buddhist-nlp/tatpa-noisy · Datasets at Hugging Face

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tathā hi yatrāpi kevalapradeśopalambhād ghaṭābhāvasiddhiḥ, sāpi ghaṭopalambhākhyakāryānupalabdhir eva /	For instance, even in a case where the apprehension of the bare place brings about the cognition of the absence of the Jar, what brings about this latter cognition is the non-apprehension of the effect in the shape of the apprehension of the Jar;
yata upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasyaiva ghaṭasyābhāvaḥ sādhyate, na sarvasya /	because the absence that is cognised is only that of the Jar which would have been perceptible (if it were there), and not of all Jars.
ya evāpratibaddhasāmarthyaḥ /	And what would be that which is perceptible t That alone whose capacity has not been obstructed.
yata upalabdhilakṣaṇaṃ svabhāvaviśeṣo varṇitaḥ yaḥ svabhāvaḥ sa pratyakṣa eva bhavatīti /	Because Perceptibility has been described as a particular character, and what is the character of a thing must be perceptible.
anyathā hyatrāpi ghaṭopalabdhyā ghaṭasattā na vyāptā syāt tat tataścāvyāpakasya nivṛttau nāvyāptasya nivṛttir iti tato ghaṭābhāvo na siddhyet /	Otherwise, here also, all cases of the Existence of the Jar would not be covered by the Apprehension of the Jar i and hence the absence of the non-pervading factor could not lead to the absence of the un-pervaded factor; and there would be no cognition of the absence of the Jar.
tasmāt sarvaiva svabhāvānupalabdhir asadvyavahārahetuḥ /	It is for this reason that in all cases, the non-apprehension of the character of the thing leads to the thing being regarded as non-existent.
paramārthataḥ kāryānupalabdhir eva draṣṭavyā //	In reality however what has to be perceived is the non-apprehension of the effect (which leads to the cognition of the non-existence of the Cause).
ittham ityādinābhāvaśabdavācyatvād ityasya hetor anaikāntikatvam āha	The following Text proceeds to show the ‘Inconclusive’ character of the Reason ‘because it is spoken of by the name Negation [therefore Negation should be regarded as different from Perception and the rest’;
ittham iti /	see Text 1658]: [see verse 1690 above]
ekasya yā dṛṣṭiḥ saivānyā dṛṣṭir ucyata ityādinā /	‘Thus’, i.e. under the principle that ‘the perception of one thing is what is called the non-perception of other things’ and so forth.
antarbhāve 'pyabādhitam iti /	This shows that the Probans put forward by the Opponent is not absent where the contrary of the Probandum is present.
abhāvasya pratyakṣāntarbhāve 'pyabhāvaśabdavācyatvam aviruddham ity arthaḥ /	‘There is that sameness of nature’, the ‘non-apprehension’, in the shape of the apprehension of something else, being negative in character.
etena hetor vipakṣādavyāvṛttim āha //	In this connection, some people urge the following objection;
abhāvo vā pramāṇena svānurūpeṇa mīyate /	nor can it be regarded as invalid, as it is in conformity with the real state of things.
ityatra siddhasādhyatvaṃ tādṛśyastyanurūpatā //	and that it is so is due to the fact that the Place, etc. have the capacity of being perceived.
[p.482] tādṛśyastyanurūpateti /	What has been urged therefore is beneath notice.
anyopalabdhilakṣaṇānupalabdhirabhāvaḥ{iti} /	End of Negation. ‘There is that sameness of nature’, the ‘non-apprehension’, in the shape of the apprehension of something else, being negative in character.
yacāpyeke codayanti nanu vastvabhāvamātrālambanasya pratyayasya pratyakṣādau na kvacid antarbhāvo 'sti, vastuvirahamātrālambanatvād asya, pratyakṣād eva vastuviṣayatvāt /	In this connection, some people urge the following objection; “The cognition that envisages merely the absence of things cannot be included under Perception and the rest, because it envisages only the absence (negation) of things, while Perception and the rest envisage positive things;
nacāsyāprāmāṇyam avisaṃvāditvāt, nahi bhavadbhir vastūnāṃ niranvayaṃ vināśam icchadbhir vastuviraho neṣyata iti /	nor can it be regarded as invalid, as it is in conformity with the real state of things. When you (Buddhists) postulate the absolute destruction of things, you cannot deny the absence of things
tadapyanena pratyuktam /	What has been explained above disposes of tins objection also.
nahi tena vikalpe{na} taddeśakālādiviśeṣaṇarahitam abhāvamātramālambyate / kiṃ tarhikvacid deśādau ghaṭādi nāstītyanena rūpeṇa saviśeṣaṇam eva /	In the case in question, what the particular Conceptual Thought envisages is not pure negation devoid of all specifications of time, place, etc., it envisages the qualified Negation in the form that at a certain place ‘the Jar is not’;
tac ca kevalasyaiva deśāder grahaṇasāmarthyādevaṃ bhavatīti na pṛthagasya prāmāṇyam pratyakṣagṛhītasyaiva kevalasya deśādes tathā vikalpanāt /	and that it is so is due to the fact that the Place, etc. have the capacity of being perceived. Thus it is that Negation is not regarded as a distinct Means or Form of Cognition; because what is conceived is only such empty place as has been apprehended by Perception.
satyapi vā nirviśeṣaṇasyābhāvasya grahaṇe na tadgrāhiṇo jñānasya prāmāṇyaṃ yuktam avastuviṣayatvāt /	Even if there were apprehension of pure, unqualified, Negation, the cognition apprehending it could not be regarded as valid, because it would be envisaging a non-entity;
arthakriyārthināṃ ca pramāṇacintāyā vastvadhiṣṭhānatvād iti yatkiñcid etat //	and all consideration of the validity of cognitions, by men seeking for effective action, relates to entities only. What has been urged therefore is beneath notice.
ityabhāvavicāraḥ //	End of Negation.
yuktyanupalabdhī adhikṛtyāha asmin satītyādi /	The author argues as follows, in connection with ‘Ratiocination’ and ‘Non-apprehension’ (as distinct Means of Cognition): [see verses 1692-1695 above]
asmin sati bhavatyeva na bhavatyasatīti ca /	nor can it be Inference, as there is no Corroborative Instance;
tasmād ato bhavatyeva yuktireṣābhidhīyate //	and in support of that, another instance would have to be sought for;
pramāṇāntarameveyam ity āha carako muniḥ /	Hence this is a distinct Means of Cognition; so says the sage Caraka, the medical doctor.
nānumānam iyam yasmād dṛṣṭānto 'tra na labhyate // upalabdhyā yayā yo 'rtho jñāyate tadabhāvataḥ /	Similarly, when there is cognition of the non-existence of a thing derived from the absence of its apprehension, it is a case of ‘Non-apprehension’;
pramāṇāntarameṣāpi dṛṣṭāntādyanapekṣaṇāt /	and the reasons for regarding this also as a distinct Means of Cognition are to be found as in the case of ‘Ratiocination’ (1692-1695)
dṛṣṭānte 'pi hi nāstitvam anayaiva prasiddhyati //	The above is refuted in the following: [see verse 1696 next]
tadbhāvabhāvitvena yat kāryatāpratipattir iyaṃ yuktiḥ, iyaṃ ca savikalpakatvān na pratyakṣaṃ, nāpyanumānaṃ, dṛṣṭāntābhāvāt, tathā hi dṛṣṭānto 'pi ata eva tadbhāvabhāvitvāt tatkāryatāpratipattiḥ, tatrāpi dṛṣṭānto 'nveṣaṇīyas tatrāpyapara ityanavasthā syāt, tasmāt pramāṇāntarameveyam ityāhacarako vaidyaḥ /	When a thing is cognised as being the effect of a certain thing, on the ground of its being produced only when the latter is present, it is regarded as a case of ‘Ratiocination’, As it is conceptual, it cannot be Perception; nor can it be Inference, as there is no Corroborative Instance; and if there were an Instance, then also the notion of being an effect would be due to being produced only when the other is present; and in support of that, another instance would have to be sought for; and so on and on, there would be an infinite regress.
tathā yā copalabdhinivṛttyā nāstitvapratītir ityam anupalabdhiḥ /	Similarly, when there is cognition of the non-existence of a thing derived from the absence of its apprehension, it is a case of ‘Non-apprehension’;
asyā api pramāṇāntaratve yuktivadeva nyāyo 'nveṣaṇīyaḥ // kāryetyādinā pratividhatte /	and the reasons for regarding this also as a distinct Means of Cognition are to be found as in the case of ‘Ratiocination’ (1692-1695)
[p.483]	The above is refuted in the following: [see verse 1696 next]
kāryakāraṇabhāvo 'bhāvaśceti kāryakāraṇabhāvau, tayoḥ pratipattir iti vigṛhya samāsaḥ, tatra kāryakāraṇatāpratipattir yuktyā, abhāvapratipattir anupalabdhyeti yathākramaṃ sambandhaḥ /	The compound ‘Kāryakāraṇatā, etc,’ is to be expounded as the ‘prati-patti’, cognition, of ‘Kāryakāraṇatā’, the relation of Cause and Effect, and of ‘abhāva’, ‘non-existence’; the cognition of the relation of Cause and Effect is said to be by means of ‘Ratiocination’, and the cognition of ‘nonexistence by means of Non-apprehension’.
yuktāvanupalabdhau ca pramādvaye 'pi na sādhyasādhanayor bhedaḥ //	‘Asyām’ in the two cases cited of ‘Ratiocination’ and ‘Non-apprehension’, there is no difference between the Probans and the Probandum.
katham ity āha tadbhāvetyādi /	How there is no difference is shown in the following [see verse 1696 next]
dṛśyādṛṣṭiṃ vihāyānyā nāstitā na pratīyate //	In the case of ‘Ratiocination’, there is no difference between the Probam and the Probandum;
yuktau tāvan na sādhyasādhanayor bhedaḥ, tathā hi tadbhāvabhāvitā hetuḥ kāryakāraṇatā sādhyā, na cānayor bheda upalabhyate paryāyatvāt tarupādapavat /	because the reason (Probans) is the fact of one thing being produced only when the other is there, the relation of Cause and Effect is the Probandum; and we find no difference between these two; the two are synonymous, like the terms ‘taru’ and ‘pādapa’ (both meaning Tree).
anupalabdhāvapi ca na bhedaḥ tathā hi yadyupalambhanivṛttimātraṃ vivakṣitaṃ tadā tasyāsiddhatvāt pūrvavad anavasthādidoṣo vācyaḥ /	In the case of ‘Non-apprehension’ also, there is no difference between the Cause and the Effect. For instance, if mere absence of apprehension is meant (by ‘Non-apprehension’), then as nothing like it is known, it would be open to the Infinite Regress and other objections urged above.
athānyopalabdhir evānupalabdhis tadā dṛśyānupalabdhāvevāntarbhāvaḥ / anayā ca nābhāvaḥ sādhyate tasya pratyakṣeṇaiva siddhatvāt /	If, on the other hand, the ‘Non-apprehension’ of a thing is only the ‘apprehension of something else’, then it becomes included under ‘the Non-apprehension of what should have been apprehended’; and this does not prove the non-existence, which is cognised by Perception itself.
ata evāha dṛśyādṛṣṭiṃ vihāyetyādi //	It is for this reason that the text has declared ‘Nor is non-existence, etc. etc.’ (1697)
atha mataṃ nābhyāṃ kāryakāraṇatābhāvau sādhyete, kiṃ tarhivyavahāra	It might be argued that “what are meant to be proved are not the Relation of Cause and Effect and Non-existence themselves, but the ordinary usage regarding these.”
iti, tatrāha tadbhāvavyavahāra ityādi /	The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 1698 above]
tayor hetuphalatābhāvayor bhāvas tadbhāvas tatra vyavahāro yaḥ sa tadbhāvavyavahāraḥ /	‘Tadbhāvavyavahāra’ is the ‘vyavahāra’, usage, of the ‘bhāva’, character, of ‘cause and effect’ and ‘non-existence That is, what is meant to be proved is the capacity of being spoken of as expressed by a certain name.
jñānābhidhānapravṛttilakṣaṇamanuṣṭhānaṃ tasmin yogyatā sādhyate /	[And in tills way, the two Means of Cognition become included under Inference] The arguments being formulated as follows:
prayogaś ca ye yadvyāpārānantaraniyatopalabhyasvabhāvās te tat kāryavyavahārayogyāḥ tadyathā saṅketakālānubhūtāḥ kulālādivyāpārānantaropalabhyasvabhāvā ghaṭādayaḥ tathāca tālvādivyāpārānantaraniyatopalabhyasvabhāvāḥ śabdā iti svabhāvahetuḥ /	(A) Things that, by their nature, are perceived after the operation of a certain thing, are capable of being spoken of as the ‘effect’ of that thing, e.g. the things perceived at the time of Convention; the Jar is found to be perceived only after the Operation of the Potter; so also Words are found to be perceived only after the Operation of the Palate and other portions of the Mouth; this being a Probans based upon the nature of things.
tathānupalabdhāv api vyavahāre sādhye prayogaḥ yeṣām upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptābhimatānāṃ yeṣvanupalabdhis te tadabhāvavyavahārayogyāḥ tadyathā viṣāṇābhāvavyavahārayogyāḥ śaśaśamastakādayaḥ upalabdhilakṣa [p.484] ṇaprāptābhimatānāṃ parābhimatasāmānyādipadārthānām anupalabdhiś ca tadāśrayatveneṣṭeṣu sāvaleyādiṣviti svabhāvānupalabdhiḥ, /	(B) Similarly in the case of ‘Non-apprehension’, if usage is what is meant to be proved, then the Inferential Reasoning may be formulated as follows: When certain things capable of being apprehended are not apprehended in certain places, they are to be spoken of as non-existent in those places; e.g. the Head of the Hare is one that can be spoken of as a place where the Horn is non-existent; and as regards the doctrine of ‘Universals’, it is found that the ‘Universal’ and other categories postulated by others, which are held to be perceptible, are not perceived at all in individuals like the spotted Cow for instance, which are supposed to be the substratum of the said ‘Universal’; so that here ‘Non-apprehension’ is in the very nature of these things. As regards the Individuals, the spotted and other cows these are duly perceived, hence these are not rejected as non-existent:
tadviviktānāṃ sāvaleyādīnām upalambhān nāsiddhiḥ nāpyanaikāntikatā hetor abhivyakter nirākariṣyamāṇatvāt, etāvan mātranibandhanatvāc cābhāvavyavahṛteḥ, nāpi viruddhatā sapakṣe bhāvād iti //	It is only on the basis of these facts that things are spoken of as ‘nonexistent Nor can the Probans be said to be ‘Contradictory’, as it is actually present in all cases where the Probandum is known to be present. It might be argued that “what are meant to be proved are not the Relation of Cause and Effect and Non-existence themselves, but the ordinary usage regarding these.”
iti yuktyanupalabdhivicāraḥ //	this being a Probans based upon the nature of things.
tatra sambhavaś ca lakṣaṇayā samudāyaḥ /	so that here ‘Non-apprehension’ is in the very nature of these things.
sambhavapratipattau samudāyipratipattiḥ /	“‘Sambhava’, (Probability) serves to bring about the cognition of the components of the Aggregate after the Aggregate itself has become cognised.
yath sahasrasadbhāve jñāte śatādisattāpratipattiḥ /	For instance, the idea of ‘a hundred’ follows after the existence of ‘a thousand’ has been cognised.
idaṃ ca kila dṛṣṭāntābhāvānnānumānam /	This cannot be Inference, as there is no Corroborative Instance available.”
atra dūṣaṇam āha samudāyetyādi /	The objection against this is set forth in the following [see verse 1699 above]
samudāyavyavasthāyā hetavaḥ samudāyinaḥ /	“‘Sambhava’, (Probability) serves to bring about the cognition of the components of the Aggregate after the Aggregate itself has become cognised.
śatādisambhavajñānaṃ sahasrāt kāryaliṅgajam //	For instance, the idea of ‘a hundred’ follows after the existence of ‘a thousand’ has been cognised.
yasmāt samudāyibhyo 'nyasya samudāyasyābhāvāt samudāyavyavasthāyāḥ samudāyina eva kāraṇaṃ tasmāt sahasrācchatādisambhavapratītiḥ kāryaliṅgajaiva //	Because the Aggregate is not something apart from the components of the Aggregate, and these components are the cause (basis) of the very notion of the ‘Aggregate’, therefore the cognition of ‘a hundred’ that proceeds from ‘a thousand’ is only a case of cognition produced by the Inferential Indicative, in the shape of Effect.
iti sambhavavicāraḥ //	The objection against this is set forth in the following [see verse 1699 above]
anye tvaitihyādi ca pramāṇāntaramicchanti, tatrānirdiṣṭavaktṛkaṃ pravādapāramparyamaitihyam /	There are others who regard ‘Tradition’, etc. also as distinct Means of Cognition. Of these ‘Tradition’ is that Means or Form of Cognition whose original promulgator cannot be discerned, but has come down through a long-continued assertion;
yathā iha vaṭe yakṣaḥ prativasatīti /	e.g. ‘A yakṣa resides in this Banyan-tree’.
aniyatadeśakālamākasmikaṃ sadasatsūcakaṃ jñānaṃ pratibhā /	‘Intuition’ is that cognition indicative of the existence or non-existence of things, which appears suddenly without, any restrictions of Time or Place;
yathā kumāryā eva bhavti, adya me bhrātā āgamiṣyatīti /	e.g. when the virgin has the notion ‘my brother will come to-day’; and this does come about;
tac ca kila tathaiva bhavatīti pramāṇam /	and this does come about; hence it is valid cognition.
atra dūṣaṇam āha aitihyetyādi /	The objection to the above is set forth in the following: [see verse 1700 above]
aitihyapratibhādīnāṃ bhūyasā vyabhicāritā /	There are others who regard ‘Tradition’, etc. also as distinct Means of Cognition.
naivedṛśāṃ pramāṇatvaṃ ghaṭate 'tiprasaṅgataḥ // ādiśabdena pratyabhijñādīnāṃ grahaṇam /	‘Intuition’ is that cognition indicative of the existence or non-existence of things, which appears suddenly without, any restrictions of Time or Place; e.g. when the virgin has the notion ‘my brother will come to-day’;
teṣām api paraiḥ kaiścit pramāṇatvena gṛhītatvāt /	The phrase ‘and the rest’ includes ‘Recognition’ and others; these also are regarded by some others as ‘Means of Right Cognition’,
atiprasaṅgata iti /	‘Would lead to incongruities’;
svapnāntikasyāpi kadācit satyatādarśanāt pramāṇāntaratvaṃ syāt //	e.g. Dream-Cognition might be found to be true in a certain case and thereby come to be regarded as a valid Means or form of Cognition.
ityaitihyādivicāraḥ //	End of Section (G).
[p.485] evaṃ vistareṇa pramāṇāntaraṃ nirākṛtya saṅkṣepeṇa nirākurvann āha athevetyādi /	Having thus rejected all other Means or Forms of Cognition, in detail, the author briefly proceeds to discard them (and thus sums up the question): [see verse 1701 above]
pratyakṣaś ca parokṣaś ca dvidhaivārtho vyavasthitaḥ // dvividha eva hyarthaḥ pratyakṣaḥ parokṣaś ca //	Things are of only two kinds Perceptible and Imperceptible. Objection: “There is also another kind which is both Perceptible and Imperceptible, and which is neither Perceptible nor Imperceptible.” Answer: [see verse 1702 next]
nanu cāparo 'pyasti pratyakṣāpratyakṣaḥ, naiva pratyakṣo nāpyapratyakṣa ity āha ubhayetyādi /	Things are of only two kinds Perceptible and Imperceptible. Objection: “There is also another kind which is both Perceptible and Imperceptible, and which is neither Perceptible nor Imperceptible.”
ubhayānubhayātmā hi naivāsau yujyate paraḥ /	Any other kind is not possible, in the shape of both perceptible and imperceptible, or neither perceptible nor imperceptible.
ekasyaikatra vijñāne vyāhate hi kriyākriye //	Because in any single thing, both action and inaction would be selfcontradictory.
sākṣāddhi jñānajanakaḥ pratyakṣo hyartha ucyate /	That thing is called ‘perceptible’ which produces its cognition directly (immediately);
yathoktaviparītas tu parokṣaḥ kṛtibhir mataḥ //	the contrary of this is regarded by the wise, as ‘imperceptible’.
ādyārthaviṣayaṃ tāvannedaṃ śābdopamādikam / pratyakṣe 'ntargatiprāpter vaiphalyaṃ vā smṛter iva //	Now verbal cognition, analogical cognition and the rest cannot envisage the former (perceptible) thing; as in that case they would become included under ‘perception’, or be futile, like remembrance.
parokṣaviṣayatve 'pi sarveṣāṃ viṣayaḥ katham / yadi sākṣāt parokṣo 'yaṃ na syāt pratyakṣavastuvat //	Even if they envisage imperceptible things, in what way could anything be envisaged by all? If directly (immediately), then the thing would not be ‘imperceptible’, being exactly like the perceptible thing.
paravyapāśrayeṇāpi pratipattau kimasya sā / sambaddhetarato no vā bhedābhāsā na vā tathā // asambaddhāt tadudbhūtāvavyavasthā prasajyate /	If the cognitions are dependent upon something else (i.e. indirect, mediate), would the cognition be related to it or not related? Would it envisage distinction or not? If it arose out of what is not related, then there could be no restriction;
na ca saṃgacchate vyāptir bhedābhāsā bhavedyadi //	and if it envisages distinction, then there could be no invariable concomitance.
parokṣaviṣayā yāvat sambaddhārthasamāśrayā / aparāmṛṣṭatadbhedā pratītir anumā sphuṭā //	If, lastly, the cognition envisages an imperceptible thing, is based upon a related object and does not envisage distinction from it, then it is clearly ‘inference’.
na hyekasyānyonyapratyanīkānekadharmasampāto yuktaḥ, ekatvahāniprasaṅgāt, tathā hi viśiṣṭasyāvyavadhānena yathāgṛhītārthāvasāyakāraṇasya jñānasya sākṣālliṅgādivyavadhānaṃ vinā janako 'rthaḥ pratyakṣa ucyate /	It cannot be right for any one thing to contain within itself a mixture of mutually contradictory properties; if it did contain such, it would cease to be one thing. For instance, that thing is called ‘Perceptible’ which brings about the cognition of the thing as it exists, directly, i.e. without the intervention of the Inferential Indicative or such other means of cognition.
evaṃ ca kṛtvā kṣaṇikaḥ śabda ityādijñānamapratyakṣārtham iti siddham /	On this principle, such cognitions as ‘Sound is momentary’ would be one envisaging an imperceptible Thing.
nacaikasya padārthasyaikatra kriyākriye yukte, yena vijñānajanakatvājanaktvābhyāṃ pratyakṣāpratyakṣasvabhāvo bhavet /	the same thing cannot be regarded as both active and inactive as regards anything; by virtue of which anything could be both Perceptible and Imperceptible as producing and not-producing a certain cognition.
nāpyanubhayasvabhāvo yuktaḥ, ekasvabhāvaniṣedhasyāparasvabhāvavidhināntarīyakatvād vastunaḥ /	Nor can a thing be neither Perceptible nor Imperceptible; because in regard to anything, the negation of one character always implies the affirma. lion of the contrary character.
anekasya tu naikatra kriyā [p.486] kriyāvirodhaḥ, yathā rūparasayoścakṣur vijñāne, tathaikasyānekasmin, yathārūpam cakṣuḥśrotravijñānayoḥ, tadarthamekasyaikatreti cāha /	If there are more things than one, then there is no incongruity in there being both action and inaction in any given case; e.g. the action and inaction of Colour and Taste (both) in regard to Visual Perception. Nor is there any incongruity in both action and inaction of even one thing, if it is in reference to more things than one;
tasmād dvividha evārthaḥ /	For all these reasons, things are of only two kinds (Perceptible and Imperceptible).
tatra śabdādīnāṃ prāmāṇyaṃ bhavatpratyakṣe vārthe bhavet parokṣe veti pakṣadvayam /	Now', if the Word and other Means of cognition were distinct Means of Cognition, there could be only two alternatives regarding them they envisage either (a) the Perceptible Thing, or (b) the Imperceptible Thing.
na tāvad ādye 'rthe, kasmāt pratyakṣentargatiprāpteḥ śābdādīnām abhinnārthaviṣayatvāt /	They cannot envisage the Perceptible Thing. “Why?” Because in that case they would be liable to become included under ‘Perception’;
atha pratyakṣeṇādhigate satyuttarakālaṃ taiḥ punar adhigamaḥ kriyate, ata āha vaiphalyaṃ vā /	It might be urged that “the other Means of Cognition bring about the Cognition of the thing concerned after it has been envisaged by Perception”; the answer to that is that ‘it would be futile’;
gṛhītamagrahaṇāsmṛtivadaprāmāṇyaprasaṅgāt /	that is, apprehending what is already apprehended, the Cognitions would be invalid, likeRemembrance.
dvitīye 'pi pakṣe sa parokṣo 'rtho viṣayo bhavan sākṣād vā syād vyavadhānādvā parāśrayeṇa, tatra tāvan na sākṣāt tasyāparokṣatvaprasaṅgāt pratyakṣārthavat /	Under the second alternative also (that Verbal and other cognitions envisage Imperceptible Things) when the Imperceptible thing is cognised would it be cognised directly, or indirectly, through the intervention of something else? It cannot be cognised directly; as, in that case it would be like any perceptible thing and would cease to be imperceptible.
yasmād ata evāsau parokṣa ucyate yataḥ sākṣān na jñānaṃ janayati, sākṣātsa cejjñānaṃ janayet katham asau parokṣa iti vacanīyam etat /	Because it is called ‘Imperceptible’ only because it does not produce cognitions directly; if then, it were to produce cognitions directly, how could it be called ‘Imperceptible’?
parāśrayeṇāpi parokṣārthapratipattiḥ sambaddhād vā syād asambaddhād vā bhedābhāsā vā syād abhedābhāsā veti catvāraḥ pakṣāḥ sambhavanti /	If the cognition of the Imperceptible thing were produced through the intervention of something else, (1) would it be produced through the intervention of something related to it? (2) of something not related to it? (3) would it envisage distinction? or (4) envisage non-distinction? These four alternatives are possible.
bhedābhāsā yathā dhūmasāmānyāt tārṇapārṇādivahniviśeṣapratītiḥ / abhedābhāsā yathā dhūmādvijātīyaparāvṛttavahnimātrādhyavasāyinī /	As an example of cognition envisaging distinction, there is the cognition of a particular Fire produced by Leaves or Grass, produced through smoke in general. An example of cognition envisaging non-distinction, there is the cognition of mere Fire as excluded from other unlike things, produced by Smoke.
tatrāsambadhāt pratipattāvavyavasthā syāt yataḥ kutaścit sarvaḥ pratīyeta /	Now if this latter cognition were brought about by the intervention of a thing (Smoke) not related, to the thing concerned (Fire), there would be no restriction at all; anything might bring about the cognition of anything.

tathā hi yatrāpi kevalapradeśopalambhād ghaṭābhāvasiddhiḥ, sāpi ghaṭopalambhākhyakāryānupalabdhir eva /

For instance, even in a case where the apprehension of the bare place brings about the cognition of the absence of the Jar, what brings about this latter cognition is the non-apprehension of the effect in the shape of the apprehension of the Jar;

yata upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptasyaiva ghaṭasyābhāvaḥ sādhyate, na sarvasya /

because the absence that is cognised is only that of the Jar which would have been perceptible (if it were there), and not of all Jars.

ya evāpratibaddhasāmarthyaḥ /

And what would be that which is perceptible t That alone whose capacity has not been obstructed.

yata upalabdhilakṣaṇaṃ svabhāvaviśeṣo varṇitaḥ yaḥ svabhāvaḥ sa pratyakṣa eva bhavatīti /

Because Perceptibility has been described as a particular character, and what is the character of a thing must be perceptible.

anyathā hyatrāpi ghaṭopalabdhyā ghaṭasattā na vyāptā syāt tat tataścāvyāpakasya nivṛttau nāvyāptasya nivṛttir iti tato ghaṭābhāvo na siddhyet /

Otherwise, here also, all cases of the Existence of the Jar would not be covered by the Apprehension of the Jar i and hence the absence of the non-pervading factor could not lead to the absence of the un-pervaded factor; and there would be no cognition of the absence of the Jar.

tasmāt sarvaiva svabhāvānupalabdhir asadvyavahārahetuḥ /

It is for this reason that in all cases, the non-apprehension of the character of the thing leads to the thing being regarded as non-existent.

paramārthataḥ kāryānupalabdhir eva draṣṭavyā //

In reality however what has to be perceived is the non-apprehension of the effect (which leads to the cognition of the non-existence of the Cause).

ittham ityādinābhāvaśabdavācyatvād ityasya hetor anaikāntikatvam āha

The following Text proceeds to show the ‘Inconclusive’ character of the Reason ‘because it is spoken of by the name Negation [therefore Negation should be regarded as different from Perception and the rest’;

ittham iti /

see Text 1658]: [see verse 1690 above]

ekasya yā dṛṣṭiḥ saivānyā dṛṣṭir ucyata ityādinā /

‘Thus’, i.e. under the principle that ‘the perception of one thing is what is called the non-perception of other things’ and so forth.

antarbhāve 'pyabādhitam iti /

This shows that the Probans put forward by the Opponent is not absent where the contrary of the Probandum is present.

abhāvasya pratyakṣāntarbhāve 'pyabhāvaśabdavācyatvam aviruddham ity arthaḥ /

‘There is that sameness of nature’, the ‘non-apprehension’, in the shape of the apprehension of something else, being negative in character.

etena hetor vipakṣādavyāvṛttim āha //

In this connection, some people urge the following objection;

abhāvo vā pramāṇena svānurūpeṇa mīyate /

nor can it be regarded as invalid, as it is in conformity with the real state of things.

ityatra siddhasādhyatvaṃ tādṛśyastyanurūpatā //

and that it is so is due to the fact that the Place, etc. have the capacity of being perceived.

[p.482] tādṛśyastyanurūpateti /

What has been urged therefore is beneath notice.

anyopalabdhilakṣaṇānupalabdhirabhāvaḥ{iti} /

End of Negation. ‘There is that sameness of nature’, the ‘non-apprehension’, in the shape of the apprehension of something else, being negative in character.

yacāpyeke codayanti nanu vastvabhāvamātrālambanasya pratyayasya pratyakṣādau na kvacid antarbhāvo 'sti, vastuvirahamātrālambanatvād asya, pratyakṣād eva vastuviṣayatvāt /

In this connection, some people urge the following objection; “The cognition that envisages merely the absence of things cannot be included under Perception and the rest, because it envisages only the absence (negation) of things, while Perception and the rest envisage positive things;

nacāsyāprāmāṇyam avisaṃvāditvāt, nahi bhavadbhir vastūnāṃ niranvayaṃ vināśam icchadbhir vastuviraho neṣyata iti /

nor can it be regarded as invalid, as it is in conformity with the real state of things. When you (Buddhists) postulate the absolute destruction of things, you cannot deny the absence of things

tadapyanena pratyuktam /

What has been explained above disposes of tins objection also.

nahi tena vikalpe{na} taddeśakālādiviśeṣaṇarahitam abhāvamātramālambyate / kiṃ tarhikvacid deśādau ghaṭādi nāstītyanena rūpeṇa saviśeṣaṇam eva /

In the case in question, what the particular Conceptual Thought envisages is not pure negation devoid of all specifications of time, place, etc., it envisages the qualified Negation in the form that at a certain place ‘the Jar is not’;

tac ca kevalasyaiva deśāder grahaṇasāmarthyādevaṃ bhavatīti na pṛthagasya prāmāṇyam pratyakṣagṛhītasyaiva kevalasya deśādes tathā vikalpanāt /

and that it is so is due to the fact that the Place, etc. have the capacity of being perceived. Thus it is that Negation is not regarded as a distinct Means or Form of Cognition; because what is conceived is only such empty place as has been apprehended by Perception.

satyapi vā nirviśeṣaṇasyābhāvasya grahaṇe na tadgrāhiṇo jñānasya prāmāṇyaṃ yuktam avastuviṣayatvāt /

Even if there were apprehension of pure, unqualified, Negation, the cognition apprehending it could not be regarded as valid, because it would be envisaging a non-entity;

arthakriyārthināṃ ca pramāṇacintāyā vastvadhiṣṭhānatvād iti yatkiñcid etat //

and all consideration of the validity of cognitions, by men seeking for effective action, relates to entities only. What has been urged therefore is beneath notice.

ityabhāvavicāraḥ //

End of Negation.

yuktyanupalabdhī adhikṛtyāha asmin satītyādi /

The author argues as follows, in connection with ‘Ratiocination’ and ‘Non-apprehension’ (as distinct Means of Cognition): [see verses 1692-1695 above]

asmin sati bhavatyeva na bhavatyasatīti ca /

nor can it be Inference, as there is no Corroborative Instance;

tasmād ato bhavatyeva yuktireṣābhidhīyate //

and in support of that, another instance would have to be sought for;

pramāṇāntarameveyam ity āha carako muniḥ /

Hence this is a distinct Means of Cognition; so says the sage Caraka, the medical doctor.

nānumānam iyam yasmād dṛṣṭānto 'tra na labhyate // upalabdhyā yayā yo 'rtho jñāyate tadabhāvataḥ /

Similarly, when there is cognition of the non-existence of a thing derived from the absence of its apprehension, it is a case of ‘Non-apprehension’;

pramāṇāntarameṣāpi dṛṣṭāntādyanapekṣaṇāt /

and the reasons for regarding this also as a distinct Means of Cognition are to be found as in the case of ‘Ratiocination’ (1692-1695)

dṛṣṭānte 'pi hi nāstitvam anayaiva prasiddhyati //

The above is refuted in the following: [see verse 1696 next]

tadbhāvabhāvitvena yat kāryatāpratipattir iyaṃ yuktiḥ, iyaṃ ca savikalpakatvān na pratyakṣaṃ, nāpyanumānaṃ, dṛṣṭāntābhāvāt, tathā hi dṛṣṭānto 'pi ata eva tadbhāvabhāvitvāt tatkāryatāpratipattiḥ, tatrāpi dṛṣṭānto 'nveṣaṇīyas tatrāpyapara ityanavasthā syāt, tasmāt pramāṇāntarameveyam ityāhacarako vaidyaḥ /

When a thing is cognised as being the effect of a certain thing, on the ground of its being produced only when the latter is present, it is regarded as a case of ‘Ratiocination’, As it is conceptual, it cannot be Perception; nor can it be Inference, as there is no Corroborative Instance; and if there were an Instance, then also the notion of being an effect would be due to being produced only when the other is present; and in support of that, another instance would have to be sought for; and so on and on, there would be an infinite regress.

tathā yā copalabdhinivṛttyā nāstitvapratītir ityam anupalabdhiḥ /

Similarly, when there is cognition of the non-existence of a thing derived from the absence of its apprehension, it is a case of ‘Non-apprehension’;

asyā api pramāṇāntaratve yuktivadeva nyāyo 'nveṣaṇīyaḥ // kāryetyādinā pratividhatte /

and the reasons for regarding this also as a distinct Means of Cognition are to be found as in the case of ‘Ratiocination’ (1692-1695)

[p.483]

The above is refuted in the following: [see verse 1696 next]

kāryakāraṇabhāvo 'bhāvaśceti kāryakāraṇabhāvau, tayoḥ pratipattir iti vigṛhya samāsaḥ, tatra kāryakāraṇatāpratipattir yuktyā, abhāvapratipattir anupalabdhyeti yathākramaṃ sambandhaḥ /

The compound ‘Kāryakāraṇatā, etc,’ is to be expounded as the ‘prati-patti’, cognition, of ‘Kāryakāraṇatā’, the relation of Cause and Effect, and of ‘abhāva’, ‘non-existence’; the cognition of the relation of Cause and Effect is said to be by means of ‘Ratiocination’, and the cognition of ‘nonexistence by means of Non-apprehension’.

yuktāvanupalabdhau ca pramādvaye 'pi na sādhyasādhanayor bhedaḥ //

‘Asyām’ in the two cases cited of ‘Ratiocination’ and ‘Non-apprehension’, there is no difference between the Probans and the Probandum.

katham ity āha tadbhāvetyādi /

How there is no difference is shown in the following [see verse 1696 next]

dṛśyādṛṣṭiṃ vihāyānyā nāstitā na pratīyate //

In the case of ‘Ratiocination’, there is no difference between the Probam and the Probandum;

yuktau tāvan na sādhyasādhanayor bhedaḥ, tathā hi tadbhāvabhāvitā hetuḥ kāryakāraṇatā sādhyā, na cānayor bheda upalabhyate paryāyatvāt tarupādapavat /

because the reason (Probans) is the fact of one thing being produced only when the other is there, the relation of Cause and Effect is the Probandum; and we find no difference between these two; the two are synonymous, like the terms ‘taru’ and ‘pādapa’ (both meaning Tree).

anupalabdhāvapi ca na bhedaḥ tathā hi yadyupalambhanivṛttimātraṃ vivakṣitaṃ tadā tasyāsiddhatvāt pūrvavad anavasthādidoṣo vācyaḥ /

In the case of ‘Non-apprehension’ also, there is no difference between the Cause and the Effect. For instance, if mere absence of apprehension is meant (by ‘Non-apprehension’), then as nothing like it is known, it would be open to the Infinite Regress and other objections urged above.

athānyopalabdhir evānupalabdhis tadā dṛśyānupalabdhāvevāntarbhāvaḥ / anayā ca nābhāvaḥ sādhyate tasya pratyakṣeṇaiva siddhatvāt /

If, on the other hand, the ‘Non-apprehension’ of a thing is only the ‘apprehension of something else’, then it becomes included under ‘the Non-apprehension of what should have been apprehended’; and this does not prove the non-existence, which is cognised by Perception itself.

ata evāha dṛśyādṛṣṭiṃ vihāyetyādi //

It is for this reason that the text has declared ‘Nor is non-existence, etc. etc.’ (1697)

atha mataṃ nābhyāṃ kāryakāraṇatābhāvau sādhyete, kiṃ tarhivyavahāra

It might be argued that “what are meant to be proved are not the Relation of Cause and Effect and Non-existence themselves, but the ordinary usage regarding these.”

iti, tatrāha tadbhāvavyavahāra ityādi /

The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 1698 above]

tayor hetuphalatābhāvayor bhāvas tadbhāvas tatra vyavahāro yaḥ sa tadbhāvavyavahāraḥ /

‘Tadbhāvavyavahāra’ is the ‘vyavahāra’, usage, of the ‘bhāva’, character, of ‘cause and effect’ and ‘non-existence That is, what is meant to be proved is the capacity of being spoken of as expressed by a certain name.

jñānābhidhānapravṛttilakṣaṇamanuṣṭhānaṃ tasmin yogyatā sādhyate /

[And in tills way, the two Means of Cognition become included under Inference] The arguments being formulated as follows:

prayogaś ca ye yadvyāpārānantaraniyatopalabhyasvabhāvās te tat kāryavyavahārayogyāḥ tadyathā saṅketakālānubhūtāḥ kulālādivyāpārānantaropalabhyasvabhāvā ghaṭādayaḥ tathāca tālvādivyāpārānantaraniyatopalabhyasvabhāvāḥ śabdā iti svabhāvahetuḥ /

(A) Things that, by their nature, are perceived after the operation of a certain thing, are capable of being spoken of as the ‘effect’ of that thing, e.g. the things perceived at the time of Convention; the Jar is found to be perceived only after the Operation of the Potter; so also Words are found to be perceived only after the Operation of the Palate and other portions of the Mouth; this being a Probans based upon the nature of things.

tathānupalabdhāv api vyavahāre sādhye prayogaḥ yeṣām upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptābhimatānāṃ yeṣvanupalabdhis te tadabhāvavyavahārayogyāḥ tadyathā viṣāṇābhāvavyavahārayogyāḥ śaśaśamastakādayaḥ upalabdhilakṣa [p.484] ṇaprāptābhimatānāṃ parābhimatasāmānyādipadārthānām anupalabdhiś ca tadāśrayatveneṣṭeṣu sāvaleyādiṣviti svabhāvānupalabdhiḥ, /

(B) Similarly in the case of ‘Non-apprehension’, if usage is what is meant to be proved, then the Inferential Reasoning may be formulated as follows: When certain things capable of being apprehended are not apprehended in certain places, they are to be spoken of as non-existent in those places; e.g. the Head of the Hare is one that can be spoken of as a place where the Horn is non-existent; and as regards the doctrine of ‘Universals’, it is found that the ‘Universal’ and other categories postulated by others, which are held to be perceptible, are not perceived at all in individuals like the spotted Cow for instance, which are supposed to be the substratum of the said ‘Universal’; so that here ‘Non-apprehension’ is in the very nature of these things. As regards the Individuals, the spotted and other cows these are duly perceived, hence these are not rejected as non-existent:

tadviviktānāṃ sāvaleyādīnām upalambhān nāsiddhiḥ nāpyanaikāntikatā hetor abhivyakter nirākariṣyamāṇatvāt, etāvan mātranibandhanatvāc cābhāvavyavahṛteḥ, nāpi viruddhatā sapakṣe bhāvād iti //

It is only on the basis of these facts that things are spoken of as ‘nonexistent Nor can the Probans be said to be ‘Contradictory’, as it is actually present in all cases where the Probandum is known to be present. It might be argued that “what are meant to be proved are not the Relation of Cause and Effect and Non-existence themselves, but the ordinary usage regarding these.”

iti yuktyanupalabdhivicāraḥ //

this being a Probans based upon the nature of things.

tatra sambhavaś ca lakṣaṇayā samudāyaḥ /

so that here ‘Non-apprehension’ is in the very nature of these things.

sambhavapratipattau samudāyipratipattiḥ /

“‘Sambhava’, (Probability) serves to bring about the cognition of the components of the Aggregate after the Aggregate itself has become cognised.

yath sahasrasadbhāve jñāte śatādisattāpratipattiḥ /

For instance, the idea of ‘a hundred’ follows after the existence of ‘a thousand’ has been cognised.

idaṃ ca kila dṛṣṭāntābhāvānnānumānam /

This cannot be Inference, as there is no Corroborative Instance available.”

atra dūṣaṇam āha samudāyetyādi /

The objection against this is set forth in the following [see verse 1699 above]

samudāyavyavasthāyā hetavaḥ samudāyinaḥ /

“‘Sambhava’, (Probability) serves to bring about the cognition of the components of the Aggregate after the Aggregate itself has become cognised.

śatādisambhavajñānaṃ sahasrāt kāryaliṅgajam //

For instance, the idea of ‘a hundred’ follows after the existence of ‘a thousand’ has been cognised.

yasmāt samudāyibhyo 'nyasya samudāyasyābhāvāt samudāyavyavasthāyāḥ samudāyina eva kāraṇaṃ tasmāt sahasrācchatādisambhavapratītiḥ kāryaliṅgajaiva //

Because the Aggregate is not something apart from the components of the Aggregate, and these components are the cause (basis) of the very notion of the ‘Aggregate’, therefore the cognition of ‘a hundred’ that proceeds from ‘a thousand’ is only a case of cognition produced by the Inferential Indicative, in the shape of Effect.

iti sambhavavicāraḥ //

The objection against this is set forth in the following [see verse 1699 above]

anye tvaitihyādi ca pramāṇāntaramicchanti, tatrānirdiṣṭavaktṛkaṃ pravādapāramparyamaitihyam /

There are others who regard ‘Tradition’, etc. also as distinct Means of Cognition. Of these ‘Tradition’ is that Means or Form of Cognition whose original promulgator cannot be discerned, but has come down through a long-continued assertion;

yathā iha vaṭe yakṣaḥ prativasatīti /

e.g. ‘A yakṣa resides in this Banyan-tree’.

aniyatadeśakālamākasmikaṃ sadasatsūcakaṃ jñānaṃ pratibhā /

‘Intuition’ is that cognition indicative of the existence or non-existence of things, which appears suddenly without, any restrictions of Time or Place;

yathā kumāryā eva bhavti, adya me bhrātā āgamiṣyatīti /

e.g. when the virgin has the notion ‘my brother will come to-day’; and this does come about;

tac ca kila tathaiva bhavatīti pramāṇam /

and this does come about; hence it is valid cognition.

atra dūṣaṇam āha aitihyetyādi /

The objection to the above is set forth in the following: [see verse 1700 above]

aitihyapratibhādīnāṃ bhūyasā vyabhicāritā /

There are others who regard ‘Tradition’, etc. also as distinct Means of Cognition.

naivedṛśāṃ pramāṇatvaṃ ghaṭate 'tiprasaṅgataḥ // ādiśabdena pratyabhijñādīnāṃ grahaṇam /

‘Intuition’ is that cognition indicative of the existence or non-existence of things, which appears suddenly without, any restrictions of Time or Place; e.g. when the virgin has the notion ‘my brother will come to-day’;

teṣām api paraiḥ kaiścit pramāṇatvena gṛhītatvāt /

The phrase ‘and the rest’ includes ‘Recognition’ and others; these also are regarded by some others as ‘Means of Right Cognition’,

atiprasaṅgata iti /

‘Would lead to incongruities’;

svapnāntikasyāpi kadācit satyatādarśanāt pramāṇāntaratvaṃ syāt //

e.g. Dream-Cognition might be found to be true in a certain case and thereby come to be regarded as a valid Means or form of Cognition.

ityaitihyādivicāraḥ //

End of Section (G).

[p.485] evaṃ vistareṇa pramāṇāntaraṃ nirākṛtya saṅkṣepeṇa nirākurvann āha athevetyādi /

Having thus rejected all other Means or Forms of Cognition, in detail, the author briefly proceeds to discard them (and thus sums up the question): [see verse 1701 above]

pratyakṣaś ca parokṣaś ca dvidhaivārtho vyavasthitaḥ // dvividha eva hyarthaḥ pratyakṣaḥ parokṣaś ca //

Things are of only two kinds Perceptible and Imperceptible. Objection: “There is also another kind which is both Perceptible and Imperceptible, and which is neither Perceptible nor Imperceptible.” Answer: [see verse 1702 next]

nanu cāparo 'pyasti pratyakṣāpratyakṣaḥ, naiva pratyakṣo nāpyapratyakṣa ity āha ubhayetyādi /

Things are of only two kinds Perceptible and Imperceptible. Objection: “There is also another kind which is both Perceptible and Imperceptible, and which is neither Perceptible nor Imperceptible.”

ubhayānubhayātmā hi naivāsau yujyate paraḥ /

Any other kind is not possible, in the shape of both perceptible and imperceptible, or neither perceptible nor imperceptible.

ekasyaikatra vijñāne vyāhate hi kriyākriye //

Because in any single thing, both action and inaction would be selfcontradictory.

sākṣāddhi jñānajanakaḥ pratyakṣo hyartha ucyate /

That thing is called ‘perceptible’ which produces its cognition directly (immediately);

yathoktaviparītas tu parokṣaḥ kṛtibhir mataḥ //

the contrary of this is regarded by the wise, as ‘imperceptible’.

ādyārthaviṣayaṃ tāvannedaṃ śābdopamādikam / pratyakṣe 'ntargatiprāpter vaiphalyaṃ vā smṛter iva //

Now verbal cognition, analogical cognition and the rest cannot envisage the former (perceptible) thing; as in that case they would become included under ‘perception’, or be futile, like remembrance.

parokṣaviṣayatve 'pi sarveṣāṃ viṣayaḥ katham / yadi sākṣāt parokṣo 'yaṃ na syāt pratyakṣavastuvat //

Even if they envisage imperceptible things, in what way could anything be envisaged by all? If directly (immediately), then the thing would not be ‘imperceptible’, being exactly like the perceptible thing.

paravyapāśrayeṇāpi pratipattau kimasya sā / sambaddhetarato no vā bhedābhāsā na vā tathā // asambaddhāt tadudbhūtāvavyavasthā prasajyate /

If the cognitions are dependent upon something else (i.e. indirect, mediate), would the cognition be related to it or not related? Would it envisage distinction or not? If it arose out of what is not related, then there could be no restriction;

na ca saṃgacchate vyāptir bhedābhāsā bhavedyadi //

and if it envisages distinction, then there could be no invariable concomitance.

parokṣaviṣayā yāvat sambaddhārthasamāśrayā / aparāmṛṣṭatadbhedā pratītir anumā sphuṭā //

If, lastly, the cognition envisages an imperceptible thing, is based upon a related object and does not envisage distinction from it, then it is clearly ‘inference’.

na hyekasyānyonyapratyanīkānekadharmasampāto yuktaḥ, ekatvahāniprasaṅgāt, tathā hi viśiṣṭasyāvyavadhānena yathāgṛhītārthāvasāyakāraṇasya jñānasya sākṣālliṅgādivyavadhānaṃ vinā janako 'rthaḥ pratyakṣa ucyate /

It cannot be right for any one thing to contain within itself a mixture of mutually contradictory properties; if it did contain such, it would cease to be one thing. For instance, that thing is called ‘Perceptible’ which brings about the cognition of the thing as it exists, directly, i.e. without the intervention of the Inferential Indicative or such other means of cognition.

evaṃ ca kṛtvā kṣaṇikaḥ śabda ityādijñānamapratyakṣārtham iti siddham /

On this principle, such cognitions as ‘Sound is momentary’ would be one envisaging an imperceptible Thing.

nacaikasya padārthasyaikatra kriyākriye yukte, yena vijñānajanakatvājanaktvābhyāṃ pratyakṣāpratyakṣasvabhāvo bhavet /

the same thing cannot be regarded as both active and inactive as regards anything; by virtue of which anything could be both Perceptible and Imperceptible as producing and not-producing a certain cognition.

nāpyanubhayasvabhāvo yuktaḥ, ekasvabhāvaniṣedhasyāparasvabhāvavidhināntarīyakatvād vastunaḥ /

Nor can a thing be neither Perceptible nor Imperceptible; because in regard to anything, the negation of one character always implies the affirma. lion of the contrary character.

anekasya tu naikatra kriyā [p.486] kriyāvirodhaḥ, yathā rūparasayoścakṣur vijñāne, tathaikasyānekasmin, yathārūpam cakṣuḥśrotravijñānayoḥ, tadarthamekasyaikatreti cāha /

If there are more things than one, then there is no incongruity in there being both action and inaction in any given case; e.g. the action and inaction of Colour and Taste (both) in regard to Visual Perception. Nor is there any incongruity in both action and inaction of even one thing, if it is in reference to more things than one;

tasmād dvividha evārthaḥ /

For all these reasons, things are of only two kinds (Perceptible and Imperceptible).

tatra śabdādīnāṃ prāmāṇyaṃ bhavatpratyakṣe vārthe bhavet parokṣe veti pakṣadvayam /

Now', if the Word and other Means of cognition were distinct Means of Cognition, there could be only two alternatives regarding them they envisage either (a) the Perceptible Thing, or (b) the Imperceptible Thing.

na tāvad ādye 'rthe, kasmāt pratyakṣentargatiprāpteḥ śābdādīnām abhinnārthaviṣayatvāt /

They cannot envisage the Perceptible Thing. “Why?” Because in that case they would be liable to become included under ‘Perception’;

atha pratyakṣeṇādhigate satyuttarakālaṃ taiḥ punar adhigamaḥ kriyate, ata āha vaiphalyaṃ vā /

It might be urged that “the other Means of Cognition bring about the Cognition of the thing concerned after it has been envisaged by Perception”; the answer to that is that ‘it would be futile’;

gṛhītamagrahaṇāsmṛtivadaprāmāṇyaprasaṅgāt /

that is, apprehending what is already apprehended, the Cognitions would be invalid, likeRemembrance.

dvitīye 'pi pakṣe sa parokṣo 'rtho viṣayo bhavan sākṣād vā syād vyavadhānādvā parāśrayeṇa, tatra tāvan na sākṣāt tasyāparokṣatvaprasaṅgāt pratyakṣārthavat /

Under the second alternative also (that Verbal and other cognitions envisage Imperceptible Things) when the Imperceptible thing is cognised would it be cognised directly, or indirectly, through the intervention of something else? It cannot be cognised directly; as, in that case it would be like any perceptible thing and would cease to be imperceptible.

yasmād ata evāsau parokṣa ucyate yataḥ sākṣān na jñānaṃ janayati, sākṣātsa cejjñānaṃ janayet katham asau parokṣa iti vacanīyam etat /

Because it is called ‘Imperceptible’ only because it does not produce cognitions directly; if then, it were to produce cognitions directly, how could it be called ‘Imperceptible’?

parāśrayeṇāpi parokṣārthapratipattiḥ sambaddhād vā syād asambaddhād vā bhedābhāsā vā syād abhedābhāsā veti catvāraḥ pakṣāḥ sambhavanti /

If the cognition of the Imperceptible thing were produced through the intervention of something else, (1) would it be produced through the intervention of something related to it? (2) of something not related to it? (3) would it envisage distinction? or (4) envisage non-distinction? These four alternatives are possible.

bhedābhāsā yathā dhūmasāmānyāt tārṇapārṇādivahniviśeṣapratītiḥ / abhedābhāsā yathā dhūmādvijātīyaparāvṛttavahnimātrādhyavasāyinī /

As an example of cognition envisaging distinction, there is the cognition of a particular Fire produced by Leaves or Grass, produced through smoke in general. An example of cognition envisaging non-distinction, there is the cognition of mere Fire as excluded from other unlike things, produced by Smoke.

tatrāsambadhāt pratipattāvavyavasthā syāt yataḥ kutaścit sarvaḥ pratīyeta /

Now if this latter cognition were brought about by the intervention of a thing (Smoke) not related, to the thing concerned (Fire), there would be no restriction at all; anything might bring about the cognition of anything.