buddhist-nlp/tatpa-noisy · Datasets at Hugging Face

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prakāśayati vijñātuṃ sā śaktir na ca śakyate //	Nor can any such potency (of words) be recognised.
no cediti / ānarthakyam iti sambandhaḥ /	‘No cet’ i.e. If it be urged that “words cannot be inexpressive;
tataś ca dṛṣṭavirodhaḥ pratijñāyā iti bhāvaḥ /	and hence the conclusion of the Buddhist is contrary to a perceived fact”.
satyaṃ syād dṛṣṭavirodho yadi vedādevārthapratītirupadeśamantareṇopajāyate, yāvataivārthapratītir vyākhyātuḥ sakāśāt samayavaśād bhavet /	The answer to this is that our conclusion would really be contrary to perceived facts if things were comprehended from the Veda itself, without the help of any instructions; as a matter of fact however, the comprehension of the meaning comes only through the help of the expounder relying upon Conventions (the conventional denotation of words);
na vedāt kevalāt samayanirapekṣāt /	and it never comes from the Veda itself independently of Convention.
tathā hi vedārthaṃ mīmāṃsakādiḥ svecchayā vyācakṣāṇo dṛṣṭaḥ, naca svābhāvikasyārthasya puruṣecchānurodhitvaṃ yuktam /	For instance, the Mīmāṃsaka and others have been found to expound the meaning of the Veda in accordance with their own whim; and it cannot be right for the natural denotation of words to be dependent upon the whim of man.
tatraitat syāt nahi puruṣeṇāpūrvo 'rthaḥ svecchayā kathyate, kiṃ tarhi/	The following might be urged “The man does not expound a new meaning through his whim;
ya eva hi svābhāviko vyavasthitaḥ sa eva puruṣeṇa prakāśyate iti tena bhavatyeva dṛṣṭavirodha iti /	he explains that same natural meaning of words which has been there all along. So that your conclusion is clearly contrary to this perceived fact.”’
evaṃ tarhi yadi prakṛtyāsya vedasya bhūtārthadyotane śaktiḥ sthitā tadā saṅketānabhijñasyāpi tato vedavākyād arthapratītiḥ prāpnoti / saṅketasāpekṣo vedo 'rthapratītihetur na kevala iti cet /	If that is so, and if the potency to express well-established things is already there in the Veda by its very nature, then it should be possible for that meaning of the Veda to be comprehended by that man also who is ignorant of the Conventions. Says the Opponent “The Veda becomes a means of expressing things only through the help of the Conventions, not independently by itself
tan na /	That cannot be right.
nahi prakṛtyārthapratītihetavo dīpādayaḥ saṅkeamapekṣante /	The Lamp and such things which are by their nature endowed with the potency to illumine things, do not need any Conventions.
anyathā saṅketasyaivānyavyatirekābhyām arthapratītau sāmarthyaṃ syāt, nasvābhāvikasya sambandhasya /	If this were not so, then, through positive and negative concomitance, the potency to express things would have to be attributed to those Conventions, not to any natural relationship (between the word and its meaning).
kiṃ ca bhavatu nāma saṅketasahāyād arthapratītis tathāpi doṣa ity āha samayetyādi / mīmāṃsakoparacitāt samayān niraktakārādyuparacitaḥ samayaḥ samayāntaraṃ	even so, the view of the opponent would be defective. This is what is shown by the words ‘As there is another Convention, etc. etc.’ The Conventions set up by the author of the Nirukta are different from those set up by the Mīmāṃsaka;
tasya sadbhāve sati prakṛtādarthād arthāntare tataḥ śabdāt pratītir na prāpnoti /	and as there is this other Convention, this latter could not bring about the comprehension of any meaning other than that indicated by itself;
nahi pradīpo 'prakāśyaṃ gandharasādikaṃ saṅketavaśāt prakāśayitum īśaḥ /	for the Lamp never illumines what cannot be illuminated by it such, for instance, as Odour, Taste and so forth, with the help of Conventions.
bhavatu nāmārthāntare vṛttiḥ samayavaśāt tathāpi prāmāṇyaṃ na sidhyatīti pratipādayati vijñātum iti / puruṣecchāvaśādyadyarthāntare 'pi śabdasya pravṛttis tadā sāṅkaryāt sā bhūtārthadyotanaśaktir niścetuṃ na śakyate iti kathaṃ tata iṣṭārthapratipattirbhavet /	Even granting that, on the ground of the other Convention, the Word may be applicable to (and lead to the comprehension of) another thing, no validity could attach to the cognition thus brought about. This is what is meant by the words ‘Nor can any such potency be recognised If, through the speaker’s whim, a word be actually applied to another thing (in another sense), then, there would be confusion, and it would not be possible to ascertain the exact expressive Potency of the word; how then could it be possible to derive from it the cognition of the intended meaning?
athavānyathā vyākhyāyate / yāsau prakṛtyā bhūtārthadyotanaśaktiḥ sā kadācid ekārthaniyatā vā syādanekārthaniyatā veti pakṣadvayam /	Or, the words of the text may be explained in another way: The natural expressiveness of the word may be either restricted to one thing, or applied to several things; only these two alternative views are possible.
tatraikārthaniyamapakṣe doṣamāha samayāntarabhāva iti /	If it is restricted to one thing, then the objection (to the Opponent’s view") is that ‘As there is another Convention, etc. etc.’.
dvitīye 'pyāha vijñātuṃ sā śaktir naca śakyata iti /	If the second alternative is accepted then ‘no such potency can be recognised’, i.e. on account of confusion.
yathoktam "girāmekārthaniyame na syād arthāntare gatiḥ /	This has been thus declared ‘If words are restricted to one thing, then there could be no comprehension of any other thing (from it);
anekārthābhisambandhe viruddhavyaktisambhavaḥ" // iti //	if they are related to several things, then there is possibility of the contradictory things being expressed’.
evaṃ prathamaṃ śābdalakṣaṇamasambhavīti pratipādyākampajñānajanmata ityasya hetor asiddhatāmupasaṃhāreṇa darśayann āha ata ityādi /	Thus, inasmuch as there can be no cognition of the meaning (of the Veda), how can there be any ‘unshake ability’ in that cognition? it could be possible only on the basis of conventions;
sa tu sāmayiko yuktaḥ puṃvāg bhūtān na bhidyate //	and in this, it would not be different from the words of human beings.
nyāyajñair na tayo kaścid viśeṣaḥ pratipadyate /	in fact, persons well-versed in the science of reasoning do not recognise any difference between these two.
śrotriyāṇāṃ tvakampo 'yam ajñātanyāyavatmanām //	It can be ‘unshakeable’ only for the śrotriyas who are ignorant of the ways of reasoning.
apauruṣeyatve sati yathoktanītyārthapratītir eva na sambhavati yadā, tadā kutas tasyā akampatvam / yaścām arthapratyayo bhavannupalabhyate vedavākyāt sa tu sāṅketika eva yukta iti pūrvaṃ pratipāditam "eṣā vyākhyānato bhave"dityādinā /	If the Veda is not the work of a human author, then, as shown above, there can be no comprehension of its meaning; how then could the cognition brought about by it be ‘unshakeable’? The meaning that is actually found to be comprehended from the words of the Veda must be one based upon Conventions, as has been shown above, under Text 1504.
itaścāyaṃ sāṅketika eva yukta iti /	Hence it can only be through Conventions.
yasmād vaidikaṃ vākyaṃ puṃvāgbhūtāt puṃvāktvaprāptāt na bhidyate /	Specially because the words of the Veda do not differ from the words of human beings;
pauruṣeyavacanān na bhidyate iti yāvat /	that is, they do not differ from human assertions.
etad api kuta ity āha nyāyajñair ityādi /	Why this is so is explained in the words ‘In fact, persons well-versed, etc. etc.’
tayor iti / vaidikapauruṣeyayoḥ /	‘Between these two’, i.e. between words in the Veda and words emanating from men.
sarvaprakāreṇa puruṣaiḥ śakyakāraṇatvān na kaścid viśeṣo vaidikasya laukikāt/	In every way the words can be brought about by men, and hence the Vedic words cannot differ from the words of men.
śrotriyāṇām ityupahasati //	In this the Author ridicules the Śrotriyas (Mīmāṃsakas).
dvitīye 'pi "yadvā pratyayitoditā"dityetasmiṭśabdalakṣaṇe 'sambhavitāṃ lakṣaṇadoṣamāha āptetyādi / āptānaṅgīkṛter eva dvitīyam api na kṣamam /	Because the ‘trustworthy person’ is not admitted, therefore the second definition also of verbal cognition is not proper. Even if such a person were regarded as possible, that a certain person is such a one cannot be ascertained. The second form of Verbal Cognition put forward by the other party in Text 1489, is that brought about ‘by words uttered by a Trustworthy Person’.
śābdalakṣaṇamiṣṭau vā so 'yam ityaviniścitaḥ //	In this definition, the Author detects the defect of ‘Impossibility’: [see verse 1510 above]
mīmāṃsakaiḥ kṣīṇadoṣapuruṣānabhyupagamād āpto nāṅīkṛta eveti kutas tadvacanasya prāmāṇyaṃ syāt /	As a matter of fact, the Mīmāṃsakas do not admit of a Person ‘free from defects’; hence no ‘Trustworthy Person’ can be admitted by them; how then could the word of such a person be valid (Right, Reliable)?
na kṣamam / na yuktam /	‘Na kṣamam’ is not proper;
asambhavīti yāvat /	i.e. it is ‘Impossible’.
athāpyāpta iṣyate tadā tasyāptasyeṣṭau satyāṃ śṛṅgagrāhikayāyamasāvityāpto na niścita ityasatprakhya eva /	Even if the ‘Trustworthy Person’ be admitted, it could never be exactly pointed out that ‘this person’ is trustworthy; hence he would be as good as non-existent.
nahyanyaguṇadoṣaniścaye pramāṇam asti teṣām atīndriyatvāt / kāyavāgvyavahārāścānyathāpi buddhipūrvaṃ kriyanta iti kutas tadvacanasyaprāmāṇyam, asāṅkaryeṇār vāgdarśibhis teṣām anavadhāraṇāt //	Then again, because there is no valid means of ascertaining whether or not there are certain bad or good qualities in a certain person, because such qualities are beyond the reach of the senses, specially because as for the bodily and verbal behaviour of men, they are sometimes purposely misrepresented, therefore how could any reliance be placed upon the word of such men? Because people with limited vision cannot properly discriminate among men.
prāyaḥ sampratyayo dṛṣṭo yadvākyāt tasya gṛhyate / parokṣapratipattyarthaṃ vākyaṃ pratyayataḥ sa cet // nānyatra pratyayābhāvāt pūrvamapratyayo 'pi hi /	If it be urged that “that person is regarded as trustworthy in regard to imperceptible things, whose assertions are found to be true in most cases”, then (the answer is that) the mere fact of one’s assertion being not true in some individual case, cannot prove that his assertions are never true;
ekatrāskhalite tatra sarvatra niyamo na hi //	nor can the fact of its being true in one case prove that all his assertions are true.
athāpi syād yasya puruṣasyākṣīṇadoṣasyāpi sato vākyād bāhulyena sampratyayo dṛṣṭaḥ so 'smābhiḥ pratyayita iṣṭo na kṣīṇadoṣaḥ.	The following might be urged “Even though a man may not be entirely free from defects, yet if it has been found that in most cases his assertions are true, then such a person is regarded by us as ‘trustworthy’, and not any person ‘free from defects’;
tasmāt tasya pratyayitasya vākyaṃ gṛhyate, [p.440] śābdalakṣaṇe tenāsambhavitā na sambhavatīti.	and it is the assertion of such a ‘trust-worthy’ person that is meant in the definition of Verbal Cognition (provided by us). Hence the definition is not open to the charge of being ‘Impossible’.”.
etad apy asamyak.	This cannot be right;
na hy ekatrāvisaṃvādamātropalambhāt sarvatra tathābhāvaniyamo yukto vyabhicārasya sambhāvyamānatvād anyathāvyabhicārilakṣaṇaṃ syāt //	because one assertion of the man has been found to be not incompatible with the real state of things, it does not necessarily follow that all his assertions are true; because it is always possible that some assertion may be untrue.
vacasāṃ pratibandho vā ko bāhyeṣvapi vastuṣu / pratipādayatāṃ tāni yenaiṣāṃ syāt pramāṇatā // bhinnākṣagrahaṇādibhyo naikātmyaṃ na tadudbhavaḥ /	What is the connection between words and external objects, by expressing which latter the words would be ‘true’ (valid)? The connection between them cannot be of the nature of being the same in essence, because they are apprehended by different sense-organs, and for other reasons.
vyabhicārān na cānyasya yujyate 'vyabhicāritā //	nor can the connection between them be that of one being produced from the other;
nahi vācyair vastubhiḥ saha kaścit tādātmyalakṣaṇas tadutpattilakṣaṇo vā pratibandho vacasām asti, yena tāni vastūni pratipādayatām eṣāṃ vacasāṃ prāmāṇyaṃ syāt /	Nor is there any other connection possible which could be true. Having thus proved that both definitions of Verbal Cognition are defective, the Author points out objections to Verbal Cognition in general: [see verses 1513-1514 above] As a matter of fact, between Words and External Things, there is no such relation as that of sameness or of being produced, by virtue of which relation, the words expressing such things would be regarded as true.
tatra tāvan na tādātmyalakṣaṇaḥ pratibandho 'sti, bhinnākṣagrahaṇādibhyo hetubhyaḥ /	For instance, the relation of sameness is not possible between them, because of such reasons as their being apprehended by different sense-organs;
tatra bhinnākṣagrahaṇaṃ bhinnendriyeṇa grahaṇam /	i.e. words are apprehended by a sense-organ which is different from that by which the things are apprehended;
tathā hi śrotrendriyeṇa śabdo gṛhyate 'rthastu cakṣurādinā /	for instance, word is apprehended by the Auditory organ, while things are apprehended by the Visual and other organs.
ādiśabdena kāladeśapratibhāsakāraṇabhedo gṛhyate /	By ‘other reasons’ are included differences of Time, Place, Appearance, Causes.
kumārilastvāha bhinnendriyagrāhyatvād bhinnamityanaikāntikametat tathā hi ---ekaṃ rūpaṃ yadā bahavaḥ paśyanti tadā bhinnendriyagrāhyatvād rūpasya bhedaḥ prāpnoti /	Kumārila has argued as follows: “The argument that, ‘one thing is different from another because they are apprehended by different sense-organs’, is not Conclusive; because in a case where the same colour is seen by several persons, the Colour will have to be regarded as different, because it is apprehended by different sense-organs.
athāpi syāc cakṣurindriyajāter abhedādekendriyagrāhyatvam eveti / evaṃ tarhi sattāyā anekendriyagrāhyatve 'pīndriyajāter abhedādabhinnendriyagrāhyatvam astīti siddham ekatvam /	It might be argued that ‘all the sense-organs apprehending the Colour belong to the same universal ‘Eye’, so that the Colour is really perceived by a single sense-organ But, in that case, though ‘Being’ is perceived by several sense-organs, yet the Universal ‘Sense-organ’ being one, it would be perceived by the same sense-organ, and hence have to be regarded as one.
tasmād buddhebhedābhedābhyāṃ padārthabhedavyavasthā nendriyabhedābhedābhyām iti /	For these reasons things have to be regarded as same or different, according as their cognitions are same or different, and not according to the sameness or diversity of the sense-organs concerned”.
āha ca "na cānekendriyagrāhyaṃ bhinnatāṃ pratipadyate /	The actual words of Kumārila are as follows: “That which is cognised by more sense-organs than one does not (on that account) become diverse;
mābhūd bhinnaśarīrasthagrāhyatvād rūpabhinnatā // jātyabhedādabhedaśced indriyatvena tat samam /	for, if it were so, then any and every object would have to be regarded as diverse on the ground of its being cognised by the sense-organs located in the bodies of different persons.
tulyabuddherato bhinnā na sattendriyabhedataḥ" //	The class ‘Being’ also is not regarded as diverse, even though it is perceived by diverse sense-organs, because it is always recognised as the same”.
iti /	This however is not right.
etaccāsamyak buddhibhedād bhede 'pi sādhye samānatvāt / tathāhyatrāpi śakyata evaṃ vaktum buddhebhedād vastubheda ityanaikāntikam etat /	Even when the difference is based upon the difference of cognitions, what has been urged remains equally applicable to what is meant to be proved (by the Opponent). For instance, in regard to the case in question also, the following might be said: That the difference among things is due to the difference in cognitions is not true (conclusive);
tathā hi yadā bahava ekaṃ rūpaṃ paśyanti, tadā buddhibhedo 'styevānekacakṣurjñānotpatteḥ / naca tadā rūpasya bhedaḥ / yadi cakṣur vijñānajāter abhedādekatvaṃ parikalpyate evaṃ tarhi rūparasādīnām apyekatvaṃ prāpnoti /	for instance, when several persons perceive Colour, there is diversity of cognitions, and yet the Colour is not diverse; if one-ness (sameness of the Sense-organs) is assumed on the basis of the eyes of all persons belonging to the same class ‘Eye’, then the same sameness may be attributed to Colour, Taste and other things also, because even though these Cognitions are diverse, yet they all belong to the one class ‘Cognition’;
tataś ca yaduktam ---"buddhibhedān na caikatvaṃ rūpādīnāṃ prasajyate"iti tadvyāhanyeta /	and this would be a direct contradiction of the assertion that ‘Colour, etc. cannot be regarded as one, because their cognitions are different’ (found in Ślokavārtika Sense-perception, 158).
tasmāj jātyuttaram etat /	Thus the answer provided (by Kumārila) is of the nature of a ‘Futile Rejoinder’.
atha satyapi svalakṣaṇabhede yādṛśe lakṣaṇa [p.441] bhede yādṛśo loke bhedābhedavyavahāraḥ prasidhaḥ ekānekapratyavamarśahetutvena tādṛśau buddhibhedābhedāvupādīyete /	If it be urged that “Just as, even -when there is difference in the Specific Individualities, there are certain characteristics upon the difference or non-difference of which people regard things as different or non-different, and treat them as the basis of conceiving of things as one or diverse;
indriye 'pi sarvaṃ samānamityalaṃ prasaṅgena /	this is what we mean by the difference and non-difference of cognitions”, all this would be equally applicable to the case of Sense-organs also.
na tadudbhava iti /	as this would be not true;
nāpi tadutpattilakṣaṇasambandho vyabhicārāt / arthābhāve 'pi vivakṣāmātrād bhāvāt /	because even wdien the Thing is not there, the Word may be there, through the mere wish of the speaker. Nor is there any other kind of inseparability between the two, except that of Cause and Effect;
nacānyasya tadutpattirahitasyāvyabhicāritāstyatiprasaṅgāt / tasmān na vācye 'rthe śabdasya prāmāṇyam //	From all this we conclude that the Word cannot serve as a valid means of cognition of the thing spoken of by it. From all verbal statements there follows inference of the ‘desire to speak’ (i.e. intention, on the part of the speaker);
yadyevaṃ katham uktam ---" na pramāṇāntaraṃ śābdamanumānāt tathā hi saḥ{tat---} /	Says the Opponent “If that is so, then how is it that it has been declared (by a Buddhist writer) that ‘Verbal Cognition is not a distinct form of Cognition, because it proceeds from Inference;
kṛtakatvādivat svārthamanyāpohena bhāṣate" iti /	just as the Inference, based upon the character of being a product, is drawn by one for his own benefit, so the word also denotes things only through the negation of others’?”
etadāśaṅkya yathānumāne 'ntarbhāva iṣṭas tathā pratipādayann āha vacobhya ityādi /	Anticipating this objection, the Author proceeds to show in what way Verbal Cognition is meant to be included under Inference: [see verse 1515 above]
pauruṣeyatvenāpyabhimatebhyaḥ /	‘All words’ i.e. all those that are regarded as emanating from human beings.
sā ca vivakṣā tat kāryatvād vacanāt pratīyate / natu vācyatayā / yasmād ātmasantāne 'nvayavyatirekābhyāṃ vacasāṃ hetuḥ sā vivakṣā niścitā /	This ‘Desire to Speak’ or ‘Intention’ is inferred from the Verbal statements, because they are the effects of that Desire, and not because it is expressed (or denoted) by it. That the said Desire is the cause of the Verbal Statement is ascertained from the fact that there is positive and negative concomitance (between them).
yattūktam anyāpohena bhāṣata iti tatra bhāṣaṇaṃ dyotanaṃ jñāpanam iti yāvat / tathācāsya vivaraṇam ---"tatkṛtakatvādivad arthāntarasambaddhena vyavacchedenadyotayatī"ti /	When it was said (by the Buddhist writer) that ‘the word also denotes things only as the negation of others’, what was meant by ‘denoting’ was only indicating, making known; that is, the explanation provided of that passage is as follows: Just like the Probans ‘Because it is a product’, it manifests (indicates) a thing by means of the negation or exclusion of other things.
avaśyaṃ caitad vijñeyam anyathā kṛtakatvādivad iti sādhanavikalo dṛṣṭāntaḥ syāt /	This has to be so understood; otherwise, the instance ‘like the Probans Because it is a product’ would be one devoid of the Probandum;
nahi kṛtakatvāder bhāṣaṇaṃ sambhavati, tasya śabdadharmatvāt /	because there can be no denoting of ‘being a product’; as the denoting is a property or function of words;
tataścānyāpohena bhāṣaṇāditi hetur asādhāraṇaḥ syāt // nanu ca vivakṣāyām api śabdasya naiva prāmāṇyaṃ yuktam / tathā hi na tāvad vivakṣāviśeṣe prāmāṇyaṃ vyabhicārāt /	so that, if actual denoting were meant, then the statement of the Reason in the form ‘because it denotes things through the negation of others’ would be ‘Too Specific’ (hence Inconclusive). Anticipating this objection in the following Text (1516), the Author asserts (in Text 1517) the fact of the Verbal Expression being an efficient Means of bringing about the cognition of the particular ‘Desire to Speak’ [see verses 1516-1517 next]
bhrāntasyānyavivakṣāyām anyavākyadarśanāt /	“In the case of the man under an illusion, a verbal statement is found which is quite different from what the man ‘desired to say’;
nāpi vivakṣāsāmānye, vaiphalyāt /	so also in the case of the ‘desire to speak’ in general;
etad āśaṅkya bhrāntasyetyādinā, vivakṣāviśeṣe tāvat prāmāṇyam āha bhrāntābhrāntetyādi / bhrāntasyānyavivakṣāyāṃ vākyaṃ cedanyadīkṣyate /	hence the verbal statement cannot function (towards bringing about the cognition of any desire to speak)”; if this is urged, (then the answer is that) there is clear distinction between words used by the man under an illusion and those used by one who is not under an illusion.
vidagdhāḥ prakṛtādibhyo niścinvanti girāmalam //	Clever men are quite able to discern this difference through the context and such other circumstances.
avaśyaṃ hi bhrāntābhrāntaprayuktānāṃ vailakṣaṇyam aṅīkartavyam, anyathā na kāraṇa [p.442] bhedo bhedakaḥ syāt /	It must be admitted that there is difference between words used by the deluded person and those used by the person not so deluded; otherwise, a difference in the causes would make no difference in their effects.
tac ca vailakṣaṇyaṃ kuśalāḥ puruṣā niścinvantyeva prakṛtādibhyaḥ /	This difference clever men are quite able to discern, through the Context and other circumstances.
prakṛtam prakaraṇam /	‘Prakṛta’ stands for the Context in which the words are used.
ādiśabdenāvyākulatā mukhaprasannatādi gṛhyate //	this includes the freedom from confusion, happy facial expression and so forth.
vailakṣaṇyam eva girāṃ katham ity āha vailakṣaṇyena hetūnām iti /	Question: “Why should there be a distinction among the words at all?”
vailakṣaṇyena hetūnāṃ viśeṣaṃ tāsu ye na tu /	Difference among words is due to difference among their causes.
avagacchanti doṣo 'yaṃ teṣāṃ liṅgasya nāsti tu //	If there are people who do not notice this difference, the fault is theirs, not of the indicative.
sandihyamānavapuṣo dhūmasyāpyekadānyathā / bhāvānniścayakāle 'pi na syāt tejasi liṅgatā //	Otherwise, the fact of mere suspected smoke not having for once brought about the true notion of fire, might lead to the conclusion that even when cognised with certainty, smoke cannot be a true indicative of fire.
kāraṇabhedād iti yāvat /	That is to say, the difference is due to the difference in the Causes.
tasmāt suvivecitaṃ kāryaṃ na kāraṇaṃ vyabhicaratīti bhavatyeva vivakṣāviśeṣe prāmāṇyam /	Consequently, when the effect has been duly pondered over, it is never found to be non-concomitant with its Cause; so that the Word does become the means of knowing the particular ‘Intention of the Speaker
ye punas tāsu liṅgabhūtāsu gīrṣu viśeṣaṃ nāvadhārayanti teṣām ayaṃ doṣo natu liṅgasya /	If some people however are unable to perceive any difference in the words that appear as indicatives (of the meaning), the fault lies with these people themselves, not with the Indicative (word).
nahi liṅgaṃ sattāmātreṇa gamakam iṣyate, kiṃ tarhi---, niścitam /	Because the Indication does not indicate the meaning by its mere presence, it does so only when it is duly ascertained.
tasmāt pratipattur doṣo 'yam /	Hence the fault lies with the person addressed.
anyathā hi kvacid bāṣpādirūpeṇa sandihyamānasya dhūmasyānyatvābhāvād agamakatvān niścitasyāpi vahnau sādhye na liṅgatā prāpnoti /	If it were not so, then, if in a case where the presence of Smoke has been merely suspected in what was really only vapour, and hence later on it is found that the Fire indicated by it is not there, and it has failed to indicate the true Fire, it may lead one to the conclusion that even in cases where the Smoke has been duly cognised with certainty, it would not be indicative of the True Fire.
apica yadā sarva evāyaṃ śābdo vyavahāras taimirikadvayadvicandradarśanavat svapratibhāsānurodhena bhrānta eveṣyate, tadā kathaṃ vivakṣāviśeṣe vyabhicārodbhāvanādaprāmāṇyaprasañjanaṃ syāt, tatra vivakṣāviśeṣe pāramārthikasya prāmāṇyasyānabhyupagamāt / tathācāha "saṅketāpekṣayā tasya hṛdi kṛtvā prakāśanam /	Further, when the entire fabric of verbal usage is regarded as illusory, being dependent solely upon mere semblances, like the idea of ‘Two Moons’ that the man of defective vision has, how could the charge of being invalid be brought, on the basis of falsity only, against the notion of the particular ‘Intention of the Speaker’? Specially when real validity is not attributed to the idea of that particular ‘Intention This has been thus declared ‘When Verbal Cognition was declared to be Inferential, it was with a view to its indicativeness being dependent upon Convention, and not with a view to the real truth’.
anumānatvam uddiṣṭaṃ natu tattvavyapekṣayā" //	In the case of those words also, there is no incongruity in the inference of the simple ‘desire to speak’;
iti //	because it is always there;
vivakṣāsāmānye 'pi sādhye prāmāṇyaṃ pratipādayann āha teṣām ityādi / teṣām api vivakṣāyāḥ kevalāyā virudhyate /	for the purpose of establishing the fact of its being produced by the speaker’s breath and so forth. The following Text shows that words can be the Means of Cognising ‘the Speaker’s Intention’ in general also: [see verse 1520 above]

prakāśayati vijñātuṃ sā śaktir na ca śakyate //

Nor can any such potency (of words) be recognised.

no cediti / ānarthakyam iti sambandhaḥ /

‘No cet’ i.e. If it be urged that “words cannot be inexpressive;

tataś ca dṛṣṭavirodhaḥ pratijñāyā iti bhāvaḥ /

and hence the conclusion of the Buddhist is contrary to a perceived fact”.

satyaṃ syād dṛṣṭavirodho yadi vedādevārthapratītirupadeśamantareṇopajāyate, yāvataivārthapratītir vyākhyātuḥ sakāśāt samayavaśād bhavet /

The answer to this is that our conclusion would really be contrary to perceived facts if things were comprehended from the Veda itself, without the help of any instructions; as a matter of fact however, the comprehension of the meaning comes only through the help of the expounder relying upon Conventions (the conventional denotation of words);

na vedāt kevalāt samayanirapekṣāt /

and it never comes from the Veda itself independently of Convention.

tathā hi vedārthaṃ mīmāṃsakādiḥ svecchayā vyācakṣāṇo dṛṣṭaḥ, naca svābhāvikasyārthasya puruṣecchānurodhitvaṃ yuktam /

For instance, the Mīmāṃsaka and others have been found to expound the meaning of the Veda in accordance with their own whim; and it cannot be right for the natural denotation of words to be dependent upon the whim of man.

tatraitat syāt nahi puruṣeṇāpūrvo 'rthaḥ svecchayā kathyate, kiṃ tarhi/

The following might be urged “The man does not expound a new meaning through his whim;

ya eva hi svābhāviko vyavasthitaḥ sa eva puruṣeṇa prakāśyate iti tena bhavatyeva dṛṣṭavirodha iti /

he explains that same natural meaning of words which has been there all along. So that your conclusion is clearly contrary to this perceived fact.”’

evaṃ tarhi yadi prakṛtyāsya vedasya bhūtārthadyotane śaktiḥ sthitā tadā saṅketānabhijñasyāpi tato vedavākyād arthapratītiḥ prāpnoti / saṅketasāpekṣo vedo 'rthapratītihetur na kevala iti cet /

If that is so, and if the potency to express well-established things is already there in the Veda by its very nature, then it should be possible for that meaning of the Veda to be comprehended by that man also who is ignorant of the Conventions. Says the Opponent “The Veda becomes a means of expressing things only through the help of the Conventions, not independently by itself

tan na /

That cannot be right.

nahi prakṛtyārthapratītihetavo dīpādayaḥ saṅkeamapekṣante /

The Lamp and such things which are by their nature endowed with the potency to illumine things, do not need any Conventions.

anyathā saṅketasyaivānyavyatirekābhyām arthapratītau sāmarthyaṃ syāt, nasvābhāvikasya sambandhasya /

If this were not so, then, through positive and negative concomitance, the potency to express things would have to be attributed to those Conventions, not to any natural relationship (between the word and its meaning).

kiṃ ca bhavatu nāma saṅketasahāyād arthapratītis tathāpi doṣa ity āha samayetyādi / mīmāṃsakoparacitāt samayān niraktakārādyuparacitaḥ samayaḥ samayāntaraṃ

even so, the view of the opponent would be defective. This is what is shown by the words ‘As there is another Convention, etc. etc.’ The Conventions set up by the author of the Nirukta are different from those set up by the Mīmāṃsaka;

tasya sadbhāve sati prakṛtādarthād arthāntare tataḥ śabdāt pratītir na prāpnoti /

and as there is this other Convention, this latter could not bring about the comprehension of any meaning other than that indicated by itself;

nahi pradīpo 'prakāśyaṃ gandharasādikaṃ saṅketavaśāt prakāśayitum īśaḥ /

for the Lamp never illumines what cannot be illuminated by it such, for instance, as Odour, Taste and so forth, with the help of Conventions.

bhavatu nāmārthāntare vṛttiḥ samayavaśāt tathāpi prāmāṇyaṃ na sidhyatīti pratipādayati vijñātum iti / puruṣecchāvaśādyadyarthāntare 'pi śabdasya pravṛttis tadā sāṅkaryāt sā bhūtārthadyotanaśaktir niścetuṃ na śakyate iti kathaṃ tata iṣṭārthapratipattirbhavet /

Even granting that, on the ground of the other Convention, the Word may be applicable to (and lead to the comprehension of) another thing, no validity could attach to the cognition thus brought about. This is what is meant by the words ‘Nor can any such potency be recognised If, through the speaker’s whim, a word be actually applied to another thing (in another sense), then, there would be confusion, and it would not be possible to ascertain the exact expressive Potency of the word; how then could it be possible to derive from it the cognition of the intended meaning?

athavānyathā vyākhyāyate / yāsau prakṛtyā bhūtārthadyotanaśaktiḥ sā kadācid ekārthaniyatā vā syādanekārthaniyatā veti pakṣadvayam /

Or, the words of the text may be explained in another way: The natural expressiveness of the word may be either restricted to one thing, or applied to several things; only these two alternative views are possible.

tatraikārthaniyamapakṣe doṣamāha samayāntarabhāva iti /

If it is restricted to one thing, then the objection (to the Opponent’s view") is that ‘As there is another Convention, etc. etc.’.

dvitīye 'pyāha vijñātuṃ sā śaktir naca śakyata iti /

If the second alternative is accepted then ‘no such potency can be recognised’, i.e. on account of confusion.

yathoktam "girāmekārthaniyame na syād arthāntare gatiḥ /

This has been thus declared ‘If words are restricted to one thing, then there could be no comprehension of any other thing (from it);

anekārthābhisambandhe viruddhavyaktisambhavaḥ" // iti //

if they are related to several things, then there is possibility of the contradictory things being expressed’.

evaṃ prathamaṃ śābdalakṣaṇamasambhavīti pratipādyākampajñānajanmata ityasya hetor asiddhatāmupasaṃhāreṇa darśayann āha ata ityādi /

Thus, inasmuch as there can be no cognition of the meaning (of the Veda), how can there be any ‘unshake ability’ in that cognition? it could be possible only on the basis of conventions;

sa tu sāmayiko yuktaḥ puṃvāg bhūtān na bhidyate //

and in this, it would not be different from the words of human beings.

nyāyajñair na tayo kaścid viśeṣaḥ pratipadyate /

in fact, persons well-versed in the science of reasoning do not recognise any difference between these two.

śrotriyāṇāṃ tvakampo 'yam ajñātanyāyavatmanām //

It can be ‘unshakeable’ only for the śrotriyas who are ignorant of the ways of reasoning.

apauruṣeyatve sati yathoktanītyārthapratītir eva na sambhavati yadā, tadā kutas tasyā akampatvam / yaścām arthapratyayo bhavannupalabhyate vedavākyāt sa tu sāṅketika eva yukta iti pūrvaṃ pratipāditam "eṣā vyākhyānato bhave"dityādinā /

If the Veda is not the work of a human author, then, as shown above, there can be no comprehension of its meaning; how then could the cognition brought about by it be ‘unshakeable’? The meaning that is actually found to be comprehended from the words of the Veda must be one based upon Conventions, as has been shown above, under Text 1504.

itaścāyaṃ sāṅketika eva yukta iti /

Hence it can only be through Conventions.

yasmād vaidikaṃ vākyaṃ puṃvāgbhūtāt puṃvāktvaprāptāt na bhidyate /

Specially because the words of the Veda do not differ from the words of human beings;

pauruṣeyavacanān na bhidyate iti yāvat /

that is, they do not differ from human assertions.

etad api kuta ity āha nyāyajñair ityādi /

Why this is so is explained in the words ‘In fact, persons well-versed, etc. etc.’

tayor iti / vaidikapauruṣeyayoḥ /

‘Between these two’, i.e. between words in the Veda and words emanating from men.

sarvaprakāreṇa puruṣaiḥ śakyakāraṇatvān na kaścid viśeṣo vaidikasya laukikāt/

In every way the words can be brought about by men, and hence the Vedic words cannot differ from the words of men.

śrotriyāṇām ityupahasati //

In this the Author ridicules the Śrotriyas (Mīmāṃsakas).

dvitīye 'pi "yadvā pratyayitoditā"dityetasmiṭśabdalakṣaṇe 'sambhavitāṃ lakṣaṇadoṣamāha āptetyādi / āptānaṅgīkṛter eva dvitīyam api na kṣamam /

Because the ‘trustworthy person’ is not admitted, therefore the second definition also of verbal cognition is not proper. Even if such a person were regarded as possible, that a certain person is such a one cannot be ascertained. The second form of Verbal Cognition put forward by the other party in Text 1489, is that brought about ‘by words uttered by a Trustworthy Person’.

śābdalakṣaṇamiṣṭau vā so 'yam ityaviniścitaḥ //

In this definition, the Author detects the defect of ‘Impossibility’: [see verse 1510 above]

mīmāṃsakaiḥ kṣīṇadoṣapuruṣānabhyupagamād āpto nāṅīkṛta eveti kutas tadvacanasya prāmāṇyaṃ syāt /

As a matter of fact, the Mīmāṃsakas do not admit of a Person ‘free from defects’; hence no ‘Trustworthy Person’ can be admitted by them; how then could the word of such a person be valid (Right, Reliable)?

na kṣamam / na yuktam /

‘Na kṣamam’ is not proper;

asambhavīti yāvat /

i.e. it is ‘Impossible’.

athāpyāpta iṣyate tadā tasyāptasyeṣṭau satyāṃ śṛṅgagrāhikayāyamasāvityāpto na niścita ityasatprakhya eva /

Even if the ‘Trustworthy Person’ be admitted, it could never be exactly pointed out that ‘this person’ is trustworthy; hence he would be as good as non-existent.

nahyanyaguṇadoṣaniścaye pramāṇam asti teṣām atīndriyatvāt / kāyavāgvyavahārāścānyathāpi buddhipūrvaṃ kriyanta iti kutas tadvacanasyaprāmāṇyam, asāṅkaryeṇār vāgdarśibhis teṣām anavadhāraṇāt //

Then again, because there is no valid means of ascertaining whether or not there are certain bad or good qualities in a certain person, because such qualities are beyond the reach of the senses, specially because as for the bodily and verbal behaviour of men, they are sometimes purposely misrepresented, therefore how could any reliance be placed upon the word of such men? Because people with limited vision cannot properly discriminate among men.

prāyaḥ sampratyayo dṛṣṭo yadvākyāt tasya gṛhyate / parokṣapratipattyarthaṃ vākyaṃ pratyayataḥ sa cet // nānyatra pratyayābhāvāt pūrvamapratyayo 'pi hi /

If it be urged that “that person is regarded as trustworthy in regard to imperceptible things, whose assertions are found to be true in most cases”, then (the answer is that) the mere fact of one’s assertion being not true in some individual case, cannot prove that his assertions are never true;

ekatrāskhalite tatra sarvatra niyamo na hi //

nor can the fact of its being true in one case prove that all his assertions are true.

athāpi syād yasya puruṣasyākṣīṇadoṣasyāpi sato vākyād bāhulyena sampratyayo dṛṣṭaḥ so 'smābhiḥ pratyayita iṣṭo na kṣīṇadoṣaḥ.

The following might be urged “Even though a man may not be entirely free from defects, yet if it has been found that in most cases his assertions are true, then such a person is regarded by us as ‘trustworthy’, and not any person ‘free from defects’;

tasmāt tasya pratyayitasya vākyaṃ gṛhyate, [p.440] śābdalakṣaṇe tenāsambhavitā na sambhavatīti.

and it is the assertion of such a ‘trust-worthy’ person that is meant in the definition of Verbal Cognition (provided by us). Hence the definition is not open to the charge of being ‘Impossible’.”.

etad apy asamyak.

This cannot be right;

na hy ekatrāvisaṃvādamātropalambhāt sarvatra tathābhāvaniyamo yukto vyabhicārasya sambhāvyamānatvād anyathāvyabhicārilakṣaṇaṃ syāt //

because one assertion of the man has been found to be not incompatible with the real state of things, it does not necessarily follow that all his assertions are true; because it is always possible that some assertion may be untrue.

vacasāṃ pratibandho vā ko bāhyeṣvapi vastuṣu / pratipādayatāṃ tāni yenaiṣāṃ syāt pramāṇatā // bhinnākṣagrahaṇādibhyo naikātmyaṃ na tadudbhavaḥ /

What is the connection between words and external objects, by expressing which latter the words would be ‘true’ (valid)? The connection between them cannot be of the nature of being the same in essence, because they are apprehended by different sense-organs, and for other reasons.

vyabhicārān na cānyasya yujyate 'vyabhicāritā //

nor can the connection between them be that of one being produced from the other;

nahi vācyair vastubhiḥ saha kaścit tādātmyalakṣaṇas tadutpattilakṣaṇo vā pratibandho vacasām asti, yena tāni vastūni pratipādayatām eṣāṃ vacasāṃ prāmāṇyaṃ syāt /

Nor is there any other connection possible which could be true. Having thus proved that both definitions of Verbal Cognition are defective, the Author points out objections to Verbal Cognition in general: [see verses 1513-1514 above] As a matter of fact, between Words and External Things, there is no such relation as that of sameness or of being produced, by virtue of which relation, the words expressing such things would be regarded as true.

tatra tāvan na tādātmyalakṣaṇaḥ pratibandho 'sti, bhinnākṣagrahaṇādibhyo hetubhyaḥ /

For instance, the relation of sameness is not possible between them, because of such reasons as their being apprehended by different sense-organs;

tatra bhinnākṣagrahaṇaṃ bhinnendriyeṇa grahaṇam /

i.e. words are apprehended by a sense-organ which is different from that by which the things are apprehended;

tathā hi śrotrendriyeṇa śabdo gṛhyate 'rthastu cakṣurādinā /

for instance, word is apprehended by the Auditory organ, while things are apprehended by the Visual and other organs.

ādiśabdena kāladeśapratibhāsakāraṇabhedo gṛhyate /

By ‘other reasons’ are included differences of Time, Place, Appearance, Causes.

kumārilastvāha bhinnendriyagrāhyatvād bhinnamityanaikāntikametat tathā hi ---ekaṃ rūpaṃ yadā bahavaḥ paśyanti tadā bhinnendriyagrāhyatvād rūpasya bhedaḥ prāpnoti /

Kumārila has argued as follows: “The argument that, ‘one thing is different from another because they are apprehended by different sense-organs’, is not Conclusive; because in a case where the same colour is seen by several persons, the Colour will have to be regarded as different, because it is apprehended by different sense-organs.

athāpi syāc cakṣurindriyajāter abhedādekendriyagrāhyatvam eveti / evaṃ tarhi sattāyā anekendriyagrāhyatve 'pīndriyajāter abhedādabhinnendriyagrāhyatvam astīti siddham ekatvam /

It might be argued that ‘all the sense-organs apprehending the Colour belong to the same universal ‘Eye’, so that the Colour is really perceived by a single sense-organ But, in that case, though ‘Being’ is perceived by several sense-organs, yet the Universal ‘Sense-organ’ being one, it would be perceived by the same sense-organ, and hence have to be regarded as one.

tasmād buddhebhedābhedābhyāṃ padārthabhedavyavasthā nendriyabhedābhedābhyām iti /

For these reasons things have to be regarded as same or different, according as their cognitions are same or different, and not according to the sameness or diversity of the sense-organs concerned”.

āha ca "na cānekendriyagrāhyaṃ bhinnatāṃ pratipadyate /

The actual words of Kumārila are as follows: “That which is cognised by more sense-organs than one does not (on that account) become diverse;

mābhūd bhinnaśarīrasthagrāhyatvād rūpabhinnatā // jātyabhedādabhedaśced indriyatvena tat samam /

for, if it were so, then any and every object would have to be regarded as diverse on the ground of its being cognised by the sense-organs located in the bodies of different persons.

tulyabuddherato bhinnā na sattendriyabhedataḥ" //

The class ‘Being’ also is not regarded as diverse, even though it is perceived by diverse sense-organs, because it is always recognised as the same”.

iti /

This however is not right.

etaccāsamyak buddhibhedād bhede 'pi sādhye samānatvāt / tathāhyatrāpi śakyata evaṃ vaktum buddhebhedād vastubheda ityanaikāntikam etat /

Even when the difference is based upon the difference of cognitions, what has been urged remains equally applicable to what is meant to be proved (by the Opponent). For instance, in regard to the case in question also, the following might be said: That the difference among things is due to the difference in cognitions is not true (conclusive);

tathā hi yadā bahava ekaṃ rūpaṃ paśyanti, tadā buddhibhedo 'styevānekacakṣurjñānotpatteḥ / naca tadā rūpasya bhedaḥ / yadi cakṣur vijñānajāter abhedādekatvaṃ parikalpyate evaṃ tarhi rūparasādīnām apyekatvaṃ prāpnoti /

for instance, when several persons perceive Colour, there is diversity of cognitions, and yet the Colour is not diverse; if one-ness (sameness of the Sense-organs) is assumed on the basis of the eyes of all persons belonging to the same class ‘Eye’, then the same sameness may be attributed to Colour, Taste and other things also, because even though these Cognitions are diverse, yet they all belong to the one class ‘Cognition’;

tataś ca yaduktam ---"buddhibhedān na caikatvaṃ rūpādīnāṃ prasajyate"iti tadvyāhanyeta /

and this would be a direct contradiction of the assertion that ‘Colour, etc. cannot be regarded as one, because their cognitions are different’ (found in Ślokavārtika Sense-perception, 158).

tasmāj jātyuttaram etat /

Thus the answer provided (by Kumārila) is of the nature of a ‘Futile Rejoinder’.

atha satyapi svalakṣaṇabhede yādṛśe lakṣaṇa [p.441] bhede yādṛśo loke bhedābhedavyavahāraḥ prasidhaḥ ekānekapratyavamarśahetutvena tādṛśau buddhibhedābhedāvupādīyete /

If it be urged that “Just as, even -when there is difference in the Specific Individualities, there are certain characteristics upon the difference or non-difference of which people regard things as different or non-different, and treat them as the basis of conceiving of things as one or diverse;

indriye 'pi sarvaṃ samānamityalaṃ prasaṅgena /

this is what we mean by the difference and non-difference of cognitions”, all this would be equally applicable to the case of Sense-organs also.

na tadudbhava iti /

as this would be not true;

nāpi tadutpattilakṣaṇasambandho vyabhicārāt / arthābhāve 'pi vivakṣāmātrād bhāvāt /

because even wdien the Thing is not there, the Word may be there, through the mere wish of the speaker. Nor is there any other kind of inseparability between the two, except that of Cause and Effect;

nacānyasya tadutpattirahitasyāvyabhicāritāstyatiprasaṅgāt / tasmān na vācye 'rthe śabdasya prāmāṇyam //

From all this we conclude that the Word cannot serve as a valid means of cognition of the thing spoken of by it. From all verbal statements there follows inference of the ‘desire to speak’ (i.e. intention, on the part of the speaker);

yadyevaṃ katham uktam ---" na pramāṇāntaraṃ śābdamanumānāt tathā hi saḥ{tat---} /

Says the Opponent “If that is so, then how is it that it has been declared (by a Buddhist writer) that ‘Verbal Cognition is not a distinct form of Cognition, because it proceeds from Inference;

kṛtakatvādivat svārthamanyāpohena bhāṣate" iti /

just as the Inference, based upon the character of being a product, is drawn by one for his own benefit, so the word also denotes things only through the negation of others’?”

etadāśaṅkya yathānumāne 'ntarbhāva iṣṭas tathā pratipādayann āha vacobhya ityādi /

Anticipating this objection, the Author proceeds to show in what way Verbal Cognition is meant to be included under Inference: [see verse 1515 above]

pauruṣeyatvenāpyabhimatebhyaḥ /

‘All words’ i.e. all those that are regarded as emanating from human beings.

sā ca vivakṣā tat kāryatvād vacanāt pratīyate / natu vācyatayā / yasmād ātmasantāne 'nvayavyatirekābhyāṃ vacasāṃ hetuḥ sā vivakṣā niścitā /

This ‘Desire to Speak’ or ‘Intention’ is inferred from the Verbal statements, because they are the effects of that Desire, and not because it is expressed (or denoted) by it. That the said Desire is the cause of the Verbal Statement is ascertained from the fact that there is positive and negative concomitance (between them).

yattūktam anyāpohena bhāṣata iti tatra bhāṣaṇaṃ dyotanaṃ jñāpanam iti yāvat / tathācāsya vivaraṇam ---"tatkṛtakatvādivad arthāntarasambaddhena vyavacchedenadyotayatī"ti /

When it was said (by the Buddhist writer) that ‘the word also denotes things only as the negation of others’, what was meant by ‘denoting’ was only indicating, making known; that is, the explanation provided of that passage is as follows: Just like the Probans ‘Because it is a product’, it manifests (indicates) a thing by means of the negation or exclusion of other things.

avaśyaṃ caitad vijñeyam anyathā kṛtakatvādivad iti sādhanavikalo dṛṣṭāntaḥ syāt /

This has to be so understood; otherwise, the instance ‘like the Probans Because it is a product’ would be one devoid of the Probandum;

nahi kṛtakatvāder bhāṣaṇaṃ sambhavati, tasya śabdadharmatvāt /

because there can be no denoting of ‘being a product’; as the denoting is a property or function of words;

tataścānyāpohena bhāṣaṇāditi hetur asādhāraṇaḥ syāt // nanu ca vivakṣāyām api śabdasya naiva prāmāṇyaṃ yuktam / tathā hi na tāvad vivakṣāviśeṣe prāmāṇyaṃ vyabhicārāt /

so that, if actual denoting were meant, then the statement of the Reason in the form ‘because it denotes things through the negation of others’ would be ‘Too Specific’ (hence Inconclusive). Anticipating this objection in the following Text (1516), the Author asserts (in Text 1517) the fact of the Verbal Expression being an efficient Means of bringing about the cognition of the particular ‘Desire to Speak’ [see verses 1516-1517 next]

bhrāntasyānyavivakṣāyām anyavākyadarśanāt /

“In the case of the man under an illusion, a verbal statement is found which is quite different from what the man ‘desired to say’;

nāpi vivakṣāsāmānye, vaiphalyāt /

so also in the case of the ‘desire to speak’ in general;

etad āśaṅkya bhrāntasyetyādinā, vivakṣāviśeṣe tāvat prāmāṇyam āha bhrāntābhrāntetyādi / bhrāntasyānyavivakṣāyāṃ vākyaṃ cedanyadīkṣyate /

hence the verbal statement cannot function (towards bringing about the cognition of any desire to speak)”; if this is urged, (then the answer is that) there is clear distinction between words used by the man under an illusion and those used by one who is not under an illusion.

vidagdhāḥ prakṛtādibhyo niścinvanti girāmalam //

Clever men are quite able to discern this difference through the context and such other circumstances.

avaśyaṃ hi bhrāntābhrāntaprayuktānāṃ vailakṣaṇyam aṅīkartavyam, anyathā na kāraṇa [p.442] bhedo bhedakaḥ syāt /

It must be admitted that there is difference between words used by the deluded person and those used by the person not so deluded; otherwise, a difference in the causes would make no difference in their effects.

tac ca vailakṣaṇyaṃ kuśalāḥ puruṣā niścinvantyeva prakṛtādibhyaḥ /

This difference clever men are quite able to discern, through the Context and other circumstances.

prakṛtam prakaraṇam /

‘Prakṛta’ stands for the Context in which the words are used.

ādiśabdenāvyākulatā mukhaprasannatādi gṛhyate //

this includes the freedom from confusion, happy facial expression and so forth.

vailakṣaṇyam eva girāṃ katham ity āha vailakṣaṇyena hetūnām iti /

Question: “Why should there be a distinction among the words at all?”

vailakṣaṇyena hetūnāṃ viśeṣaṃ tāsu ye na tu /

Difference among words is due to difference among their causes.

avagacchanti doṣo 'yaṃ teṣāṃ liṅgasya nāsti tu //

If there are people who do not notice this difference, the fault is theirs, not of the indicative.

sandihyamānavapuṣo dhūmasyāpyekadānyathā / bhāvānniścayakāle 'pi na syāt tejasi liṅgatā //

Otherwise, the fact of mere suspected smoke not having for once brought about the true notion of fire, might lead to the conclusion that even when cognised with certainty, smoke cannot be a true indicative of fire.

kāraṇabhedād iti yāvat /

That is to say, the difference is due to the difference in the Causes.

tasmāt suvivecitaṃ kāryaṃ na kāraṇaṃ vyabhicaratīti bhavatyeva vivakṣāviśeṣe prāmāṇyam /

Consequently, when the effect has been duly pondered over, it is never found to be non-concomitant with its Cause; so that the Word does become the means of knowing the particular ‘Intention of the Speaker

ye punas tāsu liṅgabhūtāsu gīrṣu viśeṣaṃ nāvadhārayanti teṣām ayaṃ doṣo natu liṅgasya /

If some people however are unable to perceive any difference in the words that appear as indicatives (of the meaning), the fault lies with these people themselves, not with the Indicative (word).

nahi liṅgaṃ sattāmātreṇa gamakam iṣyate, kiṃ tarhi---, niścitam /

Because the Indication does not indicate the meaning by its mere presence, it does so only when it is duly ascertained.

tasmāt pratipattur doṣo 'yam /

Hence the fault lies with the person addressed.

anyathā hi kvacid bāṣpādirūpeṇa sandihyamānasya dhūmasyānyatvābhāvād agamakatvān niścitasyāpi vahnau sādhye na liṅgatā prāpnoti /

If it were not so, then, if in a case where the presence of Smoke has been merely suspected in what was really only vapour, and hence later on it is found that the Fire indicated by it is not there, and it has failed to indicate the true Fire, it may lead one to the conclusion that even in cases where the Smoke has been duly cognised with certainty, it would not be indicative of the True Fire.

apica yadā sarva evāyaṃ śābdo vyavahāras taimirikadvayadvicandradarśanavat svapratibhāsānurodhena bhrānta eveṣyate, tadā kathaṃ vivakṣāviśeṣe vyabhicārodbhāvanādaprāmāṇyaprasañjanaṃ syāt, tatra vivakṣāviśeṣe pāramārthikasya prāmāṇyasyānabhyupagamāt / tathācāha "saṅketāpekṣayā tasya hṛdi kṛtvā prakāśanam /

Further, when the entire fabric of verbal usage is regarded as illusory, being dependent solely upon mere semblances, like the idea of ‘Two Moons’ that the man of defective vision has, how could the charge of being invalid be brought, on the basis of falsity only, against the notion of the particular ‘Intention of the Speaker’? Specially when real validity is not attributed to the idea of that particular ‘Intention This has been thus declared ‘When Verbal Cognition was declared to be Inferential, it was with a view to its indicativeness being dependent upon Convention, and not with a view to the real truth’.

anumānatvam uddiṣṭaṃ natu tattvavyapekṣayā" //

In the case of those words also, there is no incongruity in the inference of the simple ‘desire to speak’;

iti //

because it is always there;

vivakṣāsāmānye 'pi sādhye prāmāṇyaṃ pratipādayann āha teṣām ityādi / teṣām api vivakṣāyāḥ kevalāyā virudhyate /

for the purpose of establishing the fact of its being produced by the speaker’s breath and so forth. The following Text shows that words can be the Means of Cognising ‘the Speaker’s Intention’ in general also: [see verse 1520 above]