buddhist-nlp/tatpa-noisy · Datasets at Hugging Face

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dvirūpaṃ hi sāmānyaṃ viśeṣaṇāvacchinnarūpamanavacchinnarūpaṃ ca /	The Universal has been held to be of two kinds (1) distinguished by qualifications, and (2) not distinguished by qualifications.
tatra yadanavacchinnarūpaṃ tannirvikalpakavijñānagrāhyam iṣṭam /	That which is not distinguished by qualifications has been held to be apprehended by Non-conceptual Perception.
tatrāpi sāmānye /	‘To that’ i.e. to the Universal.
ata etad vikalpakavijñānagrāhyatvaṃ tulyam //	Hence the charge of being apprehended by Conceptual Perception would apply to these also.
[p.382] katham ity āha viśeṣāddhītyādi /	Question: “How so?” Answer: [see verse 1275 next]
viśeṣāddhi viśiṣṭaṃ tat sāmānyamavagamyate /	The universal is recognised as ‘distinguished’ from the particular;
tadgrāhakamataḥ prāptaṃ vijñānaṃ savikalpakam //	hence the perception of it would have to be regarded (under the opponent’s contention) as conceptual.
yaddhyasmād viśeṣād viśiṣṭam vyāvṛttaṃ, tat sāmānyaṃ pratīyate /	That is understood to be the Universal which is ‘qualified’ i.e. distinguished’ from the Particular.;
anyathā sāmānyam eva na syāt tato yadi na vyāvarteta /	if it were not so, then there would be no Universal at all, if it were not excluded distinguished from the Particular.
tataścāsyāpi sāmānyasya viśeṣād vyāvṛttasya grāhakaṃ vijñānaṃ savikalpakaṃ prāpnoti, viśiṣṭaviṣayatvāt /	Such being the case, the Perception that apprehends this Universal, as distinguished from the Particular, becomes ‘Conceptual’, as it apprehends something that is qualified.
na ca bhavati tvanmatena /	And yet, according to your view, this cognition is not conceptual;
tasmāt svato 'naikānta iti //	hence your Reason is itself Inconclusive.
atra kila tenaiva sumatinā svayam āśaṅkya sāmānyena hetor anaikāntikatvaṃ parihṛtaṃ tadevādarśayati nirviśeṣamityādi /	The said Sumati himself, anticipating the objection that his own Reason becomes ‘Inconclusive’ by the case of the Universal, has answered it. This answer is shown in the following [see verse 1276 next]
nirviśeṣaṃ gṛhītaśced bhedaḥ sāmānyamucyate /	“A thing is called ‘universal’ when it is apprehended without distinction;
tato viśeṣāt sāmānyaviśiṣṭatvaṃ na yujyate //	hence it is not right to regard the universal as something distinguished from the particular.” (1276)
nahi sāmānyaṃ kiñcid asti viśeṣebhyo vyatiriktasvarūpaṃ, yat svarūpeṇa viśiṣṭaṃ gṛhyamāṇaṃ savikalpakavijñānagocaraḥ syāt, kintu nirviśeṣaṃ gṛhītā bhedā eva sāmānyamityucyante /	There is no ‘Universal’ apart from the Particulars, by virtue of which on being apprehended it would be amenable to Conceptual Perception;
pratiniyatasvarūpanirapekṣāḥ pratīyamānāḥ sāmānyaśabdābhidheyā iti yāvat /	in fact, it is only when the Particulars are apprehended without distinction that they are called ‘Universal’;
tataś ca kutas tasmād viśeṣāt sāmānyasya viśiṣṭatvam yena tadgrāhakasya savikalpanā bhavet // kathaṃ tarhi sāmānyaviśeṣayor asaṅkīrṇā vyavasthetyāha vaiṣamyetyādi /	that is to say, when they are not cognised, each in its own distinctive form, they are called ‘Universal Consequently, how could the Universal be ‘distinguished’ from the Particulars, by virtue of which its apprehension would become ‘conceptual’, (1276) Question: How then can there be a clear division between the Universal and the Particular?
vaiṣamyasamabhāvena jñāyamānā ime kila / prakalpayanti sāmānyaviśeṣasthitimātmani //	“When these (particulars) are cognised as similar or dissimilar, they indicate the existence in themselves, of the character of the ‘universal’ or the ‘particular’.” (1277)
eta eva hi bhedāḥ samaviṣamatayā samprajñāyamānā yathākramaṃ sāmānyaviśeṣābhidhānābhidheyatām anubhūya sāmānyaviśeṣavyavahārayor viṣayabhedaṃ prakalpayanti //	“These same Particulars, according as they are cognised as similar or dissimilar, become spoken of as ‘Universal’ or ‘Particular’, respectively and in this way they bring about a division between the use of the two names, ‘Universal’ and ‘Particular (1277)
vaiṣamyasamabhāvo 'yam ityādinā pratividhatte /	The above criticism of Sumatis is answered in the following [see verses 1278-1279 next]
vaiṣamyasamabhāvo 'yaṃ pravibhakto yadīṣyate / sāmānyasya viśiṣṭatvaṃ tadavasthaṃ viśeṣataḥ //	If the said ‘similarity’ and ‘dissimilarity’ are held to be differentiated, then the fact of the universal being distinguished from the particulars remains as before.
athāvibhakta evāyam asaṅkīrṇā sthitiḥ katham / anyonyāparihāreṇa sthiter gatyantaraṃ naca //	If, on the other hand, they are not held to be differentiated, then, how can the clearly marked division be possible, without crossing each other? there is no other way in which they could be conceived.
pravibhakta iti amiśraḥ /	‘Differentiated’: Not mixed up;
anyadeva sāmānyamanya eva viśeṣa iti yāvat /	i.e. the Universal being one thing and the Particular being another thing.
[p.383] sāmānyasya viśeṣato viśiṣṭatvamityupalakṣaṇam /	That the Universal is distinguished from the Particular is said only by way of illustration;
tathā viśeṣasyāpi sāmānyato viśiṣṭatvam eva /	in fact the Particular also is distinguished from the Universal;
dvayor api parasparasvabhāvavivekena pravibhaktatvāt /	as both these having distinct characters are clearly distinguished from one another.
asaṅkīrṇā sthitir iti /	‘The fact, etc.’ ‘Asaṅkīrṇā’ is unmixed.
yathoktaṃ tenaiva sumatinā ---"sattādisāmānyasvabhāvānuviddha eva viśeṣaḥ sākṣāt kriyate nānyathā, tato viśiṣṭaviṣayatvam eva viśeṣyasya yuktaṃ rūpam, sāmānyaṃ punar aśeṣanirapekṣaṃ sākṣātkartuṃ śakyata ityaviruddhamasyāvikalpaviṣayatvam" iti /	This has been declared by the same Sumati in the following words “The Particular is perceived only as infused with the character of such Universals as ‘Being’ and the like, not otherwise; hence it is only right that what is qualified should form the object of a qualified (determinate, conceptual) Perception; as for the Universal, on the other hand, it is capable of being perceived independently of all Particulars; and hence there can be nothing incongruous in its forming the object of the non-conceptual Perception”.
iyam asaṅkīrṇā sthir na syāt /	This clearly marked distinction would not be there.
na pravibhakto nāpravibhakta iṣyata iti cedāha anyonyetyādi /	It might be argued that “It is not held to be either distinguished or undistinguished.”
api ca nirviśeṣaṃ gṛhītā bhedā iti parasparavyāhatam iti darśayann āha viśeṣātmātirekeṇetyādi /	Then again, to speak of the Particulars as apprehended ‘without distinction’ involves a contradiction in terms. This is what is shown in the following [see verses 1280-1281 next]
viśeṣātmātirekeṇa nāparaṃ bhedalakṣaṇam /	Of the particular things there is no other characteristic except that of being ‘particular’ (or ‘distinct’);
tadrūpāsparśane teṣu grahaṇaṃ katham ucyate // tadrūpasparśane cāpi bhedāntaravibhedinaḥ /	how then can there be any apprehension of them which does not envisage the ‘distinct’ form? Even if their forms are envisaged, they are apprehended only as distinct from other particulars;
gṛhītā iti vijñānaṃ prāptameṣu vikalpakam //	so that their perception would be ‘conceptual’.
bhedebhyo hi nānyo viśeṣaḥ, tasya ca viśeṣasya sāmānyagrāhiṇā jñānenāsaṃsparśe kathaṃ bhedās tena gṛhītā bhaveyuḥ, agṛhītasvabhāvāvyatirekāttepyagṛhītā eveti bhāvaḥ /	There is no ‘Particular’ apart from the various Things. If then, the Particular were not envisaged in the apprehension of the Uni versa’, how could the various Things be apprehended? That is to say, being non-different from the nature of what is not apprehended, the Particulars also would be not -apprehended.
atha gṛhītā iti matam, tadā tadrūpasaṃsparśane bhedarūpasaṃsparśane grahaṇegṛhītāvyatirekād gṛhītasvabhāvavad viśeṣo 'pi gṛhīta eveti, eṣu bhedeṣu yat sāmānyaviṣayatvenābhimataṃ jñānaṃ tadvikalpakaṃ prāptam //	If it be held that the various Things are apprehended, then, if these forms are envisaged, and are apprehended, the Particular also would be apprehended, being, as it is, non-different from what has been apprehended. So that, in regard to these various things, the Cognition that is held to be apprehensive of the Universal turns out to be conceptual.
nirupākhyāc ca sāmānyaṃ viśeṣaṃ sampratīyate /	The universal is cognised as ‘distinguished’ (distinct) from the featureless thing;
ato vikalpakajñānagrāhyaṃ tadapi te bhavet //	hence for you, it should be cognisable by conceptual perception.
nāsatastadviśiṣṭaṃ cet kimidānīṃ tadātmakam / no cet tathāpi vaiśiṣṭyaṃ tasmād asya na kiṃ matam //	If it be urged that “the universal cannot be regarded as distinguished from a non-entity”, then (we ask) is it of the same nature as the non-entity? if not, then why is it not admitted that it is ‘distinguished’ from it? (1282-1283)
syād etat sāmānyasyābhāvato na viśeṣaḥ nāpi sādṛśyam /	The following might be urged There can be no distinction made between the Universal and the Non-entity;
tathā hi [p.384] yan na kiñcitso 'bhāvaḥ kalpyate, tac ca tādṛśaṃ sāmānyato naiva viśiṣṭaṃ nāpi samaṃ, bhāvatvaprasaṅgāt /	nor can there be any similarity between them. Because that is supposed to be a nonentity which is not anything; and such a thing cannot be either ‘distinguished’ from, or similar to, the Universal.
tathā hi yadi tacchūnyaṃ sāmānyato viśiṣṭaṃ syāt tadapi vastveva syāt /	If it were, it would be an Entity. Even if the Void i.e. the Non-entity were ‘distinguished’ from the Universal, then also it would be an entity;
nahyavastuno viśeṣākhyasvabhāvaḥ sambhavati, na ca viśeṣākhyaṃ svabhāvamantareṇa viśiṣṭaṃ śakyaṃ vaktum /	because a non-entity cannot have the character of ‘being distinguished’; and without the character of ‘being distinguished’ a thing cannot be regarded as ‘distinguished Nor can the Non-entity be ‘similar’ to the Universal;
nāpi samaṃ vastutvaprasaṅgāt /	as even so it would have to be an entity.
nahyavastunaḥ kenacit samānaṃ rūpaṃ bhavati naca samānarūpamantareṇa samaṃ yuktam atiprasaṅgāt /	A non-entity cannot have a form similar to something else; and unless a thing has a form similar to another’s, it cannot be regarded as ‘similar’ to it;
tasmāt sāmānyasya śūnyam avadhiṃ kṛtvā na samatvaṃ viśiṣṭatvaṃ vā yuktam /	Hence relatively to the Void (Non-entity), the Universal cannot be said to be either distinguished (distinct) or similar.
tathā hi yo yamavadhiṃ kṛtvā samo viśiṣṭo vā bhavati tena so 'pyavadhiḥ samo viṣamaś ca dṛśyate /	Because when one thing is either distinct or similar in relation to another thing, then this latter also has to be regarded as distinct from, or similar to, the former.
yadi hi so 'vadhis tena samo viṣamo vā na dṛśyeta, itaropyavadhimān samo viṣamovā na dṛśyeta //	If it were not so, then the others also could not be perceived as distinct from, or similar to, it.
kiṃ ca nābhāvo nāma kaścid bhāvavyatirikto 'sti bhāva eva tu bhāvāntaraṃ	Further, there is no such thing as ‘non-entity’ apart from entity; when an entity is not found to be another entity, it is called ‘nonentity’ in relation to it;
na bhavatītyabhāva akhyāyate, tat kuto 'sya vaiśiṣṭyamityetat sarvaṃ sumatinoktam āgūryāha atadātmakamevedam ityādi	how then could it be ‘distinguished’?” All this has been argued by Sumati; as against all this, the Author proceeds to urge as follows: [see verses 1284-1285 next]
atadātmakam evedaṃ vaiśiṣṭyaṃ vastuno 'pi hi /	As a matter of fact, in the case of the entity also, being ‘distinguished’ consists in not being that same;
nāsadrūpaṃ ca sāmānyaṃ tadviśiṣṭaṃ na te katham //	and as the universal is not the same as the non-entity, why can you not regard it as being ‘distinguished’ from the non-entity? (1284)
tasmāt svalakṣaṇe jñānaṃ yatkiñcit sampravartate / vākpathātītaviṣayaṃ sarvaṃ tannirvikalpakam //	From all this it follows that whatever cognition appears in regard to the ‘specific individuality’ of things appertains to what is beyond the range of words and is hence non-conceptual.
vastuno 'pi hi sakāśād yadavastuno viśiṣṭatvaṃ tat khalu nānyat kiñcit /	In the case of the entity also, when it is ‘distinguished’ from Non-entity, this ‘being distinguished’ is not anything different;
kiṃ tarhitattvaniṣedhaḥ, atadātmatvam eva, lakṣaṇabheda iti yāvat /	it is only the negation of sameness; the meaning being that it is not the same as the other;
taccāsato 'pi śaśaviṣāṇādeḥ sakāśāt sāmānyasya tulyam eva /	and this can be equally so in the case of the Universal also, in relation to the Nonentity, like the Hare’s Horn.
tathā hi asacchaśaviṣāṇādi sarvārthakriyāvirahalakṣaṇaṃ, sāmānyaṃ tu na tatheṣṭam iti vispaṣṭam asya tato vaiśiṣṭyam /	Because the Hare’s Horn is a non-entity in the sense that it is not capable of any action whatever; the Universal on the other hand is not regarded as so incapable; so that its being distinguished from the Non-entity is quite clear.
tataścāsato 'pi sakāśād vaiśiṣṭyaṃ syān na ca vastutvaprasaṅgo 'sata iti yatkiñcid etat /	That there should be the distinction of the Universal from the Non-entity, and yet the Non-entity does not become an entity, that is nothing very important.
yaduktam nābhāvo nāmānya evetyādi tatra tena svabhāṣitasyaivārtho na vivecitaḥ / tathā hi bhāva eva tu bhāvāntaraṃ na bhavatītyukte bhāvāntarāt tasya viśeṣa ukto bhavati, tato vyāvṛttisaṅkīrtanāt /	As regards the Non-entity, the assertion (made by Sumati) that it is nothing different from Entity and so forth, it is clear that the writer has not pondered over the meaning of his own assertion: Because when it is said that ‘an Entity is not found to be another entity’, the fact of its being ‘distinguished’ from it becomes asserted; because it speaks of its preclusion from it.
tadetadhyānyavijṛmbhitam ityalaṃ prasaṅgena / tasmād ityādinā pramāṇaphalopasaṃhāraḥ //	All that has been urged, therefore, is only the effect of blindness. Hence we desist from further argumentation. The upshot of his whole argument is stated by the Author in the following [see verse 1285 above]
asti hyālocanājñānamādyaṃ cennirvikalpakam / bālamūkādivijñānasadṛśaṃ śuddhavastujam //	“At first there is only a pre-cognition, which is non-conceptual, like the cognition of the infant and the dumb and the like; it is born purely of the thing (cognised);
na viśeṣo na sāmānyaṃ tadānīmanubhūyate /	at that moment, neither the universal nor the particular character is apprehended;
tayorādhārabhūtā tu vyaktirevāvasīyate //	all that is apprehended is only a certain individual which is the substratum of both those characters.
tataḥ paraṃ punar vastu dharmair jātyādibhiryayā /	Subsequently, the thing becomes apprehended along with the properties of the ‘class-character’ and the rest;
buddhyāvasīyate sāpi pratyakṣatvena saṃmatā //	and the cognition also by which it is thus apprehended is regarded as ‘sense-perception’.
tathā hi sarvaṃ pratyakṣaṃ, pakṣīkṛtaṃ tatra ca sarvatra pratyakṣākhye dharmiṇi savikalpakavyavasthitau nāsti ca viśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭārthagrahaṇaṃ nimittam ityasya hetor asiddhiḥ, ālocanājñānavyatirekeṇānyatra pratyakṣe sāmānyādiviśeṣaṇaviśeṣṭārthagrahaṇasya vidyamānatvāt /	and thereby indicates the charge against his own Reason (Premiss) put forward (under Text 1257 above), to the effect that ‘when there is no basis for the existence of a thing in a certain form, that thing, in that form, cannot be admitted as real’, that it is partly ‘inadmissible’ as not present in a part of the Subject of the Reasoning: [see verses 1286-1288 above] All sense-perceptions are made here the Subject (of the Argument); and the sense is that the Premiss (of the Buddhist) that ‘the basis of conceptuality, in the shape of the apprehension of the thing qualified by qualifications, cannot be there’ is not admissible.
athālocanājñānam eva pratyakṣīkṛtya hetur abhidhīyate tadā siddhasādhyateti manyate paraḥ /	If the Buddhist puts forward his Premiss in reference to the Pre-cognition, then the argument is superfluous. Such is the view of the Opponent (Kumārila).
bālamūkādivijñānasadṛśam iti /	‘Like the cognition of the infant and the dumb’;
bālavijñānasadṛśaṃ mūkādivijñānasadṛśam /	i.e. like the infant’s cognition, and like the dumb person’s cognition.
ādiśabdena saṃmūrchitaparigrahaḥ / abhilāpaviśeṣarahitatvamātreṇa sāmyam /	‘And the rest’ is meant to include the man in a swoon. The only point of similarity in all these cases is the absence of association with words
śuddhatvaṃ punar vastunaḥ sāmānyadvayaviviktatvāt /	‘Purely’; what is meant by this ‘purity’ is freedom from the two Universals.
tadeva dvitīyena ślokena spaṣṭayati na viśeṣa ityādi / viśeṣa iti / avāntarasāmānyaṃ gotvādi /	This same idea is made clearer in the second text (1287) ‘Neither the Universal nor the Particular, etc. etc.’ The term ‘Particular’ stands for the intermediate Universal, ‘Cow’ and the like;
sāmānyam iti / mahāsāmānyaṃ vastutvādi / tayorādhārabhūteti /	and ‘Universal’ for the Summum Genus, ‘Entity’ and the like, ‘The substratum of both these’;
anena śuddhaṃ vastu darśitam /	this indicates the pure thing.
tataḥ paramityādinā tāmeva pakṣaikadeśāsiddhatāṃ hetor abhivyanakti tataḥparam iti /	‘Subsequently, etc.’ This makes clear the partial ‘inadmissibility’ of the same Premiss.
śuddhavastugrahaṇottarakālaṃ yayā buddhyā vastu vyavasīyate jātyādibhir	‘Subsequently’ i.e after the apprehension of the apprehension of the pure thing, that cognition, by which the thing is apprehended along with the qualifications of the class-character and the rest, is also regarded as ‘Sense-perception
viśeṣaṇaiḥ viśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭārthagrahaṇaṃ darśayati /	‘By the class-character, etc.’ This indicates the apprehension of the Thing as qualified by qualifications.
anena cānadhigatārthādhigantṛtvaṃ hetoś cāsiddhatoktā bhavati //	This shows that the said cognition apprehends what has not been already apprehended: and also that the Premiss (of the Buddhist) is inadmissible.
punaḥ punar vikalpe 'pi yāvānadhigamo bhavet /	“Again and again, as more and more conceptual contents come in, there follow further apprehensions, in connection with the same;
tat sambandhānusāreṇa sarvaṃ pratyakṣamiṣyate //	and all this is regarded as ‘sense-perception (ślokavārtika sense-perception, 125).
punaḥ punariti /	‘Again and again’;
tṛtīyādau kṣaṇe /	i.e. at the third and subsequent moments.
yāvāniti / anadhigatārthādhiganteti śeṣaḥ /	‘There follow further apprehensions’, i.e. such as apprehend what has not been already apprehended.
tatsambandhānusāreṇeti / tasyākṣasya sambandhānusāreṇa //	‘In connection with the same’; i.e. in accordance with the connection of the sense-organ concerned.
syād etat yadi prathamato 'kṣavyāpārakāle sakalajātyādidharmasamanvitaṃ vastu na bhāsate, tat tarhyuttarakālam api na bhāsetāviśeṣād ity āha na hipraviṣṭamātrāṇām ityādi / [p.386]	The following might be urged (against Kumārila): If, at the first operation of the Sense-organ concerned, the Thing does not appear as equipped with all its properties in the shape of the Universal and the rest, then, it should not so appear even subsequently; as the circumstances are the same in both cases. The answer to this is provided in the following [see verse 1290 above]
uṣṇāditi / prabhāsvarāt /	‘Uṣṇāt’ i.e. from bright light.
praviṣṭamātrāṇām iti yojyam / gamyante nendriyair iti / api tu gamyanta eveti kākā darśayati //	The construction is ‘uṣṇāt praviṣṭamnātrāṇām’, ‘who have just come in from bright light’. ‘He does not perceive, etc. etc.’ The particular intonation implies that things are actually apprehended by the sense-organs.
evaṃ dṛṣṭāntaṃ prasādhya dārṣṭāntikaṃ upasaṃharann āha yathetyādi /	Having thus cited the Example, he applies the same idea to the case in question: [see verse 1291 next]
yathā svābhāsamātreṇa pūrvaṃ jñātvā svarūpataḥ / paścāt tatra vibuddhyante tathā jātyādidharmataḥ //	“Just as, in the first instances, he perceives a mere semblance of the thing and subsequently he perceives them in their true form, so also with the properties of ‘class-character’ and the rest.” (Ślokavartika sense-perception, 127).
yathā garbhagṛhe ābhāsamātraṃ gṛhītvā paścād viśeṣato nīlam ityādinā	In the inner room, the Man apprehends the mere semblance of the thing; later on he apprehends the thing more specifically as ‘blue’ and so forth;
jānāti, evaṃ svarūpataḥ pūrvaṃ jñātvā paścāj jātyādidharmataḥ pratyakṣavān bhaviṣyatītyadoṣaḥ //	in the same manner in the case in question, having, at first apprehended the thing in its mere outline, one would subsequently come to have the Perception of the thing equipped with the Class-character and other properties.
evaṃ tarhi yadyālocanājñānād ūrdhvaṃ punaḥ punar yāvānadhigamas tasya prāṃānyaṃ tadālocanājñānena yadi kaścid ālocya paścāddakṣiṇī nimīlya jātyādidharmato vikalpayati tadāsyāpūrvādhigamo 'stīti tasyāpi pratyakṣatā syād ity āha yadi tvityādi /	If such be the case, and all the cognitions that appear after the initial Pre-cognition are valid, then, in a case where the man has had the precognition of the thing, and then closing his eyes, conceives of the thing as connected with the Class-character and other properties (as the Conceptual Content), then, inasmuch as this latter apprehends things not apprehended before, this also would have to be regarded as Sense-perception.
yadi tvālocya saṃmīlya netre kaścid vikalpayet /	“If after having pre-cognised the thing, the man closes his eyes and then imposes conceptual contents, this latter would not be ‘sense-perception’;
na syāt pratyakṣatā tasya sambandhānanusārataḥ //	because it is not in accordance with the connection (op the sense-organs).” (Ślokavārtika sense-perception, 128).
ālocyeti / ālocanājñāne jñātvā /	‘Having pre-cognised’ i.e. having apprehended by Pre-cognition.
netre iti / saṃmīlyeti sambandhaḥ /	‘Eyes’ to be construed with ‘closes’,
sambandhānanusārata iti / akṣasambandhadvāreṇānutpatteḥ /	‘It is not in accordance, etc. etc,’: i.e. it has not been brought about by the contact of the sense-organ concerned.
yathoktaṃ tenaiva kumārilena ---"evaṃ samāne 'pi vikalpamātre yatrākṣasambandhaphalānusāraḥ /	This has been thus asserted by Kvmārila “Thus then the process of conceptual content being similar in the two cases, that cognition which follows upon the contact of the sense-organ has the.character of sense-perception;

dvirūpaṃ hi sāmānyaṃ viśeṣaṇāvacchinnarūpamanavacchinnarūpaṃ ca /

The Universal has been held to be of two kinds (1) distinguished by qualifications, and (2) not distinguished by qualifications.

tatra yadanavacchinnarūpaṃ tannirvikalpakavijñānagrāhyam iṣṭam /

That which is not distinguished by qualifications has been held to be apprehended by Non-conceptual Perception.

tatrāpi sāmānye /

‘To that’ i.e. to the Universal.

ata etad vikalpakavijñānagrāhyatvaṃ tulyam //

Hence the charge of being apprehended by Conceptual Perception would apply to these also.

[p.382] katham ity āha viśeṣāddhītyādi /

Question: “How so?” Answer: [see verse 1275 next]

viśeṣāddhi viśiṣṭaṃ tat sāmānyamavagamyate /

The universal is recognised as ‘distinguished’ from the particular;

tadgrāhakamataḥ prāptaṃ vijñānaṃ savikalpakam //

hence the perception of it would have to be regarded (under the opponent’s contention) as conceptual.

yaddhyasmād viśeṣād viśiṣṭam vyāvṛttaṃ, tat sāmānyaṃ pratīyate /

That is understood to be the Universal which is ‘qualified’ i.e. distinguished’ from the Particular.;

anyathā sāmānyam eva na syāt tato yadi na vyāvarteta /

if it were not so, then there would be no Universal at all, if it were not excluded distinguished from the Particular.

tataścāsyāpi sāmānyasya viśeṣād vyāvṛttasya grāhakaṃ vijñānaṃ savikalpakaṃ prāpnoti, viśiṣṭaviṣayatvāt /

Such being the case, the Perception that apprehends this Universal, as distinguished from the Particular, becomes ‘Conceptual’, as it apprehends something that is qualified.

na ca bhavati tvanmatena /

And yet, according to your view, this cognition is not conceptual;

tasmāt svato 'naikānta iti //

hence your Reason is itself Inconclusive.

atra kila tenaiva sumatinā svayam āśaṅkya sāmānyena hetor anaikāntikatvaṃ parihṛtaṃ tadevādarśayati nirviśeṣamityādi /

The said Sumati himself, anticipating the objection that his own Reason becomes ‘Inconclusive’ by the case of the Universal, has answered it. This answer is shown in the following [see verse 1276 next]

nirviśeṣaṃ gṛhītaśced bhedaḥ sāmānyamucyate /

“A thing is called ‘universal’ when it is apprehended without distinction;

tato viśeṣāt sāmānyaviśiṣṭatvaṃ na yujyate //

hence it is not right to regard the universal as something distinguished from the particular.” (1276)

nahi sāmānyaṃ kiñcid asti viśeṣebhyo vyatiriktasvarūpaṃ, yat svarūpeṇa viśiṣṭaṃ gṛhyamāṇaṃ savikalpakavijñānagocaraḥ syāt, kintu nirviśeṣaṃ gṛhītā bhedā eva sāmānyamityucyante /

There is no ‘Universal’ apart from the Particulars, by virtue of which on being apprehended it would be amenable to Conceptual Perception;

pratiniyatasvarūpanirapekṣāḥ pratīyamānāḥ sāmānyaśabdābhidheyā iti yāvat /

in fact, it is only when the Particulars are apprehended without distinction that they are called ‘Universal’;

tataś ca kutas tasmād viśeṣāt sāmānyasya viśiṣṭatvam yena tadgrāhakasya savikalpanā bhavet // kathaṃ tarhi sāmānyaviśeṣayor asaṅkīrṇā vyavasthetyāha vaiṣamyetyādi /

that is to say, when they are not cognised, each in its own distinctive form, they are called ‘Universal Consequently, how could the Universal be ‘distinguished’ from the Particulars, by virtue of which its apprehension would become ‘conceptual’, (1276) Question: How then can there be a clear division between the Universal and the Particular?

vaiṣamyasamabhāvena jñāyamānā ime kila / prakalpayanti sāmānyaviśeṣasthitimātmani //

“When these (particulars) are cognised as similar or dissimilar, they indicate the existence in themselves, of the character of the ‘universal’ or the ‘particular’.” (1277)

eta eva hi bhedāḥ samaviṣamatayā samprajñāyamānā yathākramaṃ sāmānyaviśeṣābhidhānābhidheyatām anubhūya sāmānyaviśeṣavyavahārayor viṣayabhedaṃ prakalpayanti //

“These same Particulars, according as they are cognised as similar or dissimilar, become spoken of as ‘Universal’ or ‘Particular’, respectively and in this way they bring about a division between the use of the two names, ‘Universal’ and ‘Particular (1277)

vaiṣamyasamabhāvo 'yam ityādinā pratividhatte /

The above criticism of Sumatis is answered in the following [see verses 1278-1279 next]

vaiṣamyasamabhāvo 'yaṃ pravibhakto yadīṣyate / sāmānyasya viśiṣṭatvaṃ tadavasthaṃ viśeṣataḥ //

If the said ‘similarity’ and ‘dissimilarity’ are held to be differentiated, then the fact of the universal being distinguished from the particulars remains as before.

athāvibhakta evāyam asaṅkīrṇā sthitiḥ katham / anyonyāparihāreṇa sthiter gatyantaraṃ naca //

If, on the other hand, they are not held to be differentiated, then, how can the clearly marked division be possible, without crossing each other? there is no other way in which they could be conceived.

pravibhakta iti amiśraḥ /

‘Differentiated’: Not mixed up;

anyadeva sāmānyamanya eva viśeṣa iti yāvat /

i.e. the Universal being one thing and the Particular being another thing.

[p.383] sāmānyasya viśeṣato viśiṣṭatvamityupalakṣaṇam /

That the Universal is distinguished from the Particular is said only by way of illustration;

tathā viśeṣasyāpi sāmānyato viśiṣṭatvam eva /

in fact the Particular also is distinguished from the Universal;

dvayor api parasparasvabhāvavivekena pravibhaktatvāt /

as both these having distinct characters are clearly distinguished from one another.

asaṅkīrṇā sthitir iti /

‘The fact, etc.’ ‘Asaṅkīrṇā’ is unmixed.

yathoktaṃ tenaiva sumatinā ---"sattādisāmānyasvabhāvānuviddha eva viśeṣaḥ sākṣāt kriyate nānyathā, tato viśiṣṭaviṣayatvam eva viśeṣyasya yuktaṃ rūpam, sāmānyaṃ punar aśeṣanirapekṣaṃ sākṣātkartuṃ śakyata ityaviruddhamasyāvikalpaviṣayatvam" iti /

This has been declared by the same Sumati in the following words “The Particular is perceived only as infused with the character of such Universals as ‘Being’ and the like, not otherwise; hence it is only right that what is qualified should form the object of a qualified (determinate, conceptual) Perception; as for the Universal, on the other hand, it is capable of being perceived independently of all Particulars; and hence there can be nothing incongruous in its forming the object of the non-conceptual Perception”.

iyam asaṅkīrṇā sthir na syāt /

This clearly marked distinction would not be there.

na pravibhakto nāpravibhakta iṣyata iti cedāha anyonyetyādi /

It might be argued that “It is not held to be either distinguished or undistinguished.”

api ca nirviśeṣaṃ gṛhītā bhedā iti parasparavyāhatam iti darśayann āha viśeṣātmātirekeṇetyādi /

Then again, to speak of the Particulars as apprehended ‘without distinction’ involves a contradiction in terms. This is what is shown in the following [see verses 1280-1281 next]

viśeṣātmātirekeṇa nāparaṃ bhedalakṣaṇam /

Of the particular things there is no other characteristic except that of being ‘particular’ (or ‘distinct’);

tadrūpāsparśane teṣu grahaṇaṃ katham ucyate // tadrūpasparśane cāpi bhedāntaravibhedinaḥ /

how then can there be any apprehension of them which does not envisage the ‘distinct’ form? Even if their forms are envisaged, they are apprehended only as distinct from other particulars;

gṛhītā iti vijñānaṃ prāptameṣu vikalpakam //

so that their perception would be ‘conceptual’.

bhedebhyo hi nānyo viśeṣaḥ, tasya ca viśeṣasya sāmānyagrāhiṇā jñānenāsaṃsparśe kathaṃ bhedās tena gṛhītā bhaveyuḥ, agṛhītasvabhāvāvyatirekāttepyagṛhītā eveti bhāvaḥ /

There is no ‘Particular’ apart from the various Things. If then, the Particular were not envisaged in the apprehension of the Uni versa’, how could the various Things be apprehended? That is to say, being non-different from the nature of what is not apprehended, the Particulars also would be not -apprehended.

atha gṛhītā iti matam, tadā tadrūpasaṃsparśane bhedarūpasaṃsparśane grahaṇegṛhītāvyatirekād gṛhītasvabhāvavad viśeṣo 'pi gṛhīta eveti, eṣu bhedeṣu yat sāmānyaviṣayatvenābhimataṃ jñānaṃ tadvikalpakaṃ prāptam //

If it be held that the various Things are apprehended, then, if these forms are envisaged, and are apprehended, the Particular also would be apprehended, being, as it is, non-different from what has been apprehended. So that, in regard to these various things, the Cognition that is held to be apprehensive of the Universal turns out to be conceptual.

nirupākhyāc ca sāmānyaṃ viśeṣaṃ sampratīyate /

The universal is cognised as ‘distinguished’ (distinct) from the featureless thing;

ato vikalpakajñānagrāhyaṃ tadapi te bhavet //

hence for you, it should be cognisable by conceptual perception.

nāsatastadviśiṣṭaṃ cet kimidānīṃ tadātmakam / no cet tathāpi vaiśiṣṭyaṃ tasmād asya na kiṃ matam //

If it be urged that “the universal cannot be regarded as distinguished from a non-entity”, then (we ask) is it of the same nature as the non-entity? if not, then why is it not admitted that it is ‘distinguished’ from it? (1282-1283)

syād etat sāmānyasyābhāvato na viśeṣaḥ nāpi sādṛśyam /

The following might be urged There can be no distinction made between the Universal and the Non-entity;

tathā hi [p.384] yan na kiñcitso 'bhāvaḥ kalpyate, tac ca tādṛśaṃ sāmānyato naiva viśiṣṭaṃ nāpi samaṃ, bhāvatvaprasaṅgāt /

nor can there be any similarity between them. Because that is supposed to be a nonentity which is not anything; and such a thing cannot be either ‘distinguished’ from, or similar to, the Universal.

tathā hi yadi tacchūnyaṃ sāmānyato viśiṣṭaṃ syāt tadapi vastveva syāt /

If it were, it would be an Entity. Even if the Void i.e. the Non-entity were ‘distinguished’ from the Universal, then also it would be an entity;

nahyavastuno viśeṣākhyasvabhāvaḥ sambhavati, na ca viśeṣākhyaṃ svabhāvamantareṇa viśiṣṭaṃ śakyaṃ vaktum /

because a non-entity cannot have the character of ‘being distinguished’; and without the character of ‘being distinguished’ a thing cannot be regarded as ‘distinguished Nor can the Non-entity be ‘similar’ to the Universal;

nāpi samaṃ vastutvaprasaṅgāt /

as even so it would have to be an entity.

nahyavastunaḥ kenacit samānaṃ rūpaṃ bhavati naca samānarūpamantareṇa samaṃ yuktam atiprasaṅgāt /

A non-entity cannot have a form similar to something else; and unless a thing has a form similar to another’s, it cannot be regarded as ‘similar’ to it;

tasmāt sāmānyasya śūnyam avadhiṃ kṛtvā na samatvaṃ viśiṣṭatvaṃ vā yuktam /

Hence relatively to the Void (Non-entity), the Universal cannot be said to be either distinguished (distinct) or similar.

tathā hi yo yamavadhiṃ kṛtvā samo viśiṣṭo vā bhavati tena so 'pyavadhiḥ samo viṣamaś ca dṛśyate /

Because when one thing is either distinct or similar in relation to another thing, then this latter also has to be regarded as distinct from, or similar to, the former.

yadi hi so 'vadhis tena samo viṣamo vā na dṛśyeta, itaropyavadhimān samo viṣamovā na dṛśyeta //

If it were not so, then the others also could not be perceived as distinct from, or similar to, it.

kiṃ ca nābhāvo nāma kaścid bhāvavyatirikto 'sti bhāva eva tu bhāvāntaraṃ

Further, there is no such thing as ‘non-entity’ apart from entity; when an entity is not found to be another entity, it is called ‘nonentity’ in relation to it;

na bhavatītyabhāva akhyāyate, tat kuto 'sya vaiśiṣṭyamityetat sarvaṃ sumatinoktam āgūryāha atadātmakamevedam ityādi

how then could it be ‘distinguished’?” All this has been argued by Sumati; as against all this, the Author proceeds to urge as follows: [see verses 1284-1285 next]

atadātmakam evedaṃ vaiśiṣṭyaṃ vastuno 'pi hi /

As a matter of fact, in the case of the entity also, being ‘distinguished’ consists in not being that same;

nāsadrūpaṃ ca sāmānyaṃ tadviśiṣṭaṃ na te katham //

and as the universal is not the same as the non-entity, why can you not regard it as being ‘distinguished’ from the non-entity? (1284)

tasmāt svalakṣaṇe jñānaṃ yatkiñcit sampravartate / vākpathātītaviṣayaṃ sarvaṃ tannirvikalpakam //

From all this it follows that whatever cognition appears in regard to the ‘specific individuality’ of things appertains to what is beyond the range of words and is hence non-conceptual.

vastuno 'pi hi sakāśād yadavastuno viśiṣṭatvaṃ tat khalu nānyat kiñcit /

In the case of the entity also, when it is ‘distinguished’ from Non-entity, this ‘being distinguished’ is not anything different;

kiṃ tarhitattvaniṣedhaḥ, atadātmatvam eva, lakṣaṇabheda iti yāvat /

it is only the negation of sameness; the meaning being that it is not the same as the other;

taccāsato 'pi śaśaviṣāṇādeḥ sakāśāt sāmānyasya tulyam eva /

and this can be equally so in the case of the Universal also, in relation to the Nonentity, like the Hare’s Horn.

tathā hi asacchaśaviṣāṇādi sarvārthakriyāvirahalakṣaṇaṃ, sāmānyaṃ tu na tatheṣṭam iti vispaṣṭam asya tato vaiśiṣṭyam /

Because the Hare’s Horn is a non-entity in the sense that it is not capable of any action whatever; the Universal on the other hand is not regarded as so incapable; so that its being distinguished from the Non-entity is quite clear.

tataścāsato 'pi sakāśād vaiśiṣṭyaṃ syān na ca vastutvaprasaṅgo 'sata iti yatkiñcid etat /

That there should be the distinction of the Universal from the Non-entity, and yet the Non-entity does not become an entity, that is nothing very important.

yaduktam nābhāvo nāmānya evetyādi tatra tena svabhāṣitasyaivārtho na vivecitaḥ / tathā hi bhāva eva tu bhāvāntaraṃ na bhavatītyukte bhāvāntarāt tasya viśeṣa ukto bhavati, tato vyāvṛttisaṅkīrtanāt /

As regards the Non-entity, the assertion (made by Sumati) that it is nothing different from Entity and so forth, it is clear that the writer has not pondered over the meaning of his own assertion: Because when it is said that ‘an Entity is not found to be another entity’, the fact of its being ‘distinguished’ from it becomes asserted; because it speaks of its preclusion from it.

tadetadhyānyavijṛmbhitam ityalaṃ prasaṅgena / tasmād ityādinā pramāṇaphalopasaṃhāraḥ //

All that has been urged, therefore, is only the effect of blindness. Hence we desist from further argumentation. The upshot of his whole argument is stated by the Author in the following [see verse 1285 above]

asti hyālocanājñānamādyaṃ cennirvikalpakam / bālamūkādivijñānasadṛśaṃ śuddhavastujam //

“At first there is only a pre-cognition, which is non-conceptual, like the cognition of the infant and the dumb and the like; it is born purely of the thing (cognised);

na viśeṣo na sāmānyaṃ tadānīmanubhūyate /

at that moment, neither the universal nor the particular character is apprehended;

tayorādhārabhūtā tu vyaktirevāvasīyate //

all that is apprehended is only a certain individual which is the substratum of both those characters.

tataḥ paraṃ punar vastu dharmair jātyādibhiryayā /

Subsequently, the thing becomes apprehended along with the properties of the ‘class-character’ and the rest;

buddhyāvasīyate sāpi pratyakṣatvena saṃmatā //

and the cognition also by which it is thus apprehended is regarded as ‘sense-perception’.

tathā hi sarvaṃ pratyakṣaṃ, pakṣīkṛtaṃ tatra ca sarvatra pratyakṣākhye dharmiṇi savikalpakavyavasthitau nāsti ca viśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭārthagrahaṇaṃ nimittam ityasya hetor asiddhiḥ, ālocanājñānavyatirekeṇānyatra pratyakṣe sāmānyādiviśeṣaṇaviśeṣṭārthagrahaṇasya vidyamānatvāt /

and thereby indicates the charge against his own Reason (Premiss) put forward (under Text 1257 above), to the effect that ‘when there is no basis for the existence of a thing in a certain form, that thing, in that form, cannot be admitted as real’, that it is partly ‘inadmissible’ as not present in a part of the Subject of the Reasoning: [see verses 1286-1288 above] All sense-perceptions are made here the Subject (of the Argument); and the sense is that the Premiss (of the Buddhist) that ‘the basis of conceptuality, in the shape of the apprehension of the thing qualified by qualifications, cannot be there’ is not admissible.

athālocanājñānam eva pratyakṣīkṛtya hetur abhidhīyate tadā siddhasādhyateti manyate paraḥ /

If the Buddhist puts forward his Premiss in reference to the Pre-cognition, then the argument is superfluous. Such is the view of the Opponent (Kumārila).

bālamūkādivijñānasadṛśam iti /

‘Like the cognition of the infant and the dumb’;

bālavijñānasadṛśaṃ mūkādivijñānasadṛśam /

i.e. like the infant’s cognition, and like the dumb person’s cognition.

ādiśabdena saṃmūrchitaparigrahaḥ / abhilāpaviśeṣarahitatvamātreṇa sāmyam /

‘And the rest’ is meant to include the man in a swoon. The only point of similarity in all these cases is the absence of association with words

śuddhatvaṃ punar vastunaḥ sāmānyadvayaviviktatvāt /

‘Purely’; what is meant by this ‘purity’ is freedom from the two Universals.

tadeva dvitīyena ślokena spaṣṭayati na viśeṣa ityādi / viśeṣa iti / avāntarasāmānyaṃ gotvādi /

This same idea is made clearer in the second text (1287) ‘Neither the Universal nor the Particular, etc. etc.’ The term ‘Particular’ stands for the intermediate Universal, ‘Cow’ and the like;

sāmānyam iti / mahāsāmānyaṃ vastutvādi / tayorādhārabhūteti /

and ‘Universal’ for the Summum Genus, ‘Entity’ and the like, ‘The substratum of both these’;

anena śuddhaṃ vastu darśitam /

this indicates the pure thing.

tataḥ paramityādinā tāmeva pakṣaikadeśāsiddhatāṃ hetor abhivyanakti tataḥparam iti /

‘Subsequently, etc.’ This makes clear the partial ‘inadmissibility’ of the same Premiss.

śuddhavastugrahaṇottarakālaṃ yayā buddhyā vastu vyavasīyate jātyādibhir

‘Subsequently’ i.e after the apprehension of the apprehension of the pure thing, that cognition, by which the thing is apprehended along with the qualifications of the class-character and the rest, is also regarded as ‘Sense-perception

viśeṣaṇaiḥ viśeṣaṇaviśiṣṭārthagrahaṇaṃ darśayati /

‘By the class-character, etc.’ This indicates the apprehension of the Thing as qualified by qualifications.

anena cānadhigatārthādhigantṛtvaṃ hetoś cāsiddhatoktā bhavati //

This shows that the said cognition apprehends what has not been already apprehended: and also that the Premiss (of the Buddhist) is inadmissible.

punaḥ punar vikalpe 'pi yāvānadhigamo bhavet /

“Again and again, as more and more conceptual contents come in, there follow further apprehensions, in connection with the same;

tat sambandhānusāreṇa sarvaṃ pratyakṣamiṣyate //

and all this is regarded as ‘sense-perception (ślokavārtika sense-perception, 125).

punaḥ punariti /

‘Again and again’;

tṛtīyādau kṣaṇe /

i.e. at the third and subsequent moments.

yāvāniti / anadhigatārthādhiganteti śeṣaḥ /

‘There follow further apprehensions’, i.e. such as apprehend what has not been already apprehended.

tatsambandhānusāreṇeti / tasyākṣasya sambandhānusāreṇa //

‘In connection with the same’; i.e. in accordance with the connection of the sense-organ concerned.

syād etat yadi prathamato 'kṣavyāpārakāle sakalajātyādidharmasamanvitaṃ vastu na bhāsate, tat tarhyuttarakālam api na bhāsetāviśeṣād ity āha na hipraviṣṭamātrāṇām ityādi / [p.386]

The following might be urged (against Kumārila): If, at the first operation of the Sense-organ concerned, the Thing does not appear as equipped with all its properties in the shape of the Universal and the rest, then, it should not so appear even subsequently; as the circumstances are the same in both cases. The answer to this is provided in the following [see verse 1290 above]

uṣṇāditi / prabhāsvarāt /

‘Uṣṇāt’ i.e. from bright light.

praviṣṭamātrāṇām iti yojyam / gamyante nendriyair iti / api tu gamyanta eveti kākā darśayati //

The construction is ‘uṣṇāt praviṣṭamnātrāṇām’, ‘who have just come in from bright light’. ‘He does not perceive, etc. etc.’ The particular intonation implies that things are actually apprehended by the sense-organs.

evaṃ dṛṣṭāntaṃ prasādhya dārṣṭāntikaṃ upasaṃharann āha yathetyādi /

Having thus cited the Example, he applies the same idea to the case in question: [see verse 1291 next]

yathā svābhāsamātreṇa pūrvaṃ jñātvā svarūpataḥ / paścāt tatra vibuddhyante tathā jātyādidharmataḥ //

“Just as, in the first instances, he perceives a mere semblance of the thing and subsequently he perceives them in their true form, so also with the properties of ‘class-character’ and the rest.” (Ślokavartika sense-perception, 127).

yathā garbhagṛhe ābhāsamātraṃ gṛhītvā paścād viśeṣato nīlam ityādinā

In the inner room, the Man apprehends the mere semblance of the thing; later on he apprehends the thing more specifically as ‘blue’ and so forth;

jānāti, evaṃ svarūpataḥ pūrvaṃ jñātvā paścāj jātyādidharmataḥ pratyakṣavān bhaviṣyatītyadoṣaḥ //

in the same manner in the case in question, having, at first apprehended the thing in its mere outline, one would subsequently come to have the Perception of the thing equipped with the Class-character and other properties.

evaṃ tarhi yadyālocanājñānād ūrdhvaṃ punaḥ punar yāvānadhigamas tasya prāṃānyaṃ tadālocanājñānena yadi kaścid ālocya paścāddakṣiṇī nimīlya jātyādidharmato vikalpayati tadāsyāpūrvādhigamo 'stīti tasyāpi pratyakṣatā syād ity āha yadi tvityādi /

If such be the case, and all the cognitions that appear after the initial Pre-cognition are valid, then, in a case where the man has had the precognition of the thing, and then closing his eyes, conceives of the thing as connected with the Class-character and other properties (as the Conceptual Content), then, inasmuch as this latter apprehends things not apprehended before, this also would have to be regarded as Sense-perception.

yadi tvālocya saṃmīlya netre kaścid vikalpayet /

“If after having pre-cognised the thing, the man closes his eyes and then imposes conceptual contents, this latter would not be ‘sense-perception’;

na syāt pratyakṣatā tasya sambandhānanusārataḥ //

because it is not in accordance with the connection (op the sense-organs).” (Ślokavārtika sense-perception, 128).

ālocyeti / ālocanājñāne jñātvā /

‘Having pre-cognised’ i.e. having apprehended by Pre-cognition.

netre iti / saṃmīlyeti sambandhaḥ /

‘Eyes’ to be construed with ‘closes’,

sambandhānanusārata iti / akṣasambandhadvāreṇānutpatteḥ /

‘It is not in accordance, etc. etc,’: i.e. it has not been brought about by the contact of the sense-organ concerned.

yathoktaṃ tenaiva kumārilena ---"evaṃ samāne 'pi vikalpamātre yatrākṣasambandhaphalānusāraḥ /

This has been thus asserted by Kvmārila “Thus then the process of conceptual content being similar in the two cases, that cognition which follows upon the contact of the sense-organ has the.character of sense-perception;