buddhist-nlp/tatpa-noisy · Datasets at Hugging Face

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dvitīyaprayoge dūṣaṇam āha candretyādi /	As regards ‘being spoken of as the moon this is present also in things where the probandum is known to be present;
candratvenāpadiṣṭatvaṃ sapakṣe 'pyanuvartate / kvacin māṇavake yadvā karpūrarajatādike //	or it is also sometimes present in the man (who is spoken of as the moon), or in camphor, silver and such other things (which are also called ‘moon’).
māṇavaka iti / puruṣe //	‘Māṇavake’ i.e. in Man.
nanu ca yadi candraprasādhanāya trirūpo hetuḥ sambhavati / kathaṃ tarhi yo 'candratvaṃ śaśini pratijānīte taṃ prati candratvasādhanāya lokasya bruvato 'numānābhāva ācāryeṇokto "yatrāpyasādhāraṇatvād anumānābhāve śabdaprasiddhena viruddhenārthenāpohyate yathācandraḥ śaśī sattvāditi nāsau pakṣa"	as, in the absence of any well-known fact regarding it, it would be based entirely upon the nature of the thing itself. Objection: “If a three-featured Probans is possible, for the proving of the ‘Moon’, then how is it that your Teacher has asserted that, when a man declares that the Moon is not the Moon, for the proving of its being the Moon against such a person, there can be no Inference, as he has asserted in the following passage ‘In the case where there can be no Inference on account of the thing in question being unique, it is excluded by its contrary which is well known in its verbal form;
candratvasādhane hetāvasādhāraṇatā bhavet /	when, for example, it is said that the Hare-holder is the Moon because it is an entity;
prasiddhivyatireke ca vasturūpasamāśraye //	In anticipation of this objection, the following answer has been provided: [see verse 1396 above]
vasturūpasamāśraya iti /	‘It would be based entirely, etc.’;
vastusadasattānurodhini sādhane / atrāsādhāraṇatoktā natu prasiddhilakṣaṇe hetau /	i.e. it is in regard to the Probans in the shape of the existence or non-existence of things, that ‘Uniqueness’ has been asserted, not in regard to a Probans in the form of a.
tasyecchānurodhitvād astyevānvayaḥ /	because in the case of the latter, as it is dependent upon the wish of the speaker, the necessary concomitance would always be there.
yasmād asau vipratipannaḥ sarvapratītyapalāpī na śakyate prasiddhilakṣaṇena candratvaṃ pratipādayitum / na cānyalliṅgam asti vastubalapravṛttaṃ, yena candratvaṃ śaśini pratipādyeta candrādivyapadeśasyecchāmātrānurodhitvenāvastudharmatvād iti taṃ pratyadṛṣṭāntakamanumānam uktam /	The Inference, without a Corroborative Instance, hàs been spoken of only in the case •where the other party holds a different opinion and denies all experience, and consequently cannot be convinced of the thing being the Moon on the basis of any well-known fact, nor is there any Inferential Indicative (Probans) based upon the capacity of things by which the Moon-ness could be proved in reference to the Hare-holder, because the name ‘Moon’ is based upon the mere whim of the speaker and is not an inherent property of the thing concerned.
yathoktam	That this is so is clear from the following statement ‘One who does not wish to attribute Moon-ness to the Hare-holder, what sort of well-known cognition could he want? It is for this reason that the Inference addressed to him has to be without a Corroborative Instance, and hence unique, too specific.’
"candratāṃ [p.412] śaśino 'nicchan kāṃ pratītiṃ sa vāñchati /	In place of ‘candratvasādhane’, ‘To prove Moon-ness’, some texts read ‘acandrasādhane’, ‘to prove that it is not-Moon’;
tatraivam iti sambandhaḥ / pūrvapakṣavādinā ya ukto 'candraḥ śaśī sattvād iti hetus tasminnacandrasādhanhetau pūrvapakṣavādinā prokte sati candratvasādhanāya taṃ prati pravṛttasyottarapakṣavādino 'sādhāraṇatānumānābhāve kāraṇamācāryeṇoditaṃ "yatrāpyasādhāraṇatvād anumānābhāva"ityādinā prasiddhivyatiriktaṃ vastubalapravṛttaṃ liṅgamāśrityeti //	and with this reading, the explanation would be as follows: Where the other party has asserted that ‘The Hare-holder is not the Moon, because it exists’, when the Probans, ‘because it exists’, has been cited by that party for proving the ‘Non-moon-character’, then, the person who proceeds to answer him by proving the ‘Moon-character’, has a reason why he cannot put forward an Inference of ‘uniqueness’; and it is this reason that the Teacher has indicated by asserting that ‘where, on account of uniqueness, there is no Inference, etc, etc.’, which refers to the absence of an Inferential Indicative in the shape of the character of the thing concerned, as apart from any well-known fact (which could be cited).
tṛtīye 'pi hetāvāha patadityādi /	The following Text points out the defect in the third argument (put forward by Pātrasvāmin, in Text 1373, regarding the ‘falling insect’): [see verse 1397 above]
patatkīṭakṛtatvasya na viśeṣaḥ samīkṣyate /	‘There is no distinction perceived’, between the Probans (Premiss) and the Proposition (Conclusion);
patatkīṭakasaṃsparśapratilabdhodayasya ca //	‘Falling’ must be made a qualification in the probans;
na viśeṣaḥ samīkṣyata iti /	otherwise ‘inconclusiveness’ (falsity) would be inevitable.
hetupratijñayoḥ / pratijñārthaikadeśo hetur iti yāvat / tathā hi atra viśiṣṭakīṭahetutvaṃ vedanāyāḥ sādhyatveneṣṭam, tadeva ca śabdāntareṇa hetunoktam iti na viśeṣo hetupratijñayoḥ // atha matam yadā patata ityetad viśeṣaṇaṃ nopādīyate pratilabdhodayatvād ityeva tu sāmānyaṃ heturucyate tadā na pratijñārthaikadeśatetyāha patata	If what is meant to be proved (asserted in the conclusion) is that between the two (the pain and the insect) there is the relation of cause and effect, which has been forgotten, then the probans would be ‘three-featured’, as there would be a corroborative instance provided by previous experience. The following might be urged “If the epithet falling is not introduced, and the Probans (Premiss) is stated in the general form ‘because its appearance is felt’, then the Premiss cannot be a part of the Conclusion.”
ityādi /	Answer: [see verses 1398-1399 above]
patato 'syeti kāryaṃ hi dhruvaṃ hetor viśeṣaṇam /	The qualification must be there;
anyathā vyabhicāritvaṃ durnivāraṃ prasajyate //	otherwise the Premiss would be falsified by reference to the Pain caused by other insects.
atha kāryakāraṇavyavahāro vismṛtaṃ prati sādhyate, tathāsati trirūpo hetuḥ syād agnidhūmādeḥ prasiddhakāryakāraṇasya dṛṣṭāntatvena vidyamānatvsāt //	It might be urged that “what is meant to be proved is the relation of Cause and Effect for the benefit of one who has forgotten it, then, in that case, the Probans would become ‘three-featured’, as the Corroborative Instance would be provided by such well-known cases as that of Smoke and Fire.
cakṣūrūpetyādāvāha cakṣuṣa ityādi /	As a matter of fact, the very existence of the eye, which is the subject is still uncertain;
tasyāś ca sādhanaṃ yuktaṃ nāsiddhyādiprasaṅgataḥ //	and the proving of this (existence) cannot be right, as it would be open to the defects of ‘inadmissibility’ and the rest.
tasyāś ca sādhanaṃ yuktaṃ neti chedaḥ /	There is a stop after ‘na’ (in the second line).
asiddhyādītyādiśabdena vyabhicāravirodhayor grahaṇam /	‘Inadmissibility and the rest The term ‘and the rest’ includes ‘falsity’ and ‘contradiction’.
sattāyāṃ sādhyāyāṃ sarvo hetur doṣatrayaṃ nātivartate /	What is meant is that if Existence is to be proved, then the Probans put forward is open to all the three defects of the Probans.
tathā hi bhāve dharme hetāvasiddhatā, ubhayadharme 'naikāntikatā, abhāvadharme viruddhatā / yathoktam	For instance, if the character cited as the Probans is something positive, then it is ‘inadmissible’; if it is both (positive and negative), then it is ‘Inconclusive’;
[p.413] "nāsiddher bhāvadharmo 'sti vyabhicāryubhayāśrayaḥ /	if it is negative, then it is ‘contradictory This has been thus declared ‘The positive property is not admitted;
dharmo viruddho bhāvaś ca sā sattā sādhyate katham" // iti /	and the negative one would be contradictory; how then can Existence be proved?’
atha cakṣuṣi dharmiṇi cakṣur vijñānotpādanaśaktiḥ sādhyate tadāpi śaktiḥ sattetyādeḥ paryāyatvāt tatsādhane sattāsādhanaprasaṅgaḥ / vyatireke 'pi tasyā atīndriyatvenāsiddhatvād āśrayāsiddho hetuḥ syāt /	If what is sought to be proved is the potency in the Eye, the Subject, to bring about visual perception, even so, inasmuch as ‘potency’, ‘existence’, etc. are synonymous, the proving of Potency would involve the proving of Existence. On the negative aspect also, inasmuch as the Potency, being beyond the reach of the senses, would not be well-known, the Probans would become fallacious, as having no well-known substratum.
evaṃ rūpagrahaṇād ityayam apyapakṣadharmatvād asiddho draṣṭavyaḥ //	Similarly, the Probans, in the form ‘because of the perception of Colour’, would be something not present in the Subject, and hence it should be understood to be Inadmissible.
kathaṃ tarhi bhavatām api cakṣurādīndriyasiddhir ity āha kintvityādi /	Question: “How then can you also prove the existence of the Eyes and the other sense-organs?” Answer: [see verse 1401 next]
kintu rūpādibhāve 'pi cakṣur jñānaṃ na jāyate /	But sometimes, even though colour and other things are there, visual perception does not take place;
kadācittena tanmātraṃ na hetur iti gamyate //	hence it is understood that that (perception) alone cannot be a reason (for the existence of the eye).
kadācid iti / nimīlitalocanāvasthāyām /	‘Sometimes’, when, for instance, the Eyes are closed.
na hyasmābhir āhatya cakṣurādīdantayā sādhyate, apitu jñānaṃ keṣucidrūpādiṣu satsvanvayavyatirekāvanubhavaddṛśyate tasya kāraṇāntarāpekṣitā tanmātrāsambhavitā ca sādhyata iti tadeva jñānaṃ dharmīti nāsiddhyādidoṣaḥ/ yat tatkāraṇāntaraṃ taccakṣur iti vyavahriyate /	We never seek to prove the existence of the Eye directly as ‘this is the Eye’; what happens (according to us) is that it is found that the Perception appears only when certain things, in the form of Colour, etc. are there, and it is so found that it is present when these things are there, and it is absent when they are absent; and what we seek to prove is that the Perception could not have those things alone as its cause, that it must have some other cause; so that the Subject (of our Inference) is the said Perception, which cannot be said to be ‘unknown’, What this other cause is comes to be spoken of as the ‘Eye’,
siddhāntāśrayas tu bhedavyavahāraḥ //	The basis of our conclusion is the practical notion of diversity.
syād etat bhavatu yathoktayā nītyā vijñānasya dharmitvam, tathāpi dvirūpa eva hetur ity āha svahetviti /	The following might be urged It may be that, in the manner shown, the Perception may be the Subject; even so, the Probans remains only ‘two-featured’”. The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 1402 above]
svahetuniyatā hetupratibaddhā, udbhūtir yasyāsau sa tathoktaḥ /	‘Inseparably connected with its Cause’ invariably concomitant with its Cause is the birth appearance, coming into existence of the Sprout.
evambhūtāḥ svakāraṇāyattajanmāno 'ṅkurādayaḥ kādācitkā dṛṣṭāntatvena sambhavantīti yāvat /	Things like the Sprout, having their birth dependent upon their Cause and hence coming into existence only occasionally, are possible as the Corroborative Instance (in the proving of the Visual Perception as being due to the Eye);
ye yat sannidhāne kādācitkās te na tanmātrasambhavinaḥ, kāraṇāntarasavyapekṣakāś ca tadyathā satsvapi kṣityādiṣu bījasannidhānāsannidhānābhyām anvayavyatirekiṇo 'ṅkurādayaḥ, satsvapi rūpādiṣu kādācitkaṃ cakṣur jñānaṃ nimīlitānimīlitāvasthāyām iti vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhiḥ pratiṣedhe /	the argument being formulated thus: Those things that appear on the presence of something else, only occasionally, cannot be regarded as produced from that alone, they must be regarded as dependent upon other causes, for instance, even when the soil and other things are there, the Sprout is found to appear or not to appear according as the seed is there or not there; even when Colour, etc. are there, the Visual Perception appears only at certain times, according as the Eyes are closed or not closed; hence in the case of the denial of the Eye, the argument would point out that the said denial would be contrary to a wider proposition;
vidhau tu svabhāvahetuḥ //	while in the case of the asserting of the existence of the Eye, it would contain a natural reason.
kathañcid ityādāvāha kathañciditi / kathañcid asadātmatvasādhane ca ghaṭādiṣu /	In proving that the jar and other things are “somehow nonexistent”, the probans is found as, in a previous case, to be ‘futile’ and also ‘inadmissible’.
pūrvavaddhetuvaiphalyam asiddhiś ca dṛśyate //	Here also, there would be proving what is already admitted;
atrāpi siddhasādhyatā kenacitprakāreṇa ghaṭādīnām asattvasya siddhatvāt /	as the fact of the Jar, etc. being ‘somehow non-existent’ is already admitted.
atha na [p.414] siddham, anupalabhyamānatvād ityayaṃ hetur api na sidhyatītyasiddho hetur itipūrvavad vācyaṃ dūṣaṇaṃ yathā sadātmatvasādhane hetāvuktam //	In case it is not admitted, then the Probans also, in the form ‘because it is not apprehended’, cannot be admitted; so that the Probans becomes ‘Inadmissible’. In this way, the defect in the Probans may be pointed out, just as it was in connection with the argument seeking to prove that the things in question are existent.
asti cātrāpi vispaṣṭaṃ vaidharmyeṇa nidarśanam /	Here also, there is a clear corroborative instance per dissimilarity;
tadeva teṣāṃ svaṃ rūpaṃ prayāti hi vipakṣatām // kathañcana sadātmatvasādhanepi nirātmasu /	that same form of the things becomes the thing where the probandum is known to be absent, in the proving of the character of ‘being somehow existent’ in regard to non-entities, there would be ‘proving of what is already admitted’;
iṣṭasiddhir asiddhiś ca vaidharmāptis tathaiva ca //	also ‘inadmissibility’, and the concomitance of the contrary character in that way.
yena rūpeṇopalabhyante ghaṭādayas tena rūpeṇa sadātmatvaṃ teṣām iṣṭam eva	That form in which the Jar, etc. are apprehended, if their existence in that form is accepted by them, then, in that case, that same character would also serve as the Instance per dissimilarity;
tasmin svabhāve 'nupalabhyamānatvasya hetor nivṛttatvāt /	because in that character, the Probans ‘being unapprehended’ will have ceased to exist.
evaṃ kathañcanetyatrāpi prayoge tulyā iṣṭasiddhādayaḥ /	Similarly in the case of the argument regarding things being ‘somehow existent’, the defect of ‘futility’ would be present.
nirātmasviti / abhāveṣu /	‘Nirātmasu’ i.e. in non-entities.
vaidharmyāptir iti vaidharmyasya sādhyanivṛttilakṣaṇasya sādhanābhāvenāptir vyāptiḥ /	‘Concomitance of the contrary character’; i.e. the ‘contrary character’, in the shape of the cessation of the Probandum would be pervaded by (concomitant with) the absence of the Probans.
tathaiveti svabhāvasya vaidharmyasambhavena //	‘In that way’ i.e. by the possibility of the Instance per dissimilarity.
pitṛśabdaśruteryāpi veśmanaḥ pratipādyate / pitṛsambandhitā tatra vyakto hetustrilakṣaṇaḥ //	When the presence of the father in the house is sought to be proved by the hearing of the father’s voice, the probans in this case is clearly ‘three-featured’.
kvacid vipratisambaddhaḥ svaraḥ prāgupalakṣitaḥ /	As, surely, at some time previously the concomitance of the voice has been perceived;
tasyānanubhave pūrvaṃ durdharā hetvasiddhatā // tasyeti pitṛsambaddhasyānyatra kvacit pradeśe 'nanubhave satyasiddho hetuḥ syāt //1406---------	The following Texts point out the defects in the argument propounded (by Pātrasvāmin), in Text 1377, regarding “Your father being present in the house, etc. etc.”: [see verses 1406-1407 above] ‘Tasya’: the voice as belonging to the Father must certainly have been heard before. If it had not, then the Probans would be inadmissible.
yasmin nityādinā tad eva trairūpyam ādarśayati	The said three-featured character of the Probans is shown in the following: [see verses 1408-1415 next]
yasmin prāgupalabdhaś ca nopalabdhaś ca yatra saḥ / anvayo vyatireko vā vispaṣṭaṃ tatra dṛśyate // śabdas tu jñāpayatyarthaṃ naiva bāhyaṃ kathañcana /	In that house wherein the father had been found before, and also in that wherein he had not been found before, there is the concomitance, positive and negative, clearly perceived, as regards the word, it does not make known any external object at all;
anyathāsambhavābhāvād vilakṣāgamakastvasau //	because in this case, the character of ‘being otherwise impossible’ is not present;
vivakṣāsaṃmukhībhāve na hi śabdaḥ prayujyate //	Because when the ‘speaker’s wish’ is not there, the word cannot be used.
dīpastu jñāpako naiva nīlāder liṅgabhāvataḥ /	As regards the lamp, it does not make the blue and other things known by becoming the indicative (inferential);
jñānotpādanayogyasya jananāt tu tathocyate // [p.415] jñāpake liṅgarūpe ca pakṣadharmādi cintyate /	and it is only in this sense that it is called a ‘means of cognition only in case the word were an inferential indicative, would it be necessary to consider if it fulfils the conditions of being present in the subject (minor term.) and so forth.
anyathā cakṣurādīnāṃ kasmād etan na codyate // anyathānupapattyāpi cākṣuṣatvaṃ na sādhakam / pakṣadharmaviyogena klībās tenaikalakṣaṇaḥ //	Otherwise, why cannot the same be urged in connection with the eye and other organs (as means of cognition)? Even through the character of ‘being otherwise impossible’, visibility cannot prove anything, unless it is present in the subject (minor term). Thus ‘one-featured’ probans are all impotent.
ekarūpatayoktānāṃ dvairūpyaṃ copalakṣitam / dvirūpatvena coktānāṃ trairūpyaṃ pakṣadharmataḥ //	In those that have been cited as ‘one-featured’ probans, the presence of two features becomes clearly indicated; and in those that have been cited as ‘two-featured’, the presence of three features becomes clearly indicated;
anyathānupapattyaiva cākṣepāditi cen na tat /	If it be argued that “this feature is implied by the character of being otherwise impossible”, that cannot be so;
śabdādāvanyathāpīṣṭe cākṣuṣatve 'tha nāstyasau //	because in the case of sound, though visibility may be otherwise desired, it is not present in sound (which is the subject).
śabdasya bāhyārthāpekṣayānyathānupapannatvam asiddham iti taṃ pratyaliṅgatvam icchāmātravṛttitvāt tasya, atha buddhiparivartinām artham apekṣya, tadā trailakṣaṇyam asty eva dhūmasyeva, yato vivakṣāyā asammukhībhāve śabdasyāprayogāt tatkāryatvād bhūmavajjātavedase gamaka iṣṭa eva, natu vācakarūpeṇa /	because it cannot serve as an Inferential Indicative of these latter, being, as it is, dependent entirely upon the Speaker’s wish. If the said character is asserted in the case of words, in reference to the object that figures in the cognition (brought about by the words), then, there are all the three features present, as in the case of Smoke (indicating the Fire). Because, if the Speaker’s wish is not there, words cannot be used, the use must be regarded as the effect of that wish; and as such it is indicative of the thing spoken of, just as the Smoke is of Fire;
pradīpastu liṅgadvāreṇa dhūmavan na jñāpaka iṣṭaḥ /	but not as being expressive of the thing. As regards the Lamp, it is not admitted to be even the Indicator like Smoke;
kiṃ tarhivijñānajananayogyaghaṭādyutpādanena jñāpako rūḍho natu liṅgatveneti tasya liṅgabhūtasya pakṣadharmatvādicintā na yuktaiva / anyathā cakṣurādīnām api pakṣadharmatvādi codanīyaṃ syāt /	but the words are not inferential Indicatives; hence any discussion as to the Indicative subsisting in the Subject cannot arise in this case. If it did arise in this case, then why could not the same discussion arise in the case of the Eye and the rest (which are the means of Sense-perception, not Inferential Indicatives)?
anyathetyādi prakṛtārthopasaṃhāraḥ /	‘Otherwise, etc. etc.’; this sums up the subject-matter under consideration.
yataś cākṣuṣatvam anityatvāvinābhāvyapi śabde tadanityatvaṃ na sādhayati, yataścāvaśyaṃ sarvatra pakṣadharmatvamāśrayaṇīyam, ataḥ pakṣadharmatvāśrayaṇādekarūpatayoktānāṃ dvairūpyamāvaśyakaṃ dvirūpatayā coktānāṃ, trairūpyaṃ tata eva pakṣadharmata ityekalakṣaṇā eva klībā hetavaḥ /	The sense is that, even though Visibility is invariably concomitant with non-eternality, it does not prove this non-eternality in Sound. Thus then, inasmuch as in all cases, the condition of subsisting in the Subject must be present, by admitting this as a necessary condition, those Probans that have been cited as ‘one-featured’, must, necessarily, become ‘two-featured’, and those cited as ‘two-featured’ must become ‘three-featured Thus, on account of the necessity of subsistence in the Subject, it is the one-featured Probans that are really impotent.
na caitad vaktavyam anyathānupapattyaiva pakṣadharmatvam antareṇāpyanyathānupapannatvam astīti svayam evoktam ---"anyathānupapattyaiva śabdādivastuṣv apakṣadharmabhāve 'pi dṛṣṭā jñāpakatāpi ce"ti /	It cannot be right to argue that “such characters as subsisting in the Subject are all implied by that of ‘being otherwise impossible’, and hence they cannot form so many different independent characteristics of the Probans” because the other party has himself asserted that there is the character of ‘being otherwise impossible’, even when subsistence in the Subject is not there, in the following passage “Through the character of being otherwise impossible the Lamp and other things are actually indicative of things, even though they do not reside in the subject (Text 1378, above)”.
cākṣuṣatve cānityatvānyathānupapanne 'pyasau pakṣadharmo nāstītyanekānta	In the case of Visibility, even though ‘non-eternality’ is ‘otherwise impossible’, visibility does not subsist in the Subject.
yad uktaṃ sa śyāmas tatputratvād ity eṣa trilakṣaṇe 'pi na niścityai pravartata ity atrāha tat putretyādi /	So that in every way what has been asserted is entirely doubtful. In the case of such probans as ‘because he is the son of so and so’, the contrary being open to doubt, the three conditions are not present;
na trailakṣaṇyasadbhāvo vijātīyāvirodhataḥ //	because what is cited is not incompatible with the contrary.
[p.416] tatputraś ca bhaviṣyati na ca śyāma iti nātra kaścid virodha iti saṃdigdhavipakṣavyāvṛttikatvān nāyaṃ trilakṣaṇa ityasiddho dṛṣṭāntaḥ //	It has been argued above, under Text 1370 that “in the case of the Reasoning ‘He is dark because he is the son of so and so’, even though the Probans has all the three features, yet it is not conducive to certainty of cognition”. The answer to that is as follows: [see verse 1416 above]
syād etat astyeva virodhaḥ /	there being no incompatibility in this, the absence of the Probans
kāraṇābhede sati yadi kāryaṃ bhidyeta nirhetukaṃ syād ity āha karmetyādi /	where the Probandum is known to be absent is open to doubt [and this is one of the three features]; so that the Probans is not ‘three featured’; hence the example cited (by Pātrasvāmin) is not relevant.
karmāhārādihetūnāṃ sarvathāpi viśeṣataḥ / sambhāvyate 'nyathābhāvas tatputratve 'pi tasya hi //	Even when the child is born of a certain person, there is always a likelihood of diversity in its features, by reason of the peculiarities of such causes as the ‘destiny’ (of the child) and food (of the parents) and so forth.
nāyaṃ svabhāvaḥ kāryaṃ vā dṛśyasyādṛṣṭir eva vā /	(b) nor is that its effect; (c) nor is it of the nature of ‘the non-perception of the perceptible’;
naca tadvyatiriktasya bhavatyavyabhicāritā //	and apart from these (three) there is nothing that can make the probans ‘infallible’ (true).
śubhādikarmaviśeṣād uṣṇaśītādyāhārāvasthābhedāc cānyathābhāvo gaurāditvaṃ sambhāvyata iti kuto virodhaḥ, kāraṇabhedasya siddhatvāt /	Through such causes as the peculiarity of past good deeds (Destiny) and eating of hot food and other diverse circumstances, diversity in the features of the child such as fairness and the like are possible; wherefore then can there be any incompatibility where a diversity in the causes is well known?
api ca tat putratvād iti nāyaṃ svabhāvahetur yathā kṛtakatvaṃ, nahi kṛtakatvasyānyat tattvam asti muktvānityatvam nanvevaṃ tatputratvasyānyaḥ svabhāvonāsti yataḥ pañcopādānaskaṃdhātmakasya kañcid apekṣya tatputra iti vyapadeśonatu śyāmatvasya /	Then again, the Premiss ‘Because he is the son of so and so’ is not a ‘natural’ Reason, as ‘being a product’ is (in the proving of non-eternality); in the latter case, ‘being a product’ can have no other character save that of non-eternality; while in the case in question it is not that there is no other character for ‘being his son’; because the appellation of ‘his son’ is applied, not on the ground of the son being dark, but on the basis of the aggregate of five ingredients (of which the body of the child consists).
nāpi kāryahetuḥ /	Nor is the Probans one based on ‘effect’;
nāpyanupalabdhir vidhiviṣayatvāt /	as there is no causal relation known to subsist (between Being his son and Darkness).
virodhābhāvāc ca na śyāmetaravarṇābhāvasiddhiḥ / nacaitad vyatiriktaṃ liṅgam astyanyatra pratibandhābhāvāt / naca pratibandhamantareṇa gamakatvam atiprasaṅgāt tasmān nāyaṃ hetur nāpi	also because there being no incongruity between the two, the Probans cannot prove the negation of complexions other than the Dark. Apart from these three there can be no Inferential Indicative, because of the absence of ‘Invariable Concomitance’ (in all other cases); without Invariable Concomitance, there can be no proper ‘indicative’ character;
trilakṣaṇa iti kuto 'vyabhicāraḥ / dṛśyasyādṛṣṭirupalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptānupalabdhiḥ // nanu cetyādināvyāpitāṃ lakṣaṇadoṣam āha	Thus then, what has been cited is neither a ‘Probans’, nor is it ‘three-featured How then could there be ‘Infallibility’ in it? ‘Non-perception of the perceptible’ is the non-apprehension of something which fulfils all the conditions of apprehensibility, (1417-1418)
nanu cāvyabhicāritvam anyeṣām api dṛśyate / kumudānāṃ vikāsasya vṛddhiś ca jaladher yathā //	“The said ‘infallibility’ is seen in other cases also: for instance, (1) the blooming of the lily and the rise in the sea have the rise of the moon for their ‘indicative’.
liṅgaṃ candrodayo dṛṣṭa ātapasya ca bhāvataḥ /	(2) From the presence of sun-light, the presence of shade on the other side is inferred.
tamasyulmukadṛṣṭau ca dhūma ārāt pratīyate /	(3) When the half-burnt wood-piece is seen in the dark from a distance, it brings up the idea of smoke.
kṛttikodayaścāpi rohiṇyāsattikalpanā //	(4) From the rise of the kṛttikā (asterism) is inferred the proximity of the rohiṇī (asterism).” (1419-1421)
yathā candrodayāt kumudavikāsasamudravṛddhyoranumānam /	(1) From the Rise of the Moon follows the inference of the Blooming of the Lily and the Rise in the Sea.
ādigrahaṇāt sūryodayāt padmavikāśasya, atapasadbhāvāt parvatādiṣu parabhāge cchāyānumitiḥ evaṃ dūrāt tamasyulmukamarddhadagdhakāṣṭhakhaṇḍakaṃ dṛṣṭvā dhūmapratītiḥ, tathā kṛttikānakṣatrodayādrohiṇīnakṣatrasyāsa [p.417] nnatvaṃ pratīyate yato 'śvinīmārabhya yathāpāṭhaṃ krameṇaiva nakṣatrāṇām	The term ‘ādi’ is meant to include such cases as the Blooming of the Lotus inferred from the Rise of the Sun. (2) From the presence of sun-light, there follows the inference of the shadow on the other side. (3) When from a distance one sees in the darkness a half burnt piece of wood, he infers the presence of smoke, (4) From the rise of the asterism Kṛttikā, one infers the proximity of the asterism Rohiṇī; since it is well known that the asterisms rise in the same order in which they are enumerated in the list beginning with Aśvinī.
na cāsya sarvasya hetutrayāntarbhāvo 'stīti tat kumucyate na tadvyatiriktasyabhavatyavyabhicāriteti //	All these are not included among the three kinds of Probans (mentioned in Texts 1417-1418). Why then should it be asserted that there can be no ‘Infallibility’ in any Probans other than those of the said three kinds? (1419-1421)
atrottaram āha tadatretyādi /	The answer to the above is as follows: [see verses 1422-1423 next]
tadatra hetudharmasya tādṛśo 'numitair matāḥ / jātās tadekakālās te sarve bodhādayo 'pare //	because if the Probans were to lead to the inference of things without some such relationship, then they might lead to the inference of anything and everything;
sambandhānupapattau ca sarvasyāpi gatir bhavet //	because the absence of relationship would be equally present in all things.

dvitīyaprayoge dūṣaṇam āha candretyādi /

As regards ‘being spoken of as the moon this is present also in things where the probandum is known to be present;

candratvenāpadiṣṭatvaṃ sapakṣe 'pyanuvartate / kvacin māṇavake yadvā karpūrarajatādike //

or it is also sometimes present in the man (who is spoken of as the moon), or in camphor, silver and such other things (which are also called ‘moon’).

māṇavaka iti / puruṣe //

‘Māṇavake’ i.e. in Man.

nanu ca yadi candraprasādhanāya trirūpo hetuḥ sambhavati / kathaṃ tarhi yo 'candratvaṃ śaśini pratijānīte taṃ prati candratvasādhanāya lokasya bruvato 'numānābhāva ācāryeṇokto "yatrāpyasādhāraṇatvād anumānābhāve śabdaprasiddhena viruddhenārthenāpohyate yathācandraḥ śaśī sattvāditi nāsau pakṣa"

as, in the absence of any well-known fact regarding it, it would be based entirely upon the nature of the thing itself. Objection: “If a three-featured Probans is possible, for the proving of the ‘Moon’, then how is it that your Teacher has asserted that, when a man declares that the Moon is not the Moon, for the proving of its being the Moon against such a person, there can be no Inference, as he has asserted in the following passage ‘In the case where there can be no Inference on account of the thing in question being unique, it is excluded by its contrary which is well known in its verbal form;

candratvasādhane hetāvasādhāraṇatā bhavet /

when, for example, it is said that the Hare-holder is the Moon because it is an entity;

prasiddhivyatireke ca vasturūpasamāśraye //

In anticipation of this objection, the following answer has been provided: [see verse 1396 above]

vasturūpasamāśraya iti /

‘It would be based entirely, etc.’;

vastusadasattānurodhini sādhane / atrāsādhāraṇatoktā natu prasiddhilakṣaṇe hetau /

i.e. it is in regard to the Probans in the shape of the existence or non-existence of things, that ‘Uniqueness’ has been asserted, not in regard to a Probans in the form of a.

tasyecchānurodhitvād astyevānvayaḥ /

because in the case of the latter, as it is dependent upon the wish of the speaker, the necessary concomitance would always be there.

yasmād asau vipratipannaḥ sarvapratītyapalāpī na śakyate prasiddhilakṣaṇena candratvaṃ pratipādayitum / na cānyalliṅgam asti vastubalapravṛttaṃ, yena candratvaṃ śaśini pratipādyeta candrādivyapadeśasyecchāmātrānurodhitvenāvastudharmatvād iti taṃ pratyadṛṣṭāntakamanumānam uktam /

The Inference, without a Corroborative Instance, hàs been spoken of only in the case •where the other party holds a different opinion and denies all experience, and consequently cannot be convinced of the thing being the Moon on the basis of any well-known fact, nor is there any Inferential Indicative (Probans) based upon the capacity of things by which the Moon-ness could be proved in reference to the Hare-holder, because the name ‘Moon’ is based upon the mere whim of the speaker and is not an inherent property of the thing concerned.

yathoktam

That this is so is clear from the following statement ‘One who does not wish to attribute Moon-ness to the Hare-holder, what sort of well-known cognition could he want? It is for this reason that the Inference addressed to him has to be without a Corroborative Instance, and hence unique, too specific.’

"candratāṃ [p.412] śaśino 'nicchan kāṃ pratītiṃ sa vāñchati /

In place of ‘candratvasādhane’, ‘To prove Moon-ness’, some texts read ‘acandrasādhane’, ‘to prove that it is not-Moon’;

tatraivam iti sambandhaḥ / pūrvapakṣavādinā ya ukto 'candraḥ śaśī sattvād iti hetus tasminnacandrasādhanhetau pūrvapakṣavādinā prokte sati candratvasādhanāya taṃ prati pravṛttasyottarapakṣavādino 'sādhāraṇatānumānābhāve kāraṇamācāryeṇoditaṃ "yatrāpyasādhāraṇatvād anumānābhāva"ityādinā prasiddhivyatiriktaṃ vastubalapravṛttaṃ liṅgamāśrityeti //

and with this reading, the explanation would be as follows: Where the other party has asserted that ‘The Hare-holder is not the Moon, because it exists’, when the Probans, ‘because it exists’, has been cited by that party for proving the ‘Non-moon-character’, then, the person who proceeds to answer him by proving the ‘Moon-character’, has a reason why he cannot put forward an Inference of ‘uniqueness’; and it is this reason that the Teacher has indicated by asserting that ‘where, on account of uniqueness, there is no Inference, etc, etc.’, which refers to the absence of an Inferential Indicative in the shape of the character of the thing concerned, as apart from any well-known fact (which could be cited).

tṛtīye 'pi hetāvāha patadityādi /

The following Text points out the defect in the third argument (put forward by Pātrasvāmin, in Text 1373, regarding the ‘falling insect’): [see verse 1397 above]

patatkīṭakṛtatvasya na viśeṣaḥ samīkṣyate /

‘There is no distinction perceived’, between the Probans (Premiss) and the Proposition (Conclusion);

patatkīṭakasaṃsparśapratilabdhodayasya ca //

‘Falling’ must be made a qualification in the probans;

na viśeṣaḥ samīkṣyata iti /

otherwise ‘inconclusiveness’ (falsity) would be inevitable.

hetupratijñayoḥ / pratijñārthaikadeśo hetur iti yāvat / tathā hi atra viśiṣṭakīṭahetutvaṃ vedanāyāḥ sādhyatveneṣṭam, tadeva ca śabdāntareṇa hetunoktam iti na viśeṣo hetupratijñayoḥ // atha matam yadā patata ityetad viśeṣaṇaṃ nopādīyate pratilabdhodayatvād ityeva tu sāmānyaṃ heturucyate tadā na pratijñārthaikadeśatetyāha patata

If what is meant to be proved (asserted in the conclusion) is that between the two (the pain and the insect) there is the relation of cause and effect, which has been forgotten, then the probans would be ‘three-featured’, as there would be a corroborative instance provided by previous experience. The following might be urged “If the epithet falling is not introduced, and the Probans (Premiss) is stated in the general form ‘because its appearance is felt’, then the Premiss cannot be a part of the Conclusion.”

ityādi /

Answer: [see verses 1398-1399 above]

patato 'syeti kāryaṃ hi dhruvaṃ hetor viśeṣaṇam /

The qualification must be there;

anyathā vyabhicāritvaṃ durnivāraṃ prasajyate //

otherwise the Premiss would be falsified by reference to the Pain caused by other insects.

atha kāryakāraṇavyavahāro vismṛtaṃ prati sādhyate, tathāsati trirūpo hetuḥ syād agnidhūmādeḥ prasiddhakāryakāraṇasya dṛṣṭāntatvena vidyamānatvsāt //

It might be urged that “what is meant to be proved is the relation of Cause and Effect for the benefit of one who has forgotten it, then, in that case, the Probans would become ‘three-featured’, as the Corroborative Instance would be provided by such well-known cases as that of Smoke and Fire.

cakṣūrūpetyādāvāha cakṣuṣa ityādi /

As a matter of fact, the very existence of the eye, which is the subject is still uncertain;

tasyāś ca sādhanaṃ yuktaṃ nāsiddhyādiprasaṅgataḥ //

and the proving of this (existence) cannot be right, as it would be open to the defects of ‘inadmissibility’ and the rest.

tasyāś ca sādhanaṃ yuktaṃ neti chedaḥ /

There is a stop after ‘na’ (in the second line).

asiddhyādītyādiśabdena vyabhicāravirodhayor grahaṇam /

‘Inadmissibility and the rest The term ‘and the rest’ includes ‘falsity’ and ‘contradiction’.

sattāyāṃ sādhyāyāṃ sarvo hetur doṣatrayaṃ nātivartate /

What is meant is that if Existence is to be proved, then the Probans put forward is open to all the three defects of the Probans.

tathā hi bhāve dharme hetāvasiddhatā, ubhayadharme 'naikāntikatā, abhāvadharme viruddhatā / yathoktam

For instance, if the character cited as the Probans is something positive, then it is ‘inadmissible’; if it is both (positive and negative), then it is ‘Inconclusive’;

[p.413] "nāsiddher bhāvadharmo 'sti vyabhicāryubhayāśrayaḥ /

if it is negative, then it is ‘contradictory This has been thus declared ‘The positive property is not admitted;

dharmo viruddho bhāvaś ca sā sattā sādhyate katham" // iti /

and the negative one would be contradictory; how then can Existence be proved?’

atha cakṣuṣi dharmiṇi cakṣur vijñānotpādanaśaktiḥ sādhyate tadāpi śaktiḥ sattetyādeḥ paryāyatvāt tatsādhane sattāsādhanaprasaṅgaḥ / vyatireke 'pi tasyā atīndriyatvenāsiddhatvād āśrayāsiddho hetuḥ syāt /

If what is sought to be proved is the potency in the Eye, the Subject, to bring about visual perception, even so, inasmuch as ‘potency’, ‘existence’, etc. are synonymous, the proving of Potency would involve the proving of Existence. On the negative aspect also, inasmuch as the Potency, being beyond the reach of the senses, would not be well-known, the Probans would become fallacious, as having no well-known substratum.

evaṃ rūpagrahaṇād ityayam apyapakṣadharmatvād asiddho draṣṭavyaḥ //

Similarly, the Probans, in the form ‘because of the perception of Colour’, would be something not present in the Subject, and hence it should be understood to be Inadmissible.

kathaṃ tarhi bhavatām api cakṣurādīndriyasiddhir ity āha kintvityādi /

Question: “How then can you also prove the existence of the Eyes and the other sense-organs?” Answer: [see verse 1401 next]

kintu rūpādibhāve 'pi cakṣur jñānaṃ na jāyate /

But sometimes, even though colour and other things are there, visual perception does not take place;

kadācittena tanmātraṃ na hetur iti gamyate //

hence it is understood that that (perception) alone cannot be a reason (for the existence of the eye).

kadācid iti / nimīlitalocanāvasthāyām /

‘Sometimes’, when, for instance, the Eyes are closed.

na hyasmābhir āhatya cakṣurādīdantayā sādhyate, apitu jñānaṃ keṣucidrūpādiṣu satsvanvayavyatirekāvanubhavaddṛśyate tasya kāraṇāntarāpekṣitā tanmātrāsambhavitā ca sādhyata iti tadeva jñānaṃ dharmīti nāsiddhyādidoṣaḥ/ yat tatkāraṇāntaraṃ taccakṣur iti vyavahriyate /

We never seek to prove the existence of the Eye directly as ‘this is the Eye’; what happens (according to us) is that it is found that the Perception appears only when certain things, in the form of Colour, etc. are there, and it is so found that it is present when these things are there, and it is absent when they are absent; and what we seek to prove is that the Perception could not have those things alone as its cause, that it must have some other cause; so that the Subject (of our Inference) is the said Perception, which cannot be said to be ‘unknown’, What this other cause is comes to be spoken of as the ‘Eye’,

siddhāntāśrayas tu bhedavyavahāraḥ //

The basis of our conclusion is the practical notion of diversity.

syād etat bhavatu yathoktayā nītyā vijñānasya dharmitvam, tathāpi dvirūpa eva hetur ity āha svahetviti /

The following might be urged It may be that, in the manner shown, the Perception may be the Subject; even so, the Probans remains only ‘two-featured’”. The answer to this is as follows: [see verse 1402 above]

svahetuniyatā hetupratibaddhā, udbhūtir yasyāsau sa tathoktaḥ /

‘Inseparably connected with its Cause’ invariably concomitant with its Cause is the birth appearance, coming into existence of the Sprout.

evambhūtāḥ svakāraṇāyattajanmāno 'ṅkurādayaḥ kādācitkā dṛṣṭāntatvena sambhavantīti yāvat /

Things like the Sprout, having their birth dependent upon their Cause and hence coming into existence only occasionally, are possible as the Corroborative Instance (in the proving of the Visual Perception as being due to the Eye);

ye yat sannidhāne kādācitkās te na tanmātrasambhavinaḥ, kāraṇāntarasavyapekṣakāś ca tadyathā satsvapi kṣityādiṣu bījasannidhānāsannidhānābhyām anvayavyatirekiṇo 'ṅkurādayaḥ, satsvapi rūpādiṣu kādācitkaṃ cakṣur jñānaṃ nimīlitānimīlitāvasthāyām iti vyāpakaviruddhopalabdhiḥ pratiṣedhe /

the argument being formulated thus: Those things that appear on the presence of something else, only occasionally, cannot be regarded as produced from that alone, they must be regarded as dependent upon other causes, for instance, even when the soil and other things are there, the Sprout is found to appear or not to appear according as the seed is there or not there; even when Colour, etc. are there, the Visual Perception appears only at certain times, according as the Eyes are closed or not closed; hence in the case of the denial of the Eye, the argument would point out that the said denial would be contrary to a wider proposition;

vidhau tu svabhāvahetuḥ //

while in the case of the asserting of the existence of the Eye, it would contain a natural reason.

kathañcid ityādāvāha kathañciditi / kathañcid asadātmatvasādhane ca ghaṭādiṣu /

In proving that the jar and other things are “somehow nonexistent”, the probans is found as, in a previous case, to be ‘futile’ and also ‘inadmissible’.

pūrvavaddhetuvaiphalyam asiddhiś ca dṛśyate //

Here also, there would be proving what is already admitted;

atrāpi siddhasādhyatā kenacitprakāreṇa ghaṭādīnām asattvasya siddhatvāt /

as the fact of the Jar, etc. being ‘somehow non-existent’ is already admitted.

atha na [p.414] siddham, anupalabhyamānatvād ityayaṃ hetur api na sidhyatītyasiddho hetur itipūrvavad vācyaṃ dūṣaṇaṃ yathā sadātmatvasādhane hetāvuktam //

In case it is not admitted, then the Probans also, in the form ‘because it is not apprehended’, cannot be admitted; so that the Probans becomes ‘Inadmissible’. In this way, the defect in the Probans may be pointed out, just as it was in connection with the argument seeking to prove that the things in question are existent.

asti cātrāpi vispaṣṭaṃ vaidharmyeṇa nidarśanam /

Here also, there is a clear corroborative instance per dissimilarity;

tadeva teṣāṃ svaṃ rūpaṃ prayāti hi vipakṣatām // kathañcana sadātmatvasādhanepi nirātmasu /

that same form of the things becomes the thing where the probandum is known to be absent, in the proving of the character of ‘being somehow existent’ in regard to non-entities, there would be ‘proving of what is already admitted’;

iṣṭasiddhir asiddhiś ca vaidharmāptis tathaiva ca //

also ‘inadmissibility’, and the concomitance of the contrary character in that way.

yena rūpeṇopalabhyante ghaṭādayas tena rūpeṇa sadātmatvaṃ teṣām iṣṭam eva

That form in which the Jar, etc. are apprehended, if their existence in that form is accepted by them, then, in that case, that same character would also serve as the Instance per dissimilarity;

tasmin svabhāve 'nupalabhyamānatvasya hetor nivṛttatvāt /

because in that character, the Probans ‘being unapprehended’ will have ceased to exist.

evaṃ kathañcanetyatrāpi prayoge tulyā iṣṭasiddhādayaḥ /

Similarly in the case of the argument regarding things being ‘somehow existent’, the defect of ‘futility’ would be present.

nirātmasviti / abhāveṣu /

‘Nirātmasu’ i.e. in non-entities.

vaidharmyāptir iti vaidharmyasya sādhyanivṛttilakṣaṇasya sādhanābhāvenāptir vyāptiḥ /

‘Concomitance of the contrary character’; i.e. the ‘contrary character’, in the shape of the cessation of the Probandum would be pervaded by (concomitant with) the absence of the Probans.

tathaiveti svabhāvasya vaidharmyasambhavena //

‘In that way’ i.e. by the possibility of the Instance per dissimilarity.

pitṛśabdaśruteryāpi veśmanaḥ pratipādyate / pitṛsambandhitā tatra vyakto hetustrilakṣaṇaḥ //

When the presence of the father in the house is sought to be proved by the hearing of the father’s voice, the probans in this case is clearly ‘three-featured’.

kvacid vipratisambaddhaḥ svaraḥ prāgupalakṣitaḥ /

As, surely, at some time previously the concomitance of the voice has been perceived;

tasyānanubhave pūrvaṃ durdharā hetvasiddhatā // tasyeti pitṛsambaddhasyānyatra kvacit pradeśe 'nanubhave satyasiddho hetuḥ syāt //1406---------

The following Texts point out the defects in the argument propounded (by Pātrasvāmin), in Text 1377, regarding “Your father being present in the house, etc. etc.”: [see verses 1406-1407 above] ‘Tasya’: the voice as belonging to the Father must certainly have been heard before. If it had not, then the Probans would be inadmissible.

yasmin nityādinā tad eva trairūpyam ādarśayati

The said three-featured character of the Probans is shown in the following: [see verses 1408-1415 next]

yasmin prāgupalabdhaś ca nopalabdhaś ca yatra saḥ / anvayo vyatireko vā vispaṣṭaṃ tatra dṛśyate // śabdas tu jñāpayatyarthaṃ naiva bāhyaṃ kathañcana /

In that house wherein the father had been found before, and also in that wherein he had not been found before, there is the concomitance, positive and negative, clearly perceived, as regards the word, it does not make known any external object at all;

anyathāsambhavābhāvād vilakṣāgamakastvasau //

because in this case, the character of ‘being otherwise impossible’ is not present;

vivakṣāsaṃmukhībhāve na hi śabdaḥ prayujyate //

Because when the ‘speaker’s wish’ is not there, the word cannot be used.

dīpastu jñāpako naiva nīlāder liṅgabhāvataḥ /

As regards the lamp, it does not make the blue and other things known by becoming the indicative (inferential);

jñānotpādanayogyasya jananāt tu tathocyate // [p.415] jñāpake liṅgarūpe ca pakṣadharmādi cintyate /

and it is only in this sense that it is called a ‘means of cognition only in case the word were an inferential indicative, would it be necessary to consider if it fulfils the conditions of being present in the subject (minor term.) and so forth.

anyathā cakṣurādīnāṃ kasmād etan na codyate // anyathānupapattyāpi cākṣuṣatvaṃ na sādhakam / pakṣadharmaviyogena klībās tenaikalakṣaṇaḥ //

Otherwise, why cannot the same be urged in connection with the eye and other organs (as means of cognition)? Even through the character of ‘being otherwise impossible’, visibility cannot prove anything, unless it is present in the subject (minor term). Thus ‘one-featured’ probans are all impotent.

ekarūpatayoktānāṃ dvairūpyaṃ copalakṣitam / dvirūpatvena coktānāṃ trairūpyaṃ pakṣadharmataḥ //

In those that have been cited as ‘one-featured’ probans, the presence of two features becomes clearly indicated; and in those that have been cited as ‘two-featured’, the presence of three features becomes clearly indicated;

anyathānupapattyaiva cākṣepāditi cen na tat /

If it be argued that “this feature is implied by the character of being otherwise impossible”, that cannot be so;

śabdādāvanyathāpīṣṭe cākṣuṣatve 'tha nāstyasau //

because in the case of sound, though visibility may be otherwise desired, it is not present in sound (which is the subject).

śabdasya bāhyārthāpekṣayānyathānupapannatvam asiddham iti taṃ pratyaliṅgatvam icchāmātravṛttitvāt tasya, atha buddhiparivartinām artham apekṣya, tadā trailakṣaṇyam asty eva dhūmasyeva, yato vivakṣāyā asammukhībhāve śabdasyāprayogāt tatkāryatvād bhūmavajjātavedase gamaka iṣṭa eva, natu vācakarūpeṇa /

because it cannot serve as an Inferential Indicative of these latter, being, as it is, dependent entirely upon the Speaker’s wish. If the said character is asserted in the case of words, in reference to the object that figures in the cognition (brought about by the words), then, there are all the three features present, as in the case of Smoke (indicating the Fire). Because, if the Speaker’s wish is not there, words cannot be used, the use must be regarded as the effect of that wish; and as such it is indicative of the thing spoken of, just as the Smoke is of Fire;

pradīpastu liṅgadvāreṇa dhūmavan na jñāpaka iṣṭaḥ /

but not as being expressive of the thing. As regards the Lamp, it is not admitted to be even the Indicator like Smoke;

kiṃ tarhivijñānajananayogyaghaṭādyutpādanena jñāpako rūḍho natu liṅgatveneti tasya liṅgabhūtasya pakṣadharmatvādicintā na yuktaiva / anyathā cakṣurādīnām api pakṣadharmatvādi codanīyaṃ syāt /

but the words are not inferential Indicatives; hence any discussion as to the Indicative subsisting in the Subject cannot arise in this case. If it did arise in this case, then why could not the same discussion arise in the case of the Eye and the rest (which are the means of Sense-perception, not Inferential Indicatives)?

anyathetyādi prakṛtārthopasaṃhāraḥ /

‘Otherwise, etc. etc.’; this sums up the subject-matter under consideration.

yataś cākṣuṣatvam anityatvāvinābhāvyapi śabde tadanityatvaṃ na sādhayati, yataścāvaśyaṃ sarvatra pakṣadharmatvamāśrayaṇīyam, ataḥ pakṣadharmatvāśrayaṇādekarūpatayoktānāṃ dvairūpyamāvaśyakaṃ dvirūpatayā coktānāṃ, trairūpyaṃ tata eva pakṣadharmata ityekalakṣaṇā eva klībā hetavaḥ /

The sense is that, even though Visibility is invariably concomitant with non-eternality, it does not prove this non-eternality in Sound. Thus then, inasmuch as in all cases, the condition of subsisting in the Subject must be present, by admitting this as a necessary condition, those Probans that have been cited as ‘one-featured’, must, necessarily, become ‘two-featured’, and those cited as ‘two-featured’ must become ‘three-featured Thus, on account of the necessity of subsistence in the Subject, it is the one-featured Probans that are really impotent.

na caitad vaktavyam anyathānupapattyaiva pakṣadharmatvam antareṇāpyanyathānupapannatvam astīti svayam evoktam ---"anyathānupapattyaiva śabdādivastuṣv apakṣadharmabhāve 'pi dṛṣṭā jñāpakatāpi ce"ti /

It cannot be right to argue that “such characters as subsisting in the Subject are all implied by that of ‘being otherwise impossible’, and hence they cannot form so many different independent characteristics of the Probans” because the other party has himself asserted that there is the character of ‘being otherwise impossible’, even when subsistence in the Subject is not there, in the following passage “Through the character of being otherwise impossible the Lamp and other things are actually indicative of things, even though they do not reside in the subject (Text 1378, above)”.

cākṣuṣatve cānityatvānyathānupapanne 'pyasau pakṣadharmo nāstītyanekānta

In the case of Visibility, even though ‘non-eternality’ is ‘otherwise impossible’, visibility does not subsist in the Subject.

yad uktaṃ sa śyāmas tatputratvād ity eṣa trilakṣaṇe 'pi na niścityai pravartata ity atrāha tat putretyādi /

So that in every way what has been asserted is entirely doubtful. In the case of such probans as ‘because he is the son of so and so’, the contrary being open to doubt, the three conditions are not present;

na trailakṣaṇyasadbhāvo vijātīyāvirodhataḥ //

because what is cited is not incompatible with the contrary.

[p.416] tatputraś ca bhaviṣyati na ca śyāma iti nātra kaścid virodha iti saṃdigdhavipakṣavyāvṛttikatvān nāyaṃ trilakṣaṇa ityasiddho dṛṣṭāntaḥ //

It has been argued above, under Text 1370 that “in the case of the Reasoning ‘He is dark because he is the son of so and so’, even though the Probans has all the three features, yet it is not conducive to certainty of cognition”. The answer to that is as follows: [see verse 1416 above]

syād etat astyeva virodhaḥ /

there being no incompatibility in this, the absence of the Probans

kāraṇābhede sati yadi kāryaṃ bhidyeta nirhetukaṃ syād ity āha karmetyādi /

where the Probandum is known to be absent is open to doubt [and this is one of the three features]; so that the Probans is not ‘three featured’; hence the example cited (by Pātrasvāmin) is not relevant.

karmāhārādihetūnāṃ sarvathāpi viśeṣataḥ / sambhāvyate 'nyathābhāvas tatputratve 'pi tasya hi //

Even when the child is born of a certain person, there is always a likelihood of diversity in its features, by reason of the peculiarities of such causes as the ‘destiny’ (of the child) and food (of the parents) and so forth.

nāyaṃ svabhāvaḥ kāryaṃ vā dṛśyasyādṛṣṭir eva vā /

(b) nor is that its effect; (c) nor is it of the nature of ‘the non-perception of the perceptible’;

naca tadvyatiriktasya bhavatyavyabhicāritā //

and apart from these (three) there is nothing that can make the probans ‘infallible’ (true).

śubhādikarmaviśeṣād uṣṇaśītādyāhārāvasthābhedāc cānyathābhāvo gaurāditvaṃ sambhāvyata iti kuto virodhaḥ, kāraṇabhedasya siddhatvāt /

Through such causes as the peculiarity of past good deeds (Destiny) and eating of hot food and other diverse circumstances, diversity in the features of the child such as fairness and the like are possible; wherefore then can there be any incompatibility where a diversity in the causes is well known?

api ca tat putratvād iti nāyaṃ svabhāvahetur yathā kṛtakatvaṃ, nahi kṛtakatvasyānyat tattvam asti muktvānityatvam nanvevaṃ tatputratvasyānyaḥ svabhāvonāsti yataḥ pañcopādānaskaṃdhātmakasya kañcid apekṣya tatputra iti vyapadeśonatu śyāmatvasya /

Then again, the Premiss ‘Because he is the son of so and so’ is not a ‘natural’ Reason, as ‘being a product’ is (in the proving of non-eternality); in the latter case, ‘being a product’ can have no other character save that of non-eternality; while in the case in question it is not that there is no other character for ‘being his son’; because the appellation of ‘his son’ is applied, not on the ground of the son being dark, but on the basis of the aggregate of five ingredients (of which the body of the child consists).

nāpi kāryahetuḥ /

Nor is the Probans one based on ‘effect’;

nāpyanupalabdhir vidhiviṣayatvāt /

as there is no causal relation known to subsist (between Being his son and Darkness).

virodhābhāvāc ca na śyāmetaravarṇābhāvasiddhiḥ / nacaitad vyatiriktaṃ liṅgam astyanyatra pratibandhābhāvāt / naca pratibandhamantareṇa gamakatvam atiprasaṅgāt tasmān nāyaṃ hetur nāpi

also because there being no incongruity between the two, the Probans cannot prove the negation of complexions other than the Dark. Apart from these three there can be no Inferential Indicative, because of the absence of ‘Invariable Concomitance’ (in all other cases); without Invariable Concomitance, there can be no proper ‘indicative’ character;

trilakṣaṇa iti kuto 'vyabhicāraḥ / dṛśyasyādṛṣṭirupalabdhilakṣaṇaprāptānupalabdhiḥ // nanu cetyādināvyāpitāṃ lakṣaṇadoṣam āha

Thus then, what has been cited is neither a ‘Probans’, nor is it ‘three-featured How then could there be ‘Infallibility’ in it? ‘Non-perception of the perceptible’ is the non-apprehension of something which fulfils all the conditions of apprehensibility, (1417-1418)

nanu cāvyabhicāritvam anyeṣām api dṛśyate / kumudānāṃ vikāsasya vṛddhiś ca jaladher yathā //

“The said ‘infallibility’ is seen in other cases also: for instance, (1) the blooming of the lily and the rise in the sea have the rise of the moon for their ‘indicative’.

liṅgaṃ candrodayo dṛṣṭa ātapasya ca bhāvataḥ /

(2) From the presence of sun-light, the presence of shade on the other side is inferred.

tamasyulmukadṛṣṭau ca dhūma ārāt pratīyate /

(3) When the half-burnt wood-piece is seen in the dark from a distance, it brings up the idea of smoke.

kṛttikodayaścāpi rohiṇyāsattikalpanā //

(4) From the rise of the kṛttikā (asterism) is inferred the proximity of the rohiṇī (asterism).” (1419-1421)

yathā candrodayāt kumudavikāsasamudravṛddhyoranumānam /

(1) From the Rise of the Moon follows the inference of the Blooming of the Lily and the Rise in the Sea.

ādigrahaṇāt sūryodayāt padmavikāśasya, atapasadbhāvāt parvatādiṣu parabhāge cchāyānumitiḥ evaṃ dūrāt tamasyulmukamarddhadagdhakāṣṭhakhaṇḍakaṃ dṛṣṭvā dhūmapratītiḥ, tathā kṛttikānakṣatrodayādrohiṇīnakṣatrasyāsa [p.417] nnatvaṃ pratīyate yato 'śvinīmārabhya yathāpāṭhaṃ krameṇaiva nakṣatrāṇām

The term ‘ādi’ is meant to include such cases as the Blooming of the Lotus inferred from the Rise of the Sun. (2) From the presence of sun-light, there follows the inference of the shadow on the other side. (3) When from a distance one sees in the darkness a half burnt piece of wood, he infers the presence of smoke, (4) From the rise of the asterism Kṛttikā, one infers the proximity of the asterism Rohiṇī; since it is well known that the asterisms rise in the same order in which they are enumerated in the list beginning with Aśvinī.

na cāsya sarvasya hetutrayāntarbhāvo 'stīti tat kumucyate na tadvyatiriktasyabhavatyavyabhicāriteti //

All these are not included among the three kinds of Probans (mentioned in Texts 1417-1418). Why then should it be asserted that there can be no ‘Infallibility’ in any Probans other than those of the said three kinds? (1419-1421)

atrottaram āha tadatretyādi /

The answer to the above is as follows: [see verses 1422-1423 next]

tadatra hetudharmasya tādṛśo 'numitair matāḥ / jātās tadekakālās te sarve bodhādayo 'pare //

because if the Probans were to lead to the inference of things without some such relationship, then they might lead to the inference of anything and everything;

sambandhānupapattau ca sarvasyāpi gatir bhavet //

because the absence of relationship would be equally present in all things.