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tatra kumārila etat pratyakṣatodṛṣṭasambandhamanumānaṃ vyācikhyāsur āha pratyakṣetyādi / pratyakṣe dṛṣṭasambandhamanumānam evaṃ pratyakṣata iti sambandhaḥ /
In connection with tins, Kumārila, with a view to explaining the nature of the Inference based upon the perceived relationship of Particulars has used the words ‘Pratyakṣadṛṣṭasambandham, etc.’. (Text 1443.) This is to be construed as ‘The Inference based upon the relationship of perceived Particulars they explain as follows’;
yataḥ pūrvasminn anantaraśloke evaṃ pracakṣata iti prakṛtam /
The words ‘they explain’ having gone before in the preceding text (in the Ślokavārtika).
yayor evāgnidhūmaviśeṣayor viṣayabhūtayor gomayendhanaviśeṣabuddhiḥ kṛtā utpāditā puruṣeṇa gomayendhanaprabhavāvetāvagnidhūmāviti, tathā parvatādideśaviśeṣamatiḥ kṛtā etat parvatādideśaviśeṣasthāvetāvagnidhūmāv iti /
In connection with the two particular things Fire and Smoke the observer has formed the idea of the new factor in the shape of dry cowdung, the idea being that ‘these two things Fire and Smoke are the effect of the burning of dry cowdung’; and then he has also formed the idea of the particular spot in the shape of the Hill, the idea being that ‘these two things, Fire and Smoke, exist on the Hill’.
gomayamindhanaṃ yayor agnidhūmayos tau gomayendhanau, sa deśo yayos tau taddeśaugomayendhanau ca tau taddeśau ceti vigrahaḥ /
The compound ‘gomayendhana’ means ‘that of which dry cowdung is the fuel’, and the compound ‘taddeśa’ means ‘that of which that is the place’;
tāv eva viśeṣau tāvādī yeṣāṃ sarjasaralasallakīvanaprabhṛtīnāṃ vahnyādiviśeṣāntarāṇāṃ tāni gomayendhanataddeśaviśeṣādīni /
and these two compounds qualify the ‘viśeṣa’ the ‘two particular things’ (Fire and Smoke); the ‘ādi’ stands for other particular fuels in the shape of the woods of the various trees, Sarja, Sarala, Sallakī and the rest, and also other Fires;
teṣu matir iti saptamī{ti}yogavibhāgāt samāsaḥ /
there arises the cognition, in regard to these;
sā evambhūtā pratyakṣā matir yena pramātrā kṛtā utpāditā sa taddeśasthena tenaiva dhūmādinā liṅgena tamevāgniṃ kālāntareṇa yadā budhyate /
the Locative being construed by ‘splitting up’ the words; such perceptional cognition becomes apprehended by the observer; that same observer, through the indicative in the shape of the same Smoke as seen in another place and at another time, cognises the same Fire;
punaḥ punar iti sambandhaḥ /
and this happens again and again;
tadā tasya bodhasya pūrvabodhāt pratyakṣātmakāt pramāṇatā pramāṇāntaratetyarthaḥ /
this cognition thus becomes one that is distinct from the previous Perceptional Cognition.
athavā pūrvabodhāt kāraṇāttameva vahniṃ budhyata iti sambandhaḥ /
Or the construction may be ‘he cognises Fire on the basis of the previous cognition’.
kimāste vahnirāhosvinnivṛtta ityevaṃ sandihyamānaḥ sadbhāvo yasya vastunas tattathā tac ca tadvastu ceti tattathā tasya bodha iti vigrahaḥ / etac ca yathoktaṃ pratyakṣadṛṣṭasambandhamanumānaṃ viśeṣato dṛṣṭam anumānam ityevaṃ vindhyavāsinā gaditam /
The compound ‘Sandihyamāna, etc.’ is to be interpreted as ‘the cognition of that thing whose presence was in doubt as to whether it is there or not This Inference based upon the relationship of perceived Particulars, as described above, has been spoken of by Vindhyavāsin as ‘Viśeṣatodṛṣṭa’, ‘Inference in relation to Particulars’. The other kind of Inference, the Sāmānyatodṛṣta, that based upon generalised Relationship, is next described [see verse 1446 above]
tatredaṃ codyaṃ bhavati nanu cāgnyantare dhūmāntare ca sāmānyadharmasamaśrayeṇa yadānumitiḥ kriyate, tadā sāmānyatodṛṣṭamanumānamagnidhūmayor asty eva kim iti bhāṣyakāreṇāgnidhūmādau buddhau viparivartamānatvena pratyāsannāvutsṛjyāditya eva sāmānyatodṛṣṭāv udāhṛta ity etac codyam āśaṅkya kumārilā bhāṣyakārābhiprāyaṃ varṇayann āha agnidhūmāntara iti /
The author of the Bhāṣya (Śabara) has cited the Inference of the moving of the Sun from its change of position as an example of Inference based upon generalised Relationship. In regard to this, the following objection might be raised ‘In reference to another Fire and another Smoke (other than those actually perceived), there can be Inference on the basis of common character; and this Inference of Fire and Smoke would be based upon generalised Relationship; while these Smoke and Fire were present in his mind already, why did he give this up and cite the case of the Sun moving as an example of Inference based upon generalised Relationship?’
[p.424] sāmānyato 'numitau sāmānyatodṛṣṭānumāne udāharaṇatvenāgnidhūmāntaratve vācye yadbhāṣyakāreṇādityodāharaṇaṃ kṛtaṃ tat sarvakālamādityagater apratyakṣatvādekāntena / atrādityagatau sāmānyatodṛṣṭam evānumānaṃ sambhavati na viśeṣatodṛṣṭam iti manyamānenāsaṅkīrṇaṃ viṣayaṃ darśayitum āditya evodāharaṇatvenocyate na punar agnidhūmayoḥ sāmānyatodṛṣṭasyaivānumānasyābhāvād iti //1443-
Anticipating this, Kumārila offers the explanation ‘Though the Inference, etc. etc.’, That is to say, when the Inference based upon Generalised Relationship could be cited, on the basis of other Smoke and Fire as corroborative Instances, the author of the Bhāṣya has cited the case of the Sun, in consideration of the fact that the moving of the Sun is imperceptible at all times, and hence for cognising it, the only means available is the Inference based upon generalised Relationship, and not that based upon Perceived Particulars; hence he wished to cite a case like that of the Sun which was purely and unalloyedly one of Inference based on Generalised Relationship; and he did not cite the case of Smoke and Fire, as in this case the Inference need not always be one based upon Generalised Relationship.
tadatretyādinā dūṣaṇam āha
The objection to the above-mentioned classification of Inference is as follows: [see verses 1448 next]
tadatra kṣaṇabhaṅgasya vyāpinaḥ pratipādanāt / prāktanasyaiva tenaiva nānumānasya sambhavaḥ //
Inasmuch as it has been proved that ‘perpetual flux’ is all-embracing, there can be no inference of what has gone before, by itself.
kalpitaṃ cet tadekatvaṃ prabandhaikyavivakṣayā / na tasyāvasthitiḥ kācid vastutvaṃ naca bhāvikam //
If it be argued that “the sameness is assumed on the basis of the sameness of the chain” Then (the answer is that) no such sameness can have any real existence; and what is merely assumed cannot be an entity.
agnidhūmādisakalapadārthavyāpakasya /
‘All-embracing’, i.e. embracing all such, things as Fire, Smoke and the rest.
satyapi kṣaṇikatve prabandhaikatvād ekatvam iti cedāha kalpitam iti /
It might be argued that “Even though the individual things are momentary, there would be sameness (unity) of the chain or series.”
tadā kalpitamekatvaṃ na pāramārthikaṃ, paramārthatas tu na kasyacid avasthitiḥ /
The answer to that is ‘No such sameness, etc.’ That is, this sameness would be something assumed, not real; so that in reality, there would be no continuity of existence for anything;
nāpi kalpitasya vastutvaṃ, tataś ca sandihyamānasadbhāvavastubodhādityasambaddhaṃ syāt // athāpi syāt kalpanāsamāropitamevaikyam āśritya viśeṣato dṛṣṭamākhyātam, nabhāvikam ity āha nacetyādi /
under the circumstances, it cannot be right to say ‘by the observer remaining at that place’, or ‘by that same means’ and so forth. What too is merely assumed cannot be an entity or thing; hence there would be no sense in the words ‘because it is a cognition of a thing whose existence was doubted’ (as used in Text 1445, by Kumārila).
na ca nirviṣayaṃ jñānaṃ yuṣmābhir anumanyate /
A cognition devoid of objects is not admitted by you;
vikalpitārthatāyāṃ ca vyaktaṃ nirviṣayaṃ bhavet //
and if the inference had an assumed object, it would clearly be devoid of an object.
syād etad yadyapi vyaktir vināśinī jātistvanapāyinī vidyate, tataś ca bhāvikam ekatvaṃ bhaviṣyati, naca nirviṣayatvam ity āha vyaktirūpetyādi /
The following might be urged “When the Inference was described as based upon Perceived Particulars, it was on the basis of the assumed, not real, sameness.”
vyaktirūpasya nāśe 'pi tiṣṭhatyevākṛtis tayoḥ / yadi na kṣaṇabhaṅgāpter bhāve tasyā api dhruvam //
If what is meant is that “even on the destruction of the individual, the universal persists”, then, that cannot be; because even if the universal existed, that also would certainly be covered by the ‘perpetual flux’.
pratyakṣadṛṣṭaḥ sambandho yayor eva viśeṣayoḥ / ityayaṃ niyamaścokto yuṣmābhiḥ kena hetunā // dṛṣṭvaikadānumānena tasyaiva hyanumā punaḥ / pramāṇaṃ neṣyate kasmāt ko viśeṣo hi pūrvake //
Further, on what grounds have you asserted the restriction that “these same two particulars whose relationship has been cognised by sense-perception, etc. etc.” (text 1443)? Then again, having once cognised a thing by means of inference, if the same thing is cognised again by means of inference, why is not this latter regarded as valid? What is the peculiarity in the previous one (whereby it is regarded as valid, and not the later one)? If it be urged that “the later one is not regarded as valid because like remembrance, it apprehends what has been already apprehended”, then why is not the previous inference also regarded as the same? If it be argued that “in the former inference there is this additional peculiarity that it sets aside the doubt that has set in during the interval,” why is not the same in the latter also? Hence it is this latter itself that sets aside the doubt as to something being present or not present;
vijñātārthādhigantṛtvān na pramāṇam idaṃ yadi /
and hence the generalised perception is really what is independent.
smārtavat prāktano 'pyetat samānaṃ kiṃ na vīkṣyate //
The following might be urged: “Though the Individual is fleeting (momentary), yet the Universal is something not fleeting;
tasmāt kimasti nāstīti sandehavinivṛttikṛt / sa eveti nirākāṅkṣam etat sāmānyadarśanam //
and on this basis, the sameness or unity would be real, and the Inference would not be devoid of an object”. The answer to this is as follows: [see verses 1450-1455 above]
ākṛtiḥ jātiḥ /
‘Ākṛti’ The Universal.
yadītyabhyupagame /
‘Even if’ i.e. granting that such a thing as the Universal exists.
jātivyaktyoḥ pareṇaikyasyeṣṭatvāt kuto vyaktivināśe jāter avasthānaṃ sambhavati, anyathā bhinnayogakṣematvād ekāntena tayor bhedo 'bhyupagantavyaḥ syāt /bhāva iti /
The other party regards the Individual and the Universal as identical; how then can the Universal continue to exist when the Individual is destroyed? If it did, then, having different fates, they would have to be regarded as distinct from one another.
ayam abhyupagamavāda eva /
‘If it exists’ This also is only by way of being granted;
ekadā tāvajjātir vistareṇa nirastaiveti kutas tasyāḥ sattvam / bhāve 'pi sattve 'pi /
as in reality, the Universal having been once for all rejected, how could it exist? ‘If it exists’ i.e. even if it existed; it would be in ‘perpetual flux’;
vyāpinaḥ kṣaṇabhaṅgasya prasādhanāt /
as the ‘perpetual flux’ has been proved to be all-embracing.
api ca yadānumānaparicchinnaṃ punar api tata eva liṅgāt tameva vahniṃ paricchinatti, tadāpi viśeṣato dṛṣṭaṃ kiṃ na varṇitam, / yena pratyakṣato dṛṣṭa iti viśeṣaṇamiṣṭam /
Further, when a thing has been once cognised by means of an Inference, and later on, the same thing (Fire) is cognised by another Inference drawn from the same Inferential Indicative Probans), (Smoke), why has not this latter Inference also been cited as one based upon Perceived Particulars, when the qualification of having been ‘cognised by Perception’ is considered desirable?
adhigatārthādhigantṛtvād iti cet /
It might be argued that “It has not been so regarded as it apprehends what has been already apprehended”.
na /
That cannot be right;
pratyakṣadṛṣṭe 'pi tat tulyam / antarālavartisandehanivartanamadhikaṃ pratyakṣadṛṣṭe 'stīti cenna /
as the same applies also to what is based on Perceived Particulars. “In the case of that based upon Perceived Particulars, there is this additional peculiarity that it has set at rest the doubt that has appeared during the interval.”
anumānadṛṣṭe 'pi samānam ādhikyam /
as this same peculiarity is also present in what is based upon the Inferred Particulars.
tasmāt sarvatraiva sāmānyato dṛṣṭam eva kṣaṇakṣayiṣu bhāveṣvanumānaṃ na viśeṣato dṛṣṭaṃ nāma //
Thus from all this it follows that when all things are in a ‘perpetual flux’, the only Inference possible is that based upon generalised Relationship, not any based upon Perceived Particulars.
na pramāṇam iti prāhur anumānaṃ tu kecana / vivakṣāmarpayanto 'pi vāgbhirābhiḥ kudṛṣṭayaḥ //
Some short-sighted people have asserted that “inference is not a means of right cognition”, though, by these very words, they offer up their own ‘desire to speak’ (intention, idea in the mind, as something to be inferred from those words).
kecid iti / bārhaspatyādayaḥ /
‘Some people’ the followers of Bṛhaspati and others.
nānumānaṃ pramāṇam ityevaṃrūpābhiḥ /
‘Through these same words’, i.e. by the words ‘Inference is not a means of Right Cognition’.
anena svavacanavirodham āha /
This shows that the assertion of these people involves self-contradiction.
tathā hi vacanaliṅgād vivakṣā pratīyata iti manyamānena parasmai svābhiprāyanivedanāya vyāharatā darśitamanumānasya prāmāṇyam, naca tat pramāṇamiti bruvatā tadeva pratiṣiddhamitītaretaravyāghātaḥ /
For instance, when a man makes a statement to another person, it is on the basis of the understanding that ‘the idea present in one’s mind is understood from the words he uses, which are indicative of that idea’; so that when the people denying Inference make the statement, by this statement itself they admit the fact of Inference being a Means of Right Cognition; and yet this same he denies by the statement that ‘Inference is not a Means of Right Cognition’;
etac ca dūṣaṇaṃ paścād vyaktīkariṣyate //
and this is self-contradiction. This objection is going to be further explained later on.
trirūpaliṅgapūrvatvāt svārthaṃ mānaṃ na yujyate / iṣṭaghātakṛtā janyaṃ mithyājñānaṃ yathā kila //
“Inference for one’s own sake cannot be right, because it is brought about by the three-featured indicative, which is subversive of what is desirable, like wrong cognition.
bhāvād anumāne 'pi na cānumitikāraṇam / dvairūpyam iva liṅgasya trairūpyaṃ nāstyato 'numā // [p.426]
nor can the presence of the ‘three features’ in the indicative be regarded as the means of inference; as they are present also where there is no inference, just like the ‘two features’.
anumānavirodhasya viruddhānāṃ ca sādhane / sarvatra sambhavāt kiñca viruddhāvyabhicāriṇaḥ //
Further, the contradiction of inference is possible in every reasoning; so also there is possibility in every case of the inferring of mutually contradictory conclusions;
tatra tāvac cārvākāḥ pramāṇayanti svārthānumānam pramāṇaṃ na bhavati, trirūpaliṅgapūrvatvān mithyājñānavat /
The Cārvākas urge the following arguments (against Inference, as a Means of Right Cognition): [see verses 1457-1459 above] Inference for one’s own sake cannot be right, because it is brought about by the three-featured Indicative, like the Wrong Cognition.
parārthāścakṣurādayaḥ saṅghātatvācchayanāsanādyaṅgavad ityetasyeṣṭavighātakṛtaḥ kila trirūpatvān mithyājñānametaj janyaṃ trirūpaliṅgajam iti /
[Here is a Wrong Cognition based upon a three-featured Indicative] ‘The eye and other organs are for the purpose of other persons, because they are composite things; like the Couch, the Seat and such things’; this is a wrong cognition, being subversive of a desirable idea, but brought about by a three-featured Indicative;
na ca trairūpyamanumitikāraṇam ananumāne 'pi bhāvād dvairūpyavat /
Nor can the presence of the Three Features in the Indicative be the means of Inference; because, like the Two Features, they are present also where there is no Inference.
api ca sarvatra sādhane 'numānavirodhaḥ sambhavati /
Further, in every reasoning, contradiction of Inference would be possible;
tadyathā vivakṣitasādhyadharmo dharmiviśeṣaṇaṃ na bhavati etat samudāyaikadeśatvād dharmisvarūpavat /
for example, it would always be possible to put forward the Inference that ‘The intended Probandum cannot reside in the Subject (Minor Term), because it is a part of the aggregate of all these several factors, like the form of the Minor Term itself’;
anena hi sarvamanumānaṃ niranumānīkṛtam /
and this would put an end to all Inferences.
sarvatra cānumāne kṛte viśeṣaviruddhānāṃ sambhavas tadyathā anityaḥ śabdaḥ kṛtakatvād ghaṭavad iti kṛte kaścid viśeṣaviruddham udbhāvayet / yathāyaṃ hetur anityatvaṃ sādhayati tathākāśaguṇatvābhāvamapītyevamādi /
Then again, in all cases, when an Inference has been put forward, there is always a possibility of several undesirable contingencies being put forward; for instance, when the Inference has been put forward that ‘Sound is non-eternal, because it is a product, like the Jar’, some one might set up the argument to the contrary, that ‘just as the reason asserted proves the non-eternality of Bound, so does it also prove the fact of its not being the quality of Ākāśa’, and so forth.
sarvatra ca viruddhāvyabhicārī sambhavati /
Lastly, in every case, it is possible to find a Reason that is concomitant with the contrary of the desired Conclusion;
tadyathā anityaḥ śabdaḥ kṛtakatvād ghaṭavad iti kṛte kaścid viruddhāvyabhicāriṇam āha nityaḥ śabdaḥ śrāvaṇatvācchabdatvavad iti /
for instance, the inference having been put forward, that ‘Sound is non-eternal, because it is a product, like the Jar’, some one may put forward the following reasoning which is concomitant with (and proves) the contrary of this conclusion ‘Sound is eternal, because it is perceptible by the Ear, like the universal Sound’.
evam ādistattvaṭīkāyām udāharaṇaprapañco draṣṭavyaḥ //
Several such examples may be found in the Tattvaṭīkā.
avasthādeśakālānāṃ bhedād bhinnāsu śaktiṣu / bhāvānam anumānena prasiddhir atidurlabhā //
“Condition, place and time being different in regard to different potencies, the cognition of things by means of inference is not attainable.
vijñātaśakter apyasya tāṃ tamarthakriyāṃ prati / viśiṣṭadravyasambandhe sā śaktiḥ pratibadhyate //
Even in the case of a thing whose potency is well-known, that potency becomes restricted in regard to particular effective actions, by becoming related to particular things.
yatnenānumito 'pyarthaḥ kuśalair anumātṛbhiḥ / abhiyuktatarair anyathaivopapādyate //
Even when a certain conclusion has been deduced with great care, from an inference, it may be proved to be otherwise by other more intelligent and clever persons well-versed in the art of reasoning” (vākyapadīya, p.
avasthādeśakālabhedena padārthānāṃ śaktayo bhinnāḥ /
The potency of things varies with their Condition, Time and Place;
ato na śakyate 'numānāt tadbhāvaniścayaḥ kartum, na hyevaṃ śakyate 'numānāt
hence no definite conclusion can be got at regarding them by means of Inference;
pratyetum devadatto bhārodvahanasamartho na bhavati, devadattatvād bālāvasthadevadattavad iti /
for instance, it is not possible to be convinced that ‘Devadatta is unable to bear the burden, because he is Devadatta, like Devadatta in the state of childhood’;
tathā deśabhedenāmalakīkharjūrādīnāṃ rasavīryavipākabhedo dṛśyate, tatranaivaṃ śakyate kartum sarvāmalakī kaṣāyaphalā, anubhūyamānāmalakīvaditi / tathā kālabhedena kūpodakādīnāṃ śītoṣṇādibhedaḥ sambhavati, tatra sarvāāpaḥ śītā iti [p.427] na śakyate niścayaḥ kartum /
here there is a possibility of the man’s potency having changed, hence the reasoning becomes ‘indecisive Similarly, difference in the place makes a difference in the taste, strength and ripening of the Āmalakī, the Kharjūra and other fruits; hence it cannot be argued that ‘all Āmalakī fruits are astringent, like the Āmalakī I am tasting now.’ Similarly difference of time leads to variations in the coolness and other properties of the water of the well, and hence it cannot be right to argue that ‘all water is cool’, and so on.
avasthādeśakālānām iti bhedād ityetadapekṣya ṣaṣṭhī /
‘Avasthādeśākālānām’; the Genitive ending goes with ‘bhedāt’;
bhāvānām iti prasiddhyapekṣayā /
and the Genitive in ‘Bhāvānām’ goes with ‘prasiddhi’,
tathā tṛṇādiṣu niścitadahanasāmarthyasyāgner abhrapaṭale tat sāmarthyaṃ pratihanyate, na ca tatraivamanumātuṃ śakyate abhrapaṭalamagninā dahyate pārthivattvāt tṛṇādivad iti /
Then again, the Fire’s capacity to burn, which is manifested in the case of grass, is set aside as against the mass of clouds; and there can be no such reasoning as ‘The mass of Clouds is burnt by Fire, because it is earthy (?), like the grass’.
tathānyenānyathā pratipādito 'rthaḥ punar abhiyuktatareṇānyenānyathā pratipādyata ityaniṣṭā //
Further, when one man has proved a certain fact, another man, more clever, proves quite the contrary of it;
parārthamanumānaṃ tu na mānaṃ vaktrapekṣayā /
“Inference for the benefit of another cannot be a means of right cognition, because it is only a reiteration so far as the speaker himself is concerned;
anuvādān na tenāsau svayam arthaṃ prapadyate //
as the man putting forward the inference does not himself derive his knowledge of the thing from that inference.
śrotṛvyapekṣayāpyetat svārthamevopapadyate /
For the other person, to whom the inference is addressed, the cognition so derived comes to be for his own sake;
śrotradarśanamūlāyāḥ ko viśeṣo hi saṃvidaḥ // na parārthānumānatvaṃ vacasaḥ śrotrapekṣayā /
because what difference is there between the cognition derived through the ear and that obtained through the eyes? so far as the other person is concerned, the statement (of the inference) cannot be regarded as inference for the sake of another;
śrotṛsantānavijñānahetutvajñāpakatvataḥ // yathendriyasya sākṣāc ca nānumeyaprakāśanam / tasmād asyāvinābhāvasambandhajñānavan na tat //
because it falls within the chain of cognitions produced by the ear, and because it is a means of cognition, like the sense-organ, nor is there any direct indication of the object inferred hence, like the idea of the relation of invariable concomitance, it cannot be a means of right cognition.
athocyate parārthatvaṃ paravyāvṛttyapekṣayā /
If it be explained that “it is called for the sake of another, because it leads to the activity of the other person”, that also cannot be right;
tadapyayuktaṃ svārthepi parārthatvaprasaṅgataḥ //
because (in this way), the inference for one’s own benefit also might be regarded as ‘for the sake of another’ [as that also might lead to the activity of other persons].” (1463-1467)
anyaḥ punar āha parārtham anumānaṃ vaktrapekṣayānuvādatvān na pramāṇam /
Another writer argues as follows: [see verses 1463-1467 above] Inference for the sake of others cannot be a means of right cognition, because it is only a reiteration, so far as the speaker himself is concerned.
śrotrapekṣayā tu svārtham eva, ko hi viśeṣaḥ śrotradvāreṇa tamarthaṃ pratipadyate darśanadvāreṇa ceti / yathā darśanendriyasya vyāpāre sati parārthavyapadeśo na bhavati, evaṃ śrotrendriyavyāpāre 'pi mābhūd iti /
what difference is there between the cognition of a thing derived through the Ear and that-derived through the Eyes? Just as, when one’s Visual Organ is operative, the resultant cognition is not spoken of as being ‘for the benefit of others’, so also it cannot be spoken of as such if the cognition is derived through the operation of the Auditory Organ.
darśanam cakṣurindriyaṃ / dṛśyate 'neneti kṛtvā /
The term ‘darśana’ stands for the Visual Organ, the term being derived as ‘dṛśyate anena’, ‘that whereby a thing is seen’.
saṃvida iti / jñānasya /
‘Saṃvit’ stands for cognition.
tathā na śrotrapekṣayā vacanasya parārthānumānatvam, śrotṛsantānavartijñānahetutvāt, jñāpakatvād vā, indriyavad iti /
Similarly, so far as the other person is concerned, to whom the Inference is addressed, the statement of the Inference cannot be said to be for the sake of others; because it falls within the chain of cognitions produced by the Ear, or because it is a means of cognition, like the Sense-organ.
śrotṛsantānavijñānahetutvaṃ ca jñāpakatvaṃ ceti dvandvena hetudvayanirdeśaḥ /
The compound ‘Śrotṛsantānādi’ contains the statement of two reasons;
yathendriyasyeti dṛṣṭāntanirdeśaḥ /
and ‘yatha indṛyasya’ cites the corroborative Instance.
ayamaparaḥ prayogaḥ na parārthānumānatvaṃ vacanasya śrotrapekṣayāsākṣādanumeyāprakāśakatvāt, avinābhāvasambandhajñānavat /
There is another argument also: So far as the other person is concerned, the statement of the Inference in question cannot be said to be ‘for the sake of another’, because it does not directly indicate the object inferred, like the cognition of the relation of Invariable concomitance.
tasmād iti / sākṣādanumeyāprakāśakatvāt /
‘Tasmāt’ i.e. because it does not directly indicate the object inferred.
yasmāt sākṣādanumeyāprakāśakatvaṃ tasmān na śrotrapekṣayā vacasaḥ prāmāṇyamavinābhāvasambandhajñānavad iti vākyārthaḥ / avinābhāvaḥ sādhyena sādhanasya, sa eva sambandhaḥ sādhyena yasya liṅgasyatasya jñānam iti vigrahaḥ /
What is meant is that because it is not directly indicative of the inferred object, therefore the statement cannot be regarded as a means of Right Cognition, it being like the Cognition of the relation of Invariable Concomitance, i.e. the ‘Invariable Concomitance’ between the Probans and the Probandum; and the cognition of an Indicative which is so related to the Probandum (is not by itself the Means of Right Cognition).
atha paravyāpārāpekṣayā taducyate parārtha iti /
If it be explained that “it is said to be for the benefit of another, because it leads to the activity of the other person”, even so it cannot be right;
tathā [p.428] 'pyayuktaṃ svārthe 'pi parārthatvaprasaṅgāt, āpekṣikatvāt paratvasya, pārācāravat //
because in that sense the Inference for one’s own benefit may also be for the benefit of others; because ‘another’ is a relative term; just like the term ‘other side’, (1463-1467)
trirūpaliṅgetyādinā pratividhatte / trirūpaliṅgapūrvatvaṃ nanu saṃvādilakṣaṇam /
When the inference is spoken of as ‘brought about by the three-featured indicative’, what is meant to be indicated is that it is compatible (with the real state of things);
tallakṣaṇaṃ ca mānatvaṃ tat kiṃ tasmānniṣidhyate //
and this same (compatibility) is what characterises the valid cognition; why then is it denied? (1468)
tatra prathame prayoge trirūpaliṅgapūrvatvād ityasya hetor viruddhatām āha saṃvādilakṣaṇam iti /
First of all, the author points out the ‘contradictory’ character of the Probans in the first argument propounded in Text 1457 viz.: “Because it is brought about by the three-featured Indicative”, ‘What is meant is that it is compatible, etc. etc.’;
saṃvāditvam anena lakṣyata iti kṛtvā /
that is, what is meant to be indicated is that it is compatible;
yatastrirūpaliṅgajaṃ yajjñānaṃ tat pāramparyeṇa vastuni pratibaddhamato 'visaṃvādakaṃ pratyakṣavat / yathāha "liṅgaliṅgidhiyorevaṃ pāramparyeṇa vastuni / pratibandhāt tadābhāsaśūnyayor apyavañcanam" //
the sense being that, because the cognition that proceeds from the Three-featured Indicative is indirectly appurtenant to the thing concerned, it is not incompatible, just like Sense-perception, as has been asserted in the following statement ‘Inasmuch as the Probans and the Probandum are indirectly appurtenant to the Thing, and are entirely free from any wrong notions regarding it, there can be nothing deceitful about it.’
iti /
‘This same’;
avisaṃvādalakṣaṇam /
i.e. compatibility;
yathāha ---"pramāṇamavisaṃvādijñānam" iti / nahi pratyakṣe 'pi tat pramāṇavādinānyat pramāṇavyavasthānibandhanaṃ śakyamādarśayitum anyatrāvisaṃvādāt /
as has been thus declared The cognition that is not incompatible is right (or valid) In the case of Sense-perception also, even for one who admits its validity there is nothing that can be pointed out as determining its validity, except this absence of incompatibility;
sa ca trirūpaliṅgajanye 'stīti kimiti tasmāttrirūpaliṅgapūrvatvād avisaṃvāditvahetoḥ prāmāṇyaṃ niṣidhyate /
and this same condition is present in the case of the cognition proceeding from the three-featured Indicative; why then is the validity of the cognition brought about by the Three-featured Indicative sought to be denied, on the ground of its being brought about by the Three-featured Indicative?
etena sādhyasādhanayor arthato virodha uktaḥ / tathā hi yatra trirūpaliṅgapūrvatvaṃ tatrāvisaṃvāditvaṃ yatrāvisaṃvāditvaṃ tatra prāmāṇyaṃ, prāmāṇyāprāmāṇyayoś ca parasparaparihārasthitalakṣaṇo virodha iti sāmarthyād viruddho hetur nirdiṣṭaḥ //
What is indicated by this is the incongruity between the Probandum and the Probans (as put forward by the Opponent (in 1457), For instance, where there is the character of being brought about by the three-featured Indicative, there is absence of incompatibility; and where there is absence of incompatibility, there is validity; and’validity and invalidity are mutually exclusive, the incompatibility consisting in the fact that where the one is present the other cannot be present and where the one is absent, the other is present;
mithyājñānam ityādinā dṛṣṭāntasya sādhyavikalatām āha
so that by implication the Probans put forward by the Opponent is ‘Contradictory (1468)