buddhist-nlp/tatpa-noisy · Datasets at Hugging Face

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tathā hi yatkiñcid idam aspaṣṭaṃ bhavatā grāhyadūṣaṇam abhihitam / idaṃ tu spaṣṭaṃ gāhyavivecanāya sādhanamabhidhīyate 'smābhiḥ /	In fact, the objection that you have urged against the object apprehended has been only indistinctly (vaguely) stated; while this is exactly that we have stated quite clearly, while examining i.e. rejecting the idea conviction that there is something real that is apprehended.
kiṃ tvaspaṣṭaṃ sādhanam ity āha sarvetyādi /	Question: “What is that clear statement in proof of your doctrine?” Answer: [see verse 1358 next]
sarvātmanā hi sārūpye jñānam ajñānatāṃ vrajet / sāmyaṃ kenacid aṃśena sarvaṃ syāt sarvavedakam //	If there were absolute sameness of form, then cognition would become non-cognition; as for partial sameness of form, that would make every cognition apprehensive of everything.
yāvadbhyo vijātīyebhyo vyāvṛttāvadbhya eva jñānapītīdaṃ sarvātmanā sārūpyam / katipayapadārthavyāvṛttitastvaṃśena sārūpyam //	‘Absolute sameness of form’ would consist in the fact of the Cognition being ‘excluded’ from exactly those homogeneous things from which the cognised object is ‘excluded’, while ‘partial sameness’ would consist in ‘exclusion’ from only a few of those.
kathaṃ tarhyarthasārūpyasya prāmāṇyamuktam ity āha kintvityādi /	Question: “If that is so, then, why has the validity of the Cognition been said to consist in its being of the same form as the Object?”
kintu bāhyārthasadbhāvavāde sārūpyasambhavaḥ /	But under the doctrine of the reality of the external world,, the possibility of the sameness of form has to be accepted;
dhruvamabhyupagantavya ityarthaṃ sa prakāśitaḥ //	that is why it has been mentioned.
nirbhāsijñānapakṣe hi grāhyād bhede 'pi cetasaḥ / pratibimbasya tādrūpyād bhāktaṃ syād api vedanam //	Under the doctrine, however, of cognition being a mere reflected image, even if the cognition differs from the cognised object, the sameness of form belongs to the reflection; and the cognition can be only figurative.
yena tviṣṭaṃ na vijñānam arthasārūpyabhājanam / tasyāyam api naivāsti prakāro bāhyavedane //	Lastly, for one who does not admit the cognition to be the receptacle of the semblance of the object, there is not even the said method possible for the cognising of the external object.
sa iti /	‘It has, etc.’.
sārūpyasambhava ākāro vā /	‘It’ stands for ‘the possibility of the sameness of form’, or the ‘form’ itself.
nirbhāso viṣayasārūpyaṃ, tadyasyāsti tannirbhāsi /	‘Nirbhāsi’, ‘Reflected Image’: ‘Nirbhāsa’, ‘Reflection’, is sameness of form with the object; and that which has this sameness of form, is the ‘Reflected linage’.
grāhyād iti / bāhyādarthāt /	‘From the cognised object’, i.e. from the external object.
pratibimbasyeti / jñānākārasya /	‘Belongs to the Reflection’, i.e. to the Reflection in the form of the Cognition.
tādrūpyād iti / viṣayasārūpyāt / bhāktam iti /	‘Sameness of form’, with the object. ‘Figurative’, Indirect, Secondary.
vedanam iti / arthasyeti śeṣaḥ /	‘Cognition’ i.e. of the object.
bhājanam āśrayaḥ /	‘Receptacle’ substratum.
viṣayavipratipattis tu sāmānyasya vastubhūtasya nirākaraṇād vastuviṣayatveneṣṭasya pratyakṣasya nānyaḥ svalakṣaṇād viṣayo 'stīti sāmarthyād upadarśitatvān na pṛthaṅnirākṛtā /	As regards the divergence of opinion regarding the object of Cognition, the Universal as a real entity has been already rejected; hence for Perception which has been regarded as having an entity for its object, there can be no other object except the Specific Individuality, and this having been already pointed out as being got at by implication, no special effort has been made for setting aside the said divergence of opinion.
ye tvāhurayuktam evedaṃ pratyakṣalakṣaṇam, lakṣaṇaṃ hi pramāṇasya praṇīyate	the definition put forward is that of the Means of Cognition, with the view that other people may, through that definition, come to understand what the Means of Cognition is, and then regulate their action accordingly;
api nāma tena rūpeṇopalakṣya pramāṇaṃ tataḥ pareṣāṃ pravṛttiḥ, syād iti, na tu vyasanitayā, na ca kalpanāpoḍhatvādinopalakṣitasyāpi pravartakatvaṃ nivartakatvaṃ vā samasti loka iti /	and it is not put forward only for satisfying a whim. And (in so far as the proposed definition is concerned) the knowledge that Sense-perception is ‘free from Conceptual Content’ and all that cannot, in ordinary life, either prompt a man to activity, or make him desist from it.”
tadasamyak /	This is not right.
nahi svecchayā vastūnāṃ svabhāvavyavasthānaṃ kartuṃ labhyaṃ yenānyathā	The nature of things cannot be made or determined according to one’s wish;
praṇīyeta lakṣaṇam, api tu yathāvasthitam eva vastusvarūpamanūdya prasi [p.403] ddhasvabhāvaviśeṣapratipipādayiṣayā lakṣaṇaṃ praṇayanti tadvidaḥ /	by virtue of which one could frame a definition accordingly; what, has to be done, however, is to take the thing as it stands, and to put forward a definition embodying that particular aspect of the thing which one wishes to bring out.
yathā pṛthivyāḥ khaṣkhaṭatvaṃ{Karatvaṃ---} /	For example, one points out ‘roughness’ as a characteristic of the Earth.
anyathā hyasambhavitādoṣeṇa duṣṭaṃ syāt /	If it were not thus, then the definition put forward might be open to the charge of being an ‘impossible’ one.
naca pratyakṣasya kalpanāpoḍhābhrāntatvābhyāmanyallakṣaṇamupalakṣakam asti / tathā hi tadavaśyabhrāntamaṅgīkartavyaṃ pramāṇatvāt /	As regards Sense-perception, there is nothing else to indicate its character, -except ‘freedom from Conceptual Content’ and ‘freedom from error’, For instance, it must be ‘free from error’, because it is a valid means of Cognition;
kalpanāpoḍhaṃ ca sākṣāt svalakṣaṇaviṣayatvāt /	and it must be ‘free from Conceptual Content’, because it directly apprehends the Specific Individuality of things;
svalakṣaṇasya cāśakyasamayatvena tat saṃvitter anabhijalpatvasya prasādhitatvāt / ato nyāyānuyātameva lakṣaṇam eva tadācakṣate kuśalāḥ /	and it has been proved that the Specific Individuality is something in regard to which no Convention can be made, and hence its cognition must be free from association with words. It is for tins reason that all intelligent persons regard this definition as entirely in accordance with reason.
na cāpyato lakṣaṇāt prekṣāvatāṃ pravṛttinivṛttī na bhavataḥ /	Nor is it true that this definition cannot bring about either activity, or desisting from activity, on the part of intelligent persons.
tathā hi ghaṭotkṣepaṇasāmānyasaṅkhyādijñānasya pratyabhijñāpratyayasyaca tathā pītaśaṅkhādijñānasya paraiḥ pratyakṣatvenopakalpitasya yathāyogaṃ savikalpakatvena bhrāntatvena vā pratyakṣatvamavadhārya tadviṣayatvenopakalpitasya saṅkhyāder vastutvābhiniveśānnivartante /	For instance, in connection with such cognitions as (a) the Idea of the Jar, the action of Throwing up, the Universal, the Number and so forth, (b) the idea of Recognition, and (c) the idea of the ‘yellow conch-shell’, some persons have been led to regard all these as ‘Sense-perception’, in accordance with the definition provided by other parties, and then they find that all these are either Conceptual or Erroneous, and then, in accordance with the definition provided by us, they conclude that these cannot be ‘Sense-perception’;
yac ca nirdeśyaṃ nīlādi svalakṣaṇaṃ tadeva vastvityavasāya tatra pravartante /	and they also conclude that what is an entity is only that Specific Individuality of the ‘Blue’ for instance, which is inexpressible by words, and hence they betake themselves to activity towards that.
yathā ca nirvikalpasyāpi pratyakṣasya pravartakatvaṃ tathā prāguktam eva /	How even the non-conceptual Cognition can lead to activity has been already explained before.
yadyevaṃ kalpanāpoḍhatvam evaikaṃ lakṣaṇaṃ kartuṃ yuktaṃ natvabhrāntam iti / tathā hi pravṛtteḥ prāgyadeva siddhaṃ rūpaṃ tadeva pravṛttikāmānāṃ lakṣaṇatvena praṇetuṃ yuktaṃ nāprasiddham asattulyatvāt tasya /	“If this is so, then let there be a single item in the definition ‘free from Conceptual Content’, and ‘free from error’ need not be added. Because that fact alone which is already known prior to the intended activity, should be put forward as a definition for the benefit of persons desirous of undertaking activity in accordance with that definition; and no unknown thing; as the latter is as good as non-existent.
nacābhrāntatvaniścayo 'rthakriyāsaṃvādāt prāgasti na hyarvāgdarśanāsztatkāryādhigamamantareṇa yathārthatāṃ jñānasya jñātumīśate teṣāṃ nityaṃ	And as a matter of fact, any certainty regarding ‘freedom from error’ cannot be there until it has been found to be compatible with the fruitful activity undertaken; in fact people with limited powers of perception are not able to ascertain the truthful character of a cognition, except through the perception of its practical effect;
padārthaśakteḥ kāryānumeyatvāt /	because for such persons the capacity of things can only be inferred from its effects;
yathopadarśitārthaprāpaṇasāmarthyalakṣaṇatvāc ca yathārthatāyāḥ /	it has been shown above that ‘truthfulness’ i.e. conformity with the real state of things of the Cognition consists only in its capacity to make people actually get at the thing cognised.
na cottarakālaṃ yathārthatāvadhāraṇe 'pi sāphalyam asti tataḥ punar apravṛtteḥ /	So that if this conformity were learnt only subsequently, it would serve no useful purpose; as after that, there is no further activity.”
tadetad acodyam /	Answer: There is no force in this objection.
tathā hi keśoṇḍrakādibuddhīnām api prāmāṇyaprasaṅgān mābhūd ativyāpitā lakṣaṇadoṣa ityato 'vaśyakaraṇīyamabhrāntagrahaṇam ityuktam /	It has been already explained that it is necessary to add the qualification ‘free from error’, in order to save the definition from the defect of being ‘too wide’ by reason of the possibility, under the definition, of notions like those of the ‘Hair -tuft’, etc. being regarded as valid cognition.
yaścāpi pravṛtteḥ prāganiścayaheturarvāgdarśitvam ucyate, so 'pyanaikānta eva / ko hyatra pratibandho yadarvāg darśibhir na kvacit sāmarthyaṃ niścitavyam iti / evaṃ hi na kiñcittairniśceyam iti prāptam /	As regards the argument that before the activity has actually taken place, people with limited powers of vision have no means of ascertaining the truth of the cognition, this also is Inconclusive. Where is there any such hard and fast rule that people with limited vision cannot ascertain the capacity of anything? If that were so, then, they would be unable to be certain of anything;
tataścācetanatvam eva teṣām āyātam /	which would mean that they are unconscious beings;
yāvatā paśuśiśavo 'pyabhyāsabalād udbhūtabhūtajñānavāsanāvṛttayaḥ sukhasya sādhanametad etad asukhasyeti pravṛtteḥ prāgapi niścitya prapātādi pariharantaḥ stanādi copādadānāḥ saṃdṛśyanta eva / tathāhyabhūtam api bhāvayatāṃ kāmaśokabhayādyupaplutacetasāmanapekṣitasādharmyādismṛter abhyāsasya sphuṭapratibhāsasya jñānotpādanasāmarthyam	because even animals and infants, through repeated experience, come to have their impressions aroused, are able to feel certain that ‘this thing brings pleasure’, ‘that other brings pain’, and are found to act accordingly, even before their present activity, and then avoid the precipice and take to the mother’s breasts. Also in the case of people who are constantly thinking of something that has never existed before, and have their mind disturbed by excessive desire, grief, fear and so forth, even without remembering any points of similarity, etc. it is found that the mere repetition of the vivid idea has the capacity to bring about the cognition.
upalabhyata eva / yatra tu punar nābhyāsas tatra teṣāṃ kāryānumeyaiva śaktir na tu sarvatra /	In a case where there is no repetition, there alone, not everywhere is the potency to be only inferred from its practical effects.
etena dhūmādiliṅganiścayo 'pi vyākhyātaḥ /	This same explanation applies to the certainty attaching to the perception of Inferential Indicatives, like Smoke;
yatas tatrāpi tada{de}tatkāryasya dhūmādeḥ prakṛtyā parasparamatyantaviviktasvabhāvatvāt, tadvivekaniścayasya cābhyāsādihetutvāl liṅganiścayasambhavād ato nānumānapratikṣepaḥ /	as here also, the effect, in the shape of Smoke, is, by its very nature, something entirely different (from the Fire), and the certainty regarding its difference is due to repeated observation, whereby the idea of the Inferential Indicative also becomes possible, and consequently there is no rejection of Inference. Says the Opponent: “The repetition would be there only after the first activity has taken place;
[p.404] natvādyāyāṃ pravṛttau satyām abhyāsaḥ sidhyati, yāvatā saiva kathaṃ bhavatīti vaktavyam /	Question: “How can the Perception which gives rise to Doubt have any validity?” Answer: How can there be validity in the Perception that brings about certainty?
ucyate saṃśayāt /	that is why it has been mentioned.
saṃśayahetoḥ pratyakṣasya kathaṃ tatra prāmāṇyam iti cet /	Because that fact alone which is already known prior to the intended activity, should be put forward as a definition for the benefit of persons desirous of undertaking activity in accordance with that definition;
niścayahetor api kathaṃ prāmāṇyam /	Answer: How can there be validity in the Perception that brings about certainty?
avasāyotpādanād arthinas tatra pravartanād iti cet /	“It is due to the fact that this Perception brings about a definite Cognition and the man seeking for it takes up his activity.”
tadetat saṃśayahetor api tulyam /	This same may be said also with regard to Perception leading to Doubt.
yadyapi tatra pratīyamānārthitārthakāraviparīto vyavasāyaḥ, tathāpi na tenākāreṇa tasya pratyakṣasya pravartakatvam, tathāvasitasyānarthitatvāt /	Even though in this case, the cognition is contrary to the form of what is sought after, yet it is not in that form that the Perception leads to activity, because what is so cognised is not what is wanted;
nāpi nivartakatvaṃ, pratīyamānaprārthitārthādhyavasāyahetutvenārthinaḥ	nor does it lead to desisting from activity; because it is only when there is cognition of the thing as desired that there can be any activity on the part of the man.
anyathā hi saṃśayahetoḥ pratyakṣād arthī na pravarteta nāpi nivarteteti praptaṃ, na caivaṃ bhavati, api tv arthinām asambhāvitānarthodayānām arthitayāpravṛtter eva balīyastvam /	Otherwise, from Perception leading to Doubt, no one could act or desist from acting. But this does not so happen; on the contrary, it so happens that that activity is all the more powerful which proceeds on the part of persons who do not apprehend any evil consequences from the activity in question.
anena cāṃśena niścayahetoḥ pratyakṣād asya na kaścid viśeṣaḥ /	So far as this aspect is concerned, there is no difference between the Perception leading to Doubt and that leading to Certainty.
yatra tvekāntena pratīyamānārthaviparītākārāvasāyahetutvameva, avasāyānutpādakatvaṃ vā, tatra tasya sarvārthārthino 'pravartanād aprāmāṇyameveti yuktaṃ vaktuṃ nānyatretyalam //	It is only where the Perception brings about a cognition entirely contrary to the thing cognised, or where it brings about no cognition at all, that there is no activity on the part of the man seeking for something;
iti pratyakṣalakṣaṇaparīkṣā //	and hence it is only this Perception that is invalid, not any other.
KAPITEL ANUMAANAPARIIK.SAA	End of the Chapter on Sense-perception.
svaparārthavibhāgena tvanumānaṃ dvidheṣyate /	Inference is held to be of two kinds, as divided into (1) for one’s own benefit, and (2) for the benefit of others.
svārthaṃ trirūpato liṅgād anumeyārthadarśanam //	(1) inference ‘for one’s own benefit’ consists in the cognition of the inferred object derived from the three-featured probans;
trirūpaliṅgavacanaṃ parārthaṃ punar ucyate /	and (2) inference ‘for the benefit of others’ consists in the statement of the three-featured probans.
ekaikadvidvirūpo 'rtho liṅgābhāsas tato mataḥ //	That probans which has only one or two features (out of the necessary three) is regarded as a ‘semblance of the probans’.
anumānaṃ svārthaparārthabhedena dvividham / tatra svārthaṃ yat trirūpāl liṅgāt pakṣadharmatvaṃ sapakṣe sattvaṃ vikaṣāc ca sarvato vyāvṛttir ityevaṃlakṣaṇād anumeyārthaviṣayaṃ jñānaṃ tadātmakaṃ boddhavyam /	Inference is of two kinds as divided into ‘for one’s own benefit’ and ‘for the benefit of others’, The former should be understood to be that Cognition of the inferred object which is derived from ‘the three-featured Probans’, the Indicative that fulfils the three conditions of (1) ‘being present in the Subject’, (2) ‘being present in that wherein the Probandum is known to be present’, and (3) ‘being entirely absent where the Probandum is known to be absent’. The Inference ‘for the sake of others’ should be understood to consist in the verbal expression of the said three-featured Probans.
parārthaṃ tu yathoktatrirūpaliṅgaprakāśakavacanātmakaṃ draṣṭavyam /	(b) the character of being corporeal, fulfils only the second condition, of being present where the Probandum is known to be present and does not fulfil the first condition of being present in the Subject (Sound), because Sound is not corporeal;
nityaḥ śabdaḥ kṛtakatvān mūrtatvād aprameyatvādityekaikarūpo yathākramaṃ pakṣadharmatvasapakṣasattvavipakṣavyāvṛttimātrasya vidyamānatvāt / tatra dvidvirūpo yathā dhvaniranityaścākṣuṣatvāc chrāvaṇatvād amūrtatvād iti yathākramaṃ pakṣasattvasapakṣasattvavipakṣavyāvṛttimātrābhāvāt /	and (c) the character of being non-cognisable fulfils only the third condition, of being absent where the Proban-dura (Eternality) is known to be absent (e.g. in the Soul, etc. which are cognisable) [and it does not fulfil the other two conditions, as it is not present in the Subject, Sound, which is cognisable; nor is it present where the Probandum is known to be present, e.g. the Soul, etc, which are cognisable], Those fulfilling only two of the thrée conditions are the Probans in the following argument ‘Sound is non-eternal, (a) because it is visible, (b) because it is audible, and (c) becaxise it is incorporeal’;
taduktam	This has been thus expressed.
"kṛtaktavād dhvanir nityo mūttatvād aprameyataḥ /	‘Sound is eternal, because it is a product, because it is corporeal and because it is non-cognisable;
amūttaśrāvaṇatvābhyam anityaścākṣuṣatvataḥ" //	and Sound is non-eternal, because it is incorporeal, because it is audible and because it is visible’.
iti // [p.405]	This has been thus expressed.
anyathānupapannatve nanu dṛṣṭā suhetutā /	and Sound is non-eternal, because it is incorporeal, because it is audible and because it is visible’.
nāsati tryaṃśakasyāpi tasmān klībāstrilakṣaṇāḥ //	hence the ‘three-featured’ probans are impotent (infruc-tuous).” (1364)
sa hy āha anyathānupapannatva eva hetur na tu punas trilakṣaṇaḥ.	Pātrasvāmin argues as follows: “The Probans is valid only when it is found to be ‘otherwise impossible’;
tathā hy asatyanyathānupapannatve tryaṃśakasyāpi tat putratvāder na dṛṣṭā suhetutā / tasmāt klībāḥ asaktāḥ, trilakṣaṇā hetava iti /	and not when it has the ‘three features Because it is found that even when the Probans has the said three features, it is not valid, when it does not fulfil the condition that it is ‘otherwise impossible’; e.g. in the case where the Probans is cited in the form ‘Because hé is the Son of so and so’ [therefore he must be dark] Consequently the ‘three-featured’ Probans are infructuous, inefficient”.
anyatheti / sādhyena vinānupapannatvaṃ, hetoḥ sādhya eva sattvam ity arthaḥ //	In the term ‘otherwise impossible’, the term ‘otherwise’ stands for ‘without the Probandum’; that is to say, the valid Probans is that which exists in the Probandum only.
anyathānupapannatvaṃ yasyāsau hetur iṣyate /	“That which is ‘otherwise impossible’ is held to be the probans, while this is only ‘one-featured’;
ekalakṣaṇakaḥ so 'rthaś catur lakṣaṇako na vā //	it may or may not be regarded as ‘four-featured’.” (1365)
ekaṃ lakṣaṇam anyathānupapannatvaṃ yasyāsti sa ekalakṣaṇaḥ.	‘One-featured’ That which has only one characteristic, that of being ‘otherwise impossible’;
sa eva laukikaiḥ parīkṣakair vā hetur iṣyate, nānyaḥ.	that alone none other, is regarded as ‘Probans’, by ordinary men as well as by investigators.
arthāpattyā tu pakṣadharmatvādi trayam anenaivākṣipyata iti caturlakṣaṇako 'pi vā bhavatu /	Through Presumption this same character implies the three features of ‘Being present in the Subject’ and so forth; and hence it may be regarded as ‘four-featured’;
na vā caturlakṣaṇo yasmāt kvacid ekalakṣaṇo dvilakṣaṇastrilakṣaṇo 'pi vā nyāyyaḥ, yasmād anyathānupapattir ekaṃ lakṣaṇaṃ tenaikalakṣaṇa iti vyapadiśyate	or it may not be so regarded, because in several cases, the Probans is found to be valid even when it has only one or two or three features. Inasmuch as ‘being otherwise impossible’ is its one characteristic feature, it is called ‘one-featured’.
anyathānupapattisahitāṃ sajātīyasiddhatāṃ vijātīyavyāvṛttiṃ cābhisamīkṣya dvilakṣaṇaḥ, anyathānupapannatvaṃ sajātīyavṛttiḥ sādhyavipakṣāc ca vyāvṛttir iti trilakṣaṇaḥ /	Along with ‘being otherwise impossible’, if it is found to exist in like things and not to exist in unlike things, then, it becomes ‘two-featured’; and when along with ‘being otherwise impossible’, it is also existent in like things and also to be absent where the Probandum is known to be absent, then it is ‘three-featured’;
na tu pakṣadharmatvādilakṣaṇadharmatrayayogāt trilakṣaṇahetur iṣyate /	and it is not called ‘three-featured’ on account of the presence of the three features of ‘presence in the Subject’ and the rest (mentioned in the Buddhist’s definition);
tasya samyagjñānaṃ prati hetutvānupapatteḥ //	because a Probans of this latter kind cannot bring about a valid cognition.
athavā prādhānyād anyathānupapattināmadheyenaivaikalakṣaṇavyapadeśo na tupakṣadharmatvādibhis teṣām aprādhānyād akiñcikaratvād vetyetad darśayann āha yathetyādi /	“Or, the Probans is spoken of as ‘one-featured’ in view of the one character of ‘being otherwise impossible’, because this is its principal characteristic; and it is not spoken of in terms of the other features of ‘presence in the Subject’ and the rest, because these latter are secondary, or because they do not serve any useful purpose.” This is what is shown in the following [see verse 1366 next]
yathā loke triputraḥ sannekaputraka ucyate / tasyaikasya suputratvāt tathehapi ca dṛśyatām //	“Just as among people, the man who has three sons is spoken of as ‘having one son’, on account of the one son being a good son, so it should be understood in the present instance also.” (1366)
nanu cāvinābhāvasambandhāt trirūpasyaiva sahetutā yuktetyāha avinetyādi /	Says the other party: On account of the relation of Invariable Concomitance, the character of the Probans should be rightly attributed to the ‘three-featured’ Reason only.
avinābhāvasambandhas trirūpeṣu na jātucit /	“As a matter of fact, the relation of invariable concomitance is not present in the ‘three-featured’ reasons;
anyathāsambhavaikāṅgahetuṣvevopalabhyate // anyathāsambhava ekamaṅgaṃ yeṣāṃ te tathoktās te ca te hetavaścetyanyathāsambhavaikāṅgahetavaḥ //	it is really found only in those reasons which have the one characteristic feature of ‘being otherwise impossible (1367) The compound ‘anyathāsambhava, etc.’ is to be expounded as ‘those Reasons in whom there is the single character of being otherwise impossible’, (1367)
[p.406] anyathetyādi yathoktamevārthaṃ nigamayati /	The same idea is re-affirmed in the following [see verses 1368-1369 next]
anyathānupapannatvaṃ yasya tasyaiva hetutā /	“That alone is the true probans which has the character of ‘being otherwise impossible’;
dṛṣṭāntau dvāvapi stāṃ vā mā vā tau hi na kāraṇam //	as for corroborative instances, they may be there, or they may not; as they are not the means.
nānyathānupapannatvaṃ yatra tatra trayeṇa kim / anyathānupapannatvaṃ yatra tatra trayeṇa kim // dṛṣṭāntāv iti /	if the character of ‘being otherwise impossible’ is not there, what is the use of the ‘three features? And if the character of ‘being otherwise impossible’ is there, what is the use of the ‘three features’?” (1368-1369)
sādharmyavaidharmyalakṣaṇau /	‘Corroborative Instances’, in the form similarity and dissimilarity.
na kāraṇam iti / sādhyapratipatteḥ /	‘They are not the Means’ of proving the Probandum.
pāṭhaḥ kartavyaḥ //	It would be better to read the second line of 1369 before the first line.
trirūpe 'vinābhāvasambandhābhāvaṃ darśayann āha sa śyāma ityādi / sa śyāmas tasya putratvād dṛṣṭā śyāmā yathetare /	“The reasoning in the form ‘he must be bark, because he is the son of so and so, like other sons of his who are found to be dark’, contains the ‘three featured’ probans, and yet it cannot lead to any valid definite conclusion.” (1370)
iti trilakṣaṇo hetur na niścityai pravartate //	The following Text proceeds to show that there can be no Invariable Concomitance in the ‘three-featured’ Probans;
tatraiketyādinaikalakṣaṇasyaiva hetoḥ sāmarthyaṃ darśayaty udāharaṇaprapañcena tatraikalakṣaṇo hetur dṛṣṭāntadvayavarjitaḥ / kathañcidupalabhyatvād bhāvābhāvau sadātmakau //	“An example of the one-featured probans without corroborative instances, we have in the reasoning ‘positive and negative entities are essentially existent because they are capable of being apprehended somehow’.” (1371) In the following Texts, it is shown, by a number of examples, that it is only the ‘one-featured’ Probans that has the requisite capacity (of leading to a valid conclusion): [see verse 1371 above]
bhāvābhāvau kathañcitsadātmakau kathañcid upalabhyatvāt / atra na sādharmyavaidharmyadṛṣṭāntau bahirbhūtau prayogātmakāvarthātmakau vā vidyete /	The Reasoning is in the form ‘Positive and Negative entities are somehow existent, because they are apprehensible somehow’, In this case there are no external corroborative Instances, either of similarity or dissimilarity, either in the form of a statement or in the form of actual things;
bhāvābhāvātmkasya sarvapādārtharāśeḥ pakṣīkṛtatvāt /	because all things have been included under the Subject (Minor Term) ‘Positive and Negative entities’;

tathā hi yatkiñcid idam aspaṣṭaṃ bhavatā grāhyadūṣaṇam abhihitam / idaṃ tu spaṣṭaṃ gāhyavivecanāya sādhanamabhidhīyate 'smābhiḥ /

In fact, the objection that you have urged against the object apprehended has been only indistinctly (vaguely) stated; while this is exactly that we have stated quite clearly, while examining i.e. rejecting the idea conviction that there is something real that is apprehended.

kiṃ tvaspaṣṭaṃ sādhanam ity āha sarvetyādi /

Question: “What is that clear statement in proof of your doctrine?” Answer: [see verse 1358 next]

sarvātmanā hi sārūpye jñānam ajñānatāṃ vrajet / sāmyaṃ kenacid aṃśena sarvaṃ syāt sarvavedakam //

If there were absolute sameness of form, then cognition would become non-cognition; as for partial sameness of form, that would make every cognition apprehensive of everything.

yāvadbhyo vijātīyebhyo vyāvṛttāvadbhya eva jñānapītīdaṃ sarvātmanā sārūpyam / katipayapadārthavyāvṛttitastvaṃśena sārūpyam //

‘Absolute sameness of form’ would consist in the fact of the Cognition being ‘excluded’ from exactly those homogeneous things from which the cognised object is ‘excluded’, while ‘partial sameness’ would consist in ‘exclusion’ from only a few of those.

kathaṃ tarhyarthasārūpyasya prāmāṇyamuktam ity āha kintvityādi /

Question: “If that is so, then, why has the validity of the Cognition been said to consist in its being of the same form as the Object?”

kintu bāhyārthasadbhāvavāde sārūpyasambhavaḥ /

But under the doctrine of the reality of the external world,, the possibility of the sameness of form has to be accepted;

dhruvamabhyupagantavya ityarthaṃ sa prakāśitaḥ //

that is why it has been mentioned.

nirbhāsijñānapakṣe hi grāhyād bhede 'pi cetasaḥ / pratibimbasya tādrūpyād bhāktaṃ syād api vedanam //

Under the doctrine, however, of cognition being a mere reflected image, even if the cognition differs from the cognised object, the sameness of form belongs to the reflection; and the cognition can be only figurative.

yena tviṣṭaṃ na vijñānam arthasārūpyabhājanam / tasyāyam api naivāsti prakāro bāhyavedane //

Lastly, for one who does not admit the cognition to be the receptacle of the semblance of the object, there is not even the said method possible for the cognising of the external object.

sa iti /

‘It has, etc.’.

sārūpyasambhava ākāro vā /

‘It’ stands for ‘the possibility of the sameness of form’, or the ‘form’ itself.

nirbhāso viṣayasārūpyaṃ, tadyasyāsti tannirbhāsi /

‘Nirbhāsi’, ‘Reflected Image’: ‘Nirbhāsa’, ‘Reflection’, is sameness of form with the object; and that which has this sameness of form, is the ‘Reflected linage’.

grāhyād iti / bāhyādarthāt /

‘From the cognised object’, i.e. from the external object.

pratibimbasyeti / jñānākārasya /

‘Belongs to the Reflection’, i.e. to the Reflection in the form of the Cognition.

tādrūpyād iti / viṣayasārūpyāt / bhāktam iti /

‘Sameness of form’, with the object. ‘Figurative’, Indirect, Secondary.

vedanam iti / arthasyeti śeṣaḥ /

‘Cognition’ i.e. of the object.

bhājanam āśrayaḥ /

‘Receptacle’ substratum.

viṣayavipratipattis tu sāmānyasya vastubhūtasya nirākaraṇād vastuviṣayatveneṣṭasya pratyakṣasya nānyaḥ svalakṣaṇād viṣayo 'stīti sāmarthyād upadarśitatvān na pṛthaṅnirākṛtā /

As regards the divergence of opinion regarding the object of Cognition, the Universal as a real entity has been already rejected; hence for Perception which has been regarded as having an entity for its object, there can be no other object except the Specific Individuality, and this having been already pointed out as being got at by implication, no special effort has been made for setting aside the said divergence of opinion.

ye tvāhurayuktam evedaṃ pratyakṣalakṣaṇam, lakṣaṇaṃ hi pramāṇasya praṇīyate

the definition put forward is that of the Means of Cognition, with the view that other people may, through that definition, come to understand what the Means of Cognition is, and then regulate their action accordingly;

api nāma tena rūpeṇopalakṣya pramāṇaṃ tataḥ pareṣāṃ pravṛttiḥ, syād iti, na tu vyasanitayā, na ca kalpanāpoḍhatvādinopalakṣitasyāpi pravartakatvaṃ nivartakatvaṃ vā samasti loka iti /

and it is not put forward only for satisfying a whim. And (in so far as the proposed definition is concerned) the knowledge that Sense-perception is ‘free from Conceptual Content’ and all that cannot, in ordinary life, either prompt a man to activity, or make him desist from it.”

tadasamyak /

This is not right.

nahi svecchayā vastūnāṃ svabhāvavyavasthānaṃ kartuṃ labhyaṃ yenānyathā

The nature of things cannot be made or determined according to one’s wish;

praṇīyeta lakṣaṇam, api tu yathāvasthitam eva vastusvarūpamanūdya prasi [p.403] ddhasvabhāvaviśeṣapratipipādayiṣayā lakṣaṇaṃ praṇayanti tadvidaḥ /

by virtue of which one could frame a definition accordingly; what, has to be done, however, is to take the thing as it stands, and to put forward a definition embodying that particular aspect of the thing which one wishes to bring out.

yathā pṛthivyāḥ khaṣkhaṭatvaṃ{Karatvaṃ---} /

For example, one points out ‘roughness’ as a characteristic of the Earth.

anyathā hyasambhavitādoṣeṇa duṣṭaṃ syāt /

If it were not thus, then the definition put forward might be open to the charge of being an ‘impossible’ one.

naca pratyakṣasya kalpanāpoḍhābhrāntatvābhyāmanyallakṣaṇamupalakṣakam asti / tathā hi tadavaśyabhrāntamaṅgīkartavyaṃ pramāṇatvāt /

As regards Sense-perception, there is nothing else to indicate its character, -except ‘freedom from Conceptual Content’ and ‘freedom from error’, For instance, it must be ‘free from error’, because it is a valid means of Cognition;

kalpanāpoḍhaṃ ca sākṣāt svalakṣaṇaviṣayatvāt /

and it must be ‘free from Conceptual Content’, because it directly apprehends the Specific Individuality of things;

svalakṣaṇasya cāśakyasamayatvena tat saṃvitter anabhijalpatvasya prasādhitatvāt / ato nyāyānuyātameva lakṣaṇam eva tadācakṣate kuśalāḥ /

and it has been proved that the Specific Individuality is something in regard to which no Convention can be made, and hence its cognition must be free from association with words. It is for tins reason that all intelligent persons regard this definition as entirely in accordance with reason.

na cāpyato lakṣaṇāt prekṣāvatāṃ pravṛttinivṛttī na bhavataḥ /

Nor is it true that this definition cannot bring about either activity, or desisting from activity, on the part of intelligent persons.

tathā hi ghaṭotkṣepaṇasāmānyasaṅkhyādijñānasya pratyabhijñāpratyayasyaca tathā pītaśaṅkhādijñānasya paraiḥ pratyakṣatvenopakalpitasya yathāyogaṃ savikalpakatvena bhrāntatvena vā pratyakṣatvamavadhārya tadviṣayatvenopakalpitasya saṅkhyāder vastutvābhiniveśānnivartante /

For instance, in connection with such cognitions as (a) the Idea of the Jar, the action of Throwing up, the Universal, the Number and so forth, (b) the idea of Recognition, and (c) the idea of the ‘yellow conch-shell’, some persons have been led to regard all these as ‘Sense-perception’, in accordance with the definition provided by other parties, and then they find that all these are either Conceptual or Erroneous, and then, in accordance with the definition provided by us, they conclude that these cannot be ‘Sense-perception’;

yac ca nirdeśyaṃ nīlādi svalakṣaṇaṃ tadeva vastvityavasāya tatra pravartante /

and they also conclude that what is an entity is only that Specific Individuality of the ‘Blue’ for instance, which is inexpressible by words, and hence they betake themselves to activity towards that.

yathā ca nirvikalpasyāpi pratyakṣasya pravartakatvaṃ tathā prāguktam eva /

How even the non-conceptual Cognition can lead to activity has been already explained before.

yadyevaṃ kalpanāpoḍhatvam evaikaṃ lakṣaṇaṃ kartuṃ yuktaṃ natvabhrāntam iti / tathā hi pravṛtteḥ prāgyadeva siddhaṃ rūpaṃ tadeva pravṛttikāmānāṃ lakṣaṇatvena praṇetuṃ yuktaṃ nāprasiddham asattulyatvāt tasya /

“If this is so, then let there be a single item in the definition ‘free from Conceptual Content’, and ‘free from error’ need not be added. Because that fact alone which is already known prior to the intended activity, should be put forward as a definition for the benefit of persons desirous of undertaking activity in accordance with that definition; and no unknown thing; as the latter is as good as non-existent.

nacābhrāntatvaniścayo 'rthakriyāsaṃvādāt prāgasti na hyarvāgdarśanāsztatkāryādhigamamantareṇa yathārthatāṃ jñānasya jñātumīśate teṣāṃ nityaṃ

And as a matter of fact, any certainty regarding ‘freedom from error’ cannot be there until it has been found to be compatible with the fruitful activity undertaken; in fact people with limited powers of perception are not able to ascertain the truthful character of a cognition, except through the perception of its practical effect;

padārthaśakteḥ kāryānumeyatvāt /

because for such persons the capacity of things can only be inferred from its effects;

yathopadarśitārthaprāpaṇasāmarthyalakṣaṇatvāc ca yathārthatāyāḥ /

it has been shown above that ‘truthfulness’ i.e. conformity with the real state of things of the Cognition consists only in its capacity to make people actually get at the thing cognised.

na cottarakālaṃ yathārthatāvadhāraṇe 'pi sāphalyam asti tataḥ punar apravṛtteḥ /

So that if this conformity were learnt only subsequently, it would serve no useful purpose; as after that, there is no further activity.”

tadetad acodyam /

Answer: There is no force in this objection.

tathā hi keśoṇḍrakādibuddhīnām api prāmāṇyaprasaṅgān mābhūd ativyāpitā lakṣaṇadoṣa ityato 'vaśyakaraṇīyamabhrāntagrahaṇam ityuktam /

It has been already explained that it is necessary to add the qualification ‘free from error’, in order to save the definition from the defect of being ‘too wide’ by reason of the possibility, under the definition, of notions like those of the ‘Hair -tuft’, etc. being regarded as valid cognition.

yaścāpi pravṛtteḥ prāganiścayaheturarvāgdarśitvam ucyate, so 'pyanaikānta eva / ko hyatra pratibandho yadarvāg darśibhir na kvacit sāmarthyaṃ niścitavyam iti / evaṃ hi na kiñcittairniśceyam iti prāptam /

As regards the argument that before the activity has actually taken place, people with limited powers of vision have no means of ascertaining the truth of the cognition, this also is Inconclusive. Where is there any such hard and fast rule that people with limited vision cannot ascertain the capacity of anything? If that were so, then, they would be unable to be certain of anything;

tataścācetanatvam eva teṣām āyātam /

which would mean that they are unconscious beings;

yāvatā paśuśiśavo 'pyabhyāsabalād udbhūtabhūtajñānavāsanāvṛttayaḥ sukhasya sādhanametad etad asukhasyeti pravṛtteḥ prāgapi niścitya prapātādi pariharantaḥ stanādi copādadānāḥ saṃdṛśyanta eva / tathāhyabhūtam api bhāvayatāṃ kāmaśokabhayādyupaplutacetasāmanapekṣitasādharmyādismṛter abhyāsasya sphuṭapratibhāsasya jñānotpādanasāmarthyam

because even animals and infants, through repeated experience, come to have their impressions aroused, are able to feel certain that ‘this thing brings pleasure’, ‘that other brings pain’, and are found to act accordingly, even before their present activity, and then avoid the precipice and take to the mother’s breasts. Also in the case of people who are constantly thinking of something that has never existed before, and have their mind disturbed by excessive desire, grief, fear and so forth, even without remembering any points of similarity, etc. it is found that the mere repetition of the vivid idea has the capacity to bring about the cognition.

upalabhyata eva / yatra tu punar nābhyāsas tatra teṣāṃ kāryānumeyaiva śaktir na tu sarvatra /

In a case where there is no repetition, there alone, not everywhere is the potency to be only inferred from its practical effects.

etena dhūmādiliṅganiścayo 'pi vyākhyātaḥ /

This same explanation applies to the certainty attaching to the perception of Inferential Indicatives, like Smoke;

yatas tatrāpi tada{de}tatkāryasya dhūmādeḥ prakṛtyā parasparamatyantaviviktasvabhāvatvāt, tadvivekaniścayasya cābhyāsādihetutvāl liṅganiścayasambhavād ato nānumānapratikṣepaḥ /

as here also, the effect, in the shape of Smoke, is, by its very nature, something entirely different (from the Fire), and the certainty regarding its difference is due to repeated observation, whereby the idea of the Inferential Indicative also becomes possible, and consequently there is no rejection of Inference. Says the Opponent: “The repetition would be there only after the first activity has taken place;

[p.404] natvādyāyāṃ pravṛttau satyām abhyāsaḥ sidhyati, yāvatā saiva kathaṃ bhavatīti vaktavyam /

Question: “How can the Perception which gives rise to Doubt have any validity?” Answer: How can there be validity in the Perception that brings about certainty?

ucyate saṃśayāt /

that is why it has been mentioned.

saṃśayahetoḥ pratyakṣasya kathaṃ tatra prāmāṇyam iti cet /

Because that fact alone which is already known prior to the intended activity, should be put forward as a definition for the benefit of persons desirous of undertaking activity in accordance with that definition;

niścayahetor api kathaṃ prāmāṇyam /

Answer: How can there be validity in the Perception that brings about certainty?

avasāyotpādanād arthinas tatra pravartanād iti cet /

“It is due to the fact that this Perception brings about a definite Cognition and the man seeking for it takes up his activity.”

tadetat saṃśayahetor api tulyam /

This same may be said also with regard to Perception leading to Doubt.

yadyapi tatra pratīyamānārthitārthakāraviparīto vyavasāyaḥ, tathāpi na tenākāreṇa tasya pratyakṣasya pravartakatvam, tathāvasitasyānarthitatvāt /

Even though in this case, the cognition is contrary to the form of what is sought after, yet it is not in that form that the Perception leads to activity, because what is so cognised is not what is wanted;

nāpi nivartakatvaṃ, pratīyamānaprārthitārthādhyavasāyahetutvenārthinaḥ

nor does it lead to desisting from activity; because it is only when there is cognition of the thing as desired that there can be any activity on the part of the man.

anyathā hi saṃśayahetoḥ pratyakṣād arthī na pravarteta nāpi nivarteteti praptaṃ, na caivaṃ bhavati, api tv arthinām asambhāvitānarthodayānām arthitayāpravṛtter eva balīyastvam /

Otherwise, from Perception leading to Doubt, no one could act or desist from acting. But this does not so happen; on the contrary, it so happens that that activity is all the more powerful which proceeds on the part of persons who do not apprehend any evil consequences from the activity in question.

anena cāṃśena niścayahetoḥ pratyakṣād asya na kaścid viśeṣaḥ /

So far as this aspect is concerned, there is no difference between the Perception leading to Doubt and that leading to Certainty.

yatra tvekāntena pratīyamānārthaviparītākārāvasāyahetutvameva, avasāyānutpādakatvaṃ vā, tatra tasya sarvārthārthino 'pravartanād aprāmāṇyameveti yuktaṃ vaktuṃ nānyatretyalam //

It is only where the Perception brings about a cognition entirely contrary to the thing cognised, or where it brings about no cognition at all, that there is no activity on the part of the man seeking for something;

iti pratyakṣalakṣaṇaparīkṣā //

and hence it is only this Perception that is invalid, not any other.

KAPITEL ANUMAANAPARIIK.SAA

End of the Chapter on Sense-perception.

svaparārthavibhāgena tvanumānaṃ dvidheṣyate /

Inference is held to be of two kinds, as divided into (1) for one’s own benefit, and (2) for the benefit of others.

svārthaṃ trirūpato liṅgād anumeyārthadarśanam //

(1) inference ‘for one’s own benefit’ consists in the cognition of the inferred object derived from the three-featured probans;

trirūpaliṅgavacanaṃ parārthaṃ punar ucyate /

and (2) inference ‘for the benefit of others’ consists in the statement of the three-featured probans.

ekaikadvidvirūpo 'rtho liṅgābhāsas tato mataḥ //

That probans which has only one or two features (out of the necessary three) is regarded as a ‘semblance of the probans’.

anumānaṃ svārthaparārthabhedena dvividham / tatra svārthaṃ yat trirūpāl liṅgāt pakṣadharmatvaṃ sapakṣe sattvaṃ vikaṣāc ca sarvato vyāvṛttir ityevaṃlakṣaṇād anumeyārthaviṣayaṃ jñānaṃ tadātmakaṃ boddhavyam /

Inference is of two kinds as divided into ‘for one’s own benefit’ and ‘for the benefit of others’, The former should be understood to be that Cognition of the inferred object which is derived from ‘the three-featured Probans’, the Indicative that fulfils the three conditions of (1) ‘being present in the Subject’, (2) ‘being present in that wherein the Probandum is known to be present’, and (3) ‘being entirely absent where the Probandum is known to be absent’. The Inference ‘for the sake of others’ should be understood to consist in the verbal expression of the said three-featured Probans.

parārthaṃ tu yathoktatrirūpaliṅgaprakāśakavacanātmakaṃ draṣṭavyam /

(b) the character of being corporeal, fulfils only the second condition, of being present where the Probandum is known to be present and does not fulfil the first condition of being present in the Subject (Sound), because Sound is not corporeal;

nityaḥ śabdaḥ kṛtakatvān mūrtatvād aprameyatvādityekaikarūpo yathākramaṃ pakṣadharmatvasapakṣasattvavipakṣavyāvṛttimātrasya vidyamānatvāt / tatra dvidvirūpo yathā dhvaniranityaścākṣuṣatvāc chrāvaṇatvād amūrtatvād iti yathākramaṃ pakṣasattvasapakṣasattvavipakṣavyāvṛttimātrābhāvāt /

and (c) the character of being non-cognisable fulfils only the third condition, of being absent where the Proban-dura (Eternality) is known to be absent (e.g. in the Soul, etc. which are cognisable) [and it does not fulfil the other two conditions, as it is not present in the Subject, Sound, which is cognisable; nor is it present where the Probandum is known to be present, e.g. the Soul, etc, which are cognisable], Those fulfilling only two of the thrée conditions are the Probans in the following argument ‘Sound is non-eternal, (a) because it is visible, (b) because it is audible, and (c) becaxise it is incorporeal’;

taduktam

This has been thus expressed.

"kṛtaktavād dhvanir nityo mūttatvād aprameyataḥ /

‘Sound is eternal, because it is a product, because it is corporeal and because it is non-cognisable;

amūttaśrāvaṇatvābhyam anityaścākṣuṣatvataḥ" //

and Sound is non-eternal, because it is incorporeal, because it is audible and because it is visible’.

iti // [p.405]

This has been thus expressed.

anyathānupapannatve nanu dṛṣṭā suhetutā /

and Sound is non-eternal, because it is incorporeal, because it is audible and because it is visible’.

nāsati tryaṃśakasyāpi tasmān klībāstrilakṣaṇāḥ //

hence the ‘three-featured’ probans are impotent (infruc-tuous).” (1364)

sa hy āha anyathānupapannatva eva hetur na tu punas trilakṣaṇaḥ.

Pātrasvāmin argues as follows: “The Probans is valid only when it is found to be ‘otherwise impossible’;

tathā hy asatyanyathānupapannatve tryaṃśakasyāpi tat putratvāder na dṛṣṭā suhetutā / tasmāt klībāḥ asaktāḥ, trilakṣaṇā hetava iti /

and not when it has the ‘three features Because it is found that even when the Probans has the said three features, it is not valid, when it does not fulfil the condition that it is ‘otherwise impossible’; e.g. in the case where the Probans is cited in the form ‘Because hé is the Son of so and so’ [therefore he must be dark] Consequently the ‘three-featured’ Probans are infructuous, inefficient”.

anyatheti / sādhyena vinānupapannatvaṃ, hetoḥ sādhya eva sattvam ity arthaḥ //

In the term ‘otherwise impossible’, the term ‘otherwise’ stands for ‘without the Probandum’; that is to say, the valid Probans is that which exists in the Probandum only.

anyathānupapannatvaṃ yasyāsau hetur iṣyate /

“That which is ‘otherwise impossible’ is held to be the probans, while this is only ‘one-featured’;

ekalakṣaṇakaḥ so 'rthaś catur lakṣaṇako na vā //

it may or may not be regarded as ‘four-featured’.” (1365)

ekaṃ lakṣaṇam anyathānupapannatvaṃ yasyāsti sa ekalakṣaṇaḥ.

‘One-featured’ That which has only one characteristic, that of being ‘otherwise impossible’;

sa eva laukikaiḥ parīkṣakair vā hetur iṣyate, nānyaḥ.

that alone none other, is regarded as ‘Probans’, by ordinary men as well as by investigators.

arthāpattyā tu pakṣadharmatvādi trayam anenaivākṣipyata iti caturlakṣaṇako 'pi vā bhavatu /

Through Presumption this same character implies the three features of ‘Being present in the Subject’ and so forth; and hence it may be regarded as ‘four-featured’;

na vā caturlakṣaṇo yasmāt kvacid ekalakṣaṇo dvilakṣaṇastrilakṣaṇo 'pi vā nyāyyaḥ, yasmād anyathānupapattir ekaṃ lakṣaṇaṃ tenaikalakṣaṇa iti vyapadiśyate

or it may not be so regarded, because in several cases, the Probans is found to be valid even when it has only one or two or three features. Inasmuch as ‘being otherwise impossible’ is its one characteristic feature, it is called ‘one-featured’.

anyathānupapattisahitāṃ sajātīyasiddhatāṃ vijātīyavyāvṛttiṃ cābhisamīkṣya dvilakṣaṇaḥ, anyathānupapannatvaṃ sajātīyavṛttiḥ sādhyavipakṣāc ca vyāvṛttir iti trilakṣaṇaḥ /

Along with ‘being otherwise impossible’, if it is found to exist in like things and not to exist in unlike things, then, it becomes ‘two-featured’; and when along with ‘being otherwise impossible’, it is also existent in like things and also to be absent where the Probandum is known to be absent, then it is ‘three-featured’;

na tu pakṣadharmatvādilakṣaṇadharmatrayayogāt trilakṣaṇahetur iṣyate /

and it is not called ‘three-featured’ on account of the presence of the three features of ‘presence in the Subject’ and the rest (mentioned in the Buddhist’s definition);

tasya samyagjñānaṃ prati hetutvānupapatteḥ //

because a Probans of this latter kind cannot bring about a valid cognition.

athavā prādhānyād anyathānupapattināmadheyenaivaikalakṣaṇavyapadeśo na tupakṣadharmatvādibhis teṣām aprādhānyād akiñcikaratvād vetyetad darśayann āha yathetyādi /

“Or, the Probans is spoken of as ‘one-featured’ in view of the one character of ‘being otherwise impossible’, because this is its principal characteristic; and it is not spoken of in terms of the other features of ‘presence in the Subject’ and the rest, because these latter are secondary, or because they do not serve any useful purpose.” This is what is shown in the following [see verse 1366 next]

yathā loke triputraḥ sannekaputraka ucyate / tasyaikasya suputratvāt tathehapi ca dṛśyatām //

“Just as among people, the man who has three sons is spoken of as ‘having one son’, on account of the one son being a good son, so it should be understood in the present instance also.” (1366)

nanu cāvinābhāvasambandhāt trirūpasyaiva sahetutā yuktetyāha avinetyādi /

Says the other party: On account of the relation of Invariable Concomitance, the character of the Probans should be rightly attributed to the ‘three-featured’ Reason only.

avinābhāvasambandhas trirūpeṣu na jātucit /

“As a matter of fact, the relation of invariable concomitance is not present in the ‘three-featured’ reasons;

anyathāsambhavaikāṅgahetuṣvevopalabhyate // anyathāsambhava ekamaṅgaṃ yeṣāṃ te tathoktās te ca te hetavaścetyanyathāsambhavaikāṅgahetavaḥ //

it is really found only in those reasons which have the one characteristic feature of ‘being otherwise impossible (1367) The compound ‘anyathāsambhava, etc.’ is to be expounded as ‘those Reasons in whom there is the single character of being otherwise impossible’, (1367)

[p.406] anyathetyādi yathoktamevārthaṃ nigamayati /

The same idea is re-affirmed in the following [see verses 1368-1369 next]

anyathānupapannatvaṃ yasya tasyaiva hetutā /

“That alone is the true probans which has the character of ‘being otherwise impossible’;

dṛṣṭāntau dvāvapi stāṃ vā mā vā tau hi na kāraṇam //

as for corroborative instances, they may be there, or they may not; as they are not the means.

nānyathānupapannatvaṃ yatra tatra trayeṇa kim / anyathānupapannatvaṃ yatra tatra trayeṇa kim // dṛṣṭāntāv iti /

if the character of ‘being otherwise impossible’ is not there, what is the use of the ‘three features? And if the character of ‘being otherwise impossible’ is there, what is the use of the ‘three features’?” (1368-1369)

sādharmyavaidharmyalakṣaṇau /

‘Corroborative Instances’, in the form similarity and dissimilarity.

na kāraṇam iti / sādhyapratipatteḥ /

‘They are not the Means’ of proving the Probandum.

pāṭhaḥ kartavyaḥ //

It would be better to read the second line of 1369 before the first line.

trirūpe 'vinābhāvasambandhābhāvaṃ darśayann āha sa śyāma ityādi / sa śyāmas tasya putratvād dṛṣṭā śyāmā yathetare /

“The reasoning in the form ‘he must be bark, because he is the son of so and so, like other sons of his who are found to be dark’, contains the ‘three featured’ probans, and yet it cannot lead to any valid definite conclusion.” (1370)

iti trilakṣaṇo hetur na niścityai pravartate //

The following Text proceeds to show that there can be no Invariable Concomitance in the ‘three-featured’ Probans;

tatraiketyādinaikalakṣaṇasyaiva hetoḥ sāmarthyaṃ darśayaty udāharaṇaprapañcena tatraikalakṣaṇo hetur dṛṣṭāntadvayavarjitaḥ / kathañcidupalabhyatvād bhāvābhāvau sadātmakau //

“An example of the one-featured probans without corroborative instances, we have in the reasoning ‘positive and negative entities are essentially existent because they are capable of being apprehended somehow’.” (1371) In the following Texts, it is shown, by a number of examples, that it is only the ‘one-featured’ Probans that has the requisite capacity (of leading to a valid conclusion): [see verse 1371 above]

bhāvābhāvau kathañcitsadātmakau kathañcid upalabhyatvāt / atra na sādharmyavaidharmyadṛṣṭāntau bahirbhūtau prayogātmakāvarthātmakau vā vidyete /

The Reasoning is in the form ‘Positive and Negative entities are somehow existent, because they are apprehensible somehow’, In this case there are no external corroborative Instances, either of similarity or dissimilarity, either in the form of a statement or in the form of actual things;

bhāvābhāvātmkasya sarvapādārtharāśeḥ pakṣīkṛtatvāt /

because all things have been included under the Subject (Minor Term) ‘Positive and Negative entities’;