buddhist-nlp/tatpa-noisy · Datasets at Hugging Face

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abhrāntagrahaṇaṃ taddhi bhrāntatvānneṣyate pramā //	as these are not regarded as ‘valid cognition’ on the ground of their being ‘erroneous’.
abhrāntamatrāvisaṃvāditvena draṣṭavyam, natu yathāvasthitālambanākāratayā /	The term ‘not-erroneous’ should be understood as ‘not incongruent’ and not as ‘having for its basis a form as it really exists’.
anyathā hi yogācāramatenālambanāsiddher ubhayanayasamāśrayeṇeṣṭasya pratyakṣalakṣaṇasyāvyāpitā syāt /	If this latter were meant, then, as under the view of the Yogācāra (the extreme Idealist) there can be no real basis, the definition, thus interpreted, would not be applicable to Sense-perception as accepted by both theorists (the Realist Sautrāntika and the Idealist Yogācāra).
avisaṃvāditvaṃ cābhimatārthakriyāsamarthārthaprāpaṇaśaktikatvam, natu prāpaṇam eva pratibandhādisambhavāt /	As regards ‘being non-incon-gruent’, what it means is ‘the presence of the capacity to envisage a thing which is capable of the intended fruitful activity’, not actually envisaging it; as obstacles are likely to appear in the actual envisaging.
yadyevam abhrāntagrahaṇamevāstu, kiṃ kalpanāpoḍhagrahaṇeneti cet /	Question “If that is so, then let there be only the qualification ‘not erroneous’; what is the use of mentioning the ‘freedom from conceptual content’?”
na /	Answer: That cannot be right;
anumānavikalpasyāpi pratyakṣatvaprasaṅgāt //	as in that case the inferential concept also would have to be regarded as Sense-perception.
mānasaṃ tadapītyeka iti /	Some people have held that illusion is purely mental.
mānasaṃ tadapītyeke naitad indriyabhāvataḥ / bhāvāt tadvikṛtāvasya vikṛteścopalambhataḥ // sarpādibhrāntivaccedam anaṣṭe 'pyakṣaviplave /	but that is not so; as it is pound to appear only when the sense-organ is present (and operative) and to cease when this latter (becomes disordered, ceases). If it were purely mental, it should cease like the illusion regarding a serpent, even when the disorder of the sense-organ has not ceased;
nivarteta manobhrānteḥ spaṣṭaṃ ca pratibhāsanāt //	Against this view the following might be urged: Granting that Illusion is mental;
na tadarthamabhrāntagrahaṇaṃ yuktaṃ kartum iti teṣām abhiprāyaḥ /	even so, it is not necessary to add the qualifying term ‘not erroneous’;
nanu ca bhavatu nāma mānasam tathāpyabhrāntagrahaṇaṃ kartavyam eva, nahyanenendriyajñānasyaiva pratyakṣalakṣaṇaṃ kartumārabdham, kiṃ tarhi/	because what the person propounding the definition under review wanted to do was not to provide a definition of only that ‘Sense-perception’ which is brought about by the Sense-organs, but also of that Sense-perception which appears in the Mystic and which is purely mental;
mānasasyāpi yogijñānādeḥ, tatra ca svapnāntikasyāpi nirvikalpakatvam ast spaṣṭapratibhāsitvāt, natvabhrāntatvam iti tannivṛttyarthamabhrāntagrahaṇaṃ yuktam eva /	as in this latter Dream-cognition also is non-conceptual, as it appears quite distinctly; and yet it is not ‘non-erronoeus’; hence for the exclusion of this, the addition of the qualifying term ‘non-erroneous’ is necessary.
satyam etat /	This is true;
kiṃtvindriyabhrāntir api sambhavatyato 'yam ayukta eṣāṃ pakṣa itīndriyajatvapratipādanāyāha naitad ityādi /	but there are Illusions possible through the Senses also [and they are not always mental]; hence the said view of ‘some people’ is not right. The author explains how Illusions may be sense-born ‘But that is not so, etc. etc.’.
indriyabhāve sati bhāvādindriyajeyaṃ keśoṇḍrakādibuddhiḥ /	which shows that like any other sense-born cognition, this Illusion of the ‘Hair-tuft’ and the like also is Sense-born.
kiṃ ca yadi manobhrāntiḥ syāt tato manobhrānter eva kāraṇānnivartetānivṛtte 'pyakṣaviplave /	Further, if the Illusion belonged entirely to the Mind, then the mental aberration would be the sole cause of the Illusion, and hence the Illusion would cease on the cessation of the mental aberration, though the disorder of the Sense-organ may still be there.
sarpādibhrāntivad iti dṛṣṭāntaḥ /	The illusion regarding the serpent and such things is cited as an example.
spaṣṭapratibhāsā ca na prāpnotītyayam aparaḥ prasaṅgaḥ / nahi vikalpānuviddhasya spaṣṭārthapratibhāsitā, sāmānyollekhenaiva tasya pravṛtteḥ //	That the Illusion should not be very clear is another incongruous, possibility cited. What is mixed up with Conceptual Content cannot bring about a very clear apprehension of the Thing; as the said Content operates only through the presentation of the Universal (which is always vague).
tadbhāvetyādinā parakīyaṃ dūṣaṇam āśaṅkate	The following texts sets forth the objection of the other party: [see verses 1315-1320 next]
tadbhāvābhāvitā sākṣād asiddhā vyabhicāriṇī /	and in its indirect sense, it is inconclusive;
pāramparyeṇa sā tasyāṃ smṛtibuddhau samanvayāt //	as it is present in remembrance also.
[p.393] tadvikāravikāritvaṃ pāramparyodbhaveṣyapi / kāryeṣu dṛśyate loke vyaktaṃ vegasarādiṣu //	(b) as regards the reason ‘illusion is an aberration brought about by the disorder of the sense-organ’, that is clearly found also in the case of effects produced indirectly, for example, in the case of the mule and such things.
mānasyo bhrāntayaḥ sarvā nivartante vicārataḥ / ityasmin vyabhicāritvaṃ bhāvasāmānyabuddhibhiḥ //	(c) as regards the idea’ that ‘all mental illusions cease after reflection’, this also is not quite true (inconclusive), in view of such ideas as-‘entity’ and ‘universal’.
vastusvalakṣaṇe naitāḥ pravartante svabhāvataḥ / evaṃ tadvinivṛttiścet tulyaṃ candradvayādiṣu //	If it be held that these notions do cease on the subsequent notion that ‘these are not found in the specific individuality of things’, then the answer is that such cessation is possible also in the case of such illusions as that of ‘two moons’.
na sattāvinivṛttiścet samaṃ sāmānyabuddhiṣu / naceśvarādibhrāntīnāṃ tanmatābhiniveśinām // yuktikoṭiśrave 'pyasti nivṛttiḥ pratyuta svayam /	If it be urged that the existence of these does not cease then, the same may be said in regard to the notions of the universal, etc, also as regards the illusions regarding god and such other beings, appearing in persons who are bent upon believing in them, there is no cessation at all, even on listening to millions of reasons;
naitā yuktaya ityevaṃ te vadanti jaḍāḥ punaḥ //	in fact, these dull-witted persons declare that these reasons are no reasons at all.” (1315-1320)
atra yadi sākṣāt tadbhāvabhāvitvaṃ hetus tadānyatarāsiddhatā hetoḥ, nahiparasya sākṣād indriyād utpattirbhrānteḥ siddhā, tasyā eva sādhyatvāt /	(a) If the fact of Illusion being there only when the Sense-organ is there is cited as a Reason in the direct sense, then it is Inadmissible for one or the other of the two parties; for the other party, it is not proved that Illusion is produced directly from the Sense-organs;
atha sāmānyena tadbhāvabhāvitvaṃ hetus tadānaikāntikatā, smṛtibuddhau vipakṣabhūtāyām api tadbhāvabhāvitvasya samaṃdhayā{pāramparya---}dvidyamānatvāt /	On the other hand, if it is meant in the indirect sense, that the Illusion being there only when the Sense-organ is there is cited as the Reason; then it is Inconclusive; because such indirect concomitance with the Sense-organ is present in Remembrance also (which is not regarded as Sense-born).
yacca tadvikāravikāritvaṃ tadapi sākṣād asiddham, pāramparyeṇāpyupādīyamānamanaikāntikameva /	(b) As regards the Premiss that ‘the Illusion is an aberration brought about by the disorder of the Sense-organ,’ that also is Inadmissible in the direct sense; and if taken in the indirect sense, this also is Inconclusive;
yato 'ścāyāṃ gardabhena jātasya vegasarasya kalalādyavasthāvyavadhāne 'pi gardabharūpānukāreṇa tadvikāritvasya paścād darśanādato nāsmāt sākṣād utpattiḥ sidhyati /	as in the case of the Mule, which is born of the Mare from the Ass, all the embryonic stages intervene between the contact of the animals and the birth of the Mule and it is only when the final product is subsequently found to resemble the Ass that the idea comes about that it is born of the Ass; but that does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that it is produced from the Ass directly.
mānasī ca bhrāntir vicārān nivartata ityatrāpyanaikāntikatvaṃ bhāvasāmānyabuddhibhiḥ / nahi bhavatāṃ yuktyā sāmānyābhāvamavagacchatām api bhāveṣu ghaṭādiṣu bhāva iti vā sāmānyam iti vā sāmānyākāro vikalpo nivartate /	(c) The assertion that “Mental Illusion ceases on reflection” is also Inconclusive, in view of the ideas of Entity and Universal’, That is, for you the Buddhist, who, relying on Reasoning, hold that there is no such thing as the Universal, the generic idea that there is in regard to things like the Jar being ‘entities’ or ‘universals’ does not cease at all.
atha manyase nivartanta eva yuktyā vicārayataḥ sāmānyabuddhayaḥ svalakṣaṇenaitāḥ pravartanta ityanenākāreṇeti /	If you think that “when one comes to reflect over them, the said ideas do disappear, through such notions as ‘these ideas do not appertain to the Specific Individuality”, then we say that this is no answer at all.
candradvayādibuddhayo 'pi yuktyā vicārayataḥ svalakṣaṇe naitāḥ pravartanta ityanenākāreṇa nivartanta eva /	In the case of the Illusions regarding ‘Too Moons’ and the like, when one comes to ponder over them, they also cease through the notion that ‘these do not appertain to the Specific Individuality’;
na ca tāvatā mānasyo bhavanti /	and yet these do not become ‘mental’.
sattā tāsāṃ na nivartata iti cet tattulyaṃ sāmānyabuddhibhiḥ /	It might be urged that “the existence of these does not cease”.
nahi tāsām api svabhāvo nivartate //	as the existence of these also does not cease.
tadbhāvabhāvitetyādinā pratividhatte tadbhāvabhāvitā sākṣān na siddhābhrāntacetasā / vyavadhānaṃ na siddhaṃ hi na hi tadvedyate 'ntarā //	The idea of the illusion being there when the sense-organ is there cannot be said to be ‘inadmissible’, in its direct sense. Because there is no intervention by any unmistaken (right) notion; as no such intervening right notion is ever apprehended.
[p.394] apyarthāsaktacitto 'pi dvicandrādi samīkṣate /	Even when the man has his mind not turned to other things, he has the continuous perception of ‘two moons’;
avicchinnamato nāsti pāramparyasamudbhavaḥ // bhāvasāmānyabuddhīnāṃ pratisaṃhārasambhave / nivṛttiḥ sambhavatyeva svecchayeśamater api //	which shows that the production (of the illusion, by the sense-organ) is not indirect as regards the ideas of ‘entity’, ‘universal’ and so forth, where there is the possibility of their being retracted, cessation is quite possible, if the person so wishes.
nāsiddhā api tu siddhaiva, kasmāt/ abhrāntenaikacandracetasā vyavadhānāsiddheḥ / tasyopalabhyasyāntarāle 'nupalabhyamanatvāt /	‘Cannot be Inadmissible’, i.e. it must be admissible. Why? Because there is no intervention by any unmistaken notion of the One Moon because while it would be cognisable if it were there, no such notion is cognised at all.
etad evānyārthetyādinā spaṣṭīkurute /	This same idea is made clear in the sentence ‘Even when the man, etc, etc.’.
avicchinnaṃ dvicandrādīti sambandhanīyam /	‘Continuous’ is to be construed with ‘perception of the Two Moons’.
ata eva tadvikāravikāritvasyāpyavyabhicāraḥ / nahi tadapi vyavahitaṃ, yena vegasarādibhir vyabhicāraḥ syāt /	For this same reason the Premiss, that ‘illusion is an aberration produced by the aberration of the Sense-organ’, also is not ‘Inconclusive As this also is not interrupted, in view of which the case of the Mule would render it false, inconclusive.
bhāvasāmānyabuddhīnām api yadecchayā saṃhāraṃ kurute tadā nivṛttir astyeva /	As regards the notions of ‘Entity’, ‘Universal’ and so forth, when the person retracts them by bis own wish, there is cessation of these also.
natu keśoṇḍrakādibuddhīnām icchayā saṃhāraḥ sambhavatīti nānaikāntikatā/	But in the case of the Illusions like that of the ‘Hair-tuft’, there can be no retraction at will;
indriyajñānasyāpi cakṣuṣīcchayā nimīlite nivṛttir icchāvaśāt sambhavatīti cet /	It might be argued that “even in the case of Perception through the Senses, there can be cessation at will, by closing one’s eyes for instance”.
nahi samanantaramicchānivṛttau nivartate cakṣur vijñānam /	The Visual Perception does not cease immediately on the appearance of the wish;
cakṣur nimīlanaṃ tāvadicchāvaśād bhavati tato nivṛtte cakṣuṣi tajjñānaṃ nivartate mānasī tu bhrāntiḥ sākṣādicchāvaśān nivartata iti na samānam /	in fact what is brought about by the man’s wish is only the closing of the eyes; and it is only when the Eyes have ceased to function that the Visual Perception ceases. In the case of mental Illusion, on the other hand, it ceases directly after the wash of the man;
itthaṃ caitad avaseyam yataḥ praṇihite cakṣuṣi draṣṭumaniṣyamāṇo 'pyartho dṛśyata evāto necchāyāścakṣurādijñāne sākṣāt sāmarthyam //	hence the two cases are not analogous, It has to be borne in mind that, when the Eyes are fixed upon a thing, even though the man may not wish to look at the thing, the thing is actually seen; so that the wish has no direct influence upon the Visual or other Perceptions.
pītaśaṅkhādibuddhīnāṃ vibhrame 'pi pramāṇatām / arthakriyāvisaṃvādādapare sampracakṣate //	There are others who declare that “notions like ‘the yellow conch-shell’, even though illusory, are valid, inasmuch as they are not in con gruent with effective action.” (1324)
kecit tu svayūthyā evābhrāntagrahaṇaṃ necchanti /	There are some people belonging to our own party (Buddhists) who do not wish to have the qualification ‘not-erroneous’ (in the definition of Sense-perception);
bhrāntasyāpi pītaśaṅkhādijñānasya pratyakṣatvāt /	because (they argue that) even the illusory idea of the ‘Yellow conch-shell’ is Sense-perception.
tathā hi na tadanumānamaliṅgajatvāt / pramāṇaṃ cāvisaṃvāditvāt /	Because it cannot be Inference, as it is not brought about by an Inferential Indicative, And that it is valid is clear from the fact that it is not incongruent with reality.
ata evācāryadiṅnāgena lakṣaṇe na kṛtamabhrāntagrahaṇam /	It was for this reason that the Teacher Diṅṅāga did not introduce this qualification ‘not erroneous’ in his definition of Sense-perception.
bhrāntiḥ saṃvṛttiḥ sājñānamanumānetyādinā pratyakṣābhāsanirdeśādisaṃvādikalpanāpoḍhamityevaṃvidhamiṣṭamācāryasya lakṣaṇam / sataimiram iti tu timiraśabdo 'yam ajñānaparyāyaḥ / timiraghnaṃ ca mandānām iti yathā /	Error, Illusion, Ignorance, Inference these he has mentioned as having the ‘Semblance’ of Perception, which shows that the definition intended by him was that ‘it is free from Conceptual Content and is not incongrnent with the real state of things’, He has also included the ‘taimiram’ (among the Semblances of Perception), where ‘timira’ (Darkness) stands for ignorance: as found in such expressions as ‘Timiraghnañca mandānām’;
timire bhavaṃ taimiraṃ visaṃvādakam ity arthaḥ //	and that which proceeds from Timira Ignorance is ‘Taimira’, i.e. incongruent.
tannetyādinā pratividhatte /	The answer to the above is provided in the following [see verses 1325-1326 next]
tannādhyavasitākārapratirūpā na vidyate / tatrāpyarthakriyāvāptiranyathātiprasajyate //	This cannot be right the effective action available is not in keeping with the form apprehended. otherwise there would be incongruities;
keśādipratibhāse ca jñāne saṃvādibhāvataḥ /	as in the cognition where there is appearance of the hair and such things, there is compatibility, though only with the light (which is not apprehended) and other details;
ālokāder atas tasya durnivārā pramāṇatā //	hence the validity of this would be irresistible (under the opponent’s view).
[p.395] prāmāṇyaṃ hi bhaddvābhyām ākārābhyāṃ bhavati, yathāpratibhāsamavisaṃvādādyathādhyavasāyāṃ vā /	The validity of a cognition is of two kinds (1) when there is compatibility with the appearance, and (2) when there is compatibility with the Apprehension.
tatreha na yathāpratibhāsamavisaṃvādaḥ, pītasya pratibhāsanāt tasya yathābhūtasyāprāpteḥ /	In the case in question (of the idea of the ‘yellow conch-shell’), the ‘absence of incongruence’ (i.e. compatibility) is not in accordance with the appearance, as what appears what is apparent is the yellow conch-shell;
nāpi yathādhyavasāyamavisaṃvādaḥ, pītasyaiva viśiṣṭārthakriyākāritvenādhyavasāyāt, na ca tadrūpārthakriyāprāptir asti /	nor is its compatibility in accordance with the apprehension, because it is the yellow thing itself that is apprehended as capable of a particular fruitful activity; and yet no fruitful activity in that form is actually found.
na cānadhyavasitārthāvisaṃvādenāpi prāmāṇyam atiprasaṅgāt /	Nor can there be validity even when there is compatibility with what is not apprehended at all; as that would lead to absurdity;
keśādijñāne 'pi hyanadhyavasitālokādiprāpteḥ //	as in the case of the cognition of the Hair-tuft also, what is actually got at is only the light (whose reflections create the impression of the Hair-tuft).
atha manyase yadyapi varṇo 'dhyavasito na prāpyate, saṃsthānaṃ tu prāpyata evetyata āha na varṇetyādi / na varṇavyatiriktaṃ ca saṃsthānamupapadyate /	There can re no shape apart from the colour; and with the apparent colour, there is no compatibility (in the case in question). If you think that “though the apprehended Colour is not obtained, yet the shape is certainly obtained”, then our answer is as follows: [see verse 1327 above]
subodham //	This is easily under stood.
yadyākāramityādinopacayam āha yadyākāramanādṛtya prāmāṇyaṃ ca prakalpyate / arthakriyāvisaṃvādāt tadrūpo hyarthaniścayaḥ // ityādigaditaṃ sarvaṃ kathaṃ na vyāhataṃ bhavet / vāsanāpākahetūtthastasmāt saṃvādasambhavaḥ //	If, without regard to the form of things, validity were presumed on the ground of mere compatibility with fruitful action, then how would this not contradict such assertions (of yours) as that ‘the definite cognition of the thing is in the form of the thing’? as regards the possibility of ‘compatibility’ (in the case of the notion of the ‘yellow conch-shell’), that can only be the result of the impression (of a previous cognition).
naiva hyarthakriyāvisaṃvāditvamātreṇākāramanapekṣya prāmāṇyaṃ, kalpanīyam viṣayākārasyāprāmāṇyaprasaṅgāt /	Validity cannot be presumed merely on the basis of the compatibility of effective action, without regard to the form; as in that case the cognition in the form of the thing itself might have to be regarded as invalid.
tadrūpa iti / jñānasthābhāsarūpaḥ /	‘In the form of the thing’ i.e. in the form that appears in the cognition.
ādiśabdena yathā yathā hyarthasyākāraḥ śubhrāditvena sanniviśate tadrūpaḥsa viṣayaḥ pramīyata ityādikam ācāryīyaṃ vacanaṃ virudhyata iti darśayati / arthakriyāsaṃvādas tu pūrvārthānubhavavāsanāparipākād eva pramāṇāntarād bhavatīty avaseyam /	‘Such assertions as’; this is meant to show that the presumption in question would go against such assertions of the Teacher as ‘As the form of the thing figures in the Cognition, in that form is the thing rightly cognised’, As regards ‘compatibility with effective action’, (in the case) in question, it should be understood to be the result of the Impression left by previous apprehensions.
pītaśaṅkhajñānasya vāsanāparipākahetuḥ śukla eva śaṅkhas tadādhipatyenatat paripākāt / vāsanāparipākahetutaḥ samutthānaṃ yasyāvisaṃvādasya sa tathoktaḥ //	That is to say, the idea of the ‘yellow conch-shell’ is the effect of the Impression left by a previous apprehension of the ‘white conch-shell And the ‘compatibility with effective action’ (that has been said to be present in the case) is due to this Impression.
sukhādīnāṃ kathaṃ saṃvedanapratyakṣatetyāha mānasetyādi / mānasendriyavijñānanirvikalpatvasādhane / yo nyāyaḥ sa sukhādīnām avikalpatvasādhakaḥ //	The reasoning that is used in proving the non-conceptual character of the cognitions produced by the mental sense-organ, also serves to prove the non-conceptual character of the sensations of pleasure, etc. The Author now proceeds to show how the character of ‘Sense-perception’ belongs to the Sensation of Pleasure, etc.: [see verses 1330 above]
yo nyāya iti / aśakyasamayatvādiḥ /	‘The Reasoning, etc.’ that is, the argument based upon the impossibility of Conventions and so forth.
mānasasya yady api nokto nyāyastathāpi [p.396] ya indriyajñāne nyāyo 'śakyasamayatvaṃ sa tasyāpi tulya eva / yadvā yogijñānam iha mānasaṃ, tac ca vakṣyamāṇam /	Even though this Reasoning has nowhere been urged specifically in regard to mental cognition, yet the Reasoning that has been urged in regard to Cognitions through other Sense-organs, in the shape of the impossibility of Conventions, is equally applicable to Mental Cognitions also. Or, the ‘mental’ cognition meant here may be the cognition of the Mystic, which is going to be referred to later on.
siddhāntaprasiddhatvān mānasasyātra na lakṣaṇaṃ kṛtaṃ / pramāṇenābādhitatvam ācāryeṇaiva pratipāditam iti na pratipādyata iti bhāvaḥ //	The Mental Perception has not been defined here, as its character is well-known to Buddhists. What the Text means is that the fact of the Buddhist view of the sensations in question being not annulled by any means of right cognition, has been fully explained by the Teacher; hence we do not seek to prove it here.
avedakatā ityādinā vaiśeṣikamatamāśaṅkate /	“They (pleasure, etc.) are non-apprehensive of another thing;
avedakāḥ parasyāpi svavidbhājaḥ kathaṃ nu te / ekārthāśritavijñānavedyāstvete bhavanti cet //	how then can they carry their own cognisance with them? In fact, they become cognisable only by the cognition which subsists in the same substratum as themselves”.
na kevalaṃ svasaṃvedanā na bhavanti, bāhyasyāpyarthasyāvedakāḥ /	“It is not only that they are not self-cognised; they are not apprehensive of any external thing either;
na jñānasvabhāvā iti yāvat / ekasminnātmani samavetena tu jñānena vedyanta iti teṣāṃ siddhāntaḥ //	that is, they are of the nature of Cognition, In fact Pleasure, etc, become cognised only by that Cognition which subsists in the same substratum as themselves i.e. the Soul”.
nairantaryetyādinā pratividhatte /	The above view is answered in the following [see verses 1332-1339 next]
sukhādi vedyate kasmāt tasmin kāle nirantaram // mānasenaiva yadvedyamiṣyate cetasā na ca / tat kāle tasya sadbhāvaḥ kramajanmopavarṇanāt //	As a matter of fact, pleasure, etc. are felt immediately after the perception of the external object; why is it that they are always felt at that same time? It is regarded as cognised by mental perception; but this perception is not there at the time;
janmaiva yaugapadyena neṣyate na punaḥ sthitiḥ / iti cen na sthitis tasya kṣaṇabhaṅgaprasādhanāt //	If it be urged that “it is only simultaneous birth of cognitions that is not admitted, not their simultaneous existence”, then the answer is that there can be no (continued) existence of anything;
āśuvṛtteḥ sakṛdbhranatir iti cet sāpyapākṛtā /	If it be urged that “there is an illusion of simultaneity, due to the quick succession of the cognitions”, this also has been rejected already.
vispaṣṭapratibhāso hi na syāt smaraṇagocare //	If the pleasure, etc., were amenable only to remembrance, then the feeling could not be vivid (as it is).
śātāśātādirūpā ca sā bhrāntir yadi kalpyate / tadā prāptā sukhādīnāṃ sattā tanmātralakṣaṇā //	If it be assumed that the said illusion is in the form of ‘agreeable’ and ‘disagreeable’, then it comes to this that the existence of pleasure and pain rests in themselves (and they are thus self-cognised).
yadā ca yogino 'nyeṣām adhyakṣeṇa sukhādikam / vidanti tulyānubhavāt tadūtte 'pi syurāturāḥ //	When the mystics cognise, by sense-perception, the pleasure, etc. of other persons, then, on account of the similarity of experience, they would themselves be unhappy (at the unhappiness of other people).
svasminnapi hi duḥkhasya sattaivānubhavo na te /	For you, the feeling of pain consists, not in the existence of the pain itself, but in the cognition of which that pain is the object;
kiṃ tu tadviṣayaṃ jñānaṃ taccāsti parasantatau //	and that is another ‘chain’.
paraduḥkhānumāne ca tulyametat tathā hi tat / {anumānaṃ sa}viṣayaṃ varṇyate na tvagocaram //	The same applies to the inference of another person’s pain also, as inference has been described (by others) as objective (with object), and not purely subjective (not touching objects).
anena pratijñāyāḥ pratyakṣaviruddhatām āha yadā bāhyavastvavalambanajñānasamakālaṃ sukhādayo 'nubhūyante, tadā katamenaikārthāśrayiṇā jñānenavedyeran, na tāvat tenaiva bāhyā [p.397] lambane na cakṣurādijñānena, tasya bāhyālambanatvāt, antaḥsaṃvedyamānatv	It is meant to show that the Proposition (of the Vaiśeṣika) is contrary to perceived facts. When, as a matter of fact, Pleasure, etc., are apprehended at the same time as the Cognition of the external object upon which they rest, then by which particular cognition subsisting in the same substratum as themselves would they be apprehended? Certainly not by that Visual Cognition of the external object;
ācca sukhādīnāṃ mānasenaiva cetasā vedyatveneṣṭatvāt /	as this rests upon the external object, while Pleasure, etc. are felt within and as such they are held to be cognisable by mental Cognition only.
naca tasminkāle mānasasya cetasaḥ sambhavaḥ, krameṇaiva jñānātyutpadyanta	And yet at the time concerned there can be no mental Cognition; because the theory held is that Cognitions appear in succession, one after the other.
athāpi syājjanmaiva jñānānāṃ krameṇābhyupagataṃ na sthitir iti /	It might be held that “it is only the birth of Cognitions that has been held to be in succession, not their existence”.
etaccāsamyak /	That cannot be right;
sarvajanmināṃ kṣaṇikatvasya prasādhitatvāt /	as it has been established that all that is born has only a momentary existence.
āśu vṛttyā sakṛdbhrāntir api yā sāpāstaiva pūrvam /	As regards the explanation that “there is only an illusion of simultaneity, due to the quickness of the succession”, this has been already refuted.
kiñca āhlādaparitāpirūpeṇa spaṣṭaḥ pratibhāso na prāpnoti, vikalpaviṣayatve sati sukhādīnāṃ mānasenaiva cetasā vedyatvenābhyupagamāt /	Then again, under the view suggested, the clear perception of Pleasure and Pain, in the form of joy and grief, would not be possible; because the view held is that Pleasure and Pain, envisaging Conceptual Contents, are apprehended only by Mental Perception;
tasya ca savikalpakatvāt /	and Mental Perception is Conceptual;

abhrāntagrahaṇaṃ taddhi bhrāntatvānneṣyate pramā //

as these are not regarded as ‘valid cognition’ on the ground of their being ‘erroneous’.

abhrāntamatrāvisaṃvāditvena draṣṭavyam, natu yathāvasthitālambanākāratayā /

The term ‘not-erroneous’ should be understood as ‘not incongruent’ and not as ‘having for its basis a form as it really exists’.

anyathā hi yogācāramatenālambanāsiddher ubhayanayasamāśrayeṇeṣṭasya pratyakṣalakṣaṇasyāvyāpitā syāt /

If this latter were meant, then, as under the view of the Yogācāra (the extreme Idealist) there can be no real basis, the definition, thus interpreted, would not be applicable to Sense-perception as accepted by both theorists (the Realist Sautrāntika and the Idealist Yogācāra).

avisaṃvāditvaṃ cābhimatārthakriyāsamarthārthaprāpaṇaśaktikatvam, natu prāpaṇam eva pratibandhādisambhavāt /

As regards ‘being non-incon-gruent’, what it means is ‘the presence of the capacity to envisage a thing which is capable of the intended fruitful activity’, not actually envisaging it; as obstacles are likely to appear in the actual envisaging.

yadyevam abhrāntagrahaṇamevāstu, kiṃ kalpanāpoḍhagrahaṇeneti cet /

Question “If that is so, then let there be only the qualification ‘not erroneous’; what is the use of mentioning the ‘freedom from conceptual content’?”

na /

Answer: That cannot be right;

anumānavikalpasyāpi pratyakṣatvaprasaṅgāt //

as in that case the inferential concept also would have to be regarded as Sense-perception.

mānasaṃ tadapītyeka iti /

Some people have held that illusion is purely mental.

mānasaṃ tadapītyeke naitad indriyabhāvataḥ / bhāvāt tadvikṛtāvasya vikṛteścopalambhataḥ // sarpādibhrāntivaccedam anaṣṭe 'pyakṣaviplave /

but that is not so; as it is pound to appear only when the sense-organ is present (and operative) and to cease when this latter (becomes disordered, ceases). If it were purely mental, it should cease like the illusion regarding a serpent, even when the disorder of the sense-organ has not ceased;

nivarteta manobhrānteḥ spaṣṭaṃ ca pratibhāsanāt //

Against this view the following might be urged: Granting that Illusion is mental;

na tadarthamabhrāntagrahaṇaṃ yuktaṃ kartum iti teṣām abhiprāyaḥ /

even so, it is not necessary to add the qualifying term ‘not erroneous’;

nanu ca bhavatu nāma mānasam tathāpyabhrāntagrahaṇaṃ kartavyam eva, nahyanenendriyajñānasyaiva pratyakṣalakṣaṇaṃ kartumārabdham, kiṃ tarhi/

because what the person propounding the definition under review wanted to do was not to provide a definition of only that ‘Sense-perception’ which is brought about by the Sense-organs, but also of that Sense-perception which appears in the Mystic and which is purely mental;

mānasasyāpi yogijñānādeḥ, tatra ca svapnāntikasyāpi nirvikalpakatvam ast spaṣṭapratibhāsitvāt, natvabhrāntatvam iti tannivṛttyarthamabhrāntagrahaṇaṃ yuktam eva /

as in this latter Dream-cognition also is non-conceptual, as it appears quite distinctly; and yet it is not ‘non-erronoeus’; hence for the exclusion of this, the addition of the qualifying term ‘non-erroneous’ is necessary.

satyam etat /

This is true;

kiṃtvindriyabhrāntir api sambhavatyato 'yam ayukta eṣāṃ pakṣa itīndriyajatvapratipādanāyāha naitad ityādi /

but there are Illusions possible through the Senses also [and they are not always mental]; hence the said view of ‘some people’ is not right. The author explains how Illusions may be sense-born ‘But that is not so, etc. etc.’.

indriyabhāve sati bhāvādindriyajeyaṃ keśoṇḍrakādibuddhiḥ /

which shows that like any other sense-born cognition, this Illusion of the ‘Hair-tuft’ and the like also is Sense-born.

kiṃ ca yadi manobhrāntiḥ syāt tato manobhrānter eva kāraṇānnivartetānivṛtte 'pyakṣaviplave /

Further, if the Illusion belonged entirely to the Mind, then the mental aberration would be the sole cause of the Illusion, and hence the Illusion would cease on the cessation of the mental aberration, though the disorder of the Sense-organ may still be there.

sarpādibhrāntivad iti dṛṣṭāntaḥ /

The illusion regarding the serpent and such things is cited as an example.

spaṣṭapratibhāsā ca na prāpnotītyayam aparaḥ prasaṅgaḥ / nahi vikalpānuviddhasya spaṣṭārthapratibhāsitā, sāmānyollekhenaiva tasya pravṛtteḥ //

That the Illusion should not be very clear is another incongruous, possibility cited. What is mixed up with Conceptual Content cannot bring about a very clear apprehension of the Thing; as the said Content operates only through the presentation of the Universal (which is always vague).

tadbhāvetyādinā parakīyaṃ dūṣaṇam āśaṅkate

The following texts sets forth the objection of the other party: [see verses 1315-1320 next]

tadbhāvābhāvitā sākṣād asiddhā vyabhicāriṇī /

and in its indirect sense, it is inconclusive;

pāramparyeṇa sā tasyāṃ smṛtibuddhau samanvayāt //

as it is present in remembrance also.

[p.393] tadvikāravikāritvaṃ pāramparyodbhaveṣyapi / kāryeṣu dṛśyate loke vyaktaṃ vegasarādiṣu //

(b) as regards the reason ‘illusion is an aberration brought about by the disorder of the sense-organ’, that is clearly found also in the case of effects produced indirectly, for example, in the case of the mule and such things.

mānasyo bhrāntayaḥ sarvā nivartante vicārataḥ / ityasmin vyabhicāritvaṃ bhāvasāmānyabuddhibhiḥ //

(c) as regards the idea’ that ‘all mental illusions cease after reflection’, this also is not quite true (inconclusive), in view of such ideas as-‘entity’ and ‘universal’.

vastusvalakṣaṇe naitāḥ pravartante svabhāvataḥ / evaṃ tadvinivṛttiścet tulyaṃ candradvayādiṣu //

If it be held that these notions do cease on the subsequent notion that ‘these are not found in the specific individuality of things’, then the answer is that such cessation is possible also in the case of such illusions as that of ‘two moons’.

na sattāvinivṛttiścet samaṃ sāmānyabuddhiṣu / naceśvarādibhrāntīnāṃ tanmatābhiniveśinām // yuktikoṭiśrave 'pyasti nivṛttiḥ pratyuta svayam /

If it be urged that the existence of these does not cease then, the same may be said in regard to the notions of the universal, etc, also as regards the illusions regarding god and such other beings, appearing in persons who are bent upon believing in them, there is no cessation at all, even on listening to millions of reasons;

naitā yuktaya ityevaṃ te vadanti jaḍāḥ punaḥ //

in fact, these dull-witted persons declare that these reasons are no reasons at all.” (1315-1320)

atra yadi sākṣāt tadbhāvabhāvitvaṃ hetus tadānyatarāsiddhatā hetoḥ, nahiparasya sākṣād indriyād utpattirbhrānteḥ siddhā, tasyā eva sādhyatvāt /

(a) If the fact of Illusion being there only when the Sense-organ is there is cited as a Reason in the direct sense, then it is Inadmissible for one or the other of the two parties; for the other party, it is not proved that Illusion is produced directly from the Sense-organs;

atha sāmānyena tadbhāvabhāvitvaṃ hetus tadānaikāntikatā, smṛtibuddhau vipakṣabhūtāyām api tadbhāvabhāvitvasya samaṃdhayā{pāramparya---}dvidyamānatvāt /

On the other hand, if it is meant in the indirect sense, that the Illusion being there only when the Sense-organ is there is cited as the Reason; then it is Inconclusive; because such indirect concomitance with the Sense-organ is present in Remembrance also (which is not regarded as Sense-born).

yacca tadvikāravikāritvaṃ tadapi sākṣād asiddham, pāramparyeṇāpyupādīyamānamanaikāntikameva /

(b) As regards the Premiss that ‘the Illusion is an aberration brought about by the disorder of the Sense-organ,’ that also is Inadmissible in the direct sense; and if taken in the indirect sense, this also is Inconclusive;

yato 'ścāyāṃ gardabhena jātasya vegasarasya kalalādyavasthāvyavadhāne 'pi gardabharūpānukāreṇa tadvikāritvasya paścād darśanādato nāsmāt sākṣād utpattiḥ sidhyati /

as in the case of the Mule, which is born of the Mare from the Ass, all the embryonic stages intervene between the contact of the animals and the birth of the Mule and it is only when the final product is subsequently found to resemble the Ass that the idea comes about that it is born of the Ass; but that does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that it is produced from the Ass directly.

mānasī ca bhrāntir vicārān nivartata ityatrāpyanaikāntikatvaṃ bhāvasāmānyabuddhibhiḥ / nahi bhavatāṃ yuktyā sāmānyābhāvamavagacchatām api bhāveṣu ghaṭādiṣu bhāva iti vā sāmānyam iti vā sāmānyākāro vikalpo nivartate /

(c) The assertion that “Mental Illusion ceases on reflection” is also Inconclusive, in view of the ideas of Entity and Universal’, That is, for you the Buddhist, who, relying on Reasoning, hold that there is no such thing as the Universal, the generic idea that there is in regard to things like the Jar being ‘entities’ or ‘universals’ does not cease at all.

atha manyase nivartanta eva yuktyā vicārayataḥ sāmānyabuddhayaḥ svalakṣaṇenaitāḥ pravartanta ityanenākāreṇeti /

If you think that “when one comes to reflect over them, the said ideas do disappear, through such notions as ‘these ideas do not appertain to the Specific Individuality”, then we say that this is no answer at all.

candradvayādibuddhayo 'pi yuktyā vicārayataḥ svalakṣaṇe naitāḥ pravartanta ityanenākāreṇa nivartanta eva /

In the case of the Illusions regarding ‘Too Moons’ and the like, when one comes to ponder over them, they also cease through the notion that ‘these do not appertain to the Specific Individuality’;

na ca tāvatā mānasyo bhavanti /

and yet these do not become ‘mental’.

sattā tāsāṃ na nivartata iti cet tattulyaṃ sāmānyabuddhibhiḥ /

It might be urged that “the existence of these does not cease”.

nahi tāsām api svabhāvo nivartate //

as the existence of these also does not cease.

tadbhāvabhāvitetyādinā pratividhatte tadbhāvabhāvitā sākṣān na siddhābhrāntacetasā / vyavadhānaṃ na siddhaṃ hi na hi tadvedyate 'ntarā //

The idea of the illusion being there when the sense-organ is there cannot be said to be ‘inadmissible’, in its direct sense. Because there is no intervention by any unmistaken (right) notion; as no such intervening right notion is ever apprehended.

[p.394] apyarthāsaktacitto 'pi dvicandrādi samīkṣate /

Even when the man has his mind not turned to other things, he has the continuous perception of ‘two moons’;

avicchinnamato nāsti pāramparyasamudbhavaḥ // bhāvasāmānyabuddhīnāṃ pratisaṃhārasambhave / nivṛttiḥ sambhavatyeva svecchayeśamater api //

which shows that the production (of the illusion, by the sense-organ) is not indirect as regards the ideas of ‘entity’, ‘universal’ and so forth, where there is the possibility of their being retracted, cessation is quite possible, if the person so wishes.

nāsiddhā api tu siddhaiva, kasmāt/ abhrāntenaikacandracetasā vyavadhānāsiddheḥ / tasyopalabhyasyāntarāle 'nupalabhyamanatvāt /

‘Cannot be Inadmissible’, i.e. it must be admissible. Why? Because there is no intervention by any unmistaken notion of the One Moon because while it would be cognisable if it were there, no such notion is cognised at all.

etad evānyārthetyādinā spaṣṭīkurute /

This same idea is made clear in the sentence ‘Even when the man, etc, etc.’.

avicchinnaṃ dvicandrādīti sambandhanīyam /

‘Continuous’ is to be construed with ‘perception of the Two Moons’.

ata eva tadvikāravikāritvasyāpyavyabhicāraḥ / nahi tadapi vyavahitaṃ, yena vegasarādibhir vyabhicāraḥ syāt /

For this same reason the Premiss, that ‘illusion is an aberration produced by the aberration of the Sense-organ’, also is not ‘Inconclusive As this also is not interrupted, in view of which the case of the Mule would render it false, inconclusive.

bhāvasāmānyabuddhīnām api yadecchayā saṃhāraṃ kurute tadā nivṛttir astyeva /

As regards the notions of ‘Entity’, ‘Universal’ and so forth, when the person retracts them by bis own wish, there is cessation of these also.

natu keśoṇḍrakādibuddhīnām icchayā saṃhāraḥ sambhavatīti nānaikāntikatā/

But in the case of the Illusions like that of the ‘Hair-tuft’, there can be no retraction at will;

indriyajñānasyāpi cakṣuṣīcchayā nimīlite nivṛttir icchāvaśāt sambhavatīti cet /

It might be argued that “even in the case of Perception through the Senses, there can be cessation at will, by closing one’s eyes for instance”.

nahi samanantaramicchānivṛttau nivartate cakṣur vijñānam /

The Visual Perception does not cease immediately on the appearance of the wish;

cakṣur nimīlanaṃ tāvadicchāvaśād bhavati tato nivṛtte cakṣuṣi tajjñānaṃ nivartate mānasī tu bhrāntiḥ sākṣādicchāvaśān nivartata iti na samānam /

in fact what is brought about by the man’s wish is only the closing of the eyes; and it is only when the Eyes have ceased to function that the Visual Perception ceases. In the case of mental Illusion, on the other hand, it ceases directly after the wash of the man;

itthaṃ caitad avaseyam yataḥ praṇihite cakṣuṣi draṣṭumaniṣyamāṇo 'pyartho dṛśyata evāto necchāyāścakṣurādijñāne sākṣāt sāmarthyam //

hence the two cases are not analogous, It has to be borne in mind that, when the Eyes are fixed upon a thing, even though the man may not wish to look at the thing, the thing is actually seen; so that the wish has no direct influence upon the Visual or other Perceptions.

pītaśaṅkhādibuddhīnāṃ vibhrame 'pi pramāṇatām / arthakriyāvisaṃvādādapare sampracakṣate //

There are others who declare that “notions like ‘the yellow conch-shell’, even though illusory, are valid, inasmuch as they are not in con gruent with effective action.” (1324)

kecit tu svayūthyā evābhrāntagrahaṇaṃ necchanti /

There are some people belonging to our own party (Buddhists) who do not wish to have the qualification ‘not-erroneous’ (in the definition of Sense-perception);

bhrāntasyāpi pītaśaṅkhādijñānasya pratyakṣatvāt /

because (they argue that) even the illusory idea of the ‘Yellow conch-shell’ is Sense-perception.

tathā hi na tadanumānamaliṅgajatvāt / pramāṇaṃ cāvisaṃvāditvāt /

Because it cannot be Inference, as it is not brought about by an Inferential Indicative, And that it is valid is clear from the fact that it is not incongruent with reality.

ata evācāryadiṅnāgena lakṣaṇe na kṛtamabhrāntagrahaṇam /

It was for this reason that the Teacher Diṅṅāga did not introduce this qualification ‘not erroneous’ in his definition of Sense-perception.

bhrāntiḥ saṃvṛttiḥ sājñānamanumānetyādinā pratyakṣābhāsanirdeśādisaṃvādikalpanāpoḍhamityevaṃvidhamiṣṭamācāryasya lakṣaṇam / sataimiram iti tu timiraśabdo 'yam ajñānaparyāyaḥ / timiraghnaṃ ca mandānām iti yathā /

Error, Illusion, Ignorance, Inference these he has mentioned as having the ‘Semblance’ of Perception, which shows that the definition intended by him was that ‘it is free from Conceptual Content and is not incongrnent with the real state of things’, He has also included the ‘taimiram’ (among the Semblances of Perception), where ‘timira’ (Darkness) stands for ignorance: as found in such expressions as ‘Timiraghnañca mandānām’;

timire bhavaṃ taimiraṃ visaṃvādakam ity arthaḥ //

and that which proceeds from Timira Ignorance is ‘Taimira’, i.e. incongruent.

tannetyādinā pratividhatte /

The answer to the above is provided in the following [see verses 1325-1326 next]

tannādhyavasitākārapratirūpā na vidyate / tatrāpyarthakriyāvāptiranyathātiprasajyate //

This cannot be right the effective action available is not in keeping with the form apprehended. otherwise there would be incongruities;

keśādipratibhāse ca jñāne saṃvādibhāvataḥ /

as in the cognition where there is appearance of the hair and such things, there is compatibility, though only with the light (which is not apprehended) and other details;

ālokāder atas tasya durnivārā pramāṇatā //

hence the validity of this would be irresistible (under the opponent’s view).

[p.395] prāmāṇyaṃ hi bhaddvābhyām ākārābhyāṃ bhavati, yathāpratibhāsamavisaṃvādādyathādhyavasāyāṃ vā /

The validity of a cognition is of two kinds (1) when there is compatibility with the appearance, and (2) when there is compatibility with the Apprehension.

tatreha na yathāpratibhāsamavisaṃvādaḥ, pītasya pratibhāsanāt tasya yathābhūtasyāprāpteḥ /

In the case in question (of the idea of the ‘yellow conch-shell’), the ‘absence of incongruence’ (i.e. compatibility) is not in accordance with the appearance, as what appears what is apparent is the yellow conch-shell;

nāpi yathādhyavasāyamavisaṃvādaḥ, pītasyaiva viśiṣṭārthakriyākāritvenādhyavasāyāt, na ca tadrūpārthakriyāprāptir asti /

nor is its compatibility in accordance with the apprehension, because it is the yellow thing itself that is apprehended as capable of a particular fruitful activity; and yet no fruitful activity in that form is actually found.

na cānadhyavasitārthāvisaṃvādenāpi prāmāṇyam atiprasaṅgāt /

Nor can there be validity even when there is compatibility with what is not apprehended at all; as that would lead to absurdity;

keśādijñāne 'pi hyanadhyavasitālokādiprāpteḥ //

as in the case of the cognition of the Hair-tuft also, what is actually got at is only the light (whose reflections create the impression of the Hair-tuft).

atha manyase yadyapi varṇo 'dhyavasito na prāpyate, saṃsthānaṃ tu prāpyata evetyata āha na varṇetyādi / na varṇavyatiriktaṃ ca saṃsthānamupapadyate /

There can re no shape apart from the colour; and with the apparent colour, there is no compatibility (in the case in question). If you think that “though the apprehended Colour is not obtained, yet the shape is certainly obtained”, then our answer is as follows: [see verse 1327 above]

subodham //

This is easily under stood.

yadyākāramityādinopacayam āha yadyākāramanādṛtya prāmāṇyaṃ ca prakalpyate / arthakriyāvisaṃvādāt tadrūpo hyarthaniścayaḥ // ityādigaditaṃ sarvaṃ kathaṃ na vyāhataṃ bhavet / vāsanāpākahetūtthastasmāt saṃvādasambhavaḥ //

If, without regard to the form of things, validity were presumed on the ground of mere compatibility with fruitful action, then how would this not contradict such assertions (of yours) as that ‘the definite cognition of the thing is in the form of the thing’? as regards the possibility of ‘compatibility’ (in the case of the notion of the ‘yellow conch-shell’), that can only be the result of the impression (of a previous cognition).

naiva hyarthakriyāvisaṃvāditvamātreṇākāramanapekṣya prāmāṇyaṃ, kalpanīyam viṣayākārasyāprāmāṇyaprasaṅgāt /

Validity cannot be presumed merely on the basis of the compatibility of effective action, without regard to the form; as in that case the cognition in the form of the thing itself might have to be regarded as invalid.

tadrūpa iti / jñānasthābhāsarūpaḥ /

‘In the form of the thing’ i.e. in the form that appears in the cognition.

ādiśabdena yathā yathā hyarthasyākāraḥ śubhrāditvena sanniviśate tadrūpaḥsa viṣayaḥ pramīyata ityādikam ācāryīyaṃ vacanaṃ virudhyata iti darśayati / arthakriyāsaṃvādas tu pūrvārthānubhavavāsanāparipākād eva pramāṇāntarād bhavatīty avaseyam /

‘Such assertions as’; this is meant to show that the presumption in question would go against such assertions of the Teacher as ‘As the form of the thing figures in the Cognition, in that form is the thing rightly cognised’, As regards ‘compatibility with effective action’, (in the case) in question, it should be understood to be the result of the Impression left by previous apprehensions.

pītaśaṅkhajñānasya vāsanāparipākahetuḥ śukla eva śaṅkhas tadādhipatyenatat paripākāt / vāsanāparipākahetutaḥ samutthānaṃ yasyāvisaṃvādasya sa tathoktaḥ //

That is to say, the idea of the ‘yellow conch-shell’ is the effect of the Impression left by a previous apprehension of the ‘white conch-shell And the ‘compatibility with effective action’ (that has been said to be present in the case) is due to this Impression.

sukhādīnāṃ kathaṃ saṃvedanapratyakṣatetyāha mānasetyādi / mānasendriyavijñānanirvikalpatvasādhane / yo nyāyaḥ sa sukhādīnām avikalpatvasādhakaḥ //

The reasoning that is used in proving the non-conceptual character of the cognitions produced by the mental sense-organ, also serves to prove the non-conceptual character of the sensations of pleasure, etc. The Author now proceeds to show how the character of ‘Sense-perception’ belongs to the Sensation of Pleasure, etc.: [see verses 1330 above]

yo nyāya iti / aśakyasamayatvādiḥ /

‘The Reasoning, etc.’ that is, the argument based upon the impossibility of Conventions and so forth.

mānasasya yady api nokto nyāyastathāpi [p.396] ya indriyajñāne nyāyo 'śakyasamayatvaṃ sa tasyāpi tulya eva / yadvā yogijñānam iha mānasaṃ, tac ca vakṣyamāṇam /

Even though this Reasoning has nowhere been urged specifically in regard to mental cognition, yet the Reasoning that has been urged in regard to Cognitions through other Sense-organs, in the shape of the impossibility of Conventions, is equally applicable to Mental Cognitions also. Or, the ‘mental’ cognition meant here may be the cognition of the Mystic, which is going to be referred to later on.

siddhāntaprasiddhatvān mānasasyātra na lakṣaṇaṃ kṛtaṃ / pramāṇenābādhitatvam ācāryeṇaiva pratipāditam iti na pratipādyata iti bhāvaḥ //

The Mental Perception has not been defined here, as its character is well-known to Buddhists. What the Text means is that the fact of the Buddhist view of the sensations in question being not annulled by any means of right cognition, has been fully explained by the Teacher; hence we do not seek to prove it here.

avedakatā ityādinā vaiśeṣikamatamāśaṅkate /

“They (pleasure, etc.) are non-apprehensive of another thing;

avedakāḥ parasyāpi svavidbhājaḥ kathaṃ nu te / ekārthāśritavijñānavedyāstvete bhavanti cet //

how then can they carry their own cognisance with them? In fact, they become cognisable only by the cognition which subsists in the same substratum as themselves”.

na kevalaṃ svasaṃvedanā na bhavanti, bāhyasyāpyarthasyāvedakāḥ /

“It is not only that they are not self-cognised; they are not apprehensive of any external thing either;

na jñānasvabhāvā iti yāvat / ekasminnātmani samavetena tu jñānena vedyanta iti teṣāṃ siddhāntaḥ //

that is, they are of the nature of Cognition, In fact Pleasure, etc, become cognised only by that Cognition which subsists in the same substratum as themselves i.e. the Soul”.

nairantaryetyādinā pratividhatte /

The above view is answered in the following [see verses 1332-1339 next]

sukhādi vedyate kasmāt tasmin kāle nirantaram // mānasenaiva yadvedyamiṣyate cetasā na ca / tat kāle tasya sadbhāvaḥ kramajanmopavarṇanāt //

As a matter of fact, pleasure, etc. are felt immediately after the perception of the external object; why is it that they are always felt at that same time? It is regarded as cognised by mental perception; but this perception is not there at the time;

janmaiva yaugapadyena neṣyate na punaḥ sthitiḥ / iti cen na sthitis tasya kṣaṇabhaṅgaprasādhanāt //

If it be urged that “it is only simultaneous birth of cognitions that is not admitted, not their simultaneous existence”, then the answer is that there can be no (continued) existence of anything;

āśuvṛtteḥ sakṛdbhranatir iti cet sāpyapākṛtā /

If it be urged that “there is an illusion of simultaneity, due to the quick succession of the cognitions”, this also has been rejected already.

vispaṣṭapratibhāso hi na syāt smaraṇagocare //

If the pleasure, etc., were amenable only to remembrance, then the feeling could not be vivid (as it is).

śātāśātādirūpā ca sā bhrāntir yadi kalpyate / tadā prāptā sukhādīnāṃ sattā tanmātralakṣaṇā //

If it be assumed that the said illusion is in the form of ‘agreeable’ and ‘disagreeable’, then it comes to this that the existence of pleasure and pain rests in themselves (and they are thus self-cognised).

yadā ca yogino 'nyeṣām adhyakṣeṇa sukhādikam / vidanti tulyānubhavāt tadūtte 'pi syurāturāḥ //

When the mystics cognise, by sense-perception, the pleasure, etc. of other persons, then, on account of the similarity of experience, they would themselves be unhappy (at the unhappiness of other people).

svasminnapi hi duḥkhasya sattaivānubhavo na te /

For you, the feeling of pain consists, not in the existence of the pain itself, but in the cognition of which that pain is the object;

kiṃ tu tadviṣayaṃ jñānaṃ taccāsti parasantatau //

and that is another ‘chain’.

paraduḥkhānumāne ca tulyametat tathā hi tat / {anumānaṃ sa}viṣayaṃ varṇyate na tvagocaram //

The same applies to the inference of another person’s pain also, as inference has been described (by others) as objective (with object), and not purely subjective (not touching objects).

anena pratijñāyāḥ pratyakṣaviruddhatām āha yadā bāhyavastvavalambanajñānasamakālaṃ sukhādayo 'nubhūyante, tadā katamenaikārthāśrayiṇā jñānenavedyeran, na tāvat tenaiva bāhyā [p.397] lambane na cakṣurādijñānena, tasya bāhyālambanatvāt, antaḥsaṃvedyamānatv

It is meant to show that the Proposition (of the Vaiśeṣika) is contrary to perceived facts. When, as a matter of fact, Pleasure, etc., are apprehended at the same time as the Cognition of the external object upon which they rest, then by which particular cognition subsisting in the same substratum as themselves would they be apprehended? Certainly not by that Visual Cognition of the external object;

ācca sukhādīnāṃ mānasenaiva cetasā vedyatveneṣṭatvāt /

as this rests upon the external object, while Pleasure, etc. are felt within and as such they are held to be cognisable by mental Cognition only.

naca tasminkāle mānasasya cetasaḥ sambhavaḥ, krameṇaiva jñānātyutpadyanta

And yet at the time concerned there can be no mental Cognition; because the theory held is that Cognitions appear in succession, one after the other.

athāpi syājjanmaiva jñānānāṃ krameṇābhyupagataṃ na sthitir iti /

It might be held that “it is only the birth of Cognitions that has been held to be in succession, not their existence”.

etaccāsamyak /

That cannot be right;

sarvajanmināṃ kṣaṇikatvasya prasādhitatvāt /

as it has been established that all that is born has only a momentary existence.

āśu vṛttyā sakṛdbhrāntir api yā sāpāstaiva pūrvam /

As regards the explanation that “there is only an illusion of simultaneity, due to the quickness of the succession”, this has been already refuted.

kiñca āhlādaparitāpirūpeṇa spaṣṭaḥ pratibhāso na prāpnoti, vikalpaviṣayatve sati sukhādīnāṃ mānasenaiva cetasā vedyatvenābhyupagamāt /

Then again, under the view suggested, the clear perception of Pleasure and Pain, in the form of joy and grief, would not be possible; because the view held is that Pleasure and Pain, envisaging Conceptual Contents, are apprehended only by Mental Perception;

tasya ca savikalpakatvāt /

and Mental Perception is Conceptual;