, there is the idea of the Milk being no longer there, it is called ‘Destruction’.
yadi tu prāgabhāvo na bhavet kṣīrādau dadhyādikāryaṃ bhavedeva /	If this Negation were not an entity then the Milk would still be there in the Curd.
gavādau vastvāder abhāvo 'nyonyābhāva ucyate /	In reference to the Cow, there is the idea of its not being the Horse; this is called ‘Mutual Negation’.
yasmāt tasya gavādeḥ pararūpam aśvādisvabhāvo nāsti tasmāt tayor anyonyābhāva ucyate / anyathā gavādau bhavedevāśvādi yadyanyonyābhāvo na bhavet /	Because the Cow does not have the form of the other, the Horse therefore this is called ‘Mutual Negation’, If this Mutual Negation were not an entity, then the Horse would be there in the Cow.
śaśaśiraso 'vayavā nimnā vṛddhikāṭhinyābhyāṃ rahitā viṣāṇādirūpeṇātyantamasanto 'nyantābhāva ucyate /	When the flat parts of the Hare’s head are found to be devoid of growth and hardness, and entirely non-existent in the form of Horns, it is called ‘Absolute Negation’.
yadyapi cātra vastuvṛtter anyonyābhāvas tathāpi lokaprasiddhyoktamatyantabhāva iti /	Even though here also, in so far as the nature of the things is concerned, we have a case of ‘Mutual Negation’.
prāyeṇa hi loke sāmānādhikaraṇyenaivetaretarābhāvavyavahāraḥ yathā gaurayaṃ nāśva iti /	[The flat Head not being the Horn], yet, it has been cited as an example of ‘Absolute Negation’, in accordance with the popular notion of it.
natu śaśīyaṃ na viṣāṇam ityevam / yadi tvatyantābhāvo na bhavet śaśe śṛṅgaṃ bhavedeva /	in the case of the negation of the Hare’s Horn, however, they do not say ‘This is the Hare, not the Horn’, If ‘absolute Negation’ were not an entity, then the Hare’s Horn would be there.
śaśe śṛṅgaṃ pṛthivyādau caitanyaṃ mūrtirātmani // apsu gandho rasaścāsau vāyau rūpeṇa tau saha / vyomni sasparśakās te ca na cedasya pramāṇatā" // iti /	As says Kumārila [in Ślokavārtika Negation, 2-4] ‘If Negation were not a Means of valid Cognition, then there would be Curd in the Milk, Milk in the Curd, the Cloth in the Jar, the Horn in the Hare, sentience in the Earth and other substances, Corporeality in the Soul, Odour in Water, Taste in Eire, and both Odour and Taste along with Colour, in Air, Touch and the other qualities’ in Ākāśa.
tatra caitanyam ātmā /	Here ‘sentience’ stands for the soul;
mūrtiḥ kāṭhinyam /	‘Corporeality’ for solidity;
tau gandharasau rūpasahitau vāyau syātām /	‘those two’ Odour and Taste along with Colour, would be there in Air;
te rūparasagandhāḥ saha sparśena vyomni ākāśe syuḥ /	and Colour, Taste and Odour, along with Touch would be there in Ākāśa.
kiṃ ca naca syāt kāraṇādivibhāgena lokavyavahāro yadyabhāvasya prāgabhāvādibhedena bhedo na syāt /	Further, there could be no differentiation into Causes and Effects in the transactions of the ordinary world, if Negation did not exist in its various forms of ‘Previous Negation’ and the rest.
yathā yo dadhyarthī sa kṣīropādānaṃ karoti natu kṣīrārthī dadhyupādānam tathā gavārthī nāśvam upādatte nāpyaśvārthī gām /	For instance, one who wants Curd, obtains Milk, but one who wants Milk does not seek to obtain Curd; similarly one who wants the Cow does not secure the Horse; nor does the man who wants the Horse secure the Cow.
ityevam ādikāraṇādivibhāgena vyavahāraḥ //	It is in this way that business is carried oil in the world. This sentence is not a quotation from the Ślokavārtika.
athāpi syādyadi nāma caturdhā bhedo 'sya jātas tathāpi vastutvena bhavitavyam etat kuta ity āha na cāvastuna ityādi /	The following might be urged ‘Even if there is this fourfold division, how does that make Negation an entity?’ The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 1655 above]
na cāvastuna ete syur bhedās tenāsya vastutā /	There can be no division of a Non-entity; as division always rests in entities.
tasmād abhāvo vastu /	Hence Negation must be an entity.
kīdṛśaṃ punar asya vastutvam ity āha kāryādīnām iti /	“What sort of an entity can it be?”
kṣīrādeḥ kāraṇasya yo bhāvaḥ sa eva dadhyādeḥ kāryasyābhāvaḥ kāryasya dadhyāder yo bhāvaḥ sa eva kṣīrādeḥ kāraṇasyābhāva ityetad abhāvavastutvam //	Answer: ‘The Negation of the Effect, etc. etc.’ The Presence of the Cause Milk, for instance is what constitutes the Negation of the Effect Curd; and the Presence of the Effect Curd is what constitutes the Negation of the Cause Milk, It is in this way that Negation is an entity.
punar apyunumānena vastutvam asya pratipādayann āha yadvetyādi /	The following Text seeks to prove, by means of Inference, that Negation is an entity: [see verse 1656 above]
tasmād gavādivad vastu prameyatvāc ca gamyatām //	as division always rests in entities. Hence Negation must be an entity.
abhāvo vastviti pakṣaḥ anuvṛttivyāvṛttibuddhigrāhyatvāt prameyatvācceti hetudvayaṃ gavādivad iti dṛṣṭāntaḥ //	‘Negation is an entity’, this the statement of the Proposition; in support of this there are two Reasons: (1) ‘because it is apprehended by exclusive and inclusive notions’, and (2) ‘because it is cognisable’; ‘like the Cow, etc.’ is the Corroborative Instance.
tatrānuvṛttibuddhiścaturṣvapyabhāvo 'bhāva ityekākāraḥ pratyayaḥ /	Of these, the ‘inclusive Notion’ is the idea, in regard to all the four kinds of Negation, that ‘it is Negation’;
vyāvṛttibuddhiḥ prāgabhāvo 'yaṃ na pradhvaṃsābhāva ityādibhedākāraḥ pratyayaḥ /	the ‘exclusive notion’ is in the form of the differentiating idea as ‘Previous Negation is not Destruction’, (1656)
tatra kumārilena trividho 'bhāvo varṇitaḥ /	Kumārila has described three lands of Negation: (1) the ‘Nonmodification of the Soul’;
ātmano 'pariṇāma ekaḥ padārthāntaraviśeṣajñānaṃ dvitīyaḥ "sātmano 'pariṇāmo vā vijñānaṃ vānyavastunī"ti vacanāt pramāṇanivṛttimātrātmakastṛtīyaḥ trilakṣaṇena yā buddhir janyate sānumeṣyate /	(2) ‘the Cognition of some other particular object’, as declared under Text 1649 (which is a quotation from the Ślokavārtika Negation, 11), and (3) ‘mere cessation (non-functioning) of all Means of Cognition’, as described by him in this passage ‘That Cognition is regarded (by the Buddhist) as Inference which is brought about by the three-featured Probans;
nacānutpattirūpasya kāraṇādhīnatā kvacid iti vacanāt /	but that Means of Cognition which consists in not being brought about (i.e, Negation) cannot stand in need of a Cause’ (Ślokavārtika Negation, 44).
tatraitasmiṃs tṛtīye 'bhāve codyamāśaṅkya pariharannāha mānaṃ katham abhāvaśced iti /	In regard to this third kind of Negation, the following Text anticipates and answers an objection: [see verse 1657 above]
athocyate kathaṃ pratyakṣānutpattilakṣaṇo 'bhāvaḥ pramāṇam iti / atrocyate prameyaṃ cātra kīdṛśam iti /	The following point may be raised How can ‘Negation’, which consists in non-appearance of Perception, be a Means of Cognition? The answer to this is What sort of Object is it that is cognised by it?
abhāvarūpaṃ prameyam iti cet /	The rejoinder may be “What is cognised is negative in character.”
evaṃ tarhi yathābhūtaṃ prameyaṃ tathābhūtam eva pramāṇam itīṣyatām /	In that case (our answer would be that), the Means of Cognition also should be understood to be of the same nature as the Object cognised;
tat kimucyate mānaṃ katham abhāva iti / nahi lakṣaṇaṃ pramāṇaṃ yuktam //	why then should it be asked how Negation can be a Means of Cognition? Certainly it cannot be denied that the Means can be of the same nature as the Object.
abhāvo vā pramāṇena svānurūpeṇa mīyate /	Question: Negation may be a Means of Cognition;
prameyatvād yathā bhāvas tasmād bhāvātmakāt pṛthak //	but why should it be different from Perception and the rest?
[p.474] pratyakṣādīnāṃ pramāṇānām abhāvaḥ pramāṇaṃ pratyakṣādibhyo bhinnam abhāvaśabdavācyatvāt prameyābhāvavat /	Answer: [see verses 1658-1659 above] The ‘Negation of Perception and the other Means of Cognition’ must be regarded as a Means of Cognition different from Perception and the rest, because it is spoken of by the name ‘Negation’, just like the negation of cognisable things.
yac ca svānurūpaṃ pramāṇaṃ tadbhāvātmakāt pratyakṣāder anyad iti siddham //	Or, the cognisable object named ‘Negation’ may be the subject (Minor Term), the Probandum regarding it being that ‘it is cognisable through a Means of Cognition of the same nature as itself’;
tadatretyādinā pratividhatte /	‘because it is a cognisable object’ is the Probans;
tadatra nityasattvasya pariṇāmo nirākṛtaḥ / tadviparyayasadbhāvaḥ kādācit ko na yujyate //	From this it follows that the Means of Cognition which is of the same nature as the cognisable ‘negation’ must be distinct from Perception and the rest which are positive in character, (1658-1659)
anenātmano 'pariṇāmo veti prathamasyābhāvalakṣaṇasyāsambhavitām āha /	This shows the ‘impossibility’ of the first definition of Negation as ‘the non-modification of the Soul’ (see Text 1649).
tathā hi paryudāsavṛttyā pariṇāmaviparīto 'pariṇāmaḥ kādācitko 'bhipreto lakṣaṇatvena / anyathā hi yadi kādācitko nābhipretaḥ paryudāsavṛttyā syāt tadā sarvadaiva vastuno 'stitvapratītiḥ syāt /	What is meant is as follows: By the process of Preclusion, ‘non-modification’ is something ‘contrary to modification’; it is this, as appearing at certain times, that is meant to be the characteristic feature of ‘Negation If it were not this occasional ‘non-modification’ that is meant by the process of Preclusion, then the thing defined would be there at all times.
sa cāpariṇāmo yathokto na sambhavatyātmanaḥ yasmānnityasattvasya pariṇāmo	Such ‘non-modification’ is not possible in the case of the Soul; as the possibility of any modification of an eternal entity has been already rejected.
nirākṛtas tasmāt kutas tasya viparītasyāpariṇāmasya paryudāsavṛttyā saṃśrayaṇaṃ bhavet /	Under the circumstances, how could there be any basis for what is only the. contrary of that Modification by the process of Preclusion?
tatra sattva ātmā nityaścāsau sattvaśceti nityasattvaḥ / yadvā nityaṃ sattvam sattā yasya sa tathoktaḥ / nitya iti yāvat /	The ‘sattva’, ‘entity’, meant here is the Soul, which is qualified by the adjective ‘nitya’, ‘eternal Or, the compound ‘nityasattva’ may be expounded as ‘that of which, the sattva, existence, is nitya eternal’; that is, eternal.
tadviparyayasadbhāva iti /	‘The existence of the contrary of such modification’;
tasya pariṇāmasya viparyayo 'pariṇāmaḥ sa kādācitko na yuktaḥ /	‘the contrary of modification’ is non-modification; this cannot be occasional;
kiṃ tarhi sarvadā bhavennityaikarūpatvād ātmaikaḥ //	it must be eternal; as being always of one and the same form, the Soul is one only.
atha matam apariṇāmo na pariṇāmaviparītavastvātmakaḥ / kiṃ tarhipariṇāmapratiṣedhamātrātmakaḥ /	The following might be urged “Non-modification is not of the nature of ‘something contrary to modification’, it is only of the nature of the ‘absence of modification’;
tena nāsambhavi lakṣaṇaṃ bhavatīti atrāha tat pratikṣepetyādi /	so that the definition cannot he impossible”. The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 1661 above]
tasya pariṇāmasya pratikṣepaḥ pratiṣedhaḥ sa eva tanmātraṃ tadevātmā svabhāvo yasyāpariṇāmasya sa tathoktaḥ /	‘Tatpratikṣepamātrātmā’ ‘Tat’ is modification; ‘Pratikṣepa’ is denial, absence; ‘mātra’ is only; that which has this absence of modification for its essence.
pratyayāntarasadbhāve tadviviktānyadarśanāt / ghaṭajñānādirūpeṇa tasyāsāviṣyate yadi //	‘This’ i.e. the ‘non-modification’ in the form of ‘absence of modifications’ should be always of one and the same form;
[p.475]	as there can be no modification of the Soul.
yadvikalpena nirdiṣṭaṃ pakṣadvayam idaṃ tvayā // vyabhicāriteti /	In the following Texts, the possibility of ‘non-modification’ is taken for-granted, and then it is shown that the definition is too wide: [see verses 1662-1664 above]
ativyāpitā /	‘Wrong’ Too wide.
mūrcchādītyādiśabdena vyavadhānaparāṅmukhādyavasthā gṛhyante /	‘Swoon and the like ‘And the like’ is meant to include those conditions where there is interception, or the thing is behind one’s back.
tadbhāve 'pīti / ghaṭādijñānarūpeṇāpariṇatātmadravyasadbhāve 'pi /	‘Even though this is there’ i.e, even though the Soul is there, not-modified into the form of the Cognition of the Jar and other things.
arthālambanapratyayavyatiriktapratyayāntarasadbhāve sati ghaṭādiviviktapradeśajñānam evāpariṇāma iṣyate /	[Says the Opponent] “Even though cognition other than those based on real objects are there, this is cognition of the place as devoid of the Jar and such real substances, and it is this that is meant by ‘non-modification’;
ghaṭādijñānarūpeṇāpariṇatatvāt /	as the Soul (under the states) is not modified into the form of the cognition of the Jar, etc. [and thus this precludes the cases of sleep, swoon and the like].
tasyeti ātmanaḥ / asāviti / apariṇāmaḥ /	‘Tasya’ stands for the Soul ‘Asau’ stands for non-modification”.
evaṃ sati vijñānaṃ vānyavastunītyetasmād dvitīyāt pakṣād asya viśeṣo noktaḥ syāt /	If this is what is meant (by the first definition), then there would be nothing said (in the first definition) which differentiated this definition from the second definition (put forward in Text 1649) to the effect that ‘Negation is the cognition of some other object’;
tataś ca pakṣadvayanirdeśo 'narthakaḥ syāt //	so that the putting forward of two alternative views would be useless.
anyavastunītyādinā dvitīye 'bhāvalakṣaṇe vyabhicāritām āha /	The following Text points out the defect in the second definition of Negation (put forward under Text 1649);
adṛśyasyāpīti /	[see verse 1665 above]
tat tulyayogyarūpasya kāraṇāntarasannidhau /	‘Even that, etc. etc.’ i.e. things removed in time, place and nature.
tadviviktānyavijñāne nāstitā cet pratīyate //	‘Second kind of Negation’ i.e. that in the form of ‘the cognition of something else’.
athāpi syān na sarvasyādṛṣṭasyābhāvaḥ sādhyaḥ iṣṭaḥ /	The following might be urged “What we mean to prove is not the non-existence of all that is not perceived;
upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasyeti yāvat / tadviviktānyavijñāna iti ghaṭādiviviktapradeśajñāne //	it is the non-existence of only that which is as capable of being cognised as the place devoid of the Jar and other things, i.e. that only which would be perceptible if it were there.
anyavastuni vijñānaṃ jātaṃ vā jñāyate katham /	‘Through the cognition of some other thing’, i.e, on the cognition of the place devoid of the Jar and other things.” (1666)
pratyakṣe 'ntargatā bhāvas tathāsati kathaṃ na te //	The answer to the above is as follows: [see verses 1667-1670 next]
[p.476] śakyadarśanasya upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasya vastunaḥ, ābhā ākāro yasya tat tathā, śakyadarśanavastvābhaṃ ca tat pratyakṣaṃ ceti karmadhārayaḥ /	‘Śakyadarśana’ is that thing the Perception of which is possible, i.e. what is perceptible. ‘Ābhā’ is form, figure; hence what is meant is that Perception which envisages the perceptible thing.
nānyeṣām iti / anumānādīnām /	‘Not of others’ i.e. of Inference and the rest;
yatas teṣāṃ parokṣa evārtho viṣayaḥ /	because what is cognised through these is imperceptible;
naca teṣāṃ nivṛttau parokṣasya deśakālasvabhāvaviprakṛṣṭasya nivṛttir astīti /	and the absence of these is not followed by the absence or negation of things removed in time, place and nature;
ato vyabhicāriṇī teṣāṃ nivṛttiḥ /	so that the absence or negation of these would be false (if brought forward as bringing about the Negation of these things).
tataś ca pratyakṣāder anutpattirityatrādigrahaṇam anarthakaṃ syāt /	Hence there would be no sense in adding the term ‘and the rest’ in the phrase ‘negation of Perception and the rest
apica tadanyavastuni vijñānaṃ yadi niścitaṃ bhavedevaṃ pratiyogino 'bhāvaṃ sādhayatītyevam avaśyābhyupagantavyam /	Further, if ‘the cognition of a thing other than that’ were definite and certain, then it must be admitted that it proves the absence of the counter-entity.
anyathā hi sattāmātreṇa tato 'bhāvasiddhau satyāṃ sarvasya puṃsas tasmād ekapuruṣotpannādapi jñānād abhāvasiddhiprasaṅgaḥ syāt /	Otherwise, if the Negation were proved as merely existing, then it would mean that the negation in question has become cognised by all men, through the said ‘cognition of the other thing’ appearing in any one person only.
tatra yena mīmāṃsakenāpratyakṣā buddhir abhyupagatā tena tadeva tadanyavastuni jātaṃ vijñānaṃ kathaṃ jñāyeta / naiva /	In that case, how could the Mīmāṃsaka, who regards Cognition as imperceptible, become cognisant of that ‘Cognition of another thing’? He would never be able to cognise it.
arthāpattito yadīti /	‘If through Presumption’;
jñāyata iti prakṛtena sambandhaḥ /	‘if it is cognised’ this has to be construed here, from the Context;
yathoktam ajñāte 'rthe buddher asiddher arthajñānālliṅgāt tadbuddhir anumīyata iti /	as has been asserted in the statement ‘As there can be no idea of the object that is not cognised, the cognition of the thing is inferred from the inferential indicative in the shape of the Idea of the thing’;
atra hi liṅgavacanamanyathānupapattivācakam /	here the term ‘inferential indicative’ stands for Presumption;

tatra sadasadrūpeṇobhayātmake vastuni vyavasthite, yasmin vasturūpe vastvaṃśe 'sadrūpākhye, pramāṇapañcakam arthāpattiparyantaṃ na jāyate /

the non-existent aspect of the object, the five Means of Cognition, ending with ‘Presumption’, do not function, for what? for the comprehension of the existence of that object, d.e. for apprehending the existent aspect of the object, in the case of such cognisable object, in the shape of its non-existent aspect, ‘Negation’ is the only Means of Cognition. This shows only the object cognisable by this Means of Cognition, not the form of the Cognition itself. Question: What then is the form of this Cognition?

kimartham/

Answer: [see verse 1649 next]

vastusattāvabodhārtham vastunaḥ sattāṃśāvabodhārtham / tatra abhāvāṃśe [p.471] prameye, abhāvasya pramāṇatā /

and they hold that every object has two aspects the existent and the non-existent; thus it being acknowledged that the Object has these two aspects, the existent and the non-existent, in the case of an object Le.

anena viṣayo 'sya kevalo nirdiṣṭo natu svarūpam //

This shows only the object cognisable by this Means of Cognition, not the form of the Cognition itself.

svarūpamasya tarhi kīdṛśīm ity āha pratyakṣāder ityādi /

Question: What then is the form of this Cognition? Answer: [see verse 1649 next]

sātmano 'pariṇāmo vā vijñānaṃ vānyavastuni // pratyakṣāder arthāpattiparyantasyānutpattiḥ pramāṇābhāva iṣyate.

What is regarded to be ‘Negation, a Means of Cognition’ is the non-functioning of Perception and the other Means of Cognition. The term ‘pramāṇabhāva’ may be taken either as the Genitive Tatpuruṣa Compound, or as the Kārmadhāraya.

kvacit pāṭhaḥ pramāṇe 'bhāva iti. tatra nirdhāraṇe saptamī, jātāvekavacanam. pramāṇānāṃ madhye 'bhāvaḥ pramāṇam ity arthaḥ.

In some places the reading is ‘pramāṇe-abhavaḥ’, in which the meaning of the Locative ending would be ‘among Pramāṇas’, the singular number in ‘pramāṇe’ being due to all Pramāṇas being referred to as a class.

yathoktaṃ śabarasvāminā abhāvo 'pi pramāṇābhāvo nāstītyarthasyāsannikṛṣṭasyeti.

Thus has Śabarasvāmin declared (under Sū. 5) ‘Negation consists in the absence of the Means of Cognition and it gives rise to the notion of a certain unseen object not existing’.

atha keyam anutpattir ity āha sātmano 'pariṇāmo vā vijñānaṃ vānyavastunīti. sā pratyakṣāder anutpattiḥ, niṣedhyābhimataghaṭādipadārthajñānarūpeṇāpariṇataṃ sāmyāvasthamātmadravyam ucyate, ghaṭādiviviktabhūtalajñānaṃ vā.

Question “What is this non-functioning (of the Means of Cognition)?” Answer: ‘This may consist, etc. etc.’ This i.e. the non-functioning of Perception and the rest, may be said to consist in the Soul in a state of rest, not becoming modified into the form of the cognition of the Jar or any such thing which may be meant to be denied; or it may consist in the cognition of the spot on the ground as devoid of the said Jar, etc.

nanu cābhāva iti vastuviraha ucyate /

Objection: It is the absence of things that is called ‘Abhāva’, ‘Negation’;

tat kathaṃ vastutvam asya, nahi vastu viraho bhavatīty āśaṅkya vastutvam abhāvasya pratipādayann āha pramābhāvād iti / pramābhāvāc ca vastūnām abhāvaḥ sampratīyate /

how then can it be an entity? Certainly the absence cannot be an entity. Anticipating’ this objection, the Mīmāṃsaka proceeds to prove that Negation is an entity: [see verse 1650 above] If the ‘Negation of the Means of Cognition’ were not an entity, then, as a non-entity, it would have no capacity at all;

caturdhā ca vibhinno 'sau prāgabhāvādibhedataḥ //

nor would there be any division of Negation into the four kinds of ‘Previous Negation’ and so forth.

yadi pramāṇābhāvo vastu na bhavet tataś ca sarvasāmarthyaśūnyatvād asyeti tato nābhāvapratītiḥ syāt, prāgabhāvādibhedena caturdhā ca bhedo 'bhāvasya na syāt, nacaivam, tasmād abhāvapratītyanyathānupapattyā caturdhā bhedena lokasya vyavahārānyathānupapattyā cābhāvasya vastutvam /

And yet this is not so. Hence inasmuch as the Idea of Negation cannot be otherwise explained, and as the well-known fourfold division also of it cannot be otherwise accounted for, Negation must be regarded as an entity.

etaccārthāpattyākhyaṃ pramāṇadvayam ityeke /

Some people hold that these two ‘Presumptions’ afford the proof for Negation being an entity.

anye tu caturdhā ca vibhinno 'sāvityetadanumānam iti varṇayanti /

Others however explain that the sentence (in the Text) to the effect ‘It is divided under four heads’ embodies an Inference;

evaṃ ca pramāṇayanti abhāvo vastu bhidyamānatvāt ghaṭādivad iti //

and they formulate it as follows: Negation is an entity, because it is divided, like the Jar and other things.

kathaṃ punar asya caturdhā bheda iti pratipādayann āha kṣīre dadhītyādi /

The following Texts proceed to show how ‘it is divided under four heads’: [see verses 1651-1654 next]

kṣīre dadhyādi yannāsti prāgabhāvaḥ sa kalpyate / nāstitā payaso dadhni pradhvaṃsābhāvalakṣaṇam // gavi yo 'śvādyabhāvaś ca so 'nyonyābhāva ucyate / pararūpaṃ na tasyāsti nāstitāsyātmanā tataḥ //

When in reference to the cause such as Clay or Milk, people have the idea of the effect the Jar or the Curd not being there, this is called ‘Previous Negation’, If this ‘Previous Negation’ were not an entity, the product, Curd, would always be there in the Milk. In the same way, when in reference to the Curd, there is the idea of the Milk being no longer there, it is called ‘Destruction’.

yadi tu prāgabhāvo na bhavet kṣīrādau dadhyādikāryaṃ bhavedeva /

If this Negation were not an entity then the Milk would still be there in the Curd.

gavādau vastvāder abhāvo 'nyonyābhāva ucyate /

In reference to the Cow, there is the idea of its not being the Horse; this is called ‘Mutual Negation’.

yasmāt tasya gavādeḥ pararūpam aśvādisvabhāvo nāsti tasmāt tayor anyonyābhāva ucyate / anyathā gavādau bhavedevāśvādi yadyanyonyābhāvo na bhavet /

Because the Cow does not have the form of the other, the Horse therefore this is called ‘Mutual Negation’, If this Mutual Negation were not an entity, then the Horse would be there in the Cow.

śaśaśiraso 'vayavā nimnā vṛddhikāṭhinyābhyāṃ rahitā viṣāṇādirūpeṇātyantamasanto 'nyantābhāva ucyate /

When the flat parts of the Hare’s head are found to be devoid of growth and hardness, and entirely non-existent in the form of Horns, it is called ‘Absolute Negation’.

yadyapi cātra vastuvṛtter anyonyābhāvas tathāpi lokaprasiddhyoktamatyantabhāva iti /

Even though here also, in so far as the nature of the things is concerned, we have a case of ‘Mutual Negation’.

prāyeṇa hi loke sāmānādhikaraṇyenaivetaretarābhāvavyavahāraḥ yathā gaurayaṃ nāśva iti /

[The flat Head not being the Horn], yet, it has been cited as an example of ‘Absolute Negation’, in accordance with the popular notion of it.

natu śaśīyaṃ na viṣāṇam ityevam / yadi tvatyantābhāvo na bhavet śaśe śṛṅgaṃ bhavedeva /

in the case of the negation of the Hare’s Horn, however, they do not say ‘This is the Hare, not the Horn’, If ‘absolute Negation’ were not an entity, then the Hare’s Horn would be there.

śaśe śṛṅgaṃ pṛthivyādau caitanyaṃ mūrtirātmani // apsu gandho rasaścāsau vāyau rūpeṇa tau saha / vyomni sasparśakās te ca na cedasya pramāṇatā" // iti /

As says Kumārila [in Ślokavārtika Negation, 2-4] ‘If Negation were not a Means of valid Cognition, then there would be Curd in the Milk, Milk in the Curd, the Cloth in the Jar, the Horn in the Hare, sentience in the Earth and other substances, Corporeality in the Soul, Odour in Water, Taste in Eire, and both Odour and Taste along with Colour, in Air, Touch and the other qualities’ in Ākāśa.

tatra caitanyam ātmā /

Here ‘sentience’ stands for the soul;

mūrtiḥ kāṭhinyam /

‘Corporeality’ for solidity;

tau gandharasau rūpasahitau vāyau syātām /

‘those two’ Odour and Taste along with Colour, would be there in Air;

te rūparasagandhāḥ saha sparśena vyomni ākāśe syuḥ /

and Colour, Taste and Odour, along with Touch would be there in Ākāśa.

kiṃ ca naca syāt kāraṇādivibhāgena lokavyavahāro yadyabhāvasya prāgabhāvādibhedena bhedo na syāt /

Further, there could be no differentiation into Causes and Effects in the transactions of the ordinary world, if Negation did not exist in its various forms of ‘Previous Negation’ and the rest.

yathā yo dadhyarthī sa kṣīropādānaṃ karoti natu kṣīrārthī dadhyupādānam tathā gavārthī nāśvam upādatte nāpyaśvārthī gām /

For instance, one who wants Curd, obtains Milk, but one who wants Milk does not seek to obtain Curd; similarly one who wants the Cow does not secure the Horse; nor does the man who wants the Horse secure the Cow.

ityevam ādikāraṇādivibhāgena vyavahāraḥ //

It is in this way that business is carried oil in the world. This sentence is not a quotation from the Ślokavārtika.

athāpi syādyadi nāma caturdhā bhedo 'sya jātas tathāpi vastutvena bhavitavyam etat kuta ity āha na cāvastuna ityādi /

The following might be urged ‘Even if there is this fourfold division, how does that make Negation an entity?’ The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 1655 above]

na cāvastuna ete syur bhedās tenāsya vastutā /

There can be no division of a Non-entity; as division always rests in entities.

tasmād abhāvo vastu /

Hence Negation must be an entity.

kīdṛśaṃ punar asya vastutvam ity āha kāryādīnām iti /

“What sort of an entity can it be?”

kṣīrādeḥ kāraṇasya yo bhāvaḥ sa eva dadhyādeḥ kāryasyābhāvaḥ kāryasya dadhyāder yo bhāvaḥ sa eva kṣīrādeḥ kāraṇasyābhāva ityetad abhāvavastutvam //

Answer: ‘The Negation of the Effect, etc. etc.’ The Presence of the Cause Milk, for instance is what constitutes the Negation of the Effect Curd; and the Presence of the Effect Curd is what constitutes the Negation of the Cause Milk, It is in this way that Negation is an entity.

punar apyunumānena vastutvam asya pratipādayann āha yadvetyādi /

The following Text seeks to prove, by means of Inference, that Negation is an entity: [see verse 1656 above]

tasmād gavādivad vastu prameyatvāc ca gamyatām //

as division always rests in entities. Hence Negation must be an entity.

abhāvo vastviti pakṣaḥ anuvṛttivyāvṛttibuddhigrāhyatvāt prameyatvācceti hetudvayaṃ gavādivad iti dṛṣṭāntaḥ //

‘Negation is an entity’, this the statement of the Proposition; in support of this there are two Reasons: (1) ‘because it is apprehended by exclusive and inclusive notions’, and (2) ‘because it is cognisable’; ‘like the Cow, etc.’ is the Corroborative Instance.

tatrānuvṛttibuddhiścaturṣvapyabhāvo 'bhāva ityekākāraḥ pratyayaḥ /

Of these, the ‘inclusive Notion’ is the idea, in regard to all the four kinds of Negation, that ‘it is Negation’;

vyāvṛttibuddhiḥ prāgabhāvo 'yaṃ na pradhvaṃsābhāva ityādibhedākāraḥ pratyayaḥ /

the ‘exclusive notion’ is in the form of the differentiating idea as ‘Previous Negation is not Destruction’, (1656)

tatra kumārilena trividho 'bhāvo varṇitaḥ /

Kumārila has described three lands of Negation: (1) the ‘Nonmodification of the Soul’;

ātmano 'pariṇāma ekaḥ padārthāntaraviśeṣajñānaṃ dvitīyaḥ "sātmano 'pariṇāmo vā vijñānaṃ vānyavastunī"ti vacanāt pramāṇanivṛttimātrātmakastṛtīyaḥ trilakṣaṇena yā buddhir janyate sānumeṣyate /

(2) ‘the Cognition of some other particular object’, as declared under Text 1649 (which is a quotation from the Ślokavārtika Negation, 11), and (3) ‘mere cessation (non-functioning) of all Means of Cognition’, as described by him in this passage ‘That Cognition is regarded (by the Buddhist) as Inference which is brought about by the three-featured Probans;

nacānutpattirūpasya kāraṇādhīnatā kvacid iti vacanāt /

but that Means of Cognition which consists in not being brought about (i.e, Negation) cannot stand in need of a Cause’ (Ślokavārtika Negation, 44).

tatraitasmiṃs tṛtīye 'bhāve codyamāśaṅkya pariharannāha mānaṃ katham abhāvaśced iti /

In regard to this third kind of Negation, the following Text anticipates and answers an objection: [see verse 1657 above]

athocyate kathaṃ pratyakṣānutpattilakṣaṇo 'bhāvaḥ pramāṇam iti / atrocyate prameyaṃ cātra kīdṛśam iti /

The following point may be raised How can ‘Negation’, which consists in non-appearance of Perception, be a Means of Cognition? The answer to this is What sort of Object is it that is cognised by it?

abhāvarūpaṃ prameyam iti cet /

The rejoinder may be “What is cognised is negative in character.”

evaṃ tarhi yathābhūtaṃ prameyaṃ tathābhūtam eva pramāṇam itīṣyatām /

In that case (our answer would be that), the Means of Cognition also should be understood to be of the same nature as the Object cognised;

tat kimucyate mānaṃ katham abhāva iti / nahi lakṣaṇaṃ pramāṇaṃ yuktam //

why then should it be asked how Negation can be a Means of Cognition? Certainly it cannot be denied that the Means can be of the same nature as the Object.

abhāvo vā pramāṇena svānurūpeṇa mīyate /

Question: Negation may be a Means of Cognition;

prameyatvād yathā bhāvas tasmād bhāvātmakāt pṛthak //

but why should it be different from Perception and the rest?

[p.474] pratyakṣādīnāṃ pramāṇānām abhāvaḥ pramāṇaṃ pratyakṣādibhyo bhinnam abhāvaśabdavācyatvāt prameyābhāvavat /

Answer: [see verses 1658-1659 above] The ‘Negation of Perception and the other Means of Cognition’ must be regarded as a Means of Cognition different from Perception and the rest, because it is spoken of by the name ‘Negation’, just like the negation of cognisable things.

yac ca svānurūpaṃ pramāṇaṃ tadbhāvātmakāt pratyakṣāder anyad iti siddham //

Or, the cognisable object named ‘Negation’ may be the subject (Minor Term), the Probandum regarding it being that ‘it is cognisable through a Means of Cognition of the same nature as itself’;

tadatretyādinā pratividhatte /

‘because it is a cognisable object’ is the Probans;

tadatra nityasattvasya pariṇāmo nirākṛtaḥ / tadviparyayasadbhāvaḥ kādācit ko na yujyate //

From this it follows that the Means of Cognition which is of the same nature as the cognisable ‘negation’ must be distinct from Perception and the rest which are positive in character, (1658-1659)

anenātmano 'pariṇāmo veti prathamasyābhāvalakṣaṇasyāsambhavitām āha /

This shows the ‘impossibility’ of the first definition of Negation as ‘the non-modification of the Soul’ (see Text 1649).

tathā hi paryudāsavṛttyā pariṇāmaviparīto 'pariṇāmaḥ kādācitko 'bhipreto lakṣaṇatvena / anyathā hi yadi kādācitko nābhipretaḥ paryudāsavṛttyā syāt tadā sarvadaiva vastuno 'stitvapratītiḥ syāt /

What is meant is as follows: By the process of Preclusion, ‘non-modification’ is something ‘contrary to modification’; it is this, as appearing at certain times, that is meant to be the characteristic feature of ‘Negation If it were not this occasional ‘non-modification’ that is meant by the process of Preclusion, then the thing defined would be there at all times.

sa cāpariṇāmo yathokto na sambhavatyātmanaḥ yasmānnityasattvasya pariṇāmo

Such ‘non-modification’ is not possible in the case of the Soul; as the possibility of any modification of an eternal entity has been already rejected.

nirākṛtas tasmāt kutas tasya viparītasyāpariṇāmasya paryudāsavṛttyā saṃśrayaṇaṃ bhavet /

Under the circumstances, how could there be any basis for what is only the. contrary of that Modification by the process of Preclusion?

tatra sattva ātmā nityaścāsau sattvaśceti nityasattvaḥ / yadvā nityaṃ sattvam sattā yasya sa tathoktaḥ / nitya iti yāvat /

The ‘sattva’, ‘entity’, meant here is the Soul, which is qualified by the adjective ‘nitya’, ‘eternal Or, the compound ‘nityasattva’ may be expounded as ‘that of which, the sattva, existence, is nitya eternal’; that is, eternal.

tadviparyayasadbhāva iti /

‘The existence of the contrary of such modification’;

tasya pariṇāmasya viparyayo 'pariṇāmaḥ sa kādācitko na yuktaḥ /

‘the contrary of modification’ is non-modification; this cannot be occasional;

kiṃ tarhi sarvadā bhavennityaikarūpatvād ātmaikaḥ //

it must be eternal; as being always of one and the same form, the Soul is one only.

atha matam apariṇāmo na pariṇāmaviparītavastvātmakaḥ / kiṃ tarhipariṇāmapratiṣedhamātrātmakaḥ /

The following might be urged “Non-modification is not of the nature of ‘something contrary to modification’, it is only of the nature of the ‘absence of modification’;

tena nāsambhavi lakṣaṇaṃ bhavatīti atrāha tat pratikṣepetyādi /

so that the definition cannot he impossible”. The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 1661 above]

tasya pariṇāmasya pratikṣepaḥ pratiṣedhaḥ sa eva tanmātraṃ tadevātmā svabhāvo yasyāpariṇāmasya sa tathoktaḥ /

‘Tatpratikṣepamātrātmā’ ‘Tat’ is modification; ‘Pratikṣepa’ is denial, absence; ‘mātra’ is only; that which has this absence of modification for its essence.

pratyayāntarasadbhāve tadviviktānyadarśanāt / ghaṭajñānādirūpeṇa tasyāsāviṣyate yadi //

‘This’ i.e. the ‘non-modification’ in the form of ‘absence of modifications’ should be always of one and the same form;

[p.475]

as there can be no modification of the Soul.

yadvikalpena nirdiṣṭaṃ pakṣadvayam idaṃ tvayā // vyabhicāriteti /

In the following Texts, the possibility of ‘non-modification’ is taken for-granted, and then it is shown that the definition is too wide: [see verses 1662-1664 above]

ativyāpitā /

‘Wrong’ Too wide.

mūrcchādītyādiśabdena vyavadhānaparāṅmukhādyavasthā gṛhyante /

‘Swoon and the like ‘And the like’ is meant to include those conditions where there is interception, or the thing is behind one’s back.

tadbhāve 'pīti / ghaṭādijñānarūpeṇāpariṇatātmadravyasadbhāve 'pi /

‘Even though this is there’ i.e, even though the Soul is there, not-modified into the form of the Cognition of the Jar and other things.

arthālambanapratyayavyatiriktapratyayāntarasadbhāve sati ghaṭādiviviktapradeśajñānam evāpariṇāma iṣyate /

[Says the Opponent] “Even though cognition other than those based on real objects are there, this is cognition of the place as devoid of the Jar and such real substances, and it is this that is meant by ‘non-modification’;

ghaṭādijñānarūpeṇāpariṇatatvāt /

as the Soul (under the states) is not modified into the form of the cognition of the Jar, etc. [and thus this precludes the cases of sleep, swoon and the like].

tasyeti ātmanaḥ / asāviti / apariṇāmaḥ /

‘Tasya’ stands for the Soul ‘Asau’ stands for non-modification”.

evaṃ sati vijñānaṃ vānyavastunītyetasmād dvitīyāt pakṣād asya viśeṣo noktaḥ syāt /

If this is what is meant (by the first definition), then there would be nothing said (in the first definition) which differentiated this definition from the second definition (put forward in Text 1649) to the effect that ‘Negation is the cognition of some other object’;

tataś ca pakṣadvayanirdeśo 'narthakaḥ syāt //

so that the putting forward of two alternative views would be useless.

anyavastunītyādinā dvitīye 'bhāvalakṣaṇe vyabhicāritām āha /

The following Text points out the defect in the second definition of Negation (put forward under Text 1649);

adṛśyasyāpīti /

[see verse 1665 above]

tat tulyayogyarūpasya kāraṇāntarasannidhau /

‘Even that, etc. etc.’ i.e. things removed in time, place and nature.

tadviviktānyavijñāne nāstitā cet pratīyate //

‘Second kind of Negation’ i.e. that in the form of ‘the cognition of something else’.

athāpi syān na sarvasyādṛṣṭasyābhāvaḥ sādhyaḥ iṣṭaḥ /

The following might be urged “What we mean to prove is not the non-existence of all that is not perceived;

upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasyeti yāvat / tadviviktānyavijñāna iti ghaṭādiviviktapradeśajñāne //

it is the non-existence of only that which is as capable of being cognised as the place devoid of the Jar and other things, i.e. that only which would be perceptible if it were there.

anyavastuni vijñānaṃ jātaṃ vā jñāyate katham /

‘Through the cognition of some other thing’, i.e, on the cognition of the place devoid of the Jar and other things.” (1666)

pratyakṣe 'ntargatā bhāvas tathāsati kathaṃ na te //

The answer to the above is as follows: [see verses 1667-1670 next]

[p.476] śakyadarśanasya upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasya vastunaḥ, ābhā ākāro yasya tat tathā, śakyadarśanavastvābhaṃ ca tat pratyakṣaṃ ceti karmadhārayaḥ /

‘Śakyadarśana’ is that thing the Perception of which is possible, i.e. what is perceptible. ‘Ābhā’ is form, figure; hence what is meant is that Perception which envisages the perceptible thing.

nānyeṣām iti / anumānādīnām /

‘Not of others’ i.e. of Inference and the rest;

yatas teṣāṃ parokṣa evārtho viṣayaḥ /

because what is cognised through these is imperceptible;

naca teṣāṃ nivṛttau parokṣasya deśakālasvabhāvaviprakṛṣṭasya nivṛttir astīti /

and the absence of these is not followed by the absence or negation of things removed in time, place and nature;

ato vyabhicāriṇī teṣāṃ nivṛttiḥ /

so that the absence or negation of these would be false (if brought forward as bringing about the Negation of these things).

tataś ca pratyakṣāder anutpattirityatrādigrahaṇam anarthakaṃ syāt /

Hence there would be no sense in adding the term ‘and the rest’ in the phrase ‘negation of Perception and the rest

apica tadanyavastuni vijñānaṃ yadi niścitaṃ bhavedevaṃ pratiyogino 'bhāvaṃ sādhayatītyevam avaśyābhyupagantavyam /

Further, if ‘the cognition of a thing other than that’ were definite and certain, then it must be admitted that it proves the absence of the counter-entity.

anyathā hi sattāmātreṇa tato 'bhāvasiddhau satyāṃ sarvasya puṃsas tasmād ekapuruṣotpannādapi jñānād abhāvasiddhiprasaṅgaḥ syāt /

Otherwise, if the Negation were proved as merely existing, then it would mean that the negation in question has become cognised by all men, through the said ‘cognition of the other thing’ appearing in any one person only.

tatra yena mīmāṃsakenāpratyakṣā buddhir abhyupagatā tena tadeva tadanyavastuni jātaṃ vijñānaṃ kathaṃ jñāyeta / naiva /

In that case, how could the Mīmāṃsaka, who regards Cognition as imperceptible, become cognisant of that ‘Cognition of another thing’? He would never be able to cognise it.

arthāpattito yadīti /

‘If through Presumption’;

jñāyata iti prakṛtena sambandhaḥ /

‘if it is cognised’ this has to be construed here, from the Context;

yathoktam ajñāte 'rthe buddher asiddher arthajñānālliṅgāt tadbuddhir anumīyata iti /

as has been asserted in the statement ‘As there can be no idea of the object that is not cognised, the cognition of the thing is inferred from the inferential indicative in the shape of the Idea of the thing’;

atra hi liṅgavacanamanyathānupapattivācakam /

here the term ‘inferential indicative’ stands for Presumption;