buddhist-nlp/tatpa-noisy · Datasets at Hugging Face

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āha nanvityādi /	‘He’ i.e. the Speaker.
nanu śabdapramāṇādipramāṇāntarasambhavāt /	‘Tena’ by means of the Inference consisting of the verbal statement.
nirdiṣṭaṃ lakṣaṇaṃ kasmād dvayor eva pramāṇayoḥ //	“Inasmuch as there are other means or forms of knowledge, in the shape of verbal cognition and others, why has the definition of only two such means been provided?”
anenāvyāpitāṃ pramāṇalakṣaṇasya doṣaṃ pramādvitayaniścitamityatra dvitayāvadhāraṇavaiphalyaṃ cāha //	What the Opponent means to do by this is (1) to point out that the definition provided is ‘too narrow’, and (2) to indicate that what has been asserted (under Text 3) regarding Truth ‘being ascertained by the two Means or Forms of Knowledge’ is futile.
ucyata ityādinā pariharati /	The answer to this is provided in the following [see verse 1488 next]
ucyate na dvayād anyatpramāṇamupapadyate / pramāṇalakṣaṇāyogād yoge cāntargamādiha //	“Inasmuch as there are other means or forms of knowledge, in the shape of verbal cognition and others, why has the definition of only two such means been provided?”
antargamād iheti /	The Opponent (of the Buddhist) urges the following objection: [see verse 1487 above]
asminneva pramāṇadvaye / etad uktaṃ bhavati pramāṇadvayādanyasya pramāṇalakṣaṇamavisaṃvāditvaṃ nā	What the Opponent means to do by this is (1) to point out that the definition provided is ‘too narrow’, and (2) to indicate that what has been asserted (under Text 3) regarding Truth ‘being ascertained by the two Means or Forms of Knowledge’ is futile.
styeva, sati cātraivāntarbhāvāt pṛthaṅnocyate pramāṇāntaram iti // tatra kathamanyeṣām aprāmāṇyaṃ prāmāṇye vā katham ihāntarbhāva ityetad	The reply to this is as follows: in fact, there cannot be any form of cognition except the two (already described); because all the others that have been postulated either do not possess the character of the ‘form of right cognition’, or are included in these two.
dvayaṃ pratipādayati /	‘Included in these’, i.e. in the two Forms of Cognition already described.
atra śabdopamārthāpattyabhāvayuktyanupalabdhisambhavaitihyapratibhākhyātipramāṇāntarāṇi parair abhyupagatāni /	What is meant is as follows: The characteristic of Valid Knowledge is that it should be in conformity with the real state of things; and this is not present at all in any of the others that have been postulated;
tatra śabdamadhikṛtyāha śabdajñānād ityādi / śabdajñānāt parokṣārthajñānaṃ śābdaṃ pare jaguḥ / taccākartṛkato vākyāt tathā pratyayinoditāt //	Other people have declared ‘verbal cognition’ to be “that knowledge of imperceptible things which is derived from words”; and [they provide the following account of it], “that cognition is derived from (a) the eternal sentence and from (b) the sentence uttered by a trustworthy person.
idaṃ ca kila nādhyakṣaṃ parokṣaviṣayatvataḥ / nānumānaṃ ca ghaṭate tallakṣaṇaviyogataḥ //	This cannot be ‘sense-perception’, because the object apprehended by it is beyond the reach of the senses; nor can it be ‘inference because it is devoid of the characteristic features of inference;
dharmī dharmaviśiṣṭo hi liṅgityetat suniścitam / na bhaved anumānaṃ ca yāvat tadviṣayaṃ na tat //	until the subject (minor term) is definitely known to be possessed of the probandum and also of the probans, it cannot be regarded as a case of ‘inference’ of that subject.
tatra śabarasvāmī śabdalakṣaṇamāha śabdajñānād asannikṛṣṭe 'rthajñānaṃ śabdam iti / śabdasvalakṣaṇagrahaṇād uttarakālaṃ parokṣe 'rthe yadutpadyate jñānaṃ tacchabdādāgatam iti kṛtvā śābdapramāṇam /	5) has provided the following definition of Verbal Cognition: “That cognition of things not within reach of the senses which proceeds from the cognition of words is called Verbal”; which means that the Specific Individuality of the word having been apprehended, the cognition that follows after that, in regard to things beyond the reach of the Senses, is called Verbal Cognition, because it is derived from words.
tac ca dvividham / apauruṣeyaśabdajanitaṃ pratyayitapuruṣavākyajaṃ ca /	“This Verbal Cognition is of two kinds (1) Proceeding from words not emanating from human beings, and (2) Proceeding from the words of trustworthy persons.
etac ca pratyakṣād bhinnaṃ parokṣaviṣayatvāt /	This cognition is different, from Sense-perception, because the object apprehended by it is beyond the reach of the senses.
nāpyanumānaṃ trairūpyābhāvāt / tathā hi sādhyadharmaviśiṣṭo dharmī anumeya iṣyate, na kevalo nāpi dharmamātram, yāvac ca taddharmitvena dharmiviṣayaṃ liṅgaṃ nāvadhāryate na tāvad	Nor is it Inference; as it is devoid of the ‘three features For instance, the object of Inferential Cognition is the Subject (Minor Term) which is qualified by the character that is sought to be proved (i.e. the Probandmn), not merely the Subject by itself, nor the character by itself; and until the Probans is definitely known as having the same character and as appertaining to the same Subject, the Inference cannot proceed.
yāvat pakṣadharmatvāvadhāraṇā na bhavati na tāvad anumānam iti yāvat //	That is to say, until the presence of the Probans in the Subject is definitely cognised with certainty, there can be no Inference”.
saiva pakṣadharmatvāvadhāraṇa kiṃ na bhavatītyāha yaśceti /	Question Why cannot this condition of the definite cognition of the Probans in the Subject be fulfilled in the case in question?
yaś cātra kalpyate dharmī prameyo 'sya sa eva ca /	“In the case in question (i.e. in verbal cognition) that which would be regarded as the subject forms the object cognised itself;
nacānavadhṛte tasmiṃs taddharmatvāvadhāraṇā //	and unless this is cognised, there can be no idea of any character (probans) belonging to it.” (1492)
yaścātra śābde kalpyate vṛkṣādidharmī sa eva prameyas tasyaiva pratipādyatvāt /	“In the case of Verbal Cognition, anything, in the shape of the Tree and such things, that may be assumed to be the Subject, forms the object cognised itself;
dharmyevātra prameyo na dharmaviśiṣṭo dharmīti yāvat /	as that is what is expressed by the word. That is to say, in this ease, the Subject itself and not the Subject as qualified by the Probandun, is the object cognised;
tasmin dharmiṇi anavadhṛte aniścite kathaṃ tad dharmatvaṃ niścīyate //	and so long as the said Subject has not been definitely cognised, how can there be any definite cognition of any character as belonging to it?” (1492)
prāk sa cetpakṣadharmatvād gṛhītaḥ kiṃ tataḥ param / pakṣadharmādibhir jñātair yena syād anumānatā //	“And if the subject has already been cognised, prior to the recognition of the probans in the subject (i.e. the minor premiss) then what is the use of knowing that the probans subsists in it and so forth, by virtue of which the cognition could be regarded as inference?” (1493)
kiṃ ca yadi cāsau dharmī pakṣadharmatvaniścayāt prāgjñātas tadā niṣpha laḥ pakṣadharmatvādiniścaye prayatnaḥ, dharmipratipattyartho hi sarvaḥ, prayāsaḥsa cet pratipannaḥ kimidānīṃ pakṣadharmatvādinirūpaṇaprayāsena /	“Then again, if the Subject has been cognised before the recognition of the Minor Premiss, then all attempt to obtain the recognition of this latter would be futile; because the purpose of the whole attempt is to secure the cognition of the Subject; hence, if that has been cognised, what would be the use in trying to know of the presence of the Probans in the Subject?”
abhyupagamya caitad abhihitam /	What has been stated is on the basis of taking it for granted that what the opponent has asserted is true.
naca śabdo vṛkṣāder dharmiṇo dharmaḥ, vaktṛdeśe 'vadhāryamāṇatvāt //	As a matter of fact, the Word is not a property of any Such Subject as the Tree; as it is always found in the place where the Speaker is.
anvayo na ca śabdasya prameyeṇa nirūpyate /	“Nor cast the concomitance of the word with the object inferred (probandum) be ascertained;
vyāpāreṇa hi sarveṣām anvetṛtvaṃ pratīyate //	the concomitance of all things is recognised only by their functioning.” (1494)
nirūpyata iti / niścīyate /	‘Ascertained’‘ recognised with certainty.
sadbhāvena sattayeti yāvat / etaduktaṃ bhavati vidyamānasyaivānvetṛtvaṃ nāvidyamānasyeti //	‘By their functioning’, i.e. by existence, by being present. What is meant is that it is only what exists that can be concomitant, not what does not exist.
[p.435] etad eva darśayann āha yatretyādi /	The same idea is further elucidated: [see verse 1495 next]
yatra dhūmo 'sti tatrāgner astitvenānvayaḥ sphuṭam /	“It is only when the eire exists whenever there is smoke that its concomitance is clearly perceived.
natvevaṃ yatra śabdo 'sti tatrārtho 'stīti niścitam //	in the case in question however, there is no such certain idea as that ‘the thing spoken of exists wherever the word exists’.” (1495)
yatra dhūmas tatrāvaśyaṃ yato vahnirityato 'sau vahniranvetā bhavati, dhūmasyanatvevaṃ śabdasyārthenānvayaḥ //	“It is because of the well-recognised fact that ‘wherever there is smoke there must be Fire’ that Fire is said to be concomitant with smoke; there is however no such concomitance between the Word and the Thing (spoken of).” (1495)
kathaṃ nāstīti pratipādayann āha na tāvad iti /	Question: Why is there no such concomitance? Answer: [see verse 1496 next]
na tāvat tatra deśe 'sau na tat kāle ca gamyate /	“It does not exist at the place (where the word is); nor at the time.
bhavennityavibhutvāccet sarvaśabdeṣu tat samam //	If it he urged that the required concomitance would be there in view of the eternality and the all-pervasive character (of the word)”, then [the answer is that] that would be so with all words;
tena sarvatra dṛṣṭatvād vyatirekasya cāgateḥ /	and for that same reason the concomitance being perceived in all cases, there would be no idea of the negative concomitance at all;
sarvaśabdair aśeṣārthapratipattiḥ prasajyate //	and it would thus be possible for all words to provide the cognition of all things.” (1496-1497)
na tāvat tatra śabdākrānte deśe 'rthasya sadbhāvaḥ /	“The Thing (spoken of) does not exist at the place that is occupied by the Word;
tathā hi piṇḍakharjūrādiśabdo 'nyatra pāṭaliputrādau śrūyate, naca tatra	for instance, the word ‘Dates’ is heard in one place the city of Pāṭaliputra for instance, and yet the thing, the dates themselves do not exist there.
tathā nāpi śabdakāle 'rtho 'vaśyaṃ sambhavati dilīpamahāsammatādiśabdā vartamānās tadarthastu bhūto bhaviṣyaṃśceti kuto 'rthaiḥ śabdasyānvetṛtvam /	Nor again is the Thing necessarily present at the time that the word is present; for instance, the word ‘Dilīpa’ is present (uttered) now, while the person of that name lived long ago; and while the word ‘Mahāsammata’ is present now, what it denotes is to come in future. Under the circumstances, how can there be concomitance between words and the things denoted by them?
atha matam nityatvācchabdānāṃ sarvakālam avasthiter arthena saha na bhinnakālatā, nāpi bhinnadeśatā, vyāpitvāt sarvadeśeṣvavasthiteḥ, ato nityavibhutvād bhaved anvayaḥ śabdānām iti / tatra sarvaśabdeṣu tannityavibhutvaṃ tulyam iti kṛtvā pratiniyatena śabdena pratiniyatārthābhidhānaṃ na prāpnoti /	“The following might be urged ‘Words are eternal and as such exist at all times; so that things denoted by them cannot exist at a time other than that of the Word; nor can they exist at a place other than that occupied by the words, as being all-pervading in character, words are present at all places. Thus, by reason of their eternality and all-pervasive character, there would be concomitance between the Words and the Things denoted by them’.
kiṃ tarhiyena kenacicchabdena sarvasyaivārthasyābhidhānaṃ syāt, tenārthena saha sarvatra deśe kāle vā sarvaśabdasya dṛṣṭatvāt /	and hence it should not be the case that particular words should denote particular things only; in fact, any single word should denote all things, as all things would be present at the place and at the time at which the Word is present.
vyatirekaḥ sādhyābhāve sādhanābhāvaḥ tasya /	‘The negative concomitance i.e. the absence of the Probans wherever there is absence of the Probandum.
agateriti anupalambhāt /	‘There would be no idea’ no apprehension;
nityavibhutvād eva //	for the same reason that words are eternal and all-pervading.
tasmād ananumānatvaṃ śābde pratyakṣavad bhavet / trairūpyarahitatvena tādṛgviṣayavarjanāt //	Thus the verbal cognition is not-inference because it is devoid of the three features; like sense-perception; as is shown by the absence of an object like that.” (1498)
tasmād ityupasaṃhṛtya pramāṇaṃ darśayati /	Recapitulating the arguments, the Opponent formulates his case as follows: [see verse 1498 above]
ananumānatvaṃ śābda iti sādhyanirdeśaḥ / trairūpyarahitatveneti hetuḥ /	“The Proposition of his Reasoning is ‘The Verbal Cognition is not-Inference;’ ‘because it is devoid of the three features’ is the statement of the Probans (Minor Premiss);
pratyakṣavad iti dṛṣṭāntaḥ / tādṛgviṣayavarjanād iti hetusamarthanam /	‘like Sense-perception’ is the Corroborative Instance. And ‘as is shown by the absence of an object like that’ is said in support of the Minor Premiss;
yādṛśo dhūmādiliṅgajasyānumānasya viṣayo dharmaviśiṣṭo dharmī tena tādṛśā viṣayeṇa varjanāt rahitatvād iti yāvat //	what is meant by this is that the object of the Inference brought about by the Inferential Indicative like Smoke is the Subject as endowed with the particular property (Probandum), and any such object is absent in the case of Verbal Cognition.” (1498)
bhavatu nāma trairūpyarahitatvād anumānād anyatvaṃ, prāmāṇyaṃ tvasya śabdasya katham ity āha agnihotretyādi /	“Inasmuch as the words speaking of the agnihotra and other things bring about unshakeable cognitions, the character of being eight cognition cannot be denied to them.” (1499) Says the Opponent ‘Not having the Three-features, Verbal Cognition may not be Inference;
[p.436]	The answer is as follows: [see verse 1499 above]
agnihotrādivacanād akampajñānajanmataḥ / tat pramāṇatvam apyasya nirākartuṃ na pāryate //	The cognition is ‘unshakeable’ by reason of its being free from doubt and error; that is, it is Eight Cognition because there is no Right Cognition sublating it;
bādhakapramāṇābhāvāt pramāṇaṃ pratyakṣādivad iti yāvat /	just in the same way as Sense-perception is Right Cognition.
tathā cāha śabarasvāmī na ca svargakāmo yajetetyato vacanāt sandigdhamavagamyate bhavati svargo na vā bhavatīti /	Says Śabarasvāmin (in his Bhāṣya on Sū. 5) “The cognition derived from the statement ‘Desiring Heaven one should offer the Agnihotra’ is not a doubtful one, it leaves us in no doubt as to whether Heaven is to be attained or not;
na ca niścitamavagamyamānam idaṃ mithyā syāt, yo hi janitvā pradhvaṃsate naitad evam iti sa mithyāpratyayaḥ, nacaiṣa deśāntare kālāntare puruṣāntare viparyeti, tasmād avitathaḥ /	and when this is cognised with certainty, it cannot be wrong; it is only when the cognition, after having come about, becomes subîated by the subsequent idea that ‘it is not so’, that it can be called wrong cognition; the cognition in question however is never, at any time or at any place, found to be otherwise; hence it must be true.
yat tu laukikaṃ vacanaṃ taccetpratyayitāt puruṣādindriyaviṣayaṃ, vā tadavitatham eva /	As regards the assertion of the common people, if it comes from a trusted person, or if it pertains to what is actually perceived by the Senses, then it is certainly true;
athāpratyayitādatīndriyaviṣayaṃ vā tatpuruṣabuddhiprabhavamapramāṇam aśakyaṃ hi puruṣamātreṇa jñātum iti //	if, on the other hand, it emanates from an untrustworthy person, or it relates to something beyond the reach of the Senses, then having its source in a human being, it cannot be regarded as right; because such a thing cannot be rightly known by human beings by themselves”.
tatretyādinā taccākartṛkato vākyādityetasmin prathame śābde lakṣaṇe 'sambhavitāṃ lakṣaṇadoṣam āha tatrākartṛkavākyasya sambhavārthāvasaṅgatau / tasmād asambhavi proktaṃ prathamaṃ śābdalakṣaṇam //	As regards the ‘eternal sentence’, its possibility and expressiveness (usefulness) are both improbable; hence the first definition of ‘verbal cognition’ is an ‘impossible’ one. In the following Text, the author proceeds to show that the definition of Verbal Cognition propounded in Text 1489, as ‘that Cognition which is derived from the eternal sentence’, is open to the charge of being ‘impossible’: [see verse 1500 above]
akartṛkasya hi vākyasya sambhavo nāstyeva, vyāpinaḥ kṣaṇabhaṅgasya sādhitatvāt /	There is no possibility of there being an ‘eternal sentence’, because it has been established that all things are in perpetual flux;
vakṣyamāṇayuktyā vā /	also because of the reasons that are going to be adduced.
satyapi vā sambhave na tasyārthavattvaṃ sambhavati, ato 'kartṛkādvacanāt parokṣo 'rtho 'yaṃ jñāta ityasyāsambhavād asambhavi pramāṇalakṣaṇam //	Even if such ‘eternal Sentence’ were possible, it could not convey a meaning (and serve any useful purpose). Hence the statement that “Through the eternal Sentence imperceptible things become known” is impossible; hence the proposed definition is an ‘impossible’ one.
kathaṃ punar akartṛkaṃ vākyaṃ nāstītyāha śaktetyādi /	The sentence may be ‘capable’ or ‘incapable’;
śaktāśaktasvabhāvasya sarvadā hyanuvartanāt / tadā tadbhāvivijñānaṃ bhaven no vā kadācana //	in either case, as the character would be always there, the cognition resulting therefrom would come about (always); or it would not come about at all. Question: “Why can there be no eternal Sentence?”
tatrākartṛkaṃ vākyaṃ śaktaṃ vā syāt jñānajanane, kadācid aśaktaṃ veti	The ‘eternal Sentence’ may be ‘capable’ of bringing about the cognition, or ‘incapable’ at times;
pakṣadvayam /	these two alternatives are possible.
prathame pakṣe tasya śaktasya svabhāvasyānuvartanānnityaṃ tadbhāvivijñānamprāpnoti /	In the former case, as the said ‘capability’ would be always there, the Cognition resulting from it would be always there.
tatra prayogaḥ yadapratibaddhasāmarthyaṃ yasmin kartavye, tat karotyeva, yathāntyā kāraṇasāmagrī, apratibaddhasāmarthyaṃ cākartṛkaṃ vākyaṃ jñānajanane sarvakālam iti svabhāvahetuḥ / athavā yadavikalakāraṇaṃ tadbhavatyeva yathāvikalakāraṇo 'ṅkuraḥ, avikalakāraṇaṃ cāpauruṣeyavākyabhāvivijñānam iti svabhāvahetuḥ /	This argument may be formulated as follows: When a thing has its capacity to produce something unobstructed, it must always produce that thing, as for example, the final causal conditions, the eternal Sentence has its capacity to produce verbal cognition unobstructed at all times, hence this is a Reason based upon the very nature of the thing. Or it may be formulated as follows: That effect whose cause is present in its perfect condition must come about, e.g. the sprout, whose cause (in the shape of the seed, the soil and the requisite moisture) is present in its perfect condition; the Cognition resulting from the eternal Sentence has its cause always present in its perfect condition;
dvitīye 'pi pakṣe tasyāśaktasya svabhāvasya sarvakālamanuvartanāc ca na kadācit tadbhāvi vijñānaṃ syāt, yathā vikalakāraṇo 'ṅkuraḥ //	Under the other alternative that the eternal Sentence is incapable (of bringing about cognition), as the said ‘incapability’ would be there always, any cognition resulting from it would never come about at all, just like the sprout whose cause is imperfect.
dveṣyamohādayo doṣā yathā mithyātvahetavaḥ / kṛpāprajñādayo 'pyevaṃ jñātāḥ satyatvahetavaḥ //	Just as hatred, delusion, etc. are known to be sources of error, so are compassion, wisdom, etc. known to be sources of truthfulness.
tadāśrayanarābhāve na tayor api sambhavaḥ /	where, then, there is no person as the source, these two also cannot be there.
ānarthyakyamataḥ prāptaṃ vacasyyapuruṣāśraye //	consequently the sentence that does not emanate from a person must be inexpressive (useless).
dvābhyāṃ prakārābhyām arthavattā bhavati, {aviparītārtatvena} viparītārthatvena vā, tṛtīyarāśyabhāvāt /	Answer: [see verses 1502-1503 above] A verbal cognition can serve a useful purpose in two ways: either by representing things as they are, or by representing things as they are not; no third way is possible;
tasyāś ca buddher dviprakārāyā apyarthavattāyā guṇadoṣau kāraṇam ityanvayavyatirekābhyāṃ niścitam /	the use of both these kinds of Cognition have their source in good and bad qualities, as ascertained by positive and negative concomitance.
tathā hi yathā rāgādidoṣaparītapuruṣo mṛṣāvādī dṛṣṭas tathā kṛpādiguṇayuktaḥ satyavāgdṛṣṭaḥ /	For instance, the man who is beset with Love, Hatred and other bad qualities is found to say things that are not true, while one who is endowed with Compassion and other good qualities is found to say what is true;
tayoś ca guṇadoṣayoḥ samyaktvamithyātvahetvorāśrayaḥ puruṣaḥ, tataś ca puruṣanivṛttau guṇadoṣanivṛttiḥ guṇadoṣanivṛttau samyaktvamithyātvayor apyabhāvaḥ,	the receptacle of both these qualities good and bad which are the sources of truth and falsehood, is always a Person; hence where there is no Person, there can be no good or bad qualities; and when the good and bad qualities are not there, there can be no Truth or Falsehood;
tadabhāve prakārāntarāsāmbhavād ānarthakyam apauruṣeye vacasi prāptam /	and as there is no third alternative possible, the statement that does not emanate from a Person can serve no purpose at all;
kāraṇābhāvāt /	as the cause is not there;
nahi kāraṇamantareṇa kāryasya sambhavo yuktaḥ, nirhetutvaprasaṅgāt /	and when the cause is not there, there can be no effect; if it were, it would be causeless;
tataś ca deśakāladravyādiniyamo na syāt /	and in that case there could be no restriction of Place, Time, etc. in regard to such effects
prasaṅgasādhanam etad draṣṭavyam /	This argument is to be taken as a Reductio ad absurdum;
anyathā hi svātantryeṇa sādhane dṛṣṭavirodhaḥ syāt /	otherwise, if it were meant to be really true, then it would be contrary to perceptible facts;
tathā hi ---"agnihotraṃ juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ" ityādivākyād arthapratītir bhavantyupalabhyata eva, naca dṛṣṭamapohnotuṃ śakyate /	because such sentences as ‘One desiring Heaven should offer the Agnihotra’ are actually found to convey a definite meaning; and what is actually perceived cannot be denied.
nacākartṛkatvamubhayasiddham ityasiddhaś ca hetuḥ syāt /	Further, the fact that the sentence is eternal is not admitted by both parties; hence the Reason is ‘Inadmissible’.
prasaṅgasādhane tu dvayam apy aduṣṭam /	Stated in the form of a Reductio ad Absurdum, both the arguments are flawless.
tathā hi yady apauruṣeyatvamabhyupagamyate vedasya tadānarthakyam abhyupagantavyam /	For instance, if the Veda is held to be ‘without a Personal Author’, then it must be meaningless (and useless);
arthavattvahetoḥ puruṣasyābhāvāt /	as the basis of expressiveness, in the shape of the Reason, is not there;
nacānarthakyam, ataḥ syāt pauruṣeya eveti prasaṅgena pradarśyate //	and yet, it is not meaningless; hence it must have a Personal Author; this is the contingency that is shown by the Reductio ad Absurdum (1502-1503)
etad eva prasaṅgasādhanaṃ samarthayituṃ dṛṣṭavirodhābhāvaṃ pratipādayannāśaṅkāpūrvakam āha arthetyādi / arthapratītito no cedeṣā vyākhyānato bhavet /	In order to further support this Reductio ad Absurdum, and to refute the charge of being contrary to a perceived fact, the author anticipates and answers an objection: [see verses 1504-1507 next] If it be urged that “a certain meaning is actually comprehended from words, hence they cannot be inexpressive or useless”, then (the answer is that) such comprehension can only be derived from explanations provided;
svatantro hi pumān dṛṣṭo vyācakṣāṇo 'rthamicchayā //	and in the matter of explanations, it is found that the expounder is free to explain things as he likes.
bhūtārthadyotane śaktiḥ prakṛtyaiva sthitāsya cet /	It might be argued that “the word, by its very nature, has the potency to denote well-established things”.
ajñātasamayasyāpi bhaved arthagatis tataḥ //	In that case, its meaning would be comprehended also by one who has no knowledge of the convention (bearing upon the word and its denotation).
prakṛtyā dīpako dīpo na saṅketamapekṣate /	Further, the lamp, which is illuminative by its very nature, does not need a convention (in illumining things).
samayāntarabhāve ca tasmād arthāntare gatiḥ //	Lastly, as there is another convention also (bearing upon the same word), there could be no comprehension of that other thing from that same word.
nahi saṅketabhāve 'pi dīpo gandharasādikam /	Even though there be a convention, the lamp cannot manifest odour, taste, etc.

āha nanvityādi /

‘He’ i.e. the Speaker.

nanu śabdapramāṇādipramāṇāntarasambhavāt /

‘Tena’ by means of the Inference consisting of the verbal statement.

nirdiṣṭaṃ lakṣaṇaṃ kasmād dvayor eva pramāṇayoḥ //

“Inasmuch as there are other means or forms of knowledge, in the shape of verbal cognition and others, why has the definition of only two such means been provided?”

anenāvyāpitāṃ pramāṇalakṣaṇasya doṣaṃ pramādvitayaniścitamityatra dvitayāvadhāraṇavaiphalyaṃ cāha //

What the Opponent means to do by this is (1) to point out that the definition provided is ‘too narrow’, and (2) to indicate that what has been asserted (under Text 3) regarding Truth ‘being ascertained by the two Means or Forms of Knowledge’ is futile.

ucyata ityādinā pariharati /

The answer to this is provided in the following [see verse 1488 next]

ucyate na dvayād anyatpramāṇamupapadyate / pramāṇalakṣaṇāyogād yoge cāntargamādiha //

“Inasmuch as there are other means or forms of knowledge, in the shape of verbal cognition and others, why has the definition of only two such means been provided?”

antargamād iheti /

The Opponent (of the Buddhist) urges the following objection: [see verse 1487 above]

asminneva pramāṇadvaye / etad uktaṃ bhavati pramāṇadvayādanyasya pramāṇalakṣaṇamavisaṃvāditvaṃ nā

What the Opponent means to do by this is (1) to point out that the definition provided is ‘too narrow’, and (2) to indicate that what has been asserted (under Text 3) regarding Truth ‘being ascertained by the two Means or Forms of Knowledge’ is futile.

styeva, sati cātraivāntarbhāvāt pṛthaṅnocyate pramāṇāntaram iti // tatra kathamanyeṣām aprāmāṇyaṃ prāmāṇye vā katham ihāntarbhāva ityetad

The reply to this is as follows: in fact, there cannot be any form of cognition except the two (already described); because all the others that have been postulated either do not possess the character of the ‘form of right cognition’, or are included in these two.

dvayaṃ pratipādayati /

‘Included in these’, i.e. in the two Forms of Cognition already described.

atra śabdopamārthāpattyabhāvayuktyanupalabdhisambhavaitihyapratibhākhyātipramāṇāntarāṇi parair abhyupagatāni /

What is meant is as follows: The characteristic of Valid Knowledge is that it should be in conformity with the real state of things; and this is not present at all in any of the others that have been postulated;

tatra śabdamadhikṛtyāha śabdajñānād ityādi / śabdajñānāt parokṣārthajñānaṃ śābdaṃ pare jaguḥ / taccākartṛkato vākyāt tathā pratyayinoditāt //

Other people have declared ‘verbal cognition’ to be “that knowledge of imperceptible things which is derived from words”; and [they provide the following account of it], “that cognition is derived from (a) the eternal sentence and from (b) the sentence uttered by a trustworthy person.

idaṃ ca kila nādhyakṣaṃ parokṣaviṣayatvataḥ / nānumānaṃ ca ghaṭate tallakṣaṇaviyogataḥ //

This cannot be ‘sense-perception’, because the object apprehended by it is beyond the reach of the senses; nor can it be ‘inference because it is devoid of the characteristic features of inference;

dharmī dharmaviśiṣṭo hi liṅgityetat suniścitam / na bhaved anumānaṃ ca yāvat tadviṣayaṃ na tat //

until the subject (minor term) is definitely known to be possessed of the probandum and also of the probans, it cannot be regarded as a case of ‘inference’ of that subject.

tatra śabarasvāmī śabdalakṣaṇamāha śabdajñānād asannikṛṣṭe 'rthajñānaṃ śabdam iti / śabdasvalakṣaṇagrahaṇād uttarakālaṃ parokṣe 'rthe yadutpadyate jñānaṃ tacchabdādāgatam iti kṛtvā śābdapramāṇam /

5) has provided the following definition of Verbal Cognition: “That cognition of things not within reach of the senses which proceeds from the cognition of words is called Verbal”; which means that the Specific Individuality of the word having been apprehended, the cognition that follows after that, in regard to things beyond the reach of the Senses, is called Verbal Cognition, because it is derived from words.

tac ca dvividham / apauruṣeyaśabdajanitaṃ pratyayitapuruṣavākyajaṃ ca /

“This Verbal Cognition is of two kinds (1) Proceeding from words not emanating from human beings, and (2) Proceeding from the words of trustworthy persons.

etac ca pratyakṣād bhinnaṃ parokṣaviṣayatvāt /

This cognition is different, from Sense-perception, because the object apprehended by it is beyond the reach of the senses.

nāpyanumānaṃ trairūpyābhāvāt / tathā hi sādhyadharmaviśiṣṭo dharmī anumeya iṣyate, na kevalo nāpi dharmamātram, yāvac ca taddharmitvena dharmiviṣayaṃ liṅgaṃ nāvadhāryate na tāvad

Nor is it Inference; as it is devoid of the ‘three features For instance, the object of Inferential Cognition is the Subject (Minor Term) which is qualified by the character that is sought to be proved (i.e. the Probandmn), not merely the Subject by itself, nor the character by itself; and until the Probans is definitely known as having the same character and as appertaining to the same Subject, the Inference cannot proceed.

yāvat pakṣadharmatvāvadhāraṇā na bhavati na tāvad anumānam iti yāvat //

That is to say, until the presence of the Probans in the Subject is definitely cognised with certainty, there can be no Inference”.

saiva pakṣadharmatvāvadhāraṇa kiṃ na bhavatītyāha yaśceti /

Question Why cannot this condition of the definite cognition of the Probans in the Subject be fulfilled in the case in question?

yaś cātra kalpyate dharmī prameyo 'sya sa eva ca /

“In the case in question (i.e. in verbal cognition) that which would be regarded as the subject forms the object cognised itself;

nacānavadhṛte tasmiṃs taddharmatvāvadhāraṇā //

and unless this is cognised, there can be no idea of any character (probans) belonging to it.” (1492)

yaścātra śābde kalpyate vṛkṣādidharmī sa eva prameyas tasyaiva pratipādyatvāt /

“In the case of Verbal Cognition, anything, in the shape of the Tree and such things, that may be assumed to be the Subject, forms the object cognised itself;

dharmyevātra prameyo na dharmaviśiṣṭo dharmīti yāvat /

as that is what is expressed by the word. That is to say, in this ease, the Subject itself and not the Subject as qualified by the Probandun, is the object cognised;

tasmin dharmiṇi anavadhṛte aniścite kathaṃ tad dharmatvaṃ niścīyate //

and so long as the said Subject has not been definitely cognised, how can there be any definite cognition of any character as belonging to it?” (1492)

prāk sa cetpakṣadharmatvād gṛhītaḥ kiṃ tataḥ param / pakṣadharmādibhir jñātair yena syād anumānatā //

“And if the subject has already been cognised, prior to the recognition of the probans in the subject (i.e. the minor premiss) then what is the use of knowing that the probans subsists in it and so forth, by virtue of which the cognition could be regarded as inference?” (1493)

kiṃ ca yadi cāsau dharmī pakṣadharmatvaniścayāt prāgjñātas tadā niṣpha laḥ pakṣadharmatvādiniścaye prayatnaḥ, dharmipratipattyartho hi sarvaḥ, prayāsaḥsa cet pratipannaḥ kimidānīṃ pakṣadharmatvādinirūpaṇaprayāsena /

“Then again, if the Subject has been cognised before the recognition of the Minor Premiss, then all attempt to obtain the recognition of this latter would be futile; because the purpose of the whole attempt is to secure the cognition of the Subject; hence, if that has been cognised, what would be the use in trying to know of the presence of the Probans in the Subject?”

abhyupagamya caitad abhihitam /

What has been stated is on the basis of taking it for granted that what the opponent has asserted is true.

naca śabdo vṛkṣāder dharmiṇo dharmaḥ, vaktṛdeśe 'vadhāryamāṇatvāt //

As a matter of fact, the Word is not a property of any Such Subject as the Tree; as it is always found in the place where the Speaker is.

anvayo na ca śabdasya prameyeṇa nirūpyate /

“Nor cast the concomitance of the word with the object inferred (probandum) be ascertained;

vyāpāreṇa hi sarveṣām anvetṛtvaṃ pratīyate //

the concomitance of all things is recognised only by their functioning.” (1494)

nirūpyata iti / niścīyate /

‘Ascertained’‘ recognised with certainty.

sadbhāvena sattayeti yāvat / etaduktaṃ bhavati vidyamānasyaivānvetṛtvaṃ nāvidyamānasyeti //

‘By their functioning’, i.e. by existence, by being present. What is meant is that it is only what exists that can be concomitant, not what does not exist.

[p.435] etad eva darśayann āha yatretyādi /

The same idea is further elucidated: [see verse 1495 next]

yatra dhūmo 'sti tatrāgner astitvenānvayaḥ sphuṭam /

“It is only when the eire exists whenever there is smoke that its concomitance is clearly perceived.

natvevaṃ yatra śabdo 'sti tatrārtho 'stīti niścitam //

in the case in question however, there is no such certain idea as that ‘the thing spoken of exists wherever the word exists’.” (1495)

yatra dhūmas tatrāvaśyaṃ yato vahnirityato 'sau vahniranvetā bhavati, dhūmasyanatvevaṃ śabdasyārthenānvayaḥ //

“It is because of the well-recognised fact that ‘wherever there is smoke there must be Fire’ that Fire is said to be concomitant with smoke; there is however no such concomitance between the Word and the Thing (spoken of).” (1495)

kathaṃ nāstīti pratipādayann āha na tāvad iti /

Question: Why is there no such concomitance? Answer: [see verse 1496 next]

na tāvat tatra deśe 'sau na tat kāle ca gamyate /

“It does not exist at the place (where the word is); nor at the time.

bhavennityavibhutvāccet sarvaśabdeṣu tat samam //

If it he urged that the required concomitance would be there in view of the eternality and the all-pervasive character (of the word)”, then [the answer is that] that would be so with all words;

tena sarvatra dṛṣṭatvād vyatirekasya cāgateḥ /

and for that same reason the concomitance being perceived in all cases, there would be no idea of the negative concomitance at all;

sarvaśabdair aśeṣārthapratipattiḥ prasajyate //

and it would thus be possible for all words to provide the cognition of all things.” (1496-1497)

na tāvat tatra śabdākrānte deśe 'rthasya sadbhāvaḥ /

“The Thing (spoken of) does not exist at the place that is occupied by the Word;

tathā hi piṇḍakharjūrādiśabdo 'nyatra pāṭaliputrādau śrūyate, naca tatra

for instance, the word ‘Dates’ is heard in one place the city of Pāṭaliputra for instance, and yet the thing, the dates themselves do not exist there.

tathā nāpi śabdakāle 'rtho 'vaśyaṃ sambhavati dilīpamahāsammatādiśabdā vartamānās tadarthastu bhūto bhaviṣyaṃśceti kuto 'rthaiḥ śabdasyānvetṛtvam /

Nor again is the Thing necessarily present at the time that the word is present; for instance, the word ‘Dilīpa’ is present (uttered) now, while the person of that name lived long ago; and while the word ‘Mahāsammata’ is present now, what it denotes is to come in future. Under the circumstances, how can there be concomitance between words and the things denoted by them?

atha matam nityatvācchabdānāṃ sarvakālam avasthiter arthena saha na bhinnakālatā, nāpi bhinnadeśatā, vyāpitvāt sarvadeśeṣvavasthiteḥ, ato nityavibhutvād bhaved anvayaḥ śabdānām iti / tatra sarvaśabdeṣu tannityavibhutvaṃ tulyam iti kṛtvā pratiniyatena śabdena pratiniyatārthābhidhānaṃ na prāpnoti /

“The following might be urged ‘Words are eternal and as such exist at all times; so that things denoted by them cannot exist at a time other than that of the Word; nor can they exist at a place other than that occupied by the words, as being all-pervading in character, words are present at all places. Thus, by reason of their eternality and all-pervasive character, there would be concomitance between the Words and the Things denoted by them’.

kiṃ tarhiyena kenacicchabdena sarvasyaivārthasyābhidhānaṃ syāt, tenārthena saha sarvatra deśe kāle vā sarvaśabdasya dṛṣṭatvāt /

and hence it should not be the case that particular words should denote particular things only; in fact, any single word should denote all things, as all things would be present at the place and at the time at which the Word is present.

vyatirekaḥ sādhyābhāve sādhanābhāvaḥ tasya /

‘The negative concomitance i.e. the absence of the Probans wherever there is absence of the Probandum.

agateriti anupalambhāt /

‘There would be no idea’ no apprehension;

nityavibhutvād eva //

for the same reason that words are eternal and all-pervading.

tasmād ananumānatvaṃ śābde pratyakṣavad bhavet / trairūpyarahitatvena tādṛgviṣayavarjanāt //

Thus the verbal cognition is not-inference because it is devoid of the three features; like sense-perception; as is shown by the absence of an object like that.” (1498)

tasmād ityupasaṃhṛtya pramāṇaṃ darśayati /

Recapitulating the arguments, the Opponent formulates his case as follows: [see verse 1498 above]

ananumānatvaṃ śābda iti sādhyanirdeśaḥ / trairūpyarahitatveneti hetuḥ /

“The Proposition of his Reasoning is ‘The Verbal Cognition is not-Inference;’ ‘because it is devoid of the three features’ is the statement of the Probans (Minor Premiss);

pratyakṣavad iti dṛṣṭāntaḥ / tādṛgviṣayavarjanād iti hetusamarthanam /

‘like Sense-perception’ is the Corroborative Instance. And ‘as is shown by the absence of an object like that’ is said in support of the Minor Premiss;

yādṛśo dhūmādiliṅgajasyānumānasya viṣayo dharmaviśiṣṭo dharmī tena tādṛśā viṣayeṇa varjanāt rahitatvād iti yāvat //

what is meant by this is that the object of the Inference brought about by the Inferential Indicative like Smoke is the Subject as endowed with the particular property (Probandum), and any such object is absent in the case of Verbal Cognition.” (1498)

bhavatu nāma trairūpyarahitatvād anumānād anyatvaṃ, prāmāṇyaṃ tvasya śabdasya katham ity āha agnihotretyādi /

“Inasmuch as the words speaking of the agnihotra and other things bring about unshakeable cognitions, the character of being eight cognition cannot be denied to them.” (1499) Says the Opponent ‘Not having the Three-features, Verbal Cognition may not be Inference;

[p.436]

The answer is as follows: [see verse 1499 above]

agnihotrādivacanād akampajñānajanmataḥ / tat pramāṇatvam apyasya nirākartuṃ na pāryate //

The cognition is ‘unshakeable’ by reason of its being free from doubt and error; that is, it is Eight Cognition because there is no Right Cognition sublating it;

bādhakapramāṇābhāvāt pramāṇaṃ pratyakṣādivad iti yāvat /

just in the same way as Sense-perception is Right Cognition.

tathā cāha śabarasvāmī na ca svargakāmo yajetetyato vacanāt sandigdhamavagamyate bhavati svargo na vā bhavatīti /

Says Śabarasvāmin (in his Bhāṣya on Sū. 5) “The cognition derived from the statement ‘Desiring Heaven one should offer the Agnihotra’ is not a doubtful one, it leaves us in no doubt as to whether Heaven is to be attained or not;

na ca niścitamavagamyamānam idaṃ mithyā syāt, yo hi janitvā pradhvaṃsate naitad evam iti sa mithyāpratyayaḥ, nacaiṣa deśāntare kālāntare puruṣāntare viparyeti, tasmād avitathaḥ /

and when this is cognised with certainty, it cannot be wrong; it is only when the cognition, after having come about, becomes subîated by the subsequent idea that ‘it is not so’, that it can be called wrong cognition; the cognition in question however is never, at any time or at any place, found to be otherwise; hence it must be true.

yat tu laukikaṃ vacanaṃ taccetpratyayitāt puruṣādindriyaviṣayaṃ, vā tadavitatham eva /

As regards the assertion of the common people, if it comes from a trusted person, or if it pertains to what is actually perceived by the Senses, then it is certainly true;

athāpratyayitādatīndriyaviṣayaṃ vā tatpuruṣabuddhiprabhavamapramāṇam aśakyaṃ hi puruṣamātreṇa jñātum iti //

if, on the other hand, it emanates from an untrustworthy person, or it relates to something beyond the reach of the Senses, then having its source in a human being, it cannot be regarded as right; because such a thing cannot be rightly known by human beings by themselves”.

tatretyādinā taccākartṛkato vākyādityetasmin prathame śābde lakṣaṇe 'sambhavitāṃ lakṣaṇadoṣam āha tatrākartṛkavākyasya sambhavārthāvasaṅgatau / tasmād asambhavi proktaṃ prathamaṃ śābdalakṣaṇam //

As regards the ‘eternal sentence’, its possibility and expressiveness (usefulness) are both improbable; hence the first definition of ‘verbal cognition’ is an ‘impossible’ one. In the following Text, the author proceeds to show that the definition of Verbal Cognition propounded in Text 1489, as ‘that Cognition which is derived from the eternal sentence’, is open to the charge of being ‘impossible’: [see verse 1500 above]

akartṛkasya hi vākyasya sambhavo nāstyeva, vyāpinaḥ kṣaṇabhaṅgasya sādhitatvāt /

There is no possibility of there being an ‘eternal sentence’, because it has been established that all things are in perpetual flux;

vakṣyamāṇayuktyā vā /

also because of the reasons that are going to be adduced.

satyapi vā sambhave na tasyārthavattvaṃ sambhavati, ato 'kartṛkādvacanāt parokṣo 'rtho 'yaṃ jñāta ityasyāsambhavād asambhavi pramāṇalakṣaṇam //

Even if such ‘eternal Sentence’ were possible, it could not convey a meaning (and serve any useful purpose). Hence the statement that “Through the eternal Sentence imperceptible things become known” is impossible; hence the proposed definition is an ‘impossible’ one.

kathaṃ punar akartṛkaṃ vākyaṃ nāstītyāha śaktetyādi /

The sentence may be ‘capable’ or ‘incapable’;

śaktāśaktasvabhāvasya sarvadā hyanuvartanāt / tadā tadbhāvivijñānaṃ bhaven no vā kadācana //

in either case, as the character would be always there, the cognition resulting therefrom would come about (always); or it would not come about at all. Question: “Why can there be no eternal Sentence?”

tatrākartṛkaṃ vākyaṃ śaktaṃ vā syāt jñānajanane, kadācid aśaktaṃ veti

The ‘eternal Sentence’ may be ‘capable’ of bringing about the cognition, or ‘incapable’ at times;

pakṣadvayam /

these two alternatives are possible.

prathame pakṣe tasya śaktasya svabhāvasyānuvartanānnityaṃ tadbhāvivijñānamprāpnoti /

In the former case, as the said ‘capability’ would be always there, the Cognition resulting from it would be always there.

tatra prayogaḥ yadapratibaddhasāmarthyaṃ yasmin kartavye, tat karotyeva, yathāntyā kāraṇasāmagrī, apratibaddhasāmarthyaṃ cākartṛkaṃ vākyaṃ jñānajanane sarvakālam iti svabhāvahetuḥ / athavā yadavikalakāraṇaṃ tadbhavatyeva yathāvikalakāraṇo 'ṅkuraḥ, avikalakāraṇaṃ cāpauruṣeyavākyabhāvivijñānam iti svabhāvahetuḥ /

This argument may be formulated as follows: When a thing has its capacity to produce something unobstructed, it must always produce that thing, as for example, the final causal conditions, the eternal Sentence has its capacity to produce verbal cognition unobstructed at all times, hence this is a Reason based upon the very nature of the thing. Or it may be formulated as follows: That effect whose cause is present in its perfect condition must come about, e.g. the sprout, whose cause (in the shape of the seed, the soil and the requisite moisture) is present in its perfect condition; the Cognition resulting from the eternal Sentence has its cause always present in its perfect condition;

dvitīye 'pi pakṣe tasyāśaktasya svabhāvasya sarvakālamanuvartanāc ca na kadācit tadbhāvi vijñānaṃ syāt, yathā vikalakāraṇo 'ṅkuraḥ //

Under the other alternative that the eternal Sentence is incapable (of bringing about cognition), as the said ‘incapability’ would be there always, any cognition resulting from it would never come about at all, just like the sprout whose cause is imperfect.

dveṣyamohādayo doṣā yathā mithyātvahetavaḥ / kṛpāprajñādayo 'pyevaṃ jñātāḥ satyatvahetavaḥ //

Just as hatred, delusion, etc. are known to be sources of error, so are compassion, wisdom, etc. known to be sources of truthfulness.

tadāśrayanarābhāve na tayor api sambhavaḥ /

where, then, there is no person as the source, these two also cannot be there.

ānarthyakyamataḥ prāptaṃ vacasyyapuruṣāśraye //

consequently the sentence that does not emanate from a person must be inexpressive (useless).

dvābhyāṃ prakārābhyām arthavattā bhavati, {aviparītārtatvena} viparītārthatvena vā, tṛtīyarāśyabhāvāt /

Answer: [see verses 1502-1503 above] A verbal cognition can serve a useful purpose in two ways: either by representing things as they are, or by representing things as they are not; no third way is possible;

tasyāś ca buddher dviprakārāyā apyarthavattāyā guṇadoṣau kāraṇam ityanvayavyatirekābhyāṃ niścitam /

the use of both these kinds of Cognition have their source in good and bad qualities, as ascertained by positive and negative concomitance.

tathā hi yathā rāgādidoṣaparītapuruṣo mṛṣāvādī dṛṣṭas tathā kṛpādiguṇayuktaḥ satyavāgdṛṣṭaḥ /

For instance, the man who is beset with Love, Hatred and other bad qualities is found to say things that are not true, while one who is endowed with Compassion and other good qualities is found to say what is true;

tayoś ca guṇadoṣayoḥ samyaktvamithyātvahetvorāśrayaḥ puruṣaḥ, tataś ca puruṣanivṛttau guṇadoṣanivṛttiḥ guṇadoṣanivṛttau samyaktvamithyātvayor apyabhāvaḥ,

the receptacle of both these qualities good and bad which are the sources of truth and falsehood, is always a Person; hence where there is no Person, there can be no good or bad qualities; and when the good and bad qualities are not there, there can be no Truth or Falsehood;

tadabhāve prakārāntarāsāmbhavād ānarthakyam apauruṣeye vacasi prāptam /

and as there is no third alternative possible, the statement that does not emanate from a Person can serve no purpose at all;

kāraṇābhāvāt /

as the cause is not there;

nahi kāraṇamantareṇa kāryasya sambhavo yuktaḥ, nirhetutvaprasaṅgāt /

and when the cause is not there, there can be no effect; if it were, it would be causeless;

tataś ca deśakāladravyādiniyamo na syāt /

and in that case there could be no restriction of Place, Time, etc. in regard to such effects

prasaṅgasādhanam etad draṣṭavyam /

This argument is to be taken as a Reductio ad absurdum;

anyathā hi svātantryeṇa sādhane dṛṣṭavirodhaḥ syāt /

otherwise, if it were meant to be really true, then it would be contrary to perceptible facts;

tathā hi ---"agnihotraṃ juhuyāt svargakāmaḥ" ityādivākyād arthapratītir bhavantyupalabhyata eva, naca dṛṣṭamapohnotuṃ śakyate /

because such sentences as ‘One desiring Heaven should offer the Agnihotra’ are actually found to convey a definite meaning; and what is actually perceived cannot be denied.

nacākartṛkatvamubhayasiddham ityasiddhaś ca hetuḥ syāt /

Further, the fact that the sentence is eternal is not admitted by both parties; hence the Reason is ‘Inadmissible’.

prasaṅgasādhane tu dvayam apy aduṣṭam /

Stated in the form of a Reductio ad Absurdum, both the arguments are flawless.

tathā hi yady apauruṣeyatvamabhyupagamyate vedasya tadānarthakyam abhyupagantavyam /

For instance, if the Veda is held to be ‘without a Personal Author’, then it must be meaningless (and useless);

arthavattvahetoḥ puruṣasyābhāvāt /

as the basis of expressiveness, in the shape of the Reason, is not there;

nacānarthakyam, ataḥ syāt pauruṣeya eveti prasaṅgena pradarśyate //

and yet, it is not meaningless; hence it must have a Personal Author; this is the contingency that is shown by the Reductio ad Absurdum (1502-1503)

etad eva prasaṅgasādhanaṃ samarthayituṃ dṛṣṭavirodhābhāvaṃ pratipādayannāśaṅkāpūrvakam āha arthetyādi / arthapratītito no cedeṣā vyākhyānato bhavet /

In order to further support this Reductio ad Absurdum, and to refute the charge of being contrary to a perceived fact, the author anticipates and answers an objection: [see verses 1504-1507 next] If it be urged that “a certain meaning is actually comprehended from words, hence they cannot be inexpressive or useless”, then (the answer is that) such comprehension can only be derived from explanations provided;

svatantro hi pumān dṛṣṭo vyācakṣāṇo 'rthamicchayā //

and in the matter of explanations, it is found that the expounder is free to explain things as he likes.

bhūtārthadyotane śaktiḥ prakṛtyaiva sthitāsya cet /

It might be argued that “the word, by its very nature, has the potency to denote well-established things”.

ajñātasamayasyāpi bhaved arthagatis tataḥ //

In that case, its meaning would be comprehended also by one who has no knowledge of the convention (bearing upon the word and its denotation).

prakṛtyā dīpako dīpo na saṅketamapekṣate /

Further, the lamp, which is illuminative by its very nature, does not need a convention (in illumining things).

samayāntarabhāve ca tasmād arthāntare gatiḥ //

Lastly, as there is another convention also (bearing upon the same word), there could be no comprehension of that other thing from that same word.

nahi saṅketabhāve 'pi dīpo gandharasādikam /

Even though there be a convention, the lamp cannot manifest odour, taste, etc.