buddhist-nlp/tatpa-noisy · Datasets at Hugging Face

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mithyājñānaṃ samānaṃ ca pūrvapakṣavyapekṣayā / iṣṭaghātakṛtā janyaṃ jñānamuktaṃ na vastutaḥ //	When the ‘wrong cognition’, as ‘subversive of what is desirable’, is spoken of as being ‘similar’, the ‘similarity’ meant must be only that of the view of the first party, and not real similarity;
vastusthityā hi tajjñānam avisaṃvādi niścitam /	because as regards the real state of things, the cognition in question has been definitely found to be not incompatible;
vādīṣṭaviparītasya pramāṇamata eva tat // ato viruddhatā hetor dṛṣṭānte cāpyasādhyatā /	in fact, it is in view of this fact that it is a valid argument against what is ‘desired’ by the disputant. Thus the reason adduced is found to be ‘contradictory’;
etenaiva prakāreṇa dvitīye hetvasiddhatā //	In the same way, in the second argument, the probans is ‘inadmissible’.
yato vādīṣṭaviparītasādhanāt tadapi pramāṇam eva, anyathā hi sādhyāntaramapekṣya sarvadaiva sarvasya yadyaprāmāṇyaṃ vyavasthāpyeta, pratyakṣe 'pi prasaṅgaḥ syāt /	As proving the contrary of what is desired by the disputant, the cognition in question must be valid; otherwise, if it were meant that all cognitions are invalid and at all times, in regard to another Probandum, then, such invalidity might affect Sense-perception also.
pūrvapakṣāpekṣayā tu tanmithyājñānam uktam na vastusthityā /	In fact, it has been spoken of as ‘wrong Cognition’, only in reference to the view of the First Party.
pūrvasya prathamavādinaḥ pakṣaḥ, pūrvapakṣaḥ tasya vyāpekṣeti vigrahaḥ/	The term ‘pūrvapakṣa’ here stands for the ‘pakṣa’, view of the ‘pūrva’, the First Party.
yo hyanādheyātiśayaikaparā{dā---}rthatvaṃ cakṣurādīnām icchati [p.429] tadabhiprāyāpekṣayā mithyājñānamucyate / anityānekavijñānādihetutvena cakṣurādīnāṃ siddhatvāt /	One who holds the view that the Eye and the rest appertain only to an object which is essentially incapable of any additional features imposed upon it, it is only in reference to the view of such a party that the Cognition could be spoken of as ‘wrong’; because (under that view) the Eye, etc, have been proved to be the Cause of many fleeting cognitions.
viruddhateti /	‘Contradictory’;
trirūpaliṅgapūrvatvasyāpramāṇe kvacid apyabhāvāt / pramāṇe tu tatraiveṣṭavighātakṛtā janye jñāne bhāvāt /	because the character of ‘being brought about by the Three-featured Indicative’ is never present in any invalid Cognition and when the cognition so brought about is valid, then the said character is present in that same Cognition which is ‘subversive of what is desired’ (by the Disputant).
nanu ca lokāyataṃ prati viruddhasādhane kartavye dṛṣṭānto na siddha eva /	Bays the Opponent: “When an argument to the contrary is urged against the Materialist, then the Corroborative Instance cannot be one that is admitted (by both parties).
nahīṣṭavighātakṛjjanyaṃ jñānaṃ pramāṇam icchati paraḥ, nacānyatarāsiddho dṛṣṭānto bhavati /	The opponent does not admit the validity of the Cognition of what is subversive of what is desired; and what is not admitted by either of the two parties cannot serve as a Corroborative Instance.
ya eva tūbhayaniścitavācī sa eva sādhanadūṣaṇam iti nyāya{yāt---} ucyate ---	In fact, the law is that what is equally admitted by both parties that alone can be cited against the argument of either party.”
yadyapipareṇātra prāmāṇyaṃ neṣṭaṃ vācā, tathāpyasaṃvāditvaṃ tvaśakyāpahnavatvādiṣṭam eva, tadicchatāṃ sāmarthyāt prāmāṇyam api tena vastusthityābhyupagantavyam iti vastubalaprakṛtyā viruddha udbhāvyate na parābhyupagamānurodhena /	The answer to this is as follows Though the other party has not actually admitted the validity of the cognition, in so many words, yet, the absence of incompatibility has to be accepted, as that cannot be denied; and those who accept that, have tacitly accepted the validity also, in so far as the real state of things is concerned; consequently, the ‘contradiction’ that we have urged is in regard to the real state of things, not in regard to the theory of the other party.
athavā viruddhahetusaṃsūcanād viruddhaḥ /	Or, the Opponent’s Reason may be regarded as ‘contradictory’ on the ground of being indicative of a contradictory Reason.
tatra viruddho hetuḥ yadavisaṃvādi tat pramāṇaṃ yathā pratyakṣaṃ, saṃvādi ca trirūpaliṅgajanyaṃ jñānam iti svabhāvahetuḥ /	For instance, the ‘contradictory’ Reason would be in the form ‘What is not incompatible is valid, e.g. Sense-perception, the cognition bro ught about by the t hree -featured Indicative is compatible; [hence it must be valid]’; this would be Reason based on the nature of the thing itself.
nacāsiddho niḥsvabhāvatvānihetutvaprasaṅgāt, pratyakṣāprāmāṇyaprasaṅgānnaikāntikaḥ /	The Reason here put forward cannot be ‘Inadmissible’, for, if it were not admitted, then the Subject would become featureless and there could be no Reason at all (indicative of validity).
asādhyateti /	‘Asādhyatā;
sādhyavikalateti yāvat /	i.e. the Instance would be devoid of the Probandum.
dvitīya iti /	‘In the second argument’;
na ca trairūpya ityādau / hetvasiddhateti /	i.e. in the argument “nor can the presence of three features, etc. etc.” (urged under Text 1458),
ananumāne kvacid apyabhāvāt /	because it is not present anywhere where the (valid) Inference is absent.,
etenaiveti / trirūpaliṅgetyādinā nyāyena //	‘In the same way’ i.e. by the reasoning based upon the presence of Three-features, etc. etc.
yattādātmyatadutpattyā sambandhaṃ pariniścitam / tadeva sādhanaṃ prāhuḥ siddhaye nyāyavādinaḥ //	Exponents of the true reasoning have all declared that that reason alone is capable of proving the conclusion whose relationship (with the probandum) is known with certainty, such relationship being either in the nature of sameness of essence or of being an effect;
anumānavirodhādirīdṛśe 'sti na sādhane /	and against such a probans, there can be no such defect as that of ‘being contrary to inference’ and so forth.
naiva taddhyātmahetubhyāṃ vinā sambhavati kvacit // parasparaviruddhau ca dharmau naikatra vastuni / yujyete sambhavo nāto viruddhāvyabhicāriṇaḥ //	Because no such inference could be possible except through essential sameness or being the cause. Mutually contradictory properties cannot belong to the same thing. Consequently there can be no possibility of any pbobans which might be concomitant with the contrary of the desired conclusion.
īdṛśa iti /	The following Text provides the answer to the argument urged (under 1459): [see verses 1472-1474 above]
tādātmyatadutpattipratibaddhe /	‘Against such a Probans’ i.e. in a Probans that is related through essential sameness and through being an effect.
ātmahetubhyām iti /	‘Except through essential sameness, or being the cause’;
svabhāvena kāraṇena ca vinā yathākramaṃ talliṅgaṃ na bhavati niḥsvabhāvatvanirhetutvaprasaṅgāt /	i.e. except through, being the same, or being the Cause, there can be no Probans (Inferential Indicative); if there were, it would be featureless and not a Probans at all.
yaduktam vivakṣitaḥ sādhyadharmo na dharmiviśeṣaṇam iti, tatra yadi sādhyadharmo na dharmiviśeṣaṇaṃ tadā samudāya eva nāstīti tataścaitat samudāyaikadeśatvādityasiddhau hetuḥ syāt /	It has been argued that “What is meant to be the Probandum is not present in the Subject (Minor Term) The answer to that is that, if the Probandum is not present in the Minor Term, then the aggregate (of the ‘Three features’) as a whole is not present in the Probans; hence on account of the absence of a part of the aggregate, such, a Probans would be clearly ‘inadmissible’.
yaccoktam sarvatrānumāne viśeṣaviruddhānāṃ sambhava iti tadayuktam /	It has been argued that “in the case of all Inferences, there is possibility of particular Inferences to the contrary”.
yataḥ sādhyaviparyayasādhanād viruddha iṣyate naca viśeṣaḥ sādhayitumiṣṭaḥ / vastubalapravṛttā [p.430] numāne viṣaye na viruddhāvyabhicārī ca sambhavati /	Because that alone is called ‘Contradictory’ which is found to prove the contrary of the desired Probandum; and no particular case is meant to be the Probandum (in the argument under dispute, which is in reference to the definition of Inference). As a matter of fact, in the case of an Inference based on the nature of things, there is no possibility of there being any (valid) Probans proving the contrary;
ekasmin dharmiṇi parasparaviruddhadharmadvayaprasaṅgāt //	because in the same thing, two mutually contradictory properties cannot coexist.
taduktamavasthādeśakālānām ityādi tatrāha abhyastetyādi /	As a matter of fact, inference proceeds only on the basis of things whose ‘indicative character’ has been properly ascertained by repeated experience;
anumāvṛttiranyā tu nānumetyabhidhīyate // avasthādeśakālānāṃ bhedād bhinnāsu śaktiṣu / bhāvānām anumānena nātaḥ siddhiḥ sudurlabhā //OO TS 1476	all else is regarded as ‘not inference so that even though the potencies of things vary according to the variations of condition, time and place, yet the cognition of things by means of inference is not unattainable.
yatnenānumito 'pyarthaḥ kuśalair anumātṛbhiḥ / nānyathā sādhyate so 'nyair abhiyuktatarair api //PP TS 1477	And when a certain conclusion has been deduced, with great care from an inference, it cannot be proved to be otherwise, even by cleverer persons. It has been argued (under 1470) that “on account of the diversity of Condition, Place and Time, etc. etc.”
supariniścitaṃ liṅgaṃ gamakam iṣyate na saṃdigdham, nahi dhūmo bāṣpādirūpeṇasandihyamāno vahner niścāyako bhavati /	It is only the well-ascertained Probans that is held to be truly indicative, not one that is doubtful; e.g. when the presence of Smoke is only suspected, in regard to Vapour, it does not lead to a certain Cognition of the presence of Fire.
liṅganiścaya eva katham iti cet /	Question: “How does the certainty of the Probans come about?”
yathā maṇirūpādiṣu tadvidām /	Answer By repeated experience: as is found in persons well-versed in the science of gems, in regard to gems.
tathā hi vivecayanty eva bāṣpādibhyo dhūmādīnabhyas tatatsvalakṣaṇāḥ / a{tha}vivecya pravṛttāścaite prāpnuvantyeva vahnim /	That is to say, persons who are conversant with the nature of the things concerned, do discern the real Smoke from Vapour: and when they proceed to act after discernment, they do actually find Fire.
tasmādyataḥ suvivecitaṃ liṅgaṃ na vyabhicarati, tenāvasthādibhedabhinnānāṃsiddhir na durlabhā /	Thus then, inasmuch as the well-discerned Probans is never found to fail, the cognition of things is not unattainable through such Probans, even though the things vary with variations of Condition, Place and Time.
nāpi suvivecitālliṅgāt pariniścito 'rtho 'nyathā śakyate kartum /	And when a thing has been well-ascertained by means of well-discerned Probans, it can never be made otherwise;
nahi dhūmāt supariniścitād anumitasya vahner anyathābhāvaḥ śakyate kartum, ekasya viruddhasvabhāvadvayāyogāt /	e.g. when the presence of Fire has been well-ascertained by means of the presence of Smoke, the Fire cannot be proved to be otherwise (i.e. absent); as one and the same thing cannot have two contradictory characters.
yaccoktam na devadatto bhārodvahanasamartha ityādi, yaccābhrapaṭalaṃ vahninā dahyata iti, talliṅgameva na bhavati, trairūpyābhāvāt /	It has been argued (in commentary on 1460, etc.) that “Devadatta is not capable of bearing a burden in his childhood, etc. etc., and the Fire burning the Abhrapaṭala, etc. etc”. But in all these cases, there is no proper Probans at all; as the ‘three features’ are not present.
nahyadarśanamātreṇa vipakṣāddhetor vyāvṛttiḥ śakyate kartum /	The mere fact of not being perceived cannot lead to the idea of the Probans being excluded from that where the Probandum is known to be absent;
yadāha ---"nacādarśanamātreṇa vipakṣād vyatirekitā" iti / kiṃ tarhi tādātmyatadutpattisambandhaniyamād avinābhāvaniyamaḥ /	as has been thus declared ‘Exclusion from that where the Probandum is known to be absent cannot follow from mere non-perception.’ In fact, the reality of Invariable Concomitance follows only from the presence of the relationship either of essential sameness or of being the effect;
"kāryakāraṇabhāvād vā svabhāvād vā niyāmakāt / avinābhāvaniyamo 'darśanān na na darśanāt" //	as has been thus declared ‘Either from the relationship of Cause and Effect, or on the restrictive nature of the thing concerned, there is definite Invariable Concomitance, and this follows from Perception, not from Non-perception’;
nacātra tādātmyatadutpattisambandho 'sti //	and in the case of the arguments cited, neither of the two relationships of essential sameness, or of being the effect is present.
na hi svabhāvaḥ kāryaṃ vā svabhāvāt kāraṇādṛte /	(a) there can be no nature (or character) without a nature (or character); (b) nor can there be effect without a cause.
bhedānimittatāprāptes te vināsti na cānumā //	The following might be urged “How is it known that the well-ascertained Probans never fails? There is no reason why this should bo so.”
dvividham eva hi liṅgaṃ yaduta svabhāvaḥ kāryam iti /	The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 1478 above] There are only two kinds of Probans (1) Nature of the thing and (2) Being an Effect;
anupalabdhes tu svabhāve 'nta [p.431] rbhāvaḥ / naca svabhāvakāraṇākhyena liṅginā vinā tayor liṅgayoḥ sambhavo 'sti, yena	‘non-apprehension’ being included under ‘Nature’, And these two kinds of Probans are not possible except where there is a Probandum, called ‘Nature’ and ‘Cause’, by reason of which there could be ‘fallibility’ (falsity) in the Probans.
kasmān na sambhava ity āha bhedānimittatāprāpteḥ bhedaścānimittatā ca tayoḥ prāptiḥ /	“Why is it not possible?” ‘Because otherwise, etc. etc.’, There is copulative compounding between ‘bheda’ and ‘animittatā’;
svabhāvahetor bhedo 'svabhāvatā prāpnoti, kāryahetor animittatvaṃ nirhetukatvaṃ prāpnoti, naca svabhāvakāryavyatirekeṇānyaliṅgamiṣṭamanyatrāpratibandhād avinābhāvāyogāt /	the sense is that the Probans which forms the Nature of the thing would cease to be its ‘nature’; and the Probans which is an effect would come to be without cause; and yet no Probans is admitted which forms neither the ‘nature’ nor the ‘effect’ (of the Probandum), except when there is no connection and when there is no Invariable Concomitance.
te vineti / svabhāvakārye /	‘Without these two’, i.e. as ‘nature’ and as ‘effect’.
dvivacanāntam etat //	The word has the Dual Ending.
yaduktaṃ parārtham anumānaṃ tu mānam iti tatrāha trirūpaliṅgetyādi / trirūpaliṅgavacasaḥ saktasaṃsūcakatvataḥ / yatparārthānumānatvam uktaṃ tacchrotrapekṣayā //	The statement of the three-featured probans has been described as ‘inference for the benefit of another’, on the ground of its being indicative of what is possible, with reference to the other person addressed. but this ‘inferential character’ can only be ‘secondary’ (figurative) and conventional.
saktasaṃsūcakatvena tena nātiprasajyate //	hence the fact of its being ‘indicative of what is possible’ cannot lead to any incongruity.
nānumānaṃ pramāṇaṃ ced viphalā vyāhatis tava /	if inference is not a means of right cognition, then your assertion is useless.
na kaścid api vādo hi vivakṣāṃ pratipadyate //	Indeed no disputant ever comprehends what you wish to speak of.
vacanasya yat parārthānumānatvamuktaṃ tacchrotrapekṣayā tena vaktrapekṣābhāvī doṣo na bhavati /	The statement (of the Inference) has been spoken of as ‘for another’s benefit’, in reference to the other person; hence it cannot be open to the objection urged against its being in reference to the speaker himself.
śrotrapekṣayāpi trirūpaliṅgasūcanād upacāreṇānumānakāraṇatvāt samayād vānumānatvam uktam /	Even in reference to the listener, the other person, as there is the setting forth of the three-featured Probans, and on that account, it leads to the Inference, or on account of Convention, it has been spoken of as ‘Inference’;
saktasaṃsūcaka evānumānasaṃjñāniveśāt /	this name ‘Inference’ being applicable only to what is indicative of what is possible.
tenendriyasyāvinābhāvitvasambandhajñānasya ca parārthānumānatvaprasaṅgād atiprasaṅgo na bhavati tayoḥ, saktasaṃsūcakatvābhāvāt /	Consequently, there can be no such incongruity as that of the Sense-organ, or the cognition of the relation of Invariable Concomitance, being regarded as ‘Inference for another’s benefit’; as in those cases, there is no ‘indication of what is possible’.
ata eva darśanamūlayoḥ saṃvidaḥ sakāśād asyā viśeṣaḥ /	It is for this same reason that this Inference differs from the cognition based upon actual Perception.
tathā hi darśanajñānena sākṣād dhūmāder liṅgasya pratītir na tu śrotrajñānena, tena hi śabda eva sākṣād gṛhyate, naca śabdo dhūmavad bāhyasyārthasya liṅgaṃ vivakṣāpratibaddhasya bāhyena sambandhāsiddheḥ /	For instance, the cognition of the Indicative, Smoke, is directly brought about by Visual Perception, not by Auditory Perception; as what is directly apprehended by the latter is the Word (uttered by the Man) only; and the Word is not the indicative of the external thing (Fire), in the way that Smoke is; because the Word is related to the speaker’s wish to speak (which is subjective), and hence it can have no relation (of invariable concomitance) with anything external (objective);
kevalaṃ tasya dhūmāder liṅgasya saṃsūcakatvena saṅketavaśāt tathādhyavasāyivikalpotpatter bāhyārthāpekṣayā parārtham iti varṇyate / vivakṣāyāṃ tu gamyāyāṃ śrotrapekṣayā svārtham eva bhavati / tathā hi tat kāryatvād dhūmavivakṣāyāṃ gamaka iṣyate /	and it is through Convention that it brings about the conceptual Cognition (associated with words), and hence, in reference to the external thing, it comes to be described as being ‘for the benefit of others And when what is meant to be understood is only the Speaker’s wish to speak, then it turns out to be ‘for the Speaker’s own benefit’, Because it is held to be indicative of the Speaker’s wish to speak of what contains the Smoke, which is the effect of the statement in question;
na vācakatvena /	it is ‘indicative’, not expressive, of it;
tato jñānāpratīteḥ /	because no other cognition is comprehended from it.
viphalā vyāhṛtir iti /	‘Your assertion is useless’;
nānumānaṃ pramāṇam ityeṣā /	i.e. the assertion that “Inference is not the means of right cognition”.
tathā hi na kaścit pratipādyas tadvacanād vivakṣāṃ pratipadyate /	Because as a matter of fact, from the said statement, no person to whom it is addressed, comprehends what you wish to speak of.
anena svavacanavirodhamāha etac ca pūrvaṃ varṇitam eva //	This shows that your assertion involves ‘self-contradiction’. This has been explained previously.
laukikaṃ liṅgamiṣṭaṃ cen na tvanyaiḥ parikalpitam / nanu loko 'pi kāryāder hetvādīnavagacchati //	If it be urged that “what is ordinarily known as the inferential indicative is accepted by us, but not what has been set up by others”, then (the answer is that) even the ordinary man understands what is the ‘cause etc. of the effect, etc.’;
tattvatas tu tadevoktaṃ nyāyavādibhir apyalam /	and in reality, this is all that the masters of the science of reasoning also have declared.
tallaukikābhyanujñāte kiṃ tyaktaṃ bhavati svayam //	So that when the ordinary (popular) idea is accepted, what is it that becomes excluded? (1482-1483)
nanu loko 'pīti / hetvādīnavagacchatīti sambandhaḥ /	Purandara has argued as follows: “What is known as Inference, in the ordinary world, is admitted by the Cārvākas also;
kāryāder ityādiśabdāt svabhāvagrahaṇam / evaṃ hetvādīnityatrāpi svabhāvagrahaṇam eva /	‘Effect, etc.’; ‘Etc.’ is meant to include the ‘nature’ of the thing. Similarly in ‘Cause, etc.’, the ‘nature’ is meant to be included.
bahuvacanaṃ tu vyaktibhedāt /	In both cases the Plural number has been used in view of individual things.
yadeva liṅgaṃ tādātmyatadutpattipratibaddhāllokārthaṃ pratipadyate tadevoktaṃ liṅgamasmābhiḥ, tadabhyanujñāne kiṃ tyaktaṃ syād yasyānumānatvaniṣedhobhavet //	Thus then, the Inferential Indicative which is understood by ordinary men to be related through the relationship of ‘Nature’ and ‘Effect’, is just what has been spoken of by us as the ‘Probans’; and when you accept this, what is it that you discard, for which you are denying the Character of ‘Inference’? (1482-1483)
apramāṇena caitena paraḥ kiṃ pratipadyate / apramāṇakṛtaścāsau pratyayaḥ kīdṛśo bhavet //	If this (inference) is not a means of knowledge, then what does the other party understand by it? Of what sort too would that cognition be which has been brought about by what is not a means of cognition? (1484)
kutaścāyaṃ niścayo jātaḥ pareṇa tat pramāṇamabhyupagatam iti, nahi parābhyupagamaḥ pratyakṣaḥ, na cānyat tava pramāṇam asti, yena niścayaḥ syāt /	How have you come to the conclusion that your opponent has accepted Inference as a Means of Knowledge? The idea of another man cannot be known by Sense-perception; and for you there is no other Means of Right Knowledge whereby you could derive a definite Cognition?
bhavatu nāma niścayaḥ, tathāpi tenāpramāṇena parābhyupagatena kimiti paraḥ pratipadyate, na vai vyasanametat /	Even if there be such a definite Cognition; oven so, if what the other party accepts is not a means of Cognition, then how does his opponent know what it means? The accepting of a Means of Knowledge cannot be a mere whim.
athāpi syād yathā ripuhastādācchidya khaḍgaṃ tenaiva sa eva ripur nipātyate evaṃ pareṇa yat pramānatvenābhyupagataṃ tadeva gṛhītvā paro nirākriyata ityāśaṅkyāha apramāṇakṛta iti /	It might be argued that “Just as a man wrests the sword from the hands of his enemy and by that same sword fells the enemy, in the same way the Atheist takes up what the other regards as a Means of Right Cognition and then by that same attacks his opponent”.
etaduktaṃ bhavati yadi mohāt pareṇāpramāṇam eva pramāṇam iti kṛtvā saṃgṛhītaṃ kathaṃ tenāpramāṇena parasya samyagjñānotpādanaṃ śakyate kartuṃ samyagjñānaphalatvāt pramāṇasya / nahi mohāt khaḍga iti kṛtvā gṛhītena yenakenacicchedakena paraśchettuṃ śakyata iti na samāno dṛṣṭāntaḥ //	what is meant is as follows: If, through delusion, the other party has accepted as Means of Right Knowledge, what is really not a Means of Knowledge, then, how can it be possible for one to bring about the right Cognition in the mind of that party, by means of what is not a Means of Right Cognition, as right Cognition is the only resultant of the Means of Knowledge? Certainly, if a man has taken up, as sword, what is not-sword, another man cannot take up that and strike the other with it. The example cited therefore is not analogous. “Inference, consisting of a verbal statement, is not a means of knowledge for the speaker;
aviddhakarṇas tatvaṭīkāyām āha nanu vā pramāṇena kimiti paraḥ pratipādyate, ubhayasiddhaṃ hi pratipādakaṃ bhavatīti /	Aviddhakarṇa has argued thus in the Tattvaṭīkā: “It may be asked ‘By means of this Means of Knowledge (Inference), what is the idea that is conveyed to the other person? It is only what is admitted by both parties (the Speaker and the person addressed) that can convey any idea’.
tadevad ayuktam /	But this is not right.
yasmād vacanātmakamanumānaṃ naca vaktuḥ pramāṇam, atha ca vaktā tena paraṃ pratipādayati, parapratipādanārthatvāt prayāsasya /	Because Inference is in the form of a verbal statement; and it is not a Means of Right Cognition for the person making the statement; and yet that person conveys the idea (expressed) to the other person; as his sole effort is towards the conveying of the idea to that other person;
nāvaśyamubhayasiddhena prayojanam iti /	hence the Means need not be admitted by both parties”.
tadāśaṅkate anumānam ityādinā /	This is the view put forward in the following [see verse 1485 above]
[p.433]	‘He’ i.e. the Speaker.
ayam iti vaktā / teneti vacanātmakena /	‘Tena’ by means of the Inference consisting of the verbal statement.
ajñātetyādinā dūṣaṇam āha nahi vacanasya vaktrapekṣayā saṃsūcanād aprāmāṇyam iṣṭaṃ, kiṃ tarhiajñātārthāprakāśanāt /	The above view is controverted in the following [see verse 1486 above] When a statement is said to be ‘not a Means of Knowledge’, it is not because, it conveys the idea to the Speaker, but because it does not convey any information that is not already known.
saktasūcakatvamasyāstyeva /	As regards conveying the idea tṇ the Speaker, it is of course there.
tvadīyaṃ tvanumānaṃ na saktasaṃsūcakamityasamānametat /	In the case of your Inference (argument) on the other hand, it conveys no idea to the Speaker. Hence the two cases are not analogous.
anyathā hyubhayasiddham eva bhavet /	Otherwise, what is urged would be something admitted by both parties.
tasmānnyāyād anapetaṃ pramāṇaṃ sarveṣāṃ yuktaṃ pratyakṣavad iti nyāyyam //	From all this it follows that that Means of Knowledge which is not devoid of reason must be accepted by all parties as a Means of Right Cognition, just like Sense-perception.
KAPITEL PRAMAA.NANTARAPARIIK.SAA	End of Chapter (18) on Inference. End of Volume I.
idānīṃ pramāṇadvitayaniyamasādhanārthaṃ saṅkhyāvipratipattikaraṇārtham	Because Inference is in the form of a verbal statement; and it is not a Means of Right Cognition for the person making the statement;

mithyājñānaṃ samānaṃ ca pūrvapakṣavyapekṣayā / iṣṭaghātakṛtā janyaṃ jñānamuktaṃ na vastutaḥ //

When the ‘wrong cognition’, as ‘subversive of what is desirable’, is spoken of as being ‘similar’, the ‘similarity’ meant must be only that of the view of the first party, and not real similarity;

vastusthityā hi tajjñānam avisaṃvādi niścitam /

because as regards the real state of things, the cognition in question has been definitely found to be not incompatible;

vādīṣṭaviparītasya pramāṇamata eva tat // ato viruddhatā hetor dṛṣṭānte cāpyasādhyatā /

in fact, it is in view of this fact that it is a valid argument against what is ‘desired’ by the disputant. Thus the reason adduced is found to be ‘contradictory’;

etenaiva prakāreṇa dvitīye hetvasiddhatā //

In the same way, in the second argument, the probans is ‘inadmissible’.

yato vādīṣṭaviparītasādhanāt tadapi pramāṇam eva, anyathā hi sādhyāntaramapekṣya sarvadaiva sarvasya yadyaprāmāṇyaṃ vyavasthāpyeta, pratyakṣe 'pi prasaṅgaḥ syāt /

As proving the contrary of what is desired by the disputant, the cognition in question must be valid; otherwise, if it were meant that all cognitions are invalid and at all times, in regard to another Probandum, then, such invalidity might affect Sense-perception also.

pūrvapakṣāpekṣayā tu tanmithyājñānam uktam na vastusthityā /

In fact, it has been spoken of as ‘wrong Cognition’, only in reference to the view of the First Party.

pūrvasya prathamavādinaḥ pakṣaḥ, pūrvapakṣaḥ tasya vyāpekṣeti vigrahaḥ/

The term ‘pūrvapakṣa’ here stands for the ‘pakṣa’, view of the ‘pūrva’, the First Party.

yo hyanādheyātiśayaikaparā{dā---}rthatvaṃ cakṣurādīnām icchati [p.429] tadabhiprāyāpekṣayā mithyājñānamucyate / anityānekavijñānādihetutvena cakṣurādīnāṃ siddhatvāt /

One who holds the view that the Eye and the rest appertain only to an object which is essentially incapable of any additional features imposed upon it, it is only in reference to the view of such a party that the Cognition could be spoken of as ‘wrong’; because (under that view) the Eye, etc, have been proved to be the Cause of many fleeting cognitions.

viruddhateti /

‘Contradictory’;

trirūpaliṅgapūrvatvasyāpramāṇe kvacid apyabhāvāt / pramāṇe tu tatraiveṣṭavighātakṛtā janye jñāne bhāvāt /

because the character of ‘being brought about by the Three-featured Indicative’ is never present in any invalid Cognition and when the cognition so brought about is valid, then the said character is present in that same Cognition which is ‘subversive of what is desired’ (by the Disputant).

nanu ca lokāyataṃ prati viruddhasādhane kartavye dṛṣṭānto na siddha eva /

Bays the Opponent: “When an argument to the contrary is urged against the Materialist, then the Corroborative Instance cannot be one that is admitted (by both parties).

nahīṣṭavighātakṛjjanyaṃ jñānaṃ pramāṇam icchati paraḥ, nacānyatarāsiddho dṛṣṭānto bhavati /

The opponent does not admit the validity of the Cognition of what is subversive of what is desired; and what is not admitted by either of the two parties cannot serve as a Corroborative Instance.

ya eva tūbhayaniścitavācī sa eva sādhanadūṣaṇam iti nyāya{yāt---} ucyate ---

In fact, the law is that what is equally admitted by both parties that alone can be cited against the argument of either party.”

yadyapipareṇātra prāmāṇyaṃ neṣṭaṃ vācā, tathāpyasaṃvāditvaṃ tvaśakyāpahnavatvādiṣṭam eva, tadicchatāṃ sāmarthyāt prāmāṇyam api tena vastusthityābhyupagantavyam iti vastubalaprakṛtyā viruddha udbhāvyate na parābhyupagamānurodhena /

The answer to this is as follows Though the other party has not actually admitted the validity of the cognition, in so many words, yet, the absence of incompatibility has to be accepted, as that cannot be denied; and those who accept that, have tacitly accepted the validity also, in so far as the real state of things is concerned; consequently, the ‘contradiction’ that we have urged is in regard to the real state of things, not in regard to the theory of the other party.

athavā viruddhahetusaṃsūcanād viruddhaḥ /

Or, the Opponent’s Reason may be regarded as ‘contradictory’ on the ground of being indicative of a contradictory Reason.

tatra viruddho hetuḥ yadavisaṃvādi tat pramāṇaṃ yathā pratyakṣaṃ, saṃvādi ca trirūpaliṅgajanyaṃ jñānam iti svabhāvahetuḥ /

For instance, the ‘contradictory’ Reason would be in the form ‘What is not incompatible is valid, e.g. Sense-perception, the cognition bro ught about by the t hree -featured Indicative is compatible; [hence it must be valid]’; this would be Reason based on the nature of the thing itself.

nacāsiddho niḥsvabhāvatvānihetutvaprasaṅgāt, pratyakṣāprāmāṇyaprasaṅgānnaikāntikaḥ /

The Reason here put forward cannot be ‘Inadmissible’, for, if it were not admitted, then the Subject would become featureless and there could be no Reason at all (indicative of validity).

asādhyateti /

‘Asādhyatā;

sādhyavikalateti yāvat /

i.e. the Instance would be devoid of the Probandum.

dvitīya iti /

‘In the second argument’;

na ca trairūpya ityādau / hetvasiddhateti /

i.e. in the argument “nor can the presence of three features, etc. etc.” (urged under Text 1458),

ananumāne kvacid apyabhāvāt /

because it is not present anywhere where the (valid) Inference is absent.,

etenaiveti / trirūpaliṅgetyādinā nyāyena //

‘In the same way’ i.e. by the reasoning based upon the presence of Three-features, etc. etc.

yattādātmyatadutpattyā sambandhaṃ pariniścitam / tadeva sādhanaṃ prāhuḥ siddhaye nyāyavādinaḥ //

Exponents of the true reasoning have all declared that that reason alone is capable of proving the conclusion whose relationship (with the probandum) is known with certainty, such relationship being either in the nature of sameness of essence or of being an effect;

anumānavirodhādirīdṛśe 'sti na sādhane /

and against such a probans, there can be no such defect as that of ‘being contrary to inference’ and so forth.

naiva taddhyātmahetubhyāṃ vinā sambhavati kvacit // parasparaviruddhau ca dharmau naikatra vastuni / yujyete sambhavo nāto viruddhāvyabhicāriṇaḥ //

Because no such inference could be possible except through essential sameness or being the cause. Mutually contradictory properties cannot belong to the same thing. Consequently there can be no possibility of any pbobans which might be concomitant with the contrary of the desired conclusion.

īdṛśa iti /

The following Text provides the answer to the argument urged (under 1459): [see verses 1472-1474 above]

tādātmyatadutpattipratibaddhe /

‘Against such a Probans’ i.e. in a Probans that is related through essential sameness and through being an effect.

ātmahetubhyām iti /

‘Except through essential sameness, or being the cause’;

svabhāvena kāraṇena ca vinā yathākramaṃ talliṅgaṃ na bhavati niḥsvabhāvatvanirhetutvaprasaṅgāt /

i.e. except through, being the same, or being the Cause, there can be no Probans (Inferential Indicative); if there were, it would be featureless and not a Probans at all.

yaduktam vivakṣitaḥ sādhyadharmo na dharmiviśeṣaṇam iti, tatra yadi sādhyadharmo na dharmiviśeṣaṇaṃ tadā samudāya eva nāstīti tataścaitat samudāyaikadeśatvādityasiddhau hetuḥ syāt /

It has been argued that “What is meant to be the Probandum is not present in the Subject (Minor Term) The answer to that is that, if the Probandum is not present in the Minor Term, then the aggregate (of the ‘Three features’) as a whole is not present in the Probans; hence on account of the absence of a part of the aggregate, such, a Probans would be clearly ‘inadmissible’.

yaccoktam sarvatrānumāne viśeṣaviruddhānāṃ sambhava iti tadayuktam /

It has been argued that “in the case of all Inferences, there is possibility of particular Inferences to the contrary”.

yataḥ sādhyaviparyayasādhanād viruddha iṣyate naca viśeṣaḥ sādhayitumiṣṭaḥ / vastubalapravṛttā [p.430] numāne viṣaye na viruddhāvyabhicārī ca sambhavati /

Because that alone is called ‘Contradictory’ which is found to prove the contrary of the desired Probandum; and no particular case is meant to be the Probandum (in the argument under dispute, which is in reference to the definition of Inference). As a matter of fact, in the case of an Inference based on the nature of things, there is no possibility of there being any (valid) Probans proving the contrary;

ekasmin dharmiṇi parasparaviruddhadharmadvayaprasaṅgāt //

because in the same thing, two mutually contradictory properties cannot coexist.

taduktamavasthādeśakālānām ityādi tatrāha abhyastetyādi /

As a matter of fact, inference proceeds only on the basis of things whose ‘indicative character’ has been properly ascertained by repeated experience;

anumāvṛttiranyā tu nānumetyabhidhīyate // avasthādeśakālānāṃ bhedād bhinnāsu śaktiṣu / bhāvānām anumānena nātaḥ siddhiḥ sudurlabhā //OO TS 1476

all else is regarded as ‘not inference so that even though the potencies of things vary according to the variations of condition, time and place, yet the cognition of things by means of inference is not unattainable.

yatnenānumito 'pyarthaḥ kuśalair anumātṛbhiḥ / nānyathā sādhyate so 'nyair abhiyuktatarair api //PP TS 1477

And when a certain conclusion has been deduced, with great care from an inference, it cannot be proved to be otherwise, even by cleverer persons. It has been argued (under 1470) that “on account of the diversity of Condition, Place and Time, etc. etc.”

supariniścitaṃ liṅgaṃ gamakam iṣyate na saṃdigdham, nahi dhūmo bāṣpādirūpeṇasandihyamāno vahner niścāyako bhavati /

It is only the well-ascertained Probans that is held to be truly indicative, not one that is doubtful; e.g. when the presence of Smoke is only suspected, in regard to Vapour, it does not lead to a certain Cognition of the presence of Fire.

liṅganiścaya eva katham iti cet /

Question: “How does the certainty of the Probans come about?”

yathā maṇirūpādiṣu tadvidām /

Answer By repeated experience: as is found in persons well-versed in the science of gems, in regard to gems.

tathā hi vivecayanty eva bāṣpādibhyo dhūmādīnabhyas tatatsvalakṣaṇāḥ / a{tha}vivecya pravṛttāścaite prāpnuvantyeva vahnim /

That is to say, persons who are conversant with the nature of the things concerned, do discern the real Smoke from Vapour: and when they proceed to act after discernment, they do actually find Fire.

tasmādyataḥ suvivecitaṃ liṅgaṃ na vyabhicarati, tenāvasthādibhedabhinnānāṃsiddhir na durlabhā /

Thus then, inasmuch as the well-discerned Probans is never found to fail, the cognition of things is not unattainable through such Probans, even though the things vary with variations of Condition, Place and Time.

nāpi suvivecitālliṅgāt pariniścito 'rtho 'nyathā śakyate kartum /

And when a thing has been well-ascertained by means of well-discerned Probans, it can never be made otherwise;

nahi dhūmāt supariniścitād anumitasya vahner anyathābhāvaḥ śakyate kartum, ekasya viruddhasvabhāvadvayāyogāt /

e.g. when the presence of Fire has been well-ascertained by means of the presence of Smoke, the Fire cannot be proved to be otherwise (i.e. absent); as one and the same thing cannot have two contradictory characters.

yaccoktam na devadatto bhārodvahanasamartha ityādi, yaccābhrapaṭalaṃ vahninā dahyata iti, talliṅgameva na bhavati, trairūpyābhāvāt /

It has been argued (in commentary on 1460, etc.) that “Devadatta is not capable of bearing a burden in his childhood, etc. etc., and the Fire burning the Abhrapaṭala, etc. etc”. But in all these cases, there is no proper Probans at all; as the ‘three features’ are not present.

nahyadarśanamātreṇa vipakṣāddhetor vyāvṛttiḥ śakyate kartum /

The mere fact of not being perceived cannot lead to the idea of the Probans being excluded from that where the Probandum is known to be absent;

yadāha ---"nacādarśanamātreṇa vipakṣād vyatirekitā" iti / kiṃ tarhi tādātmyatadutpattisambandhaniyamād avinābhāvaniyamaḥ /

as has been thus declared ‘Exclusion from that where the Probandum is known to be absent cannot follow from mere non-perception.’ In fact, the reality of Invariable Concomitance follows only from the presence of the relationship either of essential sameness or of being the effect;

"kāryakāraṇabhāvād vā svabhāvād vā niyāmakāt / avinābhāvaniyamo 'darśanān na na darśanāt" //

as has been thus declared ‘Either from the relationship of Cause and Effect, or on the restrictive nature of the thing concerned, there is definite Invariable Concomitance, and this follows from Perception, not from Non-perception’;

nacātra tādātmyatadutpattisambandho 'sti //

and in the case of the arguments cited, neither of the two relationships of essential sameness, or of being the effect is present.

na hi svabhāvaḥ kāryaṃ vā svabhāvāt kāraṇādṛte /

(a) there can be no nature (or character) without a nature (or character); (b) nor can there be effect without a cause.

bhedānimittatāprāptes te vināsti na cānumā //

The following might be urged “How is it known that the well-ascertained Probans never fails? There is no reason why this should bo so.”

dvividham eva hi liṅgaṃ yaduta svabhāvaḥ kāryam iti /

The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 1478 above] There are only two kinds of Probans (1) Nature of the thing and (2) Being an Effect;

anupalabdhes tu svabhāve 'nta [p.431] rbhāvaḥ / naca svabhāvakāraṇākhyena liṅginā vinā tayor liṅgayoḥ sambhavo 'sti, yena

‘non-apprehension’ being included under ‘Nature’, And these two kinds of Probans are not possible except where there is a Probandum, called ‘Nature’ and ‘Cause’, by reason of which there could be ‘fallibility’ (falsity) in the Probans.

kasmān na sambhava ity āha bhedānimittatāprāpteḥ bhedaścānimittatā ca tayoḥ prāptiḥ /

“Why is it not possible?” ‘Because otherwise, etc. etc.’, There is copulative compounding between ‘bheda’ and ‘animittatā’;

svabhāvahetor bhedo 'svabhāvatā prāpnoti, kāryahetor animittatvaṃ nirhetukatvaṃ prāpnoti, naca svabhāvakāryavyatirekeṇānyaliṅgamiṣṭamanyatrāpratibandhād avinābhāvāyogāt /

the sense is that the Probans which forms the Nature of the thing would cease to be its ‘nature’; and the Probans which is an effect would come to be without cause; and yet no Probans is admitted which forms neither the ‘nature’ nor the ‘effect’ (of the Probandum), except when there is no connection and when there is no Invariable Concomitance.

te vineti / svabhāvakārye /

‘Without these two’, i.e. as ‘nature’ and as ‘effect’.

dvivacanāntam etat //

The word has the Dual Ending.

yaduktaṃ parārtham anumānaṃ tu mānam iti tatrāha trirūpaliṅgetyādi / trirūpaliṅgavacasaḥ saktasaṃsūcakatvataḥ / yatparārthānumānatvam uktaṃ tacchrotrapekṣayā //

The statement of the three-featured probans has been described as ‘inference for the benefit of another’, on the ground of its being indicative of what is possible, with reference to the other person addressed. but this ‘inferential character’ can only be ‘secondary’ (figurative) and conventional.

saktasaṃsūcakatvena tena nātiprasajyate //

hence the fact of its being ‘indicative of what is possible’ cannot lead to any incongruity.

nānumānaṃ pramāṇaṃ ced viphalā vyāhatis tava /

if inference is not a means of right cognition, then your assertion is useless.

na kaścid api vādo hi vivakṣāṃ pratipadyate //

Indeed no disputant ever comprehends what you wish to speak of.

vacanasya yat parārthānumānatvamuktaṃ tacchrotrapekṣayā tena vaktrapekṣābhāvī doṣo na bhavati /

The statement (of the Inference) has been spoken of as ‘for another’s benefit’, in reference to the other person; hence it cannot be open to the objection urged against its being in reference to the speaker himself.

śrotrapekṣayāpi trirūpaliṅgasūcanād upacāreṇānumānakāraṇatvāt samayād vānumānatvam uktam /

Even in reference to the listener, the other person, as there is the setting forth of the three-featured Probans, and on that account, it leads to the Inference, or on account of Convention, it has been spoken of as ‘Inference’;

saktasaṃsūcaka evānumānasaṃjñāniveśāt /

this name ‘Inference’ being applicable only to what is indicative of what is possible.

tenendriyasyāvinābhāvitvasambandhajñānasya ca parārthānumānatvaprasaṅgād atiprasaṅgo na bhavati tayoḥ, saktasaṃsūcakatvābhāvāt /

Consequently, there can be no such incongruity as that of the Sense-organ, or the cognition of the relation of Invariable Concomitance, being regarded as ‘Inference for another’s benefit’; as in those cases, there is no ‘indication of what is possible’.

ata eva darśanamūlayoḥ saṃvidaḥ sakāśād asyā viśeṣaḥ /

It is for this same reason that this Inference differs from the cognition based upon actual Perception.

tathā hi darśanajñānena sākṣād dhūmāder liṅgasya pratītir na tu śrotrajñānena, tena hi śabda eva sākṣād gṛhyate, naca śabdo dhūmavad bāhyasyārthasya liṅgaṃ vivakṣāpratibaddhasya bāhyena sambandhāsiddheḥ /

For instance, the cognition of the Indicative, Smoke, is directly brought about by Visual Perception, not by Auditory Perception; as what is directly apprehended by the latter is the Word (uttered by the Man) only; and the Word is not the indicative of the external thing (Fire), in the way that Smoke is; because the Word is related to the speaker’s wish to speak (which is subjective), and hence it can have no relation (of invariable concomitance) with anything external (objective);

kevalaṃ tasya dhūmāder liṅgasya saṃsūcakatvena saṅketavaśāt tathādhyavasāyivikalpotpatter bāhyārthāpekṣayā parārtham iti varṇyate / vivakṣāyāṃ tu gamyāyāṃ śrotrapekṣayā svārtham eva bhavati / tathā hi tat kāryatvād dhūmavivakṣāyāṃ gamaka iṣyate /

and it is through Convention that it brings about the conceptual Cognition (associated with words), and hence, in reference to the external thing, it comes to be described as being ‘for the benefit of others And when what is meant to be understood is only the Speaker’s wish to speak, then it turns out to be ‘for the Speaker’s own benefit’, Because it is held to be indicative of the Speaker’s wish to speak of what contains the Smoke, which is the effect of the statement in question;

na vācakatvena /

it is ‘indicative’, not expressive, of it;

tato jñānāpratīteḥ /

because no other cognition is comprehended from it.

viphalā vyāhṛtir iti /

‘Your assertion is useless’;

nānumānaṃ pramāṇam ityeṣā /

i.e. the assertion that “Inference is not the means of right cognition”.

tathā hi na kaścit pratipādyas tadvacanād vivakṣāṃ pratipadyate /

Because as a matter of fact, from the said statement, no person to whom it is addressed, comprehends what you wish to speak of.

anena svavacanavirodhamāha etac ca pūrvaṃ varṇitam eva //

This shows that your assertion involves ‘self-contradiction’. This has been explained previously.

laukikaṃ liṅgamiṣṭaṃ cen na tvanyaiḥ parikalpitam / nanu loko 'pi kāryāder hetvādīnavagacchati //

If it be urged that “what is ordinarily known as the inferential indicative is accepted by us, but not what has been set up by others”, then (the answer is that) even the ordinary man understands what is the ‘cause etc. of the effect, etc.’;

tattvatas tu tadevoktaṃ nyāyavādibhir apyalam /

and in reality, this is all that the masters of the science of reasoning also have declared.

tallaukikābhyanujñāte kiṃ tyaktaṃ bhavati svayam //

So that when the ordinary (popular) idea is accepted, what is it that becomes excluded? (1482-1483)

nanu loko 'pīti / hetvādīnavagacchatīti sambandhaḥ /

Purandara has argued as follows: “What is known as Inference, in the ordinary world, is admitted by the Cārvākas also;

kāryāder ityādiśabdāt svabhāvagrahaṇam / evaṃ hetvādīnityatrāpi svabhāvagrahaṇam eva /

‘Effect, etc.’; ‘Etc.’ is meant to include the ‘nature’ of the thing. Similarly in ‘Cause, etc.’, the ‘nature’ is meant to be included.

bahuvacanaṃ tu vyaktibhedāt /

In both cases the Plural number has been used in view of individual things.

yadeva liṅgaṃ tādātmyatadutpattipratibaddhāllokārthaṃ pratipadyate tadevoktaṃ liṅgamasmābhiḥ, tadabhyanujñāne kiṃ tyaktaṃ syād yasyānumānatvaniṣedhobhavet //

Thus then, the Inferential Indicative which is understood by ordinary men to be related through the relationship of ‘Nature’ and ‘Effect’, is just what has been spoken of by us as the ‘Probans’; and when you accept this, what is it that you discard, for which you are denying the Character of ‘Inference’? (1482-1483)

apramāṇena caitena paraḥ kiṃ pratipadyate / apramāṇakṛtaścāsau pratyayaḥ kīdṛśo bhavet //

If this (inference) is not a means of knowledge, then what does the other party understand by it? Of what sort too would that cognition be which has been brought about by what is not a means of cognition? (1484)

kutaścāyaṃ niścayo jātaḥ pareṇa tat pramāṇamabhyupagatam iti, nahi parābhyupagamaḥ pratyakṣaḥ, na cānyat tava pramāṇam asti, yena niścayaḥ syāt /

How have you come to the conclusion that your opponent has accepted Inference as a Means of Knowledge? The idea of another man cannot be known by Sense-perception; and for you there is no other Means of Right Knowledge whereby you could derive a definite Cognition?

bhavatu nāma niścayaḥ, tathāpi tenāpramāṇena parābhyupagatena kimiti paraḥ pratipadyate, na vai vyasanametat /

Even if there be such a definite Cognition; oven so, if what the other party accepts is not a means of Cognition, then how does his opponent know what it means? The accepting of a Means of Knowledge cannot be a mere whim.

athāpi syād yathā ripuhastādācchidya khaḍgaṃ tenaiva sa eva ripur nipātyate evaṃ pareṇa yat pramānatvenābhyupagataṃ tadeva gṛhītvā paro nirākriyata ityāśaṅkyāha apramāṇakṛta iti /

It might be argued that “Just as a man wrests the sword from the hands of his enemy and by that same sword fells the enemy, in the same way the Atheist takes up what the other regards as a Means of Right Cognition and then by that same attacks his opponent”.

etaduktaṃ bhavati yadi mohāt pareṇāpramāṇam eva pramāṇam iti kṛtvā saṃgṛhītaṃ kathaṃ tenāpramāṇena parasya samyagjñānotpādanaṃ śakyate kartuṃ samyagjñānaphalatvāt pramāṇasya / nahi mohāt khaḍga iti kṛtvā gṛhītena yenakenacicchedakena paraśchettuṃ śakyata iti na samāno dṛṣṭāntaḥ //

what is meant is as follows: If, through delusion, the other party has accepted as Means of Right Knowledge, what is really not a Means of Knowledge, then, how can it be possible for one to bring about the right Cognition in the mind of that party, by means of what is not a Means of Right Cognition, as right Cognition is the only resultant of the Means of Knowledge? Certainly, if a man has taken up, as sword, what is not-sword, another man cannot take up that and strike the other with it. The example cited therefore is not analogous. “Inference, consisting of a verbal statement, is not a means of knowledge for the speaker;

aviddhakarṇas tatvaṭīkāyām āha nanu vā pramāṇena kimiti paraḥ pratipādyate, ubhayasiddhaṃ hi pratipādakaṃ bhavatīti /

Aviddhakarṇa has argued thus in the Tattvaṭīkā: “It may be asked ‘By means of this Means of Knowledge (Inference), what is the idea that is conveyed to the other person? It is only what is admitted by both parties (the Speaker and the person addressed) that can convey any idea’.

tadevad ayuktam /

But this is not right.

yasmād vacanātmakamanumānaṃ naca vaktuḥ pramāṇam, atha ca vaktā tena paraṃ pratipādayati, parapratipādanārthatvāt prayāsasya /

Because Inference is in the form of a verbal statement; and it is not a Means of Right Cognition for the person making the statement; and yet that person conveys the idea (expressed) to the other person; as his sole effort is towards the conveying of the idea to that other person;

nāvaśyamubhayasiddhena prayojanam iti /

hence the Means need not be admitted by both parties”.

tadāśaṅkate anumānam ityādinā /

This is the view put forward in the following [see verse 1485 above]

[p.433]

‘He’ i.e. the Speaker.

ayam iti vaktā / teneti vacanātmakena /

‘Tena’ by means of the Inference consisting of the verbal statement.

ajñātetyādinā dūṣaṇam āha nahi vacanasya vaktrapekṣayā saṃsūcanād aprāmāṇyam iṣṭaṃ, kiṃ tarhiajñātārthāprakāśanāt /

The above view is controverted in the following [see verse 1486 above] When a statement is said to be ‘not a Means of Knowledge’, it is not because, it conveys the idea to the Speaker, but because it does not convey any information that is not already known.

saktasūcakatvamasyāstyeva /

As regards conveying the idea tṇ the Speaker, it is of course there.

tvadīyaṃ tvanumānaṃ na saktasaṃsūcakamityasamānametat /

In the case of your Inference (argument) on the other hand, it conveys no idea to the Speaker. Hence the two cases are not analogous.

anyathā hyubhayasiddham eva bhavet /

Otherwise, what is urged would be something admitted by both parties.

tasmānnyāyād anapetaṃ pramāṇaṃ sarveṣāṃ yuktaṃ pratyakṣavad iti nyāyyam //

From all this it follows that that Means of Knowledge which is not devoid of reason must be accepted by all parties as a Means of Right Cognition, just like Sense-perception.

KAPITEL PRAMAA.NANTARAPARIIK.SAA

End of Chapter (18) on Inference. End of Volume I.

idānīṃ pramāṇadvitayaniyamasādhanārthaṃ saṅkhyāvipratipattikaraṇārtham

Because Inference is in the form of a verbal statement; and it is not a Means of Right Cognition for the person making the statement;